THE SECOND BRITISH-AFGHAN WAR

A BATTLEFIELD TOUR AROUND KABUL

Kabul is steeped in history. And war has been a constant theme of Afghan life: be it war against the foreign invaders or, as most recently, internecine warfare amongst the indigenous tribes. Indeed as soldiers serving with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) today, helping the Afghan people recover from a further 30 years of war, we find ourselves living through yet another momentous period in Afghanistan history. So, as soldiers, we ought to be especially aware of Afghanistan’s military history. It has shaped this country and it goes some way towards placing today’s events in context.

The British have fought three wars on Afghan soil. In the first two of these wars they captured and occupied the city of Kabul. Evidence of their presence can still be found today. Indeed the ISAF Headquarters is located on the site of the very first British cantonment.

This information booklet accompanies a battlefield tour of some of the sites associated with the second of the British-Afghan wars. It explains the background to the war, gives details of the opposing armies, their weapons and their tactics, and is intended to set the scene for each of the individual stands.

PART ONE

BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT

THE GREAT GAME

1. Many of you, particularly those who have read the works of Rudyard Kipling, will have heard of The Great Game. It is the stuff of schoolboy comic books, full of tales of daring-do on the edge of Empire where intrepid explorers ‘went native’ in order to explore and map the uncharted territories of central Asia. More particularly it is the story of two expanding Empires (the Russian and the British) and their desire to hold on to, at any cost, the territories they had conquered. It was in Afghanistan that The Great Game was mostly played and it is The Great Game which provides the background to the British-Afghan Wars.

AFGHANISTAN

2. Afghanistan literally means ‘land of the Afghans’. It is a country more defined by its people than its territory. It is a land of tribes accustomed to internecine warfare. Indeed it has never been a nation state in the sense that we in the West would understand the term to mean today. Its present day borders were imposed upon the Afghans at the turn of the nineteenth century and, even today, the eastern border remains a subject of controversy.

3. The topography of Afghanistan is dominated by the central mountain range of the Hindu Kush. North of the Hindu Kush are the plains of Turkestan and the city of Mazar-i-Sharif; to the west and south lie the cities of Herat and Kandahar respectively. And east of the Hindu Kush lies the city of Kabul.

4. Herat, Kandahar and Kabul are linked by a road which forms the major communications artery of the country. Kandahar and Kabul guard the approaches into India and straddle the main invasion routes into the Indian sub-continent.

5. These three cities have seen the ebb and flow of great armies from Alexander the Great in 325 BC, through the Arab invader Muhammed Kasim in AD 720, to the Mughul armies of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. To rule Afghanistan it is necessary to rule Herat, Kandahar and Kabul and, up until the middle of the eighteenth century, these three cities had been under the effective control of the Persians.

6. The history of modern Afghanistan dates from 1747 when Ahmed Shah, head of the Durani tribe, taking advantage of the death of the Persian Emperor, Nadir Shah, seized control of the country and imposed his will over his warring countrymen. When he died in 1773 Ahmed Shah was succeeded by his son, Timur Shah.

7. Timur lacked the iron grip of his father. He is principally remembered for moving the Afghan winter capital from Kabul to Peshawar and the summer capital from Kandahar to Kabul and for the fact that he was unable to control his warring family. When Timur died in 1793 much of what Ahmed Shah had achieved was lost as Afghanistan once again lapsed into anarchy. In 1803 Timur’s grandson, Shah Shuja, coming to power in a bloody coup, became the third ruler in 10 years. However, his reign

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was short lived and six years later he was deposed. He subsequently fled to India where he fell under the protection of the British.

8. Afghanistan’s neighbours were the principal victors of all this internecine warfare. In particular, Ranjit Singh, leader of the Sikhs in the Punjab, seized control of Rawalpindi, Multan and Peshawar. In the west the traditional enemy, Persia, threatened to recapture the city of Herat and in the north the expanding Russian empire was advancing towards Afghan Turkestan.

9. From 1826 to 1838 Anglo-Afghan relations were dominated by three factors: the struggle between the Afghans and the Sikhs over Peshawar; the attempts of Shah Shuja to regain his throne; and the growing perception of a Russian threat to India. THE FIRST BRITISH AFGHAN WAR (1839-1842)

10. The British fought the first British Afghan War in order to preserve its hold on India. India was the jewel in the crown of Empire and the British were terrified of losing it.

11. In 1839 the Governor General of India, George Eden, first Earl of Auckland, concerned about the growing influence of Russia, sent an Army into Afghanistan. His aim was to seize Kabul, depose the current Afghan ruler, Dost Mohammed, and re-install Shah Shuja.

12. The British entered Afghanistan via Quetta and the Bolan Pass and seized the city of Kandahar. After pausing there for a few months they finally made a move on Kabul taking and destroying the fortress at Ghazni en route. Before their arrival in his capital Dost Mohammed took to the hills in an abortive attempt to initiate a guerilla campaign. A few months later he surrendered himself and was taken into voluntary exile in India.

13. After 2 years of occupation the British, feeling that they had tamed the beast, began to draw down the size of the Afghan garrisons. But the beast had not been tamed. On the contrary, the rebel leader Akbar Khan, Dost Mohammed’s son, had been plotting a carefully orchestrated uprising.

14. The first blow was struck at the British Residency in Kabul where the Resident, Sir Alexander Burnes, his servants and all his staff were all brutally hacked to death by the Kabul mob. A similar fate overtook the British Envoy, Sir William Macnaghten, killed whilst attempting to negotiate a safe passage of the British garrison to India.

15. It fell to the Commander in Chief, Major General Elphinstone, to try to save the garrison. In return for a guarantee of safe passage from Akbar Khan, Elphinstone surrendered his guns, ordered the closure of the forts and prepared to leave the

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city. On Thursday January 6, 1842 some 16,000 troops and camp followers left the cantonment of Kabul; only a handful reached the safety of Jellalabad. The Retreat from Kabul was to become one of the greatest tragedies of the British Empire.

16. When news eventually filtered back to London the nation was stunned. The Government clearly had to act and action came quickly. As soon as the snows melted, an avenging Army, under the command of General Sir George Pollock, swept up the passes from India.

17. Kabul fell on September 15. Having achieved their purpose and defeated an Afghan army in the field, the British completed the humiliation of the Afghans by destroying the great covered bazaar of Kabul, one of the marvels of Asia. On 11 October 1842 the British pulled out of Kabul and withdrew all their forces to India. Dost Mohammed was allowed to resume the throne.

THE SECOND BRITISH AFGHAN WAR (1879-1881)

18. Between 1842 and 1878 Dost Mohammed was absorbed in consolidating his hold on his kingdom and the British, wary of repeating their previous costly mistake, remained content to pursue a policy of ‘masterly inactivity’. However by 1876 the arrival of Disraeli’s new Conservative administration saw a change in this policy. Once again the spectre of a pro-Russian Afghanistan sitting on the borders of British India became a cause for concern. Fresh diplomatic attempts were made to bring Afghanistan within the British sphere of influence.

19. When diplomacy failed the British turned once again to force. A punitive expedition entered Afghanistan in November 1878 thus precipitating the Second British-Afghan War. The British attacked on three fronts: in the north through the Khyber Pass towards Gandamak; in the south through the Bolan Pass to Kandahar; and in the center through the Kurram Valley towards Kabul. The British, however, had no intention of occupying the country. Their aim was merely to bring the Afghans to battle as quickly as possible and, by defeating them, compel Sher Ali to sue for peace.

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20. The attack through the Khyber Pass was led by Major General Sam Browne1 commander of the British 1st Division. Browne’s mission was limited to securing the Pass as far as the town of Dakka. His operation was essentially a feint to draw attention away from the main attack which was to be led by Major General Robert’s Kurram Valley Field Force. On 21 November 1878 Browne fought a major battle at the fort of Ali Masjid, an Afghan stronghold which guarded the entrance to the Khyber Pass. It was not a textbook action and in many ways Browne was lucky to win a battle where all the advantages were with his enemy. Nevertheless, win he did and the defeat played a major part in the subsequent collapse of Afghan morale.

1 Nowadays Browne is chiefly remembered for the fact that he designed the distinctive ‘Sam Browne’ leather belt that is still worn as part of a British Army officer’s parade uniform.

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Invasion Routes

XXX

BROWNE

XXX

ROBERTS

XXX

STEWART

21. Four hundred and fifty miles to the south Lieutenant General Stewart was preparing to lead the third prong of the invasion. By the 21 December his force had cleared the Khojak Pass and was pushing on towards Kandahar. On 5 January 1880 at Ghlo Kotal, 50 miles south-east of Kandahar, he fought a successful minor action against a large force of Afghan cavalry and on 8 January he entered the city unopposed.

22. It fell to General Roberts, commander of the Kurram Valley Field Force, to lead the main effort and it was his spectacular victory at Peiwar Kotal on 2 December 1878 that set the conditions for the Afghan’s capitulation. On 26 May 1879 at Gandamak, scene of the desperate last stand of the 44th Foot in 1842, Sher Ali, the Afghan King, agreed to the British terms.

23. The terms of the Treaty allowed the British to install an Envoy in Kabul. This had been one of the original war aims and the person selected for role was the charismatic figure of Major Sir Louis Napoleon Cavagnari. Cavagnari arrived in Kabul on 24 July 1879. By the 3rd of September he, like his predecessors in 1841, had been murdered by the Kabul mob. This death triggered a renewal of hostilities.

24. Some commentators contend that the so-called Second Afghan War was in actual fact two wars, distinguishing between the campaign which ended with the Treaty of Gandamak and the campaign which started with the massacre of Cavagnari. Most historians, however, regard the period 1878-1881 as a unity, both militarily and politically, and therefore regard the hostilities as two campaigns within a single war.

25. The task of capturing Kabul was given to General Roberts. Given the choice of attacking through the Khyber Pass or through the Kurram Valley, Roberts chose, perhaps not unnaturally, to follow the route of his previous victories.

26. Our battlefield tour covers General Roberts’ final approach to, and occupation of, Kabul. It begins with the Battle of Charasiab on 6 October 1879 and ends with the final defeat of the eastern Afghan tribes at Sherpur on 23 December 1879.

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PART TWO

THE OPPOSING ARMIES AND THEIR WEAPONS

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THE BRITISH

GENERAL ORGANISATION

27. The British Army which entered Afghanistan in 1879 was different in character if not in kind from the Army which preceded it forty years earlier. For one thing, the ignominy of the Retreat from Kabul had removed for all time the illusion of British invulnerability. For another, it was an army which had suffered the shock of the Sepoy Mutiny twenty years earlier.

28. In organisational terms, however, the two armies were much the same. As was the case before the Mutiny, the military forces in India in 1879 were divided between the three Presidency Armies of Madras, Bombay and Bengal; with the Commander-in-Chief of the Bengal Army formally designated as the primus inter pares and ‘Commander-in-Chief in the East Indies’.

29. Each Presidency Army consisted of both native Indian troops and British Army regiments. These British Army regiments were posted to India for a specific term of duty and, whilst there, were paid for by the Indian Government. These regiments usually remained in India for a considerable number of years, being replenished each winter by fresh drafts from the United Kingdom coming to replace casualties and time-expired men. In 1878 the longest serving infantry regiments in India were the 1st (Royal Scots) and the 2nd (Queen’s) regiments; both of whom had been in India since 1866. Among the cavalry regiments, the 4th Hussars had served the longest having arrived in India in 1867.

30. Experience levels in the Presidency Armies varied considerably. Within the Bengal Army a few regiments had taken part in frontier campaigns but most had not been tested since the days of the Mutiny twenty years earlier. The same was even more true of the Madras Army. Its great days had been in the second half of the eighteenth and the first two decades of the nineteenth centuries under commanders such as Arthur Wellesley2. It had been untouched by the Mutiny and had spent most of the past twenty years on garrison and police type duties.

The Bombay Army, the smallest of the three Presidency Armies, displayed many of the characteristics of the Madras Army. It too had been relatively unaffected by the Mutiny

2 The future Duke of Wellington..

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Soldiers of the 92nd Highlanders in full dress uniform

but had played a useful part in its suppression. Since then its only major expedition had been to Abyssinia in 1867-8 and some of its regiments had never actually been involved in a major campaign.

31. In addition to the three Presidency Armies, the Governor of India had at his disposal in 1878 a number of other military forces, of which the most important was the Punjab Frontier Force. The Punjab Frontier Force was made up exclusively of Sikhs, Punjabis and Pathans. They were veterans of a hundred border expeditions and were viewed as elite troops. The Force, which as well as infantry and cavalry regiments had its own cadre of mountain artillery, included the famous Corps of Guides which itself consisted of both cavalry and infantry.

32. The introduction of the short-service system in 1870 fundamentally changed the character of the British Army in India. No longer could the regiments rely on the contribution of ‘old sweats’ whose long service in India had acclimatised them to both the heat and the diseases of the Indian sub-continent. Instead each winter saw the arrival of a fresh influx of inexperienced and unacclimatised troops. The net result of this change in emphasis from long to short term service was that every British regiment now found itself under-strength for most of the year and continuity of experience and training was constantly compromised3.

33. As a direct consequence of the Indian Mutiny the Government of India decided to reduce the fighting power of the native contingents. There were now 65,000 British and 130,000 Native troops in India and the ratio of British to Native troops had been reduced from 1:5 in 1857 to 1:1.7 in 1878.

3 The Native regiments, however, continued to be recruited on a long service basis. A full pension was payable after 32 years service and a reduced pension could be paid on invaliding at 15 years. In peacetime a soldier could apply for discharge after 3 years. In 1879 the average length of service in the Native infantry regiments was greater than 10 years.

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Cavalry and Infantry of the Corps of Guides

34. Although the Anglo-Indian Army which went to war in Afghanistan was old-fashioned by contemporary European standards it did possess a nucleus of regiments with extensive experience of campaigning in the mountainous terrain of the North-West Frontier. By trial and error, and with some bitter experiences, it had evolved a reliable code of tactics for mountain warfare. Widespread use of the heliograph4, first tested in war by the Indian Army in 1877, and superior infantry weapons also gave the Army a technological

edge over the Afghans.

THE INFANTRY

35. Both the British and the Native Infantry regiments were organised into eight companies. These companies were further grouped together into Wings5. The establishment of a British regiment was 30 officers and 886 other ranks and for the Native regiments it was 7 officers and 712 other ranks. However, for practical planning purposes, and taking into account losses due to sickness and turnover of personnel, commanders assumed the strength of a British regiment to be 700 all ranks: for a Native regiment it was 550.

36. Prior to the Mutiny it was not uncommon for the different classes of native soldiers to stand shoulder to shoulder in mixed regiments. So a Muslim would happily stand next to a Hindu and a Punjabi beside a Pathan. Although in 1879 a minority of regiments still recruited from a single class of native soldier6 the experience of the Mutiny, which had particularly scarred the Bengal Army, had seen a change of philosophy within the Indian Army. Now regiments were segregated along class lines with soldiers being recruited into single class companies. Regiments had become a mosaic of multi-class companies7. Moreover, exponents of a primitive form of eugenics had now purported to identify so-called ‘martial races’ and this led to some British officers focusing their recruiting efforts on a narrower range of classes - predominantly those from the North and North-West of the country8.4 A heliograph uses a mirror to reflect sunlight to a distant observer. Using Morse code it was a highly effective means of communication capable of operating over distances in excess of 50 miles.5 A Wing consisted of four companies. There were two Wings in each regiment.6 The 23rd and 32nd Bengal Infantry Regiments consisted solely of Mazbi Sikhs and, of course, the Gurkha regiments recruited exclusively from Nepal.7 For instance in 1862 the 5th Bengal Infantry had eight companies: two of Brahmans and Rajputs; one of Hindustani Muslims; one of Jats; one of Gurkhas; one of Bundelas; one of Sikhs; and one company of lower-caste Hindus.8 In 1884 the 5th Bengal Infantry companies reflected this new order. There were now 3 companies of Brahmans and Rajputs, two companies of Hindustani Muslims, two companies of Jats and just one

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How a Heliograph works

37. Before the Mutiny the old East India Company had, in addition to its Sepoy regiments, raised its own European regiments; but these had now been subsumed into the British Army and no longer existed.

38. Each Sepoy regiment had its own cadre of native officers who commanded the individual companies and platoons but the real leadership of the regiment remained vested in the 7 British officers who provided the Wing Commanders, the regimental staff and the Commanding Officer. Prior to the Mutiny these officers would have been appointed to specific regiments but now, apart from a few diehards who refused to leave their regimental cadre, all British officers were posted to the Presidency Staff Corps9. A positive benefit of this new system was that it ensured that regiments could be kept up to strength when officers were posted to extra-regimental appointments. Its biggest downside, however, remained the fact that promotion in the Staff Corps was based on time served and the organisation had become top heavy with too many senior officers chasing too few appointments. It was not uncommon, therefore, for lieutenant colonels to be commanding wings and for majors to be wing officers (a post usually reserved for subalterns).

THE CAVALRY

39. The Native cavalry regiments were recruited under the silladar system10. Each trooper purchased his place in the regiment and provided his own horse and equipment. In return he was guaranteed a higher rate of pay and, when he retired or was invalided out, he could secure his pension by selling on his place in the regiment.

company of lower-caste Hindus.9 In 1891 the three Presidency Staff Corps were amalgamated into a single Indian Staff Corps.10 Except that is for the four native cavalry regiments of the Madras Army. These regiments were unique in that they had rejected the silladar system and were recruited normally.

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Native Soldiers

40. In peacetime the silladar system had obvious advantages. Troopers were bound into the regiment and had a vested interest in its future. But on active service, particularly if prolonged or arduous, the system

produced serious problems when it came to making up losses of men, horses and equipment.

41. The establishments of the cavalry regiments were 24 officers and 455 other ranks for the British regiments and 7 officers and 457 other ranks for the Native regiments. Once again, for practical planning purposes, the assumed strength on operations for both types of cavalry was 350 all ranks.

THE ARTILLERY

42. The biggest change in the size and shape of the Army in India had taken place in the artillery. Prior to the Mutiny the old East India Company had recruited its own local artillery regiments, albeit led by British officers. However, following the shock of the Sepoy rebellion, it was no longer considered either safe or appropriate to leave this powerful weapon of the battlefield in the hands of the natives. Thus virtually all the artillery was now in British hands and the artillery pieces were manufactured in British arsenals in the United Kingdom.

INFANTRY WEAPONS

43. The principal infantry weapon in the British infantry regiments was the Martini-Henry rifle11. This had been introduced into service in 1871 and was the first purpose-

11 A rifle is any long gun which has a rifled barrel. A rifled barrel incorporates two or more helical grooves in its bore and these grooves impart a spin on the bullet as it travels down the barrel. The spin makes the bullet more aerodynamically stable and therefore keeps it on a straighter path. A rifled weapon is inherently more accurate than a smooth bore weapon.

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Native Cavalryman

designed breech-loading12 rifle to see service in the British Army. A single shot weapon with a .45in calibre13, the Martini-Henry was considered by many to be the best military rifle of its time; it was certainly loved and trusted by its users. It was very accurate and sighted out to 1500 yards although its effective range was considered to be about 500 yards. It delivered a heavy, man-stopping bullet. On the down side it had a brutal kick and displayed a tendency to jam in sandy conditions.

44. The Native regiments were issued with the rifle that the British Army had recently cast off when taking the Martini-Henry. The Snider rifle was also a single-shot breech-loader, but it had a .577in calibre and, although effective, was longer, heavier and slightly less accurate than the new rifle. The Snider was a hybrid having been introduced into service in 1867 as a cheap modification of the old 1853 pattern Enfield (a muzzle-loader14). The Native regiments began taking delivery of the weapon in 1874 and by the start of the 2nd British-Afghan War not all of them were experienced in its use.

Martini-Henry Rifle Mark 1

45. Martini-Henry and Snider rifles are still being offered for sale today in the bazaars of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The vast majority of these are so-called Khyber-copies, locally produced ‘knock-offs’ of inferior quality. Nevertheless, if you manage to see one on sale do pick it up and get a feel for it. But remember: don’t buy. You are highly unlikely to be able to take it back to Europe legally and most regiments have access to real thing!

12 A breech-loading weapon, usually a gun or an artillery piece, is one where the bullet or shell is inserted into the weapon from the rear of the barrel via an opening called the breech. It is the opposite of muzzleloading13 The calibre of a weapon refers to the relationship between the length of its barrel and the size of its bore.14 Muzzleloading is a term used to describe any firearm which is loaded at the muzzle, or open end of the gun barrel. Muzzleloaders usually, but not always, involve the use of a loose propellant (ie gun powder), a projectile and a separate method of ignition or priming.

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CAVALRY WEAPONS

46. The principal weapons of the cavalry remained the lance and the sword and the differences in these weapons between the British and Indian regiments was marginal. But a cavalryman’s secondary weapon was his carbine. Carbines were short-barrelled versions of in-service rifles designed for use by supporting troops such as cavalry and artillery. Most were incapable of taking a bayonet and all had modifications made to recognise the fact that this weapon was normally sheathed in a holster (by cavalrymen) or carried over the shoulder (by artillerymen). In particular, the trigger mechanism was invariably designed to ensure that the weapon did not accidentally discharge when it was removed from a holster.

47. The Martini-Henry carbine used by the British cavalry regiments and artillery batteries was markedly superior to the Snider carbines issued to the Native cavalry and mountain artillery units. More worryingly, however, was the fact that these carbines had only just been produced (in 1877) and were still being issued. The 9th Lancers, for instance, had only recently received their carbines en route to Afghanistan in December 1878 and by the time the 12th Bengal Cavalry took delivery of its Snider carbines it had already been in Afghanistan for 6 months.

UNIFORMS

48. If there is one thing that can be said about the British troops which fought in Afghanistan in 1879 they were not uniform in appearance! Officers appeared to wear what they wanted (so no change there then!) and the soldiers were not much better.

49. The British Infantry regiments appear to have started the campaign in their cold-weather undress serge uniforms (the Highlanders of the 72nd still wore their red trews and the Highlanders of the 92nd their green kilts) and most wore official army greatcoats or (unofficial) Afghan sheepskin coats (poshteens). In hot weather, the serge uniforms were replaced by the recently introduced lightweight khaki service jackets but these had been procured from a variety of sources most commonly by dyeing the white hot-weather clothing issued to the peacetime establishment in India. Some regiments took their full dress uniform with them too!

50. The cavalry and artillery wore the normal Indian cold-weather blue serge supplemented by an assortment of greatcoats, poshteens, jerkins and jerseys. In hot weather, the cavalry and horse artillery adopted khaki tunics over blue or, later, khaki breeches.

51. The normal service headdress was the white or khaki tropical helmet. These were unpopular and often referred to as a ‘bug trap’. Many soldiers preferred to wear the ‘pill box’ hat when off (and sometimes on) duty.

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Snider Rifle

52. Other ranks wore ammunition boots with puttees or gaiters , except that cavalry troopers and artillery drivers often wore knee-boots.

53. The Indian troops were more uniform in appearance. The native infantry, except the Gurkhas, wore khaki drill in hot weather and a heavier-weight khaki uniform in winter (supplemented by the ubiquitous greatcoats and poshteens). The Gurkhas wore their dark-green cloth uniforms in winter but adopted lightweight khaki as the war progressed. All native soldiers wore native shoes or sandals of Indian pattern which were quite useless in the stony wastes of Afghanistan and many chose to adopt the ammunition boot even though they had to pay for it themselves. To his credit, Roberts identified a shoe of Kabuli design which he then tried to make a general issue. All wore their native turbans except, once again, the Gurkhas who retained their traditional pillbox.15

ARTILLERY WEAPONS

54. In terms of equipment, the artillery in India was the most obsolete arm of the service. At a time when European armies possessed steel breech-loading guns of high accuracy and long range most of the Indian Army batteries were still using muzzle-loading weapons of short range and light calibre.

55. The Native Mountain Batteries were each equipped with 7-pounders16. This was a rifled, muzzle-loading gun which threw a 7lb shell out to a maximum range of 3000 yards. The principal advantage of this gun was its high mobility as it could be easily broken down for carriage on animals or by porters. But this advantage was more than outweighed by its short range and the fact that it delivered such a miniscule projectile.

56. The Native Field Batteries were equipped with two 12-pounder howitzers17 and two 6-pounder guns. Once again these were muzzle-loaded weapons of short range delivering small projectiles and were widely regarded as obsolete.

57. The remainder of the artillery was in British hands. The horse and field artillery batteries were equipped with 9-pounder rifled, muzzle-loading guns; only a few had 9- or 12-pounder, breech loading Armstrongs18. Heavy batteries deployed a mixture of rifled-, 15 The general dissatisfaction with the standards and serviceability of uniform during the campaign, as well as concerns about organisations, equipments and establishments led afterwards to the setting up of the Eden Commission whose report instigated a root and branch reorganisation of the Indian Army.16 Artillery weapon designations either refer to the weapon’s calibre (see footnote 13) or the weight of the projectile it delivers (hence the designation 7-pounder).17 Howitzers are distinguished from other types of artillery by their trajectory in that they tend to fire at high angles and deliver plunging fire. The barrel of a howitzer is commonly below 30 calibres.18 The 9-pounder Armstrong was a rifled muzzle loader which fired a 9lbs 12oz projectile out to a maximum range of 4000 yards. The 12-pounder (see illustration above) had been introduced to the British Army in 1859. It was one of the first practical breech-loading field guns of the modern era. It could fire

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muzzle- or breech-loaded 40-pounders and 6.3in or 8in howitzers. These larger guns were either bullock-, camel-, or elephant drawn.

58. All of the artillery weapons of the time suffered from practically uncontrollable recoil.

TACTICS

59. The British had now been involved in regular hill fighting along the North West Frontier for more than 30 years. And yet, despite this experience, British doctrine remained ad-hoc and widely controversial. This was due, in main, to the fact that hill fighting, or mountain warfare, had remained a minority sport for the Indian Army. It was a unique form of fighting practiced primarily by the frontiersmen of the Punjab Irregular Force (who became, in the 1860s the Punjab Frontier Force). The only elements of the regular Indian Army who had been exposed to it were regiments of the Bengal Army stationed in the Peshawar District. And these regiments changed over so frequently that lessons, even if learned, were not passed on.

60. In fact British Army tactics, both at home and in India, were now firmly based on the lessons of the Franco-Prussian War. It was the requirements of conventional European warfare – and in India the perceived threat from Russia - which drove the procurement cycle for weapons and provided the general scenario for tactical training. Hill fighting, if it was thought about at all, was seen as an aberration; even though it remained the most likely form of warfare in which Indian Army troops would become involved. So what was unique about Frontier fighting? Two things: the enemy and the terrain.

61. Frontier tribesmen were essentially predators. They came down from their barren hills in order to prey on passing traders or to steal money, livestock and goods from the farming communities of the plains. As raiders their tactics were essentially snatch and grab. The British, frustrated by their inability to bring the tribesmen to battle in the conventional sense, could only respond in kind. Punitive expeditions would be sent into the hills to seize livestock and destroy villages. The tribesmen would harass the troops as they came in and attack the rearguards as the British retired. It was a game of cat and mouse where roles were frequently reversed.

62. The tribesmen, accustomed to fighting from their youth, were physically fit, skilled at skirmishing, adept at using the mountainous terrain for cover and concealment and highly practiced in the use of their swords and firearms. They would defend ridges and passes tenaciously from behind their sangars (rock breastworks) until their flanks or line of retreat were threatened when they would retire to fight another day. They seldom engaged in close quarter combat with large bodies of British troops and yet relished the opportunity to get in close with their knives and swords when the tables were reversed and they were numerically superior.

63. The rugged, mountainous terrain of the Frontier compelled the British to move along narrow, winding, boulder-strewn river beds and valleys where they were constantly overlooked by their enemy. The narrowness of the paths and the need to carry all of their

shrapnel, case shot or an explosive 11.56lb shell. It had a 3in calibre and was considered highly accurate.

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supplies with them on slow moving pack animals meant that British troops were inevitably broken up into several columns each strung out over long distances.

64. Unable to maintain close-order infantry formations or exploit the benefits of massed firepower the British took to adopting light infantry tactics. Using the ground for cover and concealment, troops were deployed using loose, flexible, skirmishing tactics. Fitness, marksmanship and fieldcraft were at a premium and officers and men alike needed to be self-reliant, well-motivated and able to use considerable personal initiative. Rifles became standard issue to the Frontier Force at a time when smoothbore percussion muskets were still standard issue to the rest of the Bengal Army. Troops travelled light unencumbered, as far as possible, by camp followers. The offensive spirit remained the essential requirement for successful operations. Attacks or retirements were made in bounds up spurs or along ridges and care was taken to avoid low ground or re-entrants where the enemy could fire upon them from above or encircle them. Although dispersed when moving across country troops still required to come into close-order line for the final attack in case the enemy counter-attacked with massed swordsmen. Fighting was characterised by a large number of separate, individual and unrelated skirmishes rather than formal set-piece encounters. This empowered the junior and native officers who were able to operate independently.

LOGISTICS

TRANSPORT AND SUPPLIES

65. Logistics, or Administration as it was known to the Victorians, was a poorly understood art in the nineteenth century. And the Indian Army was not untypical in its approach to the subject. The Army which entered Afghanistan in 1878 lacked any in-built mobility: it relied entirely on ‘just-in time’ transport bought or hired from any source that it could lay its hands on. Similarly the Army depended almost entirely on local purchase and requisitioning to sustain itself.

66. Although by 1878 there existed in India a network of more than 8000 miles of railway track, which in itself aided strategic mobility, this network did not stretch as far as the North-West Frontier. Beyond the railheads, all of which were on the eastern side of the Indus River, troops had to rely upon animal transport to get them to the front. This transport primarily consisted of bullock-carts and camels. Where possible, these were

supplemented with horses, ponies and mules. And at times even more exotic creatures such as elephants and, on occasion, yaks were pressed into service.

67. Animal transport was inordinately slow and inefficient, not least because a high percentage of the carrying capacity was taken up with forage for the

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animals themselves. And the mortality rates were crippling too as animals succumbed to heat and disease, factors which were then exacerbated by neglect and poor management.

MEDICAL

68. Medical facilities for the soldiers themselves were also primitive. British regiments had an establishment of three doctors whilst Native regiments were restricted to one. British regiments had trained medical orderlies; Indian regiments might have two or three native apothecaries or dressers. The hospital facilities were focussed on the regiments although, later on in the campaign, the Army did begin to organise field and base hospitals to which the sick and wounded could be evacuated.

69. In action, casualties would be carried or assisted back to the regimental dressing station where they would be given immediate first aid before being taken on to the regimental hospital. Transport over long distances would be on litters or ‘doolies’ born on the backs of camels or mules. Surgical treatment in the hospitals was now routine with antiseptics and anaesthetics such as chloroform widely available. However, there were no antibiotics or blood transfusions and amputation, to prevent the onset of gangrene, was still a routine procedure.

70. The Army also had a better understanding of hygiene and preventative medicine. The need for strict camp sanitation was widely accepted and practiced and quinine was now available to check, if not eliminate, malaria. Sadly nothing could be done about the really serious killer diseases of cholera, pneumonia and typhoid fever; mainly because their causes were still not known.

THE AFGHANS

71. Nowadays there is a tendency to think that the Afghan forces which opposed the British in the 2nd British-Afghan War were merely an ad hoc collection of tribes operating without a structure or formal chain of command. Nothing could be further from the truth. Although Afghan society was still very feudal in its outlook, when it came to warfighting this had positive benefits. Most tribal leaders held land as a gift from the King and as such they were required to provide troops for his service.

72. Sher Ali, the Afghan King at the time of the British invasion, had really gripped his Army making great improvements in their drill, discipline and equipment. In 1878 he

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Casualties being evacuated by Doolie

Transporting Supplies

possessed 62 regiments of infantry, 16 regiments of cavalry and 49 batteries of artillery.

73. The artillery was the elite force of Sher Ali’s army. It consisted of two elephant-drawn heavy batteries, 22 horse artillery batteries, 18 mountain batteries and 7 bullock-drawn field batteries. Many of these guns were new breech-loaders and, comparatively speaking, it is possible to say that, at least in terms of artillery firepower, the Afghans had the advantage of the British.

74. The Afghan cavalry had always been formidable and the Afghans were able to use their small Afghan ponies to devastating effect, moving quickly across the battlefield and being expert in the delivery of lightening raids particularly against line of communication troops.

75. As far as small arms were concerned, the old fashioned jezails19 of the First Afghan War were still prevalent but, by and large, they had been replaced as the weapon of choice by ex-British Army Enfields (muzzleloaders) bought from the British. The

Afghans also had more modern weapons including about 7000 Snider rifles, also kindly donated to them by the British! Moreover, the Afghans had plenty of ammunition and the resupply of rifles and ammunition would never prove a problem; the traders of Kabul and the Khyber Pass had long been adept at manufacturing both.

76. In addition to his regular troops Sher Ali could also call upon substantial numbers of irregular levies. Indeed the British assessed that for the Battle of Sherpur in December 1879 the Afghans had assembled 100,000 armed men merely from the Eastern tribes.

77. Finally, logistics were simply not an impediment to the Afghan soldier. Unlike the British, the Afghans were used to living frugally. This allowed them to travel light and fast. Time and time again their ability to move forces and concentrate them quickly caught the British off guard. The Afghans were to prove a formidable enemy.

19 A jezail is a long-barrelled matchlock or flintlock rifle commonly associated with the Afghan tribesman. Although long-barrelled the deep and distinctive curve of the butt stock allowed the weapon to be tucked under the arm, thus it could be fired by men on horseback as well by men on foot. For accuracy over long distances it was common to fire the jezail from a forked rest.

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Afghan tribesmen with jezails

PART THREE

THE PERSONALITIES

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THE BRITISH

78. Lieutenant General Donald Martin Stewart (1824-1900). Aged 55. Commander of the South Afghanistan Field Force. Commissioned 1840 (aged 16) into the Bengal Infantry and saw active service in frontier expeditions and the Indian Mutiny (1857-58). He commanded a brigade in Abyssinia (1868). After the 2nd British-Afghan War he went on to command the Lahore Division (1875-78) and in 1881 became CinC India. Promoted Field Marshal 1894. Last appointment was as Governor, Chelsea Hospital.

79. Major General Frederick Sleigh (‘Bobs’) Roberts VC (1832-1914). Aged 47. Commander of the North Afghanistan Field Force. Son of Brig Abraham Roberts who served in the 1st British-Afghan War. Commissioned 1851 (aged 19) into the Bengal Artillery. Saw service in the Indian Mutiny, where he gained his VC, and also on the Ambeyla Expedition (1863) and in Abyssinia (1868) where he served as AQMG to Stewart. He was QMG Indian Army (1875-1878) and had been commanding the Punjab Frontier Force when the 2nd British-Afghan War started. After the war he was created KCB, GCB. He went on to become CinC Madras Army (1881-85) before succeeding Stewart as CinC India (1885-93). He was the longest serving CinC India. In 1892 he received a peerage and became known as Lord Roberts of Kandahar and Waterford. In 1893 he succeeded Wolseley as CinC Ireland and was promoted Field Marshal in 1895. In 1899 he was dispatched to South Africa (2nd Boer War) as CinC and subsequently handed over command to Lord Kitchener in 1901 when, as Earl Roberts, he succeed Lord Wolseley as CinC of the British Army. He was the last officer to hold this post before it was finally abolished in 1904. He died November 1914 in France whilst visiting Indian troops fighting on the Western Front.

80. Major General Robert Onesiphorous Bright (1823-1896). Aged 56. Commissioned 1843 (aged 20) into the 19th Foot (Green Howards). Served in the Crimea (1854-55) and Hazara Field Force (1868). Promoted Major General 1868. During the latter stages of the 2nd British-Afghan War his 2nd Division was protecting Roberts’ Line of Communication through the Khyber Pass.

81. Brigadier General Thomas Durand Baker (1837-1893). Aged 42. Commissioned 1854 (aged 17) into the 18th Foot (Royal Irish Regiment). Served in the Crimea (1854-56), Indian Mutiny (1857-58), the Maori War (1864-66) and the Ashanti Expedition (1873-74). He commanded the 2nd Inf Bde in Roberts’ North Afghanistan Field Force. Received a KCB for his contribution to the 2nd British-Afghan War and went on to become AG Indian Army (1884-86). He served in the Third Burmese War (1886-87) and commanded the Allahabad Division (1887-90). In 1890 he became QMG of the British Army and died in office three years later.

82. Brigadier Charles John Stanley Gough VC (1832-1912) Aged 47. Commissioned 1848 (aged 16) into the Bengal Cavalry. Saw service under his father (Lord Gough) in the 2nd Sikh War (1848-49) and received his VC in the Indian Mutiny (1857-58). He also served in the Bhutan Expedition (1864-65). During the 2nd British-

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Afghan War he commanded 1st Brigade of Bright’s 2nd Division. After the war he commanded the Hyderbad Contingent (1881-85) and the Oudh Division (1885-90). His other claim to fame is that he was the father of General Sir Hubert Gough who commanded the British 5th Army in the Great War.

83. Brigadier Hugh Henry Gough VC (1833-1901) Aged 46. Commissioned 1853 (aged 20) into the Bengal Cavalry. Charles Gough’s younger brother he also gained his VC in the Indian Mutiny (1857-58). He went on to serve in Abyssinia (1868). During the 2nd British-Afghan War he commanded a cavalry brigade under Roberts. After the war he commanded the Lahore Division (1887-92). He was promoted to General in 1894. His last appointment was Keeper of the Crown Jewels in the Tower of London.

84. Brigadier General Charles Metcalfe MacGregor (1840-1887). Aged 39. Commissioned 1857 (aged 17) into the Bengal Army. Served in the Indian Mutiny, China (1860), Bhutan Expedition (1864-65), Abyssinia (1865-68). He commanded the 3rd Inf Bde in Roberts’ North Afghanistan Field Force and after the war was rewarded with a KCB. During the 2nd British-Afghan War Macgregor was only a substantive major. He was still a major when, in the acting rank of Major General, he became QMG Indian Army in 1881! MacGregor died early, whilst still QMG, but at the time of his death his reputation had become slightly tarnished (perhaps as a result of his outspoken criticism of Roberts as a commander) and it was generally believed that his career had peaked.

85. Brigadier General Herbert Taylor Macpherson VC (1827-1886). Aged 52. Commissioned 1845 (aged 18) into the 78th Highlanders (the Seaforths). Served in the Persian War (1857) and the Indian Mutiny (1857-58) where he gained his VC. He also saw active service in the Hazara (1868), Lushai (1871-72) and Jowaki (1877) Expeditions. He commanded the 1st Inf Bde in Roberts’ North Afghanistan Field Force and received a KCB for his contribution to the 2nd British-Afghan War. He went on to command the Indian Army Contingent in Egypt (1882). Became CinC Madras Army 1885 and died on board a ship taking him to Burma where he was due to take command of the British troops involved in the Third Burma War.

86. Brigadier General William Godfrey Dunham Massey VC (1838-1906). Aged 41. Commissioned 1854 (aged 16) and served in the Crimea where he gained his VC during the attack on the Redan at Sebastopol. He was commanding the Rawalpindi Brigade when the 2nd British-Afghan War started. Roberts sacked him for his perceived poor performance in the operations around Kabul and in February 1880 he was sent back to India. However his friends ensured that he retained command of the brigade in Rawalpindi and he eventually rose to become GOC Ceylon (1888-1893).

87. Major George Stewart White (1835-1912). Aged 44. Commissioned 1853 (aged 18) into the 27th (Inniskilling) Foot he first saw active service in the Indian Mutiny. During the 2nd British-Afghan War he commanded a Wing of the 92nd Highlanders (Gordons) and in September 1880 was awarded a VC for his bravery and leadership at Charasaib (6 Oct 1879) and Kandahar (1 Sep 1880). He subsequently went on to command the Gordon Highlanders and in 1893 he succeeded Roberts as CinC Indian Army. In 1897 he became QMG of the British Army. As a field commander in the Boer War his reputation was tarnished when, by inept generalship, he allowed his troops to be

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bottled up in Ladysmith. Nevertheless he ended up as Governor of Gibraltar in 1901. He was promoted Field Marshal in 1903.

THE AFGHANS

88. Sher Ali. In 1865 Sher Ali became Amir of Afghanistan in succession to his father, Dost Mohammed. However, the succession was by no means smooth and in 1865 he was usurped by his elder brother, Mohammed Afzal who, in turn, was usurped by another brother, Mohammed Azim. Nevertheless, by 1869 Sher Ali was back on the throne and, initially at least, he managed to remain on good terms with the British. Having seen the damage caused to his country by the clash of empires (Russian and British) Sher Ali was resolute in his resolve to keep all foreign ambassadors out of Kabul but was finally undone by the re-emergence of the British ‘Forward Policy’. His refusal to allow the British to dominate Afghan foreign policy and his acceptance of a Russian delegation in Kabul led ultimately to the 2nd British-Afghan War. Defeats at Ali Masjid and Peiwar Kotal broke his spirit and he left Kabul in December 1878, leaving his son, Yakub Khan, to conclude the Treaty of Gandamak with the British. A broken man, he died shortly afterwards in Mazar-i-Sharif in February 1879.

89. Yakub Khan. Although he was Sher Ali’s eldest son Yakub Khan was not the King’s favourite son. The relationship between the King and his legitimate heir was a frosty one and in December 1878, when Sher Ali fled the capital, Yakub Khan was languishing in prison! On becoming Amir, Yakub Khan reluctantly accepted a British Mission in Kabul but he failed to protect them from the Kabul mob and so, when Cavagnari and his escort were murdered, the British felt that Yakub Khan, even if he had not instigated the act, must have been complicit in its execution. Notwithstanding this, the official British position was that, since Yakub Khan had been the victim of an uprising, the British were coming to Kabul not only to punish Cavagnari’s murderers but also to support the Amir. Kept a virtual prisoner by Roberts, Yakub Khan attempted to abdicate soon after Roberts arrival in Kabul in October 1879 saying that he would rather be a grasscutter in the English camp than ruler of Afghanistan. However, the British still needed him to give their invasion a veneer of legitimacy and it was not until 28 October that his abdication was accepted. Yakub Khan left Kabul on 1 December 1879 eventually becoming a pensioner of the British in India. He died in 1923.

90. Mohammed Jan. In November 1879 Mohammed Jan, a relative of Yakub Khan’s finance minister, emerged as the leader of the Afghan insurgency. He had commanded Sher Ali’s artillery at Ali Masjid. Having been defeated by Roberts at the battle of Sherpur Mohammed withdrew to his power base around Ghazni where in April 1880 he fought an unsuccessful action against General Stewart’s army.

91. Mushk-i-Alam. In November 1879, Mushk-i-Alam, Mullah of Ghazni, called for a Holy War (a jihad) against the British. As the principal religious leader of the insurgency it was Mushk-i-Alam who lit the signal beacon on Asmai Heights which launched the Afghan attack on Roberts’ cantonment at Sherpur.

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PART FOUR

THE BATTLEFIELD TOUR

STAND ONE – CHARASIAB AND THE APPROACH TO KABUL

92. Background. News of Cavagnari’s murder reached the Government of India on 5 September 1879. It was a shattering blow. Lytton, the Governor-General, recognised immediately that he had no alternative but to advance on Kabul and exact retribution. Although Kandahar could be re-occupied in a matter of hours it would take too long to prepare a force to march from Kandahar to Kabul. The question was: do we advance through the Khyber Pass or through the Kurram Valley? The latter offered the most direct route and, with the disposition of forces currently available, was the one which could be executed quickest. Roberts was to advance with best speed at the head of a force consisting of one brigade of cavalry and two brigades of infantry. A holding force of one division would seize Jalalabad with the aim of opening a line of communication through the Khyber Pass to Kabul once the city had been seized. With judicious bribes and promises of liberal payments for transport and supplies, Roberts managed to secure the support of the border tribes. On 1 October Roberts’ force crossed the Shutagarden Pass and began its final advance towards Kabul. Transport was still a major concern and Roberts found it difficult to maintain the advance and still keep his troops concentrated. On the afternoon of 5 October he approached the village of Charasiab. This village skirted the Logar River and guarded a narrow defile along which lay the direct route to Kabul. Roberts now saw that the surrounding hills were occupied by a superior force of Afghan tribesmen.

CORRELATION OF FORCESBRITISH INDIAN AFGHAN

9th Lancers 12th Bengal Cavalry Details not available. But British estimates made after the battle suggest that the Afghans had 13 regular regiments (mainly infantry) and 20 guns as well several thousand irregulars (tribesmen)

F/A Bty RHA 14th Bengal LancersG/3 Bty RA 5th Punjab Cavalry 67th Foot (South Hampshire) No 2 Dejarat Mountain Bty72nd Highlanders (Seaforths) 23rd Bengal Infantry92nd Highlanders (Gordons) 28th Bengal Infantry

5th Gurkhas5th Punjab InfantryNo 7 Coy Bengal Sappers & Miners

TOTALS 3,800 (Approx) 10,000 (approx)

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STAND TWO – THE CAPTURE OF KABUL (BALA HISSAR)

93. Background. Roberts’ victory at Charasiab opened the way to Kabul. However, even though Afghan morale appeared to be shattered Roberts was keenly aware that the local population remained intensely hostile and that his relatively weak force was completely unsuited to cope with street fighting in the narrow streets and bazaars of the city. On 7 October he occupied the village of Beni Hissar; three miles north of Charasiab and two miles south of the city. From here he could see the impressive fort of the Bala Hissar, seat of the Afghan Kings. Roberts intended to concentrate his force in the fort but first he had to clear the remaining Afghan troops from the hills surrounding the city.

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Map of Charasiab

Picture of the Bala Hissar 1879

CORRELATION OF FORCESBRITISH INDIAN AFGHAN

9th Lancers 12th Bengal Cavalry Details not available. But British estimates made it clear that the British were greatly outnumbered throughout the period of the occupation and up to, and including, the Battle of Sherpur

F/A Bty RHA 14th Bengal LancersG/3 Bty RA 5th Punjab Cavalry 9th Foot (East Norfolk) Queen’s Corps of Guides (Cav)67th Foot (South Hampshire) No 2 Dejarat Mountain Bty72nd Highlanders (Seaforths) 23rd Bengal Infantry92nd Highlanders (Gordons) 5th Gurkhas

Queen’s Corps of Guides (Inf)3rd Sikh Infantry5th Punjab InfantryNo 5 Coy Bengal Sappers & MinersNo 7 Coy Bengal Sappers & Miners

TOTALS 5,550 (Approx)

STAND THREE – RETRIBUTION (BALA HISSAR)

94. Background. Roberts formally occupied the Bala Hissar on 12 October 1879. But first, in a deliberate show of strength, the whole of the Field Force, dressed in full-dress parade uniforms, marched through the city. It was an operation designed to display British superiority but in reality Roberts knew that his position was weak. Soon the winter snows would close his line of communication through the Kurram Valley and it

was therefore essential that a new one be established via the Khyber Pass. But the troops here were woefully short of transport and combat power and progress was slow. And worse was to come. The Kurram Valley Field Force could ill afford to spare troops to protect its extended line of communication and it wasn’t long before the hill tribes, taking advantage of this weakness, attacked. By the end of October Roberts was effectively cut off from

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View from above the Bala Hissar

India. There is no doubt that Roberts had taken great risks, both tactical and logistic, to reach Kabul. A lesser commander may well have failed. Roberts had seized the initiative but could he maintain it?

STANDS FOUR AND FIVE – INSURRECTION (ASMAI HEIGHTS)

95. Background. Roberts knew that any withdrawal to India would not be possible before the spring and that he would therefore have to continue to defend his position in the city until then. The Bala Hissar had served its purpose as an initial base but now Roberts needed a location which could not only be easily defended but from which he could also dominate Kabul. The Bala Hissar, he felt, was unsuited for this purpose being both too constricted and too close to the city. It was also hemmed in by the surrounding hills which, in the case of a sudden attack, would make it extremely difficult to manoeuvre his troops. Roberts therefore decided that he would occupy the uncompleted cantonment of Sherpur. This massive fortress lay a mile to the north of the city in the lee of the Bimaru Heights and Sher Ali had intended it to be the main winter quarters of the Afghan army. Built on a huge scale, it was bounded on two sides by a massive, loopholed wall with towers for artillery at regular intervals; the rear was open but rested on the Bimaru Heights, and the east face was incomplete. The main frontal wall facing the city was over a mile and a half long and the whole cantonment could easily take a force much bigger than that which Roberts possessed. Roberts immediately set about completing the defences and began taking in supplies for the winter. As November drew to a close Roberts began to receive worrying intelligence of a growing insurgency.

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Sherpur Cantonment

STAND SIX – THE BATTLE OF SHERPUR (BIMARU HEIGHTS)

96. Background. Faulty intelligence in dealing with the insurgency had led Roberts to make a series of unforced errors. But luck and an aggressive spirit meant that he had escaped the consequences by the skin of his teeth. By the night of 13 December all of his troops had been withdrawn into the safety of the Sherpur cantonment but, on the morning of the 14 December, the British awoke to find the Asmai Heights crowded with enemy

soldiers. The next 9 days were to see a series of minor actions as Roberts endeavoured to maintain the initiative as he strove to complete his defences. The campaign in Kabul was reaching the decisive hour.

CORRELATION OF FORCESBRITISH INDIAN AFGHAN

9th Lancers 12th Bengal Cavalry Details not available. But British estimates made it clear that the British were greatly outnumbered throughout the period of the occupation and up to, and including, the Battle of Sherpur. Roberts himself estimated that on 23 December 1879 he was faced by over 60,000 Afghans

F/A Bty RHA 14th Bengal LancersG/3 Bty RA 5th Punjab Cavalry 9th Foot (East Norfolk) Queen’s Corps of Guides (Cav)67th Foot (South Hampshire) No 2 Dejarat Mountain Bty72nd Highlanders (Seaforths) 23rd Bengal Infantry92nd Highlanders (Gordons) 28th Bengal Infantry

5th GurkhasQueen’s Corps of Guides (Inf)3rd Sikh Infantry5th Punjab Infantry23rd Punjab Infantry (Pioneers)No 5 Coy Bengal Sappers & MinersNo 7 Coy Bengal Sappers & Miners

TOTALS 7000 (Approx) 60,000

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Map of Sherpur

PART FIVE

MISCELLANEOUS MATERIAL

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THE VCs

There were 16 Victoria Crosses awarded for gallantry during the 2nd British-Afghan War.

Six of these medals were awarded to members of Roberts’ North Afghanistan Field Force operating around Kabul during the period October – December 1879.

Recipient Unit Date Action

Reverend JW Adams Chaplain to the Force

11 Dec Rescuing men at Kila Kazi during the attempt to save the guns on the Chardeh Plain

Lt WH Dick Cunyngham 92nd Highlanders 13 Dec Attack on the Takht-i-Shah

Capt AG Hammond Guides Infantry 14 Dec Attack on the Asmai Heights

LCpl Sellar 72nd Highlanders 14 Dec Attack on the Asmai Heights

Capt WJ Vousden 5th Punjab Cavalry 14 Dec Cavalry charge near Siah Sang

Maj George White 92nd Highlanders 1 Sep 1880

For his actions at both Chariasab and Kandahar

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