The King of Saudi Arabia, Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, had suffered from a bout of pneumonia. Although his health has been deteriorating for a number of years, leading him to reduce his workload, the 90-year-old chain-smoking monarch retained such gravitas and influence that no matter how prepared the family is for his passing, Saudi Arabia will feel his loss acutely.A hugely popular figure even among those Saudis who do not feel strong affinity for the monarchy, he will leave a gap that most likely cannot be filled.To rule in Saudi Arabia is not just a matter of being a good manager of government and ensuring oil keeps pumping out of the ground. It is a complex and difficult task that involves managing a wide spectrum of interests and constituencies across a vast territory, many of whom directly contradict each other.Changing slowlySaudis often talk of change having to occur slowly, this is not just an excuse to bat away those pushing for reform, it is a genuine reflection of the need to balance the competing interests and constituencies in the country. All of whom must be placated in order for Saudi Arabia to progress forward stably.

King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia diesUnderstanding this balance is what Abdullah was particularly good at - even in his older years, his knowledge of his own people was remarkably astute.A man who knew reforms for women's participation must come, he ruthlessly removed conservative clerics who stood in his way, all the while ensuring not to undermine the institution of the clerical establishment and the religious police, whom many conservative Saudis hold in great esteem.Likewise, with the kingdom's restive Shia population, the king and his half-brother and former Crown Prince Nayef pursued a policy of dialogue-led engagement and force.In November 2014, the Saudi state was quick to act against an al-Qaeda affiliated group that had launched attacks on a Shia Hussainiyah, a religious building, in Saudi's Eastern Province. Although tensions between the state and its Shia population remain high, it was an encouraging sign.At times the king has cut a lonely figure - never fully connected to his half brothers. His rise to power was as much due to force of personality and guile, resisting attempts to emasculate his position as Commander of the National Guard, as it was his abilities in politics.It was often his sheer force of personality that ensured large modernisation projects, such as King Abdullah University of Science and Technology, or the instigation of a number of economic cities were pushed forward. Old versus youngOn issues of foreign policy the older generation of princes tend to be cut from similar cloth, Iran is perennially viewed with suspicion, and its desire to expand at the expense of Saudi interests is almost a given. With or without Abdullah, the Saudi position vis-a-vis Tehran will not soften, because the underlying assumptions which govern the bi-lateral relationship have not changed in decades.Likewise, despite friction with the United States on a number of issues ranging from clandestine talks with Iran, to the failure to make peace between Israel and Palestine, the kingdom will have to maintain its ties come what may, and no matter who leads either country.The soured relationship at present is far more a product of circumstance than it is any particular personality clash between US President Barack Obama and the Saudi king.As such, Abdullah's departure from the scene is unlikely to radically alter the way that the kingdom sees its position in the region, and indeed the world.Riyadh's elites have had to come to terms with the thing they fear most - instability - becoming a permanent feature of their neighbourhood. It is unsettling and has moved the country towards a more aggressive activist posture; something which Saudi Arabia has always been hesitant to do.Despite friction with the United States on a number of issues ranging from clandestine talks with Iran, to the failure to make peace between Israel and Palestine, the kingdom will have to maintain its ties come what may, and no matter who leads either country.Nevertheless, be it in the realm of military interventions in Bahrain or Yemen, or playing around with oil prices to defend market share and hurt regional competitors, the kingdom is flexing its muscles in a way that has not been seen since the days of King Faisal.The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), however, poses a particularly difficult conundrum. It seeks to undermine the most fundamental pillar upon which the al-Saud's rule rests; its Islamic legitimacy to govern the land of the prophet and act as the custodian of the two holy mosques.That the kingdom is not safe from ISIL's retribution was illustrated on January 5, when two Saudi border guards along with their commander were killed in a combined suicide and shooting attack that bore all the hallmarks of al-Qaeda-ISIL backing.It is clear that for the al-Saud, there can be no compromise in dealing with the organisation until they are destroyed. This is an uncomfortable policy for the ruling house, who must manage the tension between taking on an entity which seeks to unseat it, while also understanding that sympathy for ISIL among Saudi's citizenry is not uncommon.The fact, for instance, that ISIL is said to be using adapted versions of Saudi text books in its schools, and much of its hardline anti-Shia outlook is stirred by firebrand clerics in the kingdom illustrates the complexity of the relationship between the kingdom and would-be caliphate. Steering roleLastly, in its relations with the GCC, the kingdom has always maintained an overbearing role, which is largely why the smaller Gulf countries with the exception of Bahrain, eschew further integration with it. Demography and geography ensure that Saudi will still play this role in its own neighbourhood, largely steering the GCC towards a hawkish line on Iran, while attempting to collectivise security, economy and foreign policy postures.But with regard to bringing Qatar back into the fold, it has been Abdullah, in particular, that has pushed forward the agenda. Without Abdullah, the possibility of fully mending intra-GCC ties, for example by brokering a reconciliation between Qatar and the Sisi government in Egypt, hangs more finely in the balance.Can Saudi Arabia manage the turbulent changes in the region without its king? Yes, of course, the family have plenty of capable princes, well-educated thinkers and capable technocrats. As such the kingdom's new-found assertiveness is unlikely to end. While the region is unstable, Saudi Arabia will be looking to see in what ways it can assert its own interests.Domestically the recent influx of a number of younger princes into the cabinet, which Abdullah has personally overseen, has gone some way to alleviating the concerns of many Saudis that vacuums of governance will open up as the older generation of princes relinquish their grip on power.What the kingdom loses however is a figurehead that is close to irreplaceable. There are certain intangible qualities that make a statesman; strength, cunning, fearlessness, and a deep understanding of your own domestic political scene, all of which Abdullah bin Abdulaziz possessed in abundance.Saudi Arabia without his leadership will still be a great power in the region, if not the great power in the region, but it will not be the same without him.

Many are wondering what it will take to convince Turkey that the threat posed by ISIL is real and that action by Ankara is required as Syria enters its fourth year of civil war.As things stand, Turkey's policy towards Syria has been to balance its desire to see regime change in Damascus against the regional threat posed by ISIL. However, this policy is unsustainable in the long term.One event that could forcibly trigger Turkey's entry into the war would be an attack on the Tomb of Suleyman Shah - the grandfather of Osman I, the founder of the Ottoman Empire.Today, the tomb is a Turkish exclave located inside Syria's Aleppo governorate only 25km from the Syrian-Turkish border. Even though the tomb is located inside Syria, it is sovereign Turkish territory. To complicate matters further, the road from Turkey to the tomb passes through the besieged town of Kobane. Imperial legacyTurkey finds itself possessing a tiny piece of territory inside Syria after Suleyman Shah drowned in the Euphrates River in 1236 and his tomb remained under the control of the Ottoman Empire. When the British and the French carved up the Middle East after World War I, the Government of the Grand National Assembly, the precursor to the Republic of Turkey, was keen to keep Suleyman Shah's tomb under Turkish control. Turkey was granted the tomb and the land surrounding it in the 1921 Treaty of Ankara, which ended the brief Franco-Turkish war. In return, Turkey agreed to recognise French sovereignty over the newly established French Mandate of Syria and Lebanon. Turkey is viewed by many in NATO as more of a hindrance than a partner under Erdogan's leadership. Many in NATO are puzzled as to why Turkey has not played a bigger role in taking on ISIL.Article 9 of the Treaty of Ankara states:"The Tomb of Suleyman Shah, the grandfather of the Sultan Osman, founder of the Ottoman dynasty [the tomb known under the name of Turk Mezari], situated at Jaber-Kalesi, shall remain, with its appurtenances, the property of Turkey, who may appoint guardians for it and may hoist the Turkish flag there."Almost a century later, Turkey still claims sovereignty over this tiny piece of land - no bigger than two football pitches.Today, the tomb is defended by Turkish infantry and Special Forces. Even after years of deadly fighting inside Syria, which at times occurs close to the tomb, Turkey has remained committed to its defence.Attack on NATO?Last year ISIL threatened to attack the tomb if Turkey did not remove its forces but never carried it out in the end. However, this threat posed an interesting question for western policy makers: Would NATO be obligated to intervene on behalf of Ankara, if attacked, since Turkey is a member of the alliance?Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan seems to think so. Erdogan has claimed that an attack on the tomb would be an attack on Turkey, and by extension of its membership, an attack on NATO.In reality, NATO's commitment is not as black and white as Erdogan might think. The security alliance is based on the idea of collective defence. For NATO and its members, an attack on one is considered to be an attack on all. This commitment to collective defence is made explicitly clear in Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty - the alliance's founding document. Article 6 of the treaty specifically states that NATO's defence guarantee applies to "the territory of Turkey".But Erdogan should not get his hopes up.

Inside Story - Turkey's ISIL dilemmaInvoking Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is not automatic. Any country which feels it has been the victim of an attack and wants NATO's assistance must first secure a unanimous vote from all 28 members of the alliance.Ultimately, invoking Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is a political decision taken by the elected leaders of each member state.Turkey is viewed by many in NATO as more of a hindrance than a partner under Erdogan's leadership. Many in NATO are puzzled as to why Turkey has not played a bigger role in taking on ISIL.They have also been put off by Erdogan's crackdown on political dissent, limitations on press freedom, and his drive to bring a more conservative brand of Islam into what is still a largely secular society.Consequently, in the current political climate it would be inconceivable to believe that all 28 NATO members would vote to invoke Article 5 to defend what many outside Turkey might consider to be a post-imperial anomaly.One thing is clear: If Turkey is serious about protecting its small patch of territory inside Syria, then it had better be drawing up contingency plans to act alone.Luke Coffey is a research fellow specialising in transatlantic and Eurasian security at a Washington DC based think-tank. He previously served as a special adviser to the British defence secretary and was a commissioned officer in the United States army.

For Armenia, its role as a reliable partner and ally of Russia has never faced any real challenge. Much of this reliance on Russia stems from essential security and economic concerns.Armenia's security reliance on Russia is driven by a virtual state of war with neighbouring Azerbaijan, rooted in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, only exacerbated by the absence of "normal" diplomatic relations and closed border with Turkey. And with the Turkish refusal to recognise the Armenian genocide, this threat perception is only magnified.For small, landlocked Armenia, a strategic alliance with Russia is generally accepted as essential in the face of such inherent insecurity. And beyond an imperative of security, Armenia also depends on Russia as a crucial source of remittances, or money sent home by large numbers of Armenians living and working in Russia.Yet, there is a surprisingly intense debate now under way within Armenia that seriously questions these fundamental pillars of the Armenian-Russian relationship.New challengeMore specifically, this new challenge to Armenia's traditional reliance on Russia is driven by two significant factors: tragedy and timing.

Armenia to join Russian-led trading blocA tragedy first triggered this turnabout when a rogue Russian soldier killed an entire Armenian family, save for a six-month-old infant who later died of his stab wounds, in Gyumri, Armenia.Gyumri is the country's second-largest city and the host of the Russian military base.That senseless act of random violence in the early morning hours of January 12, sparked an immediate and spontaneous outpouring of grief and mourning.But the initial shock and grief quickly turned to outrage, as Russian military officials seemed to take charge of the case with a heavy-handed disdain and disregard for local sensitivities.That perception was only deepened when Armenian officials were slow to respond or react.It was this mishandling of the tragedy, even more than the murder itself, that then triggered a series of demonstrations and protests by local Armenians in Gyumri.Fearing that the Russian conscript would be moved from his detention within the Russian base and likely returned to Moscow, local residents demanded that the self-confessed soldier be turned over to Armenian authorities.Calming tensionsFor its part, local Armenian officials and the prosecutor general scurried to calm tensions by first announcing that Armenian investigators were actively participating in the interrogation of the soldier, and then, once that did little to appease the protesters, vowed that the soldier would be tried in Armenia.Amid the Armenian officials' wrangling over the legal process of the case, the absence of any higher level Armenian officials, and the failure of the Armenian president to declare a day of mourning or even make a statement, only escalated the tension.And days later, no Armenian official attended the funeral of the murdered family, thereby triggering a fresh wave of indignant protests in the city, that later spread to the capital, Yerevan. The protests soon moved to the Russian consulate in Gyumri before culminating in a march on the Russian base as protesters broke through a police cordon to enter the base itself. The family members are only latest victims in murders and shootings by Russian servicemen stationed at the Russian military base. In 1999, two drunk Russian soldiers opened fire on a local market in the city, killing two and injuring dozens of others.Yet, there is a deeper context to this public anger. In fact, that family is only the latest victim in murders and shootings by Russian servicemen stationed at the Russian military base.In 1999, two drunk Russian soldiers opened fire on a local market in the city, killing two and injuring dozens of others. And in 2013, two children were killed by unexploded ordnance on an unguarded tank firing range on the premises of the Russian base.Bad timingAgainst this backdrop, the tragedy has also raised renewed questions of base security, with outrage that the armed soldier who reportedly deserted his post triggered no notice or alarm by Russian military personnel at the base.Although this tragedy has prompted a new challenge to Armenian-Russian relations, it is also exacerbated by a second factor, timing.The timing of this tragedy could not be much worse, for several reasons. First, in 2013, in what many perceived as Russian pressure on its so-called "strategic partner", Armenia was forced to scrap its planned free trade deal with the European Union in favour of joining the Russian-led Eurasian Union.Second, a steady supply of arms and advanced weapons systems to Azerbaijan from Russia has sowed further distrust.And most recently, the negative impact on the Armenian economy from western sanctions imposed on Russia, evident in a sudden depreciation of the Armenian currency and reflected in a steep decline in remittances, has only revealed the asymmetry and lack of parity in Armenia's "partnership" with Russia.It seems clear that this unexpected challenge to Armenia's reliance on Russia will not dissipate any time soon.Richard Giragosian is the founding director of the Regional Studies Centre, an independent think-tank in Yerevan, Armenia.

It is no secret that Russia views the South Caucasus as being in its natural sphere of influence. In light of Russia's annexation of Crimea, and on the back of Moscow's recent treaties with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgians have legitimate reasons to believe that Russian activity in their country will only increase in 2015.Consequently, many are keeping a close eye on the Georgian province of Samtskhe-Javakheti - a majority ethnically Armenian region located just three hours' drive from the nation's capital city of Tbilisi.Causing instability in Samtskhe-Javakheti would achieve two goals for Moscow.First, it would further dismember the territorial integrity of Georgia. The Georgian provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia are already under Russian occupation. By some accounts they are closer than ever to being annexed by Moscow. An independent Samtskhe-Javakheti, or one under Russian influence, would divide Georgia down the middle.A perfect stormArmenian separatism in Samtskhe-Javakheti might not be as vocal as it was only a few years ago; but there is still a fear that Moscow could easily reenergise separatist movements in the region.Secondly, and more importantly for Russia, bringing the region under Moscow's influence would make a land corridor between Russia and Armenia, via South Ossetia, one step closer. This is important because Russia maintains a sizeable military presence in Armenia. The bulk of the Russian force is based in the city of Gyumri and consists of approximately 5,000 soldiers and dozens of fighter planes and attack helicopters.

People & Power - Georgia: Corridor of powerRussia has long had the difficult challenge of supplying these forces, especially since Georgia and Turkey refuse transit rights. This has left a reliance on Iran, which for obvious reasons, is not ideal for Russia.It is not only for Russia that Samtskhe-Javakheti is strategically important, but also for Europe.The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and the South Caucasus Pipeline, carrying oil and gas respectively from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean Sea, passes through the province.As the possibility of more Central Asian oil and gas finding its way to Europe becomes likely, these pipelines bypassing Russia will become a vital part of Europe's energy security.In addition, the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railway, which is due to open later this year, passes through Samtskhe-Javakheti. It is expected that this rail line will eventually transport 3 million passengers and over 15 million tons of freight each year.There is a perfect storm brewing in the region and if Russia wanted to exploit the situation in Samtskhe-Javakheti it could not ask for better timing than now.Russian sympathiesFirst is the fact that many Javakheti Armenians have Russian sympathies. Until its closure in 2007, the Russian military base there was the single biggest source of employment. It has also been reportedthat Moscow is issuing Russian passports to ethnic Armenians living in the region.The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and the South Caucasus Pipeline, carrying oil and gas respectively from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean Sea, passes through the province.This in itself is telling; Russia issued passports to Abkhazians and South Ossetians just before its 2008 invasion of Georgia and also issued passports to Crimeans ahead of the annexation of Crimea last year.But Russia is only part of the problem. Many of the grievances Javakheti Armenians have are a result of poor policy making by the central government in Tbilisi.Many Javakheti Armenians feel that their culture and language are discriminated against. There has been a decrease in the quality of education among the Javakheti Armenian population.The bilingual education program of teaching in both Georgian and Armenian has been described as a "total failure" because there are not enough qualified teachers with proficiency in both languages.Unemployment is high in Samtskhe-Javakheti and future economic prospects in the region look bleak. Many Javakheti Armenians travel to Russia or Armenia for work.Economy strainedThanks to the drop in the value of the Russian ruble - almost one-third of its value in the past year - remittances have also decreased. The unusually harsh winter in the region is placing a further strain on economic activity.Then there is the issue of citizenship and immigration. Many Javakheti Armenians do not have Georgian citizenship. Instead, many hold Armenian passports because finding seasonal work in Armenia and Russia is easier this way.Until recently, Armenian citizens were allowed to live and work inside Georgia without any special authorisation as long as they crossed the border back into Armenia at least once a year.Last September this changed. Now Javakheti Armenians without Georgian citizenship can only stay in Georgia for three months at a time. Longer term residency permits are costly.These policies breed animosity and form a perfect storm that could easily be exploited by Russia.It does not have to be this way. Sensible policies can be pursued by Tbilisi to address the legitimate grievances of the Javakheti Armenians. The West can make it clear to Russia that further meddling in Georgia's domestic affairs could lead to additional sanctions.The last thing the South Caucasus needs is another sectarian conflict.Luke Coffey is a research fellow specialising in transatlantic and Eurasian security at a Washington DC based think tank. He previously served as a special adviser to the British defence secretary and was a commissioned officer in the United States army.

While global media appears to be focused on debating the limitations on free speech in France following the attack on the French satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo, it is worth remembering that France is not the only country whose media professionals are targeted.For years, journalists in Azerbaijan have suffered harsh penalties for defending their freedom of speech - from prison sentences to interrogation and the confiscation of broadcasting equipment.On December 26, at around 10:30am, a group of police officers and investigators stormed the Baku bureau of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, ransacking the company's safe, seizing company documents, the official seal and equipment, while keeping the staff hostage in a conference room for over five hours. Once the search was over, the office was sealed shut. The staff was let go only to be forcefully summoned a day later at the heavy crimes unit of the state prosecutor's office for questioning.In just a few days, over 30 former and current staff members of RFE/RL were questioned, including the bureau's cleaner. On December 30, the government accused the radio and its staff of espionage, money laundering and appropriation of funds as part of the ongoing criminal investigation against foreign-funded entities in Azerbaijan.Similar measures were taken against Institute for Reporters' Freedom and Safety (IRFS), the Media Rights Institute, and International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX). The offices of all three were raided in August and sealed shut with IREX leaving the country shortly after. The director of IRFS, Emin Huseynov, remains in hiding.Consistent targetingThis is not the first time the RFE/RL station, locally called Azadliq Radio (Liberty Radio) is targeted by the authorities. In 2009, its FM broadcast was shut down. BBC radio service and Voice of America followed suit. For years, the police harassed the radio's reporters, often confiscating or breaking their equipment or detaining them for endless hours of interrogation.On December 5, Azadliq Radio investigative journalist and the host of the radio's daily show, Khadija Ismayilova, was arrested and placed in pre-trial detention for two months. Accused of "incitement to suicide" or "an attempt to suicide" as per Article 125 of the Criminal Code, Ismayilova remains in jail - even though her accuser, Tural Mustafayev, has withdrawn his complaint.Prior to this charge, Ismayilova was already facing an unrelated criminal trial for defamation linked to her posting a document on Facebook revealing the identity of a man who was an informant for Azerbaijan's intelligence services.Mustafayev had accused Ismayilova of inciting him to attempt suicide and "insulting his honour and dignity on social networks and among her friends following the break-up of their relations and his intention to marry another woman". On December 30, the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed Ismayilova's appeal for house arrest.Prior to this charge, Ismayilova was already facing an unrelated criminal trial for defamation linked to her posting a document on Facebook revealing the identity of a man who was an informant for Azerbaijan's intelligence services.In October, when travelling for a conference in Prague, Ismayilova was prevented from leaving the country. A little over a week before this trip, Ismayilova was searched and detained for four hours at Baku International Airport. She was returning from Strasbourg where she talked about the deteriorating human rights conditions in Azerbaijan. Her investigative work uncovered many of the hidden and illegal business dealings of the ruling Aliyev family and other government officials for which she is recognised internationally. Ismayilova is the recipient of Global Shining Award, the Gerd Bucerius Free Press of Eastern Europe Award, the Courage of Journalism Award, and named one of the Brave Thinkers of the world by Atlantic magazine.'Treason'?Was it a coincidence that Ismayilova's detention came just a day after the country's chief of staff, Ramiz Mehdiyev, accused Ismayilova of treason and being a foreign spy? Or that the radio station was raided and then closed in another few weeks time?In his 60-page diatribe on "Western Colonialism", Mehdiyev wrote: "Their main concern is lip service to their bosses abroad and keeping good relations with them. The example is Azadliq Radio's journalist Kahdija Ismayilova. Together with her colleague 'friends' she puts on anti-Azerbaijani shows, makes absurd statements, openly demonstrates destructive attitude towards well-known members of the Azerbaijani community, and spreads insulting lies. It is clear this sort of defiance pleases Ms Ismayilova's patrons abroad."He concluded: "Overall there is an understanding within the society that Azadliq Radio and its employees are on a disgusting path. There is no need to prove that provision of false information is the same as working for the foreign secret service. This is treason. This is what journalists and people with a healthy mindset would think. If the symbol of democracy is Khadija Ismayilova, then it is awful to imagine what future awaits the society."

Azerbaijan arrests renowned rights activistSiyavush Novruzov, an MP from the ruling party, agrees. In an interview with a local news site, Novruzov said: "Every place that works for foreign intelligence and the Armenian lobby should be searched."The Armenian lobby is just another popular tool used by government circles to punish dissent in Azerbaijan. Despite its support for Track Two diplomacy initiatives, Aliyev's regime was quick to accuse Leyla Yunus and Rauf Mirkadirov of treason and spying for Armenia this year.Both Yunus and Mirkadirov have been engaged in public diplomacy initiatives pressing for reconciliation between Armenia and Azerbaijan for over a decade. The authorities were fully aware of their work for years.And yet, in what has been by far the most unprecedented year of crackdowns, Azerbaijan continues to maintain a steady relationship with Europe and the image of a transforming country, young and rich, and eager to spend so long as its critics keep quiet.With many of the country's prominent advocates, lawyers, and journalists in jail; independent media platforms under attack; and only a handful of international non-governmental organisations left in the country, there is little hope for the country's positive transformation anytime soon. So long as President Ilham Aliyev keeps saying there are no political prisoners and no limitations on freedom of speech in Azerbaijan - conjuring the illusion of a democratic country - little is going to change in this country.Arzu Geybullayeva is a political analyst for the Caucasus region and a specialist in human rights and press freedom in Azerbaijan.