beforethe hearing board ofthe illinois ... › ans15pr0111.pdflien from $23,993.23to $12,357.28, a...

In the Matter of:

BEFORE THE HEARING BOARD

OF THE

ILLINOIS ATTORNEY REGISTRATION

AND DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION

STEPHEN THOMAS FIEWEGER,

Attorney-Respondent,

No. 6195728.

Commission No.: 2015PR00111

FILED-January 7, 2016

RESPONDENT STEPHEN THOMAS FIEWEGER'S ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

Now comes Respondent, Stephen Thomas Fieweger ("Respondent"), by Elizabeth A.

Granoff admits that he was licensed to practice law in Illinois on November 5, 1987, but denies

the conclusory portions of the remaining allegations of the prefatory paragraph and answers as

follows:

Allegations common to all counts

1. Between 1989 and October 2014, Respondent was an associate and then a partner

in the law firm Katz Nowinski P.C, f/k/a Katz, Huntoon and Fieweger, P.C. ("Katz Nowinski")

based in Moline, Illinois.

ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations of Paragraph One and states that

between November 1987 and October 2014 Respondent was a lawyer with the firm and its

predecessor firm.

2. Respondent was licensed to practice law in the State of Iowaas well as Illinois.

ANSWER: Admitted.

FILEDJAN 11 2016

ATTY REG &DISC COMMCHICAGO

COUNT I

(Conversion ofRobertSwanson's settlementfunds)

3. On March 22, 2011, Respondent agreed on behalf of Katz Nowinski to represent

Robert E. Swanson ("Swanson") in a claim for damages against the Scott County Family YMCA

("YMCA") in Davenport, Iowa, arising from injuries that Swanson sustained when he slipped

and fell on a wet floor in a YMCA building. Respondent and Swanson agreed that Respondent's

fee would be contingent upon recovery in the amount of one-third of any recovery, and they

executed a written fee agreement reflecting those terms.

ANSWER: Admitted.

4. On September 30, 2011, Respondent filed a lawsuit for Swanson in the Iowa

District Court for Scott County, Iowa, titled Robert E. Swanson v. Scott County Family YMCA, a

not-for-profit corporation, case number 07821 LACE119109.

ANSWER: Admitted.

5. In November 2013, Swansonand the YMCA agreed to a settlementof Swanson's

claims wherein the YMCA agreedto pay Swanson a total amountof $60,000.

ANSWER: Admitted.

6. Respondent and Swanson agreed that the settlement proceeds of $60,000 would

be disbursed as follows: $25,000 to Swanson; $2,642.72 to Respondent and Katz Nowinski for

reimbursement of costs advanced; $8,364.05 to Respondent and Katz Nowinski for attorney fees;

and $23,993.23 to be held in a Katz Nowinski client trust account for the satisfaction ofa lien for

that amount that Medicare perfected against the settlement proceeds.

ANSWER: Admitted.

7. The agreed disbursements described above left an unpaid balance of $11,635.95

toward Respondent's one-third fee of$20,000 ($20,000 - $8,364.05 = $11,635.95). Respondent

and Swanson agreed that the balance of Respondent's fee only would be paid on the condition

that Medicare agreed to reduce its lien, and it would be paid from the balance that remained of

the $23,993.23 after the satisfaction of the lien. Respondent and Swanson agreed that if

Medicare did not reduce its lien, Respondent would receive no further legal fee. Respondent and

Swanson agreed that if Medicare reduced its lien by an amount less than $11,635.95, Respondent

would waive his fee by the amount of the shortfall. Respondent and Swanson agreed that if

Medicare reduced its lien by more than $11,635.95, the surplus after the completion of

Respondent's fee amount would be disbursed to Swanson.

ANSWER: Respondent denies the first sentence of paragraph 7. Respondent

denies the second sentence of paragraph 7. Respondent denies the third sentence of

paragraph 7. Respondent admits the fourth sentence of paragraph 7,but states that the fee

was not Respondent's but rather the fee of the law firm of Katz Nowinski.

8. On November 18, 2013, Swanson executed a written settlement and release of his

claims against the YMCA, and Respondent received check number 39103 from Redwoods

Group, the YMCA's insurance carrier, payable Katz Nowinski as attorneys for Swanson, in the

amount of $60,000, pursuant to the settlement terms. At Respondent's direction, Katz Nowinski

bookkeeper Barb Knobloch ("Knobloch") deposited check number 39103 into the Katz

Nowinski client trust account bearing an account number ending in 7541 ("account number

7541") at Quad City Bank and Trust. Account number 7541 was used by Respondent and Katz

Nowinski as a depository of funds belonging to clients or third parties and, potentially, to

Respondent or the law firm.

ANSWER: Admits the first sentence of paragraph 8. Respondent admits that

account number 7541 was used to deposit funds with client's or third parties, and denies

that the funds potentially belonged to the Respondent but admits that the funds belonged

to the law firm.

9. On November 20, 2013, case number 07821 LACE119109 was dismissed with

prejudice.

ANSWER: Admitted.

10. On November 22, 2013, at Respondent's direction, Knobloch issued check

number 2182 drawn on account number 7541 and made payable to Swanson in the amount of

$25,000, pursuant to the agreement between Respondent and Swanson described in paragraphs

six and seven, above. Swanson received and negotiated the check shortly afterward.

ANSWER: Admitted.

11. On November 30, 2013, at Respondent's direction, Knobloch, issued check

number 2183 drawn on account number 7541 and made payable to KatzNowinski in the amount

of $11,006.77 for its expenses and partial attorney fees, pursuant to the agreement between

Respondent and Swanson described in paragraphs six and seven, above ($2,642.72 +$8,364.05

= $11,006.77).

ANSWER: Admitted.

12. Following the issuance of check numbers 2182 and 2183 as described above,

Respondent held $23,993.23 of Swanson's settlement funds in trust account number 7541

pending the satisfaction of the lien for that amount asserted by Medicare, pursuant to the

agreement between Respondent and Swanson described in paragraphs six and seven, above.

ANSWER: Admitted.

13. Before February 2015, Medicare did not, at any time, agree to reduce its lien.

ANSWER: Respondent neither admits nor denies for lack of information since

Respondent was no longer employed as a lawyer at Katz Huntoon & Fieweger, P.C. on

October 15, 2014. Respondent affirmatively states that in November 2013 Respondent sent

a letter to Medicare's authorized agent requesting that Medicare accept a reduction of its

lien from $23,993.23 to $12,357.28, a reduction of $11,635.95, the amount of fees due under

the written contingent fee agreement with Swanson.

14. Before February 2015, Swanson did not, at any time, authorize Respondent or

Katz Nowinski to use any portion of his remaining $23,993.23 in the Katz Nowinski trust

account for attorney fees, Respondent's or Respondent's law firm's business purposes, or any

purpose.

ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations in Paragraph 14 and demands strict

proof thereof.

15. On December 30, 2013, Respondent directed Knobloch to immediately take

$11,635 from Swanson's trust funds, so as to complete the payment of his one-third fee ($11,635

+ $8,364.05 = $19,999.05). Pursuant to Respondent's direction, on December 31, 2013,

Knobloch issued check number 2193 drawn on account number 7541 and made payable to Katz

Nowinski in the amount of $11,635. Knobloch deposited the check into the Katz Nowinski

general business account.


proof thereof.

16. When Respondent directed Knobloch to take Swanson's funds as attorney fees on

December 30, 2013, Respondent did not have authority to do so.


proof thereof.

17. When Respondent directed Knobloch to take Swanson's funds as attorney fees on

December 30, 2013, Respondent knewthat he did not have authority to do so.


proof thereof.

18. The Katz Nowinski general business account was used by Respondent and Katz

Nowinski as a repository for their own funds including earned attorney fees and funds received

as reimbursements for advanced expenses, and it was used to pay the law firm's general business

expenses including attorneys' and employees' compensation. Following the deposit of check

number 2193 into the general business account, the funds were expended for the law firm's

general business purposes.

ANSWER: Admitted.

19. Katz Nowinski's system for determining a partner's annual compensation

included consideration of the amount of attorney fees attributable to that partner which the firm

received in the preceding calendar year. By transferring Swanson's $11,635 to the firm as

earned fees by December 31, 2013, Respondent increased the total of earned fees that were

attributed to him for 2013. Respondent thereby influenced, or he attempted to influence, the

compensation that the firm would award him in2014.


proof thereof.

20. Respondent's conduct, described above, constituted conversion of $11,635 of

Swanson's settlement funds.


proof thereof.

21. In October 2014, Respondent left Katz Nowinski and opened his own law office.

Swanson's file remained with Katz Nowinski.

ANSWER: Admitted.

22. In January and February, 2015, Katz Nowinski attorney John F. Doak ("Doak")

reviewed Swanson's file and related trust account records. Doak discovered that Medicare had

asserted a lien for $23,993.23 against Swanson's settlement proceeds, that $23,993.23 of the

settlement proceeds had been left in trust in November 2013 for the purpose ofresolving the lien,

that the lien had never been resolved or reduced, and that Respondent had wrongly directed the

law firm to take $11,635 of those funds in December 2013, all as set forth above.


proof thereof.

23. On or about February 13, 2015, Medicare offered to accept $15,735.61 in

satisfaction of its lien. Swanson agreed to the offer.

ANSWER: Respondent neither admits nordenies for lack of information.

24. On February 16, 2015, Doak directed the law firm to deposit $11,635 into trust

account number 7541 in replacement of the funds that Respondent had caused to be taken,

thereby restoring the balance ofSwanson's funds in trust to $23,993.23.

ANSWER: Respondent neither admits nor denies for lack of information.

25. On February 19, 2015, Katz Nowinski issued check number 2320 drawn on

account number 7541 and made payable to Medicare in the amount of $15,735.61 and mailed it

to Medicare's representative, pursuant to the above-described settlement of the lien.

ANSWER: Respondent neither admits nor denies for lack of information.

26. On February 27, 2015, at Doak's direction, the law firm refunded to Swanson the

full remaining balance ofhis funds, inthe amount of$8,257.62, and waived any further legal fee.

ANSWER: Respondent neither admits nor denies for lack of information. By

further answer Respondent states that if Katz Nowinski decided to waive the $8,257.62 fee

that it was entitled to from Swanson, it was a business decision over which Respondent had

no discretion or decision making authority as Respondent was no longer a partner at the

law firm.

27. By reason of the conduct described above, Respondent has engaged in the

following misconduct:

a. failing to hold $11,635 of Swanson's settlement funds, which wasproperty of a client or third person that was in Respondent'spossession in connection with a representation, separate fromRespondent's and Respondent's law firm's own property, byconduct including conversion of the funds by removing the fundsfrom trust and using them for Respondent's and his law firm's ownpurposes as an alleged earned fee without Swanson's authority, inviolation of Rule 1.15(a) of the Illinois Rules of ProfessionalConduct (2010); and

b. conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation,by conduct including conversion of $11,635 of Swanson'ssettlement funds by removing the funds from trust and using themfor Respondent's and his law firm's own purposes as an allegedearned fee without Swanson's authority, in violation of Rule 8.4(c)of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010).


proof thereof.

By way of affirmative matter Respondent states as follows:

1. That upon settlement of the Swanson matter, under the writtenone-third contingent fee agreement, Katz Nowinski had earned an attorney fee of$20,000.00.

2. That the transferred funds of $11,635.95 were the fees earned byKatz Nowinski upon settlement in November 2013.

3. That Respondent in the past had Medicare the reductions of itsliens in past personal injury claims that he had resolved and had never hadMedicare reject his proposed reduction amount in the past.

4. That the proposed reduction in Swanson's case allowed RobertSwanson to collect a settlement recovery of $20,000.00, rather than $13,364.05 ifyour Respondenthad paid the $23,993.23.

5. That on May 22, 2015 Katz Nowinski, P.C. and Respondententered into a written settlement agreement, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit1, which resolved any claims that Katz Nowinski had regarding the Swansonmatter.

COUNT II

(Conversion ofKen McCool's security retainer)

28. On March 1, 2012, Respondent agreed on behalf of Katz Nowinski to represent

Ken McCool ("McCool") and his son, Austin McCool, to research the viability ofa legal action

for Austin on the basis of defamation of character as a result of derogatory internet postings

about Austin. Respondent and McCool agreed that McCool would pay Respondent a $1,000

security retainer and that Respondent would bill against the retainer at a rate of $225 per hour.

On March 7, 2012, McCool paidRespondent the $1,000 security retainer.

ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations in sentence 1 as Respondent soley

represented Austin McCool and never represented Ken McCool. Respondent denies the

allegations in sentence 2 stating that this was a flat fee agreement for the legal performed.

Respondent admits the allegations in sentence3.

29. McCool's security retainer constituted funds to secure payment of legal fees to

be withdrawn by Respondent only as fees were earned and expenses incurred. As such, those

funds remained the property of McCool until earned, and were required to be deposited andheld

in one or more separate and identifiable interest- or dividend-bearing client trust accounts,

pursuant to Rule 1.15 of the Illinois Rules ofProfessional Conduct, and maintained therein until

earned by Respondent.


proofthereof. Respondentaffirmatively states that this was a flat fee agreement.

30. On March 7, 2012, Respondent, or a Katz Nowinski employee acting at his

direction, deposited McCool's security retainer into the Katz Nowinski client trust account

bearing an account number ending in the four digits 7525 ("account number 7525") at Quad City

Bank and Trust. Account number 7525 was used by Respondent and Katz Nowinski as a

depository of funds belonging to clients or third parties and, potentially, to Respondent or the

law firm.

ANSWER: Admitted.

31. Between March 1 and March 30, 2012, Respondent expended 2.9 hours on

McCool's matter.

ANSWER: Admitted with respect to client Austin McCool. Denies as to Ken

McCool.

32. On March 30, 2012, Respondent approved and directed the mailing ofan itemized

billing invoice to McCool. The invoice reflected that as of that date, Respondent had earned

$652.50 (2.9 hours x $225) and stated that he would draw that amount from McCool's security

retainer, and that abalance of$347.50 ofthe retainer would remain in trust for McCool.

10

ANSWER: Admitted allegations in sentence 1, and denies the remaining allegations

and contends that the invoice speaks for itself.

33. Subsequently, at Respondent's direction, Katz Nowinski withdrew $652.50 of

McCool's retainer funds from trust account number 7525 as earned fees for Respondent's

services. Thereafter, a balance of $347.50 of McCool's funds remained in the account.

ANSWER: Admits the allegations in sentence 1 and denies the remaining

allegations due to the fact that the payment was for a flat fee.

34. McCool did not, at any time, authorize Respondent to use, prior to earning it, any

portion of his remaining $347.50 in the Katz Nowinski trust account for attorney fees or for

Respondent's or Respondent's law firm's business purposes.


proof thereof.

35. After March 30, 2012, Respondent expended no further time and incurred no

further expenses inrelation to McCool's matter beyond the time and expenses listed inhis March

30 invoice. Respondent earned no further fees in the matter.

ANSWER: Admits the allegations in sentence 1, and denies the remaining

allegations as this was a flat fee.

36. On January 31, 2014, Respondent informed Barb Knobloch ("Knobloch"), who

was the bookkeeper for Katz Nowinski, that McCool's funds on deposit were part ofa "flat fee"

that McCool had paid, and he directed her to apply McCool's trust account balance to attorney

fees. Pursuant to Respondent's direction, Knobloch transferred the remaining $347.50 of

McCool's funds from account number 7525 into the Katz Nowinski general business account.

11

ANSWER: Admits with respect to client Austin McCool. Denies remaining

allegations as to Ken McCool.

37. The Katz Nowinski general business account was used by Respondent and Katz

Nowinski as a repository for their own funds including earned attorney fees and funds received

as reimbursements for advanced expenses, and it was used to pay the law firm's generalbusiness

expenses including attorneys' and employees' compensation. Following the transfer of

McCool's funds into the general business account, the funds were expended for the law firm's

general business purposes.

ANSWER: Admitted.

38. Katz Nowinski's system for determining a partner's annual compensation

included consideration of the amount of attorney fees attributable to that partner which the firm

received in the preceding calendar year. By transferring McCool's $347.50 to the firm as an

earned fee, Respondent increased the total of earned fees that were attributed to him for 2013.

Respondent thereby influenced, or he attempted to influence, the compensation that the firm

would award him in 2014.


proof thereof.

39. Respondent's conduct, described above, constituted conversion of funds received

in connectionwith his representation of the McCool's.


proof thereof.

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40. Respondent's representation to Knobloch that McCool's funds in account number

7525 were part of a flat fee was false. The funds were the unearned portion of a $1,000 security

retainer that McCool had given to Respondent in March 2012, and, as such, belonged to McCool.


proof thereof.

41. At the time that Respondent represented to Knobloch that McCool's funds in

account number 7525 were partof a flat fee, Respondent knew thathis representation was false.


proof thereof.



a. failing to hold $347.50 of McCool's security retainer payment,which was property of a client or third person that was inRespondent's possession in connection with a representation,separate from Respondent's law firm's own property, by conductincluding conversion of the funds by directing the removal thefunds from trust and using them for Respondent's and his lawfirm's own purposes as an alleged flat fee without McCool'sauthority, in violation of Rule 1.15(a) of the Illinois Rules ofProfessional Conduct (2010);

b. withdrawing funds received to secure payment of legal fees from aclient funds account, when such funds have not yet been earned,and the client has not yet authorized their withdrawal, by conductincluding conversion of McCool's funds for Respondent's ownpurposes, in violation of Rule 1.15(c) of the Illinois Rules ofProfessional Conduct (2010); and

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c. conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation,by conduct including converting an unearned portion of McCool'ssecurity retainer to Respondent's and Respondent's law firm's ownuses, without authorization, and by falsely representing that thefunds were part of a flat fee, in violation of Rule 8.4(c) of theIllinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010).

ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations in Paragraph 42 and demands

strict proof thereof.

By way of further answer Respondent states as follows:

1. When Katz Nowinski notified the ARDC of the alleged conversion, it had failedto communicate with the Respondent regarding the allegation as the Respondent no longerworked at the firm and the parties were involved in a legal dispute.

2. Upon learning of the allegation, in March 2015 Respondent paid to KatzNowinski the sum of $347.50 for reimbursement of the amounts that Katz Nowinski paid back toKen McCool.

COUNT III

(False letters andforgeries ofElizabeth George's signature)

43. In 2012, Respondent and Stacie L. Ballard ("Stacie") began a personal

relationship. Stacie had two minor children from a previous marriage to Jason A. Ballard

("Jason").

ANSWER: Admits in September 2012 Respondent began a personal relationship.

44. Between 2012 and 2014, Stacie received child support from Jason in the amount

of 28% of Jason's net income pursuant to the terms of a post-decree order entered on June 22,

2012, in their dissolution case (number 08 D 576 in the Circuit Court for Rock Island County,

Illinois, titled In re Stacie L. Ballard, Petitioner, and Jason A. Ballard, Respondent). Jason was

employed by Stuller, Inc. ("Stuller"). Jason paid the child support obligation by means ofwage

14

deductions that Stuller remitted to the Illinois State Disbursement Unit pursuant to a wage

deduction order.

ANSWER: Admitted.

45. In April 2014, Stacie did not receive two consecutive child support payments. In

response, on April 28, 2014, Respondent prepared a subpoena to Stuller captioned under case

number 08 D 576, and a cover letter addressed to Stuller using the letterhead and name of

attorney Elizabeth A. George ("George"), who was a first-year associate employed by Katz

Nowinski. The subpoena and letter requested that Stuller produce relevant payroll information

about Jason. Respondent asked George to sign the documents, George complied, and

Respondent caused the subpoena and letter to bedelivered to Stuller.

ANSWER: Admitted.

46. Subsequently, Respondent learned that Stuller did not comply with the subpoena,

but, instead, requested proof ofa current child support order. Respondent and Stacie also learned

that Jason's-employment with Stuller would soon terminate and Jason would receive a severance

payment from the company. Respondent and Stacie were unaware of the amount of the

severance payment and were concerned that Stuller might not deduct and remit child support

from the payment.

ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations in sentence 1. Respondent denies that

Respondent learned in April 2014 that Jason's employment was terminated. Respondent

admits that Respondent was inquiring whether Stuller would pay severance pay.

47. On August 5, 2014, Respondent prepared another letter addressed to Stuller using

George's letterhead and name. In the letter, George (purportedly) stated that she understood that

Jason was to receive a severance package and that Stuller should deduct and remit 28% ofthe net

15

severance pay for child support. The letter referred to an enclosed copy of the June 2012 order

for child support in case number 08 D 576. At the end of the letter, Respondent signed

"Elizabeth George" in a signature space above George's typed name. The letter appeared to be

authored and signed by George.

ANSWER: Respondent admits and affirmatively states that Respondent informed

Elizabeth George of this letter, informed her of its purpose and she did not object to its

transmittal.

48. When he prepared the above-described letter, Respondent knew and intended that

it appeared to be authored and signed by George.

ANSWER: Respondent Admits, and affirmatively states that Respondent informed

Ms. George of this letter.

49. On August 5, 2014, Respondent, or a person acting upon Respondent's direction,

faxed the above-described signed letter to Stuller, along with the June 2012 child support order.

ANSWER: Admitted.

50. At the time that Respondent sent the above-described letter, George had not

reviewed or authorized it. At no time did George authorize the letter, and at no time did

Respondent ask her to review or authorize it. At no time did Respondent ask George for

permission to sign her name, and at no time did George give Respondent such permission.

Respondent did not inform George ofthe letter, and George had no knowledge ofituntil August

15, 2014, or later, as set forth below.


proof thereof.

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51. Respondent's above-described letter to Stuller was false because, in fact, it was

not written, authorized or signed by George.


proof thereof. Respondent affirmatively states that the content of the letter were true and

correct, and the information contained therein was accurate.

52. At the time that Respondent sent the above-descried letter to Stuller, Respondent

knew that it was false.


proof thereof.

53. Subsequently, Stuller made no response to the above-described letter.


proof thereof.

54. On August 15, 2014, Respondent prepared a third letter addressed to Stuller using

George's letterhead and name. In the letter, George (purportedly) asked to be informed of

whether Jason received a severance payment, the amount of the payment, and whether the

company deducted and remitted 28%) ofthe net sum in accordance with the child support order.

At the end of the letter, Respondent signed "Elizabeth George" in the signature space above

George's typed name. The letter appeared to beauthored and signed by George.

ANSWER: Admitted.

55. When he prepared the above-described letter, Respondent knew and intended that

the letterappeared to be authored and signed by George.

ANSWER: Admitted.

17

56. On August 15, 2014, at approximately 11:31 a.m., Respondent, or a person acting

upon Respondent's direction, faxed the above-described signed letter to Stuller.

ANSWER: Admitted.

57. At the time that Respondent sent the above-described letter, George had not

reviewed or authorized it. At no time did George authorize the letter, and at no time did

Respondent ask her to review or authorize it. At no time did Respondent ask George for

permission to sign her name, and at no time did George give Respondent such permission.

Respondent did not inform George of the letter, and George had no knowledge of it until later, as

set forth below.

ANSWER: Admits that with respect to the August 15, 2014 letter Respondent had

not shown Ms. George the letter.

58. Respondent's above-described letter to Stuller was false because, in fact, it was

not written, authorized or signed by George.


proof thereof.

59. At the time that Respondent sent the above-descried letter to Stuller, Respondent

knew that it was false.


proof thereof. Respondent affirmatively states that the contents of the letter were true and

accurate.

60. On August 15, 2014, at approximately 1:52 p.m., Stuller employee Nancy R.

Comeaux ("Comeaux") sent an email to George that responded to her purported fax sent earlier

18

that day. In the email, Comeaux told George that Stuller had made a severance payment to Jason

from which the company had deducted and would remit 28% for child support.

ANSWER: Admitted.

61. Following her receipt of Comeaux's email, George learned for the first time that

Respondent had used her identity in the letters to Stulleron August 5 and August 15,2014, as set

forth in the paragraphs above.


proof thereof.



a. conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation,by conduct including creating and sending letters on August 5 andAugust 15, 2014, that falsely purported to be written, authorizedand signed by Elizabeth George, in violation of Rule 8.4(c) of theIllinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010).


proof thereof.

By way of affirmative matter Respondent states as follows:

1. That in July 2014, Nancy Comeaux telephoned the Respondent,informed him that Stuller had terminated Jason and asked Respondent what to dowith the income withholding order. She also indicated that Jason may be paid aseverance pay and inquired whether the income withholding order applied toseverance pay.

2. Respondent informed Ms. Comeaux that the income withholdingorder should be mailed to him as an attorney for the child support recipient andthat Stuller should notify Respondent in writing that Jason was no longeremployed by Stuller. He also asked Ms. Comeaux to advise him or Ms. Georgewhether in fact severance pay was going to be made to Jason, and if so towithhold 28 percent ofthe net amount and pay it to the State Disbursement Unit.

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3. That Jason's last day of employment at Stuller was on or beforeJuly 26, 2014.

4. That the August 5, 2014 and August 14, 2014 letters were sent toensure compliance with the existing child support order, and with no intent todefraud its recipiant, Stuller.

WHEREFORE, Respondent requests that Counts I through III be dismissed with

prejudice.

Respectfully submitted,

Elizabeth A. Granoff

617 W.Fulton

Chicago, IL 60661312 441-1250

[email protected]

Copy to:

Gary S. RapaportIllinois Attorney Registration andDisciplinary Commission3161 West White Oaks Drive, Suite 301Springfield, Illinois 62704Telephone: (217)546-3523MAINLIB #663177vlNow

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