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Beijing Normal University, 31 May 2013 Interactive Semantics: Rethinking the Composition of Meaning Kasia M. Jaszczolt University of Cambridge http://people.pwf.cam.ac.uk/kmj21 1

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Beijing Normal University, 31 May 2013. Interactive Semantics: Rethinking the Composition of Meaning Kasia M. Jaszczolt University of Cambridge http://people.pwf.cam.ac.uk/kmj21. Outline: Contextualism about meaning Default Semantics and Interactive Semantics - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Beijing Normal University, 31 May 2013

Beijing Normal University, 31 May 2013

Interactive Semantics:Rethinking the Composition of

Meaning

Kasia M. JaszczoltUniversity of Cambridge

http://people.pwf.cam.ac.uk/kmj21

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Outline:

Contextualism about meaning

Default Semantics and Interactive Semantics

Example: Representing time in discourse

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Paul Grice: Intentions

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‘A meantNN something by x’: A uttered x with the intention of inducing a belief by means of the recognition of this intention.

Grice (1989: 219)

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Implicature (implicatum)

Inferences that are drawn from an utterance. They are seen by the hearer as being intended by the speaker.

Speakers implicate, hearers infer (Horn 2004).

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Implicature (implicatum)Inferences that are drawn from an utterance. They are seen by the hearer as being intended by the speaker.

Speakers implicate, hearers infer (Horn 2004).

Inference in implicature is cancellable:

‘Tom has three cats.’ ‘Tom has three cats, if not four.’

vs. deductive inference: ((p → q) ∧ p) → q)

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Modified Occam’s Razor:

‘Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.’

Grice (1989: 47)

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Post-Gricean pragmatics:

?Where is the boundary between

semantics and pragmatics?

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Contextualism (currently dominant view)

 

‘... what is said turns out to be, in a large measure, pragmatically determined. Besides the conversational implicatures, which are external to (and combine with) what is said, there are other nonconventional, pragmatic aspects of utterance meaning, which are constitutive of what is said.’

Recanati (1989: 98; see also Recanati 2004, 2010, 2012)

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Some British people like cricket.Some but not all British people like cricket.

Everybody read Frege.Every member of the research group read Frege.

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Semantic analysis takes us only part of the way towards the recovery of utterance meaning. Pragmatic enrichment completes the process.

Enrichment: some +> some but not alleverybody +> everybody in the room, every

acquaintance of the speaker, etc.

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Pragmatic enrichment of what is said is often automatic,

subconscious (Dafault/Interactive Semantics: ‘default’). 

 

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Modulation (Recanati 2004, 2005):

The logical form becomes enriched/modulated as a result of pragmatic inference and the entire semantic/pragmatic product becomes subjected to the truth-conditional analysis.

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Modulation (Recanati 2004, 2005):

The logical form becomes ?enriched/modulated as a result of pragmatic inference and the entire semantic/pragmatic product becomes subjected to the truth-conditional analysis.

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Minimalism/contextualism debate

‘Is semantic interpretation a matter of holistic guesswork (like the interpretation of kicks under the table), rather than an algorithmic, grammar-driven process as formal semanticists have claimed? Contextualism: Yes. Literalism: No. (…) Like Stanley and the formal semanticists, I maintain that the semantic interpretation is grammar-driven.’

Recanati (2012: 148)

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Conceptual structure in Default Semantics

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?How far can the logical form be extended? ‘How much pragmatics’ is allowed in the semantic representation?

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The logical form of the sentence can not only be extended but also replaced by a new semantic representation when the primary, intended meaning demands it. Such extensions or substitutions are primary meanings and their representations are merger representations in Default Semantics. There is no syntactic constraint on merger representations.

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Object of study of the theory of meaning:

Discourse meaning intended by Model Speaker and recovered by Model Addressee (primary meaning)

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Radical contextualism

DS does not recognize the level of meaning at which the logical form is pragmatically developed/modulated as a real, interesting, and cognitively justified construct.

To do so would be to assume that syntax plays a privileged role among various carriers of information (contextualists’ mistake).

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Child to mother: Everybody has a bike.

(a) All of the child’s friends have bikes.

(b) Many/most of the child’s classmates have bikes.

(c) The mother should consider buying her son a bike.

(d) Cycling is a popular form of exercise among children.

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Child to mother: Everybody has a bike.

(a) All of the child’s friends have bikes.

(b) Many/most of the child’s classmates have bikes.

(c) The mother should consider buying her son a bike.

(d) Cycling is a popular form of exercise among children.

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Interlocutors frequently communicate their main intended content through a proposition which is not syntactically restricted.

Experimental evidence:

Pitts 2005Sysoeva and Jaszczolt 2007Schneider 2009

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Merger Representation Primary meanings are modelled as the so-called

merger representations.

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Merger Representation

Primary meanings are modelled as merger representations.

The outputs of sources of information about meaning merge and all the outputs are treated on an equal footing.

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Merger Representation Primary meanings are modelled as the so-called

merger representations.

The outputs of sources of information about meaning merge and all the outputs are treated on an equal footing. The syntactic constraint is abandoned.

Merger representations have the status of mental representations.

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Merger Representation • Primary meanings are modelled as merger

representations.

• The outputs of sources of information about meaning merge and all the outputs are treated on an equal footing. The syntactic constraint is abandoned.

• Merger representations have the status of mental representations.

• They have a compositional structure: they are proposition-like, truth-conditionally evaluable constructs.

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Sources of information for

(i) world knowledge (WK)(ii) word meaning and sentence structure (WS)(iii) situation of discourse (SD)(iv) properties of the human inferential system (IS)(v) stereotypes and presumptions about society and

culture (SC)

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SCA Botticelli was stolen from the Uffizi last week.

A painting by Botticelli was stolen from the Uffizi Gallery in Florence, Italy last week.

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ISThe author of Wolf Hall is visiting Cambridge this spring.

Hilary Mantel is visiting Cambridge this spring.

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world knowledge (WK)

word meaning and sentence structure (WS)

situation of discourse (SD)

stereotypes and presumptions properties of human inferential system (IS) about society and culture (SC)

Fig. 1: Sources of information contributing to a merger representation Σ

merger representation Σ

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The model of sources of information can be mapped onto types of processes that produce the merger representation of the primary meaning and the additional (secondary) meanings.

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Primary meaning: combination of word meaning and sentence structure (WS)

conscious pragmatic inferencepm

(from situation of discourse, social and social, cultural and cognitive defaults (CD) cultural assumptions, and world world-knowledge defaultspm (SCWDpm) knowledge) (CPIpm) Secondary meanings:

Social, cultural and world-knowledge defaultssm (SCWDsm) conscious pragmatic inferencesm (CPIsm)

Fig. 2: Utterance interpretation according to the processing model of the revised version of Default Semantics

merger representation Σ

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Mapping between sources and processes

WK SCWD or CPISC SCWD or CPIWS WS (logical form)SD CPIIS CD

In building merger representations DS makes use of the processing model and it indexes the components of with a subscript standing for the type of processing.

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 Parsimony of Levels Principle (POL):

Levels of senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.

 A: I’ve cut my finger.B: You are not going to die! Primary, main meaning: ‘There is nothing to worry

about.’ 

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Merger representations

What is expressed in the lexicon in one language may be expressed by grammar in another.

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Merger representations

What is expressed in the lexicon in one language may be expressed by grammar in another.

What is expressed overtly in one language may be left to pragmatic inference or default interpretation in another.

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e.g. sentential connectives:

Wari’ (Chapacura-Wanham, the Amazon) Tzeltal (Mayan, Mexico) no ‘or’

Maricopa (Yuman, Arizona) no ‘and’ Guugu Yimithirr (Australian Aboriginal) no ‘if’

cf. Mauri & van der Auwera 2012; Evans & Levinson 2009

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English ‘and’

Tom finished the chapter and closed the book.

and +> and then

Tom finished the chapter and then closed the book.Tom finished the chapter. He closed the book.

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‘…while perhaps none of the logical connectives are universally lexically expressed, there is no evidence that languages differ in whether or not logical connectives are present in their logical forms’.

von Fintel & Matthewson (2008: 170)

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Merger representations are compositional.

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Compositionality is a methodological principle:

‘…it is always possible to satisfy compositionality by simply adjusting the syntactic and/or semantic tools one uses, unless that is, the latter are constrained on independent grounds.’

Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991: 93)

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Compositionality should be an empirical assumption about the nature of possible human languages.

Szabó (2000)

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Fodor (2008)

compositionality on the level of referential properties (for Mentalese)

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Compositionality disputes

Ascribing generative capacity to syntax (Chomsky and followers)

Compositionality as a property of semantics Montague and followers, e.g. DRT, DPL,

representationalism Evans and Levinson (2009), generative power

of semantics/pragmatics (conceptual structure)

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Interactive compositionality (Default Semantics/Interactive Semantics)

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von Fintel and Matthewson (2008: 191):

‘We found that languages often express strikingly similar truth conditions, in spite of non-trivial differences in lexical semantics or syntax. We suggested that it may therefore be fruitful to investigate the validity of ‘purely semantic’ universals, as opposed to syntax-semantics universals’.

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What are they?

vF&M (2008):

(i) some universal semantic composition principles

(ii) Gricean principles of utterance interpretation

semantic/pragmatic processing principles48

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‘For our generativist critics, generality is to be found at the level of structural representation; for us, at the level of process’

Evans and Levinson (2009: 475)

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Interactive Semantics:

Compositionality is a semantic universal

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Selected applications of DS

definite descriptions, proper names, belief reports (Jaszczolt 1997, 1999); negation and discourse connectives (Lee 2002); presupposition, sentential connectives, number terms (Jaszczolt 2005); temporality, and modality (Jaszczolt 2009; 2012; 2013a; Srioutai 2004, 2006; Jaszczolt and Srioutai 2012; Engemann 2008; first-person reference and de se belief reports (Jaszczolt 2013b; forthcoming); conditional constructions (Elder in progress; Jaszczolt & Elder 2013 & in progress)

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Time in discourse

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Jaszczolt, K. M. 2013. ‘Temporality and epistemic commitment: An unresolved question’, in: K. Jaszczolt & L. de Saussure (eds). Time: Language, Cognition, and Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press (vol. 1 of Oxford Studies of Time in Language and Thought)

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Swahili: consecutive tense marker ka

a. …wa-Ingereza wa-li-wa-chukua wa-le maiti,3Pl-British 3Pl-Past-3Pl-take 3Pl-Dem corpses‘…then the British took the corpses,

b. wa-ka-wa-tia katika bao moja,

3Pl-Cons-3Pl-put.on on board oneput them on a flat board,

c. wa-ka-ya-telemesha maji-ni kwa utaratibu w-ote…3Pl-Cons-3Pl-lower water-Loc with order 3Pl-alland lowered them steadily into the water…’

adapted from Givón (2005: 154)

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cf. rhetorical structure rules, Asher and Lascarides 2003

Narration:

Lidia played a sonata. The audience applauded. e1 e2

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Thai

f3on t1okrain fall

(a) It is raining. (default meaning)(b) It was raining. (possible intended meaning)

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Merger Representations for the Past

(1) Lidia went to a concert yesterday.(regular past)

(2) This is what happened yesterday. Lidia goes to a concert, meets her school friend and tells her…(past of narration)

(3) Lidia would have gone to a concert (then).(epistemic necessity past)

(4) Lidia must have gone to a concert (yesterday). (epistemic necessity past)

(5) Lidia may have gone to a concert (yesterday).(epistemic possibility past)

(6) Lidia might have gone to a concert (yesterday).(epistemic possibility past)

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Fig. 3: Degree of epistemic commitment for selected expressions with past-time reference

rp, pn enp epp

1 0

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ACCΔ Σ ├

‘it is acceptable to the degree Δ that Σ is true’

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amended and extended language of DRSs (Kamp and Reyle 1993)

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Fig. 4: Σ for ‘Lidia went to a concert yesterday.’ (regular past)

x t Σ' [Lidia]CD (x) yesterday (t) [ACC

rp ├ Σ']WS Σ' [x go to a concert]WS

Σ

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Past-time reference in Thai (pragmatic)

m3ae:r3i:I kh2ian n3iy3ai:

Mary write novel

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Fig. 5: for ‘Mary wrote a novel’ (regular past)

x y '

[m3ae:r3i:I]CD (x) [n3iy3ai:]CD (y) ' [x kh2ian y]WS [ACC

rp ├ ']WS, CPIpm

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Merger Representations for the Present

(1) Lidia is at a concert now.(regular present)

(2) Lidia will be at a concert now.(epistemic necessity present)

(3) Lidia must be at a concert now.(epistemic necessity present)

(4) Lidia may be at a concert now.(epistemic possibility present)

(5) Lidia might be at a concert now.(epistemic possibility present)

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Fig. 5: Degree of epistemic commitment for expressions with present-time reference

rn enn epn

1 0

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Fig. 6: Σ for Lidia will be at a concert now’ (epistemic necessity present)

x t Σ' [Lidia]CD (x) now (t) [ACC

enn will ├ Σ']WS,CPIpm Σ' [x be at a concert]WS

Σ

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Merger Representations for the Future (1) Lidia goes to a concert tomorrow evening.

(‘tenseless’ future)(2) Lidia is going to a concert tomorrow evening.

(futurate progressive)(3) Lidia is going to go to a concert tomorrow evening.

(periphrastic future)(4) Lidia will go to a concert tomorrow evening.

(regular future)(5) Lidia must be going to a concert tomorrow evening.

(epistemic necessity future)(6) Lidia may go to a concert tomorrow evening.

(epistemic possibility future)(7) Lidia might go to a concert tomorrow evening.

(epistemic possibility future)

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Fig. 7: Degree of modal detachment for selected expressions with future-time reference

epf enf rf pf fp tf

1 0

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Fig. 8: Σ for ‘Lidia is going to a concert tomorrow evening.’ (futurate progressive)

x t Σ'

[Lidia]CD (x) tomorrow evening (t) [ACC

fp ├ Σ']WS, CPIpm Σ' [x go to a concert]WS

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Summary & Conclusions

Merger representations of Interactive Semantics can represent lexicon/grammar/pragmatics trade-offs in expressing meaning in discourse.

Compositionality is best understood as pragmatic compositionality, sought at the level of Σs rather than WS.

Cross-linguistic differences in expressing time can be explained by a universal semantics of temporality in terms of the underlying concept of epistemic modality ACCΔ ├ Σ .

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‘Holistic guesswork’?

‘Is semantic interpretation a matter of holistic guesswork (like the interpretation of kicks under the table), rather than an algorithmic, grammar-driven process as formal semanticists have claimed?’

Recanati (2012: 148)

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radical contextualism

holistic (interactive semantics)compositional (pragmatic compositionality)?algorithmic (merger representation)

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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Evans, N. and S. C. Levinson. 2009. ‘The myth of language

universals: Language diversity and its importance for cognitive science’. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32. 429-492.

Fodor, J. A. 2008. LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Givón, T. 2005. Context as other Minds: The Pragmatics of Sociality, Cognition and Communication. Amsterdam: J. Benjamins. Grice, P. 1989. Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, MA:

Harvard University Press. (especially ‘Logic and conversation’, ‘Further notes on logic and conversation’, ‘Meaning’).

Grice, P. 2001. Aspects of Reason. Ed. by R. Warner. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Groenendijk, J. and M. Stokhof. 1991. ‘Dynamic Predicate Logic’. Linguistics and Philosophy 14. 39-100.

Horn, L. R. 2004. ‘Implicature’. In: L. R. Horn and G. Ward (eds). The Handbook of Pragmatics. Oxford: Blackwell. 3-28.

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Jaszczolt, K. M. 1997. ‘The Default De Re Principle for the interpretation of belief utterances’. Journal of Pragmatics 28. 315-336.

Jaszczolt, K. M. 1999. Discourse, Beliefs, and Intentions: Semantic Defaults and Propositional Attitude Ascription. Oxford: Elsevier Science.

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Jaszczolt, K. M. 2009. Representing Time: An Essay on Temporality as Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jaszczolt, K.M. 2010a. ‘Default Semantics’. In: B. Heine and H. Narrog (eds). The Oxford Handbook of Linguistic Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 193-221.

Jaszczolt, K. M. 2010b. ‘Semantics-pragmatics interface’. In: L. Cummings (ed.). The Pragmatics Encyclopedia. London: Routledge. 428-432.

Jaszczolt, K. M. 2011. 'Communicating about the past through modality in English and Thai' (with J. Srioutai). In: A. Patard and F. Brisard (eds). Cognitive Approaches to Tense, Aspect, and Epistemic Modality. Amsterdam: J. Benjamins. 249-278.

Jaszczolt, K. M. 2012. 'Cross-linguistic differences in expressing time and universal principles of utterance interpretation'. In: L. Filipovic and K. Jaszczolt (eds). Space and Time in Languages and Cultures: Linguistic Diversity. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 95-121.

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Jaszczolt, K. M. 2013a. 'Temporality and epistemic commitment: An unresolved question'. In: K. Jaszczolt and L. de Saussure (eds). Time: Language, Cognition, and Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jaszczolt, K. M. 2013b. 'First-person reference in discourse: Aims and strategies'. Journal of Pragmatics 48. 57-70 .

Jaszczolt, K. M. in progress. Interactive Semantics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kamp, H. and U. Reyle. 1993. From Discourse to Logic: Introduction to Modeltheoretic Semantics of Natural Language, Formal Logic and Discourse Representation Theory. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Mauri, C. and J. van der Auwera. 2012. ‘Connectives’. In: K. M. Jaszczolt and K. Allan (eds). The Cambridge Handbook of Pragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 377-401.

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Recanati, F. 1989. ‘The pragmatics of what is said’. Mind and Language 4. Reprinted in: S. Davis (ed.). 1991. Pragmatics: A Reader. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 97-120. 77

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Recanati, F. 2004. Literal Meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Recanati, F. 2010. Truth-Conditional Pragmatics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Recanati, F. 2012. ‘Contextualism: Some varieties’. In: In: K. Allan and K. M. Jaszczolt (eds). The Cambridge Handbook of Pragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 135-149.

Schneider, A. 2009. Understanding Primary Meaning: A Study with Reference to Requests in Russian and British English. PhD dissertation, University of Cambridge.

Sysoeva, A. and K. M. Jaszczolt, 2007. ‘Composing utterance meaning: An interface between pragmatics and psychology’. Paper presented at the 10th International Pragmatics Conference, Göteborg, July 2007.

Szabò, Z. G. 2000. ‘Compositionality as supervenience’. Linguistics and Philosophy 23. 475-505.

von Fintel, K. and L. Matthewson. 2008. ‘Universals in semantics’. The Linguistic Review 25. 139-201.

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