benedict bernabe (2012) - the historical provenance and contemporary relevance of the developmental...

7/31/2019 Benedict Bernabe (2012) - The historical provenance and contemporary relevance of the developmental state

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Thehistoricalprovenanceandcontemporaryrelevanceofthedevelopmentalstate

BenedictBernabe

TheconceptofthedevelopmentalstateisoftenusedtodescribethepoliticaleconomyofEastAsian

countriessuchasJapan,SouthKorea,Taiwan,HongKong,andSingaporeduringtheperiodfollowingtheend

oftheSecondWorldWar.ThishistoricalerasawtherisetoeconomicprominenceoftheseEastAsian

developmentalstateswithapaceofgrowththatisunparalleledinhistory.Thisessaybeginswitha

conceptualisationofthedevelopmentalstateparadigmasanideal-typeincomparativepoliticaleconomythat

emergedoutofspecifichistorical,culturalandsocialcircumstancesasobservedbypoliticalscientistsand

economistsintheirattempttoexplaintheEastAsianMiracle.Thiswillbefollowedbyadiscussionofthe

keyobservationsandinstitutionalcharacteristicsthatdefinedthedevelopmentalstatearchetype.Theessay

willthendiscussthepresentchallengestotherelevanceofthedevelopmentalstate,includingitstheoretical

weaknesses,globalisation,andtheemergenceoftheconceptsofsocialcapitalandgoodgovernance.The

conclusionarguesthat,byexpandingitstheoreticalmodel,thedevelopmentalstateparadigmcanstillbe

relevanttodayasacomparativeanalyticalframeworkthroughwhichtheeconomicdevelopmentandpolitical

progressofmodernnation-statescanbecriticallyassessed.

Conceptualisingthedevelopmentalstate

Theideabehindthedevelopmentalstatehaslongoccupiedaprominentspaceinscholarlydiscoursethat

dealtwiththestudyofthesignificantrolethatthestateplayedininducingsocioeconomictransformation

(Evans1989;Fritz&RochaMenocal2007).Themostapparentconcernofscholarsistheelucidationofthe

characteristicsofthestateapparatusesthatlatedevelopingcountriesemployedtoengagethemarketand

fosterindustrialisation(Evans1989;Fritz&RochaMenocal2007).Theseanalysesculminatedinthe

emergenceofthedevelopmentalstateideal-typeasascholarlyconstructintheseminalworkofChalmers

JohnsonontheinternationalisationoftheJapaneseeconomy(Woo-Cumings1999).Johnson(1983)came

upwithanitemiseddescriptionofthecharacteristicsofacapitalistdevelopmentalstate.First,Johnson

observedthedemarcationbetweenthereigningclassandtherulingclasswithintheJapanesepolitical


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system:Japanesepoliticiansreignwhilebureaucratsrule.Second,Japanesestateintervenedinthemarket

usingmethodsthatconformedtomarketnorms,reducingtheriskofmarketdistortion(Johnson1983).

Finally,theJapanesestateguidedthenationaleconomybyimplementingfiscalincentives,establishedstate-

ownedfinanceinstitutions,andcoordinatedprivatesectoraction(Johnson1983).

JohnsonsanalysisoftheJapanesedevelopmentalstateisjustoneinmanyattemptsataccountingforthe

successofthenewlyindustrialisedcountriesofEastAsia(Chan,Clark&Lam1998).Wong(2004a)contends

thattheseaccountsweredominatedbythestatistparadigm,influencedbytheworkofThedaSkocpolon

BringingtheStateBackIn.Chan,ClarkandLam(1998)corroboratethiscontentionbyplacingthe

developmentalstatesquarelyinthedebatebetweenneoclassicaleconomicsandstatismontheroleofthe

statevis--visthemarketintheEastAsiancontext.Statistsrefutetheclaimmadebytheneoclassical

economicsschoolthattheEastAsianmiracleisbestexplainedbythemarket-liberalisingstancetakenby

theeconomiesoftheEastAsia(Chan,Clark&Lam1998).Fromthestatistperspective,itistheactive

participationofthestateintheeconomythatshepherdedtheEastAsianeconomictigerstotheirnewly

industrialisedstatus(Chan,Clark&Lam1998;Gereffi1998).Themainpremiseofthestatistargumentisthat

thedevelopmentstatebestaccountsfortheeconomicsuccessofEastAsia,anelementthatneoclassical

economicsconvenientlyoverlookedindefenceoftheirfreemarketrhetoric(Chan,Clark&Lam1998).

AsummaryofthestatistargumentincludedpropositionsgoingbeyondJohnsonsthreebasicingredientsof

statedevelopmentalism(Chan,Clark&Lam1998).Asidefrompolicyefficacyandadaptabilityofthestateand

thedistinctionbetweenpoliticalreignandbureaucraticrule,statismobservestheimportanceofbureaucratic

cohesionanddepoliticisationintheabilityofthestatetoimplementitseconomicplans(Chan,Clark&Lam

1998).Stateautonomy,orthebureaucracysinsulationfromvestedinterest,alsoplaysakeypartinensuring

thestatesperformanceofitsdevelopmentalrole(Chan,Clark&Lam1998).Thesecharacteristicsresonate

wellwiththegerminalWeberianperspectiveofthestate,whicharguesthattheviabilityofaregimesmarket-

supportingabilityislargelydependentonthecorporatecoherenceofitsbureaucracy,whichinturnis

maintainedbyinsulationfromexternaldemands(Evans1989).


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MoonandPrasad(1998,p.9)offeracomprehensivesummaryoftheconceptualisationofthedevelopmental

statebyviewingitasapowerfulnewparadigmindevelopmenteconomicsandcomparativepolitical

economy.Thedevelopmentalstateparadigmisseenasanabstractionderivedfromdescriptionsbasedon

empiricalevidence,refinedbypopularassertions,andbolsteredbyacollectionoftheoriesinspiredby

furtherobservations(Moon&Prasad1998).MoonandPrasad(1998)namethreekeyinterrelated

observationsthatformthecoreofthedevelopmentalstateparadigm:First,thedevelopmentalstateprimarily

prioritiseseconomicdevelopment.Second,thedevelopmentalstateguidesandcoordinatestheprivatesector

throughactivemarketinterventionandstrategicresourceallocation.Lastly,asociallyandpolitically

insulatedbureaucracythatisbothcompetentandrationalensuresthesuccessofthedevelopmentalstate.

Historicalandgeopoliticalprovenanceofthedevelopmentalstateparadigm

Asalientfeatureoftheconceptualisationofthedevelopmentalstateparadigmisitsrootednessinthe

historicalcontextthatledtoitsrise.Woo-Cummings(1999)recognisesthatJohnsonsaccountofthe

emergenceofthedevelopmentalstateasasystemofpoliticaleconomywasfirmlyrootedontheJapanese

experience.ForJohnson(1983),historicalperspectiveoftheJapanesedevelopmentalstatewaspreviously

losttomanyobserversofJapanesepoliticaleconomybecauseofthedrawnoutpost-warperiod,which

preventedtheidentificationoftheoriginsoftheinstitutionsthatcharacterisedthedevelopmentalstate.

ExpandingthescopeofobservationtoincludethewiderEastAsianexperience,JohnsoninWoo-Cummings

(1999,p.7)identifieslatedevelopmentandtheemergenceofrevolutionarynationalismaskeyhistorical

markersthatactedasbindingagentsofEastAsianeconomicdevelopment.

JapansdevelopmentalorientationwentasfarbackastheMeijiRestorationinthelate19 thcenturyandwas

dictatedbythecountrysrelativelylatedevelopmentanditsvulnerablepositioninglobalpoliticaland

economicaffairsvis--vistheWesternpowers(Johnson1983).Thiscontextallowedtheemergenceofa

brandofrevolutionarynationalismthatmanifesteditselfinthelarge-scalemobilisationofthepopulationin

thelabour-intensiveindustrialisationthatproceededaftertheMeijiRestoration.ThislasteduntiltheGreat


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DepressioneraandcontinuedwiththemobilisationforthewareffortduringtheSecondWorldWar(Johnson

1983).ThiswasalsoevidentintheacquiescenceoftheJapanesepublictoacentrallyplannedandcontrolled

economyduringthepost-warreconstructionandcapital-intensiveindustrialisationphasethatisnowmore

associatedwiththeideaoftheJapanesedevelopmentalstate(Johnson1983).

InthecaseofKorea,theJapanesecolonialexperiencefromtheturnofthe20 thcenturyuntiltheendofWorld

WarIIallowedthereplacementofadisintegratingimperialregimewithafunctionalgovernmentthatcreated

asenseoforderandfacilitatedeconomicactivities(Kohli1994).Thiswasachievedthroughthe

implementationofeconomicpoliciesthatinitiallyinvolvedthetradeinrawmaterialsbeforeanintermediary

shifttoinvestmentinproductionandmanufacturing,whichfinallyculminatedinfull-scalewarmobilisation

duringthe1940s(Kohli1994).AtendoftheJapaneseoccupation,theensuingcivilwarbetweenthetwo

Koreascreatedanewrallyingpoint,whichthestateusedandtheKoreanpublicacceptedasajustificationfor

thedevelopmentalrolethatthestatetookinrelationtotheeconomy(Woo-Cumings1999).Itcanbeargued

thatthisactionwasmadenecessarymorebynationalsurvivalthanbyeconomicdevelopment.

JapanwasalsoinvolvedinTaiwansassumptionofthedevelopmentalstaterole.Theoutbreakofwar

betweenJapanandKMT-controlledChinapushedKMTbureaucratstopromotedefencescienceasoneofthe

pillarsofChineseindustrialisation(Greene2008).LiketheKoreancase,thisearlierpositionwasdriven

mainlybynationalsecuritythanbyeconomicambition(Greene2008).Afterthecommunistsdefeatedthe

nationalistsanddrovetheKMTtoTaiwan,ittook20yearsforthestatebureaucracyandthepolitical

leadershiptoconvergeandagreeondevelopingascienceandtechnologypolicythatwillpromote

industrialisation(Greene2008).Still,themilitarystandoffwithcommunistChinadefinedtheparametersof

Taiwanesestateaction,includingthoseintheeconomicsphere(Woo-Cumings1999).

Embeddedautonomyaskeycharacteristicofthedevelopmentalstate

Caldentey(2008,p.36)challengesthehistoricalandgeopoliticalfeaturesofthedevelopmentalstate

paradigmbyarguingthatthedevelopmentalstateisneitheracreationofthetwentiethcenturynorisit


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uniquetothehistoryofJapan[and]EastAsia.CitingtheexamplesofWesternEuropeandtheUnitedStates,

Caldentey(2008)arguesthatdevelopednationsoftodayexperiencedvaryingdegreesofstate

developmentalismduringtheearlystagesoftheireconomicdevelopment.HelikewiseclaimsthattheLatin

Americanexperiencealsoprovidesevidencethatthedevelopmentalstateparadigmtranscendshistorical

timeandgeographicalboundaries(Caldentey2008).UsingBrazil,Mexico,Colombia,PeruandChileaspoints

ofreference,Caldentey(2008)identifiesinstanceswhenthegovernmentsofthesecountriesactedas

developmentalstatesbyinterveninginthemarkets,mainlythroughpublicpolicy,intheperiodimmediately

followingtheindependencefromSpanishcolonialruleinthemiddleofthe19 thcentury.

However,havingelementsofdevelopmentalismdoesnotmakeastatedevelopmental.Usingthesame

exampleofBrazil,Evans(1989)explainsthatthedifferencebetweentheBrazilianstateapparatusandthe

developmentalstateideal-typeisbestillustratedbythewaythatstaterecruitsitsbureaucrats.Farfrom

beingmeritocraticastheEastAsianstateshavebeen,politicalappointmentsinBrazilledtothecaptureofthe

statebyprivateinterests,withelectedofficialsseekingtopayoffpoliticaldebtthroughbureaucratic

appointments(Evans1989).

ForEvans,theefficientdevelopmentalstateisbestcharacterisedbytheembeddedautonomyofitselite,

meritocraticbureaucracy(Evans1989).Embeddedautonomyischaracterisedbytheinformalties

maintainedbythebureaucracytoexternalnetworksthatallowittoactcoherentlyinitsdevelopmentalgoals

whileatthesametimepreventingitscapturebyrent-seekinginterests(Evans1989).Rueschemeyerand

EvansinEvans(1989,p.573)observesthatthestructureoftheseinformalnetworksresultinakindof

reinforcedWeberianism,inwhichthenon-bureaucraticelementsofthebureaucracyreinforcetheformal

organizationalstructureinthesamewaythatDurkheimsnon-contractualelementsofcontractsreinforce

themarket.Withoutthisfeature,astatepursuingthegoalsofafreemarketeconomyrunstheriskof

engenderingapredatorystateapparatus(Chan,Clark&Lam1998;Evans1989),characterisedbythe

incoherentabsolutistdominationofthestatebureaucracy(Evans1989,p.581).


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Criticismsofthetheoreticalrelevanceofthedevelopmentalstate

MoonandPrasad(1998)regardtheconceptofembeddedautonomyasanattempttorespondonecriticism

ofthedevelopmentalstateparadigm,whichisitsfailuretoaccountforthedynamicsoftheinternal

organisationofthestate.Greene(2008)notes,forexample,thefailureofmanypoliticalobserversto

recognisethedistinctionswithinthestateapparatusofdevelopmentalstates.AccordingtoGreene(2008),

Taiwaneseeconomicpolicyinthedevelopmentaleraonlyworkedwhentheinterestsofthestatestwo

constituentblocks,itspoliticiansanditstechnocrats,converged.Ittookthestatebureaucracy,already

convincedoftheneedtoestablishnationalstabilitythroughscientificindustrialisation,sometimebeforeit

wasabletoconvincethepoliticalleadership,initiallyconcernedwithperpetuatingtheirholdonpower,to

pushthestatetotakeadevelopmentalrole(Greene2008).Wong(2004b)makesasimilarnoteinKorea,

whereinter-ministerialcompetitionunderminedthestatesabilitytocoordinatethecountryspost-industrial

development

MoonandPrasad(1998)addthattheideaofembeddedautonomyisinsufficientinaddressinganother

criticismofthedevelopmentalstateparadigm,whichisitsfailuretoprovideempiricalevidenceonthe

positivecorrelationbetweenastronginterventioniststateandrapideconomicgrowth.Theysuggestthatits

preoccupationwiththeexplanationofsuccessfuleconomicperformancefailstorenderacompleteanalysisof

thenatureandpotentialofdevelopmentalstates(Moon&Prasad1998).MoonandPrasad(1998)

recommendtheexpansionofthescopeofanalysistoincludenotjusteconomicsuccessstories,butalsofailed

attemptsandephemeraloutcomesintheeconomicandnon-economicspheres.

Thereisalsoaneedtobringpoliticsbackin,anotionstemmingfromMoonandPrasadsobservationthat

thedevelopmentalstateparadigmunderestimatedthepoliticalagencyofstateactors.AstheTaiwanese

experiencedemonstrates,thestateisnotaunitaryforcethatpursuestheideologyofdevelopmentsingle-

mindedly(Greene2008;Moon&Prasad1998).Instead,itisaspaceofpoliticalcompetitionandconflict,

whereeconomicpoliciesarenotjustguidedbythegoalsofdevelopmentbutalsobypoliticalrealities(Moon

&Prasad1998).Forthedevelopmentalstatetoremainrelevant,thereneedstobeatheoretical


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accommodationofpoliticswithinitsdiscourse(Moon&Prasad1998).

NotingthatneitherthemarketnorthestatecanfullyaccountfortheeconomicsuccessoftheEastAsian

developmentalstates,ClarkandChan(1998)advocatetheexpansionofthedevelopmentalstatemodelby

bringingsocietybackin.UsingempiricalevidencefromHongKongandSingapore,ClarkandChan(1998)

contendthatthegoalofeconomicdevelopmentwasachievedevenifHongKonginvestedinthemarketwhile

Singaporeinvestedinthestate.Theauthorspointtothehistoricalandculturalsimilaritiesbetweenthetwo

city-statesassignificantareasofanalysis(Clark&Chan1998).TheirChinese-dominatedsocieties,their

Britishcolonialexperience,theirurbanorientation,andtheirhistoryastradingpostsmayhaveplayedan

importantroleinshapingsocialandpoliticalinstitutionsconducivetoeconomicdevelopment(Clark&Chan

1998).ClarkandChan(1998)conclude,andMoonandPrasad(1998)agree,thattheanalysisofsocialand

politicalinstitutionsfromapoliticalcultureapproachmaybethekeyinsuccessfullybringingsocietyback

inthedevelopmentalstateparadigm.

Thenotionofsocialcapitalseemstobeanideathatcomplementsthecallforbringingsocietybackinthe

developmentaldiscourse(Fine1999).Coupledwiththehistoricalemergenceofthecivilsocietyin

developmentalaffairs,socialcapitalisameansofrevisingtheviewthatsocietyisequal,insteadof

subservient,tothemarketandthestateintermsofagencyinthedevelopmentprocess(Moon&Prasad

1998).ButFine(1999)findstheabstractambiguityofsocialcapitalsuspect.

Asthecentrepieceideologyofthepost-Washingtonconsensusreformthatfollowedthefailureofstructural

adjustmentprogramsdrivenbytheneoliberalstrategiesoftheWashingtonconsensus,thevaguenessofthe

socialcapitalconstructworksasadouble-edgedsword.Whileitallowsitsproponentstorespondtothe

criticsofneoliberalreductionism,itfailstoincorporateexplicitlythemaincorpusofthesecriticisms,whichis

theinabilityoftheglobaldevelopmentalagendatofullaccountfortheradicalinfluencethatnon-economic

factorsexertontheeconomy.Fine(1999)cautionsthatifthenotionofsocialcapitalisallowedtodominate

thedevelopmentagenda,thereisadangerofobscuringtheeffectofclassandpowerintheresulting


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analyticalframeworkofpoliticaleconomies.Fine(1999)seesanexpansionofthedevelopmentalstatemodel

asaneffectivecounterbalancetotheideologicaldominanceofsocialcapitalincontemporarydiscourse.

Empiricalchallengestothedevelopmentalstate

Globalisationisanotherchallengetothecontinuingrelevanceofthedevelopmentalstatemodel.Accordingto

Gereffi(1998),globalisationcomplicatesstate-marketrelationsbycreatingbarrierstoeffectivestate

interventioninthemarket,intheformoftransnationalprivateagentssuchasmultinationalcorporations,

expatriatebusinessmen,andinternationalbureaucrats.IntheEastAsianexperience,EastAsian

developmentalstatesusednetworkassetsandpoliciesaseffectivetoolsinmaintainingastrongholdonthe

developmentagendainthefaceofanincreasinglyglobalisingmarket(Gereffi1998).Gereffioffersthe

inclusionoftheglobalcommoditychains(GCC)theoryintheexpandeddevelopmentalstatemodel,which

recognisestheimportanceoflocalfactorsintheinternationalproductionchain.TheGCCallowstheparadigm

totakeintoaccounttheabilityofthestatetoinfluencelocalsegmentsofglobalproduction,usingpolicyto

spurbothadaptiveandorganisationalinnovations(Gereffi1998).

Thediscoursesongoodgovernanceanddemocratisationposeadditionalchallengestostatesattemptingto

takeamoredevelopmentalstance.Woo-Cummings(1999,p.20)recognisestheapparentelectiveaffinity

betweenauthoritarianismanddevelopmentalism.FritzandRochaMenocal(2007)andWu(2007)notethe

fundamentalquestiononthecompatibilityofthedevelopmentalstatemodelwiththecontemporarydemand

fortherecognitionofhumanrightsanddemocraticgovernance.Theauthorsconcedethatnotall

authoritarianstatesaredevelopmental,inthesamewaythatnotalleconomicallydevelopednationsresorted

toauthoritarianismtoachievetheirgoals.Indiscussingtherelationshipbetweenthedevelopmentalstate

paradigmandthegoodgovernanceagenda,itisimportanttonotethatwhilebothagendashavedistinct

goals,certainaspectsofthesegoalsoverlap(Fritz&RochaMenocal2007).

FritzandRochaMenocalofferMerileeGrindlesconceptofgoodenoughgovernanceasastrategic

theoreticallinkbetweenthegoodgovernanceagendaandthedevelopmentalstatemodel.Thegoodenough


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governanceagendaisamorepragmaticandlessnormativealternativetothegoodgovernance

framework,allowingstatestopursuepolitical,socialandeconomicgoalsbyimposingminimalconditionsof

improvedgovernance(Fritz&RochaMenocal2007,p.538).KhaninFritzandRochaMenocal(2007,p.538)

supportsthethesisoftheminimalistgoodgovernanceagendabyaddingthatgrowth-enhancingelementsof

goodgovernancemaybemoreimportantthanmarket-enhancingoneswhenalow-incomecountry

commencesitsventureonthepathofdevelopmentalism.Theconceptofgoodenoughgovernancemaybe

compatiblewithanexpandedmodelofthedevelopmentalstateparadigm.

Concludingremarks

Thedevelopmentalstateisaparadigmincomparativepoliticaleconomyconceptualisedfromobservations

andtheorisationsoftheexperienceofEastAsiancountriesinlate-stageindustrialdevelopmentandrapid

economicgrowthduringthepost-warperiod.Thedevelopmentalstateparadigmisfirmlyrootedinthe

historicalandgeopoliticalexperienceofthesecountries,butsomeobservers,whoarguethatthe

developmentalstateideal-typetranscendshistoricaltime-space,challengethisview.Theconceptof

embeddedautonomyuniquelycharacterisesthedevelopmentalstate,wheresocioculturalinstitutionsallow

theuseofinformalnetworksforgreatereconomiccoordinationwithoutriskingbureaucraticcaptureby

privaterent-seekinginterests.

Thedevelopmentstateparadigmhasbeenmetbymanytheoreticalandempiricalchallenges,includingones

thatstemfromtheinherentweaknessofitsaspects.Thisincludesthefailureofthedevelopmentalstate

modeltoempiricallyaccountforthecorrelationbetweengrowthandstatedevelopmentalismanditsnarrow-

sightedviewofthestateasaunitaryactor,freefrompoliticalconflictandcontest.Theemergenceofthe

notionofsocialcapitalisalsoathreattotherelevanceofthedevelopmentalstatemodel.Inaddition,states

consideringthedevelopmentalmodelarefacedwiththechallengesofanincreasinglyinterconnectedglobal

marketandthenormativedemandsofgoodgovernanceanddemocratisation.Callstobringpoliticsand

societybackinaimtoexpandthescopeofanalysisofthedevelopmentalstate.Incorporatingtheglobal

commoditieschaintheoryandthegood-enoughgovernanceconceptareadditionalmeansonensuringthat


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thedevelopmentalstateparadigmremainsarelevantanalyticalframeworkincomparativepoliticaleconomy

inthecontemporaryworld.


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