bergin-oss and free thai-13jan
TRANSCRIPT
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Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 4 (Extracts, December 2011) 11
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the
author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US govern-
ment endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
War of a Different Kind
OSS and Free Thai Operations in World War II
Bob Bergin
The Thai proved to bemasters at manipulatingthe Japanese occupiersand adept at collecting
intelligence.
The situ at ion in Si am
was diff erent fr om an y
tha t had ever confronted
OSS i n an enemy-occu-
pi ed coun tr y. In stead of a
r esistan ce movement ,
such as was encoun tered
in Eu r opean countr i es,
there existed in Si amwh at m ight best be
descr i bed as a patr ioti c
gover nm ent al conspi r acy
agai nst th e Japan ese i n
wh i ch m ost of the key fig-
u res of t he sta te were
in volved. T he regent hi m-
self, the m i ni ster a nd chi ef
of poli ce, the mi ni ster of
in ter ior, the mi ni ster of
forei gn affai rs, seni or offi-
cer s of th e armed ser vi ce,and m any other r anki ng
officia l s bel onged t o it.1
Kermit Roosevelt
The U S Office of Str at egic
Services (OSS ) esta blished a
base in B a ngkok in early 1945.
At least 7,000 of the 60,000
J a pan ese troops wh o occupied
the country were based in
Ba ngkok , many wi thin a few
hundred meters of the OSS
base. The base w a s esta blished
a fter more than a yea r of frus-
tra t ing a t tempts to infi lt r a t e
Free Tha i officers into B an g-
kok from Ch ina a nd from Cey-
lon. Success came wh en OSS -
tr a ined Free Tha i officers ma deconta ct with the Tha i under-
ground t ha t h a d formed inside
the countr ya fact unknown t o
th e allies un til April 1943.
The Tha i proved to be ma s-
ters a t ma nipula t ing the J apa-
nese occupiers and a dept at
collectin g int elligence. OSS offi-
cers enga ged in Tha i opera -
tionsboth inside th e country
an d outside ithad t o dealwith s i tuat ions dif ferent from
anywhere else. Concerns about
B rita ins postwa r int entions
a nd Ch inese regional a mbi-
tions ha d to be fa ctored into
intelligence opera tions. OSS
officers ha d to wa lk a fine line,
to ha ve good working rela tions
wit h the fr iendly Brit ish and
Ch inese services, while play-
ing a lone han d, a nd w orking
1 Kermit Roosevelt, Introduction to the 1976 edition, Th e Overseas Tar gets, War Report of
the OSS, Volume II (Wa shingt on, DC : Ca rrollton P ress I nc., 1976). The origina l version of
War Report of th e OSSwa s published in 1949 by the G overnment P rinting Office, but it
wa s classified Top Secret. The book wa s par tia lly declassified in 1976 an d reprint ed com-
mercially. Tha iland w as n am ed Siam until 1939. At t he time the War Report of th e OSS
wa s origina lly writt en, the countrys name had r everted to Siam for a brief period
(194649).
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OSS in Siam
12 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 4 (Extracts, December 2011)
around th em. In the midst of
th is, the J apa nese occupiers of
Tha iland largely missed wh at
wa s ha ppening to them. The
Tha i may ha ve been adept, but
J apan ese a t t i tudes towa rd the
Tha i w ere a big factor: They
apparently could not bring
th emselves t o believe the
friendly, ea sygoing Tha i, a mong
wh om th ey lived, could be capa -
ble of skilful subversion.
Wa r Beg i n s
When the J a panese invadedTha ila nd on 8 D ecember 1941,
th e Tha i government u nder
P rime Minister P hibun Songkh-
ram a ligned i tself with the J ap-
an ese an d declared wa r on
Br i ta in and the Uni ted S ta t es.
B rita in reciprocat ed by declar-
ing wa r on Tha ilan d; Wa shing-
ton ignored th e Tha ideclara tion a nd looked on Tha i-
lan d as a n occupied nat ion.
These reactions reflected the
difference of interest s th e tw o
allies ha d in Asia, differences
th a t w ould be reflected in th e
rivalry between B rita ins Spe-
cia l Operat ions Executive
(SOE ) a nd OSS in Asia, pa rtic-
ular ly in Tha iland.
When t he Tha i government
declared w a r on th e allies, Tha i
students abroad volunteered t o
join t he resista nce movement,
calling th emselves th e Free
Thai. 2Volunt eers in E ngla nd
were tra ined by th e SOE; in
America by th e OSS. Inside
Tha ila nd, an a nti-J a panese
underground was formed under
th e lea dership of P rime Minis-
ter P hibuns political riva l,
P r idi Ph an omyong, the Rector
of Tha mma sat U niversi ty and
regent to the 17-year-old King
Ana n Ma hidon.
Ea rly indicat ions tha t a r esis-
ta nce movement inside Tha i-
lan d existed could not be
confirm ed by t he a llies. The
underground inside Tha ilan d
sent envoys to China to estab-
lish conta ct with the a l lies , but
th e envoys w ere intercepted byTa i Li, th e Chinese Nat iona list
intelligence a nd securit y chief,
wh o ha d no int ention of permit-
ting America n or Brit ish intelli-
gence operat ions inside
Tha ila nd. I t wa s not unt i l April
1943 th a t t he allies lea rned
tha t a Free Tha i movement
indeed existed inside Tha iland. 3
I n f i l t r a t i on f r om C h i n a
In ea r ly 1944, both SOE an d
OSS s ta r ted their a t tempts to
infiltra te F ree Tha i officers int oThailand from China. Major
Nicol Smit h, former tra vel-
w riter a nd one of Donovans
persona l recruits, wa s in cha rge
of the OSS Free Tha i opera-
tions. B eca use of prior agr ee-
ments , the f irs t OSS
infiltra tions ha d to be coordi-
na ted wit h Tai Li , w hose assis-
ta nce seemed to result in
nothing but delays . In t ime,
Smith s ta r t ed to th ink tha t theChinese might not wa nt a n
intelligence mission t o enter
Siam. 4
Meanw hile, the Brit ish SOE
appeared to be more success-
ful. Tea ms of S OE -t ra ined Tha i
para chuted int o North Tha i-
land; others were landed by
subma rine. But n one of th ese
SOE agents esta blished radio
conta ct a f ter their arr ival .
Ma jor S mith looked for
a nother approach a nd found a
Chinese Catholic priest who
knew t he land rout es to Tha i-
lan d. He offered the priest
$1,000 to lead th e Free Tha i to
th e border. In Ma y 1944, 11
Free Tha i officers, in t hree
independent gr oups, set off
overla nd t o Ba ngkok. This time
2 One Free Tha i member recalled tha t th e Free French movement est ablished in Engla nd soon after G erman occupation of Fra nce
inspired his gr oups na me. See Wimon Wiriya wit , Fr ee Th ai: Personal Recoll ections and Off icial Document s(Ba ngkok: White Lotus Pr ess,
1997).3 While US and UK officials m ay n ot ha ve been a ble to confirm t he existence of a resistan ce movement inside Tha iland, citizens there
would have known of the existan ce of the external Free Tha i Movement an d ha d a good idea of wha t wa s going on in the United St at es
an d Engla nd becaus e, start ing as early a s mid-December 1941, Thaila nd w as r eceiving regular C oordina tor of Informat ion, then OSS,
propaganda broadcasts, as well as news from BBC, All India Radio, and other broadcast information.4 Nicol Smith and Bla ke Clark , In to Siam , Underground Ki ngdom(India na polis: The B obbs-Merrill C ompan y, 1946), 20.
When the Japanese invaded Thailand on 8 December 1941,the Thai government under Prime Minister Phibun Songkhramaligned itself with the Japanese and declared war on Britainand the United States.
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Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 4 (Extracts, December 2011) 13
they w ere dispatched without
Ta i Lis a ssist a nce.
Oper a t i o n H OTFOOT :
Ra c i n g t h e B r i t i sh
At a bout t ha t sa me time,
an other OSS inf i l tra t ion plan
wa s being put into action in
Cey lon. Tw o Free Tha i officers,
Wimon Wiriyawit an d B unma k
Desabut, completed tra ining at
the OS S faci li ty a t Trincoma -
lee, Ceylon, a nd w ere to be infil-
tra ted into southern Tha ila nd
by a British submarine. They
set out on 8 Augus t 1944, butwhen t he submarine reached
th e Tha i coast, t hey w ere not
landed. The captain ha d
received la st-minut e orders t o
proceed on a nother mission to
th e vicinity of Singa pore. After
a series of delay s, ca used by
wea ther a nd mecha nical prob-
lems, Wimon and Bunmak
found t hemselves back in Trin-
coma lee in ear ly Septem-
berjust in t ime to part icipat e
in Oper a tion H OTFOOT.
There w a s concern, both in
Wa shingt on and in t he field,
tha t once SOE established con-
ta ct inside Tha iland, the B rit-
ish would try t o freeze OSS out
of Tha i opera tions. By August
1944 OSS h ad not yet hea rd
from the Free Tha i dispat ched
from China in Ma y. Then S OE
revealed a new plan t o para -
chute i ts agents into an ar eanear B an gkok, from w here they
would at tempt t o contact Fr ee
Tha i lea der P ridi.
Colonel Richard P.Heppner,chief of OSS Det a chment 404 in
Ceylon, saw dan ger in this . He
reported to OSS hea dqua rters
tha t the SOE plan shows tha t
the B rit ish are in dangerous
competi t ion w ith t he U nited
Sta tes in Thai land and th a t the
futu re relat ions of our govern-
ment w ith Tha iland depend to a
lar ge extent upon the a ctions of
our organ ization in tha t coun-
try. H e suggested ma inta ining
outw ar d forms of cooperat ion,
with t he Brit ish, but to play
more or less a lone ha nd. He
mentioned preparing several
operations which have a good
cha nce t o succeed.5The
response from OSS headqua r-
ters noted tha t OSS C hief Don-
ovan feels tha t since th e
Br i t i sh want to make an inde-
pendent sh ow of the [Pridi] mis-
sion t ha t gives us license to
ta ke the same a pproach.6
Heppner went to American
thea ter comma nder Lt. Gen.
J oseph S ti lwell and secured his
support for Opera tion H OT-
FOOT, wh ich would preempt
the B rit ish by gett ing OSS
a gents into Tha ila nd a s quickly
a s possible. Wimon a nd B un-
ma k would para chute in, esta b-
lish conta ct wit h th e Free Tha i
leaders , and prepare the wa yfor an OSS presence in count ry.
H OTFOOT would notbe coordi-
na t ed with t he Br i t i sh .
A minor pr oblem, Wimon a ndBunma k had no para chute
training, was quickly rectified
wi th a t r a ining manual and
practice jumps from stacked oil
drums. On th e night of 9 Sep-
tember 1944, after tw o drops
were aborted by bad wea ther
over t he drop zone, th e tw o
Tha i agent s jumped from a B -
24 bomber, 2,000 ft over Tha i-
lands Phrae Province.
W imon W i r i yaw i t s
Adven t u r e s
Wimon landed in a ta ll tree,
a nd spent t he night n earby. The
next morning h e found n o sign
of B unma k, and set of f to make
his wa y out of the dense jungle.
After five days he came t o a vil-
lage, where he encount ered a
group of arm ed men. They t old
him they ha d ear l ier a rrested
a ma n dressed as a para -
trooper, but he h a d escaped.
Wimon ha d buried his un iform
and wa s wear ing ord inary
clot hes, shorts a nd a T-shir t,
but the men now sta r ted to
question him.
Wimon had devised a cover
story. He t old the men t ha t h e
wa s an a ide to Adun Dejar at ,
th e director genera l (DG ) of the
Tha i Nat iona l Police an d wa son a secret m ission for him. H e
took a cha nce an d gave his true
na meinstead of using an al ias
5 E. B ruce Reynolds, Thai land s Secret War: OSS, SOE, and t he Free Thai Un dergr ound dur ing World War I I (Cam bridge , UK: Ca m-
bridge U niversit y P ress, 2005), 223.6 Reynolds, 235.
There was concern, both in Washington and in the field, thatonce SOE established contact inside Thailand, the Britishwould try to freeze OSS out of Thai operations.
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OSS in Siam
14 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 4 (Extracts, December 2011)
as he ha d been t ra ined to do.
Adun, know n t o be one of the
tw o riva l leaders of the inter-
na l Free Tha i, wa s reputed to
know t he na me of every Tha i
student in the United Sta tes . I f
Adun recognized Wimons
na me, he would know t ha t
Wimons retu rn h a d a political
purpose.
The cover st ory w orked.
Wimon wa s ha nded off to pro-
vincia l officials w ho wired t he
DG, who quickly telegraphedback. He asked th a t Wimon be
sent t o B an gkok secretly, with
a n escort of plain cloth es police-
men.
On his a rriva l in the city,
Wimon wa s t a ken to P olice Spe-
cia l Bran ch headqua rters ,
where he spent th e night in a
cell. The n ext mornin g, 22 Sep-
tember, he wa s ta ken t o
an other Special Br an ch insta l-la tion, and there he found
seven of Nicol Sm ith s Free
Tha i agents w ho had wa lked in
from China a nd eight SOE
agents w ho had been inf il-
tra ted by para chute or subma-
rine. All were in Special B ra nch
custody. 7The myst ery of why
none of these a gents h ad con-
tac ted their headquar t ers was
now solved. Wimon wa s t hen
told tha t D G Adun would meet
wi th h im tha t evening.
Wimons m eeting w ith Adun
took place amidst great precau-
tions. The tw o met a t nigh tfa ll
in th e middle of a bridge, a nd
Adun w a lked Wimon to a black
seda n parked in a small lane.
They t alked w hile being dr iven
through B an gkoks da rk s treets .
By Wimons account, he told
Adun tha t he wa s a messengerf rom OSS a nd tha t t he Uni ted
St at es would support the Free
Tha i, but only if the t wo ma jor
playersAdun and Pridi
would w ork togeth er. La ter
th a t n ight, Adun t ook Wimon to
a meet ing wi th P r idi , and
Wimon repeated t he messa ge
he ha d given Adun. 8
Regular ra dio conta ct betw een
B an gkok and OSS wa s soon in
place, and t he Free Tha i sta rted
to operate. The wa y w as now
open for OSS to esta blish its
presence in B an gkok. OSS h ad
won i ts race with the B rit ish.
H OTFOOT I I : OSS a r r i v es
i n B a n g k o k
In J an uar y 1945, the f irs t tw o
OSS off icers a rr ived in B an g-kok. Richa rd G reenlee a nd
Ma jor J ohn Wester ha d been
brought in by two PBY Ca t-
a l ina f lying boats tha t landed in
the G ulf of Siam in t he ea r ly
a f ternoon of 25 J an ua ry. 9They
were met by a Tha i Customs
Depar tment launch tha t t r a ns-
ported th em to B an gkok to
sta r t t he process that would
give OSS a base in Ba ngkok in
the midst of the J apa nese.
Richard Greenlee was a civil-
ian, a former New York ta x law-
yer who wa s Chief of the
Specia l Opera tions (SO) Bra nch
a t OSS Deta chment 404 in Cey-
lon. H e ha d no previous experi-
ence in Asia. J ohn Wester ha d
been employed by an in terna -
tiona l engineering firm before
the wa r an d ha d l ived in Tha i-
land for 18 years . OSS h ad sent
him to China, a nd th en Ceylon,
t o prepare F ree Tha i officers for
infiltra tion missions, including
opera t ion HOTFOOT.
The tw o were housed in a
compound nea r Wa jira wu t Col-
lege, wh ere they w ere joined by
some of th e Free Tha i wh o had
been infiltrated. Pridi came to
discuss his war plan, which
7 All the infiltra tors ha d been ar rested almost a s soon a s they entered Thaila nd. Two of the OSS Free Tha i who had w alked from China
were killed by the Tha i police, appa rent ly for gold they were car rying. Nicol Smith s misgivings a bout Ta i Li were well founded. According
to a March 1945 OSS intelligence report, the Thai police had a complete photographic record of the China group with correct names
an d ra nks of each, the lat ter ba sed on intelligence provided by Ta i Lis organ iza tion. Reynolds, 186.8 There was speculation why Adun and P ridi met with Wimon when they would not meet the Free Thai w ho had infiltra ted from China .
China itself ma y be the answ er. Wimon had been dispatched via India , Southeast Asia Comma nd headq uar ters, and th us wa s free of an y
ta int of association with Tai Lis orga nizat ion. In addit ion, the Free Tha i China groups ar rests w ere known w ithin t he Thai govern-
ment, while Wimons unusua l arriva l in Ba ngkok ha d kept him under th e rada r.9 Ironically, the Cat alina s tha t f lew OSS missions betw een Ka ndy, Ceylon, and th e Gulf of Siam w ere provided and f lown by the British
Royal Air Force (RAF).
The way was now open for OSS to establish its presence in
Bangkok. OSS had won its race with the British.
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Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 4 (Extracts, December 2011) 15
called for coordinating Ameri-
can lan dings along the G ulf of
Siam wit h a Tha i upris ing.
Greenlee deferred consider-
at ion of any m ilita ry a ction t oWashingt on a nd ra ised OSS
interest s in Tha ilan d, includ-
ing black propaga nda opera-
tions, th e insertion of more
tra ined agents , an d supply of
th e Tha i underground on a n
ever increasing scale. 10
G reenlee sta yed f ive days , wa s
exfi ltra ted t o Kan dy, a nd f lown
to Wa shingt on. He carried mes-
sages from P ridi for P resident
Roosevelt and General Dono-
van a nd gifts, a s olid gold ciga -
rette case for the president and
a silver one for D onovan .
Wester sta yed behind as t he
chief of the OSS mission in
Bangkok.
Wha t G r een l ee and Wester
Accomp l i shed
The OSS War Report focused
on th e long t erm politicalaspects of what G reenlee an d
Wester had accomplished:
Th e OSS offi cer s underes-
t im ated w hat w as real l y
th e most signi fi can t el e-
ment i n th e sit uat ion: the
fact th at t hey were not
deal i ng wit h the usual
un der ground gr oups, but
wi th th e r esponsibl e and
offi cial heads of a sover-ei gn state By send in g
tw o Am er i can offi cer s to
di scuss pol icy on t he high -
est l evel w i th th e Regent
hi mself, OSS forced him
to comm it hi mself to a
cou r se of acti on.
The best OSS politica l card
was to hold out hope of official
American support t o Sia m in
her s truggle to maint ain h er
terr i tor ia l integri ty a gainst sus-
pected B ritish designs. This
wa s delicat e, a s i t wa s also
necessar y to avoid stirring up
the S iamese aga ins t the Br i t-
ish. Mili tar y
considerations
required that
Siam cooperate
wi th the Br i t-
ish clandestine
services a s w ell
as the
OS S . 11
Over the long
term, thisw orked in
Americas
favor: What
OSS a ccom-
plished th rough
its su pport of
th e Free Tha i
a nd short ten-
ure in Ba ng-
kok would
serve the U S
governmentwell in the
years leading
up to and
through the era
of the Vietna m Wa r a nd in w ays
the w riters of the War Repor t
could not ha ve ant icipated. B ut
OSS officers on t he ground ha d
more immedia te concerns a nd,
a s th e Wa r Report notes:
Whi l e th e OSS offi cer s
pr obably di d n ot reali ze
the ful l im pl i cat ions of
th ei r success, th ey
shr ewd l y dia gnosed th e
pecul i ar char acter of th e
10 Reynolds, 278.11 OSS War Repor t: The Overseas Targets, 410.
As it became clear that no American military operation wouldbe carried out in Thailand, OSS shifted its emphasis from special operations to intelligence collection.
A graphic from the OSS War Report showin g distr i but ion of psonnel an d t otal n umber of di str ibuted i ntell i gence reports.
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OSS in Siam
16 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 4 (Extracts, December 2011)
si tuat i on i n Siam and
developed an oper ati onal
plan to meet i t. 12
This w ould become evident in
coming mont hs. Although t he
Tha i cont inued t o organize
guerrilla groups upcount ry, a nd
the OSS supported them, as i t
beca me clear th a t no America n
milita ry opera tion would be
carried out in Tha iland , OSS
shifted its empha sis from spe-
cia l operat ions to in telligencecollection.
L i v i n g i n t h e B a n g k o k
Bu l l s Eye
G reenlee retur ned to Tha i-
land in April. He brought with
him OSS Ca pta in Howard
Pa lmer, a gradua t e of Ha rvard
law school wh o had been born
in Tha iland a nd spent his child-
hood th ere. They found tha t t heOSS one-man-Bangkok-show,
J ohn Wester, ha d developed
serious medical problems. Left
to him self, Wester grew con-
scious of being t he only Ameri-
can in J a pan ese-occupied
B an gkok, never knowing a t
wha t moment he might be
betrayed or discovered, he lived
in almost unbeara ble ten-
sion. 13There w ere 60,000 J a p-
a nese in th e coun tr y, 7,000 ofthem in B angkok , many w i thin
100 m of the OS S ba se. For t wo
months Wester had spent day
an d night locked in a small
da rk room, wh ere he ma in-
ta ined t he ra dio l ink between
the Free Tha i and OS S hea d-
qua rters in Ceylon.
When Westers condition dete-
riorat edhe became violent
an d ha d to be restra inedthe
Tha i decided tha t t he lack of
female companionship was at
least pa rtly responsible:
They figur ed th at tw o
month s of soli tar y con-f in ement i n th at r oom
woul d u pset an yone com-
pl etely. Th ey evacua ted an
ent i r e r esidenti al secti on
of th e cit y, r ent ed a h ouse,
stocked i t w it h eight
youn g lad ies wh o were
expected to cur e wha tever
ai l ed J ohn and at the
same tim e pr ovid e an
ounce of pr otection for
Di ck a nd me. Th ey evendetai l ed extr a poli cemen
to the neighbor hood to
i nsu r e compl ete secur i ty.
G reenlee and P almer begged
off , an d missed a part y tha t
cost t he Tha i something like a
thousand dollars ! 14
It was decided that Wester
would ha ve to be eva cua ted.
Pa lmer would become the a ct-
ing chief of the OSS B a ngkokstation.
Ex -f i l t r a t i o n of a F l y i n g
T i g er P i l o t
The release a nd ex-filtra tion
of an AVG F lying Tiger P ilotheld as a P OW in B an gkok is
a n excellent illustr at ion of how
th e Free Tha i operat ed under
the noses of the J apa nese an d
how Thai operational thinking
obscured th e J a pan ese view of
events a nd ensured th e secu-
ri ty of Free Tha i an d OSS activ-
ities in B a ngkok. This opera tion
coincided wit h t he plan to evac-
ua te J ohn Wester.
In lat e 1944, w hen Nicol
Smith s ta r ted his a t tempt to
infiltra te Free Tha i agent s from
Ch ina w ithout Tai Lis assis-
ta nce, he ca lled on the U S Four-
teent h Air Force Comma nder
Claire Lee Chenna ult for help
in establishing a ra dio s ta tion
and jumping-off point for the
agents . Chennault had just
built a n a ir s tr ip at Szemao on
China s border with Laos a nd
a greed tha t S mith could set up
his ra dio s ta tion there. Because
the area w as remote and i t
would eat up much time if
horse caravans were used to
move th e required heavy equ ip-
ment a nd supplies there, Chen-
na ult offered aircra ft to fly it in.
In re turn, he told Smith tha t
once Tha i a gents w ere success-
fully placed into Tha iland , he
would have a favor to ask.
In ea rly 1945, aft er th e Free
Tha i agent s were esta blished in
B an gkok a nd communicating,
12 Ibid.13 Smith a nd Clark , 22514 Ibid. , 22728. Smith q uotes Howa rd P almer.
In return, Chennault told Smith that once Thai agents were suc-cessfully placed into Thailand, he would have a favor to ask.
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Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 4 (Extracts, December 2011) 17
Smith reported back to Chen-
naul t . Chennaul t showed him a
ma p of nort h Tha iland w here
one of his AVG pilots, William
Black Mac McG arry ha d para-chuted into heavy jungle th ree
year ea r l ier. McG arr y ha d been
th e pilot of one of six AVG P -40s
tha t ha d a t t a c ked the J a pa -
nese Air Force a t C hia ng Ma i
on 24 March 1942. His a ircraft
wa s dama ged by ground fire
and McGarry ha d to abandon i t
before he could reach the
B urma border. Other AVG
pilots had seen McG arry land
safely on t he ground, a nd Chen-
na ult thought there was a good
chance tha t McGa rry wa s now
a P OW. He asked Smit h if the
Free Tha i underground might
be able to loca te h im.
Chennaul t had his an swer
four days la t er. McG arr y wa s a
P OW. He wa s being held in a
compound on t he grounds of
Tha mma sat Un iversi ty. His
gua rds w ere Tha i, supervised
by the J apa nese, but underFree Tha i cont rol.15Chennaul t
a sked if Sm ith could find out
from McGa rry if possible,
wh ether h e is in condition to
leave and w ill ing to att empt an
escape. 16Word from Bangkok
came back quickly: McGarry
wa s f it for an esca pe at tempt.
The Free Tha i ha d devised a
plan: McGarry would feign ill-ness a nd be moved from one
hospital t o another unt i l he just
disappeared. If his disappear-
a nce beca me an issue wit h t he
J a pan ese, it w ould be explained
tha t McGa rry had d ied and
been crema ted in t he custom-
a ry ma nner. McG arry would be
ta ken by Customs Depart ment
boat to the G ulf of Siam w here
he would be picked up by a C a t-
alina dispatched from Ceylon.
(In t he end, tw o RAF Ca t-
a linas were used for the exfil-
tra tion, which a lso would ta ke
Wester a nd four Tha i Air Force
officers t o Ceylon.)
There wa s some concern w ith
this plan among t he senior Free
Tha i. McG a rry h a d become too
well known; his a bsence would
surely be noted by the J apa -
nese on one of th eir periodic
visits. Tha t w ould mea n tr ou-ble. The da y before McG a rry
wa s t o be moved from the com-
pound, Police Director G eneral
Adun a nnounced a bett er plan.
He had ar ranged a fakerelease
order t ha t purportedly came
from him . The order dir ected
th e Tha i chief of the int ern-
ment camp to turn McGa rry
over to t he police officer w ho
brought the order. I f the J a pa-nese later noted McGarrys
a bsencea s wa s most likely
th e Ca mp chief would explain
tha t he had turned McGa rry
over a t t he request of the direc-
tor general and then produce
th e relea se order to prove it.
When the J apa nese then came
to DG Adun to find out w ha t
wa s going on, Adun w ould show
them tha t th e relea se order wa s
a forgery a nd th at i t could not
possibly have come from him. 17
On 14 April 1945, P ridi
arr ived at the OSS safe house
a t a bout 8:30; Adun a bout 30
minutes la ter, with McGa rry in
tow. McG ar ry wa s s tunned. He
had no idea of wha t wa s hap-
pening to him unti l he wa s sud-
denly introduced to the OSS
officers. H e did not seem over-
joyed, Pa lmer wrote. Und er-
sta ndably, he did not ha ve twowords to sa y a ll evening.
Wimon Wiriyaw it, w ho ha d
been put in char ge of the exfil-
tra tion, described th e run to the
gulf. 18McG arr y and t he others
boarded a Thai Customs
Depar t ment boa t tha t ha d been
docked on the Cha o Phra ya
15 McGa rry w and ered the northern Thai hills for three weeks before Tha i police found him. He wa s turn ed over to t he J apa nese Army,interrogat ed and brought to Ba ngkok. Pridi convinced the J apa nese tha t as t he Thai ha d captured him, McGa rry should remain a Tha i
prisoner, albeit under J apa nese supervision. The compound in which McGar ry wa s held wa s on the grounds of Tham ma sat Un iversity
an d in line of sight from Pr idis off ice as the university rector. From the earliest da ys, Pridi w as convinced tha t t he J apa nese could not
win t he wa r. He believed that a show of good will toward an American P OW would pay dividends wh en the wa r ended. Author interview
with Free Thai P iya Cha kkaphak .16 Smith and Clark, 191.17 There is no record of Ja panese reaction a fter McGa rrys successful exfiltrat ion. According to Wimon, the J apa nese were outra ged when
they found McGa rry m issing. They knew t hey ha d been tricked, but w ere not q uite sure how or by w hom. Author interview w ith Wimon
Wiriyawit.18 Ibid.
When Major Nicol Smith was secretly flown into Thailand inJuly 1944, he found Howard Palmer had things well in hand
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18 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 4 (Extracts, December 2011)
River behin d t he house. To min-
imize the possibility of encoun-
ters with the J apa nese, the boa t
crossed the Chao P hra ya r iver
an d entered the netw ork of
klongs or canals that criss-
crossed the a rea a nd led south
towar d the Gulf of Siam.
Adding t o the difficulty of the
journey was Westers illness. In
his delirium he w ould often
shout out in E nglish. When-
ever a J apa nese pat rol boat
came into sight , one of the FreeTha i officers w ould get u p on
deck and da nce a ra mwong, a
tr adit iona l style of Tha i dan ce
in wh ich t he enthusia stic sing-
ing and musical accompani-
ment of th e boa ts crew w ould
drown put th e sick ma ns
shout s. Below decks, Wimon
an d McG a rry crouched with
subma chine guns ready, just in
case t he J apa nese becam e curi-
ous a nd d ecided t o comeaboard.
The boat entered th e Gu lf of
Siam a nd headed south t o the
vicinity of Pra chua b Kir i Kha n,
where it lay hidden to aw ait
nightfa l l an d the arr iva l of the
Ca ta l ina s . The two aircraf t
ar rived, a bit behind schedule,
but t he boarding of personnel
an d offload ing of equipment
wa s otherw ise unevent ful. The
two Ca ta l inas re turned to Cey-
lon, where McGa rry wa s t r a ns-
ferred to a B -24 a nd flown over
the H ump to Kunming, where
Chenna ult a nd t wo of his for-
mer AVG comra des met h im on
the runw ay. 19
A H a r d L i f e i n t h e Pa l a c e
of R oses
When Ma jor Nicol Smit h w a s
secretly flown int o Tha iland in
J uly 1944, he found H owar d
Pa lmer ha d things well in hand;
Pa lmer ha d ga ined 15 pounds
living behind enemy lines an d
the OSS base had been
ensconced in Wa ng S ua n Ku lap,
the Rose G arden P ala ce, or Pa l-
ace of Roses, a property belong-
ing to the royal family tha t
previously had been occupied
by t he deposed prime m inister.
There were six ra dio tr an smit-
ters in t he former P Ms bed-
room now, a nd his s tudy wa s
occupied by six Fr ee Tha i w ho
coded messages for tra nsmis-
sion to OSS in C eylon. Sm ith
later wrote: I am sure tha t nosecret a gents t rying to deliver a
country from oppression ever
enjoyed such pala tia l qua rters ,
as w e of the OSS l iving in
Sia ms P ala ce of Roses. 20
Pa lmer and t he Free Tha i
were very a ctive collecting
informa tion, an d Smith met
some of the agents. One, a colo-
nel in Tha i int elligence,
lunched w ith J a pan ese officersalmost every day an d wrote up
everyth ing they t old him. P unc-
tua lly, at 5 p.m. he would st op
by for a dr ink with P almer. He
brought in so much informa -
tion, Pa lmer said , tha t t wo Free
Tha i ra dio men were kept busy
sending i t out.
In a ddition t o intelligence col-
lection, th e OSS a nd Fr ee Tha i
enga ged in other kinds of oper-
a tions. One of them, Operat ion
SU ITOR, on J une 18, 1945, wa s
quit e specta cular.
Oper a t i on Su i t o r : A Com i c
Ope r a
Bangkoks hospitals had been
suffering from a serious short-a ge of medica l supplies an d
OSS a rra nged a par achute drop
to a lleviat e it. As the drop zone,
Pa lmer selected the Pra man
G round in front of the Royal
Palace, where all grand ceremo-
nies were held. He caut ioned
the Tha i tha t mea sures would
ha ve to be ta ken to assure tha t
th e supplies did not fa ll int o the
wrong hands.
On 18 J une 1945, the da y cho-
sen for the a ir drop, tw o compa-
nies of Tha i soldiers were
deta iled to put on a show of
fan cy drill . Word ha d gone out,
a nd t he Tha i public ca me to the
P rama n Ground in grea t num-
bers to w at ch. The Fr ee Tha i
had t rucks s tand ing by and
men designated to retrieve the
containers.
At n oon, B a ngkoks air r a id
sirens sounded. Aircraft
engines were soon heard, a nd
nine P -38 fighters w ere spott ed
19 Author interview w ith AVG a nd Fourteenth Air Force pilot Edwa rd Rector, who had been McGarr ys wing ma n on the Chia ng Mai ra id.
The other former AVG pilot wa iting w ith Rector wa s Ch ar les Older.20 Smit h and C lark, 236.
As the parachutes drifted down, the spectators and the drillteams ran to help themselves.
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Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 4 (Extracts, December 2011) 19
f lying low a long t he Cha o
P hra ya River. Minutes la t er, a
B -24 bomber a ppear ed over-
head a nd, a t a bout 300 feet ,
roared across the P ra ma nground, dropping eight para-
chut es of different colors. Then
a second B-24 w ent over and a
third , each dropping para -
chutes a s it pa ssed. An occa-
siona l burst of Ja panese
machine gun f ire was h eard.
Then the P-38s appeared.
Four put on a sh ow by buzzing
low over th e crowd, w hile the
five others went af t er a
machine gun posit ion th at ha d
fired on t hem. Their stra fing
killed four J apa nese soldiers
a nd five Tha i. At lea st one
round from a P -38 hit less tha n
10 ft from B riga dier Hector, a
British liaison officer, presum-
ably t he local SOE representa -
tive to th e Free Tha i, who ha d
come by t o wat ch. When t hey
met la ter, G reenlee assu red
Hector there wa s no malice
a foreth ought in th e sca re ourplanes ha d given him.21
As the parachutes drifted
down, t he specta tors and the
drill teams ra n t o help them-
selves. Fight ing broke out
am ong them. By t he t ime the
J apa nese arr ived, there wa s l it-
tle left for th em. It w a s a comic
opera, Pa lmer said , but a
hu gely su ccessful one. The med -icine ha d been delivered an d
over 10,000 Tha i ha d w it-
nessed the American drop. The
J apa nese had lost a lot of face.
Th e Wa r End s
One morning in August 1945,
OSS officers Alec MacDonald
a nd J im Thompson a nd t heir
Free Tha i tea ms w ere on board
a C-47 flying over Thailand,preparing to para chute int o
U bon P rovince.22They w ere
part of an OSS operat ion t o
infiltra te 214 Americans a nd
56 Fr ee Tha i to tr a in 12 guer-
rilla ba tt alions of 500 men
each. 23The pilot su ddenly
entered th e ca bin, shout ing,
his arms waving. Its over, he
wa s yelling. The goddamn wa r
is over! The news triggered
more shoutin g, ba ck-slapping
a nd even sobbing am ong the
Tha i. Then ca me t he Tha i
cheer: Cha i Yo! Chai Yo!
The C-47 returned to Ran-
goon. The next da y Ma cDonald
a nd Thompson in a nother C-47
landed at B an gkoks Don
Muan g airport , which was
pat rolled by scores of ar med
Japanese soldiers. 24I t w a s
decidedly eerie. We stared atthem; they s t ared a t us . They
did not bother us. The wa r
would not be over unt il the for-
ma l surrender on 2 September
1945.
MacD onald a nd Thompson
were ta ken t o the Pa lace of
Roses to meet H owar d Pa lmer.
Pa lmer wa s a short-timer and
lef t for the Unit ed Sta tes within
th e w eek, leaving Thompson, a
US Army ma jor, as the B an g-
kok OSS chief. The OSS sta -
tion w a s t o become the official
US a f fa irs establishment unti l
St at e Department off icers
arr ived in Ba ngkok, a lmost a
year la ter. In t he meant ime,
Thompson a nd Ma cDonald
would be ama teur diplomat s ,
dealing with the prime minis-
ter, the Tha i Foreign Office, and
a ll allied emba ssies.
Then Thompson decided to
leave for th e United St at es. He
would be discha rged and return
to Ba ngkok as a civil ian . Mac-
Donald then becam e the OSS
sta tion chief. As a US na val
reserve l ieutena nt, MacDonald
beca me the ra nking America n
officer in Tha ila nd. As such, he
21 Brigadier Hector a pparent ly wa s a code name for Br igadier Vic tor J acques, who ha d w orked in Ba ngkok a s a lawyer be fore the wa r a ndha d returned in early 1945 as the SOE representa tive.22 MacDona ld, a journa list in Honolulu when the J apa nese att acked Pearl Ha rbor on 7 December 1941, organized OSS bla ck propaga nda
broadcast s from Ceylon and lat er was a ssigned to OSS D etachment 101 in Burm a t o run B urmese agents through J apa nese lines. When
the J apa nese were pushed out of Burma , he volunteered to work w ith t he Free Thai. Thompson was a New York a rchitect w ho joined the
OSS an d worked wit h th e Free French in North Africa a nd in Fra nce after D-day. As the w ar in Europe wound down, he volunteered for
duty in t he Pa cif ic. The tw o became friends during their tr aining in C eylon. Both w ould achieve a degree of fame in B angkok aft er the
wa r: Thompson a s the Thai S ilk King who disappeared under myst erious circumsta nces on Ea ster da y 1967; MacDona ld as founder of
the Ba ngkok Post, one Asias most prestigious newspapers.23 Alec MacDonald, A Wand eri ng Spy Was I(Kear ney, NE: Morris P ublishing, 1997), 26.24 Ibid., 29.
The Japanese suspected there was a Thai underground andthat it had links to the outside.
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20Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 4 (December 2011)
wa s the US representat ive at
the forma l surrender of the J ap-
a nese forces in Tha ila nd. Tw o
weeks later, MacDonald again
represented the OSS at a f inal
militar y review, wh ere the Free
Tha i were formally disba nded.
MacDonald decided it wa s
time for him to return to civil-
ian life. B a ngkoks only prewar
English-language daily newspa-per wa s gone, and Ma cDona ld
saw fertile ground to grow a
new E nglish-lan guage pa per.
He w rote his own orders t o the
nearest US na val base, at Subic
B ay in t he Philippines, w here
he signed the forms tha t ended
his four a nd one half year na vy
career, w hich he lar gely spent
with the OSS. The four enlisted
men of the B angkok OSS sta ff
were sent to join the U S lega -tion. It wa s, by coincidence, a t
just this juncture tha t ba ck in
Wa shington P resident Ha rry
Truma n a bruptly ruled the U S
Office of Str a tegic Services out
of exist ence. 25The OSS mis-
sion in B a ngkok was over.
Wha t d i d t h e Ja pan ese
k n ow a bou t t h e F r ee Tha i
an d t h e OSS Pr esen ce?
The J a panese suspected t here
wa s a Tha i underground a nd
tha t it ha d links to the outside.
Over time they ha d ca ptured
OSS agents being infil t ra ted
a nd suspected others ha d been
successful. They reported
upcountry a ir drops to P ridi
and suggested that as regent he
ta ke ca re of th is problem, so
th ey w ould not ha ve to. The
J apa nese apparent ly had no
str ong suspicion of P ridis Fr ee
Tha i role and never uncovered
the B an gkok OSS presence.
When OSS first st a rted t o oper-
a te in the P a lace of Roses, the
J apa nese were told that the
Tha i police Crimina l In vestiga-
tion Division (CID) wa s setting
up a radio tra nsmission sta t ion
in th e pala ce. If t heir direction-
finding equ ipment picked up
OSS tra nsmissions, the Ja pa-
nese would think it wa s Tha i
CID.
B efore the move to the Pa lace
of Roses, the base had moved
severa l t imes for security rea-
sons. The reloca tion t o the pa l-a ce had been precipita ted by a
fruit vendor near the former
base, who had casua lly com-
mented to his customers tha t
those America ns sure ea t a lot
of ban a na s. Pa lmer described
how he m oved to a nother house
on the Cha o Phra ya River while
Greenlee and Wester were still
there. They borrowed a car a nd
a driver fr om the Tha i Army. As
they drove through crowd ed
city streets, the cars horn
sta rted blowing. B y one
a ccount , i t wa s a helpful Ja pa-
nese soldier w ho fina lly discon-
nected a wire t o stop it
without ever noticing the
OSS officers in the ba ck seat .
When former Free Tha i w ere
a sked how they ma naged to get
awa y wi th a s much as they d id
in dealing with th e Ja panese
25 Ibid., 36
Because of their feelings of superiority and their attitudes to-ward the Thai, the Japanese could never believe that thefriendly Thai among whom they lived could be capable of suchskillful subversion.
This photo of a group of Free Tha i members a nd U S officers wa s one of ma ny show n
in a C IA Museum exhibit in 2000 entit led Historic Photographs a nd Memorabiliaof Tha ilands OSS H eroes. The photos and m an y of the art ifacts hav e been tra ns-
ferred to the Thai government.
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Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 4 (Extracts, December 2011) 21
during t he occupation, th eir
an swers were usually s imilar t o
Free Tha i veteran P iya Ch a k-
kaph a ks: B eca use of their feel-
ings of superiority a nd t heir
at t i tudes toward t he Tha i , theJ a pan ese could never believe
tha t t he fr iendly Tha i among
wh om they lived could be capa -
ble of such skillful su bver-
sion. 26
Th e L egacy o f th e OSS
Ban g k ok Exper i en c e
The OS S experien ce in Tha i-
lan d wa s one of th e most com-
plex situa tions a n int elligenceorgan ization fa ced during
World Wa r II . The J a pa nese
enemy was n ot the biggest
obstacle to operational success.
Post-wa r int erests of the C hi-
nese an d Brit ish al l ies ha d to
be factored into operat ional
plann ing. The importa nce of
unila tera l intelligence opera-
tions qu ickly beca me evident.
The B ritish were our closest
a l lies during the w ar , and
American feelings a gainst B ri t-
ish colonialism a nd its possible
revival a f ter th e war a re now
lar gely forgott en. SEAC, the
joint , Anglo-America n S outh -east Asia C ommand under
Admiral Louis Mountba tt en,
often becam e to America ns
fighting in th e theater Sa ve
En gla nds Asiat ic Colonies.
The Ch inese represented a sim-
ilar problem, but, const ra ined
by geogra phy, th ey were easier
to deal w ith.
On t he other han d, the s ignif i-
cance of dealing closely a nd
openly with a n a l lyin this
case t he Free Tha ishowed
how effective joint operations
could be run . As the OSS War
Reportpoints out, the OSS w as
not just run ning int elligence
a gents who were part of a resis-
ta nce movement, but dea ling
w ith t he key figures of the
sta te on ma tt ers of grea t
importa nce. Perha ps a unique
situa tion in World Wa r II , but a
prepara tion for wha t C IA would
face in th e world t o come.
The Bangkok experience
underlined th e import a nce of
diagnosingth e peculiar char-acter of a s i tua tion, and devel-
oping an operational plan to
meet it. This is as funda men-
ta l as i t get for a n intel l igence
service. It requires a services
a bility to be open a nd flexible,
to accept a s i tuat ion for wh at i t
isnot a s one would like it to
bean d to work within th at
context.
The grea test legacy of the
OSS-Free Thai experience wasthe relat ionship betw een t he
two na t ions tha t w as formed
from it. Thailand became one of
Americas st au nchest a llies in
Asia , from World Wa r II s end
through th e era of the Vietna m
Wa r. And t he biggest benefi-
ciary of th is relat ionship wa s
th e OSS successor, t he C IA.
26 Author in terview wi th P iya C hakkaphak .
Bibliography
Read i n g s
Alsop, St ewa rt a nd Thomas B ra den, Sub-Rosa: The OSS and Amer ican E spionage. New York: Reyna l &
H itchcock, 1946.
Ma cDonald, Alec, A Wanderi ng Spy Was I. Kearney, NE: Morris Publishing 1997.
Piya Chakkaphak, My Role in the Free Thai Movement, 17 March 1997.Reynolds, E. Bruce, Thai land s Secret War: OSS, SOE, and the Free Thai U ndergr ound dur in g Worl d War I I.
Ca mbridge: Cam bridge University P ress, 2005.
Th e Overseas Tar gets: War Repor t of th e OSS, Vol um e 2. Was hingt on, D.C.: Ca rrollton P ress In c., 1976.
Smith , R. Ha rris , OSS: Th e Secret H istory of Am er icas Fir st Cent r al I nt ell igence Agency. Los Angeles: U niver
sity of California Press, 1972.
Smit h, Nicol and B lake Clark, In to Siam, Un derground K ingdom. Ind ia na polis: The B obbs-Merrill C ompany,
1946.
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Wa keman , Frederick, J r., Spymaster: D ai L i and th e Chi nese Secret Ser vice. Los Angeles: Un iversity of Ca li-
fornia P ress, 2003.
Wimon Wiriya w it, Fr ee Thai : Personal Recollecti ons and Offi cial Docum ent s. B angkok: White Lotus P ress,
1997.
I n t e r v i ews
P isoot Pete S udasa na , B an gkok, October, 2003.
Piya Chakkaphak, Bangkok, February 2005.
Wimon Wiriyaw it , B angkok, J an uar y 1994,
Krongthong Chut ima, B an gkok, Februa ry 2004.
Elizabeth P. Ma cIntosh, Virginia, 2005
Ed wa rd Rector, Wa shingt on, Ju ne, 2000