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Betrayals of Another KindIslam, Democracy and The Army in Pakistan

Lt Gen Faiz Ali Chisti (Retd)

H.I.M;S Bt

Reproduced by:

Sani H. PanhwarMember Sindh Council, PPP

B etra ya lsofA notherKind

Isla m ,Dem ocra cy a nd The A rm y in P a kista n

L tGen Fa iz A liC histi(Retd)H .I.M ;S B t

(Second Edition:Revised & Enla rged)

Reproduced B y:

Sa niH .P a nhwa rM em berSindh C ouncil

CONTENTS

PREFACE .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1Chapter One Playing War Games .. .. .. 5Chapter Two Bhutto Zia and Myself .. .. 13Chapter-Three Towards Martial Law .. .. 35Chapter-Four The Murder Trial .. .. .. 93Chapter-Five Was I Zia's Keeper? .. .. .. 98Chapter-Six The Man from Nowhere .. .. 112Chapter-Seven Accountability A Fiasco .. .. 131Chapter-Eight The Elections Cell Diary .. .. 142Chapter-Nine Elections: Yes or No? .. .. 164Chapter-Ten Commitment or Cover-up ? .. .. 177Chapter-Eleven Who Killed Zia? .. .. .. 187Chapter-Twelve Lost Labours .. .. .. 194Chapter-Thirteen A Canadian Connection .. .. 203Chapter-Fourteen Soldiering For The People .. .. 216Chapter-Fifteen Crises of Foreign Policy .. .. 226Chapter-Sixteen Gentleman Cadet to General .. 240

Annexures & Appendices .. .. .. .. .. 245

Annexure 'A' Chishti And Azad Kashrmir .. .. 246Annexure 'B' Chishti On Elections .. .. .. .. 254Annexure 'C' Chisht's Press Conferences .. .. .. 270Annexure 'D.' Chishti: A Background .. .. .. 281Annexure 'E' Reviews And opinions .. .. .. 283

Betryals of Another Kind: Copyright© www.bhutto.org 1

PREFACE

In July 1977 the Army took over the civil administration of Pakistan to protectdemocracy. It was a move widely welcomed by the people at the time. The key manGen Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq the Chief Martial Law Administrator, later betrayed thetrust placed in Pakistan's armed forces, when he proved unwilling to fulfill his pledgeof holding elections. Instead of transferring power within ninety days, he becamedictator for the next eleven years.

General Zia's intentions were, I am convinced, certainly different when the Army firsttook over. Perhaps his change of mind is best explained by the old maxim, "powercorrupts, and absolute Power corrupts absolutely". . .

The question of responsibility is straightforward in military terms. "A commander isresponsible for whatever happens in his command. He is also responsible for whateverdoes not happen in his command." In Martial Law the rule always is that of one personi.e. the CMLA. He has absolute authority vested in him, and correspondingresponsibility. All others are aides and subordinates.

I have watched closely the dramatic events in Pakistan's life, first as a witness todecision-making at the highest level, then as an officeholder and finally, as an ordinarycitizen, since 1980. I have always held onto the hope that one day the precise factswould be correctly recorded and analyzed. Instead I have seen many important factsmisinterpreted or twisted. People in power often have a tendency to distort history totheir personal advantage, or simply, to ignore inconvenient facts. So it has been inPakistan.

It is almost ten years since I retired from the Pakistan Army and at the same timeresigned as a Federal Minister in charge of three ministries. Yet, even today, whenpeople meet me they often talk as if I was associated with Gen Zia right up to his deathin August 1988. Some even go to the extent of asking me where I am posted these days.The facts, therefore need to be placed in their true perspective.

Circumstances play an important role in shaping a person's public image. Sometimesthey make a person appear controversial. At the time when the Army was sucked intonational affairs as a result of a countrywide agitation against the rigging of Pakistan'sGeneral Elections for the National Assembly held on March 7, 1977, I was GOC 10Corps, with its headquarters in Rawalpindi. I stayed there until my retirement. Likeother Corps commanders I also became involved in decision-making at the nationallevel, both before and after the imposition of Martial Law in Pakistan in July 1977.

Before July 5, 1977, unconditional authority was exercised by Prime Minister ZulfikarAli Bhutto. After July 5, total authority was exercised by the CMLA, Gen Mohammad


Zia-ul-Haq. All other functionaries were advisers, irrespective of their rank. I was alsoone of them. I do not absolve myself of the responsibility of being an aide in decisionmaking. I have no regrets or second thoughts on the various recommendations I madeto the PM or to the CMLA. If given another chance, my recommendations and myconduct would be exactly the same.

Certainly the PM listened to me, but unfortunately he was not allowed to change hispolicies because of his wily and vociferous ministers. They drowned Mr. Bhutto. As forGen Zia. I knew he found it difficult as CMLA to tolerate and accommodate mystraightforward views, because I - unlike a lot of others - had the moral courage tospeak the truth as I saw it.

If I had not been loyal to the country and the armed forces, I would have, like otherdissemblers, encouraged and supported those many harmful actions of the CMLA, anddrawn on his personal weaknesses and failings for my benefit. Instead, I preferred toexpose myself to Zia's displeasure by expressing myself bluntly, rather than remain asilent spectator to misdeeds and mistaken policies.

No one can honestly say that I had an ulterior or personal motive in advancing myviews. It is one of those great ironies of life that my sincere recommendations haveresulted in misunderstandings.

I have nothing to be ashamed of in my conduct. I am the only minister who resignedduring that period in Pakistan. Other generals were used and discarded -- I was usedbut not discarded, because I myself refused to be used any longer.

Unfortunately Gen Zia as CMLA, like previous Chief Executives of Pakistan, alsobecame rapidly surrounded by opportunists and sycophants, who succeeded in keepinghim almost completely in the dark about important but unwelcome facts. I have everyreason to believe that I was made the victim of a deliberate campaign of slander andvilification mounted against me by some of my former civil and military colleagues,with Gen Zia's approval, so as to get rid of me as the solitary voice opposing hishypocritical policies.

Since my retirement from service in March 1980, some of my friends and well-wishershave been asking me to write about the events which I had been witness to, or hadknowledge of, I planned to do it once Gen Zia had left the throne, so that I could coverhis entire regime in one hook. I feel sorry that he died in tragic circumstances. If at firstthe PM and then the CMLA had not disregarded my recommendations, the course ofevents in Pakistan might well have been very different.

I was at first reluctant to write this book. The credit for forcing me to write it goes toAkbar Ali Malik, who has a special bent for history. Although busy with his studies at


Gray's Inn for his bar-at-law and a doctorate, he asked me to come to London and to seefor myself what had been written about Gen Zia's regime. I did that, and read some ofthe books published. I found they were full of misinformation, distorted facts wildguesses or biased opinions. So I decided to write the full facts. Posterity should knowthe truth and draw the correct conclusions. I spent three months in England collectingand collating relevant details about that period. Then I went to Dubai to be with my sonHamid, so that I could find the peace of mind to write.

Whatever has been written here has been recalled from memory with the help of somenotes of mine from the period and from books and newspapers. It is very difficult toreconstruct the background of those events of a decade or more ago. I followed the bestand safest method, reliving the events in my mind, and checking them with othersources of information.

I should mention here that I tried to refresh my memory of some events and details bygoing to General Headquarters, but was informed by the VCOAS that I could notexamine the records without special permission.

This book is a record of events as I saw them, as I lived through them, as I recall themand as I reacted to them. I hope it will clear all misunderstandings and misconceptions.Let it be seen as a call for accountability and hopefully help Pakistan achieve a morejust, stable and viable political system.

My intention is not to write against anybody, or to carry out character assassinations,but to make an honest effort to record events of Pakistan's recent history correctly andwithout inhibition. This may even help overcome the effects of dishonest decisionmaking by our Chief Executives, of which we have been, as a nation and as a country,victims. From soon after the creation of Pakistan in 1947 and the death of Quaid-i-AzamM A Jinnah, the Pakistani nation has been betrayed by its rulers, in order to perpetuatetheir rule. This trend must be arrested if Pakistan is to survive. Betrayals of all kindmust stop.

Whatever plans we make today, whatever diplomacy we adopt, whatever sacrifices wemake will bear fruit for generations to come. Whatever myopic and selfish politics andpolicies we follow today will cause suffering to the coming generations. Therefore, Ibelieve whosoever is responsible for taking decisions affecting the fate of our nationmust have above all else foresight and the spirit of sacrifice.

As a background to this attitude of mine to life, I have had to narrate here some earlierepisodes from my life. They will make my frame of mind and the influences on mydecision-making clearly understood.


I would like to express my thanks to Akbar Ali Malik for helping me to make up mymind to write, and for tolerating my whims; Haq Dad and Aizaz Chishti forchaperoning me while in London; Asif Ali Khan and Shahid Aleem Qureshi for theiradministrative support at Dubai, and my toddler granddaughter Janevi for her musingsat every opportune moment.

I am also grateful to my wife Shaheen for providing me with the everlasting moralstrength that did not allow me to succumb to material gains. I owe much to ColJamshed and Hamid for reading the chapters and giving me the benefit of theirknowledge and judgment through valued discussions. Lastly, my thanks to AnthonyHyman who helped shape my writing into a book and to Shreeram Vidyarthi forpublishing it.


CHAPTER - ONEPLAYING WAR GAMES

I am a career soldier. I joined the British Indian Army back in 1946, straight fromcollege, as a gentleman cadet. I underwent my training at the Officer's Training SchoolBangalore and was commissioned an artillery officer. At the time of Partition. I optedfor Pakistan and joined the Pakistan Army in Karachi in November 1947.

I shall narrate the story of how I took up a military career and how I became a General,at a later stage in this book. Right now, suffice it to say that I am a straightforward, god-fearing and honest soldier, loyal to my country and to my conscience and that I havealways served the government of the day to the best of my ability and without anyconsideration of short-term gains for myself or my dear ones.

I had opportunities to serve in General Headquarters as Deputy Director MilitaryTraining (DDMT), Director Research and Development (DR&D) of united Pakistan andas Military Secretary (MS) of the present Pakistan. During my tenure as DR&D and MSI carried out some studies leading to policy decisions which have a direct bearing on acorrect understanding of some subsequent events. The most important of these areenumerated below:

1) Efficacy of Research War Gaming.2) Defence Needs of East Pakistan3) Dangers of Military Action in East Pakistan4) Nuclear Technology Planning5) Appointment of Colonel-in-Chief of Armoured Corps6) Tenure of Service for Lieutenant Generals

(I should mention here that I tried to refresh my memory of some eventsand details by going to General Headquarters to read some documentsfrom this period. But I was informed that, without special permissionfrom the Ministry of Defence, I would not be allowed to visit GHQ---implying that I had become persona non grata.)

Efficacy of Research War Gaming

As DR&D I went to visit the Research War Gaming Department of the Ministry ofDefence, which had been set up to produce scientific results in war gaming. I wasimpressed by the efforts put in, I asked Dr. Qureshi if they had run any research wargame. They answered in the affirmative. They had done it for the battle of Chambduring the war of 1965. I got interested because I had been in that battle. I asked the


Chief Scientist to let me have the complete run-down on that war game. It was done. If Iremember correctly, it was a Baluch battalion's attack on chak Pandit.

I quickly realized that data fed into the war game on behalf of the attacking battalionand the Brigade was entirely concocted. It was shocking, and had naturally led to thewrong conclusions. I scrapped it. Things could only improve if we stopped telling liesat all levels. This was also my conclusion on another study which we had carried out inthe R and D Directorate, on why the small arms shooting standards in the Army wereso bad.

Defence Needs of East Pakistan

After the war of 1965, the demand grew for greater resources to be allocated to defencein East Pakistan. In early 1971, when tension was increasing in East Pakistan, and therewere fears that another war may be impending with India, there was a hue and cry inthe East Pakistan papers asking for more participation in the defence forces of Pakistan.Some openly wrote that the defence of East Pakistan did not lie in the war on the WestPakistan front. They said they needed more troops to defend East Pakistan. Politicallythere was a clash with this requirement, because the Awami League did not want moretroops to be inducted into East Pakistan. So to arrive at a viable solution which wouldbe acceptable to the nation as well as thepolitical leaders.

Consequently I ordered an analysis to be carried out in the Research and DevelopmentDirectorate. The recommendations were sent to Gen Yahya Khan for approval. Themain recommendations were as follows:

a. The Pakistan Military Academy was in West Pakistan whereas the bulk of thepopulation was in East Pakistan. The East wanted training facilities of its own. Soa wing of the Military Academy should be opened in East Pakistan. Details oftypes of courses to be run and staff East Pakistan.

b. East Pakistan was mostly equipped with Chinese Weapons. For their trainingthey had to come to the Infantry School in Quetta. It was recommended that anInfantry School wing for Chinese weapons he opened in East Pakistan. A closequarter battle wing wouldalso be established with it.

c. Jungle and riverine warfare were the specialties of East Pakistan. There were nocomparative rivers or jungles in West Pakistan. So it would be beneficial to haveJungle and Riverine Warfare Schools started in East Pakistan .


d. In the field of defence production facilities like those available at the PakistanOrdnance Factory in Wah, should be created at a suitable place in East Pakistan.

e. There were very few Air Defence Units in East Pakistan. There was a need tocreate some more or send some from the West.

f. The concept of having one Logistic Area Headquarters in East Pakistan wasunworkable in war. There was a need to have four such Headquarters,demanded by the clear-cut division of the country by natural water courses.

There were other recommendations too. The main advantages of implementing theserecommendations would have been to have ready availability of more troops fordefence of East Pakistan, it would also have given more East Pakistanis the satisfactionof participation in the defence of their own country. The recommendations were sent tothe President and COAS Gen A M Yahya Khan, who approved the recommendationsbut endorsed the file: "Agreed in principle but let us do the cost accounting first."

When the file came back to me I forwarded it to the Director Budget, Brig Shariff, to dothe needful. It was never done. Soon after, when an airlift of troops started to EastPakistan I asked Gen Yahya to do the cost and was admonished.

It would also be pertinent to state here that I examined the recommendations of theNational Defence College Course of 1970 and forwarded it to the COAS forimplementation of the workable recommendations, it was not done. What was the goodof spending so much money on a course and arriving at the recommendations for thedefence of the country, if they were not to be implemented? That was what washappening at higher levels of the Army, and it contributed to the loss of the EasternWing of our country.

Dangers of Military Action in East Pakistan

As DR&D of the Pakistan Army. I carried out many studies. Some of them concernedEast Pakistan. Those studies had many aspects, including the possibility of carrying outmilitary action in East Pakistan. I had opposed it. Years later, Gen Tikka Khan refutedmy criticism by saying that I had been nowhere near East Pakistan (Jang FridayMagazine, July 22 - 28, 1983). He was right, I was not in East Pakistan. I was in GHQ,working for the integrity of Pakistan, while he was in East Pakistan doing the opposite.I had explained to Gen Yahya Khan that military action ultimately means the solutionof a simple mathematical problem. Who would win -- the attacker (the killer) or thedefender (the person(s) to be killed)? If by killing one person the situation could becontrolled, then the killer would win, but if the situation would not come under controlthen some more would have to be killed and there would be mourners andsympathizers of the first person killed, i.e. his wife, children, brothers, sisters, parents,


well-wishers etc. in a proportion which would increase geometrically. You would haveto kill more, more and yet more.

In East Pakistan the killer would only be West Pakistani. You would not be able to findan East Pakistani who would kill East Pakistanis. So ultimately the killers would be allWest Pakistanis in East Pakistan, and those to be killed would be all East Pakistanis.Flow could that equation be solved to the advantage or success of the killer? So militaryaction in East Pakistan could not produce the answer. It would only enhance Bengalifeelings against West Pakistan, and this could lead to severe consequences.

On hearing this, Gen Yahya Khan remarked to Gen Hamid "Do you see this. I told youwe do not need educated people in the Army."I replied that I was arguing thus becausethe job assigned to me made it my duty to do proper research and put uprecommendations. If I had been a Field Commander it would have been outside thepurview of my duties. So he said there was a good chance of going to war and asked meif I would like to be posted out of GHQ to an active formation. I replied I would love itand I asked for a posting to East Pakistan. But it was not to be -- instead I was posted toAzad Kashmir.

This was the second time that I had asked for a posting to East Pakistan, I was neverposted there. Imagine an officer with twenty-four years of service never posted to EastPakistan. The explanation lay in the lad that postings to East Pakistan were reserved forthe privileged ones. It ensured financial benefits and I was not one of the privilegedclass. The favored ones had to be related to someone who mattered, either civil ormilitary.

My first request for a posting to East Pakistan was in 1968. I had completed my tenurein Command and Staff College, Quetta, and was to be posted out on command duties.The Military Secretary, Maj. Gen M. Nawaz, had come to Quetta on a visit and askedme if I had any preference for posting. (It had been a tradition that the instructors of theStaff College used to get a posting station of their own choice on completion of theirtenure in the Staff College.) I asked for East Pakistan where a unit was without aCommanding Officer. He did not promise anything, but he said he would try. On hisreturn to GHQ, Rawalpindi, he informed me that I could not be posted to East Pakistan.I was posted to Malir Cantt (Karachi). That was the nearest I could get to East Pakistan.

On this particular issue of military action in East Pakistan one can say that it wascompletely uncalled for, and eventually led to the secession of Pakistan's eastern wingbecause of our intellectually dishonest decisions. The Government at the Centre was atfault. Unfortunately it was a general at the helm of affairs.

Nuclear Technology Planning


India started planning to attain nuclear technology before she got her independence.Dr. Bhabha was head of Tata Nuclear Institute. Indian Atomic Energy Commission wascreated in April 1948. Dr. Bhabha was then made head of this commission. He was alsodesignated Secretary Atomic Energy Department. He was answerable only to the primeminister. In 1960 after making the atomic reactor India decided to fabricate, by herself,reprocessing plant at Tramboy. On its opening ceremony Mr. Nehru said "Bharat canmake atom bomb but it would not do so as yet".

In June 1967 subsequent to China's sixth atomic blast Indian Atomic EnergyCommission was assigned the task to prepare for an atomic blast. Consequently Indiadetonated its atomic device on 18 May 1974 at Pokhran Rajistan - near Pakistan Border.India declared that the atomic blast was for peace.

I came to know more about Indian research in nuclear technology in 1970 when ouragents in India sent me the minutes of a conference held at the national level. Iexamined it carefully as Director Research and Development, and ordered a study tobring out all the implications of India's nuclear ambitions.

Finally, I recommended that a Technical Academy be established for better training ofPakistan's Armed Forces in technical arms. This was to be located at Risalpur orRawalpindi. It was to include the existing Defence Science Organization andamalgamated schools of instruction of Army Engineers, Army Signals. Army Electricaland Mechanical Engineers, together with a new wing of nuclear technology.

This scheme for a Technical Academy was not approved by the c-in-c, but a ten-yearplan to master nuclear technology was approved by the then President Gen YahyaKhan. The plans were not put into practice, though, because of the intervening war of1971. It was only later, in Mr. Z. A. Bhutto's time, that substantive efforts were made toattain nuclear technology.

I was Military Secretary in GHQ when Gen Tikka Khan selected Brig Zahid Ali Akbarto be deputed to Mr. Bhutto for work on the Kahuta plant. It is wrong to say that BrigZahid was nominated by Gen Zia. Most of the work done in this field by Mr. Bhutto hasbeen revealed in his book, If l am Assassinated.

In any discussion of Pakistan's development of nuclear technology, we must take intoaccount that Pakistan is surrounded by nuclear powers. The USSR, The People'sRepublic of China and India are regional neighbors while the USA is omni-afloat in theIndian Ocean with its own formidable nuclear power. Out of these states, only China isa confirmed, reliable friend. Our relations with the USSR are poor, India is a confirmedenemy and the USA is entirely unreliable. Pakistan must therefore have a deterrent inorder to defend itself. I do not agree with those who say that we should not have an


atom bomb. We must have a nuclear deterrent so that we cannot be blackmailed.Without an atom bomb our defence capability is incomplete.

Today, there are at least 350 nuclear plants functioning day and night in 27 countries. Atleast 52 nations maintain nuclear research facilities. At least 11 nations are reprocessingnuclear fuel, and in addition to the club of USA, USSR, UK, France and China otherstates including India, Israel, Sweden, South Africa, Japan, Holland, West Germany,Brazil and Argentina have become nuclear, powers.

What then can be the possible justification in trying to stop Pakistan from becoming anuclear power. Is it simply to undermine the defence potential of Pakistan? Is itintended to deny the Islamic world access to an atom bomb? If India and Israel can bepatronized to become atomic powers then why not Pakistan also? The answer seems tobe, simply because it is a Muslim Country. It would then have the capability ofinfluencing the oil policy of the world.

It is India after its own atomic explosions, which had forced Pakistan to go nuclear. Thesame had happened to India in 1964, after the Chinese atomic blast in 1965, the IndianPrime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri ordered Dr. Bhabha to go ahead with anunderground atomic blast. This was the time when UK, USA, USSR and France hadrefused to provide an "atomic umbrella" to India. Let us not forget what Mr. Bhuttosaid. "The nation will eat grass, but it must produce the atom bomb."

Appointment of Colonel-in-Chief of Armoured Corps

Uniforms greatly pleased Mr. Bhutto throughout his career. His best-known uniformwas modeled closely on that of Chairman Mao, perhaps intended as some kind ofcompliment to China, Pakistan's most important foreign ally. "Chairman" Mr. Bhutto'slove of uniforms extended beyond his own person. For Pakistan's Senators, Mr. Bhuttohad a special uniform designed, with golden collars for their tunics.

Gen Zia had noticed this weakness in him. He tried to exploit it so as to get closer to Mr.Bhutto. A friend of Gen Zia, Col Chughtai told me that Gen Zia wrote a letter to GenSahibzada Yaqub Khan asking him to invite Mr. Bhutto to become the Colonel- in-Chiefof the Armoured Corps. Mr. Bhutto accepted, and Gen Zia, as Colonel Commandant ofthe Armoured Corps, initiated the case that Mr. Bhutto be made Colonel-in-Chief of theArmoured Corps.

The case came to me as Military Secretary. I opposed it and wrote a minute to thateffect, while forwarding it to Gen Tikka Khan, COAS. I had argued that suchappointments were not for political leaders, but were traditionally reserved for retiredsenior officers. The political leaders in government today could be in the Oppositiontomorrow, in which case it would be embarrassing for both parties. I requested Gen


Tikka Khan to ask the PM to turn down the offer. Gen Tikka Khan argued that it wouldbe OK, because, in the recent past, Prince Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran had been made theColonel-in-Chief of the Frontier Constabulary. I explained to Gen Tikka Khan that therewas a lot of difference between the cases. Prince Reza would never in his life be inPakistan politics and sit either on the Opposition benches or be a part of thegovernment. Secondly, there was no comparison between the Frontier Constabularyand the Armoured Corps. The common Army view was that it was an honor whichshould never have a chance to be dishonored. However, Gen Tikka Khan, for whateverreasons, did not agree with me, and forwarded the case to the PM for his acceptance.

Later Mr. Bhutto was installed by Gen Tikka Khan and Gen. Zia as colonel-in-Chief ofthe Armoured Corps. What a tradition the Colonel Commandant Armoured Corps set:he hanged his own Colonel-in-Chief -- irrespective of what the offence was!

Tenure of Service for Lieutenant Generals

As Military Secretary at GHQ I noticed that there was an anomaly on retirement rulesfor generals. Maj. Gen -- 30 years service, or 55 years of age, whichever earlier; Lt Gen --- 57 years of age, no mention of service; Gen -- 3 years' tenure.

Good Major Generals were falling due for retirement before Lieutenant Generals weredue to vacate, and the Army was losing good officers.

I discussed this problem with Gen Tikka Khan on sixteen occasions, because werecognized it was an important matter. The Army recommendations reached made anew rule irrespective of age, giving four years tenure to Lieutenant Generals. It wassubmitted the Ministry of Defence for approval. The final rule approved by the PM was,"Lieut General's tenure will be of four years. The government may give one year'sextension only. "I was the father of the rule. Therefore when the question of my ownretirement came up in March 1980, there was no question of my requesting, oraccepting, an extension. As the originator of this rule, it would have been quite wrongfor me to do so.

As far as my retirement on completion of four years' tenure was concerned, I had toldGen Zia repeatedly, and in blunt terms, that I would never accept an extension, not onlybecause I was the father of the rule but because he was making dishonest decisions. Atthe time when he had made a wrong decision to promote Brig Rahat Latif and BrigMasood Akram, I had told him I would be staying in Pakistan Army until thecompletion of my four years' tenure, and not a day after. I was serving not in Zia'sarmy, but in Pakistan's army, and I did not intend to take baksheesh from him.

Gen Zia had a three-year tenure, but continued for 12 years until his death. Many LtGenerals who towed his line continued serving for 7 to 10 years, eg Lt Gen G. Jillani


served for ten years, Lt Gens Fazle Haq and Jahan Dad for seven years each and Lt GenS.M. Abbasi for six years. Generals M. Iqbal and Sawar Khan served for four years eachinstead of their normal tenure of three years. They might have continued if they werenot suddenly retired because of their ignorance of an attempted conspiracy or coup inLahore. Such extended tenures, based on Gen Zia's dishonest decisions, gaveunnecessary advantages to loyal lieutenants and deprived good captains of their duerights. This ultimately affected the morale and combat efficiency of the army.


CHAPTER - TWOBHUTTO, ZIA AND MYSELF

Ever since Operation Fairplay much has been written about me vis-a-vis Gen Zia andMr. Bhutto by writers responsible as well as irresponsible. The majority of writers werethose who indulged in muckraking to sell their newspapers and magazines. Others hadsuffered setbacks because of their own misdeeds and past doings, and so indulged inmud-slinging for personal reasons. Yet others were the type to take money and writeagainst anybody. There was no dearth of such writers in our society. Gen Zia had evenmade some of them his advisers with the status of federal ministers.

My conduct with Mr. Bhutto has been an issue for so long that its logical outcome isthat all types of myths, stories and anecdotes are in circulation in Pakistan and abroad.Sometimes they are so funny. The weekly Hurmat had even gone to the extent ofpublishing a concocted interview with Nusrat Bhutto, its cover/title page reading "Iwill never forgive Chishti". (Hurmat Volume V No. 7 of February 8 to 16, 1986). Anothermagazine claimed that the 1982 elections would he held because Benazir and Chishtihad secretly met in the officers' mess of a cantonment. Both interviews were denied bythe ladies concerned.

I had no personal rapport with Mr. Bhutto1, unlike some other generals -- notably GenFazie Haq - who had been meeting Mr. Bhutto often while he was a Federal Minister inField Marshal Ayub's government, and Haq was the Commandant, President'sBodyguard. My dealings with Mr. Bhutto have been those of a sincere governmentservant with the Chief Executive of the country. I think I acquitted myself well bytelling him the truth in no uncertain terms, unlike his sycophant associates and some ofmy spineless colleagues. I spoke the truth clearly whenever I was asked for my opinionby him or whenever I thought he needed a clear picture. I was never snubbed for myviews; indeed, I think he appreciated my frankness. I was neither rude nor audacious,simply frank. He was perfectly kind to me, and why not -- what wrong did I ever dohim?

It was I who was responsible for making sure nobody touched Mr. Bhutto's family thenight of the coup. Am I guilty of saving Mr. Bhutto -- or guilty of not saving, him, assome others say?

1October 1958 Commerce Minister in General Ayub's cabinet (Previously one month with Iskander Mirza as

minister), January 1960 minister for minorities affairs, national development and information and newly raisedministry of fuel, energy and natural resources and Kashmir Affairs; 1963 foreign minister; 20 December 1971President and Chief Martial Law Administrator (Civilian); 14 August 1973 Prime Minister (12 April 1973 NationalAssembly had passed constitution.)


I came in contact with Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto for the first time in June 1972 at Murree,while I was Acting General Officer Commanding Murree Division. Mr. Bhutto wasstaying at Murree where he was assessing the opinions of different sections of societybefore going to Simla for talks with Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India.

On May 12 1972, Maj Gen (later Lt Gen) Abdul Majid Malik and myself had gone toinspect our troops on location at Lipa Valley on a piece of land which we hadrecaptured from the Indians. This recapture had raised the morale of the whole nationand had infused a new life into the Army. On our return from Lipa Valley we picked upBrig Dildar, Rana from his Brigade Headquarters and went to the Haji Pir Pass toinspect some of the forward defended localities. From Haji Pir Pass we had to go toBedori Bulge. As our helicopter landed at Kuthnar De Gali, 13,000 feet above sea level,the snow under the left wheel caved in. The pilot tried to take off immediately but didnot succeed, so our helicopter rolled over to the left with Maj Gen A Majid Malik, BrigDildar Rana, Capt Badar (Pilot) and myself in it. Roll after roll, the helicopter broke intosmithereens but luckily, did not catch fire because of the snow. All of us sufferedinjuries. We were evacuated to Rawalpindi by another helicopter and hospitalized. Iwas in hospital for about ten days, then left for Murree, where, being the senior mostBrigadier, I assumed command of the Division in place of the hospitalized Gen Malik. Iwas there in that capacity when Mr. Bhutto came to Murree.

One morning it was reported to me that a bullet had been fired by the guard at theresidence of the President. That upset and worried me, so I ordered an immediateinquiry. It transpired that the bullet was fired accidentally. Disciplinary action wastaken against those responsible for the lapse. Later, I had to attend a call from Mr.Bhutto who wanted to know about the shot. As I explained the whole case to him andassured him that everything was OK. He was satisfied.

Two or three days after the above incident, a conference was to be held at GovernmentHouse, Murree, which some Federal Ministers were to attend. One of the ministers, aretired general, Maj Gen Akbar wanted to travel in his car on the Mall, Murree, wherevehicular traffic was prohibited in summer except for vehicles specifically authorizedunder a Presidential order. When the minister reached the Military Police barrier nearthe Divisional Officers' Mess, he asked the barrier to be raised. The NCO on duty didnot oblige, and reminded the minister that he was not authorized to use the route. Healso pointed out the dignitaries mentioned on the displayed notice, who were permittedto use the Mall. The minister asked the NCO if he could get special permission to usethe Mall from the GOC. The case was referred to me and I declined permission. Theminister was then rude to the NCO and told him that he would force his way through.He was told by the NCO that in such a case he would be brought back by force. Theminister chided the NCO and went away.


The minister must have reached the conference venue late and told Mr. Bhutto thereason for being late, because Mr. Bhutto rang me and wanted to know why theminister was not allowed on the Mall in his car. I explained the circumstances to Mr.Bhutto and suggested that if Federal Ministers were to be allowed to use the Mall thenthe Presidential orders might be amended. Mr. Bhutto thought over the matter and saidthat there would be no change of orders. He even said that he would "hold a class forhis ministers and teach them how to behave".

The President was still in Murree holding meetings when his Military Secretaryinformed me that the President would like to spend an evening with the Armed ForcesOfficers of the Garrison. I asked the MS to find out his preference, whether he wouldlike to be with us for an afternoon tea, a formal dinner, supper or cocktails. I wasinformed that as Mr. Bhutto had little time to spare, he would prefer to be with theofficers at a cocktail party of about 45 minutes duration.

It was arranged accordingly. I received him at the Officers' Mess and introduced him tothe officers present. He was delighted to be amongst us and we felt honored. Most of ushad seen him on TV and had listened to him on TV and Radio, but had never had theopportunity to meet him face to face. There was suspense and a natural inquisitiveness,along with reservations, respect and even awe.

Drinks were served and everyone was on his feet, also on his toes. I was playing host.We were all listening to Mr. Bhutto with keen interest when he started talking of hisimpending visit to India. Then he asked me if, my officers would like to ask him anyquestions. I said if he would allow it, the officers would like to become wiser. Mr.Bhutto, while allowing this, perhaps did not realize that intellectual honesty andstraightforwardness were inveterately stamped on the character of an average armyofficer. He perhaps thought that the pattern would be the same as that of his FederalMinisters, who used to address him as "Hazoor" (Your honor), 'Janaab-e-Aali' (RespectedSir) and 'Aali Jaah' (Highly Placed).

Lt Col Mohammad Saleem (Administrative Commandant Station HQ Murree) was thefirst to ask a question. "Sir, you are going to a country which dismembered Pakistan. Theremust be some personalities amongst our countrymen who deserve punishment for the defeat.Who are the people, in your opinion, responsible for the fall of Dacca?" Mr. Bhutto was takenaback by this question but he got hold of himself in no time, and answered the questionin a very roundabout manner. I could see the atmosphere was suddenly charged andthat the officers were not satisfied with his answer. I changed the subject andintroduced lighter questions.

I had hardly succeeded in easing the tension when Col Saleem asked another question,"Sir, you were with Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan in his cabinet and then you left him.


What were the reasons for his downfall?" Mr. Bhutto replied that, apart from other things,he was let down by his advisers. They used to give him bad advice.

At this, I interrupted and said that I did not agree with that because at that level theadvisers were not thrust on anybody but were selected by the Field Marshal himself. SoPresident Ayub slipped up when he selected his advisers. He was to be blamed formaking the wrong choice, not the advisers for being bad. Then I said that I hope youwould . . . At this stage Mr. Bhutto put his hand on my shoulder and said "I know whatyou are going to say but, Faiz, please remember I will never let it happen" (He proved to bewrong. History repeated itself.)

After some more questions of a general nature he wanted to leave, because he had tohost a dinner. I escorted, him to his car, saw him off and thanked him for being with usthat evening I was not in a position to assess whether Mr. Bhutto regretted his comingto us, or whether he appreciated the frankness displayed by the officers indicating, afterall confidence in, and respect for, Mr. Bhutto.

On the following day, I went to my office early and wrote down all that had happenedat the cocktail party. I knew that the Chief of Army Staff, Gen Tikka Khan, would bekeen to know what had happened. Sure enough, after about an hour, I got a telephonecall from Gen Tikka Khan who asked me what had gone wrong at the party on theprevious night, as Mr. Bhutto was annoyed over the behavior of the officers. I explainedto Gen Tikka Khan and told him that I had already sent a written report to him on thesubject through a courier, and that it would be reaching him in about two hours.

Nothing was heard about all this for some days till Gen Majid Malik was released fromhospital and resumed command. I narrated the incident to him when handing overduty and asked him to read the report which I had sent to Gen Tikka Khan. Shortlythereafter, Gen Malik called me to his office and told me that GHQ had asked him whyLt Col Mohammad Saleem should not be made to retire from service for behavior in aninsolent manner towards Mr. Bhutto in the Officer's Mess during the cocktail party.

I was shocked to hear this, and told Gen Majid that Col Saleem's behavior was neitherinsolent nor unbecoming. He was respectful, and behaved within the norms of theofficers' code of honor. Mr. Bhutto had permitted the questions to be asked, and noquestion was asked which could be termed derogatory or unimportant. I said that ifanybody was to be blamed, then it must be the senior most officer, i.e. myself. ColSaleem's retirement must not be considered. If anybody was to be made to retire, Iwould do so voluntarily. My point of view was partially accepted. Col Saleem was notmade to retire but, as a punishment, was posted to a unit on the Karakoram Highwaywhere he had already spent four years. I thought, and still think, that that was unfair.


At that time, different types of command experience were required for promotion to therank of a General Officer. (The situation changed in the days of Zia, who promotedofficers without and command experience, which went to destroy the fibre ofGeneralship.) I was to be posted to command an infantry brigade which could beanywhere in Pakistan. Gen Majid told me that I was being considered for posting as anindependent brigade commander in Rajanpur and asked whether would like to go or tocontinue under his command, in which case I would have to serve at Muzaffarabad. Itold Gen Majid that I would not mind serving anywhere and that I would leave thedecision to him and General Headquarters. I was subsequently posted to Muzaffarabadas an infantry brigade commander.

At this stage I must state that I served in Azad Kashmir in different ranks and atdifferent places over a considerable period of time. I had fought all three wars in AzadKashmir. I had physically traversed the entire area from Marala Head-works to AthMuqam I had always loved to serve the people of this hardy area which was devoid ofmodern facilities. I was pleased to go to Muzaffarabad. By virtue of my seniority I alsobecame the Station Commander of Muzaffarabad.

During my stay at Muzaffarabad, Sardar Abdul Qayum Khan was the President ofAzad Kashmir and of the Muslim Conference, The PPP had been trying to assert itsinfluence and infiltrate into Azad Kashmir also. So, over a period of time, the relationsbetween the Pakistan Government, i.e. Mr. Bhutto, and the Azad Kashmir Government,i.e. Sardar Qayum, became strained. The tension and mud-slinging increased day byday. It affected the whole atmosphere of Azad Kashmir and India watched the situationwith keen interest. Since the Lipa Valley action, their troops had been on the alert totake advantage of any political situation and exploit it to their military advantage.

I was camping with my Headquarters on the Kafir Khan range when Gen Majid talkedto me on the secrophone, and asked me to reach Muzaffarabad as soon as possible andto talk to him from there on the secrophone. I reached Muzaffarabad and contacted himat Murree at about three o'clock in the morning. He gave me my mission, as given tohim by Mr. Bhutto through GHQ: arrest Sardar Qayum and take him by a helicopter toGilgit. Mr. Bhutto had given an order for the removal of a democratically electedPresident.

I was fully aware of the local civil and political situation in Azad Kashmir, as due to thetension there we had already been alerted for internal security duties, in addition to ournormal operational duties which needed a round-the-clock vigil on our part. I franklyexplained the delicate situation to Gen Majid and told him that, although I would obeythe orders. I felt that Sardar Qayum should not be arrested, that the tension could beeased through a dialogue which could take place at a date place and time convenient tothe President, and that I would make Sardar Qayurn available for that Sardar Qayum'sarrest was at that stage fraught with the risk of a political uprising in Azad Kashmir.


The thinning out of my troops from forward positions, weakening of my defenses, andworking without any local and tactical reserves, would have meant making ourselveshighly vulnerable to an attack by the Indians.

I also told Gen Majid to convey to the President that Sardar Qayum had about 150 to200 armed people at his residence, police guards and his own Muslims ConferenceMujahids and in a situation like that there was always the possibility of bloodshed,intentionally or inadvertently. Therefore I could not give a hundred percent guaranteethat he would be arrested alive. I requested that my view as a local commander beconveyed to Mr. Bhutto before final orders, which would be obeyed in letter and spiritwere given. My point of view was conveyed to Mr. Bhutto who luckily agreed with me.I was told to make Sardar Qayum available at Rawalpindi at 5 PM the following day.

I went to the Presidency at Muzaffarabad, unescorted and unarmed, met Sardar Qayumand explained to him the gravity of the prevailing situation. He asked me if I wascertain that there was no danger to his life and that he would return to Muzaffarabadsafely. He was terribly upset and worried about his life. He showed some distrust inMr. Bhutto, I calmed him down and assured him that he would come back. This wasmy word of honor as a soldier to Sardar Qayum. I had got it from Gen Majid beforeproceeding to meet Sardar Qayum. He then accompanied me to the helipad. When Iwas escorting him out of the Presidential residence, all the people present there hadtheir eyes fixed on me, wondering what was to happen to their President.

He was seen off by me, received at Rawalpindi by the appropriate protocol authorities,had a meeting with Mr. Bhutto and the matter was resolved. Tension was reduced. Herang me up from Rawalpindi to inform me that all had gone well. I got his telephoneconnections restored which had been severed previously and made him speak to hisresidence at Muzaffarabad so that his family could sleep in peace. I also told his peopleto arrange a good reception for him at Kohala on his return to Azad Kashmir thefollowing day. Overall it was very kind of the President to listen to my advice and acton it. (In one of the later meetings we had, Mr. Bhutto told me that some federalministers had asked him to retire me compulsorily from service on this issue, to whichhe had replied that he could not retire an officer who had the moral courage to tell thetruth,)

Sometime in May 1973, Gen Majid Malik invited Mr. Bhutto for an informal lunch atMurree. He also invited me to come from Muzaffarahad for this, it was only three of usat table. They discussed a 1973 conspiracy, while I listened. Mr. Bhutto remarked that ifthe officers had been properly punished in 1971 there would have been no conspiracy in1973. Mr. Bhutto thanked us for the lunch and left. I felt Gen Majid had a good rapportwith Mr. Bhutto.


In November 1973 when Mr. Bhutto visited the Azad Kashmir areas, I was GeneralOfficer Commanding at Jhelum with operational responsibility for Eftikharabad(Chhamb), Bhimber, Somani etc. It fell to me to make arrangements for his visit and toaccompany him throughout his stay in my area. I arranged a public address for him atBhimber, followed by a cup of tea with the Garrison officers. This time, it went off verywell. Thereafter I took him to forward positions. I made our helicopter land only 100yards from the enemy troops (I had made foolproof security arrangements for this) sothat he might have a feel of life in the forward trenches. I made him address the troopsonly 300 yards away from the Indian troops. Brig Sher Ali Baz gave him lunch in theOfficers' Mess. He went back very pleased with what he termed an "educative trip".During this trip we had discussed the enemy's and our own capabilities in very clearterms, and he appreciated the frankness with which I explained matters.

In August 1974, Gen Tikka Khan told me that he was thinking of posting me as MilitarySecretary in GHQ. Despite my request to leave me in command of troops rather thanmoving me to a desk job in GHQ, I was posted to GHQ.

During my stay there, I had many opportunities to meet and listen to Mr. Bhuttowhenever he came to GHQ, either to attend COAS Annual Exercise or to attend any ofthe deliberations of the selection board meetings. On one of these occasions, when ageneral discussion was going on during the selection of a brigadier for the rank of amajor general, I had remarked that "a minister can be made overnight but a general or astatesman was not made overnight. It was a lifetime's effort." Mr. Bhutto had agreed.

After Gen Zia had been appointed COAS, he went to the Prime Minister with a list ofMajor Generals for discussion and selection for promotion to the rank of Lt. General. Hecame back with only one name cleared, and that was myself. Mr. Bhutto remarked thathe knew Gen Chishti because he had met him off and on. He would consider the othersat subsequent sittings. He had also agreed to post me to 10 Corps in view of myintimate knowledge of Azad Kashmir and Northern areas. There the troops sitthroughout the year eyeball to eyeball with the enemy under difficult conditions, invery harsh terrain and under operational readiness. It happened that for easiercommunications the headquarters was located at Chaklala, Rawalpindi. It was adifficult and challenging command, extending from Marala Head-works to KhunjrabPass with the terrain rising from 950 feet above sea level to 27,000 feet. I think Iacquitted myself well and did not surrender even an inch of territory to India.

I met Mr. Bhutto in 1976 on very few occasions and most of the time it was just anexchange of formal salutations, but when President Daoud had come from Afghanistan,I had the opportunity to travel with them as a co-passenger in the helicopter, and thenwhen Mr. Bhutto visited the Northern areas and stayed in Gilgit for three days, I was inregular attendance. I took him to address the troops and visit the Chinese camp and


other sites. I also arranged a dinner in his honor in the Northern Areas Headquarters'Mess.

During the floods in 1976, Mr. Bhutto used to go out of Rawalpindi almost every otherday. Gen Zia ordered me to see him off and receive him on each occasion on his behalf.I did it whenever I was present in Rawalpindi. One day, when I received him, Mr.Bhutto asked me not to come to the airport to receive him or see him off, as it must bewasting a lot of my time. I told him that I could not help it because I was under ordersfrom the COAS. In case he did not want me to do it, he could order the COAS to stopthis practice. I never, received the cancellation of these orders so I continued doing it.Mr. Bhutto knew fully well that I was not a sycophant or a hypocrite.

It was well-known that Mr. Bhutto did not like or appreciate suggestions or criticismfrom his colleagues and subordinates. That is why, perhaps most of his associatesabandoned him at the earliest opportunity. Many a time I differed with Mr. Bhutto, notfor the sake of criticism, but rather to interpret things correctly so that he could benefit.He knew I was a professional soldier, and he respected me for my intellectual honesty.But whenever I told the truth, it was at the peril of my career. Only those who knew Mr.Bhutto can understand this.

During the course of the PNA agitation in early 1977, we had numerous meetings withMr. Bhutto in which I used to say in clear terms that he should go for reelections,otherwise the Army would have to take over as an institution. Even if all the generalswere sacked, just as long as the army was there, a COAS (it does not matter what rank)would be there and would take over. He understood this point, and agreed. I alwaysaired my views frankly when others would keep quiet and play dumb, whereas outsidethe meeting hall they would often agree wholeheartedly with me. My frankness, whichwas acceptable to Mr. Bhutto, has often been a subject of discussion and quite a lot hasbeen written about it. I have been blamed for being too 'outspoken'. It has also beenstated that when I talked, it led to "pin-drop silence", or "the PM would get depressed"listening to me etc.

I wonder if I was not supposed to tell the truth. One fact is well-known, and that is thatI used to suggest and insist on political solutions to political problems. If this was notdone, the army would have no option but to take over. Take for example, if twochildren start fighting and take knives out to attack each other, would an observerremain a silent spectator or should he intervene to ensure that no bloodshed takesplace? The Army was playing a similar role, as an observer to the aftermath of theMarch elections. I used to recommend re-elections to Mr. Bhutto, as later I did to GenZia after Operation Fairplay.

So far I have given details of the contacts which I had with Mr. Bhutto prior to July 5,1977. (More details of this period are mentioned in the chapters dealing with Elections


and the Election Cell.) After the Army takeover on July 5, 1977, I had three meetingswith Mr. Bhutto and each of them was unique.

A week after the takeover, Gen Zia, the CMLA and the COAS, planned to go to Murreeto meet the political leaders of the PNA and the former PM who were under leaders ofthe PNA and the former PM who were under protective custody. AdministrativelyMurree was under my command. So, according to protocol, when the COAS was tovisit Murree, I had to receive him and conduct him around unless he specificallywanted me not to do it. I asked him the programme and he indicated that he would liketo go on July 15 by helicopter. I told him that I would receive, him at Murree, which hadbeen the common drill. He ruled it out and said that I should receive him atRawalpindi, then accompany him to Murree and stay with him throughout his visitthere. Any other inferences drawn of my presence with Gen Zia on this trip would bemisconstruing the facts.

On reaching Murree, Gen Zia, Ghulam Ishaaq Khan, Maj Gen K M Arif and I werereceived by Maj Gen (later Gen) Akhtar Abdul Rahman Khan and conducted to hisoffice. The CMLA expressed a desire that Mufti Mahmood, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khanand Professor Abdul Ghafoor meet him in Gen Akhtar's office. Word was sent, and thethree were escorted to the office. Three of us stayed with Gen Zia while Gen Akhtarwent to attend to some administrative details. The CMLA and the three leaders talkedover a cup of tea. The atmosphere was pleasant. I was meeting them for the first time.When Gen Zia asked them how, they were feeling, they replied that they were beinglooked after very well and respectfully, and, in fact, were being overfed by Gen Chishtiwho was sending in a lot of mangoes. (This was because they had specially asked formangoes.) I joked with Mufti Sahib that they were 'Nine Stars' whereas a Great Bearhad only seven stars. To this Mufti replied not to worry, because soon they would bereduced to seven since Tehrik-e-Istaqlal and Jamiat U,lema-e-Pakistan were thinking ofleaving the PNA.

They wanted to know what was in store for them, to which Gen Zia replied that they(politicians) were tired and were being given an enforced rest. They should stay therefor a while, and rejuvenate themselves for the coming General Elections. He told themthat he would be seeing the former PM also, and after some days all the leaders wouldbe allowed to pursue their activities in the manner they thought fit. He could not giveany specific date for their release. Multi Mahmood asked Gen Zia if he planned to meetother PNA leaders also, to which Gen Zia replied 'yes'. Mufti then asked him to havelunch with them, to which Gen Zia agreed. Thereafter these three leaders left for theresidence where they were being detained. We joined them for lunch after about anhour or so Maj Gen Akhtar also accompanied us.

Gen Zia met the other PNA leaders there. The conversation, was about their eagernessto get out and prepare for General Elections, which they thought they would win by an


outright majority. During lunch Gen Zia addressed Air Marshal Asghar Khan and toldhim that he did not like the way he had written and addressed the letter to the ArmedForces Commanders. Air Marshal Asghar said that there was nothing wrong in it, andthat it was the need of the day Gen Zia told him that it was sedition, and he would liketo try him for that. Tempers were high, and Air Marshal Asghar Khan told him to dowhatever he could do. He was ready to answer for all the consequences. MuftiMahmood intervened and defused the situation. After lunch the CMLA had to go tomeet Mr. Bhutto. so we left for Government House.

This was going to be the first meeting between Gen Zia and Mr. Bhutto since Mr. Bhuttowas deposed. How would they meet? How would they behave? What would be theoutcome? All these things must have passed through Gen Zia's mind, but he did notutter a word. He remained calm and composed till we reached Government, House,Gen Zia and myself in one car and Maj Gen Akhtar following us in another. AtGovernment House we were received by Maj Gen Imtiaz, MS to the former PM, whowas still with him. We were guided to the lounge and we were still standing when Mr.Bhutto walked in from the adjoining room. He shook hands with both of us. Maj GenImtiaz had withdrawn by about four paces whereas Maj Gen Akhtar had stayed outsideto inspect his own contingent at Government House. Mr. Bhutto asked us to sit down.Gen Zia sat down promptly whereas I showed a little, reluctance due to decorum andprotocol. Gen Zia asked Mr. Bhutto if it was all right with him if I stayed. He did notmind and asked Maj Gen Imtiaz to get us some tea. Thereafter Gen Imtiaz left.

So much trash has been written about this initial meeting that one is baffled by thedistortions. But the reasons for the distortions could be the following:

Zia was the junior most Lt Gen, yet was promoted by Mr. Bhutto as a special favor.

Zia was never recommended to be the COAS, by Gen Tikka Khan the outgoing COAS.

Zia was hypocritical, treacherous and perfidious.

Zia was made COAS because, at Sadiq Hussain Qureshi's residence in Multan, he hadtaken an oath on the Quran that he would be loyal to Mr. Bhutto.

Zia had been behaving as if he was a personal servant of Mr. Bhutto etc.

It was, however, a confirmed fact that Gen Zia had sworn loyalty to Mr. Bhutto till theend. It was Mr. Bhutto who got the army sucked in, Gen Zia really had no option leftbut to take over, and Mr. Bhutto knew it.

There were only three of us at this meeting. The conversation between Mr. Bhutto andGen Zia started on a very polite note. I was a silent observer. All of us had in mind thatMr. Bhutto was in a terrible fix before Operation Fairplây. He would, not order a


General Election mainly for two reasons. Firstly, what would the world think that hehad rigged the elections! How would his name go down in history (he was alwaysworried, about this). Secondly, his, close associates (federal ministers) would not let himdo it. The other alternative to come out of the impasse was to voluntarily hand over tothe army. That would have meant his political death. He knew it and he would not doit. (I am not writing these points only today. I had mentioned these points in meetingswith him and had urged him to go for General Elections, but his advisers -- in particularHafeez Pirzada would not let that happen. I had told him that his party would stillwin).

Mr. Bhutto started the conversation. He did not seem angry. He was composed butseemed a little despondent worried about his future as anything could happen underMartial Law. He asked us how we were and how things were. Gen Zia said thatthrough God's kindness everything was under control. Mr. Bhutto said he did not mindthe army takeover, perhaps that was the only solution, but more important was howfuture events should be planned. How would Zia do it? What would his decision be?Mr. Bhutto would be available for help and guidance. Gen Zia should clear the deck,and then they would run the country jointly and smoothly. It was up to Gen Zia how todo it.

Mr. Bhutto said that the military takeover had constitutional implications, but he beingthe father of the Constitution knew how to overcome those difficulties. Gen Zia shouldnot worry about them, but concentrate on other important matters. It was not easy torule Pakistan. The Army should not be withdrawn from Baluchistan, and Sindh shouldbe looked after. He said not to worry about what anybody, would say, he would not bevindictive. He also said that Ch. Zahur Elahi's utterances were obnoxious. Everythinghad been changed in Larkana. He urged that we keep Gen Yahya Khan under constantarrest, saying that if he was released, somebody would kill him. The Hyderabad caseshould stay. Do not trust "these Maulvis and Wali Khan", he warned.

Gen Zia in response said that he was only a temporary custodian. Thereafter it wasgoing to be all Mr. Bhutto's again and he should manage it as deemed fit. Gen Zia saidthe army would be neutral and hold elections as announced. Mr. Bhutto asked howlong he would be in custody, to which Gen Zia said for some days only, during whichhe should rest and recoup. Mr. Bhutto urged that all the political leaders be let out soonbecause there was a lot to be done before elections. Mr. Bhutto requested Gen Zia thatPPP Ministers under custody at Abbotabad be moved, if possible, to Murree, so thatthey could meet, as the PNA leaders were together. To this Gen Zia agreed and orderedme to do it. We left for the helipad to return to Rawalpindi. We were, seen off by MajGen Akhtar.

The next meeting took place on July 28, 1977 at Murree. I was again with Gen Zia, forreasons explained earlier (Murree being under my administrative control). The CMLA


and five MLA's had reviewed the situation which prevailed from July 5 to July 27, 1977.It was thought that tempers had calmed down, polarization had been reduced,administrative control was effective, peace was prevailing, and there was no apparentdanger of confrontation between the PPP and the PNA and that there was now nothreat to the life of any political leader. So it was decided by the CMLA that the leadersheld under protective custody should be allowed freedom of movement from July 28.For this he would like to meet and inform them himself. It was against this backgroundthat we were in Murree on July 28.

This time Gen Imtiaz was not there because he had been withdrawn, according to theinstructions of the CMLA. He had reverted to the army. Maj Gen Akhtar was howeverwith us as protocol required. Gen Zia met Mr. Bhutto and informed him that they werefree to go and pursue their activities for elections. Mr. Bhutto repeated that he being thefather of the Constitution knew how to overcome constitutional problems. Gen Ziashould concentrate on providing an efficient and clean administration so that theelections would be fair, impartial and just. He also said that in case of need he might becontacted at Larkana where he intended to go.

Gen Zia said that the PM's aircraft was on standby at Chakiala, and would take him toLarkana after Mr. Bhutto reached Rawalpindi, Gen Zia also asked Mr. Bhutto if, hewould like to go to Rawalpindi by helicopter or by car. Mr. Bhutto said that he wouldprefer helicopter. I told him that both were ready. As Gen Zia got up to go, Mr. Bhuttoasked him if he would like to meet the other PPP leaders who had by then reachedGovernment House. Gen Zia said that he would love to pay his respects to all of them.So we moved to the next room where all of them had gathered. Gen Zia met them andstayed with them for a few minutes. Some points which were raised by the formerfederal ministers included the complaint that so much was being said in the pressagainst the former head of government that the country was getting a bad name. Whatwould the world say? Please do not tarnish the image and name of the country, theysaid and asked that political activity be allowed in the schools and colleges etc. All theformer federal ministers were in good health and seemed eager to take on the challenge.I was again a patient listener there, and do not recall having uttered a single word; Iwas merely in attendance.

During July and August the weather sometimes becomes very cloudy in Murree due tothe monsoons. We had just managed to take off from Murree when the weatherdeteriorated. As a result Mr. Bhutto could not go to Rawalpindi by helicopter and leftby car, so he, could not go to Larkana on July 28. He stayed the night in Rawalpindi anddecided to go to Larkana in the morning. I was asked by Gen Zia to see him off. Ireceived Mr. Bhutto at the Chakiala PAF Base VIP room on the morning of July 29 Iasked him if he would like to have a cup of tea in the VIP room, instead of standing andwaiting outside while his baggage was being loaded and the Falcon being got ready forflight. He accepted my offer and we stayed for some time in the VIP room.


While having tea he told me that he admired and appreciated my frankness andforthright approach in giving unbiased views. He also told me that many times he hadthought of announcing, the date of re-elections on my advice, based on analyses of thesituation, but three of his colleagues did not let him. He wished he had not listened tothem. Then out of the blue, he asked me as to what his course of action should be. I wastaken aback and kept quiet. What could I say? He insisted on a sincere reply from me.All that I said was that he should go abroad for about a month and have a well-earnedrest. He then asked me, with a twinkle in his eye, if I could do anything for him. I toldhim that he had missed the opportunity and he should wait with patience and preparefor elections. Then the plane was reported ready, and I escorted him to it, saluted himand left the airport as the plane taxied towards the runway.

A third meeting took place with Mr. Bhutto on August 28, I was in my office doingsome routine work when Gen Zia telephoned me that Mr. Bhutto was to meet him at hisresidence at about 2:30 in the afternoon, and that I should also be present at themeeting.

What did I have to do with the meeting? Was anybody else also required to be there?The answer was in the negative. I had to be there as Chairman, Election Cell. I reachedGen Zia's residence and we stood outside waiting for Mr. Bhutto's arrival. He came andI found him off color. He was not the same Mr. Bhutto that I had met earlier. He lookeddepressed. I guessed it could be an outcome of the rather harsh telephonic conversationthat they had had when Gen Zia was at Murree. We went inside and Gen Zia asked himif he would like to have a cup of tea. He said no, he was fasting. (It was the month ofRamzan.)

After the normal exchange of formalities, Mr. Bhutto asked Gen Zia how the progresswas towards the October Elections. Gen Zia replied that things were under control andthat he would be discharging his duties for the restoration of democracy withearnestness and vigor. Then he asked me how the Election Cell was doing. I told himthat we were fairly busy. We had met quite a few political leaders since July 5. I namedsome of them. When I named Ghulam Mustafa Khar, Gen Zia interrupted and said thathe was one person whom he was not going to spare or pardon. He said he would bedealt with properly. Mr. Bhutto remarked that so far he had not authorized anybodyfrom the PPP to meet the Election Cell. I asked him if he would be able to meet theElection Cell if required. He said he would be available at Larkana, and I could contacthim any time to discuss anything with him.

He said he did not know Gen Jamal Said Mian, but he knew both Generals Farman andIhsan. He said Ihsan was all right but Farman was not a good choice. He reminded mehow Ihsan was put in the Defence Production Division and Farman in the FaujiFoundation on Gen Tikka Khan's recommendations when I was Military Secretary in


GHQ. Then he complained to Gen Zia that all manner of rubbish was appearing in thenewspapers about him and that his character was being attacked. He requested Gen Ziato give instructions to the press to stop it and put an end to this character assassination.

Gen Zia told Mr. Bhutto that the press was free to write what it wanted as he had givenfreedom to the press. He could not now issue such an order. If Mr. Bhutto wanted to saysomething against it, he was free to say whatever he wanted to say. If desired,according to the law, he could also go to court against the Press and file libel cases. GenZia said that, the civil courts were functioning effectively.

Gen Zia was not warm. He was rather frigid. It was evident that Mr. Bhutto did notexpect that kind of response. He became pensive and said that it seemed that thegovernment was interested in his character assassination.

Then he asked me to tell Gen Zia to do something so that the campaign to malign hisname would be stopped. I replied that, in my opinion, it was all being done by theowner of the newspapers on their own. The government wanted his characterassassination, it would disclose his activities and that of his colleagues while undercustody at Murree. The military government would not hit below the belt. Ourneutrality was evident. At this he said that it was all propaganda, and I told him that heknew very well all that was confiscated on various occasions was lying in the Corps HQunder the custody of Brig (later Lt Gen) Imtiaz Warraich. He kept quiet and changedthe subject. After some time he expressed a desire to leave and Gen Zia and I escortedhim to his car. That was my last meeting with Mr. Bhutto, I never saw him again.

Gen Zia before he became the COAS

In early 1966 I was at Chattar Bagh (Azad Kashmir), when I received orders posting meto the Command and Staff College, Quetta, as an instructor. It was a prized job for aprofessional soldier. I was to reach Quetta by mid April. I had been in the Bagh area forabout six, months after my transfer from Chhamb Jaurian to this Sector. My area ofresponsibility extended from Tatta Pani to Pir Kanthi. It was in this area, Durandi to beexact, that as I got out of my jeep and entered the bunker, a 25 pounder shell hit my jeepand destroyed it. I informed my supported Brigade Commander, Col A. Razzaq, aboutit. He asked me if I was sitting in the jeep at that time. "If I had been sitting I would notbe speaking to you now," I replied.

The Command and Staff College, Quetta, had closed down in 1965 after the declarationof the Indo-Pak war and the instructors were posted out. It was restarted in mid-1966;The first Training Course was scheduled for July 1966. The newly posted CommandantChief Instructor, and all of us who were instructors reached Quetta by mid-April so thatthe necessary spadework could be done to start the training classes on time. It was atradition of the college that the newly posted instructors give maiden speeches only to


the fellow instructors in the Directing Staff ante-room -- these were considered asassessment lectures as well. So all of us had to go through that. As everyone was new, itwas decided that everyone would speak and the sequence of speakers would be inalphabetical order. The Commandant Maj. Gen Akhtar Ali Malik, was to be the lastspeaker and the Chief Instructor, Brig Amjad Ali Khan, the last but one. My turn cameon the fourth or fifth day. The subject of the lecture given, for everyone was "Yourpersonal experiences of the 1965 war". I had been involved in that war from April 1965to March 1966. I was with Gen Akhtar Malik and Brig Chaudhry when the war startedand had been intimately involved in its execution in the Chhamb-Jaurian Sector. I beganmy lecture with a traditional opening story.

"Two stalwarts were passing through Raja Bazar. One of them was the Devil. Theother asked him, "How do wars start?" He replied that it was a very simple affair.The Devil spotted two shops side by side, a confectionery shop and a draperyshop. He made his friend, sit in front of them. The confectioner had a cat and thedraper a dog as pets. The confectioner was heating the treacle for sweetmeats.The Devil dipped his finger into it, smeared it on the wall and went back to hisfriend to sit and watch. After a while some flies sat on the treacle smear on thewall. A young lizard started a tactical approach to eat the flies. The confectioner'scat leaped to catch the lizard. The draper's dog barked and pounced on the cat.The confectioner hit the dog with his ladle. The draper got hold of the steel cloth-measuring rod and hit the confectioner. The confectioner retaliated with theladle. The fight had started. The Devil told his friend to take note of how simpleit was to start a fight. "That is how wars start." said the Devil.

After this story I remarked that in the case of the war of 1965. I did not know whether itwas Gen Akhtar Maljk who had smeared the treacle or somebody else.

Thereafter I related my, experiences of the war of 1965, starting from April 1964 whenmy Unit moved to the Lahore Front, then to Kharian Cantt, into Azad Kashmir, Chamb,Jaurian, towards Akhnur etc. After the cease-fire I was ordered to Haji Pir Pass wherefighting was still going on. (It continued till about February 1966.) I concluded mylecture with my arrival at the college at Quetta. After my lecture Gen Akhtar Malik gotup and said that although he was to speak last, as Col Chishti had asked who smearedthe wall to make the war start, he would like to speak out Of turn and answer.

So, he spoke to us for about two hours and gave us the complete background on howthe 1965 Indo-Pak war had started. That was straight from the horse's mouth. As far asthe conduct of the war was concerned, most of us, the instructors, had been involved init at different places, at different levels, and under different circumstances. Theconsensus of opinion was that there was no Generalship during the war of 1965. It wasonly the junior leadership which had acquitted itself well and saved the country.


From April onwards we were to revise and update all papers connected with the StaffCourse to be started in July. So we were very busy and used to be together only in theDirecting Staff (DS) ante-room for mid morning tea. During one of the tea breaks afellow instructor walked in with another officer. He was introduced as Lt ColMohammad Zia-ul-Haq. He had come to Quetta to see his family whom, he had leftbehind when the Staff College had closed down and he was posted as AssistantAdjutant & Quarter Master General of the newly raised Infantry Division. Theappointment did not speak highly of him. The most promising officers go to theoperational and intelligence side. We shook hands and continued with our work. Wewere neither mutually impressed nor attracted. That was my first meeting with GenZia.

He was two years and two months senior to me. Zia was an Armoured Corps Officer,while I was an Artillery Officer. I did not know where he was at the time of the Partition-- Indonesia I think ---- nor did I know when he had, come to Pakistan. We had nevermet before 1966. So the notion that we might have been friends from school or collegedays at Jalandhar or even neighbors in pre-Partition days is all a figment of theimagination.

My second meeting with Gen Zia, was again in the Staff College DS ante-room aboutthree months later, when he came to Quetta to collect his family to move to his currentstation of duty. This time too there was no exchange of words other than the normalcourtesies. We next met in 1973 when we had assembled in GHQ for the AnnualConference cum Selection Board. We were both Major Generals at that time. He wasposted at Multan and I was at Eftikharabad (Chhamb). Once again there was nothingmore than the normal exchange of courtesies.

I joined General Headquarters in September 1974 as Military Secretary (MS). One of theduties which the MS had to perform was to prepare the papers of all officers due to beconsidered for promotion. Their cases were to be discussed in two Selection Boards, vizApril Selection Board for consideration of officers for the rank of Colonel and above,and August Selection Board for selection of officers from the rank of Major to LtColonel. Preparations and updating of papers meant that the Annual ConfidentialReports of the officers under consideration were to be reviewed, checked, endorsed bythe COAS (where applicable), filed and then forwarded to the General Officers whowere to be members of the Selection Board. (All Generals were not supposed to bemembers. Only the Commanders and PSO's were members.)

While preparing the papers for the Selection Boards I noticed that the Annual Reportsof Officers serving under Gen Zia had ,not been received. In some cases the ACR's wereoverdue by two years. I wrote him a letter, but to no effect. Then I admonished himover the telephone and he said that he would dispatch them soon. I noticed that heoften delayed matters, so I got a letter written to him, and signed by Gen Tikka Khan.


That evoked some response, but not much. I remember very distinctly that for the April1975 Selection Board. I had to get overdue reports written by Zia on a day-to-day basiswhen he was in Rawalpindi. All in all, it was a shocking state of irresponsibility. Yet itwas during this period that he was promoted to the rank of Lt Gen. I told him that thenew rank had added to his responsibilities Laughingly he said, "Yes, Murshid (Mentor),I will be careful". He never was.

As Military Secretary at GHQ I used to visit Formation Headquarters and units locatedall over Pakistan. I also went to Multan where Gen Zia was the Corps Commander in1975. I visited his Corps HQ and the subordinate Division HQ and attended to theproblems of his officers by listening to their grievances. Then I talked to the GarrisonOfficers on MS matters. I also exchanged ideas with Gen Zia. This can be consideredour first meeting when we talked to each other in detail about professional matters. Iwas to stay, over in the Officers Mess but he did not let me stay there and asked me if Iwould mind staying with him in the Annexe of his Corps Commander's House. Iagreed to stay with him and thanked him for the invitation. At dinner, at his house thatThursday evening, we were just the two of us, because all his family members wereabroad. The next day I left for Rawalpindi.

In late 1975, I received a letter from him in which he had recommended that Maj Shakirbe posted from Multan to Lahore. He had recommended the case as Corps Commander.I examined the case and informed him in writing that it could not be done. (I hadknown the Major even otherwise.) Later, in 1976, when it was announced that Gen Ziawould be the next COAS, he gave me a ring from Multan and said, "Murshid, now youwill have to post Shakir to Lahore. Ha. Ha. Ha;" I replied, "Sir, it cannot be done. Youare still a Corps Commander. We will see when you become COAS," He accepted thisin good humor. That is about all that passed between ourselves as Generals of the sameArmy till he became the COAS.

Another case which was verbally referred to me was during the period when Gen Ziawas a Corps Commander in Multan in 1975, and had invited the PM for lunch. Theroute nominated ran through the Army officers colony there Gen Zia had asked theladies and children to come out of their houses to welcome the PM by clapping. One ofthe officers objected. Gen Zia then asked me to retire him from service. As MilitarySecretary I refused to do so, because the officer had done nothing wrong. But later, afterZia became COAS, he retired this officer prematurely.

Zia becomes COAS

"I did not recommend General Zia to be the Chief of Army Staff." (Gen. Tikka Khan,quoted in Al Fateh March 30, 1978. Awaz Vol 1 No. 11, dated May 1979).


Since Gen Tikka Khan has said it, I can give a detailed account of the background toGen Zia's promotion, since the whole case was processed through me as MilitarySecretary of the Pakistan Army. I was sitting in my office in General Headquarterswhen I received, a telephone call from Gen Tikka Khan, COAS from the PrimeMinister's House at Larkana where he had gone for a picnic along with someambassadors. He asked me if I was going to be in Rawalpindi during the next threedays, or was I going to be away on tour because he wanted to discuss something veryimportant on his return from Larkana. I told him that I would be available inRawalpindi. When he returned from Larkana he called me over to his office. He told methat the PM had asked him if he would like to continue as Chief of Army Staff foranother year, i.e. on extension. He wanted my views.

A Military Secretary of the Army has a dual role to perform, firstly the normal functionof career planning, promotions, postings, appointments and redress of grievances etc,and secondly to act as a kind of godfather to the officers. So the advice had to be givento Gen Tikka Khan in both these capacities.

I told him that if he wanted to accept the extension, nobody would say that the PM gaveit to him on his own initiative, but everybody would say that the old man could notleave his chair and was sticking to it unnecessarily, thus denying, the right of asubordinate general who should be promoted and appointed Chief of Army Staff. I alsotold him that he had a brilliant career as a professional soldier with about forty years ofservice to his credit and that he was respected in the country, which he should not putinto disrepute by accepting an extension for another year. He agreed and said that hiswife was also of the same Opinion. I told him that his wife was wiser than he. He theninformed the PM that he would not like an extension but would prefer retirement. Itwas accepted.

Some days after Gen Tikka Khan's decision not to accept an extension, I went to himand asked him if he would like to send the recommendations for the appointment of thenext Chief of Army Staff. He said that there was no hurry about, it because there wasstill a lot of time before his retirement. I then asked him if he had discussed the matterwith the PM, or if the latter had ever shown an inclination towards any of our senior LtGenerals. Gen Tikka Khan replied that he had not discussed it with the PM and he didnot feel the necessity of discussing it either, because the PM would appoint the newChief of Army Staff as recommended to him.

I warned him that it might not always happen that way, in which case it would meanthat the recommendation had not been honored. It would be highly derogatory and aninsult to the post. Gen Tikka said that there was no fear of that because he was certainthat the PM would do as advised. He would, however, give it a thought and let meknow some other day. I kept reminding him about it, but he kept on delaying. Then one


day he called me and asked me to take down notes for preparing the recommendatoryletter to be sent to Mr. Bhutto.

There were seven Lieutenant Generals under consideration for the appointment ofChief of Army Staff. In order of seniority they were: Mohammad Shariff, Aftab AhmadKhan, Muhammad Akbar Khan, Azmat Baksh Awan, Malik Abdul Majid, GhulamJilani Khan and Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq. Gen Tikka Khan recommended that Lt GenMuhammad Akbar Khan be promoted and appointed Chief of Army Staff. If that wasnot approved then Lt Gen Mohammad Shariff was the second choice. Lt Gen Aftab andLt Gen Azmat were not recommended for the post on grounds of ability and Lt GenMajid and Lt Gen Zia were not considered for the appointment, because they had justbeen promoted and had not acquired the requisite experience desirable for Lt Gen Jilaniwas unqualified as he had no command experience and was not to be considered at all.

I prepared a letter of recommendation accordingly, got it signed by the COAS, GenTikka Khan, and dispatched it to the PM. The office copy was retained by me in aSealed envelope in my office. Nobody knew about these recommendations except GenTikka Khan, the Prime Minister, to whom the letter was sent, my office superintendentwho had typed the letter and myself. We were expecting a reply to this letter, but itnever came. Some days later, while playing golf, Maj Gen Saghir Hussan who wasMilitary Secretary to the President, told me that Lt Gen Zia was going to be the nextChief of Army Staff. I expressed doubt, but never revealed, who had beenrecommended and who had not been. I asked him for his source of information, towhich he replied that it was Lt Gen Zia himself, as he was very close to the PrimeMinister through the People's Party stalwarts in Multan. I told him that as I did notknow Lt Gen Zia at all, I had no comments to offer.

About a month from the day when the recommendations for the Chief of Army Staffappointment had been sent, Gen Tikka Khan called me to his office and told me that hehad been informed by the Prime Minister that he was going to announce in the Cabinetthat afternoon that Lt Gen Akbar and Lt Gen Majid had been retired, that Lt Gen Shariffhad been promoted to a new appointment of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee,a luxury we could ill afford, and that Lt Gen Zia had been promoted and appointed asChief of Army Staff. These retirements, promotions and appointments were to beannounced in the evening news on radio and television.

I requested Gen Tikka Khan that Gen Akbar and Gen Majid's retirements should not beannounced, because it would be disrespectful. I asked Gen Tikka Khan as to what hadhappened to the recommendations sent by him and if the Prime Minister had discussedthem with him. He said that not a word had passed between the Prime Minister andhimself on this subject, the Prime Minister had done it on his own, completely ignoringhis views.


I told Gen Tikka Khan that it was almost a custom of service that when a junior waspromoted, the seniors asked for retirement. In that case, when Gen Zia, the junior mostgeneral, was being promoted, then the other senior generals views could be asked abouttheir line of action I also told Gen Tikka Khan that in order to respect the uniform, let itbe said that Generals Akbar and Majid had asked for retirement when they weresuperseded, rather than compulsorily retired by the Prime Minister. Firstly, this wouldnot impair the image of the Prime Minister, as had happened when he had retired a lotof generals in one go when first taking over as civilian Chief Martial Law Administratorand President of the country, and, secondly, it would be in accordance with thedecorum of the customs of service in the Army. Gen Tikka Khan agreed with me andsaid that he would talk to the Prime Minister. There was no time to lose, as the PrimeMinister was due to announce the changes in the Cabinet that same afternoon and itwas almost lunch time.

The Prime Minister was luckily available on the telephone. He was kind enough toagree to our recommendation that only the promotion and appointment of Gen Zia beannounced and no mention made of retirements. Before leaving Gen Tikka Khan's officeI informed him that I was going to speak to Gen Akbar and Gen Majid and tell themabout all that had transpired. He gave me permission to do so.

I went back to my office and talked to Gen Akbar and Gen Majid in Quetta andPeshawar respectively. I told them about Gen Zia's promotion and his newappointment and about their retirements. I had served with both of them in the ChinarDivision, so I now advised both of them to leave their offices and go to the nearestbrigade and divisional headquarters, and to let their sub-ordinates know that Gen Ziawas being appointed Chief of Army Staff and that they being senior to him had decidedto opt for retirement, with the Prime Minister kindly agreeing. They accepted thisproposal and acted accordingly. In the evening it was announced on radio andtelevision that General Shariff had been promoted and appointed as Chairman JointChiefs of Staff Committee in a new appointment, Gen Zia had been promoted andappointed as Chief of army Staff and that General Akbar and Majid had soughtpremature retirement.

It was my duty to talk to the other Lt Generals who were also in the running forpromotion and were senior to Gen Zia. I informed them of the Prime Minister'sdecision, and asked them their plans on their future employment. Gen Aftab said thathe would like to ask for retirement with the request that he be allowed to continue forone month because of some personal administrative problems. Gen Awan said that hewould like to continue serving as long as his services were required. Gen Jilani decidedto continue serving both Mr. Bhutto and Gen Zia-ul-Haq. Gen Zia became the Chief ofArmy Staff on March 1, 1976. At this stage I would like to express the Prime Minister'sviews on Gen Zia as stated by him on July 5, 1977 when he was taken to GovernmentHouse, Murree, while under protective custody:


"When I was to select the COAS, people told me that Majid was a clever person,but this gentleman has proved to be the same." (Maj Gen Akhtar Abdul RahmanKhan's letter DO NO 2145/8/PA dated July 7, 1977)

Why then was Gen Zia made Chief of Army Staff when he was notrecommended by the Army? What did Mr. Bhutto see in him? How did Gen Ziamanage to be in the good books of Mr. Bhutto? What was Gen Zia's lobby? Whohad taught him how to win over a person like Mr. Bhutto?

Many angles have come to light since July 5, 1977, including Gen Zia's own utterancesthat nobody, but Allah made him the chief of Army Staff, that he was only answerableto Allah and that he was on a divine mission to impose Islam in Pakistan. This issuewould not have been solved even if Gen Zia were alive, because he would not tell, andexperience has shown that he did not tell, the truth. One thing was certain, that he hadto be the best sycophant to win over Mr. Bhutto. I was recently given details of some ofthe first steps by which Gen Zia managed to win attention from, and then the favor ofthe Prime Minister. On January 1, 1988, I met Col Zahur Chughtai at a function atLahore. He was a friend of Gen Zia and had done the Staff Course at Quetta in 1955along with Gen Zia. He revealed to me that while at Multan Gen Zia used to visit PPPleaders' house, especially those of Sahibzada Faruq, Hamid Riza Gillani, Sadiq HussainQureshi and Sajjad Hussain Qureshi (whom he later appointed as Governor Punjab).He literally used to beg for invitations. He had adopted this method of sycophancy toget closer first to them, and then to Mr. Bhutto so that he could become the C-in-C. Gen.Zia had also shown a letter to Col Chughtai written by Gen Zia to Gen SahibzadaYaqub at Washington to get Mr. Bhutto as Colonel in Chief of the Armoured Corps; Hesucceeded in getting it done through Gen Tikka Khan as COAS.

But was Gen Zia always like that or was he forced to become one? Who tutored, him toadopt this method to get closer to Mr. Bhutto to become his COAS? Did Zia want tobecome COAS, or was it a deep conspiracy by someone else who wanted to deal withthe democratic elements in Pakistan through him?

I believe it is possible that the CIA got hold of him when he was training in the USA. Iwonder why Gen Zia made friends with Mrs. Herring, an honorary Consul of Pakistanin Houston. Texas. May be Zia's stay in Jordan took him closer to the CIA and thefundamentalist Muslims of Saudi Arabia. One thing is certain the he was carefullytutored on how to win over Mr. Bhutto and he did it successfully. Begum NusratBhutto's view is given below:-

"Although during our stay at Sadiq Palace where Mr. Bhutto was staying therewere inherent security arrangements yet on one evening Mr. Bhutto's security-in-charge told us that Maj Gen Zia-ul-Haq wanted the security arrangements to be


checked and supervised personally. Mr. Bhutto called him and conversed withhim in this context. Later Mr. Bhutto told me that he had found his choice afterTikka Khan. Soon after this incident Mr. Bhutto promoted him to the rank of LtGen and gave indications to Gen Zia on which appointment did Mr. Bhutto wishto see him.

On July 5, 1977 I could only say "Thanks, Zia-ul-Haq." What else could I say incivilized words?"----

(Begum Nusrat Bhutto: Moon Digest July/August 1986 p 79).

Gen M Zia-ul-Haq assumed the duties of COAS on March 1, 1976. On his first day inoffice, he planned to meet all PSOs, and other general officers in General headquarters.He had told me that he would not be attending to any paper work that day. I hadrequested him for an audience just for one important case. He was reluctant andwanted to do it on the following day. I was insistent. He finally agreed to see thepapers. I put up the case of Major Shakir and asked him to overrule my decision. But heagreed with my decision. I told him that that was the difference when looking at theArmy as a whole as compared to seeing it as a segment from a Corps Commander'seyes. I thanked him for the considerations shown towards justice.

Before leaving his office I asked his permission to tell him the truth if he would tolerateit, because that was the only way I could discharge my duties as MS honestly andeffectively. He answered in the affirmative, and said that not only did he want it, butexpected it of me. Then I asked him why he distributed wrist-watches as gifts to theceremonial guard which he had inspected in General Headquarters on his first entry tothe COAS office. He said it was a good thing as a goodwill gesture. I realized then thatthe Army had gone into the hands of an officer who wanted to earn cheap popularity --may be by corrupting others. That was the start of my difference with Gen Zia onmatters of management. We were poles apart and remained strangers till we partedofficially on March 30, 1980.


CHAPTER - THREETOWARDS MARTIAL LAW

Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto hosted a dinner for senior generals of the Army, at the ForeignOffice, Islamabad, on October 30, 1976. Admirals and Air Marshals present in the twincities of Islamabad-Rawalpindi were also invited. Some Federal Secretaries alsoattended. After the dinner a prepared speech was read out by Aziz Ahmed, the ForeignMinister. In his speech, he eulogized the measures taken by the Government to enhancethe prestige and combat efficiency of the Armed Forces of Pakistan, That was onlypossible because of the political stability achieved by the Government under the ableguidance of Mr. Bhutto. He dwelt on the fall of Dacca, the return of the prisoners ofwar, the Simla Agreement and the role of the Armed Forces etc. Towards the end of hisspeech he said that there was no scope for the generals to indulge in Bonapartism in ademocratic society. He had, in the presence of the PM, -indicated in clear terms whatthe behavior of the generals should be. We thought those remarks were uncalled for.There was no occasion for such comments.

When analyzed in retrospect, it seems that those remarks were carefully planned, andthe dinner was a part of a grand design. On November 15, 1976 Mr. Bhutto declaredthat his Government was fully prepared to go to the polls to meet the demands of theopposition parties. The elections were to be announced within ten days to two months.The National Assembly could also extend the date for General Elections by one year.(According to the 1973 Constitution the General Elections were due sometime in April1978.)

Some opposition leaders got together on November 21, to examine the politicalsituation prevailing in the country and considered the likelihood of holding GeneralElections. They decided on December 28 that the United Democratic Front (UDF) wouldtake part in the General Elections. (The UDF had existed since 1972. Its components in1976 were the Muslim League (ML), Jamiat-i-lslami (JI), Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI),National Democratic Party (NDP) previously National Awami Party (NAP) PakistanDemocratic Party (PDP) Khaksaars and the Azad Jammu & Kashmir MuslimConference (AJKMC))

On December 31 1976 Mr. Bhutto announced that the decision regarding GeneralElections would be taken at an appropriate time Meanwhile Mian Mahmood Ali Kasuriof Tehrik-i-Istiqlal (Tl) declared that the opposition parties would unite into a broad-based election alliance. He demanded that in view of the impending General Elections,Section 144 should be lifted, Section 144 restricts the assembly of more than fourpersons. On January 2, 1977, the final national and provincial constituencies were


announced Justice Sajjad Ahmed Jan was appointed Chief Election Commissioner. OnJanuary 3, Mr. Bhutto remarked that the verdict of the people on elections, whatever itmight be, would be acceptable to the ruling party. Air Marshal M Asghar Khan andMaulana Shah Ahmed Noorani had already met and explored the possibilities ofcooperation in putting up joint candidates. Mian Mahmood Ali Kasuri suggested thatfor free and fair elections, the Election Commission must have administrative authority.It seemed that all the major opposition parties were preparing joint action plans. Theywere also claiming that the PPP would be defeated in the General Elections. MaulanaMufti Mahmood expressed the hope that an accord would be reached amongst theopposition parties to nominate jointly approved candidates.

On January 4, 1977 it was announced that an Armed Forces Week would be celebratedin Pakistan and Azad Kashmir from January 31 to February 5, Gen Zia-ul-Haq, theCOAS, assigned me the responsibility of organizing it in Rawalpindi.

On January 7, 1977 Mr. Bhutto announced General Elections -- they were the first to beheld since 1970. The National Assembly Elections would be on March 7 and theProvincial Assembly Elections on March 10. He also said that from July 1, the weeklyholiday would be on Friday instead of Sunday. Mufti Mahmood retorted that theGovernment would have to give practical proof of its honest intention of free and fairelections by releasing political workers and lifting Section 144. With most of theprominent opposition leaders in jail and with no apparent intention of releasing them,Mr. Bhutto had reason to be optimistic about the results. As stated earlier, Mr. Bhuttocould delay them for one more year but he did not do so because he had planned forthem and was certain to win. After this announcement, the Government party startedtouring the country in spite of restrictions on opposition parties. It seemed, as if therewas only one political party.

Everything seemed to favor a Bhutto victory. There appeared to be no possiblechallenge to him. He was in power and his party had unlimited funds. He had taken allpossible measures to win the elections. The Government machinery was entirely at hisdisposal. Those who could challenge him in places where he had failed in 1970 hadbeen put in prison. He had the powerful network of TV and radio besides the entirepress to support him. He had demoralized and subjugated the bureaucracy andterrorized the people. He had admirers in the foreign press who projected him as themost powerful political leader in Pakistan. He had a great image abroad. He hadcompletely reoriented the state apparatus as a whole into so many instrumentssustaining his party and his power. His slightest wish was law. He had converted theinformation set-up into a eulogy juke box. The undercover agencies had multiplied andtheir role, privileges and funds had increased to a phenomenal degree.

However, the announcement of elections had electrified the atmosphere. Politicsbecame sharply polarized. In, no time the opposition leaders realized that their only


chance to make an impact on the people's mind lay in uniting, and in forging a strongunited front. The election campaign turned into a confrontation between those whowanted to keep Mr. Bhutto in power, and those who did not want his authoritarianrule. On January 8, the Qayum Muslim League decided to cooperate with the PPP inGeneral Elections. On January 10, it was announced that Ghulam Mustafa Khar wouldstart the Muslim League election campaign from Sheikhupura. By this date allopposition parties had agreed that they would put up jointly approved candidates foreach seat. They also agreed that the opposition would use a common election symbol.

The common view of the opposition parties was that if they did not unite, the electionresults would provide Mr. Bhutto with a chance to destroy all his critics. So it was aquestion of their survival. If Mr. Bhutto was successful, a one-party state would becreated. This became a rallying point, for the small Opposition parties. So a nine partyalliance (UDF plus TI and JUP) came into being under the name Pakistan NationalAlliance (PNA). Its election symbol -- vital in this largely illiterate country -- would bethe plough. Broadly speaking, many of the rightist elements gathered around the PNAwhile several leftist factions rallied to join the PPP. This was done with commendableswiftness which baffled Mr. Bhutto, because his ubiquitous intelligence agencies hadassured him that nothing of the kind would happen. The setting up of the PNA to fightelections jointly meant that there was no chance of splitting the votes of the oppositionas had happened in 1970.

Four Provincial Assemblies were to be dissolved from January 13. Khan Abdul QayumKhan and Yousaf Khattak resigned from the Federal Cabinet on January 12. The sameday it was declared that all members of the Khar Group would fight elections on MLtickets. The Chief Election Commissioner announced on January 13 that action wouldbe taken against election officers responsible for rigging. Maulana Maududi declaredthat only Nizam-e-Islam would be acceptable in Pakistan.

On 16 January Maulana Mufti Mahmood was elected PNA President. It was a greathonor to him that he was elected PNA Chief in spite of the fact that he was against thecreation of Pakistan. Ordinarily, in an ideological state such people should have noplace. Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan was elected Vice President, Rafiq Ahmed Bajwa asSecretary General and Pir Mardan Shah Pagaro Chairman Central Parliamentary Board.64% of the seats were to go to the UDF and the, remaining 36% to the JUT and TI. Thiswas reduced to writing and it was binding on all the PNA constituents. The mainreason for the PNA cooperation was enmity against Mr. Bhutto. Whatever happened hemust be defeated. After his fall the disintegration of the PNA was imminent. The PNAdecided to focus on Mr. Bhutto who was supremely confident of winning the elections .. . Mufti Mahmood demanded that General Elections be postponed till conditionsreverted to normal in Baluchistan. If his demands were not met, the elections would beboycotted.


Mr. Bhutto started his election campaign with great confidence. He had plans to win.His opponents in the PNA knew what' he was prepared to do to win the elections.

Mohammad Hayat Tamman, the notorious adviser of the Nawab of Kalabagh, wasappointed in charge of the Election Cell. As against 1970, when a lot of middle classpeople got elected on PPP tickets, in 1977 Mr. Bhutto thought the rich and influentialonly deserved the party ticket mostly landlords. (The administration was very happybecause everything was in their hands.)

Mr. Bhutto had prepared for elections long before. He had prepared the electionmachinery with great care. He did not want to fight elections at the party level, but at anadministrative level. So, recommendations were received from Deputy Commissionersfor the issue of party tickets.

The PNA also began its election campaign with a bang. People were united under thebanner of the PNA to introduce Nizam-e-Mustafa, to bring to an end the PPP regime (inMr. Bhutto's own words "he was the party") and to usher in democracy. People came outin their thousands to show their enthusiasm for democracy and for elections.Memorable meetings were held and historical processions were taken out. The wholecountry was involved in the elections, and people started to flock to the meetings andprocessions of the opposition leaders. The election campaign assumed a revolutionarycharacter.

Although the Government withdrew Section 144 so as to give the impression of a freeand fair election, yet the state agencies did their best to put as many obstacles aspossible in the way of the people and the opposition leaders coming together. One ofthe favorite means adopted was to deny them in practice the use of the most convenientand larger places for public rallies, e.g. flooding of Cunningham Park, Peshawar, orNasser Bagh, Lahore. Other methods towards the same effect, like preventing theleaders from reaching their announced destination in time, were also adopted. But Ithen they gave up these efforts because the district administrative officers, fearing thepublic reaction, did not want to be identified as pro-Bhutto. In some constituencies,support for the PNA seemed to be so strong that such methods could not make anymaterial change in the outlook of the people. The PNA leaders had waged an effectivecampaign pointing to broken promises, widespread arrests, conflict in Baluchistan,corruption, arbitrary use of the Federal Security Forces and intelligence services. PNAleaders said that Bhutto had promised both bread and freedom but delivered neither.During PPP regime our society had drifted towards Western permissiveness.

On January 20, Mr. Bhutto was elected unopposed. Similarly from Sindh, MumtazBhutto, Sultan Ali Chandio, Mujtaba Jatol, Abdul Fateh Memon, Mir Mehrab KhanBajrani, Makhdum-Zada Talib-ul-Maula and Noor Mohammad Lund were declaredelected unopposed. Air Marshal M Asghar Khan said that people would not accept


unfair elections. Objections would be filed against Mr. Bhutto's unopposed election. Thesame day the Election Commission stopped the PNA from using its election symbol tillJanuary 26. On January 21, the PPP candidates from Baluchistan, Mr. AmanullahGichki, Prince Mohyuddin and Mir Taj Mohammad Jamali were declared electedunopposed. On January 22, Begum Nasim Wali Khan declared that the basic issue wasrestoration of democracy.

On January 23, 1977 Air Marshal M. Asghar Khan said that after coming into power, thePNA would try those responsible for dismembering the country. (This must havecaused a shiver to quite a few, both civil and military.) Mian Tafail Muhammad saidthat Nizam-e-Mustafa would soon dominate Pakistan.

Mr. Bhutto announced that if he was given a chance to serve again, he. would do two orthree more things. He denounced the PNA as an alliance of the kind of people whomeet in foreign embassies i.e. foreign agents. Holding General Elections before time,claimed Mr. Bhutto, was the biggest proof of democracy in the country. The PPPmanifesto included teaching the Quran as a compulsory subject in Basic Education;16,000 plots would be allotted, gratis to labor every year; national production would beincreased by 50%; adult franchise would be introduced in the Federally AdministeredTribal Areas( FATA) and women would be given genuine rights.

Mufti Mahmood made a policy statement that the PNA would not boycott the electionsunder any circumstances. He said that there was no sacrifice that would not be madefor the restoration of democracy. The present ruler could not stand against the power ofthe united masses. On January 27, the PNA was finally allowed to use the joint electionsymbol of the plough. The PNA demanded that the ruling party should stop the use ofGovernment money, vehicles and TV and radio for its election campaign.

Mr. Bhutto thought that his important political opponents had been neutralized.Whatever remained could be handled with ease. His control over the civil and militaryadministration and his greater resources and opportunities assured success. It wasassumed that he could do as he pleased and get away with it. He had ordered a postalballot for the government servants, including the Armed Forces. His, decision to holdelections a year earlier than the due date was a reflection of this confidence. The Presswas in the hands of the Government. Public speech-making was often prevented.Transport was not available in remote localities and many opposition leaders wereimprisoned. The Government could use the entire system to get votes. Yet, on January29, Sherbaz Mazari remarked that five years of tyranny and oppression were to come toan end very soon, and the people responsible for dismembering Pakistan would betried.

Mr. Bhutto had antagonized the capitalists and industrialists. He condemned the PNAas capitalists, and declared that his PPP had adopted the sword as its symbol and that


the sword would eliminate exploitation, cut the chains binding the poor, and bring anend to capitalism.

During an evening with the PM at his residence in Rawalpindi, when the PNA hadalready been formed, general discussions were going on when he specificallymentioned that he knew everyone of the PNA leaders; They were a bunch of. .......... andhe was not going to hand over the country to them, under any, circumstances. GenTikka Khan, Maulana Kausar Niazi and Aziz Ahmed were also present on the occasion,in addition to the COAS and senior generals. At the time- it seemed an innocent remarkof a sincere man dedicated , to his country, but later it transpired that this was his innerdesire and intention. He did not intend to hand over to them. This was confirmed notonly by blatant rigging but also by delaying tactics in negotiations and signing ofagreements, besides his desire to continue staying on as PM till after the elections.When Mr. Bhutto said that he could not place "Pakistan's future at risk", what he reallymeant was that the PPP power must continue.

It is interesting to read Benazir Bhutto's views on the PNA leadership as given inDaughter of the East (page 71):

"The PNA leaders were not great men or even fine men......Many of those opposing myfather were small provincial men whose myopic views had failed Pakistan in the past andwould do so again in the future."

The rigging that followed was a planned affair. This was a clear proof of his intention ofnot coming to an agreement with the PNA, because he did not want to take a chancethat they might win.

On January 30, 1977 Gen Zia-ul-Haq on behalf of the Pakistan Army assured the publicthat it would do its best to discharge the duties and protection of national prestige wereits foremost duties. On the eve of the Armed Forces Week, Mr. Bhutto declared that thepay of the Armed Forces would be increased after elections. On 31 January I made myfirst public statement to the effect that the Armed Forces were a manifestation of anation's power and will. The object of Armed Forces Week was to bring the ArmedForces and the civilians closer to each other. In the modern world, war was fought notby the Armed Forces alone but by a whole nation. Gen Zia later, wrote a letter of thanksand appreciation to me, that the Week had been an excellent show and a job well done.He felt that the impact desired by the Week had been achieved to a great extent and thatit would go a long way in enhancing the image of the Army in the eyes of the people.

The PPP which had carried Mr. Bhutto to power was his, real strength. But instead ofdepending on poor workers and masses, he had started leaning on bureaucracy andlandlords who made him believe that the coming elections, like the previous ones in1970, could not be won through the votes of the poor. Therefore such candidates were


required who could spend money lavishly. So in consultation with his advisers, about172 rich people had been selected for party tickets. Inwardly they did not like the PPPand only wanted to suck the blood of the poor through the PPP. Later events provedthat they were not prepared to sacrifice anything for Mr. Bhutto. On the other hand, theparties of the PNA, some of which had fought against the Pakistan Movement werecommitted to an ideal.

On 1 February, Mukhtar Rana, warned that those who won elections through unfairmeans would meet a tragic end. A direct appeal to the workers came with a PresidentOrdinance revising compensation rules for labor. The compensation in case of death ofa laborer at work was raised from six to twelve thousand rupees. Minimum wage wasalso raised. On February 4, the PNA warned that results would not be accepted ifelections were rigged. They further stated, on February 6, that rigging of electionswould lead to a political revolution. Islam was a complete code of life. There was noquestion of socialism. People were taking a keen interest in the politics of the country.They were attending public meetings, and staying there until the early hours of themorning. The newspapers were not reporting faithfully what was happening on thepolitical front and the way election fever was intensifying. The state-run radio and TVwere giving a biased and distorted report of events.

The PPP was witnessing, in the PNA, the surfacing of popular dissatisfaction longsuppressed by the regime. It was, the PPP's own circumstances, their own shortcomingsand misadventures, rather than the PNA's campaign achievements. Mr. Bhutto's politicshad been dictatorial. He was surrounded by sycophants. He had chosen them himself,so nobody else could be blamed. The same situation which I had warned him about in1972, during a cocktail party at Murree, had arisen. The PNA had come into being at thestage when people were fed up with the Bhutto regime. People took the initiativethemselves and stepped forward against Mr. Bhutto without the PNA leadersmotivating them much. On February 7, the PNA claimed that 15 persons were injuredwhen their procession was fired upon. One of their offices was also burnt down. Theyalleged that the PPP workers had attacked on orders from a federal minister. Therewould be a general strike in Drigh Colony to protest against vandalism.

On February 8, Dr. Mubashar ordered that all businessmen who had received financialfavors from the PPP should provide the Party with resources. They should suspendbusiness totally in favor of a political war. Those party workers who would not takepart in elections would have their hide stripped. In the PPP rallies and meetings, theaudiences were generally brought from long distances on officially provided transport,whereas in the case of the PNA, the people seemed attracted to the opposition leadersand were determined to show their solidarity with them. They were choosing the PNAand rejecting the PPP. The general opinion of the politically conscious intellectuals andthe common man was that the Bhutto Government would not give the people an honestchance to choose their representatives.


On February 25, the PNA declared that the whole nation had given the decision in itsfavor, and rigging would not be allowed in the elections. Mumtaz Ali Bhutto said onthe following day that the opposition was planning to destroy Pakistan. On February27, there was a general strike in big cities in response to the call of the PNA.

March 7 was fast approaching. The nation was to decide whether the PPP should begiven the mandate for another five years, or the new leadership be tried. Mr. Bhutto'sfive year rule had proved his deviation from the Islamic path, both in his public policiesas well as in his private life He did not trust his colleagues. He had said "I am the PeoplesParty and they are all my creatures". He regarded PPP essentially as a bargaininginstrument vis-a-vis the opposition. For his real support he had developed paramilitaryand police organizations to protect his person and operations. Simultaneously he hadpoliticized the civil service through lateral entries. The Federal Security Force (FSF) wasmade up of ex-military and police personnel. It had known corrupt, notorious andsadist officers some of which had been sacked by previous governments. Mr. Bhuttorehired them and gave them important jobs. The FSF was a PPP paramilitary force aswell as a special police agency to police political matters for the PPP leadership, andhence avoid the use of regular police and armed forces. Wherever Mr. Bhutto went, theFSF was at his side. Command posts were established to filter and analyze allinformation that might be judged a threat to him or his administration. Oppositioncritics were silenced through intimidation or incarceration in prison. It tookconsiderable courage to defy the regime and most people dared only comment on theprevailing conditions in the privacy of their homes. Public places, like hotel roomsand meeting rooms, were thought to be bugged. Newspapers were under severerestrictions, and printed only what the government wanted. Mr. Bhutto had convertedhis socialist dream into a cultist police state. He included landlords and industrialists inhis organization.

His suspicious mind had not permitted delegation of authority and diffusion ofresponsibility. He accepted no equals, dissent, or challenges to his authority. He was theonly decision-maker in the country. His imperial style made him treat Pakistan as apersonal estate. Fear, intimidation, repression and constant surveillance permeatedPakistani society as the FSF inflicted their brand of punishment on the population. MianTufail, Professor Ghafoor, Dr Ghulam Hussain and thousands of others who werevictimized, all have tales to tell. This is what had happened during the PPP regime:-

a. There was no concept of faithfulness to the country by the bureaucracy,the police and the FSF.

b. Merit was generally, ignored in all cases.c. Inequality was practiced instead of equality.d. There was increase in unproductive expenditure.e. There was artificial increase of prices.


f. False propaganda was considered a big instrument.g. There was increase in gambling, dacoity and murders.h. There was misappropriation of funds given for natural and unnatural.

calamity victims.i. There was complete breakdown of rule of law.i. There was immorality, and lewdness increasedk. There was low performance of official institutions.

On March 7, 1977, hectic activity by the PPP and the PNA having come to an end, thenation went to the polls. The voters went to polling stations with great confidence.Before the polling closed, the people had started realizing that the verdict of the pollswas not going to be free or fair. There were reports of violation of the sanctity of theballot. Women, in particular, were not allowed to cast their votes. Instead, pollingofficers, PPP workers and volunteers --- both men and women --- stuffed the boxeswith bogus ballot papers. The police were there only to supervise the rigging, and checkor maul those who objected to this. Violence took place at polling stations in manycities, and ruling party strong men and officials connived. In the evening, the resultsannounced on TV indicated fictitious results from remote constituencies. In some casesthe results were announced when counting was still going on. PPP achieved aresounding victory. It came as no surprise! The extent of this manipulation was soenormous that it cast doubts on the integrity of the elections. Vote frauds were clearlyidentifiable. Votes were still being counted, as seen by the TV and radio. There was awave of disappointment as people heard the election results come in. It was announcedthat the PPP had won 154 National Assembly seats out of a total of 200.This came as ashock to the PNA supporters who refused to accept the results. The PNA accused Mr.Bhutto and the PPP of rigging the General Elections to the National Assembly andmisusing the government, bureaucracy and military machine at the hustings. Peoplecould not swallow this "landslide win".

It soon became clear that large-scale rigging had taken place. PNA leaders denouncedthe results as a farce, and decided to boycott Provincial Assembly elections on March10, Mr. Bhutto contemptuously dismissed opposition claims. The election was rigged toforestall a possible transfer of power. The incumbent refused to submit to publicopinion. The nation was plunged into a crisis. Mr. Martin Woollacott wrote in TheGuardian dated 7 March 1977:-

"Ruthless Concentration of Power"

"One unfortunate yesterday he shouted down that he had been on the way toattend his sister's funeral when his bus, plying a regular route, had been orderedto join the Government procession. This kind of manipulation invites attention tothe worst aspects of Mr. Bhutto's regime, of which the unifying theme over thelast four years has been a rapid and sometimes ruthless concentration of power.


When faced with an independent institution, or social group -- whether, it wasbig business, the judiciary, the press, the Baluchi aristocracy, the Punjabi middle-class, or even his own party -- Mr. Bhutto's instinct has been either, to take it overor, if that was not possible, to destroy it.

Thus he has achieved "Control" over the press. over the courts whoseindependence has been reduced and over the Civil Service, whose security oftenure has been abolished.

He has tamed the big business families by nationalizing the industries whichwere the basis of the prominence. He has. vigorously attacked any kind ofindependent regional politics sending Pathan and Baluchi political leaders togaol, and curbing regional tendencies even within his own party. The PPPindeed, has had no internal elections, held on party conventions, and has nocentral committee.

In other cases, Mr. Bhutto has made deals rather than attacking. He has drawninto his party a majority of large landowners ---the so, called feudal classes ---making their little local zones of influence into elements in his own powerstructure. Most recently he has laid his hands on another important lever ofpower --- by nationalizing the agricultural processing industries.

Because his initial targets were big business and political groups, which werearguably dangerous to the unity of, Pakistan, his policies were at first seen asSocialist and Nationalist. But, as the process has gone on, Mr. Bhutto's, careerreads more and more like a history book of the Renaissance, the story of somecentralizing King.

There is a fatal flaw in the character said one of his former supporters. "He is atotal cynic. He believes in rule by fear, he does not, believe in political parties,least of all his own, and he believes that a corrupt instrument is better than anhonest one, because he can use it more easily. He may want the right things forPakistan, but he has driven decency and truth out of our political life."

Stories of his ruthlessness abound, but one in particular has sullied his reputation-- the case of former minister Mr. J. A. Rahim. The picture of police dragging theelderly Rahim, once Bhutto's friend and mentor out of his house by his heels inthe middle of the night has stuck in the mind. This view of Mr. Bhutto, a crueland capricious man, accounts for, much of the decline in his popularity.

But beyond that, his policies have alienated most groups in Pakistani society.Middle class professionals are disturbed at the changes in status of the press,


judiciary and Civil Service. More businessmen are hostile. Farmers are angryabout corruption in the handling of seed, fertilizer and water."

On March 9, the General Council of the PNA unanimously rejected elections to theNational Assembly which were held on March 7. The PNA nominees declared electedto the Assembly were asked to resign their seats with immediate effect. The GeneralCouncil demanded that fresh elections should be held under the direct supervision ofthe Army with a caretaker, government in office. The Council also demanded theimmediate resignation of the Chief Election Commissioner for the 'blatant failure' of theElection Commission to conduct free and impartial elections. The PNA leadersappealed for a peaceful, country-wide strike on March 11. They decided to boycottelections to the Provincial Assemblies on March 10. This was the first public test ofstrength between Mr. Bhutto and the PNA. The people boycotted the ProvincialAssembly polls, and once again the PPP resorted to bogus voting merely to prove thatthe voters had come to cast their ballot.

Army men posted at the polling booths for maintenance of law and order reported to usthe approximate strength of the voters who had turned up. The results announced inthe evening were not in conformity with the attendance observed. Figures shown bywhich the PPP candidates had won were far more than the actual number that hadturned up for voting. That confirmed that rigging had been resorted to, and the juniorranks of the Army were a witness to it. They had themselves already exercised theirright of postal ballot. The boycott strengthened the PNA, and it served an ultimatum toMr. Bhutto either to hold fresh elections or face a mass movement. The boycott waslargely successful, and was accompanied by massive street demonstrations and partialstrikes in a number of cities.

The strike ordered by the PNA on March 11 was successful. Work came to a halt inmost of the cities. The Council met at. Lahore and demanded that by March 14 theelections should be declared null and void, the Chief Election Commissioner should beremoved and a new one appointed and the PM should resign. If not, the PNA wouldstart protest demonstrations from March 14. On March 12. Mr. Bhutto offered to have adiscussion with the PNA if it had any complaints. However, in a broadcast to thenation, he rejected any suggestion for re-election to the National Assembly. Electionswere a settled matter and could not be discussed. The PNA was firm in its demand, forre-election and the resignation of Mr. Bhutto's illegitimate government. Theuncompromising attitudes, of both the government and PNA, deepened the crisis.

The PNA observed a nationwide protest day in the major cities and insisted on theimmediate resignation of Mr. Bhutto and fresh elections. Clashes ensued and there wereseveral deaths and casualties. Mr. Bhutto admitted at last that in some marginal casesrigging might have taken place. He expressed a willingness to provide the PNA with


some additional seats in the National. Assembly and countermand Provincial Assemblyelections. These concessions were taken as an admission of rigging.

We, in the Armed Forces, had always believed that the PPP was the biggest and mostpowerful party in the country which enjoyed the, people's trust and love. The onlyother well organized party, but with only a small following, was the JI. The PPP wouldhave won in any case, so why did Mr. Bhutto rig the elections which he would surelyhave won anyway? It is said it was because of his obsession with a 2/3 majority withoutwhich he could not have been able to manipulate the Constitution. Rigging the electionssubsequently to rigging the Constitution. When the gambit, failed he blamed it,characteristically, on "massive foreign intervention" hoping to capitalize on the latenthostility to the West which is endemic in Third World countries. We were also certainthat in case of re-elections he would still win with a simple majority, irrespective as towhen the elections were held. The protests gave birth to a national movement. Due tothe blatant rigging of elections, there was also a reaction against the appointmentholders of the PPP, civil and political officials, former PPP ministers, and their policiesand amendments carried out to the Constitution of 1973. The PNA Movement so bornwas for free and fair elections . and impartial polling. It was against rigging.

With this it seemed that the PPP had lost credibility with the silent majority. The PNAslogans appealed to them and the PNA started building up their following against thegovernment. The announcement in January that the elections would be held in Marchhad surprised quite a few. There was a common belief that Mr. Bhutto would postponethe elections on some pretext or the other. Mr. Bhutto perhaps wanted to continueruling supreme in office with a mandate in his pocket. He thought the people wouldtake it lying down, and that the opposition, being divided and half asleep, would be nomatch.

It seemed Mr. Bhutto could not sense the pulse of the time and so went under the wheelof history. News like the imposition of curfew in the village of the rival politicianSherbaz Mazari, arresting of his school going children and firing on his house led tofurther tension. This had happened on March 11. Section 144 (restricting the assemblyof more than four persons), was commonly defied. On March 15, Abdul Hafiz Pirzadaon behalf of the government rejected the PNA demands and said that the electionscould not be declared null and void without abrogating the Constitution.

That same day, Khwaja Khair ud Din suggested that Sindh be divided into two zones. Itwas observed in the Army that the people were rapidly becoming. more extreme intheir demands than the PNA leaders themselves. It has been a common pattern in ourcountry that it is not the leaders who lead, but the masses who set the pace and thenleaders follow, with things rapidly going out of the leaders' control. It was feared thathistory was about to, repeat itself.


The PNA Movement was not a movement by one sect, class or ideology. In fact it was acombination of all those elements against dictatorship, which wanted to get rid of Mr.Bhutto and reinstate democracy. This movement had gathered such momentum that itcreated intense polarization. The, movement, uplifted those who took part asopposition and catapulted the PNA leadership to popularity. The Movement hadbecome a national movement. The silent majority perhaps already had an inbred hatredagainst Mr. Bhutto's Junta for their undemocratic and violent policies, but they couldnot speak out openly against them for fear of police violence and neo-fascist methods.Even some of Mr. Bhutto's previous supporters joined forces against him. They werepoliticians, intellectuals, journalists, lawyers, traders, many students and women'sorganizations. It was not only for the PNA or in support of the PNA, it was for thesincere interest in the restoration of genuine democracy.

People used mosques to stimulate the activities of this mass movement which hadstarted against rigging, but later gave the impression that it was only for Nizame-Mustafa. However, the leaders connected with the movement used to mention Nizam-e-Mustafa as well. It was part of the PNA manifesto. Later, this point was highlighted inthe movement. Speaking honestly, the connotation of Nizame-Mustafa in the minds ofthe people was social and legal justice. If these two things are available to the people,the system can be termed an Islamic System. When the movement advanced andreached the masses, the slogan of Nizarn-e-Mustafa was also added to the anti-dictatorship slogans.

Some of the PNA components did not believe in the introduction of Nizam-e-Mustafa(Islamic System) and were only paying lip service. Initially there was no cry of Nizam-e-Mustafa as an objective. The agitation was against rigging and it was only to get rid ofMr. Bhutto, but later on the masses sentiments overshadowed the movement and theleaders having seen the sentiments of the people thought it best to introduce it. For thePNA leaders, it was better to kill two birds with one stone -- end Mr. Bhutto's despoticrule and introduce Nizam-e-Mustafa. Some were even under the misconception thatMr. Bhutto was the real impediment, and if he was removed Nizam-e-Mustafa wouldbe ushered in automatically. It was only by the last week of March 1977 that there was asharp swing in mood, with a call for the introduction of a religiously-based systemtaking over from straightforward political demands.

The menace of the CIA was deliberately exaggerated into an explanation for the mass-protests which, threatened Mr. Bhutto's rule. Many PPP supporters still uncriticallybelieve that it as the USA which was behind the upsurge of protests against the PPPgovernment in 1977. There was no such thing as "a secret hand" of the USA or CIA, norwas there substance in Mr. Bhutto's charge that the USA had made him a target becauseof the so-called "Islamic bomb".


Mr. Bhutto wrote a letter to Maulana Mufti in March to discuss the issues of conflictwithin the framework of the Constitution. The PNA General Council rejected it. SomePNA leaders were arrested in Karachi and curfew was imposed. PNA demonstrationsand processions were taken out in violation of Section 144 against Mr. Bhutto'sillegitimate Government in Faisalabad, Sargodha, Multan, Lahore and other majorcities. The PNA Karachi Action Committee called for a strike in Karachi on March 21.For the third time, Mr. Bhutto wrote to Maulana Mufti Mahmood to resolve theprevailing crisis, this time he wrote as Chief Executive of the country and not asChairman of the PPP Maulana Mufti again rejected it and asked for the immediaterelease of the PNA leaders. Defiance of law by the agitators was resulting in deaths andinjuries caused by the police and the FSF. By March 21 a hundred people had beenkilled, about a 1,000 injured and about 10,000 PNA workers imprisoned. In view of theprevailing conditions, I issued instructions to the local Brigade Commander to takefoolproof security measures at the residences of the PM, of the Chairman, Joint ChiefsOf Staff Committee, COAS and GHQ. This was done in view of the parade taking placeon March 23.

A movement is an outside influence on the mind and a sudden tendency to act. It may,be arranged by waking the state of mind, or it may simply be a result of things left tocircumstances. Movements are stimulated to activity by thoughts tinged with emotion,sufferings, hopes, religion and by filling the mind with thoughts associated withunfulfilled desires. They always refer to future existence. Promises made during themovement determine the pattern of behavior and give shape to the events that follow.Movements always succeed because of public pressure. The PNA leaders used to sittogether and make decisions on some political objectives, swear on the Quran in publicgatherings, narrate the Nizam-e-Mustafa manifesto, talk about democracy, lay stress, onthe restoration of basic rights and human rights, argue for the dissolution of SpecialTribunals like the Hyderabad Tribunal, advocate the independence of the judiciary andthe return of prices to the 1970 level, assuring the masses that they would not restunless democracy was restored, to parliament. But they never meant it.

On March 25 the PNA reiterated its demand for the resignation of the PM and the ChiefElection Commissioner and for fresh General Elections. In order to counter themounting agitation of the PNA, shoot-at-sight orders were issued and the army wascalled in to disrupt a PNA mass strike on March 26. In spite of this, the PNA strikeparalyzed normal life in major cities and towns. The nationwide demonstrations andstrikes had proved that the people did not recognize the poll, results and the legitimacyof the National Assembly. Mr. Bhutto then renewed his dialogue offer to the PNA.However, he ruled out the possibility of the dissolution of the National Assembly. Boththe Government and the opposition adopted rigid postures, the PNA leaders insistentupon their three points i.e., resignation of the P.M., appointment of a new Chief ElectionCommissioner and fresh general elections. Mr. Bhutto was determined neither to quitnor to let the PNA agitation succeed. The situation was far from enviable for both the


parties in this national confrontation. There were bloody protests by the PNA. The FSFwas playing almost the same role for the PPP that the Muslim League National Guardshad played for Khan Qayum's Muslim League in 1958. As street demonstrationsmounted, Mr. Bhutto began to make concessions, but they were too little and, always,too late. If he had declared the initial results null and void and at once sanctioned newpolls, he might have averted the tragedy of a military takeover.

The Chief Election Commissioner, Justice Sajjad Ahmed Jan, had himself indicated thatthe elections were massively rigged. TheElection Commission had announced that theywere preparing to charge a senior PPP Cabinet. Minister, Hafeezullah Cheema, withelectoral malpractices. Then the PNA campaign was given an unexpected impetus bythe stunning electoral defeat suffered by the Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi.Her graceful withdrawal after accepting the verdict of the electorate was in markedcontrast to Mr. Bhutto's refusal to acknowledge what had taken place in his country. OnApril 8, he had said again that National Assembly re- elections were not possible. ThePPP had claimed that they had got the votes because of their economic programmes. Ananalyst had said that if the PPP's claim was taken as correct, then they should have gotthe maximum votes in the backward areas of NWFP and Baluchistan, where even todayaverage incomes are less than Sindh and where poverty is maximum, but the PPP gotonly one seat there. Even in Punjab, where the PPP won the most seats, it did not getmuch in the backward areas of Bahawalpur. D G Khan, D I Khan, Jhang or Sargodha.All areas contiguous to the Indian border in Sindh and Punjab got 100% PPP candidateselected.

On April 9, I had accompanied Gen Zia to Jhelum to attend the Pakistan Army RifleAssociation competitions. We were received at the helipad by Maj Gen S R Kallue whoaccompanied us to the venue. The COAS had the opportunity to meet the organizers aswell as a section of all ranks of the Army who were taking part in the competitions.Apart from, the direct questions connected with the country, they wanted to know whythree Brigadiers had disobeyed orders at Lahore, by refusing to fire on the mob whencalled upon to do so, in the discharge of their duties, in aid of the civil power. TheCOAS explained under what circumstances it had happened. He also expressed hishope that the crisis would be over soon because the Prime Minister would be able tocontrol the situation. While at Jhelum, we did not know the latest situation in Lahore.After attending the function at Jhelum we returned to Rawalpindi.

On April 9, the PNA demonstrations took place in Lahore, Gujranwala, Sheikhpura,Gujrat, Sahiwal, Bahawalpur, Cholistan, Jhang, Quetta, Sargodha, Sukkur and Lyalipur.Officially 8 people were killed and 77 injured. Unofficially the figures were muchhigher. The worst was at Lahore where the PNA Movement took a serious turn fromballot to bullet. Numerous processions taken out at Lahore wanted to converge on theProvincial Assembly building where the newly elected members had to take the oath.The Government did not want them to reach the building.


As the processions approached the vicinity of the Assembly Chambers building, Mr.Bhutto's FSF and the Police intercepted them with tear gas and firing. In order to dealwith the PNA lady workers, a newly drafted contingent of police, comprisingprostitutes from Lahore, was let loose on them. Men and women police personnel andthe FSF dealt with the situation very severely, and by the evening, in Lahore alone, 30people had been killed and 250 wounded. It was a revolutionary day. Ladies turned thetable. Nath Force aggravated the situation.

Putting prostitutes and other rough elements in police uniform was the idea of theInspector General Police. Chaudhry Fazle Haq, who was Federal Interior Secretary butwas specially appointed IG Police. Punjab by Mr. Bhutto to deal with the worsening lawand order situation. The special police force was given the name 'Nath Force' by thePNA. Chaudhrv Fazie Haq's predecessor as Secretary, of the interior was Brig MuzaffarMalik, who was chief secretary Punjab, at that time. He was also handpicked by Mr.Bhutto to be the Chief Secretary during the elections.

That same evening Gen Zia told me that he was to go to Lahore on the following day toattend a presentation at Gen Iqbals Corps Headquarters and he wanted me toaccompany him. We reached Lahore on the morning of April 10 and drove straight tothe Corps Headquarters from the airport along with Lt Gen M lqbal. He gave an up-to-date account of the political situation prevailing in his Corps area. He explained indetail the conduct of the three Brigadiers whose units were deployed on duties in aid ofthe civil power. They were all from the same division. He also explained theineffectiveness of firing on the agitating mob, and explained the ineffectiveness of firingon the agitating mob and explained in detail what had happened the previous day inthe vicinity of the Assembly Hall, Maj Gen Agha Zulfiqar was the GOC of thoseBrigadiers.

After the presentation Gen Zia told me that he thought that both Gen Iqbal and GenZulfiqar had lost their nerve and were unlikely to be able to take the further strain ofduties in aid of the civil power. He told me that on return to GHQ he would issueorders to transfer both of them and post them to soft jobs Zia said in no uncertain termsthat it was a case of command failure. At lunch time, Gen Zia received a message from.Mr. Bhutto, who was in Lahore, that he should see the Prime Minister in the afternoonat the Governor's House. Gen Zia asked me to accompany him along with Gen Iqbal. Itold Gen Zia that I had to attend the Pakistan Golf Union Executive Committee meetingthat day, but would accompany him if he so desired. He allowed me to stay back topreside over the meeting as its President. Gen Zia went ahead and had an audiencewith the Prime Minister and returned after about three hours. Thereafter we left forIslamabad-Rawalpindi.


On April 11, the PNA called for nationwide civil disobedience to protest against thealleged rigging of the General Elections. Time, April 11, 1977 wrote "Mr. Bhutto's troublesare largely of his own making. While Indira Gandhi went down to honest defeat, the PakistaniPM is reaping the bitter fruits of what was almost certainly a dishonest victory. Mr. Bhutto hadcalled elections for much the same reason as the Indian leader."

Demonstrations degenerated into riots. People could no longer be contained by thepolice and the FSF. Indira Gandhi's defeat and her yielding power to the other partywithout any crisis enraged Pakistan. If transfer of power could be achieved so smoothlyin the neighboring country, why could fair elections not be held in Pakistan? The nationcould not surrender to injustice and would not compromise with the oppressor. Theywould welcome martyrdom.

Mr. Bhutto's government had no idea what martyrdom was. It only knew corruption,dishonesty, harassment, cruelty and fear. That was what the PNA was telling people.On April 12, 1977, Mr. Bhutto gave a statement to the foreign press in which he said thatthe elections had been rigged. This rigging he said was done by over keen andoverzealous bureaucrats jealous party members and ministers. On April 13, Mr. Bhuttoruled out fresh National Assembly elections. He offered to dissolve the NationalAssembly and go for reelection provided the opposition first won a two-thirds majorityin the Provincial Assembly. He warned that the Army might be called in to restorenormalcy. On April 15, Mr. Bhutto called on Maulana Abul Ala Maudoudi, the Founderof Jamaat e Islami.

When Mr. Bhutto responded on April 17, 1977 to the PNA Movement by announcingreconstitution of the Islamic Ideology Council, a ban on drinking and horse racing andclosure of night clubs, the lifting of section 144 and abrogation of press publicationorder, it reflected his intentions to stay on and not to leave the chair. He also said thatreelections could be held to provincial assemblies and if opposition was able to winthem there would be fresh elections to the national assembly. People were not satisfied.A foreign journalist asked Mr. Bhutto in his press conference at Lahore on 17 April. "Areyou under army pressure?". He replied arrogantly, "If anybody raises slight head he will bethrown out as was Sardar Shaukat Hayat from PPP" meaning thereby that he was treatingthe army also as his own party.

The extent of Pakistan's crisis was much commented upon in the international press.

The Financial Times April 15, 1977 wrote:

The country was his personal fiefMr. Bhutto has not looked as vulnerable as he does today during the five years since hetook office. Instead of having received the popular mandate which he confidently expectedfrom last month's general elections for his second term of office he faces a nationwide


campaign of violence on the streets and civil disobedience that, at the least is likely torender government ineffective, and at the worst threatens a return to martial law.

This bleak situation with its echoes of the crisis through which Pakistan passed in 1969when President Ayub Khan was overthrown and again in 1971 with the loss of EastBengal--- has blown up with the suddenness of a squall at sea . . . .The shock of thecampaign was that it uncovered a wave of hostility against Mr. Bhutto personally forrunning the country as though it were his personal fief, and against his ruling People'sParty for grabbing the spoils of office. Mr. Bhutto would have got wind of this earlierhad he not cut himself off by giving senior appointments to mediocre men and byruthlessly curbing the Press and his political opponents.

The scale of the rigging and the number of constituencies actually affected have largelybecome an academic issue. But it was blatant enough for the state-controlled ratio andtelevision to be broadcasting results before the votes had been counted.

. . . . The net result has been to rob. Mr. Bhutto of that important, intangible commodity,political legitimacy. No longer can he claim to be the popularly elected national leader.Even his supporters now discount what they hear on radio or television or read in thetightly supervised press.

The logical conclusion of this policy is a one-party state. It is also a one-party stateincreasingly dependent on the army, as was shown by clashes in Lahore during theweekend." (The Financial Times, April 15th 1977)

To gain popularity among religious sections, Mr. Bhutto dramatically turned to IslamThe Government announced a series of measures aimed at enforcing Shariat Laws in sixmonths, total prohibition and a ban on gambling forthwith.

On 19th April, two days after the Prime Minister had claimed the full support of theworkers, twenty six labor organizations affiliated to the Pakistan Labor Alliancedeclared a nationwide strike to last until Mr. Bhutto resigns. The next day, Karachi, thenerve center of Pakistan's economy, went on strike for an indefinite period. Shops,factories and docks were closed, traffic was stopped and no train left Karachi Station.Opposition supporters threatened to lie on the tracks if Mr. Bhutto called the army torun the railways. PTA joined the stoppage on 17 April after ground staff walked out forpolitical reasons. (Pilots, and engineers were already on strike for more pay).

The political climate of the country remained charged with, violence, several peoplewere killed and hundreds injured every day in clashes between demonstrators andpolice. In Lyallpur, an industrial town in Punjab, tension rose so high after a series ofstreet battles that the District Magistrate re-imposed a ban on meetings of more thanfour people within forty eight hours of the Prime Minister's orders to lift it. In Karachi


hand to hand fighting added at least thirteen to the mounting death toll, left the citystrewn with debris, and led to the re-imposition of an army-enforced curfew.

Mr. Bhutto's strategy now seemed to match street power with street power. In Lahorehe taunted his party workers with being 'women afraid of retaliating'. The next day gangsfrom the two sides fought. Mr. Bhutto's men were badly beaten. On 19th April hisPeoples Party organized a procession of some 10,000 people in Lahore. Most of the gun-and-dagger toting demonstrators were former squatters who had a, few days ago beengiven rights to their plots in districts around Lahore, some had been imported inmunicipal trucks and buses from nearby towns. Two hours later the oppositionmustered an even larger march. Mr. Bhutto's attempt to diffuse the conflict with timelygive away seems to have failed.

Life in general became uncertain, tense and grim in the major cities. While the worldmedia talked of Pakistan everyday and reported the gravity of the explosive situation,the media at home either lied or were evasive. The people knew that the press, radioand TV in Pakistan no longer mattered. The BBC told them the facts, and improvisedstreet corner notice boards also gave the news. Communication. was by word of mouthor cyclostyled material. It showed the lack of credibility of the mass media.

These comments and many other foreign media analyses were the subject of seriousdiscussion in the Army circles.

The International Herald Tribune date April 21, 1977 wrote:-

WHY HAVE PEOPLE TAKEN TO THE STREETS

At the news conference here, Monday, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was asked, ashe has been asked so often lately, whether he would consider resigning from office, asthe political opposition is demanding.

'Why should I be considering resigning?' he said in exasperation 'I am legally, politically,morally Prime Minister of Pakistan. The people are with me.'

If the hard pressed people of this impoverished land are indeed with him, then whyhave thousands of them taken to the streets during the last six weeks in violent clashesthat have claimed at least 150 lives?

"Bhutto was ruling this country so dictatorially that he didn't realize what the peoplewere thinking" said a leader of the PNA the opposition coalition. "He finally took the lidoff the tea kettle just before the election and it has boiled over into what you see in thestreets".


Some Bhutto opponents are incensed about official corruption, not just the electionrigging, which even the Prime Minister concedes occurred to some extent, not also atthe enrichment of some of his PPP officials during his years in office.

Pakistanis who care about civil liberties have been, distressed by the summary arrestsand long imprisonment of government critics by press censorship and by the bans onpublic meetings, generally in force until the election campaign began in January.

(William Borders in International Herald Tribune April 21, 1977)

In order to crush the PNA's call for a mass strike on April 22, the Government imposedMartial Law in the three major cities of Karachi, Lahore and Hyderabad. Thus Mr.Bhutto resorted to armed action in political affairs. (Later martial law was imposed inMultan which was lifted only on 7th June after the Lahore High Court had declared on2nd June 1977 that the Martial Law was unconstitutional). PNA bitterly criticized theimposition of martial law. When Mr. Bhutto called on the Army to restore law andorder, he signaled his weakness and the Fraility of the FSF.

The FSF had been organized parallel to the Army. Machine guns were given to themand mortars and armoured personnel carriers were on the way. Characters like NajafKhan, Haq Nawaz Tiwana, Saeed Khan and Masood Mahmood were around Bhutto.

I reported various police lapses to Gen Zia (my letter number 2197/DO/PA dated April23) for action as deemed fit. I quote this letter verbatim:

"Whereas the Government and the Army was trying to restore normalcy in the country,and whereas the administrative machinery seemed to be taking all steps to keep thethings under control, the PPP did not seem to be working in harmony with theGovernment's policy and the civil authorities found it more convenient to ignore that.

Following observations were made:

a. Three processions were taken out in Rawalpindi, two of the PNA and one of thePPP. The PPP procession which started from Liaquat Garden was approximately8.000 to 10.000 strong and was led by Dr. Ghulam Hussain, Federal Minister andDr Abdul Khaliq, a Punjab Provincial Minister. They were given a free hand todo anything they felt like. The police did not object to any of their actions, someof which were not conducive to the maintenance of law and order e.g., thefollowing was observed by our intelligence staff on the spot:

i. The PPP procession burnt and brick batted vehicles houses and shops --no action was taken by the police.


ii. The PPP procession burnt Jamaat-e-Islami. Office on College Road -- Thepolice watched it as silent spectators.

iii. When the office was set on fire somebody fired with a pistol from the topof the office. In retaliation, a hand grenade was thrown by the processioninto the office, resulting in casualties to persons out of whom one died inthe hospital. -- No action was taken by the police. (On the contrary,Pakistan Times, a government paper, had given a completely distortedpicture wherein it was alleged that the individual died due to explosion ofa hand grenade carried by him in his hand -- Local police authoritiesunfortunately confirmed this incorrect version.)

b 100 workers were received at Rawalpindi Railway Station by Qayyum Butt.MNA from the PPP. Some of them were carrying weapons. These workers fired afew shots in Gawal-Mandi and then went towards Marir Hassãn Chowk.

In the PPP procession there were two vehicles and a trolley which contained lethalweapons like Sten guns and rifles -- No action by the Police.

As against the PPP procession, police took very active measures against the two PNAprocessions. They were continuously tear gassed and lathi-charged although they werecomparatively peaceful, in spite of their large strength of over 50,000.

It may be possible to give a different impression to the people who read the newspapersoutside Rawalpindi, but those who lived in Rawalpindi and those who had seen thesethings happening could not be convinced otherwise. This is how the credibility of theGovernment was lost. Because of such incidents, the PNA movement was gainingsympathies of more and more people who were losing faith in the Government andcivil administration. People belonging to all sections of society, educated as well as theman in the street, wondered. Was the ruling party helping to restore law and order, orwas it encouraging lawlessness? Their impression was that the PPP was encouragingtheir party workers to do whatever they wanted to do under the umbrella of the civiladministration. That could lead to civil war."

The Guardian. April 22, 1977 wrote:

BHUTTO'S REIGN OF TERROR

"Even in an election blatantly rigged in many, if not most constituencies, the oppositiongot 36 percent of the votes, offsetting the rigging and adding the clearly immenseweight of fresh support the opposition has gained in the current agitation, Mr. Bhutto'sparty is no longer left with an undisputed majority.....


The contrast between the old and new Bhutto was painfully visible at his pressconference last Sunday. He was defensive where he used to attack, evasive where oncehe was forthright. He was blustering, unconvincing and sometimes blatantlyuntruthful.

He allowed himself and his provincial Chief Ministers to be elected unopposed. (In hisnative Larkana, the opposition candidate was detained all night to prevent him filinghis nomination papers).

The resulting explosion has been too big to be explained by the rigging of a singleelection. The essential protest, expressed again and again by the Right and the Left, thereligious and the secular, the poor and the rich, is against Mr. Bhutto's reign of terror --a system of institutionalized corruption which had ended by defeating most of its ownobjectives.., fulfillment lagged behind, because of the weaknesses of Mr. Bhutto himselfand his system. Ruling by manipulation and terror, he introduced a new corruption intotowns and villages. Money for development was systematically pillaged and villagerswere exploited by the very officials sent to improve their lot. In town and country thepoor were at the mercy of a form of government more akin to a mafia than a modernadministration.

Under the system, promotion was for the pliable. Able men in government,administration and the sciences were hounded from their jobs and if they were lucky,allowed to go abroad. How the system defeated its own objectives is apparent in thedismal failures in agriculture. The Punjab and Sindh have the biggest and most fertilestretch of irrigated land in Asia but wheat productivity is still only 0.6 tons an acre,even after the green revolution, compared to one ton in Egypt or Mexico........

(The Guardian, 22nd April, 1977)

The PNA bitterly condemned Martial Law, as a shield to protect the illegal andunconstitutional government led by Mr. Bhutto and his PPP. The restrictions imposedby the government on processions and meetings could not stop the people from takingto the streets. Even the justified fear of the police and dread of the FSF could not stopthem. Mosques had become the pivotal point of political activity. Processions to defyrestrictions used to start from the mosques. The Imams and the Ulema in general gavethe lead and were in the forefront of the movement. The cry throughout the countrywas, "Mr. Bhutto must go!" There was hardly a town in the country which did notparticipate. The people of Pakistan, who had been quietly putting up with one dictatorafter another, demonstrated vociferously for democracy. It was a popular revolution todestroy Mr. Bhutto's tyranny.

The violence that took place was mostly committed or incited by the governmentagencies 'or their agent provocateurs. The PNA people kept affirming their faith in


Islam at meeting after meeting. They vowed that they would fight for Nizam-e-Mu'stafain Pakistan.

On April 27, a joint declaration was issued by the Chairman Joint Chiefs of StaffCommittee and the three chiefs, confirming that the Armed Forces were with thegovernment and it was their constitutional obligation to act in such a manner. Gen Ziatold me that he never sued or agreed with any such declaration. It was prepared by GenTikka Khan on Mr. Bhutto's request, and issued to the press as if it had been issued bythe Armed Forces heads. But they did not object to it and it passed. That showed thelack of courage or the intimacy of their relationship with Mr. Bhutto. Gen Zia himselftold me that it was a dirty way of doing things, but there was nothing wrong in thecontext or the spirit in which it was issued.

Mr. Bhutto knew that he was cornered; He addressed the National Assembly on April28 and claimed that the PNA agitation to topple his government was not indigenousbut a colossal international conspiracy against the Islamic state of Pakistan. He blamedthe USA for it. He also said that the imposition of Martial Law at Karachi, Lahore andHyderabad was constitutional. He was also worried about the PNA's 'Long March'which was to converge on the PM's house.

In that address, Mr. Bhutto said, "I want to stay in power because I want to accomplishtwo major objects. My first mission is the restoration of relations with Afghanistan andthe second mission is to equip the Armed Forces with modem weapons. There is a thirdmission as well and that is a peaceful and judicious solution of the Kashmir problem --but it is complicated and will take a long time."

In order to forestall the 'Long March' on April 30, select workers of the PNA werearrested on April 28. Attock Railway Station, Peshawar Road, Jhelum, Gujrat and GujarKhan rail and road routes were blockaded from April 28. On orders received on April28, road journeys towards Rawalpindi and Islamabad from 16:00 hours that day werebanned up to 20:00 hours April 30. Citizens were told to get prior permission formarriages and cinema shows. Entries to Liaquat Bagh. and Ayub National Park werebanned on April 29 and 30. The FSF in civvies and wearing PNA badges, received thePNA workers deceitfully. Mosques were searched and many PNA workers werearrested.

Army responsibility. and civil responsibility were divided. While the police did theactual physical blockading of roads, the army contingents were at hand to give supportif required. Instances of courage and bold defiance were many. People would come outfrom a masque at the appointed time, and would be warned by the police not toproceed further but they would not stop. They seemed to have no fear of bullets ordeath. The people were in no mood to tolerate Mr. Bhutto even if the administrationwanted him to stay on. They were ready to defy force. The deadlock between the


government and the opposition had taken a formidable shape. There was a situation ofvirtual civil war in the country. Hiding. the real issues Mr. Bhutto asserted that theconflict between the government and the opposition was not over 'General Elections'but was related to the norms of egalitarian society and economic reforms that had beencarried out by the PPP Government. Harsh approach of Mr. Bhutto's administrationprovided wider popularity to PNA movement.

The PNA got massive support from students, labor organizations, trade unions andwomen's organizations. Mr. Bhutto was under criticism for his unconstitutional attitudeand policies, especially the imposition of Martial Law and the brutal tactics of the FSF.For the first time, women were seen in large numbers in massive antigovernmentdemonstrations in Rawalpindi, Lahore, Lyalipur, Hyderabad and Karachi. Theeconomy was, damaged because of the confrontation between the Government and thePNA. In view of the government's brutality PNA was hitting back with more effectivemilitant methods. Confrontation assumed serious proportions when the Army wascalled in. Pakistan's ambassadors to Spain, Greece, France and USSR tenderedresignations against Mr. Bhutto's dictatorial policies. Three Army brigadiers hadalready resigned. The Army was acutely concerned over the command failure in LahoreCorps commanded by Lt Gen M. Iqbal Khan.

On 29th April Mr. Bhutto stated that there was a colossal foreign conspiracy behindPNA. agitation attempting to stall Pakistan's nuclear capability.

PNA's long march was planned on 30th April. People. were to converge on PM Housefrom all over Pakistan and surround it. Government ordered its forces to make thePNA's 'Long March' on April 30, 1977 a failure at all costs. Extra police were called toRawalpindi from nearby cities, and the Army was deployed. I had been given the dutyof making sure that no protesters reached the PM's house. Details were worked out in a.coordinating conference presided over by the Interior Secretary Mr. M A K Chaudhryon orders from the PM. I was ordered by the COAS to attend it on his behalf. Army wasrequested to assist police in making PNA Long March a failure. I went back and briefedGen Zia about the conference. He approved the action to be taken by the Army all overPakistan so that the PNA would not succeed. We had gone even to the extent of notallowing passengers to board trains even at major stations like Karachi, Quetta andPeshawar. Nothing was allowed to reach the PM's house ---- not even pedestrians.Mission was fully accomplished. About 10,000 people were arrested in 48 hours.

Thus the PNA 'Long March' to the PM's house was not allowed to materialize. On theevening of April 30, the Prime Minister himself violated Section 144. He went toRawalpindi Saddar in an open jeep, giving the impression that he had suddenlydecided to go there, displaying a letter alleged to have been written by the Americansfor the stoppage of Pakistan's nuclear programme. He declared the 'Elephants' wereafter him ('Elephants' is a common name for Americans' in Pakistan.) It was all stage


managed because the TV cameramen and journalists were there. Impression given wasas if people had suddenly gathered to listen to the popular Prime Minister.

On May 5 the PNA proposed a 32-point plan for resolution of the crisis. There were twophases of action. Phase 1 -- immediate lifting of Martial Law, setting free politicalprisoners, annulment of all amendments to the Constitution not unanimously agreedupon, apportioning time for opposition over radio and TV and an end to censorship.Phase 2 -- Dissolution of parliament followed by simultaneous General and Localelections within 30 days and Mr. Bhutto's resignation immediately, completereorganization of electoral machinery military's responsibility for security at pollingbooths, the naming of acceptable governors and dismissal of certain senior civilservants.

The Far Eastern Economic Review May 6, 1977 wrote:-

TWENTY FOUR POLITICAL MURDERS

"Additionally, the disconcerting fact for those who see Bhutto as a leader capable ofholding the nation together, is the massive erosion of his own popularity. Like Mrs.Indra Gandhi in India, Bhutto won his election in 1970 by presenting himself as acharismatic leader of the impoverished and inarticulate poor. His slogans 'roti' (bread),'Kapra' (clothing), and 'makan' (shelter) caught their imagination. The theatrical orator,he declared to the thronging multitudes at the 1970 rallies "Islam is our, faith,democracy, is our polity, socialism is our economy. All power to the people. PPPmanifesto was drawn up by J A Rahim, a public official and socialist theoretician.

Bhutto's weakness derives from a trait he shares with many Asian intellectuals whoequate intelligence, sagacity and political astuteness, with the possession of academicqualifications. His intellectual arrogance combined with an inflated ego and a pricklyvanity makes him intolerant of those who disagree with him.

It was inevitable that, heady with power he would derisively declare of his colleagues:"I am the Peoples Party and they are all my creatures". He expelled from the PPP thegenuine socialists, like Mairaj Mohammad Khan, who had strong support amonglabour, and jailed him. Rahim, too, was forced out of the party. Gunmen fired, shots athis house during his polemics with Bhutto. Rahim had protested against admitting intothe party, on Bhutto's 'Farman' (directive) alone some of the civil servants who hadgiven the Ayub Khan administration a bad name. Bhutto's credibility as a socialist iscertainly on the wane.

Bhutto's vindictiveness, too made him many enemies. In his name at least some of theseenemies were humiliated, one being handcuffed after his arrest and forced to walk upand down several times a day outside the establishment he had headed before his


disgrace. Another, a business man was peremptorily arrested after, he had spokenprivately against bank nationalization. The Karachi Bar Association has said there havebeen 24 political murders since the PPP came to power".

(Far Eastern Economic Review, May 6, 1977)

Some PPP members of the Assemblies used their legal entitlement to get arms andammunition licenses issued to thousands of people, of their party, thus getting weaponsdistributed through the district administration. Top leaders of the PPP who occupiedhigh offices had begun touring the provinces inciting and encouraging their party-menand organizing an armed confrontation against the people.

The likelihood of Army intervention to, halt the drift to anarchy was clearly seen in theinternational press. It was highlighted, for example, in a perceptive analysis of the crisisin Pakistan published in The Economist April 23, 1977:

"TAKE HIM UP ON IT"

Mr. Bhutto's increasingly defiant opponents have won the savage battle of Pakistan'sstreets. They have proved their ability to paralyze the country's major cities, to groundthe national airline, to outnumber, outshout and outshoot the mobs on the other side.Now it is time for them to validate their victory by nonviolent political means.

This is what the leaders of the Pakistan National Alliance claim they want to do. Theysay they want a return of the March 7th election, which even the election commissionnow concedes was marred by flagrant rigging and intimidation by Mr. Bhutto'ssupporters. But they also insist that Mr. Bhutto must first resign from the primeministership and turn the government over to an interim authority.

It is this last demand which Mr. Bhutto feels he cannot concede. He insists that he has amoral, legal and political right to his job. His moral claim is clearly, questionable, andwere Pakistan a more disciplined democracy, he would be long since gone. The countrywould no doubt be quieter, for a time; if he did resign. But given his doggeddetermination to hang on (he has already endured a longer and fiercer struggle thanAyub Khan) he should be taken at his word and challenged at another poll.

Mr. Bhutto has reacted to the pressures of recent weeks like any desperate man in acorner - alternately, flailing out at his attackers and tossing them concessions. Someconcessions --- such as this week's sop to the militant mullahs a, ban on drinking andgambling and a promise to enforce Islamic law---have been both irrelevant andretrograde. But at least one offer deserves more often than the disdainful dismissal itgot. This was his proposal to restage the March 10th Provincial elections, which wereboycotted by the opposition because of the rigging of the national election three days


earlier. If the PNA can prove by winning a majority in new provincial elections that itmay well have been robbed of power in March, Mr. Bhutto is committed to holding anew national election as well. He has also offered to allow the army and the judiciary tosupervise the voting.

There is one obvious snag in Mr. Bhutto's two tier plan. He has specified that theprovincial elections are to be held in all four provinces including Baluchistan.

But even before the rigging question arose, the opposition had decided to boycott theBaluchistan election because of the presence of large numbers of federal troops in theprovince, where they have been putting down a series of part-tribal, part-politicaluprisings. So Mr. Bhutto would have to make the further concession of withdrawingtroops from Baluchistan for the plan to get off the ground. Since Baluchistan has beenPakistan's most peaceful province during the past two months, and since troopwithdrawals should logically be part of Mr. Bhutto's own scheme for politicalnormalization there, this is a demand he should be able to meet.

THE ARMY WOULD BE WORSE

Apart from his feverish desire -to get rid of Mr. Bhutto, immediately if not sooner, theopposition has no good ground for turning down his election plan. The events sinceMarch 7th have unquestionably eroded such support as he had at the time of thedisputed election. He almost certainly would have won it then without rigging, hemight not do so today. So the offer to rerun the election with proper neutralsupervision, carries an enormous risk of public repudiation for this man of tender ego.For the opposition it presents an extraordinary opportunity to exploit a shift in popularmood before that mood shifts again the reaction against the continuing mob violence.

There are several other reasons why the opposition should take Mr. Bhutto upon thisoffer. The strongest that, unless it acts quickly, the initiative will pass from thepoliticians to the mobs (in some places this has happened already) making an explosionand or an army takeover inevitable. The army, which contains no outstanding publicfigures these days, has so far been responsive to Mr. Bhutto's orders. If it decides to defyhim, it is unlikely to do so - as the opposition seems to be hoping -- in order to put hisrivals into power, but rather to impose its own form of military, order. So theopposition will lose as much as Mr. Bhutto if it pushes its campaign that far.

But Pakistani democracy, such as it is, will lose the most. Unlike its neighbor, India,Pakistan has never settled comfortably into imported parliamentary ways. Mr. Bhutto'schief appeal to his countrymen, when he came to power after the 1971 Bangladesh war,was his promise to restore civilian democratic government after 13 years of militaryrule. He did not exactly fulfill those promises about democracy, his rigid restrictions oncivil liberties and press freedom attracted less international censure than Mrs. Ghandi's


relatively milder emergency only because of the lower expectations that were the resultof Pakistan's authoritarian past. Yet he did call the first election over held under acivilian government in Pakistan. If this election is to be abrogated now, by a powerseizure, even the limited gains that democracy made under Mr. Bhutto will be wipedout.

Mr. Bhutto's angry enemies should reflect that their - own interest would be served by apeaceful, legal transition. Even if Mr. Bhutto should be returned to power, the chancesof a subsequent democratic contest would still be greater than if the army assumedcontrol. And if the opposition should somehow get, itself installed in power by whatMr. Bhutto has called a civilian coup, one coup would all too likely be followed byanother and another until, even a rigged election would come to savor of the good olddays. With events moving so quickly, the election option may not remain open for long.Grab it, somebody." .

(The Economist, April 23, 1977)

On March 7, 1977, Gen Zia had issued a directive to the Army to refrain from politics.But events were pushing him to step in.

Mr. Bhutto thought that he would be able to control any mass movement with his policeand the FSF. He had said in an address to the nation, "I may be weak but this chair isstrong. I will not give them dead bodies. The National Assembly elections are over.There is no question of fresh polls now." Mr. Bhutto was caught in a web of his ownmaking. He could not accept the demand of the PNA for fresh polls because it wouldmean that he accepted that the elections were rigged. The only alternative left to himwas to insist that the polls were over. Harsh measures adopted by the governmentadded to the hatred of Mr. Bhutto and the people became even more determined to getrid of him. There was firing in Anarkali Lahore. Earlier there had been lathi charge onulema in Muslim Mosque Lahore. PNA leadership played with the sentiments of themasses.

The Bhutto government was accused of brutally violating the human rights of politicalprisoners. A dramatic report in May 1977 by Amnesty International, showed how'confessions' were being extracted by mental and physical torture --- mainly by thepolice. These tortures, according to the international human rights Organization,included severe beatings, electric shocks applied to private parts, the stringing up of theprisoner to the ceiling, the insertion of chilies in the anus, threat or strangulation andexecution, the playing of faked tapes, suggesting the prisoner's family had beenmurdered, and threats to disgrace a mother, wife or sister. These and oilier violationsattracted international. publicity.


On May 11, 1977, the National Assembly adopted a bill to make Friday the weeklyholiday instead of Sunday Mr. Bhutto's government was now desperately trying to leanon Islam. On the same day. The Times of India wrote:

".... Bhutto has had his opponents, real or imaginary, beaten up, arrested on trumped upcharges, and even murdered, he has banned the National Awami Party, which has aconsiderable following, he has humiliated leading members of his own PPP , he hasdismissed governors and Chief Ministers as if they were nobodies: and he has mruthlessly censored the press."

On the morning of May 13, Gen Zia informed me on the telephone that he was going tohold an important conference in his office and he wanted me to attend it. I asked himabout the agenda of the conference. He replied it had something to do with theprevailing political situation. On reaching his office. I found he had gathered most ofthe Generals in GHQ around him and was waiting for me.

He told us that the PM was thinking of asking for the mandate from the people througha referendum. The point at issue was, 'Should the referendum be held or not?' Maj GenAbdullah Malik, the CGS, was vehemently for it. Maj Gen Saadat Ali Khan, the E-in-Cwas totally against it, the other wavered. I was against the idea of a referendum. Thenation wanted re-elections, and would not stop short of that. I requested Zia that norecommendation should be given to the PM unless we had a unanimous opinion. Wemust argue and convince each other. Gen Zia agreed. We argued the pros and cons ofthe proposal for about four hours, and finally we unanimously agreed that areferendum should not be resorted to.

Gen Zia was to give our recommendations to the PM, who was to address the NationalAssembly in the afternoon and announce his decision on the referendum. Gen Zia toldus that he would go to the PM to inform him about our recommendation that thereshould be no referendum instead fresh elections should be held. We were to wait forhim in his office.

A TV set was available in the COAS office and we listened to the PM's address Mr.Bhutto said that he would go for a referendum. This was unexpected. So we asked theCOAS what message he had conveyed. Gen Zia told us that he had informed the PMthat it was the unanimous decision of the generals in GHQ that there should be noreferendum and that fresh elections should be held. At that stage we had no way ofchecking what Gen Zia had really said. It came as a shock to us when, in a subsequentCabinet meeting Mr. Bhutto addressed Gen Zia and said "General you had told me thatthe Army wanted me to go for a referendum but today I find that that was not theopinion of the Army". Gen Zia was caught. Out of the whole audience, I was the onlyone who knew that Gen Zia had told a deliberate lie.


Mr. Bhutto was not prepared to resign at any cost. Rejecting the demand for hisresignation, he offered to seek a vote of confidence through a referendum. He insistedthat he was placing his fate in the hands of the people because the PNA had turneddown all reconciliatory measures The PNA condemned this proposal as a calculateddevice to ensure the PPP's illegitimate rule. The General Council of the PNA accusedMr. Bhutto of foisting a one party hegemony. One of the main reasons for the PNArejecting the referendum was the fear generated by Mr. Bhutto's speech of May 13, inwhich he showed an inclination for certain administrative changes and reversion to thepresidential form of government.

A remarkable open letter, written by the PNA politician retired Air Marshal AsgharKhan to the Chiefs of Staff and Officers of the Armed Forces also came under discussionon May 13. Mr. Bhutto termed it high treason. The Defence Minister said that AsgharKhan could be court martiallel for it. The ex-Air Marshal countered that it was not aninvitation to the Armed Forces to take over the country. The contents of this letter,which was received by officers around the country, are given below in full.

"May, 1977I am addressing this message to the Chiefs of Staff and the Officers of the DefenceServices of Pakistan.

It is your duty to defend the territorial integrity of Pakistan and to obey lawfulcommands of superior officers placed over, you. To differentiate between a 'lawful' andan 'unlawful' command is the duty of every officer. Everyone of you must ask yourselfwhether what the Army is doing is 'lawful' activity and if your conscience tells you thatit is not, and you still carry it out, you would appear to lack moral fibre and would beguilty of a grave crime against your country and your people.

You should by now have realized that the military action in East Pakistan was aconspiracy in which the present Prime Minister played a Machiavellian role. You knowthe circumstances in which military action in Baluchistan was engineered and howcompletely unnecessary this action has been. You are also probably aware of the utterlyunnecessary military action last year in Dir in the North West Frontier Province. If youhave any interest in National affairs, you must also be aware, that during the electioncampaign the nation expressed its powerful disapproval of the present regime. Following,the people's rejection of the government, you should have been surprised at the electionresults in which the Pakistan National Alliance which could muster such overwhelmingpopular support, could only get 8 out of 116 National Assembly seats in the Punjab. Youmust surely know that many people were not even allowed to file their nominationpapers. Was it not too much of a coincidence that no papers could be filed against thePrime Minister and all the Chief Ministers of the four provinces? That those who daredto try, ended up spending a few nights in police custody. One of them has still not beentraced.


Those of you who were even remotely connected with duties in connection with theMarch 7 election would also know of the blatant manner, in which rigging took place, ofthe hundreds of thousands of ballot papers of PNA candidates, that had been taken out ofballet boxes and were found in the streets and fields of Pakistan, following the election ofMarch 7. You would also have seen the deserted polling, stations of March 10, the day ofthe Provincial polls, following the call for boycott of provincial elections by the PNA.Nevertheless the government media announced that an unprecedented number of voteshad also been polled, surely you must have followed the movement which called for Mr.Bhutto's resignation and re-election in the country.

The coming out of women in thousands on the streets in every city and town with babiesin their arms was a scene that no one will forget. These were the women who Mr. Bhuttoclaimed had voted for him. The movement proved within a few days that he and hisgovernment had been completely rejected by the people. The death of hundreds of ouryouth and the beating of our mothers and sisters was a scene that may well have stirredyou to shame and sorrow. Have you ever thought why the people put themselves to somuch trouble? Why must mothers come out to face bullets with babies in their arms?Why do parents allow their children to face police lathis and bullets? Surely it is onlybecause they feel that they have been wronged, that they have been cheated; that theirbasic right to 'hire and fire' their rulers have been denied to them. They understood,when we told them the truth, that the Constitution, which you as officers of the defenceservices are sworn to defend, had been violated. Article 218(3) of the Constitution of theIslamic Republic of Pakistan says, 'It shall be the duty of the Election Commissionconstituted in relation to an election to organize and conduct the election and to makesuch arrangements as are necessary to ensure that the election is conducted honestly,justly, fairly and in accordance with law, and that corrupt practices are guarded against.

This, my friends, was not a just and fair election. Mr. Bhutto has vitiated theConstitution and is guilty of a grave crime against the people. It is not your duty tosupport his illegal regime, nor can you be called upon to kill your own people so that hecan continue a little longer in office. Let it not be said that the Pakistan Armed Forces area degenerate police force, fit only for killing unarmed civilians. How else can you explainthe shooting of a spirited lad whose only fault was to show the "V" sign to the Army inLahore the other day? The spirit of adventure, of defiance rather than servility, needs to bencouraged in our youth and this unfortunate incident is a blot on the name of the Armywhich would be difficult to wipe out. Similarly shooting by the Army in Karachi on anunarmed crowd is unpardonable. Did you not realize that the poor and hungry people ofPakistan throughout 30 troubled years of our history, had shown only love and affectionfor our Armed Forces? That they wept when you laid down arms in East Pakistan thatthey have always prayed for your glory and have literally starved themselves and theirchildren so that you ate well-fed and, our Generals and senior officers can live a life thateven their British and American counterparts would not dream of. It pains me to say thatthat love is now gone. Pray do not let it turn to hate For, should that happen, a tragedy


would have occurred in the history of this nation which we in our lifetime may not beable to undo.

As men of honor, it is your responsibility to do your duty and the call of duty in thesetrying circumstances is not the blind obedience of unlawful commands. There comes atime in the lives of nations when each man has to ask himself whether he is doing theright thing. For you the time has Come. Answer this call honestly and save Pakistan.God be with you.

M. Asghar Khan"

On May 14, 1977 the Army was called out in Multan.

At one of the meetings in the PM's Secretariat Cabinet Room, Mr. Bhutto asked Gen Zia,'General, you said that the Army would support the government whole hog and youwould be able to control the situation. How come that the situation is not coming undercontrol?" Zia had not yet replied when Minister Hamid Reza Gillani interjected that theArmy was not effective Gen Tikka Khan, Abdul Hafiz Pirzada, Hanif Khan andMaulana Kausar Niazi were also present Gen Zia said simply that the Army was doingits best. Gen Tikka Khan then said that if two to three hundred were killed, the situationwould quickly come under control. The discussion continued.

When asked by the PM for my views, I said I would give my views from the researchangle and also asked permission to question Gen Tikka Khan. The PM permitted me todo so I asked Gen Tikka Khan to refresh our memory by letting us know what theprinciple governing the application of force was when troops were called out in aid ofthe civil power.

He replied that minimum force should be applied Then I asked him about theeffectiveness of fire He replied that fire is always for effect and not in the air. Then GenTikka Khan asked me in a sarcastic manner why I was asking those questions as all of

us knew those things. But I wanted these two principles to come from him in thepresence of the PM I then made my submission.

"Is our army so bad that it cannot kill unarmed civilians at a short range of 25 yards orso?" I said Sir, 42 bullets were fired in Multan and only two people were hit Where didthe other 40 bullets go? 43 bullets were fired in Anarkali Lahore and only two peoplewere hit where did the other bullets go? That clearly meant that the fire was not aimedto be effective.

The Generals sitting here are all with you but those who actually fire the bullets, theNCO or the soldier who is actually to shoot is not with you, that is, the Army isapparently obeying orders but in actuality they are not. That is tantamount todisobedience of orders. That shows a lapse of discipline revealing the fissure in the


Army It is the Army which is keeping this country intact. The day the fibre of thisArmy, breaks, India will overrun Pakistan. Therefore, please do not destroy this Army.Three Brigadiers have already cracked, the junior ranks are cracking now. So please gofor re-elections. You will win. Please do not let the cracks come in the Army."

Mr. Bhutto listened, and I believe this started him thinking. Perhaps he might havechanged his mind and gone for fresh elections, but his colleagues would not let ithappen. They had become a bad influence on him. Pirzada used to be very vocal againstany suggestion of re-elections. He seemed to be the deciding authority. Mr. Bhuttoasked me what would happen if after re-elections there was still agitation, and troopswere required to shoot.

I answered him that in that case they would shoot to incapacitate or kill. "They wouldnot fire in thebecause they would have the conviction that they were supporting thecorrect cause. Today that conviction is lacking. They knew that rigging was done andthere is no cause to shoot. In the case of re-elections, since the election would be underthe Judiciary and the Army, the conviction would be there that the elections were beingconducted freely, fairly, and without any prejudice because they would have done itthemselves. "I urged Mr. Bhutto to go for re-elections, also raising the issue ofaccountability. I said that conditions in the country were very bad. People responsiblefor bringing the country's conditions up to this pitch must be made accountable."

I sincerely wish that another witness to these events, Maulana Kausar Niazi, had givena fuller and clearer description in his book, Aur Line Kat Gayi, rather than just sayingthat Gen Chishti said in a harsh tone to Maj Gen Abdullah Malik that political mattersshould be solved politically.

From March 10, 1977 the Army had been provoked in all sorts of rude and crude waysbut the army had not reacted. It still had no plans except to support the government.But the government had only one mission i.e. to retain power. Unfortunately theopposition also had only one mission, i.e. to get rid of Mr. Bhutto. All otherconsiderations were subsidiary.

A Bill seeking to provide legitimacy for the rule of the PPP through a nation-widereferendum before the end of September 1977 was passed by the National Assembly onMay 16, 1977. The same day, in the COAS Conference attended by Corps Commandersand PSOs, it was argued that the Army was not for a referendum but for re-elections.Nobody except I knew that it was Gen Zia who had recommended a referendum to Mr.Bhutto. It was also generally assessed by the Army, Officers that the PNA Movementhad taken a new turn to become an anti Mr. Bhutto movement instead of an anti-PMmovement. There was no doubt in anybody's mind that rigging was done. (A full dressrehearsal in fact had been carried out in the 1975 elections in Azad Kashmir. Someofficers who had played a dubious role in the Azad Kashmir elections were posted by


me, as Military Secretary at GHQ, on orders from the COAS Gen Tikka Khan, to meetthe PM's requirements.)

I had never taken the stance either in the meetings with the PM or with the COAS thatthe National Assembly was an, unconstitutional body or that the PM wanted tointroduce thePresidential System of Government. I also never underrated the strengthof the PPP. It was not the PPP which people were fighting against. It was Mr. Bhuttowhom they did not want as the PM. They wanted fresh elections under the Army andJudiciary.

At this COAS Conference, on May 16, 1977, Gen. Zia told us that the PM would like tomeet us and get our views on the conditions prevailing in the country. We told him thatit was not normal and that it was for the COAS to give the Army's views to the PM.But Zia said that it was the PM's personal desire, so we agreed, to go. This first meetingwas followed by others.

The PM would always be there with his selected ministers Maulana Kausar Niazi,Abdul Hafiz Pirzada, Hanif Khan, Hamid Reza Gifiani, Gen Tikka Khan and Mir AfzaiKhan etc. Sometimes the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Naval Staff and the Chief of Air Staffwere also there. The PM would ask for our views, I starting from one end of the table.

At one of the first meetings, in early, May 1977, we expressed our views one by one,telling him bluntly that the general law and order, situation in the country was bad.There was a general lack of confidence in the government, and the atmosphere was socharged that its reversion to normal seemed unlikely unless the people were pacified bymeeting their demand for fresh elections. As far as we could assess the situation, if thegovernment had decided to go for re-elections, there was a one hundred percent chanceof winning the elections by a simple majority. Therefore we recommended that freshelections be ordered.

Abdul Hafiz Pirzada replied vehemently, saying "How can we have re-elections? Weare a democratically elected government. It is our right to form the government andstay in power. We will lose face, if we, go for re-elections. What are these generalstalking about? We have done no wrong. There should be no re-elections." Hanif Khan,after this outburst, said, "Aali Jah (Your Highness), we cannot have re-elections. Howcan this happen? It does not happen in a democratic country. It would mean anadmission of rigging and a sign of weakness. So it should not be done." Hamid RezaGillani also supported his colleagues.

We submitted to the PM that we were giving our considered opinion based on thesituation as it had been reported to us through our intelligence agencies in the field. Iftheir intelligence agencies were reporting correctly they too would know the truesituation. Our duty was to give our views based on the facts as 'reported to us. We


found that the truth was not acceptable to some of Mr. Bhutto's colleagues. Some ofthem would certainly have appreciated the fact that they had no chance of beingreelected, and would lose their ministerships.

Hamid Reza Gillani was once deputed to put the first question to the COAS. "General.you said you were with us; you would support the government fully and throughout,but now you are letting your Generals ask for re-elections." Gen Zia fumbled. GenArbab came to his rescue and explained that the entire command structure was beingaffected. Troops werenot accepting that rigging had not been done. Admiral Sharifused to give his views only occasionally. I do not think Air Chief Marshal Zulfiqar everexpressed his views at all.

It was explained to the PM that the generals were with him. It was the lower echelon ofthe Army which was not with him and was reluctant to fire because of lack ofconviction. That situation, if allowed to persist, would hit at the very fibre of the Army.So, in order to save the structure of the Army, it would have to take over because Mr.Bhutto wouldn't hand over power. All the generals sitting there may be sacked, but aslong as there was an army there would be a COAS, whatever rank he might be, perhapseven a captain, and he would do it. He would take over because the COAS could notaccept the destruction of the Army, risking the end of Pakistan. So he was requestedagain to consider re-elections as a solution to the impasse.

On May 26, the PNA announced its decision to resume negotiations with thegovernment. The PM was also for a dialogue without pre-conditions. He said an accordcould be reached if the PNA was ready for a package deal. Mr. Bhutto said that he wasnot going to act unconstitutionally or in a perverse political fashion. He would not be aGhulam Mohammad, who was not a politician and, therefore, dissolved the Assembly.He also did not want to become Iskander Mirza, who in spite of being a civilianPresident, had imposed Martial Law in the whole country. He would continue to makepolitical efforts. (Pakistan Times, May 26, 1977).

Apparently the PNA and the PPP seemed to be more fond of dialogues than timelyinitiatives. They had been locked in a series of inconclusive dialogues. (It was theunusually lengthy dialogues by Mr. Bhutto, even after agreement on basic points infavor of the PNA, that finally left no option to the COAS but to take over.) Mr. Bhuttowas in an acute dilemma. By the end of May. Mr. Bhutto waited the Army to takeoverto save himself from an ignoble and humiliating exit and the wrath of the people. Hewas himself preparing the way for it by using delay and confrontation tactics. On 30May Maulana Kausar Niazi disclosed that the government had decided to hold talkswith the opposition with an open mind.

Government and the PNA resumed negotiations on June 3, to defuse the politicalsituation: A two man subcommittee ---- one from the government and the other from


the PNA --- was constituted to work out details of a formula relating to "basic issues" ofdisagreement. After the seventh round of talks, it appeared that the results of thepackage deal between the government and the PNA could be decisive and positive. OnJune 4 the PPP and the PNA agreed to suspend processions and rallies. On 10 JuneGhulam Mustafa Khar came out in support of Bhutto. He declared that the oppositionwas out, to disintegrate the country. The PNA Movement was suspended when Mr.Bhutto agreed to hold fresh elections and began talks with the PNA leaders, to work outmodalities. This was not liked by the people because so many lives had been sacrificedand so much hatred of Mr. Bhutto had developed. People thought the talks were a trapto kill the PNA Movement. They were not in favor of talks with Mr. Bhutto. Theywanted to get rid of him and the PPP government and for that they were prepared tomake more sacrifices and undergo greater hardships.

As the talks dragged on, the people were getting impatient. Martial Law in Karachi,Hyderabad and Lahore was not good for the image of the Armed Forces. (On June 2 theHigh Court said it was not in order, and it was lifted on June 7, 1977)

Mr. Bhutto conceded in June to PNA longstanding demand to hold fresh generalelections to the National and Provincial Assemblies.

Even official spokesmen for the regime admitted the gravity of the situation. YahyaBakhtiar, the Attorney General, addressing the Supreme Court on June 8, 1977, in anappeal case, gave the following figures for casualties—and incidents during the PNAmovement from March 14 to May 27.

Men's processions 399

Women's processions 248

Lawyers' processions 92

Ulema's processions 80

Students' processions 648

Children's processions 57

Killed 241

Wounded 1198

Security Force Personnel Killed 9

Security Force Personnel Wounded 53

Incidents of riots and looting 162

Vehicles destroyed 1622

Government installations destroyed 18

Shops destroyed 47

Banks destroyed or damaged 58

Hotels destroyed or damaged 7

Cinema Houses destroyed or damaged 11

Offices destroyed or damaged 546

Railway bogies destroyed 32


There was no doubt that the figures given by the Attorney General were low. Accordingto Army, intelligence reports, the number killed was 300. About 80,000 had beenarrested for anti-government activities. Were those figures not good enough to indicatethat the 'people were against the government?

On June 16, Mr. Bhutto made a surprise statement in the National Assembly: 'Finalaccord between the government and the PNA would be signed only after my four-dayvisit to the Middle East". By June 17 when Mr. Bhutto left for Riyadh, the PNA leadersgot the feeling that the government was not keen or sincere on the parleys, and the PNAdecided that the government could not be trusted. Therefore whatever decision wasarrived at, it must be protected by constitutional guarantees.

Fears that the talks were a trap for the PNA were coming true. The PNA maintainedthat the government termed either legal or constitutional. If they did so then the PNAMovement would be an illegal movement. It would then also be an undemocraticmovement.

The nation was polarized between the PPP and the PNA supporters. Bouts ofuninhibited politicking were leading inexorably to a civil war fomented by Mr. Bhuttohimself, who made apparent preparations for civil war. Notably his appointment ofGhularn Mustafa Khar and procurement and distribution of arms. Mr. Khar said "Wewill repeat 1972 history". Sheikh Rashid said "We will burn Lahore to ashes". DrGhulam Hussain said "Nobody will escape our wrath and anger". Mr. Bhutto startedreorganizing FSF and police. Two months pay as 'good service pay' was given to policeas political bribe. That is why Gen Zia felt compelled to move and takeover.

People were not very hopeful of an agreement because arms licenses were being givento the PPP workers and many of the PNA workers were being arrested. Zia informed usthat intelligence reports indicated that the country was heading for a bloodbath on July5. With weapons distributed liberally to the PPP supporters, the Opposition-ledprocessions were to be fired upon, killing many and creating more tension. At the sametime, one of the plans of the PPP bosses was to have, the PPP-appointee MaulanaKausar Niazi (at the time Minister for Religious Affairs) assassinated then blame hismurder the "fanatical" PNA leaders who would be shot next, in revenge killings by therank and file PPP activists. Niazi himself later confirmed that his own party hadplanned his murder, so he decided on splitting with his former leader Mr. Bhutto andthe PPP.

After two weeks of the talks it became clear that Mr. Bhutto was buying time. Hisdetermination to stay in power by all means was not doubted by any one. He thoughtthat with the passage of time, people would lose interest in the movement. Then thesituation would automatically come under control. Yet when the PNA dropped thedemand for Mr. Bhutto's resignation, people showed their resentment. They wondered


how a demand be dropped by the PNA leaders. People had not forgotten Liaquat Bagh.massacre, Tajpura killings, 9 April Punjab Assembly area and 15 April Rattan Cinemaarea killings.

On June 27 Abdul Hafiz Pirzada said that the government would not receive the PNA'sdraft as it was not negotiable. Mr. Khar, Adviser to Mr. Bhutto had said "Elections orMovement, PPP was ready for both; ready to meet the challenge of any movement".(Pakistan Times 27-6-1977). Mufti Mahmood met Mr. Bhutto on June 28 and Mr. Bhuttoagreed that the PNA draft be given to Pirzada. On June 29, Mr. Bhutto and Mufti had ameeting. Mr. Bhutto promised to study the proposal. The PPP and the PNA would havea final meeting on July 1.

Pirzada and Prof Ghafoor had another meeting on June 30 to clarify certain points in thePNA draft. At Quetta, Bugti warned that there would be a mass movement if thegovernment and the PNA failed to reach an accord. Dr. Ghulam Hussain, SecretaryGeneral of PPP, said "Agitations attempt will be crushed firmly." (Pakistan Times, 30-6-1977)

The PNA, PPP teams met from 2000 on July 1 till 0630, July 2. Mr. Bhutto agreed to holdelections in October and to the creation of an Implementations Committee, with equalrepresentation from the PNA and the PPP. It was announced to the Press that thegovernment and the PNA had reached an accord on the modus operandi of the electionsand a final meeting would take place on July 3 but a few hours later the PNA denied it,though willing to continue negotiations. It raised 10 new points. This was the secondtime that such an announcement had been made. (It was first announced on June I4.)

In order to create an impression that Mr. Bhutto sincerely wanted to resolve the crisis,he conceded fresh polls. But he refused to give any constitutional basis to the accord.The PNA leaders insisted on constitutional protection for the accord. The PNA Councilmet on July 2 and decided that the Government's proposals could not be accepted forlack of constitutional-status to the accord. It said that, without constitutional authority,the Implementations Committee or the Supervisory Council were powerless to ensurethe implementation of its decisions.

The PNA Council met on July 3 again. Their lawyers were of the same opinion, andwhen the Council met. again in the evening, the consensus was that the Governmentproposals were unacceptable. Air Marshal Asghar Khan told the Press the same thing.At 2130 Mufti Mahmood, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and Prof Ghafoor met Mr.Bhutto and told him about the rejection of the Government proposals by the PNAcouncil. The PNA opted for continuing the movement because Mr. Bhutto did notaccept their demand for constitutional protection. He said he would give his reaction onJuly 4.


At about 9.30 in the evening on July 3, Maj Gen K M Arif took Maj Gen Riaz Khan andmyself in his car to meet Gen Zia in his residence. He had called us to give orders totake over the government. Gen Zia knew that the PNA and Government meeting was insession at that time. We discussed the situation and Gen Zia decided that he would givethe final orders after seeing the outcome of the meeting. We kept on waiting till themeeting was over. We came to know that Mr. Bhutto had said that he would let hisreaction be known on July 4. So we thought there was hope that an agreement wouldfinally be reached. All of us heaved a sigh of relief because there was now no need totake over yet.

Although arrangements were ready for the execution of OPERATION FAIRPLAY andthere were very good chances of the leakage of their plans, Gen Zia did not order thetakeover. This was simply because the Army did not want to do it. He risked his life bydelaying the takeover by 24 hours, because God alone knows what would havehappened if the plans had become known to the Government. We dispersed at about11.30 in the evening. I went back home and had a good night's sleep.

Mr. Bhutto held a press conference at 5 minutes past midnight on July 4. He said thatthe talks had virtually broken down and he could offer nothing more to the PNA. Butthe PM was willing to meet the PNA team again. He declared in the press conferencethat the question of reopening of accord reached between the government and the PNAon Saturday morning (2 July) did not arise. Mr. Bhutto also disclosed, that they hadraised 10 points because PNA Central Council was not willing to accept the agreement.

For the whole of July 4 there was no communication from Mr. Bhutto to the PNA. Itseemed the final agreement would not materialize because the ruling party was notsincere in honoring its commitments. Gen Zia summoned the three of us again as on 3rdJuly. He was waiting for a call from the PM, to go to him, in case he was required. Thecall did not come through, so Gen Zia asked the PM if he was required. The PM repliedthat there was no need for Gen Zia to meet him because "those bastards" were notcoming on the correct path, and he would have to deal with them differently. TheCOAS need not bother, he would take care of things himself. On hearing this, Gen Ziaordered me to execute OPERATION FAIRPLAY.

More than three weeks suspension of the PNA Movement, and the preparations Mr.Bhutto had made to deal with it in the event of the movement restarting had given himfresh confidence. He thought he had got over the difficult period. He thought that therefusal of Pir Pagaro, Mazari, Noorani and Asghar Khan to oppose the accord acceptedby the negotiating team (Mufti Mahmood, Nawabzada Nasrullah and Prof Ghafoor)would create a rift in the PNA and finally break it. So, he did not agree to further talks.Gen Zia had clearly, seen the risk and the danger in the talks dragging on for a monthand had prepared for the worst. Both sides claimed that the talks had succeeded and


both side accused each other of not signing an agreement. In fact: both had failed inevolving a workable. settlement.

Gen Zia took the initiative and ended the agony of the people. Mr. Bhutto held a PressConference at 2330 hours on July 4 and said that he was willing to meet the PNA teamon July 5. It was too late, since Gen Zia had already ordered the PM, who had originallycome into power through Martial Law to be removed by Martial Law. OPERATIONFAFRPLAY started at 0001 hours on July 5. By that time the newspapers had alreadybeen printed -- and they were still talking of the parleys.

"Government, PNA talks likely to resume today. Settled issues to be re-opened if newpoints raised. PM. warns PNA --- Ready, to sign agreed draft --- PM said his side hadalready given large concessions. If PNA comes up with new points PPP would do thesame. Nawabzada Nasrullah said no new points were raised by the PNA.".

Malik Wazir Ali former Secretary General PNA said. No agreement had been finalizedbetween the government and the PNA.......(Hurmat Volume II Number 25 of 2-9 June1983.)

The only pressure exerted on Gen Zia and us to stage a coup d'état came from the fastdeteriorating situation. We had pressed Gen Zia to convince the PM to agree to re-elections. The selection of date for the coup d'état was the prerogative of the COAS sincehe was to take over as an institution and not as. an individual. The Corps Commanderswere to obey his orders to save the country from going up in flames. Gen Zia was to dosomething which was punishable by death. Nobody would do such thing withoutcareful thinking. He would only do it when he thought it essential A general's job is torisk his life to save the country, and not to risk the country to save his life.

Gen Zia was lucky to have Maj Gen K M Arif as his lifelong confidante. He hadexperience as a Martial Law, Staff Officer, during Yahya's regime, and handled mattersefficiently.

A commander is responsible for whatever happens In his command and whatever doesnot happen in his command. He is answerable for both and cannot be absolved of theresponsibility, whatever the circumstances. Normally he has an assigned mission, butthere can be occasions when a Commander may be without a mission. This normallyhappens in higher command. Under such circumstances, a commander is theenvironment and the overall requirement.. Gen Zia did not, of course, have a missionfrom the Chief Executive to overthrow the Government. He invented it himself becauseof the prevailing conditions.

Had Mr. Bhutto signed the peace agreement with the PNA, there would have been nocoup d'état.


OPERATION FAIRPLAY was not planned overnight. It was one of the contingencyplans. I had no contact with any political leader. No guards were changed on the nightof the coup because there was no need. They were all under the command of the LocalBrigade Commander. Security of plans and security of the life of political leadersincluding the PM were the main problems. Information, regarding FAIRPLAY waspassed only to those commanders who had to take action. All the others were informedonly after its execution. Polarization between the PPP and the PNA was too serious amatter to ignore. Anybody could get anybody killed that night through infiltration, intothe troops executing the coup. There were many interested in getting the PM killed andmany, in getting the PNA leaders killed. An odd shot under the plea of firing in selfdefence would do the job. Just one recoilless rifle or tank shell, could instantly kill thePM and his entire family.

That was not our game. Our task was to separate the rival parties and to take thepolitical leaders into protective custody. The orders were given to a selected few andthe operation was carried out like lightning. No firing in self defence was allowedwithout my permission. I was available on the radio in case a decision was required. Asfar as the PM was concerned, I did not allow anyone to come within firing range of hisfamily or himself. The Prime Minister's house was sealed. Nobody was allowed to enterthe boundary wall or to go out of it without my permission. Tanks were available butwere not deployed at all. They were not even seen by anyone. Recoilless rifles wereissued only to the most trusted officers. They were not to be used without mypermission.

I have been blamed by some for not killing Mr. Bhutto on the night the Army took over.I have also been blamed by some for installing Gen Zia as the CMLA after thesuccessful execution of the coup. I have no regrets on both counts. They were bothnecessary. That was the only way to ensure the integrity of the country. If Gen Zia hadhesitated and waited a little longer, Pakistan might have become part of confederatedIndia. (Exposition of this point later. Some of the policies in operation even today areleading in that direction).

Only rather minor physical preparations were required for the execution ofOPERATION FAIRPLAY. The troops had been deployed for Internal Security dutiesfrom March 10, 1977. Additional requirements to forestall the 'Long March' on April 30had also been met from April 25. Removal of the troops from vulnerable points had notbeen allowed by the Government. If on April 30 the deployment ensured that nothingshould get into the Prime Minister's house, it could be used in the reverse order toensure that nothing moved out of the Prime Minister's house as well. That is preciselywhat was done.


Gen Zia did not come into power through a conspiracy. He was sucked in bycircumstances. And in the final analysis Mr. Bhutto was himself responsible forbringing Gen Zia to power. The Army had an unpleasant duty to perform. It facedmany problems from March 1977 to July 1977 but was patient and supported thegovernment in spite of provocation and hatred shown towards it. Mr. Bhutto had cometo the negotiating table with the PNA. Did he not know that if negotiations were notsuccessful, the Army would have to intervene, because it was Mr. Bhutto who got theArmy involved after imposing partial Martial Law? At that crucial time, if Mr. Bhuttohad had the political sagacity, he would have come to an agreement with the PNAleaders. Perhaps he wanted to do so but his very close associates would not let ithappen.

When the whole PNA leadership was incarcerated by Mr. Bhutto, the people not onlykept the movement alive, but also made heavy sacrifices to make it a success. Please tellme would anyone get himself crushed under a train only to remove Bhutto? Wouldanyone get himself killed by the bullets fired by the law, enforcing agencies or the armyjust to put PNA into power? Would anyone give his life to get the people in powerremoved? Why did people do all that? It was only for the Tehrik-i-Nizam-Mustafa. Themasses led and the leaders followed. The Government knew that the PNA movementwas not in the control of any leader or a party. It was street power which was leading it,and it was very difficult for the Government to control it. Thus the 1977 coup waslargely the result of Mr. Bhutto's personal weaknesses and political blunders. He shouldhave acted in his own better judgment rather than falling a prey to therecommendations of sycophants and toadies.

Coups d'état in Pakistan have always been regulated by the position of the generals inthe Armed Forces. It has always been led by the C-in-C Army or the COAS, and never asubordinate general or a junior officer. There is no chance of such a thing happening inthe near future either. The Army generals would not do it, and it is beyond thecapability of the Navy and the Air force to do so. In spite of the, fact that a seriouspolitical and administrative crisis was going on from March 7 to July 5, 1977, thegenerals kept away. Had they been ambitious or greedy for power, the month of Aprilwould have been most suitable, when ruthless killings had taken place in the country.

It has been alleged by some that even before the elections, the Army officers wereplotting to overthrow Mr. Bhutto. This is completely untrue. The Army supported Mr.Bhutto unconditionally from March 7 to July 4 1977 in spite of the fact that manyofficers had friends and relatives who had been brutalized by the excesses of the PPPregime, and that they were rightly resentful over the development of power in the FSFand the police.

The mass agitation had reached a stage when the Army had to decide whether it shouldcontinue to be barrier against the masses and get destroyed in the clashes with the


masses or to remove Mr. Bhutto. Mr. Bhutto who had rigged the elections and there wasa nationwide agitation against him in which about 300 got killed had been warnedmany times not to let the Army the wall between Pakistan and India be destroyed. Thecracks had already begun with the resignations of three Brigadiers. The Army decidedfinally on whatever was in favor of the masses, as well as of the Army as anorganization Mr. Bhutto was ousted without firing a bullet.

The disorder in the streets and Mr. Bhutto's orders that the troops fire on demonstratorswere at the time opposed by many field officers. They shirked at shooting theircountrymen. The troops were not firing accurately and effectively. With the fibre of theArmy being steadily destroyed, it was heading towards a split and disobedience.

When the situation became aggravated, the Army had to choose to maintain the PPPgovernment or take over. Initially nobody was in favor of a takeover, but as time passedcontingency plans for a takeover had to be made. They were not launched till the Armygot sucked in and was really left with no other option. The generals had to risk theirlives to save the country. Gen Zia stepped forward as a champion of democracy. He hadto choose between Mr. Bhutto and the integrity of Pakistan. With the Army on the vergeof disintegration, he ordered the takeover. It was carried out with military precision.

Gen Zia's strength was that the Army generals were faithful to the country, and knewthat if there was a split in Army it would finish the country.

The responsibility for the revival of military rule was entirely due to the failure of thepolitical leaders both of the PPP and the PNA. The fight was for democracy. Historytells us that them human beings have never tolerated oppression violence injustice andtyranny for very long. Civil revolutions and coups d'état can only take place, andbecome successful when the local environments become a symbol of oppression andinjustice and the rulers start considering themselves lords or masters of human beings.Bhutto totally miscalculated the nature and extent of the PNA's agitation. The PNA isequally to be blamed with its hybrid composition and lack of cohesion it did notprovide a viable alternative to the autocratic Bhutto regime. The PNA was united onlyfrom a negative standpoint in opposing Bhutto s rule. They had no positive policies tooffer. It is alleged that Gen Zia in his explanation of the situation to the political leadersstressed that troops should not be withdrawn from Baluchistan and that Hyderabad.Tribunal should not be dissolved. I do not know what he said because I was not presentin the briefing but by that time knowing Gen Zia fairly well I can say that he wouldhave uttered whatever was required of him by the PM. He was not the type who woulddiffer at will with the PM. If he was given the task to prove that the Army should bewithdrawn and Hyderabad Tribunal dissolved he would have argued it accordinglyand if he had been instructed to prove the contrary he would have also done it withease. However irrespective of this briefing the decisions required were of politicalnature and it was the duty of the political leaders to decide what to do and not of Gen


Zia the COAS. It is the political leaders who decide when to go to war the COAS isresponsible to decide on the professional angles of conduct of war so that the mission isaccomplished with minimum casualties to men and material.

It is quite wrong to say that the PNA and the PPP had come to an agreement and thatthe Army sabotaged it. From March 7 to July 4 was a long period. the Army supportedthe Government. Mr. Bhutto used delaying tactics till the Army took Over. He wanted itbecause he did not want to suffer a political setback.

The question generally asked is why did Zia stage his coup when Mr. Bhutto had saidon the morning of July 4 that he was willing to discuss those ten new points, and if thePNA wanted they could come on the morning of July 5 to sign the agreement? Was it aresponse to the situation prevailing at that time, or was it a calculated move to seizepower? One would like to counter-question here. Was it Gen Zia or the Generals whowere controlling both the parties and not letting them come to an agreement so that theArmy could take over? Was a four month-long period not enough to finalize the detailsof fresh elections? The situation was actually very simple. Mr. Bhutto did not want togive up power while the PNA leaders knew that they were not capable of forming agovernment. They were all potential Prime Ministers nine of them.

Zia saw no realistic prospects of a compromise between the PPP and the PNA, becauseof their mutual distrust and lack of faith. The decision not to take over on the night ofJuly 3/4 was due to lingering hopes of a compromise. But they soon disappeared on thefollowing day when the intentions of Mr. Bhutto became crystal clear. Postponement ofthe decision to take over on July 4 rebuts the myth that Ghulam Ishaq Khan had toldGen Zia that Mr. Bhutto was to remove him from command. Gen Zia had given his bestto Mr. Bhutto from March 7 to July 5. It was Mr. Bhutto who let down Gen Zia and notGen Zia who let Bhutto down.

Gen Zia. appeared to be the perfect choice of a military leader. He agreed with all of us,the Corps Commanders, not to interfere with the civilian political system. We were allwithout exception reluctant up to the last minute of decision to move against Mr.Bhutto. During the many Cabinet meetings, attended by the Corps Commanders, it wasmade abundantly clear to Mr. Bhutto that if the law and order situation did not improveand if he did not go for re-election, the Army would have no option but to take over. Itwas not expected of Mr. Bhutto to hand over power to the Army voluntarily becausethat would have meant his political death. Ever since then, Mr. Bhutto's ministers havenever told the truth in their versions of what happened. They have instead, displayed asingular lack of moral courage by not recommending fresh elections to the PM, sayingthat the PPP would win. In the background, there was always the option of the Armytakeover to which the PM had once referred: "Take over whenever you want to, I willnever hand over. I am a politician."


Mr. Bhutto was playing for time during negotiations. Perhaps he would have let civilwar take over the country, but Gen Zia took over in time to avoid it.

The Army took over as champions of democracy. It could have kept its credibility if theCMLA had not slipped. He claimed to be all for re-elections and restoration ofdemocracy. All planning, prior to 5 July was directed towards that. We were certain ofaccomplishment of this task through Gen Zia who was all for it for the love of theintegrity of the Army and the country. At take over it was well appreciated by all of usthat in case of re-elections PPP would win. It was with this conviction that we used totell Mr. Bhutto to go along with the wishes of the people without any worry. Our rolewas going to be that of a referee. So anybody thinking that the elections were postponedbecause of the fear of PPP winning them and coming back to power is wrong.Unfortunately, Zia fell into the trap of sycophants and advisors like A K Brohi,Sharifuddin Pirzada, the Egyptian Dr Saad Gabr, the Jordanian Dr. Dualbi, Ali AhmedTalpur, Justice Cheema and above all Col Siddiq Salik.

I was of the opinion that Army intervention was acceptable as a necessary evil. But theArmy was not trained to rule. Its rule should never have been perpetuated.

These are some points from Gen Zia's first speech:

a. " .......This changeover started at midnight last night and was concludedthis morning. Grateful to God that it was successful peacefully. All thisaction was done on my orders.....

b. I understand it in my heart that the existence of this country is indemocracy and democracy only. That is why under provocativecircumstances and different political pressures the Armed Forces avoideda takeover during the present agitational events. It has been the effort andthe desire of the Armed Forces that some political solution be found to thepolitical crisis. In view of this object, the Armed Forces of Pakistan many atime put pressure on the Government that it should come to a solutionwith its political opponents through negotiations. Time was required forthis which the Armed Forces provided by maintaining law and order......

c. The Constitution has not been abrogated....President Fazal Elahi Chaudhrihas agreed to continue as President for which I am grateful. He willcontinue acting as Head of State.

d. A Military Council has been constituted to help him in solving importantnational problems. It will comprise CJCSC, COAS, CNS and CAS. I willact as COAS and CMLA.


e. I had to come only to fill the vacuum which has been created by thepoliticians. I have accepted this challenge only as a soldier of Islam. Myonly objective is to have elections conducted fairly and judiciously, whichwill take place in October this year. My next three months will be devotedonly to election work.

f. The FSF will be re-organized.

Concluding, Gen Zia said, ": I must say that the 'spirit of Islam demonstrated during therecent movement, was commendable. It proves that Pakistan, which was created in thename of Islam, will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. This is why I considerthe introduction of an Islamic System as an essential pre-requisite for the country."

Although this point was never discussed in any of the Corps Commanders meetings, itdid not alarm us because on becoming COAS he had given the motto of Taqwa, Eimanand Jehad-Fi-Sabeel Allah (Piety, Faith and Combat in the, name of God) to the Army. Weknew that he had a pronounced bent towards religion, but never to the extent offanaticism. The introduction of this point into the political speech may have been at thebehest of someone else. Those present when the speech was being written may be ableto throw more light on this point.

Gen Zia held his first press conference as the, CMLA on July 14, 1977 at NDCRawalpindi. Some of the important points he made were:

a. Pakistan was like a placid lake up to March 6, 1977, but on March 7,immediately after the elections, a tornado came up. Agitation anddemonstrations started. Arson, looting, murder became so common thatcivil law enforcing agencies could not control it and the Army had to becalled in to discharge its constitutional duty. It was the Army's sinceredesire to set a tradition that it would not get involved in politics and thatpolitical matters be resolved by politicians. The CJCSC, the COAS the CNSand the CAS stressed to the Government that the matter should beresolved politically. (My experience, was that they seldom spoke in thecabinet meetings. However, they might have given their views some othertime.) Accordingly they issued a statement voluntarily to strengthen thehands of the Government and to make the PNA believe that the ArmedForces were, with the Government, so that they did not think of leaningon the Armed Forces. (That statement was prepared by Gen Tikka Khan,and released to the press. The Service Chiefs had no option but to own, it.)

b. The Army was not a democratic organization. But consultations did takeplace in the Army and everybody was consulted. The Army was unitedfrom the ordinary soldier to the very top. The operation, though, took


place on one person's orders. Therefore, as far as the Army wasconcerned, in that emergency, the final decision to take over and stage acoup was his own. He knew Article 6 of the Constitution. He took actionfully realizing the consequences. He said, "If my action proves treason myneck is available."

c. After reading Nawabzada Nasrullah's statement on July 4, Gen Ziaappreciated that there was no scope for an agreement between theGovernment and the Opposition and if no action was taken the countrywould be plunged into a blood bath. So he decided to act.

d. It was normal to foresee and prepare plans in advance. A few days beforeit was decided to take action, if necessary the code word 'FAIRPLAY' wasallotted to the operation.

e. The profession of Arms also taught respect, so every leader was salutedbefore being taken into custody, and not only Air Marshal Asghar Khan,as reported. Initially nine political leaders were taken into custody fromeach of the parties, i.e. the PPP and the PNA. Thereafter one was releasedfrom each side, Hamid Reza Gillani from the PPP (this was done at therequest of Maj Gen Syed Saghir Hussain, MS to the President) and Pir -Pagara, on his own (2330 hours July 5, 1977.)

f. The other leaders would be released after one or two weeks. Politicalactivity would be allowed, but not processions.

g. Why should he hang two or four leaders here and there? That was for thepeople to decide.

h. He look over when he was certain that there would be no agreementbetween the Government and the Opposition and there was clear dangerof civil war, because enough arms and weapons had been distributedamongst the supporters of the parties.

He went on to state:

"I am heading an interim Government. I believe in democracy. We have not come to stayin power. We have come to power , General Elections will be held on October 18, 1977. Ihave given a vow to the nation and by God I will do my best to fulfill it.

Who am I to decide whether the results of the General Elections are good or bad? We willabide by the verdict given by the people."


Narrating the sequence of events leading to the Army takeover in 1977, Gen Zia stated:-

1. On March 10, 1977 the PNA boycotted Provincial Elections. So we had a seniorofficers' meeting in Rawalpindi and examined all angles. One of the plansconsidered was a takeover. All the officers agreed that we should avoid a takeoveruntil forced to as a last resort.

2. After April 21, three cities were under the Army. In the first week of May, theenvironment took a new turn when bullets were fired in Anarkali, Lahore. ThreeBrigadiers were perturbed. They asked for a posting out, which I did.

3. During the first fortnight of May, another important meeting of CorpsCommanders took place. We decided to impress upon Mr. Bhutto the necessity oftaking a political decision.

4. In the first fortnight of June, we realized that the Government was not sincere inits negotiations. So in mid-June an important meeting of important officers washeld in the COAS's house.

I laid out all the details in front of the Corps Commanders at dinner time. All ofus decided that the operation to take over seemed inevitable, but the politicalparties should be given more time. If the political problem was solved amicably,the Army's headache would be over If events aggravated the situation, then theArmy should take over. That night the code word 'FAIRPLAY' was given to thisoperation.

5. In the last week of June, I decided that Mr. Bhutto's Government should befinished. OPERATION FAIRPLAY was planned in my house.

6. It was decided that the date and time of the OPERATION FAIRPLAY would befixed by the COAS. We kept it to ourselves and even the CGS was not told. Mystaff officers also did not know about it

7. In the last days of June, Mr. Bhutto started calling Generals to Cabinet meetings.

8. One night Khar and Pirzada said, "The Opposition is not stopping itsmischief. We will kill all of them. Gen Tikka Khans tone was even harsher. Hesaid: "If ten to twenty thousand are killed for Pakistan it does not matter." Mr.Bhutto said, "See the mood of my ministers? What can I do except be with them?"

9. On the first and second of July, Mr. Bhutto stage-managed a drama ofnegotiations. On July 3, I anticipated real danger and I started exercisingtakeover.


10. Nasrullah's press conference at 5 pm, 8 pm call from PM that I will be called.l0:30pm I contacted PM. I was not required. So I issued orders.

11 I reached General Headquarters at 12 midnight and supervised the operation

12. When I met Mr. Bhutto at Murree on July 15 he mentioned that he anticipatedthe coup d'état. He said he also thought of dismissing me, but then changed hismind thinking it would be better to have a tried friend as the COAS rather than anew face.

It has been often wondered why Gen Zia announced elections within ninety days. Therewas no need to do so if he intended to postpone them later. Some people have gone tothe extent of saying that schedule was agreed upon with the PNA. Some even say thatthe PNA leaders had been meeting with the generals during the pre-Martial Lawdisturbance period. I do not know about others, but as far as I am concerned no politicalleader had ever met me in any capacity except Mian Abdullah who was a minister inthe PPP government and had come to my office when I was MS at GHQ. He had comewith a request to get a doctor who was related to him released. During the conversationhe mentioned that he had also joined the Pakistan Military Academy and had stayedthere for some time. Later I came to know that he had been drummed out of theAcademy. (His relative was not released because he had not completed his conscriptionperiod.) I met political leaders, as part of my duty, only after Martial Law. So the idea ofanyone suggesting to me, or any political leader suggesting through me, that MartialLaw should be invoked and elections be held within ninety days is ridiculous.

During our meetings of the Corps Commanders with the COAS in the chair, whenreviewing the law and order situation, we had given the consensus that if the situationso demanded the COAS may impose Martial Law, I but it should be of a temporarynature with only one objective. That objective would be to hold fair, and free elections.There were some Corps Commanders (Gen Arbab was one) who were of the view that

no time limit should be imposed. The elections might even be after ten years. Therewere some who had no opinion at all, or did not want to express their views lest theyoppose Gen Zia's mind. But I was very specific on this point, and said that theConstitution would be violated or even abrogated if the elections were not held withinninety days. There was no agreement on this till the final day.

On July 5 when Masood Nabi Noor was told to go to the radio station to announce thatMartial Law had been imposed, it was agreed by Gen Zia that elections would be heldwithin ninety days. The Constitution was to be held in abeyance. How the electionscame to be postponed later, is explained in another chapter.

There was a genuine desire to restore democracy within the period stipulated in theConstitution. Abrogation of the 1973 Constitution would have threatened the integrity


of Pakistan. There could be a risk of a Unilateral Declaration on Independence by anyprovince. The staying on of the President of Pakistan as the constitutional head, andnon-abrogation of the Constitution by having elections within ninety days wouldensure the integrity of Pakistan.

There was an unexpected crisis on July 5 when, on being informed of the coup, thePresident of Pakistan declared he would resign. I went to convince him to stay in officeIt was not simply a case of general talking to the President, because we already kneweach other well. (There had been along and close family relationship between PresidentChaudhri and my father in law who were friends and had both practiced as, lawyers.) Imanaged to convince the, President that the Armed Forces had every intention ofholding elections within ninety days, to restore full democracy, and that he should stayon as President. He agreed, and later that same evening Gen Zia broadcast that thePresident was staying in office. He remained President until September 1978, when Ziareplaced him.

The behavior of Gen Zia towards Mr. Bhutto from the time he ordered me to launchOPERATION FAIRPLAY has been a deeply controversial subject. Gen Zia had giveninstructions that all leaders who were taken into protective custody would be taken outof Rawalpindi-Islamabad at the first opportunity. Arrangements for theiraccommodation had to be made at Murree and Abbottabad. These were made in adiscreet manner so that the element of surprise was not lost. Generals Sawar, Fazle Haqand Akhtar, were to make administrative arrangements. Accommodation for the PMwas no problem, as he could be accommodated at any of the Government Housesavailable at Murree and Nathiagali. Gen Zia had given no specific instructions abouthim till the last moment. Perhaps he expected that accommodation would not berequired for him. On the last day, at the time of giving me the green signal to go aheadwith the operation, he ordered me to have the PM taken out of Rawalpindi the samenight, whereas the other leaders could be taken out the following day. So instructionswere given to Maj Gen M. Riaz Khan to escort the PM to Government House, Murree,the same night.

When I reached Gen Zia in his office at GHQ, he asked me about the progress of theoperation. I told him that orders had been given to take the leaders into protectivecustody and that detachments had gone out to perform the task. I told him that theprogress by each detachment commander would be reported to the headquarters'concerned by radio on the Command net. I was an out station on the Command net andwould be listening in and keep the COAS informed about the latest developments.Meanwhile the telephone bell of the Green Circuit rang, and Gen Zia picked up thetelephone. It was Mr. Bhutto on the line. He asked Gen Zia what was happening. GenZia told him that he had taken over and Mr. Bhutto was no longer the PM.Straightaway, without any pause or without any suspense or doubt, came the nextquestion: What were the orders for him? Gen Zia told him that very soon a general


would escort him to Murree, but his family would remain in the PM's house fromwhere they would be sent to Larkana in the morning. Mr. Bhutto asked Zia if he couldspend the night in the PM's house with his family, as his children had only joined himthat evening, and he could go to Murree in the morning Gen Zia, without anyhesitation, replied that he could do so.

This was against all the planning. Having taken the risk of an army takeover, it wasunsound to leave the PM in the House with all the infrastructure available to him. Hehad all the time and facilities available which he could use to his advantage. Themanner in which Mr. Bhutto broached the subject confirmed that he fully expected thetakeover by the Army. To me, Gen Zia's willingness to allow Mr. Bhutto to stay in hishouse confirmed he had nothing against him, and that Gen Zia was honest in hisdeclared aim of holding elections.

Mr. Bhutto had also asked in the same telephone call to Gen Zia, if he could retain hismilitary secretary and ADCs. Gen Zia said that they could stay with him as normal.That was also wrong on the part of Gen Zia. He should have straightaway withdrawnthe MS and ADCs so that the PM's couriers were reduced and his activities controlled.If Gen Zia had anything against Mr. Bhutto he would not have allowed these facilitiesto continue.

Letting Mr. Bhutto stay overnight and leaving the MS and ADCs with him weregestures of good faith or courtesy, but turned out to be mistakes. (It was reported by theIntelligence Agencies on the following day that a lot of documents were burnt withtheir help in the PM's house, during July 5. It was also reported that boxes full ofdocuments were carried from the PM's house to Larkana.)

This question of letting the MS and the ADCs stay with Mr. Bhutto was later discussedin the MLAs meeting, and the consensus was to withdraw these facilities. Gen Ziaordered their continuation, arguing that these facilities were allowed for a fortnightunder the existing rules. He was told that the rules were for normal circumstances; therules were redundant after OPERATION FAIRPLAY. Gen Zia did not agree. It was in asubsequent meeting that the MLAs forced Gen Zia to withdraw these facilities, whichMr. Bhutto availed of for about a fortnight or so. If Gen Zia's intention had been not tohold elections, he would certainly have withdrawn these facilities from the first day.Unless he was so clever that he was doing everything in an ultra-meticulous manner,which I doubt. It was lot in him, both mentally and morally. Zia was genuinely forelections and so were we, the Corps Commanders. Mr. Bhutto was given full courtesiesand respect.

Mr. Bhutto was later taken to Murree during the day, on July 5, 1977. He was receivedthere by Maj Gen Akhtar Abdul Rahman Khan who, in his letter (DO No. 2145/8/PAof July 7, 1977) wrote to me:


"As required, I received Mr. Z. A. Bhutto at the Government House in Murree on theevening of July 5, 1977. Mr. Bhutto seemed exhausted, worn-out with swollen red eyes..... I was there for nearly 30 minutes, as it took a long time for the tea to come.

... I concluded that Mr. Bhutto spoke well of Lt Gen Majid. Mr. Bhutto also remarked,"When I was to selecting the COAS, people also told me that Majid was very cleverperson, but this gentleman has proved to be the same". The gentleman referred in thesentence was obviously meant to be our present COAS.

The Prime Minister's security had, been my main worry and problem because therewere many who wanted him killed. My officer's and men's conduct had been so goodthat I find no words to praise them. They helped me to discharge my duties honorably

I should mention here that when Mr. Bhutto's staff officers were being reverted to theirunits, Gen Zia told me that nobody was prepared to accept Maj Gen Imtiaz, MS to thePrime Minister. Gen Zia told me that he was going to take administrative action againsthim and retire him from service. I objected to that, I said if he had done somethingwrong, he should be court-martialled. He was a good officer and I had posted him tothe Prime Minister after getting orders from Gen Tikka Khan, the then COAS. To thebest of my knowledge he had carried out his duties honestly and efficiently. He shouldnot be punished for mistakes which he had not committed. On that Gen Zia said, "Whatdo I do with him. No Corps Commander wants him." I requested Gen Zia to post MajGen Imtiaz to me and said that I would accept him any time. So, he was posted to me asForce Commander Northern Area. When the posting was, known to Gen Imtiaz, herequested that Gilgit did not suit him and could he be posted somewhere else.Consequently he was posted to Sialkot where he stayed for some time and, thereafter.retired from service.

When OPERATION FAIRPLAY was completed I went to General Headquarters toreport to Gen Zia accordingly I met Mosood Nabi Noor the Federal Secretary forInformation and Broadcasting there. He had been called from his house to write thenews bulletin to be broadcast on the radio. The bulletin was framed very quickly byGen Zia and his assistants and given to Mr. Noor. When he reached the radio station thenews had already started, so he could only get in broadcast towards the tail end of thenews that Martial Law had been invoked in Pakistan.

Security of plans and security of political leaders, both of the Government and the PNA,were my major problems. A premature leak of the operation would have resulted inmany deaths. So it had to be ensured that the plans were kept secret. Gen Zia hadwanted me to use tanks and recoilless rifles. Both of them it were not available inRawalpindi. They had to come either from Jhelum or from Kharian. I preferred Jhelum.


I was very lucky that I had a wonderful team of subordinate commanders, who did theneedful and the operation went off well.

When Gen Zia ordered me to take over and execute OPERATION FAIRPLAY, he maywell have feared for the security of his family in the event of an abortive coup. In anyevent Gen Zia's family was not in Pakistan on July 4/5 He had shifted his family to UKduring negotiations under the plea of his daughter's operation. Two sons and threedaughters along with his wife were all abroad. On the night of the coup my Corpsintelligence Chief told me that there was one 'Puma' helicopter ready to take off at shortnotice from Dhamial. It could have been for the PM or for Gen Zia but it was unlikely tohave been for the PM because he did not know what was happening, and secondly hewould not leave his family behind. In any case he had nothing at stake. It could havebeen for Gen Zia, because he had everything at stake. What would happen to him ifOPERATION FAIRPLAY had, failed? I recollected his last sentence to me after givingorders. 'Murshid, do not get me killed.' So I ordered my Intelligence Chief to keep an eyeon the helicopter and not let it take off. It did not matter, who the passenger was goingto be.

On the imposition of Martial Law, halwa (a sweet dish offered at celebrations) wascooked and distributed throughout the country. There was a great feeling of relief andthe day of deliverance was celebrated. The PNA announced that the July 5 coup was anoutcome of their efforts.

Gen Zia had given the names of the political leaders and some civil servants to be takeninto protective custody. These names were passed on to Brig Imtiaz Warraich for action.I was present in the Brigade Headquarters when Brig Imtiaz Warraich gave the ordersto the Detachment Commanders. Those orders included these points:

a. These orders-are from the COAS.

b. Political leaders will be treated with all respect which is their due asnational leaders.

c. No misbehavior will be accepted.

d. All leaders taken into protective custody and civil servants arrested willbe taken to the Officers' Mess at Chaklala where they would be providedrespectable boarding and lodging facilities.

e. Radio communications will be maintained throughout the Operation.

f. No firing is allowed. Use close combat techniques, etc. etc.


The orders regarding the PM's house were that it should be cordoned off. Nobodywould be allowed to get in or get out without the permission of Brig Warraich. TheCommanding Officer of the battalion on duty, at the PM's house was specially warnedthat there should be no premature leak. Nobody was to go and meet the PM. TheDetachment Commanders did not have any problems locating the leaders or takingthem into protective custody except Ghulam Mustafa Khar and Gen Tilcka Khan. Kharwas difficult to find, but the officers in charge managed it. Gen Tikka created a lot offuss. He refused to be taken into custody and challenged the orders of the COAS. Hetook the longest to come out of his residence, and only did so when he was firmlyrequested to cooperate.

Bhutto - Khar Split

Under the contingency plans to take over the government, in case there was nolikelihood of reaching an agreement between the Government and the PNA leaders, wewere required to take eight to ten political leaders, each of the PPP and the PNA, underprotective custody on orders from the COAS and accommodate them at safe andcomfortable places. Gen Zia did not want them to be kept at Islamabad or Rawalpindi.It was finally decided, that after the takeover Mr. Bhutto would be accommodated atGovernment House, Murree, the PPP leaders at Abbottabad in accommodation to bemade available by Lt Gen Sawar Khan and the PNA leaders at Murree througharrangements made by Maj Gen Akhthr Abdul Rahman Khan.

On July 5, 1977 all the leaders were escorted respectfully from the Corps Officers' MessChaklala, where they had been brought initially, to their respective residences atAbbottabad and Murree, except Mr. Bhutto who was taken directly from the PM'shouse, Rawalpindi to Government House Murree. After four or five days of their stay atAbbottabad something happened between G M Khar, Mumtaz Bhutto and HafeezPirzada, and there was an exchange of hot words. The exact nature of the matter wasnot conveyed to me, nor did I bother to find out because it was their private matter. ButKhar requested the local Martial Law Authority at Abbottabad for separateaccommodation, as he did not like to stay with the other PPP leaders. The matter wasdealt with by the local Martial Law Administrator to the satisfaction of the PPP leaders.Gen Zia visited Murree on July 15, 1977 to meet the PNA leaders and the former PrimeMinister Mr. Bhutto requested Gen Zia for the transfer of the PPP leaders, fromAbbottabad to Murree so that he could confer with them as and when required. This, hesaid, would also bring the PPP on par with the PNA, who had the advantage of stayingtogether and discussing and planning the steps to be taken for the forthcomingelections. Geri Zia told Mr. Bhutto that the sole purpose of the Army was to prepare thegrounds for fair and impartial elections. He would be pleased to shift the leaders fromAbbottabad to Murree. He ordered me to make the necessary arrangements for theirstay in Murree.


Maj Gen Akhtar Abdul Rahman, incharge of the administrative arrangements, informedme that he had made the arrangements and the PPP leaders could be moved to Murreeon July 16. Instructions were, issued accordingly to move them, in the afternoon afterlunch by car via Rawalpindi and not via Nathiagali, because the Abbottabad-Nathiagali-Murree road was not in a good condition and we could not take any risks.

In the late afternoon I received a wireless. message that Khar had requested an audiencewith Gen Zia, if possible, while passing through Rawalpindi. His, request was conveyedto Gen Zia who instructed me to see Khar. So I issued instructions that Khar be directedto the Officers' Mess at Chaklala where I would meet him in the evening.

When Khar, reached the mess he told me that he was a worried man and completelyupset because his wife was expecting a baby any day, that she, was in Rawalpindi, andthat he had no arrangements for her admission to any hospital or maternity home, inRawalpindi. He asked me if it was possible to do anything about it. I assured him that itshould not be a source of worry because arrangements could me made with theCombined Military Hospital.

He then asked me if it was possible for him to talk to his wife and, if allowed, to see her.He was told that being under protective custody he could not leave the Mess premisesto go and see her, but we could allow her to see him in the Mess, and that he could talkto her on the telephone from the Mess. He talked to his wife and asked her to see him inthe Mess. Thereafter I left the Mess, giving instructions that when she had seen her,husband for about an hour, he should be escorted to Murree after dinner.

After dinner Khar phoned me and asked for my permission to stay the night in theMess and go to Murree in the morning instead of travelling at night I allowed him that.Thereafter I did not see him on this particular occasion. When I reached my office in themorning I was informed through daily routine reports that Khar had left for Murree inthe morning. On reaching Murree he was accommodated along with his colleagues. theother PPP leaders.

The intelligence agencies reported to Gen Akhtar at Murree that a harsh conversationhad taken place between Mr. Bhutto and Khar as soon as Khar arrived after that nightstop at Rawalpindi. Mr. Bhutto accused Khar of being disloyal and suggested that hehad intentionally stayed back at Rawalpindi to join hands with the Martial, LawAuthorities to play a role against Mr. Bhutto, to weaken him and his party.

Mr. Bhutto asked Khar to look into his eyes and having looked intently into his eyes Mr.Bhutto said that he could see disloyalty and mischief in Mustafa Khar s eyes Mr. Bhuttosaid that Khar had become untrustworthy and unfaithful and could not be associated inany future secret planning of the PPP. He also mentioned the differences which hademerged between Khar and Hafeez Pirzada and Mumtaz Bhutto at Abbotabad. Mr.


Bhutto also said that although he had forgiven Khar over the differences which hadtaken place when Khar had defended the water rights of Punjab vis-a-vis the waterrequirements of Sindh, this collusion with the Martial Law Authorities would never beforgiven.

Khar tried his level best to explain the actual events but Mr. Bhutto would not listen. Noreconciliation, was possible. Whereas outwardly they, seemed on good terms, in theirhearts they retained a grudge against each other. The situation was further aggravatedwhen on July 24, 1977 Khar, appeared before the Lahore High Court Judge, Zaki ud DinPal, in Murree in connection with the illegal detention of Tari and Irshad. He deposed:

"Mr. Irshad Chaudhry and Mr. lftikhar Tari are my very close friends. When I fought theby-elections in Lahore constituency No.6, after leaving the People's Party Mian IftikharTari was in charge of my election campaign. These friends of mine had also left thePeople's Party because of their differences with Mr. Bhutto. Mian Iftakhar Tari andIrshad Chaudhry were arrested before election campaign. So we got their bail grantedfrom the High Court. In addition, bail before arrest in case of Chaudhry Irshad was alsoarranged from the court of Mr. Justice Mushtaq Hussain. Although High Court orderwas operative and bail before arrest had been arranged, even then they were arrested.When I came to know about their arrest and their removal to some unknown place Iapproached Mr. Anwar, Bar at Law to plead the case.

In my election, great irregularities and rigging took place so that I could be defeated Thepublic meeting in Tajpura was also illegally disrupted and a lot of people were killed.Different methods were used so that people may not be able to vote for me Provincialadministrative machinery of that time and National and Provincial Assembly Memberswere asked to bring bus loads of people from outside the constituency limits so that bogusvotes may be cast. At one polling station four hundred votes were cast in one hour.Whereas one vote takes about three minutes This is the biggest proof of a large scalerigging indulged in by the previous government.

I consulted my friends as to what shall I do when Chaudhiy lrshad and Iftikhar Tari wereillegally arrested from their homes. My friends suggested to me that I should withdrawmyself from politics for some time, otherwise my friends could face grave danger. At thattime I was told by the Central and Provincial Governments that they knew nothing aboutthe whereabouts of Irshad Chaudhry and Iftikhar Tari. Thus I was greatly disturbed. Iadopted silence because the courts were also helpless on this issue and the administrationhad also shown their ignorance.

After sometime Sheikh Hamid Mahmud, Chairman National Press Trust came to me andsaid he could help provided in view of the. overall political situation. I stop opposing theGovernment. It is pertinent to say that Sheikh Hamid Mahmud was a close friend of Mr.Masood Mahmood Director General, Federal Security Forces. I met when he asked me asto what was the guarantee that Irshad and Tari, if released, would keep quiet and would


not oppose the Government. I took the responsibility that lrshad. Tari and all ten totwelve close friends who were under detention, when released would keep quiet ....... Iasked Sheikh Hamid to take me to the place where they were detained. I assured him thatafter their release I would change my political stance. Then he asked me to sign a paper onwhich it was written that I had hidden the Dalai Camp detainees at my house ............ .Hesaid that he would also sign that paper so that no complications arose ....... I have its copywith me and another copy was with Barrister M. Anwar.

Mr. Hamid Mahinud again met me in the evening and said that it was impossible thatmy friends be released forthwith but they would be released after some period. Theirrelease got procrastinated and I felt that the Government did not want to release myfriends ... Time passed by and General Elections, period in March 1977 approached. Sometime before elections. Director General Federal Security Force Masood Mehmood met meand told me that if I did not take part in elections against the Government then myfriends would be released. He also wanted the assurance from me that in case I proceed toa foreign country even then in my absence the relatives of Tari and Irshad would notoppose the Government and after their release would not revert to the court against theirillegal detention. I assured Masud Mahmud that it would be like that. I called Tari's andIrshad's relatives and instructed them not to oppose the Government in my absence.

I left the country before the elections so that I did not have a confrontation with theGovernment and that I may save the lives of my friends ............ On my return Icontacted Mr. Masud Mahmud and asked him why my friends had not been released aspromised. He told me that as Pakistan National Alliance agitation was going on againstthe Government (because of rigging done in the General Elections) ..... Masud Mahmudthen gave clear indications that in order to save the lives of my friends I should join thePPP. So, for my friends. I destroyed my political career and joined the PPP.

On joining the PPP I delivered provocative speeches on the instruction from the partyHigh Command because the PPP workers were greatly demoralized due to the PNAmovement .............. I also wanted to establish my sincerity with the party.

After I was appointed an adviser to the Prime Minister. I met him and talked to himabout the release of my friends. He promised that they would be released soon.

My differences with Mr. Bhutto arose when I became the Governor of Punjab for the firsttime. They increased when I became Chief Minister of Punjab. They were regarding theadministrative rights of Punjab and National policies. When these differences becameintolerable I left the PPP.

It was true that when somebody showed political differences with Mr. Bhutto he used tobe jailed and based on his personal likes and dislikes, revengeful action used to be takenagainst political opponents but sometimes he also showed tolerance.


Mr. Bhutto had told me that he would release my friends by the end of June or in the firstweek of July. I had also talked once to Mr. Bhutto regarding Mr. Irshad's release whenhis father had died. Mr. Bhutto had not given any positive reply and had shown hisignorance regarding Irshad's detention........"

(Ref. Sahafat Vol II -No 29. 30 dated April 30, 1978 - May 7, 1978).

After this hearing the split turned into a rift and Mr. Bhutto and Mr. Khar were nevertogether again.


CHAPTER - FOURTHE MURDER TRIAL

Gen Zia called me to his house on Friday, September 2, 1977 and told me that he hadscheduled a quiet visit to Karachi. He was to take off at 11 am from PAF base Chaklalain the Falcon But he could not go because of an unforeseen commitment. He wanted meto go to Karachi and see Gen Arbab I was to go and tell him to arrest Mr. Bhutto I toldGen Zia that he could telephone that message if not on an ordinary telephone circuit atleast on the green line or with the help of a secrophone. He said that the message wasonly to be given verbally. Then he requested me to go by the Falcon aircraft which waswaiting for him at Chakiala I was also required to return by a scheduled domestic flighteither on Friday or Saturday as convenient to me. At the PAF base I told the BaseCommander that Gen Zia would not be going, instead I would be I was received at theDrigh Road Base in Karachi by Brig Syed Refaqat (later Lt Gen) who took me to Lt GenArbab s house I passed on Gen Zia's message and stayed with him for about two hours.During that time I also told him on my own to make sure that no physical harm wasdone to Mr. Bhutto I came back from Karachi the same evening. That same dayMusheer Pesh Imam had said that Mr. Bhutto should be tried, immediately on thegrounds that he had become PM illegally through a conspiracy.

On September 3, Mr. Bhutto was arrested on a charge of murder at Karachi. He wassent to Lahore under FIA by the Falcon. Mufti Mahmood demanded Mr. Bhutto's trial,and punishment if found guilty. Chaudhary Zahur Elahi demanded Islami Nizam andthe PPP's accountability. Hafiz Pirzada said that Chairman Bhutto's arrest would makeno difference.

It was the killing of the father of an estranged member of the PPP which led to Mr.Bhutto's trial and eventual hanging. Nawab Mohammad Ahmad Khan Kasuri waskilled on the night of November 10, 1974. Before the end of the same year his politicianson Ahmad Raza Kasuri registered an FIR (statement to police). naming the PM, Z. A.Bhutto. as the person suspected of commissioning the murder. Nothing was done.

But immediately after the coup on July 7, 1977, the widow of the Nawab applied to theMarital Law Government for justice. Ahmad Raza Kasuri requested that the case beheard by the Lahore High Court. The record was summoned from the Session Courtand the High Court asked the Advocate General if the Government had any intention totake this case out of cold storage and put up a challan (first report) against Mr. Bhutto.

The reply of the Advocate General Was significant. He said the Government wanted tobring the case to court to see justice done. Since the Advocate General could not replyon his own, he must have consulted the MLA Lt Gen Iqbal, who in turn would not have


acted without clearance from the CMLA Gen Zia. When the police, after investigations,charged Mr. Bhutto for commissioning the murder, it became a public matter. Therewere four coconspirators too in this case.

Gen Zia's legal advisers, that is. A K. Brohi and Sharifuddin Pirzada, would haveadvised him to proceed, with the case. The only staff office who could have been fullyin the picture at this stage was Maj Gen K.M Arif. the COS to the CMLA. All these keypeople, were to be out-of-turn, beneficiaries later on.

It has been claimed that it was on my suggestion that a White Paper was compiled andpublished on the discreditable activities of Mr. Bhutto's government, with the aim ofreducing his popularity. This is simply not true. Zia never consulted me on the WhitePaper. His main advisors on these issues were. Gen Arif (with his past Martial Lawexperience), A K Brohi and Sharifüddin Pirzada (as legal advisers), Gen Hassan (Chiefof National Security). Ghulam lshaq Khan (Secretary-General in Chief) and Siddiq Salik(his speech writer). I came into the picture only along with the other MLA's and CorpsCommanders, as a matter of routine.

It was in September 1977 that Gen Zia asked me to provide temporary officeaccommodation within my Corps HQ offices to Barristers Anwar and A K Brohi. Theywould sit there to examine some papers and meet some FIA officials and other people.The accommodation was found in the same barracks in which I had my main Corpsoffices, and was used by them for about ten days. Barristers Anwar and Brohi took teawith us two or three times during our Election Cell meetings during midmorning teabreaks along with other members of the Cell and our visitors, political or merely social.

I think it was in July 1978, when we were holding a session of the Election Cell, that Iwas, informed that the relatives of one of the four co-accused in the Kasuri case, alongwith their lawyer lrshad Qureshi wanted to see me. I asked I them to be brought in, asthe Election Cell policy was to meet everyone who asked, irrespective of position orstatus. I met them in the presence of other Election Cell members, Gen J S Mian, GenFarthan and Gen Ihsan.

They asked me what would happen to the co-accused if they told the truth in court.They had just obeyed the orders of the Director General of the Federal Security Force. Itold them to tell the truth fearlessly. as required by Islam, and to have faith in Allah Onthis, Gen Ihsan asked why they were worried, since Gen Ziaul-Haq had already givenan assurance to the prosecution that nothing would happen to any of them if they toldthe truth. Gen Ihsan also said that this pledge given by Zia was also known to the MLAGen lqbal, A K Brohi and the late Barrister Anwar, as well as the COAS Gen Arif. GenIhsan then asked them to go and tell the whole truth and not concoct anything. Therelatives of co-accused and their lawyer Irshad Qureshi were satisfied and went away.That is how I came to know more about this case.


I do not know what story Irshad Qureshi spun later on as far as the assurance given tothe co-accused was concerned. However, it would be clear to any lawyer, prosecutionor defence, that assurances are given only to the approvers and only by the competentlegal authority which in this case was the President, Gen Zia, or the Governor of Punjab,Gen Sawar. Anyone else's name mentioned is simply meaningless fiction.

On March 5, 1979 Hafiz Pirzada came to my office to see me about Mir Bhutto's fate. Itold him it was no use coming to me at that late stage, especially when he had alreadygone to Gen Arif and Gen Zia. Everything had been decided between the COS and theCMLA. It was too late now to take him to the CMLA. Lt Gen Shaukat Hassan hadearlier come, and I had told him to approach Gen Zia or Gen Sawar directly, becausethey were the only two authorities who could do anything. Out of the two, Gen Sawarwas the more important because if, as Governor, he had accepted the mercy appeal, thecase would never have gone to the President.

The speeding up of the stages by which Mr. Bhutto's mercy petition was processed hadsome very curious, and as yet unexplained, features. I have every reason to believe thatit was a plot between Zia and his newly appointed Governor of the Punjab, because allthe facts connect.

How, did it come about that the regular procedures were not followed in this case?Why was it that Gen Sawar Khan at once rejected the petition, sending it on to Zia post-haste? Why was everything done in such a hurry, with Mr. Bhutto hanged at night --itself against the manual? The Governor of the Punjab has the option to accept petitions.If he had done so, then the case would never, have gone further to the final source ofappeals, Zia.

Zia had first offered me the appointment of Punjab Governor. I made a free hand indeciding all cases a precondition of accepting the post. This may, well explain why GenZia did not choose me, but instead picked Sawar Khan.

When Mir Bhutto was finally hanged on April 4, 1979, and the media asked why the co-accused had also not been hanged. pressure built up on Gen Zia to make a decision. Inone of the MLAs-cum-Corps Commanders' meetings. Gen Sawar asked Gen Zia for hisdecision. Gen Zia replied he would have to hang them, as he could not help it. Ireminded Gen Zia of his undertaking given to the four co-accused, as known to methrough Gen Ihsan. I also asked him why they were to be hanged, since they had onlyobeyed orders, as employees.

Gen Sawar interjected that this was the first time that he was hearing all this. I toldSawar it was unbelievable that he did not know everything about the case, since he hadhimself dealt with it as the MLA and Governor of the province. He had rejected Mr.


Bhutto's mercy petition, had sent it post-haste to the President, had set aside jail rulesby hanging Mr. Bhutto at night. How come that he did not know the arrangements withthe co-accused? It was obvious that his plea of ignorance was hypocritical.

Sawar kept quiet, while Zia promised he would look into the matter. But he did nothonor his word. and hanged the unfortunate men.

I must add a postscript to this. I had gone with Gen Zia when he went to visit UAE. Wehad called on the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Mr. Bhutto's case was discussed withSheikh Nahyan. Gen Arbab and Brigadier Anwar ul Haq our ambassador were alsopresent. The Sheikh had said in categorical words that he was a friend of Pakistan, hasbeen a friend of Pakistan and would always be a friend of Pakistan. He expected GenZia to do what would be in the best interests of Pakistan. Then he had said that itshould be remembered that forgiveness was divine.

Zafar Iqbal Chaudhari told me that His Highness Sheikh Nahyan was in Pakistan whenthe judgment on Bhutto was to be announced. When the date was made known. SheikhNahyan asked Gen Zia not to get the judgment announced by the court when he was inPakistan. He requested that the date be changed and if it was not possible to change thedate then he would like to go back to his country because he would not like to be inPakistan when the judgment on Bhutto is announced. Gen Zia agreed that he would askthe court to delay the judgment. Gen Zia invited Sheikh Nahyan for dinner, which hedeclined. Then Gen Zia called on His Highness. After meeting Gen Zia. Sheikh ZayadBin Sultan Al Nahyan told Zafar Iqbal that he had told Gen Zia that he could negotiatewith an alive Bhutto and not a dead Bhutto. He had also told Gen Zia that a deadBhutto would haunt him and that life for life was a good motto, but in statecraft it hadalways happened that it was best to treat offenders lightly. He also urged that Mr.Bhutto had done a lot for Pakistan. Nahyan later gave his impression that Gen Ziawould hang Bhutto in spite of his assurances to him to spare his life. That, he said, hecould see in Gen Zia's eyes.

I had first gone to Abu Dhabi in 1970 as head of a delegation and had enjoyed thehospitality of Sheikh Nahyan when I worked for him for 12 days. He was even so kindthat he took me with him in his self driven Mercedes to the camel races and his studfarm. I gave him training and defence plans which he implemented. later on. I advisedhim on many matters and got some of his previous decisions changed. I worked for himas if I was a local ( I was supposed to do so because of our special relationship with AbuDhabi). We had no ambassador stationed at Abu Dhabi those days. Our ambassador atKuwait used to cover this area. Zafar Iqbal Chaudhry was our link with His HighnessSheikh Nahyan. That is how I came to know this efficient and thorough gentlemanZafar. We have been meeting each other since then. After the Martial Law in 1977Sheikh Nahyan requested Gen Zia to let me visit Abu Dhabi for a short period, in mypresence, at least on four occasions. Zia always said that he would let me go, but he


never gave me the opportunity to serve his Highness again. What could be the reasonsfor this, I cannot conceive.


CHAPTER - FIVEWAS I ZIA'S KEEPER?

Nationally and internationally two names were mentioned in connection with the coupd'état of July 5, 1977, General Zia-ul-Hãq and myself. Gen. Zia's name because hebecame the new Chief Executive of the country as the CMLA, and myself for being inRawalpindi as officer in charge of OPERATION FAIRPLAY. Immediately after the coupthe rumor was put about that it was like the Egyptian coup of 1952 where Gen Neguibwas the than in front, but the actual person behind the coup was Colonel Nasser. It wassaid that Gen Chishti was the real mover and Gen Zia was only a figurehead. This wasnot true, but the rumor suited Gen Zia who could use it to his advantage to apply thepower politics techniques as originated and preached by Kautilya.

Either Zia should have destroyed me or I should have destroyed Zia. I had no intentionof doing it because firstly it was not in my blood and secondly it would have destroyedPakistan, according to my strong convictions. I was there to protect Zia, so that thecountry survived. and not to destroy him. It was in this connection that I had said inone of my interviews that "Pakistan's survival lies in Zia's survival". I would like toexplain it further by reconstructing the actual scenario.

Gen Zia is' the CMLA, internationally recognized and accepted as Chief Executive ofPakistan. He is also the COAS. There is no Deputy CMLA or Deputy COAS. Whathappens in case Zia ceases to be the CMLA, either by a counter-coup or natural oraccidental death? (As long as Fazal Elahi Chaudhri was the President, we had aconstitutional head of state and there was no danger to the Federation of Pakistan, butthe situation changed. when he ceased to be the President and Gen Zia became thePresident as well.) So, if Gen Zia is dead who becomes the CMLA, i.e. the ChiefExecutive? (If there is a nominated Deputy CMLA he becomes the CMLA automaticallyas per traditions of service, but if there is no Deputy CMLA, then someone else has toassume that office.) It could be one of the four senior officers, viz Gen M Shariff,Admiral Sharif, Air Chief Marshal Zulfiqar or Lt Gen Iqbal. (The order of seniority ofthe Corps Commanders was Iqbal, Sawar, Arbab, Chishti and Hassan.) Granted thatthere is no difference of opinion on the assumption of the CMLA's office by any of theseofficers, the problem could arise when one of the following happens:

a. Some Khan Baba in the NWFP says, "We do not recognize Gen --- as theCMLA. We have had enough of it, we do not want to stay in theFederation. We unilaterally declare ourselves as independent and callourselves Pathanistan, or Greater Pushtunistan, or part of Afghanistan. Mr....... Khan is the new President." The USSR would recognize Greater


Pushtunistan in no time, and India would have followed suit. Thereafternobody could do anything to save United Pakistan.

OR

b. Some Baluchi tribal chief says, on the above lines, we are GreaterBaluchistan (including Iranian Baluchistan as well), and it is recognized bythe USSR and India

c. Some Sindhi wadera says, on the above lines, we are Sindhu Desh(including Indian Sindh)

The only way to forestall or preempt these eventualities was either to have a DeputyCMLA appointed or to pray for Gen Zia's life. This point I had discussed with Gen Ziaon board PIA when we were going to Saudi Arabia. Gen Hassan was also present. GenZia had agreed with this and had promised to nominate a Deputy CMLA. AdmiralSharif's name was recommended and Gen Zia had agreed, but the orders were neverissued. So, the other alternative of protecting Gen Zia's life remained operative.

Being stationed in Rawalpindi it was my duty to oversee that nothing happened to GenZia. My repetition of the importance of the appointment of a Deputy CMLA wasconstrued by many, including some journalists, as MY desire to be appointed to thatassignment. It could never be I knew my place. I was low down on the ladder (rankingfourth amongst the Lieutenant Generals). My job was simply to ensure that nobodyremoved Zia, and put the existence of the whole country in jeopardy. Nobody dared acoup against Zia while I was present in Rawalpindi. Gen Tajjamal tried it when I wasaway in Canada for a fortnight, but did not succeed.

There was much loose talk of Gen Chishti staging a coup against Zia. (Stories andtheories were deliberately fabricated by Lt Gen Akhtar DGJSI and his staff.) I went toGen Zia and told him that there was no truth in those rumors. I told him that althoughall guards at his office, his residence, at General Headquarters, at the Presidency, at theCMLA Secretariat as well as at other Generals' residences were under my command, yetthere was never any thought of removing Gen Zia. To me, as explained above, theremoval of Gen Zia by force would have meant the end of the Federation.

So, I offered my resignation to him duly typed, to be kept by him and to be used as andwhen he liked. I told him that I may be a poor man, but disloyalty was not in my blood.He hugged me and tore up my resignation and said that there never, was any doubt inhis mind about that coup business. I came back satisfied. But the backbiting continued.Many went to Gen Zia to poison his mind against me. He decided to make me ascapegoat and destroy me.


Because of the differences that I had with Gen Zia on professional Army matters and onmatters concerning the portfolios that he had allotted to me as a Federal Minister, wedid not get on well. He never liked my calling a spade a spade. Unfortunately orfortunately I could neither change my method of expression nor could I adapt myself todiplomacy. One thing was certain between Gen Zia and myself, that it was all only, upto March 30, 1980, when I was due to complete my four years' tenure as LieutenantGeneral. Thereafter I was to be at liberty to choose my own course of action.

Using the media to project me as undesirable, using all available resources and a topGeneral of the Pakistan Army trained in psychological warfare, Gen Zia continuedworking against me in a subtle manner, as part of a plan to destroy me. The modusoperandi adopted, by using all media available to them, was to try to establish that GenZia was innocent, that the coup d'etat had been planned and forced on him by me, that Iwas terribly against Mr. Bhutto and the PPP, that I was against bureaucrats, that I wasthe man behind the throne, that I was very rude and crude, that I was unreconcilableetc. etc.

One of these plans was to give an impression that I was an arch enemy of Mr. Bhutto sothat when Mr. Bhutto was to be hanged. someone would attempt to shoot me. This wasmade crystal clear by Gen Zia's remarks when I was finally leaving him, refusing to stayas Federal Minister after March 30, 1980. He said, "Do not be a bloody fool. Do not leavethe Government, otherwise some PPP fellow will stab you in Raja Bazar." I replied, "If ithas to happen that way, when I have done no wrong, the sooner it happens the better itis. My young children would learn how to live without me." Life and death are in God'shands.

The whole plan was designed by a general and then executed with the help of a FederalSecretary. (I am intentionally not disclosing the names) The day Mr. Bhutto is hanged, itshould be known all over Pakistan that Gen Chishti had gone to Rawalpindi jail andmanhandled Mr. Bhutto so that Gen Chishti becomes the most hated person by the PPP.That story was well spread, but got discredited because of my actions. I was warned bya bureaucrat well-wisher of mine not to be in Rawalpindi on the day of Mr. Bhutto'shanging. (This same bureaucrat was initially asked to implement the plan of spreadingthis rumor of my going to jail and manhandling Mr. Bhutto, but he had refused on theplea that he respected me.) Thereafter the second bureaucrat did the dirty work. Actingon my friend's advice, I left Rawalpindi for Gilgit, to inaugurate the Gilgit Radio Stationon April 2 and a bridge on April 3. Mr. Bhutto was to be hanged on April 3, i.e. thenight of April 2/3.

A little explanation regarding the movements of a Corps Commander may be useful tocomprehend this matter properly. A Corps Commander is at liberty to move in the areaof his command whenever he wishes to go and wherever he wishes to go. The COAS


does not have to be informed of his movements because It is all within the CorpsCommanders' area. Whenever a Corps Commander moves out of his area no sanction isrequired for such a move but the COAS is informed of the move.

So my movement did not have to be intimated to Gen Zia. In other words, he did notknow whether I was still in Rawalpindi on April 2 or I had moved out. He came toknow about it as the time of hanging Mr. Bhutto came closer. In the evening, when hecame to know that I was still in Gilgit, Zia talked to me on the telephone and asked mewhat I was doing there. I told him that I was in Gilgit to perform the openingceremonies of the Radio station and the bridge. He showed his annoyance by sayingthat an important event was to take place that evening and I should have been inRawalpindi. I told him that my presence in Rawalpindi was not necessary, because Iwas just a Corps Commander and not involved in any Martial Law Executive duties. Heinsisted that I should be definitely back by the following day, i.e. April 3. I told him thatI had to do the bridge opening ceremony and attend lunch. He said that I should leaveit to the Force Commander Northern Area and come back to Rawalpindi. We finallyagreed that after the opening ceremony of the bridge I would not stay for lunch, butwould return straight to Rawalpindi.

He did not have me in Rawalpindi on the night April 2/3, so, Gen Zia postponed thehanging of Mr. Bhutto. The reason given was that the weather was going to be so badaccording to the forecast that the C-130 would not have been able to take off with Mr.Bhutto's body to proceed to Larkana, or wherever it was required to be taken. (A C-130can operate under very adverse terrain and climatic conditions. Also the weatherforecast for Rawalpindi area and Larkana areas could not be the same.) It was just anexcuse. He wanted me back in Rawalpindi so that my supposed visit to Rawalpindi Jailcould be authenticated.

Some news reports show the time sequence:

Jang Karachi (22-3-1979): Corps Commander Lt Gen F A Chishti will inauguratethe Gilgit Radio Station on April 2 at Gilgit.......

Pakistan Times (22-3-1979): Two radio stations of the PBC have been completed atGilgit and Skardu in the Northern Area ........ The Gilgit station will beinaugurated on April 2 by Corps Commander Lt Gen F A Chishti and the Skardustation on April 16 by the Federal Minister Haji Faqir Mohammad Khan............

Pakistan Times (3-4-1979): (Gilgit April 2) CHISHTI OPENS GILGIT RADIOSTATION. Corps Commander Lt Gen F A Chishti inaugurated the Gilgit RadioStation this afternoon .......


Pakistan. Times (4-4-1979): (Gilgit 3 April) ,CHISHTJ OPENS ARCH BRIDGE INGILGIT. The Corps Commander Lt Gen F A Chishti today inaugurated a newlybuilt arch bridge constructed by FWO at Shah Batot on Gilgit Skardu Road inNorthern Areas. He paid tribute to the officers and jawans........

Gen Zia's game was to have me in Rawalpindi on the night Mr. Bhutto was to behanged, and my effort was to keep away from Rawalpindi. I knew Gen Zia could notpostpone the hanging again and again, and I was bent upon not being in Rawalpindi onthe day of the hanging. The rumor details had already been supplied down to theintelligence detachment levels, and were to be released with the news of Mr. Bhutto'shanging. It was to be rumored that Gen Chishtj went to Rawalpindi jail to get someconfession signed from Mr. Bhutto which he refused to do and as a result Gen Chishtimanhandled Mr. Bhutto etc.. etc. I would not be surprised if some officer did visit thejail and a story spread that it was Gen Chishti. Other versions were also spread. Oneversion which appeared in the Daily Express London, Monday, May 21, 1979 isreproduced below:

"WAS MR BHUTTO'S HANGING A COVER FOR MURDER?Exclusive by

ROBERT EDDISON

EX-PREMIER Mr. Bhutto was tortured to death in his cell. His "hanging" was acover-up, former Punjab. governor Mustafa Khar Claimed Yesterday.

He was kicked to death by an over-zealous brigadier who had been promised ageneral's baton if he could extract a Confession, said Khar. Pakistan PresidentGeneral Zia ordered hanging to go ahead as if he was still alive and theceremony was recorded by video cameras.

Mr. Khar, 41, a close friend and political adviser to General Zia, said he was toldof the cover-up by highly placed Pakistan Government officials who wereordered to stage it."

Mr. Khar fled to London last year after pressure had been brought on him to frameZulfikar Ali Bhutto for murder.

The officials told him that General. Zia summoned his top generals and corpscommanders to a secret meeting on April 3.

After agreeing that Mr. Bhutto should be hanged, Zia ordered Brigadier Rahat Latif,brother of a top policeman to extract handwritten "confession", from Mr. Bhutto beforehe died. Zia promised that success would mean a general's baton for him by mid-summer.


Mr. Bhutto was to admit ordering the murder of a onetime political opponent but hecontinually refused and two kicks killed him.

The Army officers panicked since his death had defeated their plan to hang him laterthat week. Zia ordered them to have his body carried to the gallows on a stretcher.

Gen Zia was hopeful that I would reach Rawalpindi by the evening of April 3, aspromised. I performed the opening Ceremony of the bridge and then left forRawalpindi by Puma helicopter. Brig Akram was the senior pilot. I had Brig ImtiazWarraich, the officer who had executed OPERATION FAIRPLAY, with me, along withsome other officers. (I had intentionally taken Brig Warraich with me out of Rawalpindi,because of his involvement, with FAIRPLAY. The other officer, Brig Aslam Shah, whowas my COS at that time, was already in Gilgit as Force Commander in the rank of aMaj Gen.) I landed at Chilas and spent about half an hour there meeting the locals.Thereafter we started our flight over the river Indus towards Pattan and Tarbella. Shortof Pattan I ordered the pilot to go back to Gilgit and not to proceed to Pattan orRawalpindi because of bad weather: it was dangerous flying through the gorge, I said. Ialso ordered him not to have any radio communications with Rawalpindi or Gilgit. MajGen Aslam Shah met me with worried looks when we landed back at Gilgit. I orderedhim not to have any radio or telephone communications with Rawalpindi till furtherorders. He passed on these orders and we were without communications tin I got themrestored at 9 pm.

The Aviation Base at Rawalpindi and my Corps Headquarters knew that I was on myway back to Rawalpindi by helicopter. They waited till about dusk then startedsearching for my helicopter, thinking that we might have crashed (I had alreadycrashed once on May 12 1972). They relaxed a little when contact was made at 9 pm butGen Zia's worry continued because I was not back in Rawalpindi. He talked to me onthe telephone at about 9 15 pm and wanted to know what had happened. I explained tohim that I could not come because of bad weather I explained I had tried but could notgo through the gorge. So he instructed me to leave early morning on April 4 and be inRawalpindi by midday I agreed I knew his game (I have said this also when he wasalive and it appeared in many newspapers and magazines This is not something whichI am narrating only after Zia's death.) I left Gilgit after breakfast and was on my way toRawalpindi when I told the pilot Brig Akram to listen to the National News on the radiowhenever there was a broadcast and let me know if there was anything important. Helistened to the news at 11 am and wrote the following on a piece of paper andforwarded it to me: "Mr. Bhutto has been hanged and buried at Larkana".

I passed on that chit to all officers about ten of them travelling with me. We were allmorose but we did not discuss it amongst ourselves.


The very same day rumors were afloat that Gen Chishti went to the jail andmanhandled Mr. Bhutto. How could this rumor be there all over Pakistan? Who had thefacilities to get it done? The PPP or the Government? Obviously the Government. Anews item of the period may be of interest here.

Mr. Bhutto was hanged to death in accordance with the law and was not torturedto death as claimed by Begum Nusrat Bhutto and Miss Benazir Bhutto in theirpress statements a spokesman of the Punjab Prisons Department said in Lahoreon Sunday.

Talking to 'Morning News' he denied the allegations that Mr. Bhutto was torturedto death on the night of April 3 and 4.

He said that the Provincial Home Secretary has issued an order to the ProvincialPrisons Department for the execution of Mr. Bhutto The Home Secretary'sexpress letter carried the following message:-

The condemned prisoner Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto s/o Sir Shahnawaz Bhuttoshould be hanged to death on April 4 at 2 am and relevant rules which debar thehanging at 2 am are hereby suspended (The Home Secretary could not haveissued these instructions without clearance from the Governor and MLA Lt GenSawar Khan).

If Begum Bhutto or anybody else had any doubts about the cause of death of Mr.Bhutto they could go and get the body examined by any number of doctors theyliked both Pakistani and foreign to know the cause of death which of coursewould be by breaking of the neck.

Pakistan Times (20-8-1979)

After my return from Gilgit I asked Major Gen K M Arif as to how things had gone inRawalpindi. He told me that when Mr. Bhutto was told at night that he was to behanged he collapsed (He had been told all the time by his advisers and colleagues thatthe Army dare not hang him. So the news naturally came to him as a shock).

The doctor was called to check if Mr. Bhutto was in good shape health wise so that hecould be hanged. The doctor gave him an injection after which Mr. Bhutto's conditionimproved. He refused to go on foot outside the cell. So he was carried on a stretcher.While being carried on a stretcher, said Arif, Mr. Bhutto was constantly popping hishead up to see where he was being carried. He was certain it was all a joke. But when hereached the site of the gallows Mr. Bhutto realized that he really was to be hanged.Then it was too late. He got up from the stretcher himself and with all courage walked


and climbed up the steps on his own offering himself to Tara Masih the executioner andsaid 'Finish it'.

Gen Zia in his fervor to destroy me and to carry out my character assassinationdiscarded the rule that loyalty was a two-way traffic, juniors towards seniors andseniors towards juniors. It was expected of him, as the COAS to protect the image of hissubordinates. He should have dispelled the impression among the public in the lowerranks of the Army as to the conduct of one of his senior generals by making acategorical statement that I was not in Rawalpindi from April 2 to 4. He did not do sobecause it was going to be counter-productive to his plans. He kept quiet on this issuefrom April 4, 1979 right up to his death on August 17, 1988. The Deputy COAS, GenIqbal also chose to keep quiet lest it annoyed his COAS. Gen Sawar Khan in his capacityas Governor Punjab had said:-

It is unethical to think that someone would have gone to the cell to torture Mr. Bhutto.

It can be argued that both Gen Zia and the PPP stood to gain by the rumors like this -Zia through my, getting the blame, and the PPP because they attracted more sympathyfor the "martyred" PM.

As far as the chain in Martial Law administration concerned, the responsible officerswere Lt Col Rafi, in charge of District Jail, Rawalpindi, above him Brig Rahat Latif,above him the Martial Law Administrator, Rawalpindi Division, Maj Gen SaghirHussain, and at the top was Lt Gen Sawar, MLA, Punjab.

None of these officers lost favor after April 1979. Lt Col Rafi was promoted and becamea military attaché abroad; Brig Rahat Latif was promoted to the rank of Maj, Gen, MajGen Saghir was promoted to the rank of Lt Gen, and even after his retirement was sentto Jordan as Pakistan's ambassador and Lt Gen Sawar Khan was promoted as the Vice-Chief of Army Staff.

Benazir Bhutto in her book Daughter of the East writes,. on page 9, "The jail authoritiesled us back through the jail ward, the courtyard filled with army tents." At this stage Iwould like to point out that the army personnel, if any, in the jail ward, were under BrigRabat Latif who was the Rawalpindi District Martial Law Administrator. I have alreadyexplained the chain of command. It had nothing to do with me, as far as Martial Lawduties were concerned. The troops were mine and available to me for operations, butfor Martial Law duties they were on loan to Lt Gen Sawar, the Martial LawAdministrator of Punjab. Now the question comes as to why Brig Rahat Latif wasSMLA Rawalpindi at this stage, and nobody else. Perhaps a little insight into this woulduncover some hidden plans.


As explained earlier, 111 Brigade located at Rawalpindi was one of my reserve brigades.It could be launched anywhere in my operational area at short notice. My operationalarea included Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas. The Brigade Commander thusmust be in full readiness at all times from the very first day of the assumption ofcommand. That led to the pre-requisite that 111 Brigade Commander should be anofficer who was well conversant with the area of operation. Any areas not known tohim must be seen by him at the first opportunity, and he must familiarize himself withthe plans. He could be sent anywhere, at any time, in Corps operational area. It waslocated at Rawalpindi, for ease of travel by helicopters and for no other reason.

It is customary that such a Brigade Commander is posted after the Corps Commander'sacceptance. Brigade Commander at the time of OPERATION FAIRPLAY, Brig ImtiazWarraich, had become my Chief of Staff. Since then, 111 Brigade's Commanders hadbeen changed at Gen Zia's whim and without taking me into confidence. He had beenusing his authority. When Brig Mumtaz Malik was posted as Brigade Commanderwithout consulting me, I had objected to Gen Zia on the principle that he should havetalked to me before his clearance for posting. He agreed, apologized and said that hewould consult me next time. (I had nothing against Brig Mumtaz Malik. He had beenmy student at the Command and Staff College, Quetta, and was in the Frontier Force,same as Gen Iqbal, Dy COAS. Presumably his loyalties were greater to Gen Iqbal thanto Gen Zia or me, but I do not think so, because Mumtaz was a straight-forward soldier.It could be that he was posted to my Brigade on Gen lqbal s advice I was only trying toestablish the time-honored principle of custom of service).

Next came Brig Mumtaz's posting to Abbottabad Gen Zia remembered his words andasked me to give the name of a Brigadier whom I would like to have in place of BrigMumtaz I recommended the name of Brig Mohammad Khan who was at the timecommanding a brigade at Skardu. He was thoroughly conversant with almost thewhole area of my corps, because of his service in those areas over a long span of time.He was a tough infantry commander who could stand the rigors of terrain andconnected difficulties. He was also completing his tenure of duty in a difficult area. Iasked Brig Mohammad Khan if he would like to come to Rawalpindi as Commander,111 Brigade. It would be tough for him, yet the choice would be his. He had also beenmy student at the command and Staff College, Quetta. He agreed.

I told Gen Zia about him and requested him to post him. I asked Gen Zia if I could tellBrig Mohammad Khan about it. Gen Zia allowed me to do so. I asked Gen Zia if I couldmove Brig Mohammad Khan to Rawalpindi, pending receipt of formal orders, as I wasto go abroad for about ten days, and I would like to brief him about the Operationaltasks so that he could attend to the preliminaries when I was away. Gen Zia agreed.

I moved Brig Mohammad Khan to Rawalpindi and briefed him about the plans before Ileft for my tour abroad. When I returned from my tour abroad after about twelve days,


I found that Brig Mohammad Khan had been literally shunted out of Rawalpindi and Idid not know anything about it. He had been dispatched in quick haste to Malir asLogistic Area Commander. Why was it done? Why could not Gen Zia wait for myreturn? Where was the lack of confidence? What was Gen Zia up to and throughwhom? Postings of senior officers were not carried out like that. What was theemergency? If there was any emergency, it was certainly not based on operationalrequirements, but could be on Internal Security requirements.

After dispatching Brig Mohammad Khan to Malir, Gen Zia had ordered Brig Rahat Latifto take over the command of 111 Brigade. I objected to Brig Latif's posting, I asked GenZia what Brig Mohammad Khan had done that he was sent off in a hurry and why hecould not wait for me. He had no sound reason to give. He overruled me. He was theChief. So it was soldiers of Brig Raliat Latif's command who were under tents in the jail.Brig Rahat Latif had at the time of his transfer been in GHQ performing the duties ofProvost Marshal of the Pakistan Army under Maj Gen Akhtar Abdul Rahman theAdjutant General. They had the entire Military Police under them. Both becamebeneficiaries of Gen Zia later on Brig Rahat Latif was promoted to the rank of MajorGeneral when he was not recommended for it. Maj. Gen Akhtar Abdul Rahman becamea four star general without even commanding a Corps but for Gen Zia that meantnothing. His requirements were different he had already previously promoted Maj GenK M Arif to the rank of a four star general without the command of a Division and aCorps. It was an unprecedented example perhaps fit for the Guinness Book of Record.

This is perhaps not the place to discuss these things Suffice it to say that Mr. Bhuttotook a dishonest decision to make Gen Zia the COAS against the recommendations ofthe outgoing COAS Gen Tikka Khan and Gen Zia broke all records by making everysecond decision a dishonest decision.

I would not bother about Rao Rashid's or someone else's opinion that I would haveknown everything happening under the Martial Law Administrators because it wasbeyond then comprehension. But I was surprised at Gen Tikka Khan's intellectualdishonesty when he said that being in Rawalpindi I knew everything and that I wouldhave known everything that was happening in Rawalpindi jail. That was certainly theheight of distortion of facts probably with nefarious intent I would like to ask him in allhonesty, did he as the COAS let me know, as Military Secretary, everything that washappening under CGS MGO QMG or AG when I was under his command? I was alsoin GHQ as they were. The answer is NO because I was not supposed to know.Similarly, as a Corps Commander located at Rawalpindi I only knew about the MartialLaw affairs to the extent that the CMLA wanted me to know. No more, no less. I wasnever directly in the chain of Martial Law Administration Command.

However, when Gen Zia in his good judgment thought that a task should be assigned tome outside the normal duties of command, it was allotted, to me, and I carried it out to


the best of my ability and dedication to the Pakistan Army. I never bothered to find outif it was because of greater confidence in me or because of the convenience of mypresence in Rawalpindi or both. For example:-

a. When Gen Zia was not confident of Gen Sawar or Maj Gen Fazle Haq'soperational control over Kohistan area in 1976 for internal security duties(when the locals had blockaded the areas of Chinese and PakistaniEngineers, on Karakoram Highway) he had placed that area under mycommand and I rapidly brought the situation under control. Gen TikkaKhan, Minister for State at the time, may remember that he was sent byMr. Bhutto to attend the briefings in the CGS Operations Room, GHQ.After restoration of normalcy the area was handed back to Lt Gen Sawar'scommand.

b. When it was a question of forestalling the PNA 'Long March' to the PrimeMinister's house, Zia deviated from the normal allotment ofresponsibilities and gave me the responsibility instead of Lt Gen GhulamHassan Khan and Gen Shah Rafi Alam. After the 'Long March' wasblocked successfully, responsibility was reverted to the original allotteecommander.

c. A military takeover should have been the responsibility of Gen GhulamHassan Khan, because Rawalpindi was his area of responsibility, but Ziaasked me to plan and execute OPERATION FAIRPLAY. After theoperation I was not a part of the Martial Law Administration. Nor wasGen Ghulam Hassan, because Martial Law Administrators had beenappointed, as always, by virtue of their presence in certain stations. Thenatural choice because of my location for my employment went towardsthe work in the Centre.

d. Gen Zia asked me to take charge again when he was in trouble inNovember 1979, when the US Embassy was set on fire. It was Gen Sawar'sarea of responsibility. However, I took charge and restored order.

e. When it was, a question of organizing the Extraordinary Session of theIslamic Foreign Ministers' Conference in January 1980. Zia ignored thenormal areas of responsibility and appointed me to organize it.

f. When it was a question of organizing the 12th Rabi-ul Awal Conference inFebruary 1980, he did the same.

I did not mind doing these things as required of me why this 4 April 1979 affair withoutme? Was it a sudden lack of confidence? Or was it because Zia was certain that I would


not do it? I leave it to the readers to judge. The fact remains that Brig Rahat Latif wasappointed 111 Brigade Commander at Rawalpindi against my wishes, was forced onme and later promoted even when he was not recommended. He must have donesomething out of the ordinary for Gen Zia. What could that be? Whatever that was, itwas surely in league with Lt Gen Sawar Khan, MLA Punjab.

Page 13 of Daughter of the East reads:-

"Rumors quickly began to circulate about my father's death. The hangman had gonemad. The pilot who had flown my father's body to Gharhi had become so agitated when hehad learned the identity of his cargo that he'd had to land his plane and have another pilotcalled in. The papers were full of other lurid details about my father's end. He had beentortured almost to death and with only the barest flicker of a pulse had been carried on astretcher to his hanging. Another persistent report claimed that my father had diedduring a fight in his cell. Military officers had tried to force him to sign a confession thathe had orchestrated the coup himself and invited Zia to take over the country. My fatherhad refused to sign the lies the regime needed to give it legitimacy."

Let us examine some points of this paragraph so that we derive the correct picture ofevents. A coup's legitimacy does not depend on the signatures of a deposed PM If thesignatures are so important and so desirable, are obtained at the time of the coup of thefirst day. The revolutionary disposal takes place. There was no need for getting anysignatures if at all anybody tried to get it at that belated stage. The legitimacy of thecoup had been established by:-

a Reaction of relief of the masses on July 5, 1977.

b The PPP acceptance of going to the polls on October 18 1977 under thesupervision of the Armed Forces and Judiciary, under the Martial LawGovernment.

c The Supreme Court Judgment on Begum Nusrat Bhutto's petition.

The second point that I would like to analyze concerns lurid rumors that Mr. Bhuttowas tortured in the cell. I do not think anybody did that If it was done it should bediscovered who did it and on whose orders. If they were simply rumors then whoinvented those rumors and to achieve what aims?

My name had been generally mentioned as the perpetrator in this connection. Whocould possibly, coin this rumor? It could be either the Government or the PPP i.e. eitherGen Zia or Begum Nusrat Bhutto (being heads of respective interests the governmentand the PPP


This rumor was rampant all over Pakistan on the morning of April 4 1979. Did the PPPhave such an infrastructure for dissemination of such propaganda that they couldspread this rumor all over Pakistan especially with Begum Nusrat Bhutto and BenazirBhutto in custody? Surely not. What advantage would—it--have given the PPP?Apparently no advantage. So it is unlikely that this rumor was spread by the PPP.

The other party was the government i.e., the CMLA Gen Zia had the resources tospread the rumor through his intelligence network. It was disseminated down to FieldIntelligence Unit levels that this information would be leaked out the day Mr. Bhuttowas hanged. To give credibility to this rumor Gen Chishti must be in Rawalpindi theday Mr. Bhutto was to be hanged (In spite of Gen Zia's efforts Gen Chishti was not inRawalpindi that day.) This is what Col Ghaffar Mehdi wrote.

Zia's saving that he had consulted his colleagues individually and collectivelyand special circles regarding Z. A. Bhutto's hanging will attain a graveimportance in history. It confirms the PPP s allegations that the hanging of ZABwas part of a political process. What was the need to give such a statement whenthe High Court and Supreme Court had given their judgments on this issue andMr. Bhutto had only appealed for mercy/clemency to the President. Whilegiving a decision on the mercy petition the Political Leader of the Country doesnot have the necessity to consult opposition leaders or leaders of party in powerbut his own heart and soul and use his intellectual powers to assess therighteousness of such a decision.

(Mashriq London June 5-11, 1985)

I do not know why Gen Zia did not allow Begum Nusrat Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto toaccompany Mr. Bhutto's body on April 4, 1979. Gen Zia had said many a time that Mr.Bhutto was being treated as a common man in the eyes of the law. The law states thatafter hanging, the body of the condemned person should be handed over to next of kin.So after hanging the body should have been handed over to Begum Nusrat Bhutto atRawalpindi a she was present there. If for some reason the body was not to be handedover to her at Rawalpindi, then she had to accompany her husband's body so that itwould be handed over to her at another, place. It was decided in the MLA's meetingthat both Begum Nusrat Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto would accompany the body in casethe PM was hanged.

The reasons for not doing so would certainly be known to the Martial LawAdministrator and Governor of Punjab Lt Gen Sawar Khan, the DMLA Maj Gen SyedSaghir Hussain, the SMLA Brig Rahat Latif, or even possibly to Lt Col Rafi, the COunder whose control the District Jail, Rawalpindi was and of course, to the COS toCMLA. Maj Gen K M Arif. The reasons were certainly not known to me. It came as ashock to me when I was told that the two ladies were not allowed to accompany Mr.Bhutto's body. I never thought that Gen Zia would stoop so low. It was un-Islamic and


also inhuman I asked him questions about this later, but his answer was "Murshid, thatchapter is closed."

It seemed that nobody really wanted Mr. Bhutto to live. The masses who rose againsthim in the PNA Movement were against him, the PPP party workers who thought hehad deviated from the party manifesto by aligning himself with the feudal landlordsand the rich did not want him, and even t PPP leaders on whom had kept secret fileswere not with him. Above all the silent majority which had suffered at the hands of theso-called PPP workers did not want him. Nobody was interested. There were evensome who used to tell Gen Zia openly that Mr. Bhutto should not be spared. They weregenerals, former ministers, political leaders, civil officials and oppressed relations of thedead or the missing, those whose whereabouts were not known. Someone asked me ata diplomatic party if Mr. Bhutto would be hanged. I replied that either Allah knows orrepresentative Gen Zia knows. Nobody else would know. But of one thing I was certainthat if people only rose to save his life, Gen Zia would not dare touch him.

I often used to imagine this scenario: I am on my way to my office in Chaklala. I reachthe bridge over the railway line: it is immediately opposite the District Jail Gate andnext to the District Courts. I have to go over the bridge to turn left to go to my office. Ifthere are twenty, only twenty people squatting on the bridge in front of the jail gatedemanding Mr. Bhutto's release, what would I do? Run over them? Would my escortjeep run over them? No, I would have to reverse and take the route which goes next toZia's house. If the road passing in front of the jail also has ten to twenty squatters, Iwould go straight to Zia's house and inform him of the situation. That would surelyproduce a lease of life for Mr. Bhutto.

But things did not happen that way. The PPP could not even produce fifty people todemonstrate. Apart from his family members, it seemed almost no one was interestedin saving Mr. Bhutto's life. Whether Gen Zia's action in rejecting the mercy appeal wascorrect or not is certainly debatable, but Mr. Bhutto's popularity as depicted by the PPPwas certainly not there. There could, therefore, be no brakes applied to Gen Zia'sactions. Appeals by foreign governments and rulers were in reality a mere formality (inGen Zia's words).

Mr. Bhutto had pinned his hopes on the landlords instead of the workers, on the richinstead of the silent poor. And they were the real murderers of Mr. Bhutto.


CHAPTER - SIXZIA : THE MAN FROM NOWHERE

Little was known about Zia even by his fellow officers when he took over as COAS in1976. He was in many respects a rather colorless personality, and in fact never becamepopular or much respected either in the ranks or by the officers. He must have beenvirtually unknown in the country as a whole.

Zia's manner was always that of a simple and unambitious soldier. He used to listenattentively, giving the impression that he agreed, but then went on to do exactly whathe wanted to do. Soon after Zia assumed the post of COAS, a policy of image-buildingon behalf of Zia began. It took the, form of deliberately building up his image as theaustere, pious man of simple tastes. It continued with greater zeal when he' became theCMLA. How far this was myth or reality is a matter of opinion. What is certain is thatthere were distortions of the truth.

Part of Zia's public image was that he, as a pious Muslim, had complete faith in Allah,and resigned himself to whatever was his fate. Actually he was constantly preoccupiedand worried about his life. He did not trust doctors, and refused to have his gall bladderattended to until he was physically helpless, and had to have an operation performedby Gen Mahmud ul Hassan.

Like Mr. Bhutto, Zia had a taste for dressing up in new uniforms. Soon after taking overunder Mr. Bhutto in 1976, Zia altered the ceremonial dress uniform of the PakistanArmy. Instead of the rather simple, smart uniform with a metallic crescent and starknown before, Zia introduced a gleaming white uniform, with a quantity of gold braidmaking it something of a laughing stock. The epaulettes of heavy gold braid were verygaudy, and proved unpopular with the officer corps as a whole, because they madeofficers look like hotel commissionaires, and some of them complained.

Zia never learned to trust people. That is why he retained power in his own hands,instead of delegating it. He never appointed any Deputy Chief Martial LawAdministrator, as has been the standard practice. I challenged him on this, saying it wasnecessary for the country to appoint someone, in case of an accident or sudden death,and suggested Gen Shariff or Lt Gen lqbal or another Senior Gen. He realized the needbut never appointed anybody. He was already the CMLA and the President of Pakistan,and had no sound reason to feel threatened by filling this appointment.

Zia had been sworn in as President on September 16, 1978. Within the Army, few hadexpected him to assume this post as well as that of CMLA and COAS. Gen Shariff andGen Zia were due to retire on March 1, 1979, on completion of their 3-year tenure. Gen


Shariff requested retirement with effect from January 1, 1979, and was allowed to retire.I recommended that Gen Zia become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee,and appoint someone else the Chief of Army Staff, according to seniority.

"I don't trust anybody," said Zia, claiming he would be. "at the mercy of the Chief ofArmy Staff'.

"You have forty generals in the army, and trust none of them? Then this country isdoomed!", I replied.

Of course, Zia continued "on extension" right up to his death in 1988.

He was certain that Pakistan's Army being a very disciplined force would nevermutiny, i.e. act against its own COAS. Removal of a PM is different compared toremoval of a service chief. Zia exploited this to his own advantage, and died in uniform.There was a clique which grew up around Zia. He had progressively altered the higherechelons of the Army, creating a "gang of four", with ties reinforced by marriagealliances.

Zia's son was married to Gen Rahimuddin's daughter.

Gen Akhtar's son was married to Gen Rahimuddin's daughter.

Gen Akhtar's other son was married to Gen Zahid Ali Akbar's daughter.

Gen Zia was the COAS, Gen Rahimuddin became the CJCSC, and was followed by GenAkhtar. Gen Zahid was chief of WAPDA (Water and Power Development Authority).

In addition to these key men, Zia also promoted some officer overdue for retirement(age-wise or service-wise) of all ranks, whom he later adopted as his blue-eyed boys.Zia's inner circle included three men who served as successive Federal Secretaries ofInformation and Broadcasting. These three were Masood Nabi Nur, Zahoor Azhar (likeZia an ex-student of St Stephen's College, Delhi) and Lt Gen Mujeeb ur Rehman . AsSecretaries of Information they exploited the Pakistan media to boost Zia's image.

After Zia became the COAS, there were changes in the set rules and proceduresfollowed to assure fitness for promotion of officers in the Pakistan Army. The ideal waspromotion on strict merit, with the basic principle being that no opinion was to be givenon officers who had not served under their command, or who were related. A fewsenior officers held out, but from 1980 there was no open discussion as before, betweengenerals as equals at Board meetings, taking an officer's service record into due account.It even happened that Majors were simply told by Zia that they were promoted,without following the usual procedures


Other changes were made by Zia too. In 1979 he suddenly announced at a meeting ofthe Corps Commanders.

"We are sending troops to Saudi Arabia. I have good news; Saudi Arabia has agreed weare to send troops, and we will be paid a lot of money."

I was amazed, and at the same time appalled.

"Who gave you permission? We are not mercenaries, after all. If they are sent, it willlead to the destruction of Pakistan's Army. You will see, it will breed discontent anddivisions within the Army. They must not be sent."

Zia was taken aback at this sharp reaction. He even abused me, complaining. "I havebeen working on it so hard, it almost killed me."

Of the Generals present, only Gen Fazle Haq supported me. We made a strong case, andblocked Zia project for a while. Pakistani troops did not go to Saudi Arabia as long as Istayed in service.

The impact of Saudi service was, as I foresaw, thoroughly harmful to the PakistaniArmy. Substantial benefits from enhanced salaries bred jealousies, disinterest in serviceoften grew after a tenure in Saudia and the Sunni-Shi'a rift opened up too.

There were many things wrong with the higher echelons of the Civil Service. Selectionwas far too narrowly based for the good of the service, or the country.

In the Foreign Service, there were many officers who had stayed in Islamabad andnever been posted abroad, and many who had been abroad in coveted postingscontinuously for 6, 9, 12 or more years. What could someone out of Pakistan for such along time know about his country?

These and other defects were really a result of favoritism and nepotism, and changeswere overdue. For the Foreign Service, Zia decided on a rationalization. Every officermust revert to Pakistan after a tenure of 3 to 5 years, before taking up another foreignposting.

Under Mr. Bhutto, there was, of course, lateral entry for his PPP nominees. Under Zia,senior most appointments often went to generals. Zia in effect inducted his party, theArmy, well and proper after 1980. But I did not let it happen even once, as long as Iremained minister in charge of the Establishment Division. Under me, all newappointments and promotions were done by strict rules and by merit.


The bureaucrats did not like postings away from comfortable cities where they werewell settled, for example from Punjab to Baluchistan. Within the Civil Service, therewere, of course, some who claimed they were being "victimized", and tried to getpoliticians, friends, and even Zia himself to intervene on their behalf.

On August 23, 1978, when the politicians were inducted into the cabinet, I gave up theministerships held. After I left the Establishment Division in 1978, Zia did not give itover to anyone else, but kept it in his own hands. I believe this was because I had servedas a check, but he wanted a free hand in any changes made. Zia's playing around withappointments did much to destroy Pakistan's institutions.

The numbers of generals and senior officers appointed to the highest posts in theForeign Service from 1978 was naturally deeply unpopular with the diplomats. As withthe Civil Service as a whole, Zia's playing around with his Armed Forces appointeeseffectively blocked their own chances of promotion.

Army Service rules retire personnel much earlier than civil. The question of finding arole for former army personnel retired around 50 years of age was not new. A certainproportion were regularly taken into the civil, to compensate for early retirement. ByService rules, a Brigadier retires at 52, or after completing 28 years service, whichever isearlier. With the Civil Service, the age is 60.

No officer at grade 20 or above would like someone blocking his promotion. Entry at anearlier age is fairer not blocking promotion at the top. Army captains entering the policeforce, for example, is fine, but when army colonels and brigadiers do it is bothinefficient (he does not know and is unlikely to learn the job quickly) and unfair tothose below the corresponding grade of seniority.

Zia also extended terms of service overall - he did not want to alienate senior officersand officials. Not only one year, but often considerably longer terms were given to hisfavorites as political bribes. It was basically a search for cheap popularity.

As Minister in charge of the Establishment. Division. I received a letter, from Gen Zia,the CMLA, ordering me to induct about twenty retired and serving officers of theArmed Forces to the civil services. I was upset on receipt of the letter because it wasentirely against the decided policy. Action through review boards was being taken thattime against the lateral entrants who had been inducted into service during the Bhuttoregime. This was towards the accountability process for which the elections had beenpostponed. Mr. Bhutto was blamed for destroying the institution of civil service ofPakistan, as it was said, by recruiting his own party-men into the civil service and nowGen Zia was going to do it. If the PPP was Mr. Bhutto's party, then the Armed Forceswere Gen Zia's party. Their induction to the civil service through lateral entry would beas grave an offence as committed by Mr. Bhutto, So I was not prepared to let it happen


and expose the CMLA to that criticism of the opponents. I rang up Gen Zia and fixed anappointment with him for Establishment Division work as usual, because I used to takedecisions from him on all appointments of grade 21 and above. I went to him and tookthat letter with me.

I showed him the letter and asked him if he could recognize the signatures. He asked,me if I did not recognize the signature. I confirmed the signatures were his own andtold him that by writing that letter he was going to commit the same offence as Mr.Bhutto had done, i.e. induction of his own party to the service in an illegal manner. Hetold me that the officers mentioned in the letter were all good and all deserving cases. Itold him that there were set procedures for induction of Armed Forces officers aspracticed in Mr. Bhutto's time also, and these should be followed and no short cutsshould be adopted. He hesitated a bit and then said that something should be doneabout them. I told him that the respective officers should follow the laid downprocedures and go through the Ministry of Defence. Only then could their cases,depending on the recommendations of the Ministry of Defence, be considered, Heasked me what would be the action on the letter written by him. I told him the bestplace for that letter was his office dustbin. He took that letter from me, tore it up andput it in the bin. I thanked him for that.

When Zia used to claim the Armed Forces as his constituency, I used to tell him that itcould not be. The Armed Forces represented the nation, which comprised Sindhis,Punjabis, Baluchis, Pathans, Kashmiris, Gilgitis, Baltis etc. The Armed Forcesrepresented the National Constituency.

Gen Zia's "mission" was dignified with many fine-sounding descriptions, but in realityhis mission was to save his own life, which necessarily involved, his staying in poweruntil his death. Zia was willing to hold free, party-based elections only when the peoplecame forward and were ready to give what Zia called "positive results" by which hemeant full agreement with his own ideas.

Zia's often quirky behavior and foibles were not only a nuisance, or a source ofamazement or amusement, but at times proved -positively dangerous. By his foolish,unconsidered actions, Zia had a part - which inevitably was hushed up - in the burningof the US embassy building in Islamabad, in November 1979. It all began with hisvanity.

United States Embassy Blaze

In the profession of arms, all our life and at all levels of command, we had been taughtnot to adopt cheap popularity measures, but to conduct ourselves with dignity andhonor commensurate with the rank and appointment held. Almost all of us in thegeneral rank abided by it. However, I observed something odd in Gen Zia which I had


not seen before either in any of my seniors or my colleagues. A Chief of Army Staff,whenever he went out on a visit, he would ask his Private Secretary accompanying himto carry some currency notes in sealed envelopes, some shirt lengths or suit lengthswrapped in packets, or at times some wrist watches to be given to the personnel of theunit ore institution to be visited. During his visit be would inspect the RegimentalQuarter Guard, sneak into the cook houses, canteen, welfare centre or wash and toiletrooms and at the end of the visit ask his Private Secretary to dish out the envelopes ofmoney, packets of cloth or watches to the other ranks and non-commissioned officersresponsible for the upkeep of the inspected outfit. The money so spent was never fromhis personal pocket.

As Military Secretary in the General Headquarters I asked him many times not to do it,but he would not stop. I asked him why he was doing it, but he never gave asatisfactory answer. He continued doing so even a Chief Martial Law Administratorand President of Pakistan, without any imposed restrictions on expenditure. This wasbeing done to become popular in the lower ranks of the Army. There was nobody tostop him in his pursuance of this policy of cheap popularity.

By November 1979 Gen Zia had many sycophants henchmen and intellectuallydishonest advisers around him who knew his weakness for gaining popularity, so thathe could even at the cost of corrupting discipline continue as a popular Chief Executiveof the country. Those lackeys advised him that he should do something which wouldprove to the masses that he was from them, believed in austerity, was leading a simplelife and that he was their well-wisher. In their opinion this could be very well achievedif Gen Zia would start going to his office on a bicycle and, if possible, visit Rawalpindion a bicycle. This would not only be appreciated by the people but would also cause alot of saving of petrol, which would ultimately mean saving of valuable foreignexchange, so much of which was required for the development of the country.

Gen Zia had a weakness that he could not say 'no' to any suggestion that might increasehis so-called popularity. So he agreed with the suggestions, and agreed to go to hisoffice, only about 500 yards from his residence, on bicycle and to visit Rawalpindi Townon a bicycle, duly planned but unannounced. When I came to know about it from hisPrivate Secretary, I requested Gen Zia not to do it as by doing so he would become alaughing stock. He would not agree. Then I explained to him, in my capacity asMinister for Petroleum and Natural Resources, that his riding a bicycle would not saveany petrol but, on the contrary, would consume more petrol and cost the exchequer alot more than going in the car, because many additional administrative measures wouldhave to be taken for his security. More foot constables would be required fordeployment and more civil clothed army personnel would have to be brought in fromdistant towns like Jhelum and Attock.


Gen Zia agreed with all that, but said that it was wonderful idea to go cycling as it wasgood for the health and that he would do it. He would even go to Raja Bazar on abicycle on one of those days. So on November 17, 1977, Gen Zia cycled down to hisoffice from his residence, discarding all protocol formalities. National Trust Papers,under, the advice of the Information Secretary, and other pro-government papers gavea lot of coverage to this event to-pamper Gen Zia. Encouraged with this, he ordered thathis visit to the local town on a bicycle should be planned for November 21, 1979.

November 21 turned out to be a bad day. There was sensational news that a band ofextreme religious zealots had already seized the Holy Kaaba. Gen Zia was advised notto pursue his plan of visiting the city on cycle. As the programme had not beenannounced it would not have made any difference, but Zia thought it was the day tocash in on the sentiments of people when their feelings were injured, like the rest of theMuslim world. The sycophants goaded him to go ahead. The local Sub-Martial LawAdministrator assured him that everything would remain under control, and thatnothing would go wrong. So Gen Zia, the Chief Martial Law Administrator, thePresident of Pakistan and Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army started his tour with anentourage of army officers, police officers, civil servants, aides-de-camp, sycophants,speech writers and journalists, some on foot and some on bicycles, towards Rawalpindicity.

Gen Zia surprised people when he rode a bicycle in the congested bazaars inRawalpindi cantonment and city without any of the traditional pomp and show. Therewas no cavalcade or pilots escorting the President. Apparently he had broken allsecurity measures, met the people and mixed with them. (Remember, this visit wasunannounced.) At Kamran market he told people that by doing so, i.e. riding a bicycle,he had no ulterior motives of gaining popularity or any political motives. Hedistributed several hundred bags of atta (wheat flour) and quilts among the poor. Heeven gave money to some people. At Fawara Chauk he recited Kalama-e-Tayeabahalong with the people, rode a jeep (discarded his bicycle) because of the rush of peopleand proceeded to Banni Chauk. There too he distributed atta, quilts, and Arabicprimers. He also visited Chauk Warris Khan, where he addressed a big crowd of peopleand said that he had heard the sad news of the unhappy incident of the seizure of theHoly Kaaba in Makah, expressed his deep concern over it and prayed for the success ofthe Muslims at that hour. Later he addressed the councilors at the Town Hail.

In all he had addressed the people at Kamran Market, Marir Hassan, Fawara Chauk,Barni Chauk and Warris Khan Chauk. At Warris Khan Chauk the police could not keepthe people at bay. Those closer to Gen Zia started shaking hands with him and somestarted asking questions. Some questions asked were about the situation prevailing atthe Holy Kaaba. Intentionally or inadvertently, Zia answered that according to someinternational radio transmissions, the Americans had inspired the attack on the HolyKaaba (In the morning some foreign radio broadcasts had broadly hinted at the


involvement of the United States of America in the occupation of the Holy Kaaba.)When the people heard this they cried "Allah O Akbar" (God is Great); "Down withAmerica", "Down with Imperialism", "Pakistan Zindabad" (Long live Pakistan), "GenZia-ul-Haq Zindabad" (Long live Gen Zla, Islam Zindabad" (Long live Islam), EmbassyChalo" (Let us go to the Embassy) and "Death to America."

There were. slogans raised that it was the same America which let us down in 1971,which did not help us and got us dismembered. The American Government was alackey of the Zionists; now they were up to mischief with Islam. When Gen Zia left, thecrowd started thinning out. and started moving towards Islamabad. Nothing coulddeter them. The local martial law and civil administrator thought that they hadachieved the results, i.e. enhancing Gen Zia's popularity. They failed to realize that afterlistening to Gen Zia, the excited crowd had started moving towards the United StatesEmbassy at Islamabad, which was totally dependent on the Pakistan Government forprotection.

For me November 21 was to be a long day. I had on my schedule, visits to myHeadquarters, my office at the Ministry of Labor, my office at the Ministry ofPetroleum. I also had to go to the Ministry of Information, because Gen Shahid was notavailable and I was also acting as Minister for Information and Broadcasting, to meetthe Editor of the Far Eastern Economic Review, in connection with the arrest of theirjournalist Salamat Ali. I had attended to my work at Headquarters and had gone to theMinistry of Labor, Manpower and Overseas Pakistanis, where I was sitting when myADC Capt Iftikhar Mahmood came to me and informed me that there was a lot ofsmoke in the atmosphere and perhaps something was on fire. I peeped through thewindow and saw a dense clod, d of smoke rising nearby. I asked my ADC to find outthe details.

Capt lftikhar came back after some time and told me that an excited and enraged crowdhad set one of the US Embassy buildings on fire because of supposed Americaninvolvement in the seizure of the Holy Kaaba, as reported by the internationalbroadcasts and confirmed by Gen Zia that morning at Warris Khan Chauk. Manypeople undoubtedly believed that the USA had inspired the attack on the Holy Kaaba.He also told me that it was rumored that a lot of diplomats were trapped in the buildingon fire, whose exit routes had been blocked by the mob. In addition he said that thePolice and Army contingents had reached the spot and were trying to bring thesituation under control. I ordered my ADC to inform the Ministry of Petroleum that Iwould not be visiting that office and to get the transport ready to proceed to theMinistry of Information and Broadcasting, so that the editor of the Far Eastern EconomicReview could meet me.

I reached the Ministry after a short while and asked them about the latest situation atthe Holy Kaaba. I was told that their information was that there Was no change in the


status quo. I then decided to talk to our ambassador at Jeddah. When the call was putthrough, he informed me that the Defence Attaché had gone to Makkah to find out theexact details as to what had happened so far, and that he would let me know as soon ashe heard from him on the telephone. I then attended to the requirement of the editor ofthe Far Eastern Economic Review regarding Salamat Ali, and told him that according tothe Chief Martial Law Administrator's instructions nothing could be done for hisrelease straightaway, but I assured him that I would discuss the matter with Gen Zia atmy next meeting. The editor was disappointed, but there was nothing more that I coulddo at that time. (I however later talked to Gen Zia and finally got him released.) After ashort while, before leaving the Ministry of Information, I again contacted ourambassador at Jeddah and I was told that our Defence Attaché had been arrested by theSaudi authorities.

As explained earlier, although . I had no direct responsibility as an administrator in anypart of Pakistan, and none whatsoever in Islamabad and Rawalpindi, yet I decided togo back to my Corps Headquarters to find out if more information was available there.There was no call and no additional information regarding the US Embassy, so itseemed that things were well under control.

At about three o'clock in the afternoon I was discussing Rawalpindi Medical Collegeaffairs with my younger brother, Dr Muhammad Sadiq Ali, Associate Professor ofSurgery (Whom I had withdrawn from Army. because of Gen Zia's breach of promise),when I received a call at my residence from Gen Zia. His voice and tone soundeddifferent. I still remember his word "Murshid, the American Embassy is burning, Thesituation is very bad. The mob is not allowing anybody to rescue the Americandiplomats. All will die of asphyxia or get burnt. Please take charge and do something."

I replied that I was very sorry to hear about the incident but that according to thecharter of duties it was the responsibility of Gen Sawar Khan, Martial LawAdministrator, Punjab, to deal with it. I told him that the Sub-Martial LawAdministrator, Rawalpindi, was under Gen Sawar, through Gen Saghir, and not underme. Gen Zia replied that they had all failed and again, implored, "Murshid, dosomething quick." I accepted the task, to save the lives on humanitarian grounds. Iassured him, that I would do my best to control the situation and save lives as orderedby the Chief of Army Staff, and not by the Chief Martial Law Administrator. Therefore Icontacted my Headquarters and ordered my Chief of Staff Brig (now Lt Gen) ImtiazWarraich to send armed men to the US Embassy as soon as possible, with orders tofight their way through to rescue the American diplomats before they got burnt or diedof asphyxia. The troops should be careful that while doing so our own men or civiliansshould not suffer any casualties.

Brig Imtiaz Warraich took charge and issued the necessary instructions according to theprevailing circumstances. Meanwhile I received a telephone call from the US


Ambassador, Arthur Hummel, requesting me to do something quick. (Perhaps Gen Ziahad told him that he had issued instructions to me to arrange the rescue.) I assured HisExcellency the Ambassador that I would do my best and that he should not worry. Thatby the way, was the first and last telephone call I ever received from an Ambassador atmy residence. The Ambassador also told me that there were about 90 people in the thirdfloor vault, a specially designed windowless, steel walled room about 20 feet by 30 feet.It also contained communications equipment, coding devices and an enormous safe.

When my troops reached the US Embassy premises at about four o'clock in theafternoon the rampage had continued for about seven hours. The toll of dead was anAmerican Marine, an American Army warrant officer, two Pakistani Embassy clerksand two rioters. One of the Embassy buildings was on fire. Some excited people werealso on the roof of the burning building.

The troops as instructed warned the crowd to give them, passage to the burningbuilding. Fortunately, the crowd behaved, and the troops reached the building. Becauseof the heat, the vault doors were jammed, and it had become almost impossible to takethe people out through the doors. The only alternative was to try through theventilators. One of the marines inside the vault had opened the hatch and made contactpossible. One by one the diplomats were evacuated onto the roof. From there through aladder they descended down to the ground.

When the evacuation process was going on at the US Embassy, Gen Zia called me to hisresidence to discuss some matters. I was sitting with him when my Chief of Staff, BrigWarraich, reported that all the trapped people had been safely evacuated. Gen Ziacongratulated me for this and thanked me for getting the evacuation done. That sameevening the US President Jimmy Carter rang up Gen Zia to thank him for saving thelives of, the Americans. He had also ordered the evacuation of non-essential embassypersonnel and dependents froth Pakistan. Thereupon some 400 Americans, mostlywives and children of US personnel; left Pakistan.

The funny part of this whole action was that Lt Gen (later Gen) Akhtar Abdul RahmanDGISI told Gen Zia that he had himself gone to the US Embassy with two or three of hisintelligence men in civilian clothes and had managed to get all the diplomats evacuatedthrough the ventilators. Gen Zia, as was his habit told Gen Akhtar that he had donewell. On that same day, the American Information Centre was also burnt by the moband some other American installations were damaged.

I was told later that Gen Zia had promised the Americans that he would get theembassy building reconstructed at Pakistan's cost. I have been told it was done at a costof Rs. 250 million. This was a fine or a penalty to the nation because its Chief Executivehad, after riding a bicycle to demonstrate austerity, made irresponsible remarksregarding US responsibility for the seizure of the Holy Kaaba.


Desire for a Clean Break

Zia seemed to want a clean break with Pakistan's past. He proposed that Pakistan'sIndependence Day of August 14, 1947, which happened to coincide with 27 Ramzanthat year, should be for all time changed to that date in the Islamic calendar. But theproposal was dropped when he found no support in the Cabinet.

At another Cabinet meeting, Zia produced a modified version of the national flag whichhad Arabic inscriptions on it. When he moved this idea, it was loudly praised by somemembers of the Cabinet. Though others kept quiet, nobody raised their voices to objectexcept Mahmood Ali and myself.

I said that: Pakistan's flag as approved by Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah shouldnot be and will not be changed for any other design. I am proud of the fact that I did notlet it happen. I argued and argued against those proposals until Zia dropped them. Ibelieve that Zia never reintroduced this subject even after my retirement in 1980because he realized that tampering with the national flag was not such a good idea afterall.

Under Zia, fastinig rules were made, more rigorous during the month of Ramadan,when dawn to dusk fasting is supposed to be followed by Muslims. Yet hypocrisy wasapparent in the arrangements followed. It was a case of one rule for the poor andanother for the rich - no punitive action against the well-off, including quite a fewgovernment officials, but harsh punishments for the poorer class of law offenderscaught taking forbidden pleasures.

Offstage, the mood was more relaxed. Even during Ramadan, luncheons continued tobe prepared in the kitchen of the CMLA building in Rawalpindi, for those officials whocared to partake. Though Zia himself always kept the fast and did his five prayers, hedid not appear to mind when others ate or smoked in front of him.

Zia always had the habit of meeting foreign leaders alone, holding formal talks justbetween two. Other members of the government and I accompanied Zia on foreigntrips, and met foreign dignitaries in Pakistan, but what was said, between Zia and thevarious rulers and leaders neither I nor any of the others ever knew for certain. Is it notamazing that, at the national level, we never, knew what was discussed , or agreed? Itwas certainly irresponsible that no authenticated minutes were recorded of Zia'smeetings with. King Khalid and King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, the Shah of Iran, PresidentSiad Barre, President Daoud, Prime Minister J Callaghan, with Gen Zia-ur-Rehman ofBangladesh and, all the other leaders whom he met from 1977. Zia might, well havedone damage to the country by acting in this strange way.


Zia remained, extraordinarily, lazy with paper work. Necessary office work was simplyignored. Often I had to chase up written reports on officers, or files which had beenlying two or three months with him. I used to go to Zia's house asking for the file senton such and such a date. Go and look for it in my study, Zia would reply. There wouldbe a great pile of files. Zia was a born procrastinator, he always preferred to give verbaldecisions or ignore problems, hoping they would die a natural death. It is said thatmany thousands of files were found awaiting a decision by Zia at the time-of his deathin 1988.

Zia had other strange character traits, apart from this habit of putting off decisions orwork on files. One of them was more fit for a psychologist to examine. This was whatamounted to an obsession with toilets. Zia had a special fancy almost an obsession, forbathrooms and toilets. He would not share them with anybody. He got themconstructed exclusively for his own use wherever he was likely to stay, i.e. COAShouse, CMLA Secretariat office, Ordnance Mess, Lahore etc.

For someone who was meticulous about many things, Zia was surprisingly casualabout the Army uniform. In fact, many officers felt that Zia never stopped disgracingthe Army. uniform. He used to do it himself and even let it be done by his daughter. Heused to let her dress up improperly as Colonel, General and go along with him onceremonial occasions, reception of dignitaries and guards of honor. I repeatedly askedhim to mend his ways on both these points. He declared he would stop doing thesethings but never did.

As far as Zia's reputation for personal honesty is concerned I do not have any firmevidence that there was wrongdoing. However, there were a number of curious and asyet unexplained details in Zia's private life Zia seemed to have made friends with someof the most notorious smugglers of Pakistan such as Seth Abid the brother-in-law ofMasud Mahmood former Director General of Federal Security Forces and the equallynotorious Dohsil. Seth Abid who had many cases against him was totally rehabilitatedby Zia to the extent that he was even granted a license to open an investment bank inPakistan.

On the frequent foreign trips made by Zia, it was common practice for cargo from theplane to be loaded straightaway into a truck to be sent directly to the CMLA's house,without passing through even formal customs scrutiny. Even if there was nothingdutiable or illegal brought in this was strange behavior.

Gifts received from foreign hosts or visitors were never declared as required by rigidrules dating back to the pre-independence era. Some of these official presents werebound to be valuable, in the case of Arab Gulf potentates at least.


One could say quite a number of things about Zia's strong personal interest in the ill-fated Institute of Ummah Islamiya Studies North Hatley venture. Perhaps Zia wassimply a bad judge of character. After visiting the Montreal "showroom" of thisenterprise, I began to suspect the management of milking the financial operations runwith Saudi funds for their own private benefit.

My opposition to Gen Zia's policies was noted by many close observers of the Pakistanipolitical scene from 1980, among them the BBC World Service. The BBC (Urdu Service)on 22-3-1980 reported:

"The only suggestion of protest so far has come from Lt Gen. Chishti. At ameeting with reporters which was not put out by the national news agency, hesaid he was resigning from the Army and once resigned from the Army, thebasis on which he is Cabinet minister disappeared too."

On March 24, 1980 a BBC commentary spoke of "deep differences between him andGeneral Zia"

I was the very first cabinet colleague of Gen Zia to speak out in public against hiskeeping power and withholding general elections. My resignation from three ministriessimultaneously with my retirement from the Army in March 1980 was regarded by Ziaas "a slap in the face", so I was later told by Zia's brother-in-law Dr Basharatellahi,through a common friend.

At the time, Gen Zia pretended to know nothing of my plans to resign, though in fact Ihad told him many times in meetings and finally on the evening of March 16. Mine wasa principled resignation; Zia had consistently ignored my advice and failed to carry outthe pledges on elections. I was never a member of Zia's inner circle. There was no closepersonal relationship between us, and soon we fell apart over the issue of elections,along with the declaration of a definite date.

It is all the more ironic that some people, for whatever reasons, have chosen toexaggerate my closeness to Gen Zia The mere fact that Zia used to commonly addressme as "Murshid" (spiritual mentor or guide) has been deliberately misinterpreted. Thiswas certainly meant by Zia as nothing more than a polite honorific. But Sardar M AbdulQayum Khan actually used this "Murshid" to dub me a dictator, torment tyrant and Iknow, not what else. In his spite, he conveniently forgot that this term was applied byZia to many others among his generals and wrote about me in these fanciful and luridterms (Kashmir Banega Pakistan p101):

"Even all the dictators and tormentors of Pakistan put together would not matchan equal of Gen Chishti and why not when the President of Pakistan, Chief ofArmy Staff, Pakistan Army and Chief Executive of the country Gen Mohammad


Zia ul Haq himself used to stand up for him to receive him and call himMurshid."

This attack may not be unrelated to my relentless pursuit of this individual foraccountability for the missing funds which Sardar Qayum had responsibility for whilehead of the Azad Kashmir administration.

Unfortunately, during the Tribunal investigating the case, Qayum's influence preventedwitnesses coming forward to press many serious charges of corruption andmishandling of public funds (see Annexure 'A').

It is characteristic of Qayum that though at first a critic, he soon became one of thegreatest admirers of Zia ul-Haq, publicly calling for him to become Life President ofPakistan and also Field Marshal, "for services rendered to Umma' Islamya" (the Islamicworld community).

Hostile to Benazir Bhutto's government, Qayum is at the moment a keen supporter ofthe Punjab Chief-Minister Nawaz Sharif. He may be expected to change again whenthere is some benefit. Instead of fighting as 'mujahid' on the Kashmiri warfront, asQayum claims, he actually distributed rations as a corporal in the Army Service Corps -not a very glorious beginning to a career in politics which has made him wealthy (seeAnnexure 'A')

In spite of Zia's best efforts I did not compromise on honesty and patriotism. I becameFederal Minister twice during Zia's regime and both times did not take up the grantsavailable to refurbish my house. I also declared all gifts received by me, whereas Ziaand some other ministers did not do so.

After my retirement, Zia saw to it that difficulties were placed in my way. Petty andmean things were done. He prevented a new business venture I had started fromflourishing. My son was prevented from joining PIA. I Wanted to sell my house atIslamabad to look after my family and to clear my debts/loans which I had taken forhouse building. DGISI Lt Gen Akhtar did not let that house be sold for 13 months.Whosoever approached the house to see it with a view to buy it was told that Gen Zia,would get annoyed if Chishti's house was bought by them. Finally it was sold toPakistani buyers in USA. The money was taken in Pakistan in Pakistani currency.

An army officer who was a colleague of mine had his land at Sahiwal. He met me andwe decided to collaborate on a housing scheme on that land. He was to provide landand together we would develop it and convert it into saleable plots. Profits were to beshared as and when the plots were sold. Intelligence services under Gen Akhtar wouldnot let those plots be sold. The road near which the land lay was completely churned onthe plea of converting it into a two-way carriageway. It stayed in that condition for


about a year and a half. The landowner changed his attitude and wanted the paymentfor the land in one go, I was forced to borrow the money from a bank and give it to him.Indeed I am convinced it was a deliberate attempt by Zia to undermine my financialposition. Since then till Zia's crash on August 17 1988 there has been strict pressurepreventing sale of the plots. I have yet to assess how things stand now. Maybe the debtsand decks can now be cleared.

There were very few occasions when I met Zia after my retirement. They were eithermarriage ceremonies. funerals, or prize distributions at golf tournaments (I was thePresident Golf Union). etc. We never met to sit and discuss anything except myresignation, as Chairman of the Islamabad Branch of the Institute of Ummah IslamiyaStudies North Hately. Because of this I was kept under vigilance and treated as personanon grata and a risk to Gen Zia. He and his ISI Chief were always keen to know what Iwas up to, I used to speak out openly through the newspapers which were kind enoughto give me coverage. (see Appendix 3).

I was clearly not trusted by the Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) Even on privatevisits abroad I was spied on, in Saudi Arabia by Lt Col Gulzar of ISI, and in Canada bythe son of Lt Gen Akhtar, Director General ISI.

Immediately after my retirement my telephone was tapped by the cryptographicdepartment, and I was followed around by people from intelligence agencies. Some ofthose doing it even used to come and see me or warn me, because they had servedunder me at one stage or another. I live in Rawalpindi the heartland of our Army - andused to have many visitors. Anyone coming to see me at home was chased by the ISIpeople, who made their lives miserable.

For example, my onetime ADC in Jhelum, a capable officer named Captain Haroonbecame a Lt Colonel. So I wrote him a letter of congratulation, addressed care of hisfamily home in Lahore. It was redirected, and later he made a telephone call to mesaying, "Thank you for remembering me" a short conversation of a standard politenature. But Gen Akhtar Abdul Rehman, Director General of the ISI, gave him hell.

"Why did you ring up Gen Chishti? What did you talk about?"

I remember vividly one Major General (at present a Lt Gen) who came to me actually intears telling me he had been instructed by Gen Akhtar Abdul Rehman to have nocontacts with Chishti. I told him not to worry and to follow orders.

Literally hundreds of army, officers were intercepted over the years, their conversationsgone into closely, and effectively prevented from keeping in touch with me. Quite a fewpeople even stopped coming up to shake. hands with me on the golf course or


wherever. They deliberately avoided me instead knowing it was better for their careers.But some were indignant.

Even official functions and parties to which retired senior officers were normallyinvited were denied to me. There is an annual parade in Rawalpindi on March 23 Forfour years it was I who had arranged this parade and, the security arrangements underMr. Bhutto as well as Zia. But after my retirement, I was never invited. No other retiredgenerals as far as I know, were treated like this. I was persona non grata. Zia could nottolerate my presence.

The ISI tried to 'freeze' me totally. I must have been thought of as a serious dangersomeone capable of polluting with the germ of democracy, the minds of all thoseofficers with whom I came in contact Zia feared a political assassination and he alwaysremained unpopular in the Armed Forces in spite of all his efforts to buy popularity.

Because of Zia's vendetta against me my family were, hurt too. Both my brothers-in-lawand my younger brother were not promoted in service as they deserved. But we haveno regrets.

Gen Zia had established the Army Medical Corps College. He told me that he was inneed of good instructors. He knew that I had a younger brother Mohammad Sadiq AliFRCS in Northern General Hospital Sheffield which is a teaching hospital. He asked meif I could get him over to join AMC College as an instructor and said that he would takehim in the rank of a Colonel. I violated the rule of never volunteering in the army andpromised to talk to Sadiq. He was reluctant to return to Pakistan as he was wellestablished m Sheffield I told Sadiq that we were trying to do our best to serve ourcountry and that he should return to Pakistan for the country's sake. So he agreed toreturn. I told Gen Zia that Sadiq had agreed. I also told Gen Zia that he should not betaken in any higher rank in the Army beacuse that would give me a bad name. Nobodywould talk about his qualifications but there would be loose talk of nepotism becausehe was Gen Chishti's brother. So I told Gen Zia that he should be put through thenormal procedures.

Sadiq was commissioned in the AMC as a Captain. He was to be assessed for his abilityand then promoted to the rank of Major after three months as a classified specialist. Hewas cleared for a Major's rank much before the expiry of three months by his seniorwith whom he was working, Gen Mahrnud-ul Hassan and Director of Surgery GenShaukat Hassan. So he became a Major quickly. But a year later, when his name was putup for consideration for promotion as Lt Col he was not considered, on the grounds thatthere were no vacancies. As I read Zia's hand in this, I requested. Zia to let Sadiq resign.He agreed to that, and Sadiq came out of the Army. Sadiq became an AssociateProfessor in Surgery in Medical College, Rawalpindi and continued there till selected bya team from Saudi Arabia as a surgeon on the personal staff of His Majesty King Khalid


of Saudi Arabia, where he served until Zia disappeared. Thereafter I requested him tocome and serve Pakistan. He agreed and has returned to Pakistan, where he is tryingnow to establish a private practice.

Science and Technology was one of the neglected fields Gen Zia told me, and he wantedto give this a new impetus. He wanted to have a Professor as the Secretary, Science andTechnology in the Federal Ministry. I offered him, as Establishment Minister, somenames from the universities. He talked to me about Dr. Nisar, my brother-in-law. I toldhim that it would be narrated as "another talented cousin" or another example ofnepotism. I would go along with Gen Zia only if Dr. Nisar was found fit to hold theappointment. He was duly interviewed by Gen Zia found fit and appointed AdditionalSecretary Science and Technology. He continued serving in that post till just short of myretirement in March 1980.

I had gone abroad for about ten days and when I returned I found that he had beenremoved from the appointment and reverted to his basic appointment in the Universityof Science and Technology Lahore. Normally the appointment holders are not removedso quickly. So I asked Zia if Dr. Nisar had done something drastically wrong that hewas punished like that. Zia said nothing but apparently he did not like him and had gothim changed, wanting to do it quickly while I was abroad he had done in the case ofBrig Mohammad Khan. Zia did not have the moral courage to talk to me about it.Outwardly, Zia was all sugar and honey but inwardly he could be venomous. Thenation would come to know more about it as time passed by. Gen Zia tried hard toisolate me once I began to speak out in public against his policies from the summer of1982. One way was by banning me from airport VIP rooms.

I had gone to Islamabad Airport to receive my younger brother Sadiq, who was comingon a month's leave with his family from Riyadh. My wife and another younger brotherAslam were with me. Aslam dropped me in front of the VIP room and went with mywife to park the car. As I approached the VIP room entrance I was told by an ASFinspector that the latest orders on the use of VIP rooms were that retired generals werenot al1owed use VIP rooms. These were the orders passed Federal Cabinet. This wasnot news to me. I knew just how low Zia could stoop to keep me away from hisassociates. I experienced it ever since my resignation from the ministership on March30, 1980.

I had frequently met many of his advisors, appointees, secretaries, generals andministers in the airport VIP rooms, during my travels to and from Islamabad, Duringsuch accidental meetings one naturally, apart from other things, also discussedprevailing conditions and national affairs. I had expressed frank opinions to them aboutthe situation in the country as I read it, and that naturally was not in favor of Gen Zia.So Gen Zia ordered that I should be denied the use of VIP rooms (automaticallydenying me these accidental meetings), and the Cabinet passed the orders. The six


Minister Generals who used to be responsible for such decisions were Gen Zia, Gen J SMian, Gen Saeed Qadir, Gen Arif, Air Marshal Inamul Haq and Admiral Janjua. So theypassed these orders as generals against generals, probably because they thought theythemselves would not retire at all.

I told the ASF Inspector that I, would not create any embarrassing situation for him byinsisting on entering the VIP room. I thanked him for passing that information onto me.(Protocol-wise I could still use the VIP room in my capacity as a former FederalMinister. According to the laid-down order of precedence, former ex-Federal Ministerscome immediately after the incumbent Federal Ministers.) I knew the intentions of theruler, so I honorably withdrew. I told Aslam to receive Sadiq through the normalInternational Arrivals Channel and I waited along with my wife in my car. Sadiq andhis family arrived and we went home and I decided to pursue the matter in my ownmanner.

The next day I asked the Secretary, Rawalpindi Flying Club (RFC), to come and see mein my capacity as President, RFC. I had been an elected President of the RFC since 1978and continued until 1988. There are other Flying Clubs as Peshawar, Lahore, Karachi,Quetta and Multan in addition to Rawalpindi, but the RFC has been and still is the bestflying club, having produced many pilots for national, and international airlines apartfrom many private license holders. A flying club president is, in the discharge of hisduties at any time during the day and night, required to look up the trainees at theapron, in the hangars, in the lounges, in classrooms, first aid stations, maintenancerooms, refueling points, traffic control towers and other places within the vicinity of theairport. I used to go to some of these places to meet Pakistani and foreign nationals whowere student trainees. So I told my club Secretary that as I had been denied theprivilege of using the VIP room and other controlled premises on the airport, a lettershould be written to the Manager, Islamabad Airport, to issue me a Security Pass so thatI could visit those places in the discharge of my duties. The Secretary wrote the letter.

There was no reply in writing but verbally my secretary was told that the generalwould not be issued with a pass but would be allowed to go wherever he wanted to goafter getting clearance from the Manager,, which he would give whenever required.This was not acceptable to me, so I told my club Secretary to tell the Manager, to give areply in writing. On this he referred the case to the Aviation Division of the Ministry ofDefence for guidance. When no reply was received I instructed the RFC to write a letterto the Aviation Division, Ministry of Defence directly for the Security Pass.

Still no reply was received so I got a letter written that if a reply was not received Iwould be taking the matter up directly with the Defence Minister.

After a few, days, Ali Ahmad Talpur, the Defence Minister, talked to me on telephoneand asked what the problem was. I told him that it would be difficult for him to keep


me away, from the VIP room as the President RFC, because these facilities were beingextended to other, presidents of flying clubs and I was asking for it as a retired general.Since I was asking for it as the President, RFC I told him that the other Presidents wouldhave to shed this privilege in case he wanted to keep me out of the VIP room. Thatwould create a situation for which I should not be blamed later. I requested him toconvey my views to the CMLA. I was subsequently issued a Security Pass which read"Lt. Gen (Rtd) F. A. Chishti, President RFC, is allowed to use all lounges, aprons, VIProoms at all airports in Pakistan." I availed of that facility until 1988 when I ceased to bePresident (After this incident, the CMLA Gen Zia tried through his lackeys that I shouldnot get elected as President RFC in subsequent years but he did not succeed Later theseorders that retired generals were not authorized to use VIP rooms were withdrawn,thanks, to the Cabinet.


CHAPTER - 7ACCOUNTABILITY A FIASCO

Accountability is a great collective movement. For its application, it is necessary thateach individual of the nation participates. The nation that offers itself to accountabilityachieves success in the accomplishment of its goals. The nation which does not adopt itor adopts it partially fails miserably in the attainment of its goals and gets divided intodifferent segments, becoming entangled in economic, social, cultural and politicalsnares. This ultimately leads to destruction. A nation which is not capable of selfaccountability is politically hollow, and helpless to preempt destruction. Words andactions must be in conformity. The accountability of appointment holders is vitalbecause they need to be morally and intellectually honest and diligent. Not even thehighest officeholder, the President of a country, should be allowed to go scot-free.

The politicians must have been thinking on these lines when they approached Gen Ziaand asked him to force through accountability for prospective national and provincialassembly candidates. The NDP leader Khan Abdul Wali Khan expressed the views thataccountability was a part of the democratic process and therefore people shouldexercise patience while the interim government cleaned up the mess by subjecting thecorrupt politicians to the process of accountability. There were a sizeable number ofpoliticians who wanted elections to be held at any cost.

When Gen Zia broached the subject of accountability, which had been frequentlymentioned by me at meetings with Mr. Bhutto during pre-Martial Law discussions inthe Cabinet Room, I told him that it would be a welcome step. As we should also beprepared for our personal accountability, I said we should start the process ofaccountability in our own house, from our own constituency i.e. the Army. He agreed,and asked me what I meant. I expressed my views in detail and said that ever since ourassociation with the Pakistani Army (from November 1947 in my case), I had seen manythings go wrong with no judicial accountability ever done. Self accountability muststart. That was the only way to improve our society. Take the most disgraceful act of thebreak-up of Pakistan. Nobody had been tried or punished for that. Was it not a military,defeat? Who was responsible for it? Who was guilty of it? Let us try him. It was not onlya military defeat but also a colossal political failure and a moral disaster.

I told Gen Zia that he did not have the opportunity of fighting in the 1947 Indo-PakistanWar because armour was not employed. He did not fight in the War of 1965 either,because by the time he reached the Division HQ (as an AA&QMA from Command andStaff College, Quetta), the war had already ended. In any case, the post he held in anewly raised incomplete Division was not a good posting from the fighting point ofview. In 1971 Zia was busy protecting the rulers and learning the fine arts of


sycophancy and hypocrisy. He lacked actual experience of service in GHQ tocomprehend what went on in decision-making. He had much to learn about the manythings for which there should be accountability. I gave a long list of lapses which hadgone' on in our Army, but which nobody had ever bothered to try to check or punish.Some of them are enumerated below:

1. Officers whose performance was poor in the wars of 1947, 1965, 1971 were not punished.Some of them later reached the dizzy height' of Generalship.

2. Honours and awards were given on fictitious citations.

3. Why were war diaries ordered to be destroyed?

4. Engineers deployed on road maintenance duties in AK, and the Northern area were doingall sorts of unethical things with impunity.

5. The higher command never fought their own battles but always insisted and foughtsubordinates battles.

6. Awards were given to those who got killed by their own mistakes in wars.

7. What happened to Gen Akbar Committee Report on the 1971 war?

8. Why was it replaced by the Gen Awan Committee Report?

9. In the conduct of war, why did we not apply what we had learnt in Schools ofInstruction? Why deviate from the book?

10. Why was there no outcome of the inquiry into the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in1951?

11. On what basis were thousands of acres of agricultural land allotted to officers and what isthe annual produce from them?

12. Why was the Hamood-Ur-Rehman Report not published?

A lot has been written and talked about the Hamood-Ur-Rehman Commission Reportwithout anybody really knowing anything for certain about it. I had asked Maj Gen KM Arif to give it to me to read it. He replied that it was too voluminous a report to read.I said it did, not matter, I would manage somehow or other. He promised to send it tome but it never reached me. So I too have not been able to study this Report, whichcontains one whole chapter on the moral aspects of Pakistan's defeat. Is it not a pity thatthe nation has been denied its right to know what was written in this Report? Whatworse calamity could befall Pakistan than its dismemberment? While the nation does


not know what this Report contains, some of its contents have been disclosed in theinternational press. The Illustrated Weekly of India for instance, (October, 23, 1988),published the following:

For sixteen years, the Pakistan government has hidden from its people the realreasons why it was vanquished in the 1971 war. For fear that it would destroythe nation's fabric forever. J N Parimoo, The Times of India's correspondent inWashington, recently unearthed a secret report commissioned by Zulfikar AliBhutto, which exposes how a depraved military leadership betrayed the Pakistanpeople.

Hamood-Ur-Rehman Commission examined 283 witnesses, mostly senior armyofficers, prisoners of war, who were subsequently released. The Commissionsubmitted its preliminary report in July 1972 and its final report in November1974. When Mr. Bhutto read it he ordered that all copies of the report bedestroyed. He, however, kept one copy with him, reportedly under the mattressof hjs bed. When in 1978, General Zia-UI-Haq's men raided Mr. Bhutto's house atAl-Murtaza, they found the only remaining copy of the report under his bed.

The report was the severest indictment of Pakistan's army commanders, some ofwhom had become General Zia's henchmen. The Commission of Inquiry foundthat Pakistan's Army Commanders and Martial Law Administrators hadbetrayed its people. A Xeroxed version of the report was smuggled out ofPakistan.

The Commission had recommended that Yahya Khan, the then President ofPakistan, General Abdul Hamid Khan, Lt Gen S G Pirzada, Lt Gen Gul Hassan,Maj Gen Umar and Maj Gen Mitha should be tried in public on charges ofconspiring to usurp power from Field Marshal Ayub Khan and rigging the 1970elections.

The Commission also recommended that these officers should also be tried forcriminal neglect of duty in the conduct of war, both in West Pakistan and EastPakistan.

The Commission also recommended that Lt Gen A A K Niazi, Maj GenMohammad Jamshed, Maj Gen M Rahim Khan, Brigadier G M Baqir Siddiqui,Brigadier Mohammad Hayat, Brigadier Mohammad Aslam Niazi all be court-martialled. It recommended that allegations of personal immorality,drunkenness, indulgence in corrupt practices against Gen Yahya Khan, GenAbdul Hamid Khan and Maj Gen Khuda Dad Khan be properly investigatedbecause there is prima-facie evidence that their moral degeneration resulted inindecision, cowardice and professional incompetence.


Similarly, the Commission recommended that investigation be launched into theallegations of personal immorality against Lt Gen A A K Niazi and a number ofother officers who were reported to have indulged in looting of money andproperty, in womanizing, while they should have been preparing plans for thedefence of their country.

According to the Commission's report, one of the others, Brigadier Hayatullah,was having a good time with a number of women in his bunker in theMuqbulpur sector in West Pakistan on the night of December 12, while Indianshells were falling on his troops outside in the battlefield.

Another disgraceful episode remain unpunished to this day. A General ran away fromthe battlefield in East Pakistan, laying behind some nurses and his own ADC, who weresupposed to come with him in the General's helicopter. The. nurses were then capturedand maltreated, and the ADC killed. It came as a shock to many in the Pakistan Armywhen Gen Zia appointed this same man as Secretary General Defence. Thiscontroversial General went on to supervise the work of the Armed Forces at allechelons, under the direct guidance of Gen Zia. In the view of many, officers, four,senior Generals (Gen Iqbal, Gen Sawar, Gen Rahim-id-din and Gen Arif) should nothave allowed this to happen but for reasons best known to themselves, they, did notobject.

The report says that the evidence of Maj Gen Nazar Hussain Shah, GOC 16 Division,Maj Gen M H Ansari, GOC 9 Division, and Brigadier Baqir Siddiqui, Chief of StaffEastern Command, disclosed that seven senior officers In their units were engaged inlarge-scale looting, including the theft of one crore and thirty five lakh rupees from theNational Bank treasury at Siraj Ganj.

Why did Mr. Bhutto take no action on the report?

How much did not Gen Tikka Khan know about it? He was the COAS from March 1972to February 29, 1976. All POW cases were finalized by him. The reports after analysisused to be finalized by the Adjutant General, Maj Gen A Qureshi and then submitted tothe COAS with its recommendations through the then Military Secretary i.e. myself, forfinalization after my recommendations. How much did the A G Maj Gen Qureshiknow? How many intentional changes were made in the reports to benefit some guiltyofficers? I would like to reserve further comment. I have demanded the publication ofthis report consistently since 1977, when the Army took over. Prior to that it wasoutside the scope of my duties to press for its publication.


I believe it was shameful of Gen Zia not to take action on thereport let alone fail topublish it in Pakistan Intellectual honesty demands that this report be published, evennow.

*** *** ***

The question of accountability arose again after the Military takeover. It was discussedat one of the meetings attended by Corps Commanders, MLAs and DMLAS. Somerecommendations were made. I had been an exponent of this requirement throughoutmy service. I had court-martialled officers and men after the 1971 war for their badperformance. I had even done so in the war of 1965 by giving my recommendations tomy seniors which were ultimately implemented I had recommended to the CMLA thataccountability must start from our own house. Our own constituency, as Gen Zia usedto call it, should face accountability first.

During the war we had come down very harshly on subordinate commanders who losttheir posts or behaved in a cowardly manner. Here was a case of the entire eastern halfof the country being lost and no one being held accountable. I told Gen Zia that wemust force through accountability for the loss of East Pakistan. I recommended that GenA M Yahya Khan be tried on a very simple charge that as C m C Pakistan Army, hefailed to defend East Pakistan. Guilty or not guilty? Gen Zia had agreed to this and hadsaid that it was a very good idea It had to be a court martial.

The next question was who should be the President of the court. Could it be a four stargeneral'? The answer was no because the only four star generals in the country were thethree service chiefs and the CJCSC. So should it be a three star general? It was arguedand decided that Gen Yahya be tried by a two star general. Gen Zia said instead ofnominating one he would like to have a volunteer. So he asked for a volunteer Maj GenFazle Haq volunteered. Then Gen Zia said he would inform his Chief of Staff Maj Gen KM Arif to issue the convening or o orders were issued for some day. So I asked Gen Ziawhat had I happened. He told me that General Haq had backed out. Then he asked meif I would like to preside over the court, I told him that I would not mind. He promisedto issue the orders but he never did. As a habit Gen Zia never said "No" to anysuggestion. He always said "Good idea" but he never went anywhere near a thing hedid not want to do. That was an unpardonable disservice done to the Army by Gen Zia.I wish Gen Zia had issued the orders. In all fairness to the country, although Gen Yahyais no more now the trial should still be held in absentia so that the record is straight, andthe hidden culprits unmasked.

The trouble is that we have never punished anybody at the national level. I do notpropose punishment without a fair trial. But there have never been trials and peoplehave been getting away with all their misdoings. It has been our failing that we havenever punished those who were guilty of looting house breaking dereliction of duty,


inefficiency, bribery, nepotism, favoritism, etc. This is true of lapses in the BoundaryCommission Force handling of refugees, rehabilitation of refugees, the Wars of 1947,1965 and 1971, Martial Law of 1953, 1958, 1969, 1977. Partial Martial Law or July 1977Martial Law.

In one of the meetings presided over by Mr. Bhutto with his Ministers, the COAS, theCNS, the CJCSC, the CAS and the Corps Commanders present, I had raised this issue. Isaid the conditions in the country were bad, with lawlessness, rioting, arson, lootingrampant. I argued that people responsible for bringing of affairs to that pitch should bemade accountable and punished. The only persons tried were 46 Armed Forces officersarrested on March 30, 1973 for an alleged attempt to overthrow Mr. Bhutto'sgovernment. Their motive was that the people responsible for the dismemberment ofPakistan, the ignoble surrender of the Armed Forces in East Pakistan, together with theineffectual militaiy operations in West Pakistan, should be exposed to legal action, oraccountability.

Every one of the 46 officers was professionally efficient. A full half of them had beenawarded Pakistan's medal Sitara-e-Jurat (S J) in the wars of 1965 and 1971, and theyincluded two with S J and Bar. Two of the officers had escaped from their POW camp inIndia, after laboriously digging a tunnel over a period of two months. Five of this grouphad been awarded the Sword of Honor, and three had won gold medals for academicstudies.

Many of them had been instructors in the Pakistan Military Academy, Staff College,Army. War College and National Defence College. They were among the elite of theofficer corps. They were angry over what they saw as dangers to Pakistan's future, but Idoubt if they really planned to stage a coup. It was more a "whispering campaign" thana plot.

The prosecution accused the officers of being guilty of believing the following:

a) Mr. Bhutto, Yahya Khan and some other generals were responsible for thedismemberment of Pakistan. They were also responsible for the military defeat inEast Pakistan and surrender or loss of territory in West Pakistan.

b) In order to save himself, Mr. Bhutto was defending Yahya Khan and othergenerals, and he did not want to charge anybody, for the political and militarymistakes of 1971. Instead, Mr. Bhutto appointed to high posts the very peoplewho had made blunders, because they flattered the Prime Minister, Gen TikkaKhan was specially mentioned for the military actions he had taken.


c) Mr. Bhutto intentionally started a slander campaign against the Army, exploitingthe National Press trust. They specially mentioned H. K. Burki's concoctedreviews appearing in Dawn, Karachi.

d) Mr. Bhutto had adopted neo-fascist methods of ruling and governing, creatingthe Federal Security Fore and doing everything to continue his personal rule.

e) The country was heading for economic bankruptcy.

f) Because of the above-mentioned points, Mr. Bhutto had to be removed for thegood of the country, through military action. The action was planned betweenApril 11 and 21, 1973.

This group of officers was tried by Gen Zia, who was directed by Mr. Bhutto to awardmaximum punishment. Some were sentenced to life imprisonment, the rest to prisonterms varying from 3 to 14 years.

After Martial Law was imposed in 1977 I approached Gen Zia as EstablishmentMinister, to get their punishments remitted. He agreed and did it Some of the ex-officers were even granted "No Objection Certificates", which allowed them to goabroad permanently. However, not one was reinstated in the Armed Forces.

Nine and half year ago, on March 30, 1980, I resigned as a Minister with the portfoliosof Labor, Petroleum and Azad Kashmir.

I resigned in order not to deviate from my principles. My resignation letter read:

After an eventful and titanic struggle, a long tenure of duty in uniform comes to an endon March 30, 1980. I take this opportunity to express my deep gratitude to you especiallyhaving assigned me some important portfolios in your Federal Cabinet. In the course ofmy duties I kept the national interest uppermost in my mind. For me it was fulfillment ofa long vendetta to bring out factual and naked realities to your kind notice for the sake ofthis country, highlighting at times various unpalatable facts on events and personalities.This attitude at times might have been disliked by you, but was certainly disregarded as asolitary voice by some of my colleagues. I feel that during my tenure of duty. I have givenmy best and have acquitted myself with some credit. Let History be the judge to evaluateand sift the grains of achievement from the chaff.

As a Federal Minister up to March 30, 1980 I drew my strength from the Army as abase, being a General Officer on the active list, which is the case in any Martial LawRegime. On the evening of March 16, 1980 you were magnanimous enough to offer mecontinuity of my job as a Federal Minister, but considering the new environment I hadhumbly submitted that I would like to be relieved of the responsibilities of a Federal


Minister with effect from the date I retire from the Army, which you had kindly accepted.I therefore now request the formalization of my resignation with effect from March 31,1980. In the end I pray that may God give you the wisdom and strength to steer thecountry out of the existing political and economic crisis. I am certain with your dedicatedefforts you will be able to bridge the credibility gap between the government and thenation.

*** *** ***

In 1986, I started writing for Daily Jang on accountability under the heading'Accountability is vital for the survival of Pakistan, let us force through accountability.' Myfirst article appeared on March 1986. I was scheduled on the same day to address theBar at Karachi, at their invitation.

The newspaper with my article was circulating from 4 o'clock in the morning. It wasread by the intelligence agencies and bureaucrats, who put it up to Gen Zia for hisperusal. On reading this Gen Zia instructed Lt Gen J D Khan, Governor Sindh, not toallow Gen Chishti to address the Bar at Karachi. I was advised by my friends in theadministration, police, intelligence agencies, barristers-and lawyers not to go to the Barat 12 o'clock, the time when I was supposed to address them.

I told them that I would not change my programme. So I went at the appointed time,and was there for about 50 minutes. But I was not allowed to speak, because the peoplehired by Gen Zia's government created chaos, for which they were, no doubt,handsomely paid. The blame was wrongly put on the PPP, which actually had nothingto do with it. Some of the lawyers responsible were well-known to me from the timewhen they used to meet me as Chairman, Election Cell (1977 - 1980).

The chairman of the Karachi Bar, Shamshad Alam Lari, said that the Bar's head "shouldbow down, in shame at the manner in which some members of the Bar acted". (Jang,March 14, 1986)

This is what the independent journalist Shaziya Bashir Khan had to say on March 20,1986 in the Daily News, Karachi:

Random ThoughtsConduct Most Unbecoming

"In the first place, Gen Chishti should not have been invited to speak at theKarachi District Bar because no matter how controversial he is, he is not apolitical figure in the sense that he belongs to no political party. But if thePresident of the Bar invited him, the lawyers of Karachi should have permittedthe man to speak for himself rather than pelting him with tomatoes and


generally behaving like juvenile delinquents who have had a peg too many. WasGeneral Chishti sitting on the bench which condemned Zulfikar Ali Bhutto todeath? If not ... and if this is a matter of principle, then all those like him shouldbe discriminated against because they were one and all responsible for theMartial Law and not any one person ... Why doesn't anyone dare to pelttomatoes against them when they are invited to speak in the High Court Bar'sfunctions? Simply because they are still in a position to strike back and GenChisti is not? Is this what Pakistanis are made of -- the instant one is down youkick?

Gen Chishti can by no stretch of the imagination be held responsible for thedeath of the late Prime Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. If anyone can at all be heldresponsible for his tragic fate, it is the entire people of Pakistan who with theirtraditional habit of condemning anyone who is unfortunate enough to be madehead of state in Pakistan, were responsible for taking him to that point in historyfrom where he could go only to the gallows. What I would like to know is howmany of these lawyers and all those who today use Mr. Bhutto's name to furthertheir own personal interests, went to Kot Lakpat Jail to save the dying manwhose, death was perhaps made worse by his disillusionment in the peoplewhom he loved so much and for whom he worked 22 hours of the day? Didanyone lift a finger to save him?

If not, what right have any of us to condemn anyone else? And condemningsomeone simply because he is more powerful than you are or because hedisagrees with you is something which is typical only of a Pakistani.

We alone, no matter whether due to our lack of education lack of civilizationintolerance and general dissatisfaction with the fact that Utopia does not andcannot exist are capable of denying everyone except ourselves the right to holdan opinion contrary to anyone else's. Perhaps because the century of Voltaire istruly gone and none of us has the greatness of spirit to say to anyone exceptourselves: you may disagree with me but I will defend your right to say it withmy life. On the contrary, all we are proving is that after 5000 years of civilizinginfluence, we are all born free and yet keep each other in chains.

This incident, shocking in the very fact that one of the most educated andrespected segments of society has stooped to behavior more compatible withthe idea of semi-educated hooligans and certainly not lawyers does howeverforce one to realize that the repressed resentment of the general public hasreached dangerous proportions against those they see as a threat to thedemocratic process of course, this in no way exonerates the lawyers in theirdisgraceful behavior because the essence of democracy is the freedom to expressyourself and the right to defend yourself and your actions. Nevertheless, it


provides food for thought. In nine years, this is the first time people have had anopportunity to express themselves. And it is interesting that their first reaction isviolence directed against any one they associate even remotely with. suppressive,anti democratic institutions"

*** *** ***

All those actively organizing and running Martial Law and all those who were directlyconnected with Martial Law, during the period July 5, 1977 to December 31, 1985should be held accountable for the following decisions of national importance duringthe period:

Why was Martial Law imposed on July 5, 1977?

What action was taken against all those who were, responsible for creating conditions Conduciveto the imposition of Martial Law?

Why were those who held positions of importance between the period 1972 to July 5, 1977 not

made accountable?

Why were the decisions taken by the Supreme Court in connection with Elections notimplemented?

Why couldn't Gen Yahya Khan be tried for failing to defend East Pakistan?

Why were the General Elections postponed?

What were the functions of the Election Cell to prepare for elections?

Why were restrictions imposed on the Courts powers?

Why non-Party Elections?

Why were the Armed Forces sent abroad in service?

Why was the Constitution changed?

Why the December 1984 Referendum?

Why not the transfer of power?

How was Z. A. Bhutto treated while in custody?

Why did Gen Sawar Khan reject Mr. Bhutto's to mercy petition?

How long did it take for Mr. Bhutto's mercy petition to reach Islamabad from Lahore.


Why the delay of 48 hours in Mr. Bhutto execution?

Who was in the Rawalpindi jail organizing structure?

Why was Gen Zia the COAS on extension from March 1, 1979 right up to his death?

When and why was Blood Money enforced?

Why was the Minister of Law appointed as Attorney General, and allowed to practice in thecourts?

What properly did those people connected with the Martial Law regime gain, and what private

funds are stashed away in Pakistani banks, or sent away abroad?

What prompted civilians to accept posts the Martial Law government?

Why were accelerated and out-of-turn promotions and extensions commonly given to Civil andArmed forces personnel?

What life-long facilities have been granted to Generals. Admirals and Air Chief Marshals?

Why was 'Black Money' issued?

Who are the officials who received gifts and kept them for themselves instead of handing themover to the State?

Why was State money wasted?

Why is bribery on the increase?

Why were those who destroyed orders, not punished?

Since I was a minister for a while during the 8/2 years of Martial Law, I too must be accountablefor many of those decisions. I gladly offer myself for accountability.


CHAPTER - EIGHTTHE ELECTION CELL DIARY

The Election Cell was created on August 13, 1977 to facilitate the solution of electionproblems being referred to Gen Zia the CMLA, by various political parties and leaders.It was located at Corps Headquarters, Chakiala. I was appointed its chairman and thefollowing were nominated members:

Maj Gen Jamal Said MianMaj gen Rao Farman Ali Khan (Rtd)Maj Gen lhsan Ul Haq Malik (Rtd)

It had nothing to do with the functions of the Election Commission, which under thelaw, was responsible for the preparation of voters lists, delimitation of constituencies,receipt of nomination papers and their scrutiny, polling arrangements etc. This cell wascreated only to guarantee fair and free elections and to take steps to make theatmosphere peaceful and conducive to holding elections. The CMLA was determined tohave fair and free elections and the Election Cell was to help him in the matter.

While creating the Election Cell the CMLA had reiterated on the same day at Peshawarand Kohat when addressing troops. "October elections is our goal. The Armed Forcesare determined to hold elections und peaceful conditions hand over to the people'srepresentatives and revert to barracks Believe me it be the shortest Martial Law."

As far as creating peaceful atmosphere was concerned this was not only the MartialLaw Government's responsibility it was also the responsibility of the citizens, politicalparties and their leaders For this purpose it was desirable that there should be mutualconsultations between the CMLA and political leaders. The CMLA himself was so busyto find much time have talks with all political leaders as and when required. The issuewas further complicated because there were too many political parties in our country.Therefore it was difficult for any one person, to talk with the leader each partyindividually. So it was decided that the Election Cell was to meet all people leaders andotherwise and to convey their views to the CMLA. It was expected that the politicaldialogue would continue in this manner. The cell s doors were open to everyone. Noinvitations were to be issued so that there would be no distinctions or preferentialtreatment. I made it clear that the Election Cell would in no way clash with the ElectionCommission whose job was basically administrative and not to discuss politics and theprevailing political conditions in the country with the politicians which the Election Cellcould do. However the Election Cell was a non-political entity.


I performed the duties as Chairman till August 23, 1978 when I refused to be sworn inas a Minister. (for reasons explained in an chapter). The Government disbanded theElection Cell after the formation of the civilian government on August 23. As theFederal Government was also responsible for holding Genera Elections in the countryas early as possible, this responsibility of the Election Cell was also passed on to theCabinet

At our initial meeting, I requested the members to always remember the commitmentsthat the CMLA had made to the nation in respect of elections. These commitments, asstated by Gen Zia in his address to the nation on July 5, 1977, were:

a. 'Free and fair elections will be held in October this year (within 90 days),and

b. Pakistan will progress via Islam and Democracy because Pakistan'ssurvival lies in this.' This, concept is liked the most by Pakistanis.

Later at his press conference as the CMLA, Gen Zia said on July 14, 1977: I have to stayonly for 90 days. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Maulana Mufti Malimood should keep awatch on the future. During 7 March elections nobody had Islam on top of his or theirmanifesto. Nizam-e-Mustafa emerged only during agitation. The masses forced it onPPP and PNA. The PM accepted it. Definite arrangements are being made to holdelections in October 1977.

The Military Council does not intend taking any action against political leaders. Therewill be accountability of some corrupt officials in the administrative set up but only 'bigfish.' My only aim is basically fair elections but for this we need peaceful conditions. Wedo not want to stay for long. Not a day more after elections.

All tribunals except the Hyderabad Tribunal, which is of a special nature, have beendissolved. Elections are the sole purpose.

Presently we want an atmosphere conducive to holding elections, peaceful and withtranquility.

Elections will be held within 90 days. Transfer of power will need some time.

In his address to the nation on August 14, 1977 Gen Zia said:

I assure my countrymen again that elections will be held on due date. Elections are ameans to an end, i.e. establishment of a strong democratic government. So far thepoliticking has been without rules but this time ft would be with specified rules.


The Election Cell had meetings with many political leaders with a view to seeking theirviews and suggestions for holding the elections. I always insisted that the electionsshould be held and power transferred to the people's representatives. It was not up tothe Armed Forces to run the country. Martial Law was an unnatural method ofgoverning, acceptable as a stopgap measure. Conditions must be brought to normal assoon as possible and civil rule restored. It Was all the more important when talking, ofIslam (Which is a synonym for Justice) - Justice for the individual, the nation and theCountry. Imposition of Martial Law would only be justified if the purpose for which itwas imposed was fulfilled, otherwise there would be no justification for it. On August14, 1977 General Zia had also said that the Armed Forces considered the restoration ofdemocracy essential for the survival of Pakistan, and since any person frustrating thismission was not only an enemy of democracy but, also an enemy of Pakistan, he wouldbe administered the punishment he deserved.

I now list some of the major events which had taken place before the creation of theElection Cell.

On July 9, 1977, Gen Zia had been advised to demonetize the currency. He agreed, butdid not do it. Ghulam Ishaq Khan and A G N Kazj's advice against it had prevailedupon him. Demonetization would have taken the extra financial sting away from somepolitical Parties.

All political activity had been banned to bring the law, and order situation undercontrol.

Gen Zia, together With Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Secretary General-in-Chief, Maj Gen K MArif, COS to the CMLA, and I had gone to Murree on July 15, to meet the former PMand the PNA leaders who were under protective custody. Prior to this or, Gen Zia had,on his own, sent Air Marshal Noor Khan to Murree on July 13, to find out, through SherBaz Mazari, if the PNA leaders would be agreeable to meeting him. Gen Zia had notdisclosed this to me. (There were no restrictions on visitors meeting the leaders underprotective custody. They also had free use of the telephone, though this was monitoredand taped by the Army. Mr. Bhutto could still use all the facilities, that were his dueincluding the services of a Military Secretary and ADC's. Gen Zia reassured the PNAleaders and Mr. Bhutto that he had no political ambitions, he had taken over reluctantlyand was working for free and fair elections. Gen Zia also told Mr. Bhutto that he wouldwin the elections. When Mufti Mahmood asked Gen Zia if he had any plans to try Mr.Bhutto, Gen Zia replied in the negative and retorted "Try for what?"

PPP leaders had been shifted from Abbottabad to Murree so that they could be madeavailable to Mr. Bhutto as and when required. Military Council meeting held on July 18,had reviewed the steps taken till then for holding the elections and was satisfied withthe progress of work. Anti state activities were made punishable with death.


The privilege of meeting guests given to the PPP and the PNA leaders under custodywas withdrawn on July 19 because they were misusing it. They had tried to give apolitical color to their meetings, to project their political views. Their relatives could,however, still meet them with prior permission from the Martial Law Authorities. AzadKashmir leaders viz Sardar M Ibrahim Khan, President, Mr. A Hameed Khan, PM,Sardar M Abdul Qayum Khan, Chaudhary Noor Hussain. Pir Ali Jan Shah-PresidentAKPPP. Mr. K H Khurshid met Gen Zia in his office at GHQ, discussed future course ofaction and signed an agreement to have the elections held in AK in October 1977 but tendays after the elections in Pakistan.

The nation was told on July 27 by the CMLA that limited political activity would beallowed with effect from August 14. The Constitution was not abolished or abrogated.October, elections would be held under the 1973 constitution.

All political leaders under protective custody were released on July 28. Mr. Bhutto wasseen off by me at the PAF base Chaklala on July 29, Gen Zia informed me that he hadappointed Lt Gen Ghulam Hassan Khaij, a person of his choice, as Adviser on NationalSecurity. (Letter Number 57/1/CMLA dated 29-7-77)

The Election Commission announced that the elections would be held on October 18.The PNA on August 3, 1977 said the election schedule was acceptable to them. The PPPdecided to take part m the elections also. The Armed Forces' role as referee wasacceptable to them. Sardar Ibrahim Khan resigned as Kashmir Chief Executive of theGovernment of Azad Jammu and Kashmir but would continue as President.

On August 4, the PPP announced it would take part in the elections. That meant itrecognized the Martial Law regime. Gen Zia wanted to assess for himself the reaction ofthe troops. I requested him to visit my formations at any convenient date. He came toJhejum on August 4. After his visit he wrote to me that having met a good cross sectionof all ranks in the Division at Jhelum he had returned to Rawalpindi with greaterconfidence whatever we were doing to restore democracy and normalcy in the country.(GHQ letter number 17/3/COAS dated 26-8-1977).

Prince Hassan Bin Talal of Jordan arrived at Islamabad on August 8 and haddiscussions with Gen Zia who was assisted by Mr. Ghuiam Ishaq Khan, SecretaryGeneral in Chief, Mr. Agha Shahi Secretary General Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MajGen K M Arif, Chief of Staff to the CMLA and Mr. ShaH Nawaz, Additional SecretaryForeign Affairs. I was nowhere near them Mr. Bhutto started his election campaign onAugust 8 reaching Lahore by air from Multan. At Lahore he was given a grandreception. Filing of nomination papers started on August 8. The same day at Lahorethere was a big gathering as public meeting in favor of PPP.


On August 9 Gen Zia had a quiet dinner with Prince Hassan at Murree. Maj Gen K MArjf and I were also invited. We went to Murree by road traveling in separate cars. GenZia was to stay in the COAS's house at Clifdon and I was to stay in the CorpsCommander house at the Chinnar Division Officer's Mess. Prince Hassan was staying atGovernment House, Murree, where the dinner was being held. We reached the COAS'shouse in the afternoon. I requested permission to leave. Gen Zia asked me to stay for acup of tea. We sat on the lawn and were having tea when Brig Zafar PS(C) approachedGen Zia and informed him that Mr. Bhutto was on the line for him. Gen Zia got up andwent to attend the telephone call. The conversation started nicely and politely, butgradually became harsher. I did not know what Mr. Bhutto was saying, naturally, but Icould hear Gen Zia loud and clear. The conversation ended badly, as far as I rememberlike this:-

No. It cannot be done. I cannot give concessions. We are judicious to both sides.If we are not allowing them we cannot let you have it either. No, that stage maynot come. You may never have an opportunity. I will sort it out before that.However, I wish you good luck.

When Zia came back after the telephone call, I asked him if everything was all right. Hesaid it was nothing, only some trivial matters. I told Gen Zia that Mr. Bhutto would notmake a call on trivial, matters. Gen Zia kept quiet and looked upset. I realized the crackhad come. I left soon afterwards telling Gen Zia that I would met him at dinner.

The Azad Kashmir Assembly was dissolved on August 10 and elections wereannounced for October. Maj Gen Abdul Rehman Khan (Rtd) was sworn in as AzadKashmir Chief Executive.

Gen Zia said on August 11 that no impediments would be allowed to be put in the wayof fresh General Elections. It was felt that the freedom given to the Press was beingmisused.

The Election, Cell was officially created two days later although it had been functioningsine 5 July.

On August 15, 1977 Gen Zia said "Anti democracy elements will be dealt withruthlessly". On August 16, Gen Zia said that if Islami Nizam had been enforced in time,the common man's basic problems would have been solved long ago. The real purposeof elections was establish a democratic government Those creating obstacles in thedemocratic process would be treated anti-state elements. Elections would take placeschedule. Our leniency should not be construed as weakness, warned Zia. There was nochange in mission.


August 18 was the last date for filing of nomination papers. The PPP had done theirplanning, whereas the list, of the PNA candidates was still to be finalized.

On 21 August Yousaf Khattak met the Election Cell and recommended that electionsshould not be held because there were tendencies of unilateral declarationindependence (UDI) in the provinces. Secession may tall place after the elections. Hesaid PNA was disintegrating. Pressure should be maintained on it so that it retains itintegrity. Bhutto should, be disqualified and not allowed to become PM There werebetter people available than him in PPP like Khar and Jatoi.

On August 23 Gen Zia told BBC: "Some people's misdeeds will be revealed to the nationten days after the General Elections. Mr. Bhutto should come to court and answer theallegations. Restoration of democracy will be successful." Mr. Bhutto told BBC onAugust 26, "If I have to appear in court I will raise some basic questions. Then thecountry may face a crisis of Penal Code which I do not want." (Thus he challenged thegovernment. It was all done through BBC. My thoughts went back to the telephoneconversation between Mr. Bhutto and Gen Zia.)

On August 28, Mr. Bhutto met Gen Zia for about two hours, at his own request. Theydiscussed the future of the country, its stability and integrity and the graveconstitutional danger, facing it. Mr. Bhutto insisted that impartiality during electionswas vital, and that the election atmosphere would be affected if party workers werearrested on a large-scale before the elections. Mr. Bhutto also complained of a campaignof slander let loose against him by Gen Gul Hassan and said that his character wasbeing assassinated. In this meeting Mr. Bhutto and Gen Zia undoubtedly sized eachother up carefully.

When Maulana Kausar Niazi, Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Khar and Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoimet me for the first time after the 1977 Coup. Maulana Kausar Niazi told me that hewas against the likely confrontation between the PPP and the Army. He though that inorder to save PPP and its leader an understanding with the Army was a must. I assuredhim that there was no possibility of confrontation because the mission of the Army wasquite clear which was to have the elections held, in which PPP would undoubtedly win,and then to hand over the power back to Mr. Bhutto before reverting to the barracks. Ifthe results would not be accepted by the losing parties they would be dealt with an ironfist. The Army and the Judiciary would supervise the elections.

On August 29, Haneef Ramay said that Bhutto's intention was not to fight elections butinstead to have civil war in the country, the Lahore High Court Bar demanded Mr.Bhutto's arrest. Several political leaders who called on the Election Cell also said therewere cases against Mr. Bhutto, and that accountability should be the first order ofbusiness, before fresh elections. Some even said that Mr. Bhutto should be arrestedimmediately and tried in an open court. Chaudhary Zahur Elahi said that Mr. Bhutto


had violated the Constitution and committed treason. Air Marshal M Asghar Khan alsodeclared that Mr. Bhutto should be tried before any elections. People should know if hewas guilty or not. He should be tried in an open court. For his part, Pir Pagara said thedanger was not to the Pakistan federation but to Mr. Bhutto's life.

One September 1, Gen Zia in his Press Conference declared:-

It is not in Quran nor has it been revealed to me that elections will be held on October 18and nothing will happen thereafter.....

In my Opinion the Presidential System, which is closer to Islam, is more suitable forPakistan. I will put it up to the National Assembly on October 28 and leave the decisionto the next government.

Elections are scheduled for October 18. It can be changed by a day or two on people'sdemand I will have no objection. Let October 18 come. You will know my intentions bythen. My Government is an interim government. Everybody knows that we will handover power to the new government on October 18. This country can be kept together byArmed Forces and not by politicians. There may be some days delay in election but notmonths.

Parties with manifestos against Pakistan ideology and Islam will not be allowed to takepart in the elections.

By talking about the presidential form of government Gen Zia resiled from hiscommitted stand of neutrality. I told him he should not have done this. He said it wasonly his person view, and really not applicable because of the impending elections. Hisremark that there may be some days delay in the elections was perhaps, after hisbrooding over the problems which Mr. Bhutto had discussed with him on August 28.

More demands were made to the Election Cell that Mr. Bhutto should be triedimmediately and that the PPP should be held accountable.

Mr. Bhutto was arrested in Karachi on September 3, for murder and sent to Lahore.

On September 5 came a new proposal. Amir Abdulla Khan Rokri met the election Celland suggested that elections should be postponed. It was not based on any selfishmotives, he said. The integrity of the country was more important than elections. Ifelections were held under Martial Law and if the results were not accepted by thecountry it would lead to anarchy. There was a possibility of that eventuality. So he wasagainst elections. He recommended that a National Government should be formed firstand the Constitution amended to make the COAS the president of the country. Exceptfor Defence, all other portfolios and power should be with the PM and electedparliament The National Government on assumption of duties should declare the


election schedule. In this manner, transfer of power to the people would be facilitated.In order to make sure that Martial Law was not imposed again, the Armed Forcesshould share power. We could attain democracy only through give and take.

Sardar Mohammad Abdul Qayum Khan, President of the Azad Kashmir MuslimConference met me on September 7 and discussed Kashmiri matters. Later he wrote tome that various officials in charge of Kashmir Affairs were corrupt and partisan andwere likely to influence the forthcoming elections in favor of the Azad Kashmir People'sParty, they should therefore be transferred. It was a well known fact that Brig BãshirMalik, Additional Secretary, was closely associated with the election campaign inMarch 1975. He addressed the public meetings at places where Azad Jammu Kashmirrefugees were settled in large numbers. He was accompanying Azad Jammu andKashmir President on that election tour. He could not stay neutral or just .... Hispresence was clearly in aid of People's Party. That kingpin of the PPP for Azad Jammuand Kashmir may be removed .... Inspector General Police was acting on the advice ofChaudharv Noor Hussain who had bribed and blackmailed all the previous inspectorsGeneral of Police. I discussed the letter with the CMLA and necessary action wasinitiated as directed by Gen Zia.

On September 10, it was reported by the intelligence agencies that the tactics beinghatched by the PPP High Command were a desperate mixture of rumor mongering andwild promises. The PPP planned to:-

Start a whispering campaign against Gen Zia on the lines that he has taken money and is a CIAagent and anti-PLO.

Say Mr. Bhutto had been released on orders from King Khalid. A warning had also been given bythe Shah of Iran.

Announce that all the land holdings over haif an acre were to be distributed among the poor afterthe PPP forms the Government.

Pledge to workers total control of production under the new policy.

Promise anything to get votes. Do not worry about their fulfillment.

Spend one hundred and fifty million rupees to buy support of village maulvies and labor leaders.

Infiltrate the PNA and say that Gen Zia will not hold elections and will perpetuate his rule.

Lie low till the election campaign starts-Thereafter strike.

Agitate on the PNA lines, regarding asset cases. Plan to generate mass momentum.

Make a good start on September 19 at Rawalpindi. Hire and bring in people from outside.

Grave danger of a split in the PPP. Any, delay in elections increases risk.


Campaign on regional lines in Sindh - emphasizing Punjabi exploitation of Sindh. Portray Mr.Bhutto as the liberator of Sindh.

Say in the Punjab the PNA is breaking Pakistan by giving tickets in the NWFP and Baluchistan toanti Pakistan elements.

Make speeches in the Punjab, to influence Army Jawans (soldiers).

Start Punjabi exploitation bogey in the NWFP and Baluchistan.

Develop the theme that the poor have been exploited by the rich.

Allege that whipping and lashing sentences ordered against the PPP workers had not beenexecuted because of fear of the PPP reaction.

Tell workers stay contented in jails, if they feel the PPP is winning. If they led the PPP is losing,

use enough weapons against the government. That would enable bargaining. Initially forgive allgenerals in case of a win. Later replace the COAS.

Have a no-war pact with India and reduce the Army. Increase the FSF. Take revenge and rule as

a dictator.

Reacting to Gen Zia's suggestion regarding the Presidential System, the PPP said thatonly Parliament and representatives of the people could decide the issue. The PNA wasdivided. Air Marshal Asghar Khan said the proposal deserved consideration. ProfGhafoor said the Central Council of the PNA had given a unanimous mandate in favorof a parliamentary form of government. They were committed to elections to thelegislative assembly and not to a constituent assembly.

These views of the political leaders strengthened the arguments of the Election Cell.Consequently, Gen Zia postponed his idea of changing the form of government.Instead, he concentrated on the eradication of Bhuttoism and started laying more stresson the Islamisation of Pakistan politics.

A conference was held at GHQ lecture Hall, Rawalpindi on September 13, 1977 toevolve a code of conduct for political leaders and workers. It was presided over by GenZia and was attended by all important political leaders of Pakistan including BegumNusrat Bhutto and Abdul Hafiz Pirada. The Election Cell members were also present.The meeting lasted for about four hours and an agreement was reached on the conductof political parties in the scheduled elections. Later Gen Zia held a press conference andexplained the code which stated that any manifesto could be published by any politicalparty, but it must conform to Pakistani ideology, Islam and the country's solidarity.Disturbances in law and order would not be allowed. Elections would be held onOctober 18. Gen Zia explained the facilities that would be given on radio and TV to allpolitical parties.


During the conference Brig Zafar, Gen Zia's Private Secretary, tiptoed into theconference room and gave Maj Gen K M Arif a chit to be given to Gen Zia. It read."Telephonic message from Lahore - Mr. Bhutto has been released on bail." I noticed thatBegum Nusrat Bhutto, and Abdul Hafiz-Pirzada were gazing at Gen Zia. The mighthave guessed something as they whispered to each other and Pirzada went out. Hecame back after about five minutes and gave the news to Begum Nusrat Bhutto that theCourt had released her husband on bail.

Lt Gen Iqbal had been ordered by Gen Zia that in case Mr. Bhutto was released on bail,he should be rearrested after he had left the High Court premises. Geri Zia wanted toknow if this had happened. A chit was sent to Brig Zafar who, after sometime, reportedthat obviously Mr. Bhutto had not been rearrested. Gen Zia was upset and becamevisibly shaky, this was apparent in his conduct of the conference from then.

After the conference he asked Gen Ihsan and myself to accompany him to his office.There he asked his PS(C) about the reasons for the slip up. Brig Zafar replied that BrigBashir, COS to Lt Gen Iqbal, had told him that they had not rearrested Mr. Bhutto forlack of written orders and fear of likely repercussions. He could be arrested any timelater. On hearing this Gen Zia became livid, and said that his orders had beendisobeyed.

He talked to Lt Gen Iqbal and admonished him. There was a lengthy argument. Lt Genlqbal, MLA Zone 'A', refused to arrest Mr. Bhutto. Gen Zia said that he would sack LtGen Iqbal for disobedience. He also wished he had taken action when there was thatfailure of command in Lahore in April. He repeated he would retire Lt Gen Iqbal. Wekept quiet.

I was wondering what Zia's next move would be. Would he call off the elections,postpone them, have Mr. Bhutto rearrested or let the PPP win in the October 18elections? He did not given any hint what he intended to do. Gen Ihsan and I left aftersometime Gen Ihsan said Zia would neither sack Gen Iqbal not go for elections. He wasright on both counts.

Mr. Bhutto was rearrested on September 17 along with ten other PPP leaders, underMartial Law Order Number 12. That order could not be challenged in any court. GenZia also ordered that they be tried in Military Courts. He said that after going throughthe confidential files he had come to know that Mr. Bhutto and his colleagues wereguilty of murder, and had failed the people's trust. Who gave gen Zia those secret files;who briefed him on them? Certainly not the Army. Those flies were only with the civiladministration. So it must have been some of the bureaucrats who knew what was inthe files, where they were located and to what purpose they could be used. Someonecertainly knew how to get close to the boss.


On September 18, Gen Zia reportedly stated in an interview to Keyhan, the English dailypublished from Teheran, "I had told Mr. Bhutto that he is a murderer and a usurper."We discussed these remarks in the Election Cell and were of the opinion that suchremarks would do no good. They could plunge the country into a new polarizationbetween the Army and the PPP. (It later turned out that this interview had beenconcocted by an unscrupulous journalist.)

Justice (Rtd) Shaukat Ali, President Pakistan Muslim Liberal Party, met the Election Cellon September 19, 1977 and gave the following views:

a. The country can have a stable government only if it is administered by honestpoliticians. Politics need cleaning.

b. Whereas the PPP is a sinking ship, the PNA is a conglomerate of contradictorypolitical orientations and, therefore, not capable of steering the country to asuccessful goal.

c. General Elections be postponed till March 1978.

It is further suggested:-

i. Credentials and funds of political parties be checked. Political parties which do

not have roots in all four provinces should be banned.

ii. Encourage only those political parties which believe m the ideology of Pakistan

and not in the ideology of autonomous provinces.

iii. Do not allow any independent candidate. They pollute politics for petty gains.

iv. Electoral rolls we pared by the PPP contain bogus voters while genuine oneshave not been included. Update them.

v. Constituencies were carved out to suit the PPP candidates. Adjustments should

be made there.

vi Identity cards be introduced to avoid bogus voting.

vii. Let the PPP and the PNA tempers cool down and polarization be reduced. The

PNA however is incapable of handling the government.

vii. Arrest of Mr. Bhutto will be hailed by all democratic quarters in Pakistan. No oneis above the law. If Wali Khan, Bizenjo and several others can be tried why not

Mr. Bhutto and his colleagues?

d. The Turkish Constitution with some modifications be adopted for Pakistan.

e. Schools and colleges be denationalized.


f. Denationalize ghee mills and other industries except banks.

g. Gen Yahya be tried. He should not go unpunished.

h. Qazi courts be established at the district level to start with.

i. Re-enter the Commonwealth.

j. Kashmir issue be highlighted.

All this set the stage for the trial of Z. A. Bhutto, the erstwhile PM and for thepostponement of elections.

On September 23 Begum Nusrat Bhutto said in Lahore, "Our fight will continue evenafter the October 18 Elections. If the election gates are blocked, routes to revolution willopen. No assembly will work without Mr. Bhutto." Then she swung her red scarf in theair and declared, "The people should prepare for elections and revolution. Now thesword will be used as well as yelling." This was Bhuttoim.

Members of the Election Cell went to Quetta on 24 September and met local politicalleaders. It seemed that polarization had taken place amongst Baluchies and Pathans.Most of the leaders had shown their worry about Greater Independent Baluchistan.They alleged the census had been carried out wrongly. That had affected thedelimitation of the constituencies. Baluchies had been given extra rights.

On 26 September Ghulam Mustafa Khar met Gen Farman, Member Election Cell, andrecommended that elections should be postponed for one year or so. A. nationalgovernment should be formed.

On September 28, Gen Zia presided over a meeting attended by all MLAs and CorpsCommanders. Postponement of elections was considered. There were three Generalswho were for postponement (Sawar, Hassan, Ghulam Muhammad). Only one of themwas an MLA. The Other six Generals were against postponement (Iqbal, Arbab,Abdullah, Majid, Abbasi, Chishti) After a long discussion, Zia decided to postponeelections and insisted, "I demand loyalty."

On the same afternoon Khar, Jatoi, Kausar Niazi, Mir Afzal, Hamid Raza Gilani andNoor Hayat Noon met the Election Cell and recommended that the elections bepostponed and no new date given. Martial Law must become strict, and accountabilityproceeded with through civil courts.

The next day Gen Zia announced that the decision on whether elections would be heldor postponed would be given by October 10. Efforts would be made to investigate cases


of assets etc., by October 18, so that those who were to be disqualified would not beeligible to take part in the elections. Meanwhile, Agha Shahi addressed the UN GeneralAssembly in New York. He reiterated the pledge of the interim government that, afterOctober 18, power would be handed over, peacefully.

On October 1, Zia postponed elections indefinitely, explaining, "Political parties havenot given their manifestos. A personality cult has replaced programmes and policies.Character assassination is taking place. There is a cry from the country thataccountability should take place before elections. Holding elections under the presentcircumstances will be inviting a new crisis. So the elections are postponed till furtherannouncement, to save the country from perils and people have the correct picture afteraccountability. I assure my countrymen that there would not be a single day'sunnecessary delay in handing over power to people's elected representatives."

The people may have wanted the results of accountability first, but who were thepeople who were facing accountability charges? Who had given details of the doings ofthose people? It was certainly not the Generals. Nor was it the politicians. It was onlythe record holders who knew the details, that is to say, some key civil servants, allunder the Secretary General-in-Chief. So the bureaucrats had won the game.

The Election Cell tried hard to create an environment in which elections could takeplace and power could be transferred. The Election Cell never asked any politician tomake a demand for postponement of elections. Unfortunately, most of the PNA leaders,instead of demanding that Mr. Bhutto's trial be left to their government, welcomed eachmove against the PPP leaders. Some second line PNA leaders kept demandingaccountability of the PPP leaders and workers alike. Why were people keen onaccountability first, elections later?

The masses have always been cheated at the time of elections. Tall promises had beenmade which could not be fulfilled at any cost. It was well known that the administrationhad been protecting and patronizing the corrupt, and treating the peace-loving silentmajority with cynical contempt. Justice had openly been denied to the people at lowerlevels of the system. Every citizen knew what had happened in the past regime. Withthis background, the people feared that if elections were held without accountabilityfirst, the same corrupt and dishonest exploiters would again come into power throughthe sheer strength of their money. So they felt it very necessary that there should beaccountability before elections. The accountability process, they said should berestricted not only to those who were to take part in Elections, but should include allprevious ministers; even chairmen and other local body appointment holders, so that noexploiter of the masses stayed in the run for elections to the National and ProvincialAssemblies. It was expected that by this means it would be ensured that the NationalAssembly and Provincial Assemblies would not be monopolized by. feudal lords andcapitalists and the nation would be rid of the bad and corrupt elements.


Gen Zia postponed elections on the plea of accountability as demanded by the peoplethrough their spokesmen, but, unfortunately did not proceed with accountability. TheMartial Law Administrators are to be blamed for that. There was no retrieval attemptedof ill-gotten wealth, no control of administration, and corruption and injustices onlyincreased.

The Election Cell had recommended to Gen Zia not to postpone elections because thepostponement would lead to destruction of the morale of the Army, despondency,despair and uncertainty. Delay in elections would misguide the nation to become anti-Martial Law Regime, it advised. Thereafter the Election Cell came under attack.

On the other hand, a whole range of arguments were used by several people to prevailupon Zia to postpone elections. They belonged to such political parties who wouldnever have a chance to be in the government. They told him:

a. He was never recommended to be the COAS. He became the CMLA because hewas the COAS. So God had made him and so he was answerable to God only.God wished him to impose Islam in Pakistan and to lead the Ummah Islamiya.

b. They had dreamt that they were doing 'Tawaf', (circumambulation) at the GrandMosque of Makkah and he was leading in front.

c. People wanted to be ministers without shouldering any responsibility (In MartialLaw the responsibility is only that of the man in uniform-overall responsibility ofthe CMLA).

d. People wanted to exploit the situation for financial benefit.

It was however wrong to say that right from the first day as COAS, Gen. Zia hadulterior motives, or that he. was merely, buying time as the CMLA on the pretext ofaccountability and introducing Islamic Laws.

The Election Cell met with the CMLA on October 2 as desired by him Zia was upsetbecause he thought I was very popular. Before the assembled senior generals. Zia saidthe other Corps and Division Commanders were jealous of me. He told us that GenFarman and Ihsan were spent forces. He showed anxiety and lack of confidence in us.The reason was that we were against postponement of elections. I suggested that hedisband the Election Cell. We could not do extra work when there was a lack ofconfidence. He requested us to carry on but in a "diplomatic manner".

He called us for another meeting on October 3. This time I saw Gen Zia alone before themeeting. I explained the unhappiness of Gen Farman and Ihsan at this criticism of them.


I also explained my behavior, and assured him that I was keeping myself in thebackground. I was not a Martial Law Administrator, no was I meeting the Press,foreigners or anybody else. So why should the MLA's be jealous of me? If it suited GenZia, I would go on long leave, a posting abroad or even retire. Then Gen Zia explainedto me the current opinion about the alliances and the likely grouping in the Army. Thenames that were linked were Shariff and Iqbal, Sawar, and Jilani, Arbab and Hassan Ziaand Chishti. Zia said I was in the habit of pressing points strongly. Their ultimateadoption gave the impression that I was to domineering.

On October 6, I was supposed to go to Risalpur for the PAF Passing Out Parade alongwith the COAS, but I decided not to go. The Election Cell called on President FazalElahi Choudhary. He thought Gen Zia should become the President and form a nationalgovernment A few impartial political leaders should be co-opted. His experience since1935 indicated that the country was not yet fit for democracy.

The members of the Election Cell by now felt frustrated because our advice was notbeing adhered to. We thought immediate steps must be taken to establish image andcredibility through a national government. Law and order should be strictly enforced.Prices of ghee and cement should be controlled. Local Body elections should be held assoon as possible. If there was no value of the Cell it should be disbanded.

On October 30, Gen Zia declared, in Kuwait, that Pakistan's Armed Forces have nopolitical ambitions nor did he want political benefits. The objects of the Armed Forceswas to hold fair elections. Problems could only be solved through political government

On December 4, Gen Zia repeated in Quetta "Elections will be held 60 days afteraccountability is completed. When accountability would be completed I cannot say. TheArmed Forces role is to defend the country. We desire no power. Our survival lies inIslami-Nizam." (Zia had switched in five and a half months from democracy to Islam.Why? Who had been brainwashing him? Not the Election Cell).

And on December 9, 1977 Gen Zia again said addressing the Pakistan Jurist CouncilLahore. "I had said on July 5, 1977 in front of the nation that Martial Law is a curse onthe nation we should hand over the government to the people. On 21 December GenZia told the Press. If circumstances demand PPP can be put under restrictions(banned)".

Gen Zia then assigned me the responsibility, as Chairman Election Cell to analyze theprevailing political situation in the country, and to recommend a course of action whichshould be adopted. Consequently, a political analysis was prepared and sent to himvide my Corps HQ letter No G4562 dated December 26, 1977. It was subsequentlyreadout on December, 29 on the CMLA's instructions at a conference in which thefollowing were present:


Gen Zia ul Haq COAS and CMLA in chair,Lt Gen M Iqbal Khan Corps Commander and MLA Punjab (Zone A)Lt Gen Sawar Khan Corps Commander and MLA NWFP (Zone B)Lt Gen Jahanzeb Khan Corps Commander and Arbab MLA Sindh (Zone C)Lt Gen Ghulam Hassan Corps Commander and Khan Advisor National SecurityMaj Gen Ghulam Muhammad GOC Quetta and Incoming MLA Baluchistan (Zone D)Maj Gen Abdullah Saeed GOC Outgoing MLA BaluchistanMaj Gen Riaz Khan Acting DGISIMaj Gen K M Arif MS GHQ & COS to CMLABrig M Younas P S To COAS

A verbatim copy of the analysis is given below:

POLITICAL ANALYSIS

Background

1. Martial Law was imposed on the country on July 5 1977 due to a state oflawlessness in the country. The political parties had failed to reach an agreement andthere was a deadlock in the political negotiations. The aim of Martial Law as announcedby the CMLA was twofold. Firstly to disengage the political parties to end the state ofdeadlock and secondly to hold elections within a period of 90 days.

Expectations

2. Prior to July 5, 1977, the situation had deteriorated so much that the publicclearly condemned the continuance of the PPP government and considered that thesolution to the problem lay either with the PNA or with the Armed Forces. Thus MartialLaw was highly applauded. However, the public expected a conventional Martial Lawwith an inherent firm and tough attitude which were the characteristics of past MartialLaw Governments. The expected improvement in the essential aspects of day-to-daylife i.e. reduction in the cost of living, improvement in law and order situation etc. Thisdid not materialize thus very soon a state of disappointment set in and the peopleexpressed the reasons as democratic or benignness of Martial Law instead of expectedconventional Martial Law experienced in the past.

Prevailing conditions

3. Important characteristics of the current political atmosphere are that:

a. Martial Law is not supreme law It is under the Judiciary. With this status, wherethere is a combination of Martial Law and Judiciary, the situation is not clear cutand Martial Law has lost much if its inherent impact.


b. The law and order situation has deteriorated. The Police and CivilAdministrative machinery has been ineffective in dealing with the situationeither due to inherent intentions or genuine inefficiency.

c . Corruption has increased.

d. Communication between the masses and the government is lacking. Hence lackof confidence in the Martial Law Government.

e. The Public feels that the country is being ruled by bureaucrats who wereresponsible for the failure of the Ayub, Yahya and Bhutto regimes and will alsobring the current government to a failure.

f. The slate of the economy is far from satisfactory - The reasons may be:

i. State of uncertainty in the Private Sector, who are shy of investingmoney.

ii. The foreign capital is not forthcoming due to the presentgovernment being an interim one.

iii. Labor and industrial problems have not been solved in theirentirety.

g. Certain long term measures are being undertaken by the Martial Lawgovernment. i.e. First Five year Plan. This is contrary to the repeated assuranceby the Martial Law Government to hand over powers to the electedrepresentatives at the earliest. People have serious doubts now regarding theMartial Law being extended over a longer period. This is not liked by the people.

h. There is a considerable credibility gap. The people do not have a desired degreeof faith in the commitments made by the Martial Law Government. In the Army,the subordinate ranks are losing faith in the higher echelons of commandbecause of the repeated changes and contradictions in the directions of NationalAffairs.

i. The attitude of Russia is hostile. They may create a criticaleconomic situation and thus help socialists/pro-communistforces.

4. In the present situation, non-PPP politicians are unhappy because there is noprogress in the political field and they are losing ground with the masses. The PPPpoliticians are lying low because time is in their favor.

5. The public is not happy because Martial Law is not up to their expectations.


6. Internationally, the situation is not favorable because of the martial law governmentbeing an interim one.

Elections

7. The following parties have a following in all the four provinces of Pakistan:

a. PML.b. PPP.c. TIP.d. Jl

8. The following parties are strong in the provinces as indicated against each and have anegligible influence in other provinces:

a. NDP. Frontier and Baluchistan;b. JUL Frontier and Baluchistan, andc. JUP Punjab and Sindh.

9. All political parties favor early elections after completion or partial completion of theaccountability process. However the PPP and the JUP hold the view that the electionsneed not wait for the finalization of accountability.

10. All political parties expect that the elections will be held in 1978 and any effort topostpone the elections beyond 1978 will not be welcomed. Instead it may open the wayfor politics of agitation. The Supreme Court in its decision on the case of Begum NusratBhutto versus the Chief of Army Staff have also indicated that the elections should beheld as early as possible, indirectly, implying that the law of necessity will not holdgood if elections are not held in the shortest possible period. The elections maytherefore, either be held before the monsoon season or during the latter half of 1978.

The following factors must in favor of holding elections before the monsoon season:

a. Power must be handed back to the elected representatives of the people aspromised by the Martial Law Government.

b. A permanent Government will be in to deal with the poor economic conditions.

c. Maintain the credibility of the Armed Forces who are committed to holdelections at the earliest.

d. Internationally the effect of holding early elections will be highly favorable.


11. Elections in the early part of 1978 should be so held that the electedrepresentatives are integrated in the planning for next year's budget. The electionsshould, therefore, be completed by April 30, 1978.

Political Aim

12. Hold fair elections and transfer power to elected representatives of the peoplebefore May 1978.

Implications

13. The process of essential accountability must be completed before the elections.Undesirable elements should be disqualified under the Elective Bodies DisqualificationOrder (EBDO) at the earliest Cases pending in the courts or to be filed in the courts maycontinue but the elections should not be delayed for their finalization. The Constitutionshould be amended to authorize remission of sentences in these cases by the Presidentonly.

14. The Hyderabad Conspiracy case should not be withdrawn. It should continueeither in the tribunal or any other court of law, but the finalization of the case may beexpedited. The Tribunal or Court may even drop the case. Those acquitted should thenbe allowed to contest the elections, if otherwise not disqualified under the EBDO.

15. The Martial Law Government should encourage political parties having asatisfactory influence in all four provinces. It may also give guidelines which will helpin providing a dependable, patriotic and stable government to the country.

16. Political affairs in the country must he controlled and guided by a group ofexperts located in HQ, CMLA. No decision should made by the Martial Law Zonesindependently.

17. The law and order situation must be improved through a firm grip. Theannouncement of elections may create state of ineffectiveness in the civilianadministrative machinery which must, not be allowed.

18. A Ministerial Council at the Centre should immediately be appointed to takecare, of various departments and also establish an immediate rapport with the masses.

Political Parties Act

19. As an immediate measure, there is need to issue a Political Parties Act whichshould include:


a. All political parties to be registered.

b. Alliances between various political parties should be allowed.

c. Mamfestos of each party be vetted by the Supreme Court to ensure that these arein line with the ideology of Pakistan.

d. No party should be based on religious sect.

e Elections be held on the basis of adult franchise.

f. Elections to the Senate should be through direct voting and for this the minimumeducational standard of voters, should be Matric. The elections to the Senateshould be held within six months of the General Elections. The Senate should begiven some more powers under the Constitution.

g The restriction of two years on retired Government servants for contesting theelections as candidates should be removed.

h. People in the Tribal Areas be given Voting. Rights.

i. Each party should declare to the government as well as to the public the sourceof Party Funds.

j. Crossing of floors from one Party to another Party after having been electedshould be prohibited.

k. There should be no Independent candidates.

Constitutional Amendments

20. The Supreme Court in its verdict (Page 5 sub para 3a), has accepted theamendment to the Constitution by the Martial Law Government under the law ofnecessity, an in the interest of the general public. The following amendments arerecommended:

a. The Political Parties Act should be supported by a constitution amendment.

b. All politicians disqualified under the EBDO by the Martial Law Government, ordebarred due other reasons now or by the previous governments must not be freedfrom the, restriction of taking part in the election before the expiry of the disqualificationperiod. A Committee comprising the following should be appointed through aconstitutional amendment to ensure its implementation and if necessary review thecases of disqualifications under the previous governments.

i. President of Pakistan.


ii. The Chief of Army Staff.iii. Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.iv. Attorney General

Recommendations

21. The summary of important recommendations enumerated above is as follows:

a. The elections must be held not later than April30, 1978.

b. A Ministerial Council to be formed at the Center to look after variousdepartments on the basis of short term planning which should he subsequentlyintegrated with long term planning.

c. The country must be administered with a firm hand until the elections.

d. The process of EBDO (Elected Bodies Disqualification Order) must be completedat the earliest.

e. Constitutional amendments as given in para 20 above should he introduced.

f. The Political Parties Act should he promulgated at the earliest. The time scheduleof elections should also be issued.

g. Political guidance should be given to ensure the emergence of a capable, patrioticand stable government as a result of elections.

h. All political guidance and control should be vested in a group of experts in HQCMLA.

i. The Hyderabad Conspiracy case should he decided through a court, of law.

j. Martial Law Government should refrain from introducing long-term reformswhich should be left to the elected government.

On February 18, 1978 Air Marshal Asghar Khan demanded a firm date for elections beannounced immediately. The PNA leader Wali Khan said the process of accountabilitycould be completed within two months provided the cases of corruption against, thepolitical leaders were entrusted to military courts for trial. Sardar Abdul Qayum Khansuggested early elections in Azad Kashmir, and said the process of accountability inAzad Kashmir may be given up if it could not be taken on correct lines.

However, Gen Zia was markedly more negative about elections by the end of February.


"Steps taken on July 5, 1977 were not taken at any body's behest nor to please anybody. Itsresponsibility falls on me. I am not answerable to any political party. I have to answer to thePeople of Pakistan and God. Interim government is finished. I will hold elections when I see thatthe results will be positive. God has given us the opportunity to throw the bad blood out ofPakistan. Elections is a political process but not something without which we cannot digest ourfood. Forget about elections till I see that the results will be positive."

(Gen Zia's address to Jirga at Sibi February 23, 1978)


CHAPTER - 9ELECTIONS: YES OR NO?

On March 8, 1978 in my capacity as Advisor to the CMLA for Establishment I attendeda meeting presided over by Gen Zia, CMLA. The Chief Election Commissioner,Secretary Election Commission Ghulam lshaq Khan, and Maj Gen K M Arif COS werealso present. The meeting was called to discuss various important matters connectedwith the elections. After discussions, the following decisions were taken:

1. There would be separate electorates for minorities with multi memberconstituencies.

2. Each Province should be the constituency for separate electorates, for both theNational and Provincial Assembly.

3. The minority seats in the National Assembly would be increased from 6 to 8,with the Punjab and Sindh getting 3 each on the basis of population andBaluchistan and the NWFP getting a minimum single seat each. The ProvincialAssembly minority seats population. There would no reservation for anycommunity within the minorities.

4. Each minority elector would have a single, non-transferable vote.

5. The question of a separate electorate for women is shelved.

6. Fresh electoral rolls should be prepared for the whole country. The general rollsand the rolls for the minorities should be prepared simultaneously, but primedseparately. Any person who would attain the age 21 by January 1, 1978 would beenrolled as a voter.

7. There would he general and fresh delimitation of constituencies. It was pointedout that it may take one year.

8. The notification of August 7, 1977 calling upon the constituencies to elect theirrepresentatives would he rescinded, but the date of issue of the notificationwould he informed to the Election Commission.

9. The C'MLA would take such action as he may consider appropriate for theassociation of political parties with the preparation of fresh rolls and delimitationof constituencies.

10. Chisht would he incharge of day-to-day operations of the Elections inquiryCommittee headed by Brig Nayeem.


As political activities were banned in the country with effect from March 1, 1978 for onemonth (under MLR No 33), the Election Cell considered it appropriate to hold parleyswith various political parties to assess the political situation and to determine the nextpolitical move by the government before expiry of the ban on political activities. Therewere three main questions before the Election Cell:

1. Should the elections be held in the near future?

2. In case the current political situation was not considered conducive to holdingelections at an early date, then what should be the form of government until theelections were held? The views of the political parties on the formation of aNational Government, with representation from political parties, were also to besolicited.

3. What were the views of the parties regarding the restoration of politicalactivities?

Consequently, the Election Cell, met the PML (Pagara Group), NDP, JI, TIP, PakhtoonKhaw NAP, on March 16, 1978; PPP, JUP, PDP March 18, 1978; AJ&K Political Partiesi.e. Muslim Conference, Azad Muslim Conference, Liberation League, JI (AK) and PP(AK) on March 21, Maulana Mufti Mahmud contacted me on 14 March 1978 andinformed me that all component parties of PNA would like to meet the Election Cell asone body and not as individual parties. So it was decided that PNA would meet the Cellon 18 March, 1978. Maulana Mufti Mahmud undertook the responsibility of informingall the parties in PNA. NDP could not be contacted by him and it came on 16 March.JUP also did not come as PNA but met the Cell separately.

A summary of the views of these political parties and the recommendations of theElection Cell, were sent to Gen Zia by my Corps HQ letter No 905 1/7/MI/P of March20, 1978. Excerpts from this summary are given below:

Views

The National Democratic Party were of the view that:

The elections should be held after the process of accountability was over. The limit forcompletion of accountability could only be assessed by the government. The NDPwould wait till that time. (The general impression gathered was that it may takeanything up to three years to complete the process).

Till the elections, the ML authorities should run the government with a moral firm hand.(The NDP was neither in favor of a politically represented National Government norwould it like to join such a Government). Restoration of political activities may or maynot be restored depending upon the reaction to the announcement of judgment on themurder case against Mr. Bhutto.


To speed up the process of accountability, Military Courts may be empowered to try thecases.

In the provinces, acting Governors be replaced by permanent incumbents who shouldalso be provincial MLAs.

The competency of most of the members of the Advisory Council was not satisfactory.

The government must clean up the civil administration of officials having a pro PPPleaning.

Why Taimur Shah Jogezai, Yousaf Khattak and Aslam Khattak were invited to thebriefing conferences by the CMLA.

There is a need to improve upon the communications between the government and thepublic. District Boards be revived with nominated members.

The government must pay, more attention to the provision of basic amenities to thecommon man, i.e. foodstuffs, law and order.

The Tehreek e Istaqial Party's views were:

Elections must be held as early as possible without waiting for the completion of theprocess of accountability. The public expects elections in October November 1978 Thedate of elections must be announced at the earliest.

Till the elections ML should run the government (The TIP was neither in favor norwould it join a National Government because it is not in the interest of the country).

Ban on political activities must not be extended beyond March 31, 1978. Party elections,which is an indoor activity, should be allowed.

The process of accountability was unsatisfactory.

ML has lost a lot of ground in the field of credibility. People have started feeling that theArmed Forces will not hand over power to a civil government. This impression must bedispelled by making an announcement at the earliest regarding the future course ofnational policies and then by sticking to it.

Aslam Khattak and Yousaf Khattak invited to the CMLA briefing conferences had nostanding.

Bureaucracy must be screened to eliminate po-PPP officials who shared responsibilitiesin the promotion of policies of the PPP government.

The selection of most of the members of the Advisory Council was not satisfactory.


The government must concentrate on the basic issues affecting the common man.

The process of accountability by the ML government should be confined to certainselected persons.

Work on updating electoral rolls should start immediately.

The question of separate electorates should be left to the next elected assembly and soshould amendments to the constitution.

The NAP (Pakhtoon Khwa)'s views were:

Elections must be held at the earliest. The public expected elections any time beforeNovember 1978. An announcement must be made at the earliest.

The administration must be run by the ML authorities with a more firm hand. Theywere not in favor of a politically represented National Government nor would they joinit.

Ban on political activities should not be extended beyond March 31, 1978.

The government must take special efforts to create a better atmosphere of credibility.

The competence of some of the advisors was not satisfactory.

Electoral rolls must be updated and this work should start straightaway.

The Pakistan People's Party faced some internal problems and after discussion it wasconsidered advisable not to meet any PPP faction. However, during informal talks withthose who attended they expressed their desire to cooperate with the government inany way the latter wished.

The Pakistan National Alliance wanted some time to offer a reply. There appeared to beno unanimity of views. But the state of uncertainty in the country, the need for the dateof elections be announced at the earliest and the need to revive political activities beforeMarch 31, 1978 were mentioned. So was dissatisfaction with the selection of some of theadvisors.

The Jamiat i Ulema i Pakistan felt that:

Elections should be held at an early date. An announcement to the effect be made at theearliest to end the state of uncertainty.

A politically represented National Government was not necessary.


Ban on political activity should not be extended beyond March 31, 1978. It is indirectlyhelping the PPP. The statements of the PPP leaders before the courts continue to bepublished in the newspapers.

A speedy disposal of cases of accountability should be ensured.

The process of accountability should be confined to a few and must not take more thansix months.

Bureaucracy should be screened to eliminate pro-PPP elements.

Mr. Bhutto must be tried for treason in a Military Court.

The state of communication between the government and the public is not satisfactory.

Recommendation by the Election Cell:

There are two options before the government in order of preference:

1. Early elections, not later than December. 1978.

2. Elections in 3 to 5 years. Till then form a National Government to govern thecountry.

Option 1: Early Elections

Excepting the NDP and some other parties belonging to the PNA (final decision yet tobe conveyed), all other parties have favored this option. The Election Cell also feels thatthis is the best option under the circumstances. Elections must be held as soon aspossible as promised and power handed over to the elected government. The limitingfactors may seem to be too many, but early elections can be held and the country saved,provided the following steps are taken:

The month of elections be announced on March 22, 1978 by the CMLA. The ElectionCommissioner must then work out a programme and set in motion the electionmachinery. This will help in ending the state of uncertainty and reestablishing thecredibility of the government.

The procedure of disqualification in respect of politicians should be changed. Thedecision should be taken by the CMLA himself after taking into consideration the entirespectrum of the political situation and national Interest. If desired the Election Cell manybe consulted in the list of disqualified announced latest by April 20, 1978.

Political activities should be allowed alter March 31, 1978 in a planned progressivemanner. Timely announcements are required to ensure smooth action.


A political parties Act should be published before March 31, 1978 to ensure a disciplinedpolitical development in the best interests of the country. The details can be worked outby the Election Cell.

Till the elections, ML must be enforced with a more firm hand. No lawlessness can beaccepted.

The government must pay special attention to economic conditions. The basic necessitiesof life must be made available at reasonable prices even if subsidization is required.

The press should be carefully guided and supervised to ensure a peaceful atmosphere.Permanent ML officers be posted down to the district level. Appointments of DeputyCorps. Commanders, Deputy Division Commanders may be necessary in some cases.

Certain constitutional amendments will be required to protect the actions taken by theML regime so that these are not undone by the elected government. These amendments,when required, can be drafted by the Election Cell.

Option 2 Elections after completion of Accountability

Some political parties, in particular the NDP, favored elections after completing theprocess of accountability which may take more than three years. If it is decided topostpone the elections, it will have certain inherent disadvantages it will widen thecredibility gap with the government. There may also be a strong internal and externalreaction. However, holding of elections in the existing chaotic political situation mayfail to produce a viable and stable government and the country may face yet anothercrisis. There is, therefore, a requirement to create an atmosphere of confidence andstability, rebuild national institutions badly damaged in the last couple of years andfinally hold elections. How soon can the desired atmosphere be created? How can thegovernment's credibility be established? How can agitations as a reaction be avoided?How can the foreign reaction be made favorable? These questions may be given serious

thought. The following steps are recommended:

A National Government be setup to run the administration of the country under theCMLA. Preferably, members of the cabinet should be first tier leaders or, in exceptionalcases, second tier leaders of the political Parties. These leaders should enjoy a goodreputation in the country. Most of the parties, however, are not willing to join thegovernment as it may seriously damage their image in the public and may well be theend of their political life. The majority of them wanted the government to appointcapable and efficient technocrats, including the senior officers of the Armed Forces asministers. A via media can, however, be found by picking the cabinet in consultation withpolitical parties.

There should be no bar on members on the cabinet contesting the next elections.However, the government will be required to resign three months prior to elections.


The National Government should function under the umbrella of ML. The uniform mustremain in the background and act as an invisible force.

Governors of the provinces should be permanent and also act as MLAS. They should bemembers of the Armed Forces. The provinces should be administered throughGovernor's rule. Back up support for internal security can, be provided by localformations.

A long term ML should gradually be civilianized. The Armed Forces must get back totheir professional duties at the earliest and must on no account be exposed to civilianduties for a long time. This is true for the senior as well as junior leadership and men.They should be kept away from undesirable attractions as well as political influences.The protection of the Army from adverse effects, keeping them professionally orientedand ensuring their loyalties to the government is necessary. This must be ensured andfor this there will be a requirement to post a separate, whole time COAS or Dy COASwho should solely be responsible to run the affairs of the Army. Yahya-Hamidarrangements may be taken as a guide.

In case, this option is adopted, the Constitution will have to be suitably amended andpolitical parties disbanded. These steps have certain inherent implications which mustbe examined before deciding on this option.

Selection of Option

Events are moving fast, therefore a decision must be taken quickly as to which optionshould be adopted. If this is not done, events may go out of control. The governmenthas banned the political activities till March 31, 1978 and it is recommended that theannouncement regarding the selection of option be made before March 31, 1978preferably on March 22, 1978. The state of uncertainty must end. A bold declaration bythe recommended with each, option are ensured. The Election Cell may be given an

audience by the CMLA to personally explain both the options. It is also recommendedthat the selection of option be decided by the CMLA in consultation with the JointChiefs of Staff Committee and the Corps Commanders. The Election Cell, howeverrecommends Option 1. i.e. Elections at an early date.

We had a meeting of the Election Cell on March 27 to deliberate how to reduce thenumber of political parties in the country. It was decided that a process of evolutionthrough successive elections was desirable. It was also necessary, that newspapersshould perform the role of opinion-makers, and their views should help in nationbuilding.

Meanwhile, Gen Zia was going his own way. On April 8, he told at the SindhGovernor's reception in Sukkar. "We can have elections even today but elections are only ameans. What is the use when its results are not positive? In the political process, attention


should be paid to the foundation first. Elections should first be held at the grass-roots level. So, Ihave my attention more towards villages and towns. Therefore we are paying our attention toLocal Bodies Elections. We should become Muslims in a true sense." He more blatantlybetrayed his ulterior motives in an interview to BBC, televised on April 12, 1978. Hesaid: "There is some hand, the hand of providence, perhaps, which is helping me out, and if Iam the man who it appears God has chosen to do something for Pakistan, and if He gives me thestrength. by God, I will do it" (Times of India 14-4-1978).

I knew well whose words these were. Soon after the imposition of Martial Law in thecountry, there was a reception in Gen Zia's house. We were sipping soft drinks on thelawn. A gentleman approached me and said: "Mashallah, what a graceful look!Handsome personality. Completely Islamic outlook. Son of the soil .........." andwhatnot.

I told that gentleman, "We had a professor in our college at Ferozepur by name NandKishore. He used to teach us English in degree classes. He used to say, "My dearchildren, the best weapon in the world is sycophancy, and when you tell someone, 'Sir,you are never flattered', you have done it." So I said, "Brohi Sahib, I still remember thewords of my worthy professor. You may try it on the Big White Chief; he will love it."

It seems he did.----- and with great success!

Several politicians who met the Election Cell that April also felt that elections should bedelayed. There were others who felt that a National Government --- a combination ofvarious political parties, technocrats and miltary men -- should be formed.

The question of a National Government was discussed in detail in the meeting heldwith the CMLA on April 15. The issue of a National Government was first raised by theElection call in a meeting with the PNA leaders on March 18, 1978, the Election callstarted that the present regime had, after taking into consideration all aspects ofcomplaints and difficulties raised by the PNA delegation before the CMLA at themeeting held on March 4, 1978, proposed that the PNA should share responsibility inorder to solve the problems of the people. After the briefing session of political leaders,on March 4, the CMLA had a prolonged meeting with leaders of the PNA the sameevening in which, besides members of the Election Cell, MLAs of all provinces alsoparticipated. The PNA leaders had a free discussion on various national issuesincluding a programme for elections, accountability and problems of the people. Afterthe March 18 meeting, the Election Cell invited the PNA leaders for another meeting onMarch 22. The PNA said that Kausar Niazi should not be included in the NationalGovernment, but would make a definite decision on the question of joining theproposed National Government prior to their second round of talks with the CMLA.The PNA said it had accepted in principle the proposal to form a National Governmentwithout any rigid preconditions but would not join any government, which "Kausar


Niazi or anybody else associated with the tyrannies of the Bhutto regime are included."The PNA wanted the Army to maintain status quo. It did not want Presidential rule.

Katisar Niazi divulged on April 22, 1978 that Mr. Bhutto had plotted his assassination.He revealed Mr. Bhutto's plans to get him and Ghulam Mustafa Khar murdered inSindh and also claimed that Pir Pagara had been targeted for assassination in Punjab.Mr. Bhutto's aim had been to sow deep discord between Sindh and Punjab whichwould enable him to play the role of a peacemaker.

The proposal to form a National Government of all parties ran into difficulties not onlybecause members of the PNA resolutely opposed any PPP representation in such agovernment, but also because of rivalries between the PNA members. There was ageneral ineptitude displayed by the PNA for playing the political game. They werenervous and doubtful about their own ability to handle the intricacies of day-to-dayadministration. Their failure in the field of administration would lead to their beingdiscredited in the eyes of the people, who would eventually turn against them.

The Election Cell kept insisting that the proposed government should include all partiesincluding the PPP in order to make it fully representative, because we were neutral. ThePNA leaders were averse to becoming partners of the PPP after they had launched anintense struggle, rejecting in the process Mr. Bhutto's offer of some form of partnership.Meanwhile, Maulana Kausar Niazi, in a letter, to the CMLA, had withdrawn the PPP'soffer to join the proposed National Government because Maulana Multi Mahmnoocland some of his associates were extremely allergic to their joining it.

The government now gave a directive to the Election Commission 10 start work on thepreparation of fresh electoral lists and fresh delimitation of constituencies. It would takenine to ten months to complete the task. (This was contrary to the advice of the ElectionCell because it meant one year's delay in general elections) On May 7, 1978 Gen Zia saidthat political parties and their manifestos would be registered and their sources ofincome declared and subject to audit. No political party should be anti Pakistan.

Mr. Justice (Rtd) Shaukat Ali sent the following suggestions in writing on May 16, 1978.There was no political party in the country which could poll a majority of votes at thecentre and in the provinces. The situation in the NWFP, Baluchistan and Sindh was farfrom satisfactory and parties with a regional parochial outlook could emerge victoriousand thereby create complications for the country .... Steps should be initiated to evolve astrong national party with its roots firmly planted in the masses.

Coming to the polls at this juncture would be tantamount to asking the nation for itsverdict for a further division of the country. No Patriot who subscribes to the ideologyof Pakistan would ask for elections now except those politicians who are power crazy,however short-lived that power may be.....


The Election Cell should co-opt four additional civilian members one from eachprovince then prepare the ground for general elections. These members would startworking for the evolution of a strong political party in the country through themeetings with people from all walks of life (That was not our game).....

Abdul Wali Khan, leader of the NAP being tried with 90 others on charges of activitiesagainst the State was granted general amnesty. I had recommended to Khan Sahib thathe should not accept general amnesty, he should seek vindication through the court sothat his honor was restored. He had agreed. Why he eventually accepted the amnestyand what transpired between him and Zia, I cannot say.

On June 19, 1978 Gen Zia briefed Keng Piao, Vice-Premier of the People's Republic ofChina on the internal situation in Pakistan and said:

The PPP had entered power through the backdoor with ulterior motives since 1968.They also had a gang of four Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Mumtaz Bhutto Hafiz Przada andNusrat Bhutto. Through their polemics they set tenants against landlords, studentsagainst teachers, employees against the employers, labor against industrialists, andpeople against the government. Mr. Bhutto had not listened to Chou En Lal's advice thatPakistan was not to disturb social systems. He ignored this advice. He thought he wasthe only one with brains. Mr. Bhutto dealt with political opponents in a cruel manner.The present case was that of a civilian murder. The present government had nothing todo with it and was not associated with it. Mr. Bhutto had got 36 political opponentsmurdered. Definite information was available about seven cases He had adopted crudemethods had unnatural acts done to some enemies, and had also got girls raped. Mr.Bhutto told Dr. Ghulam Hussain to work in the party or face crude measures. Dr

Ghulam Hussain stayed, outwardly loyal but inwardly scared and disloyal.

Mr. Bhutto had no elections held within the party. He talked about democracy but infact was a butcher of democracy. He rigged the elections under a set plan. He hadrehearsed this plan in 1975 in Azad Kashmir. He got political leaders physically thrownout of the National Assembly because of political differences. His sole aim was to have aone party rule - his own political party rule which was undemocratic. He wanted toestablish an autocratic rule forever. He misused government money although officiallyhe was drawing 'No Pay'. He and his family wife and children bought a lot of propertywhich the poor country could not afford. There was a mass campaign against him by thepeople from January 7 to March 7. Agitators faced bullets unique in Pakistan against Mr.Bhutto and his regime. We supported him and his government because the Army wasreluctant to enter politics. We did not know his doings.

From March 9 to June 1, 1977 we urged Mr. Bhutto to agree for fresh elections. Twoweeks warning was given to him to resolve the issue. He had suggested. Take over if thePNA wins. Have Martial Law, I will help you.


We took over on July 5 and ordered elections in 90 days. After taking over we realizedwe had a wrecked economy. There was no production. Exports were low. Foreignexchange was so low that it could last only 90 days. It seemed impossible to exist. So Ihad to change the date of elections. I ordered accountability for their misdeeds.

Mr. Bhutto's case is a private case. We will let it go through the normal process of law.The Supreme Court has given the verdict in the Nusrat Bhutto case. If we had not takenover, Pakistan would have been ruined. There would have been civil war or neighboringunfriendly countries would have walked in. Mr. Bhutto's case is in the High Court andSupreme Court. Both are independent. The sentence can be retained, commuted or setaside. Clemency can only be exercised by the President who is bound by the advice ofthe CMLA. Law is the same for everyone, but as the highly placed are more responsiblethere should be greater punishment for them. Unfortunately it is not the case.

Mr. Bhutto was leaning towards Russia. How could he go to Russia and not to China?Mr. Bhutto had said China could not give Pakistan anything because of her owncommitments. So Russia was the only answer. Gaddafi had talked to Tito who in turntalked to Brezhnev, who confirmed that Mr. Bhutto could come for talks. But before hecould hold talks with the USSR, the Army took over. The Generals decided that Chinasfriendship could not be abandoned.

I explained to Gaddafi that Libya, Egypt, Iraq and Syria have oil and gold. What do wehave? What do we give? Russia never gives anything free .... Will Gaddafi give us gold?No. The Chinese are our sincere friends. They have given millions of dollars, and help inthe 1965 War with India and moral support in the 1971 War. We cannot desert China ....That is our foreign policy.....

Since July 5, the economic situation has improved. Your arrival has removeddespondency and demoralization. We tried to help Afghanistan on your advice, so thatshe can have friendship with Pakistan. But Daoud leaned towards Russia. YoungAfghan officers were being trained in the USSR. What can Afghanistan do?..... Moneyalone cannot defend a nation. I know we should pay attention to basic needs, i.e. water,food, education, health, electricity, development etc but I say security comes first.

It was quite a long homily on regional politics and national policy. On June 20, all thePNA parties except the NDP decided to join the government. The Muslim League alsodecided to join, whether any other party joined or not. The PNA parties had to submitthe names of their party representatives on June 21, but Maulana Mufti and NawabzadaNasrullah put up four additional demands which included calling off accountabilityprocess against Sardar Qayum. No decision was given on the points raised by the PNA.It was decided that if the PNA did not join, Martial Law would administer the countryon its own. The Muslim League, ignoring all other parties, joined the government.

Gen Zia in his address to the nation on June 25, 1978 said:


The formation of civil government does not mean that we have deviated from ourobjective. Our basic purpose is still to hold elections. You may remember I had declaredto hold elections within three months in my first speech. That was a reflection of my trueintentions and feelings. I had sacrificed my personal pride when I postponed electionsand ordered the process of accountability. The Military Government had no politicaldesigns on July 5, 1977 neither do they have such designs today nor will there be any inthe future. Our object is to hold fair and free elections in which all parties will have anequal chance.

It is our earnest wish that elections should be held as soon as possible, so that power canbe handed over to the people's representatives. Democracy is not the name of onlynational and provincial elections. It should, start from enrolment of party members andelections within parties so that any leader or a party which boasts of democracydemonstrates its commitment .... Don't we have political parties in our country whohave never had election within their ranks?

Next elections, instead of a joint electorate, will be on the basis of separate electorates.Separate voter's lists will be prepared. Present voters' lists will be reviewed. Limitedpolitical activity would be allowed after three months, with Local Bodies elections to beheld by the end of 1978 on a non-party basis.

Maulana Noorani and Air Marshal Asghar commented that the non announcement ofelection dates had frustrated people's expectations. Maulana Mufti said that the PNAwould support the government but no PNA representative would join the cabinet.

There were some MLAs and Generals against the inclusion of Chaudhary Zahur Elahiin the cabinet. The President, Fazal Elahi Chaudhri, was also against him because of apersonal family feud. Gen Zia informed the Muslim League that Chaudhary ZahurElahi could not be taken as a minister. The Muslim Leaguers refused to join the cabinetwithout him. Gen Zia thought he would be losing face if the Muslim League did notjoin. He talked to me and said the main hurdle was the President, who was notagreeable at all.

I requested Fazal Elahi Chaudhri, the President of Pakistan, to grant an audience toChaudhary Zahur Elahi to iron out the differences, he declined. I talked to him again,and finally he agreed. So I sent Chaudhary Zahur Elahi to meet Fazal Elahi Chaudhry.They met and reconciled. Gen Zia was satisfied. I also talked to the MLAs and Generalswho were against Chaudhary Zahur Elahi, and convinced them to accept him. Afterlengthy arguments they all agreed and the Cabinet was finally formed on July 5, 1978with the following main objectives:

a. To take steps for Islamisation.

b. To create conditions for holding elections as soon as possible.


c. To improve social life in the country.

d. To produce internal cooperation within the country and to enhance prestigeabroad.

It was a 22 member cabinet (17 ministers and 5 ministers of state). All ministers were totake precedence according to alphabetical order. I was also made a minister, and theportfolios allotted to me were Establishment Division and Kashmir Affairs andNorthern Areas.

Gen Zia clarified in his press conference the same day that the three service chiefswould also attend cabinet meetings in view of their appointments. The Military Councilwould stay. Gen Zia said that his colleagues were answerable to three powers -- GodAlmighty, their conscience and the next legislature. Limited political activity was to beallowed alter three months. Local Bodies elections were to be held by the end of 1978 ona non party basis.

Gen Zia formed this Cabinet to save face, because the requirement was for a NationalGovernment and we had been working for it. Maulana Mufti considered the MuslimLeague's decision to join the government as an "Objectionable Act". Fairness of electionsbecame doubtful if they were to be held with Muslim League ministers in office. Itseemed that Gen Zia's "positive results" really meant the return of the Muslim League topower. The formation of the Cabinet indicated a definite loss of neutrality, towards thepolitical parties.


CHAPTER - TENCOMMITMENT OR COVER-UP?

Maulana Kausar Niazi met me at the Chinese reception at Islamabad On the evening ofSeptember 30, 1978 and asked me if he could visit the Election Cell office the next day todiscuss some important matters with m.e I told him that our doors were always open towhomsoever wanted to meet us. So he met me on October 1 and his points as givenbelow, were sent to Gen Zia (vide my letter 2197/DO/-PA dated October 1, 1978.):

a. Overall situation in the country, is not frightfully happy.

b. Cabinet Ministers are skeptical about the functioning of the Cabinet and feel thatunder the circumstances they will not be able to produce results.

c. It will be advisable to ban political activities, dissolve the present Cabinet,activate the Military Council and dispense with four provinces by creating afederation of 15 to 16 provinces.

d. Law and order seems to be slipping out of the hands of the administration.

e. There is too much of leaning towards orthodox Islam which is construed as adanger to Islam, by Deobandis, Shias, Christians, Ahmadies Communists etc.,who do not advocate adherence to orthodox Islam.

Mir Afzal Khan, a former minister of the PPP, met me on January 21, 1979. He broughtsome very interesting points to my notice. According to him, while he was travelling byPTA from Karachi to Rawalpindi, Begum Nusrat Bhutto deliberately occupied a seatnext to him and told him:

a. Mr. Bhutto would not be executed. To give full authenticity to her statement shesaid if that happened, she, was prepared to be shot. She further reiterated thatthe Judiciary had been influenced, and a number of foreign heads of states hadalready given full assurance that no harm would come to Mr. Bhutto.

b. Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan, the President of the UAE, would continueto stay in Pakistan till such time as Mr. Bhutto's case was decided. Gen. Zia hadpromised the President that Mr. Bhutto would not be hanged.

c. Riazul-Khatib, Ambassador of Saudi Arabia, had requested his government thathe should be withdrawn from Pakistan. However, King Khalid had ordered himto stay till Mr. Bhutto's case was finalized. The King had assured the ambassadorthat Gen. Zia had promised that Mr. Bhutto would not be executed.


d. There existed a simmering discontent within the Army and very soon Gen. Ziawould be removed from the scene by one of the generals, who was constantly intouch with the PPP. Therefore, dark clouds of uncertainty would soon disappear.

e. The PPP would continue its policy of confrontation with the Army and theGovernment junta. They were perpetually being pushed to the wall and hencehad no other option.

According to Mir Afzal Khan Hafiz Pirzada had a keen desire to meet Gen Zia.

I sent this information divulged by Mir Afzal Khan to Gen Zia in letter No.9015/71ML/P dated January 22, 1979, along with the following recommendations:-

"a. As far as Begum Nusrat Bhutto's utterances that certain foreign Heads of Stateshave assured the safety of Mr. Bhutto, it appears a canny scheme and wellthought out propaganda to sustain/provide cohesion to the Party and to confusethe general public. To ascertain its correctness, Provincial Governments could beinstructed to Verify it through their own intelligence sources.

b. As far as a coup in the Army is concerned, it is baseless speculation by the PPP.All the generals are with the President and the loyalty of the Army is beyonddoubt.

c. Negotiations with the PPP seems to be a lucrative idea. We should adopt aneutral stance and exchange views with all parties. Saner elements within thePPP with a balanced approach should be encouraged.

d. Begum Nusrat Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto are more rabid than Z.A. Bhutto. Thesupport which they were receiving from the PPP warrants constant vigilance.

e. Hafiz Pirzada's offer/conjecture can be evaluated in its correct perspective and asuitable response initiated as desired by the President."

Maulana Kausar Niazi visited me on January 23, 1979 and with his political finessemade the following points:

a. The nation was highly incensed and worried about the judgment in Mr. Bhutto'scase. In case the death sentence was passed, he felt, the Government was likely tocome under incessant pressure to which it might succumb.

b. After the Supreme Court decision, the Maulana stated prophetically, there wouldbe a new surge towards the manifestation of fresh alliances between the politicalparties. The PNA was likely to break up owing to a split in the Muslim League.The PPP might also join some other party/group.


c. He hoped that the date of elections would be announced before the decision wastaken in the Supreme Court. There would be abysmal chaos if the schedule wasgiven afterwards. It would then be tantamount to a concession given underpressure.

d. Government should adopt a neutral stance by shedding the PNA. Ministers fromthe Cabinet.

e. Mr. Bhutto, in all probability, would refer his case for review once theannouncement was made. During this period maximum pressure would begenerated for his release both from within the country and from abroad.

f. In case Mr. Bhutto's death sentence was confirmed by the Supreme Court thePPP was likely to disintegrate and join the Progressive Group. In that eventualityeven the henchmen of the Party would capitulate. It would thus prove a plusfactor for the Government,

g. After the recent parleys with the President, the PNA was giving the impressionthat Sardar Abdul Qayytm Khan had been virtually absolved of his chargespending before a Tribunal.

All these points were made out to Gen Zia by me in my letter No. 2197/DO/PA datedJanuary 24, 1979.

Sardar Sikandar Hayat Khan visited me on February 4, 1979 and in his guarded andnoncommittal style made the following points which were conveyed to Gen Zia videmy letter No. 2197/DO of February 5, 1979:

a. Sardar Sahib highlighted his dual responsibility as Secretary General of the PNAand President of the AJKMC. (Apparently this was intended to convey hisimportance and authority, and also to explain his difficult position, beingrequired to steer a course protecting the interests of both the parties).

b. He disclosed that during a recent session, the Muslim Conference had given himfull authority and mandate to negotiate with the PNA and to take any decisionhe deemed appropriate, and that he had prevailed on his Party members thatthey should agree to:

(i) Continuance of Brig M Hayat Khan as the Chief Executive of Azad Kashmir.

(ii) Appearance of Sardar Abdul Qayum Khan before the High Court Tribunal.

c. He recommended that purely for expediency and to save face, Sardar A Qayum'scase should be tried by the Supreme Court and not the High Court Tribunal.


d. As a personal favor I should meet Sardar A Qayum Khan so that the existingmisunderstanding could be removed in the overall interest of the Party and theGovernment.

e. Provision and legal position for the appointment of a serving Brigadier as theChief Executive of Azad Kashmir be examined.

f. A few cases in which ex-parte decisions were taken by the tribunals should bereopened/reconsidered.

His party and he himself believed in extending full cooperation to the government andthe Army.

Sardar Sikandar was informed by me that it was not possible for the Government tochange its stance every day. Hence Sardar A Qayum Khan would have to appear beforethe High Court Tribunal. However his right to appeal before the Supreme Court couldbe examined. I conveyed my willingness to meet Sardar A Qayum on any convenientdate. Gen Zia was informed accordingly.

Anwar Aziz, a former PPP Minister, called on the Election Cell on August 6, 1979. Hisviews were:

a. Begum Nusrat Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto are the mainstay of the PPP, otherwisehere was nothing in the party.

b. Extreme confrontation existed between the Army and the PPP. He consideredthat this confrontation would not only lead to the destruction of the Army andthe PPP but would also throw long shadows on the integrity of the country. Inthat traumatic process the Army was likely to suffer the most, as no army canstand against the will of the people.

c. Apparently we were heading for a head on clash. Therefore, to save the countryradical steps must be taken immediately.

Thereafter he gave the suggestions given below in his capacity as a Pakistani citizen,and not as a member of the PPP.

a. Local Bodies Elections should be held as soon as possible. He thought that thebasic unit should be at the village level and the Council should be at Tehsil andnot at the District level.

b All political parties should be banned and general elections held as soon aspossible on no-party basis.


c. To reduce friction, the President should appoint his deputy in the form of aDCMLA or COS who could start negotiations with the PPP. Currently the partywas not inclined to have parleys with the ML regime.

d To defuse polarization Begum Nusrat Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto should betackled with more care and respect. Constant pressure on them would furtherharden their attitude and may enable them to gain more popularity amongst, themasses.

e. All tribunal cases should be finished and individuals allowed to contest electionson a non-party basis in November 1979, if not earlier.

Anwar Aziz's views and suggestions were sent to Gen Zia vide my letter No.2197/DO/PA dated August 8, 1979.

Maulana Ghulam Ullah met the Election Cell on August 9, 1979 and raised thefollowing points:

a. The political situation had deteriorated and the PPP was likely to emergesuccessful in the General Elections. In that eventuality, religious and pro-Islamicforces would suffer a great setback. He expressed his unequivocal opinion thatunder those circumstances no elections should be held. If the PPP wins therewould be no Islam and no Pakistan.

b. He expressed dissatisfaction with the attitude of the PNA leaders who hadadopted an unrealistic attitude and were forcing the government to holdelections. He was critical of Maulana Mufti Mehmood's stance.

c. He strongly advocated that the prices of consumer goods must be reduced andcontrolled. It would help in restoring the image of the ML regime.

His views were conveyed to Gen Zia vide my letter No. 2197/PA of August 11, 1979.

Khawaja Khairuddm of the Muslim League Chattha Group met the Election Cell onAugust 11 1979 and emphasised the following points:

a Holding of elections on November 17, 1979 would be tantamount to thedestruction of the country.

b. The country was not well administered. The law and order situation and pricecontrol left much to be desired. There existed a state of discontent anddespondency. The nation was looking for a change.

c. In his opinion the Muslim League could not unite as long as Pir Pagara remainedPresident. An ideal arrangement would be for Gen Zia to accept thePresidentship of the Muslim League.


These views were conveyed to Gen Zia vide my letter No 2197/PA of August 12, 1979.

On October 21, 1979 Mian Muhammad Akhtar Pagganwala wrote to me that he hadbeen abroad recently and had met a lot of Pakistanis there. They were of the view thatbanning the political parties was a good step in fact it should have been done earlier.There should be no elections until the economy of the country was built up and peoplegot relief from high prices caused by inflation.

It was the aim of the Election Cell to force Zia's hand if necessary, over the point ofsetting a date for General Elections. We wanted the nation to know we had done ourbest. As part of a prearranged, plan we three generals plus one unofficial member (co-opted by Gen Zia) had decided that I on behalf of the Election Cell should stronglypress in my speech before the Local Bodies Convention a scheme which amounted to afait accompli against Zia.

Our strategy was to put pressure on Zia forcing a confrontation, even though it was anindirect one. We had decided that the three hundred-odd assembled councilors of theLocal Bodies Convention would elect on the spot twenty of their members to form aninterim Cabinet, charged with the specific mission of getting democracy restored asquickly as possible. The onus was thus, on them. They were, after all, the duly electedrepresentatives of the people. Why should they not elect among themselves theMinisters?

I had also suggested that we should help the councilors to come to a decision fairlyrapidly about the twenty members to form a Cabinet by a rather simple means: closingthe doors of the building, laying on plentiful supplies of drinks, but at the same timearranging to have toilet facilities out of order. They would be stuck there until theycame to a decision.

I thought we had an understanding between ourselves Maj Gen Rao Farman Ali Khan(Retd), Maj Gen Jamal Said Mian and I plus Mahmood Haroon, Minister for the Interiorand prominent industrialist. But at least one of the members of the Election Cell musthave leaked our plan to Zia, because not only was the Local Bodies Conventionabruptly brought forward and convened in my absence, without any explanation, but Iwas prevented by my trip to Canada from attending the Convention, and as it turnedout, no time was even allotted in the proceedings for the Election Cell members or evenany spokesman from the ministries I was responsible for, to speak. The fait accompli wasZia's not ours.

First of all Zia met all the political leaders of the defunct political parties in the NationalAssembly building where the Local Bodies Convention was to be held. During thesemeetings, important political and international matters were discussed, including the


latest events in Afghanistan, relations with the USSR and USA etc. Zia appeared to takethose national leaders who met him into confidence. They included Pir Pagara, Mian MDaultana, Abdul Qayum Khan, Abdul Wali Khan, Mian Tufail Muhammad, MaulanaAbdul Sattar Khan Niazi, Professor Ghafoor Ahmed, Professor Shah Farid ul Haq,Khawaja Muhammad Safdar and Chaudhry Zahur Elahi. All in the absence of theChairman, Election Cell!

What Zia told them was later mentioned to me by Chaudhary Zahur Elahi. Zia wantedthe Islamic Khalifate (caliphate) revived. He wanted to be the head of an Islamic State.Islamisation and a Majlis Shura-in which the nation would be represented and whichwould be completely in line with the Islamic system-were what he was eager for. Someof the assembled politicians advised Zia not to do it, but to revive the Senate and runthe country till elections were held. The Senate could be used as a platform to expressdifferent ideas on the national affairs.

All sessions of the convention were presided over by Zia. More than 300 councilorsattended. All four Governors, Federal Ministers and Senior Civil Servants alsoparticipated. Finance Minister Ghulam Ishaq, Local Bodies Minister J. S. Mian, andForeign Affairs Advisor Agha Shahi in their speeches spoke of the country's economicconditions, the councilors' powers and duties and foreign affairs. The councilors putforward their own problems and proposals to solve them, with the main theme beingthe situation in Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion, the numbers of Afghan refugeesin Pakistan and Pakistan's defence potential. There was no mention of the restoration ofdemocracy or future elections.

After a coup d'état it is obligatory for the Armed Forces officers executing or supportingthe coup to give a helping hand to the new ruler, the CMLA, in administering thecountry. Why is it that democracy-loving civilian politicians volunteered themselves asministers? It was only sheer selfishness.

The veteran Sindhi politician Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi had agreed to become the PrimeMinister of the interim government in February 1980. I made him meet Zia in February,and everything seemed resolved. Then I was sent off to Canada, on what turned out tobe a fool's errand, and on my return everything had changed. Zia was completely in theclutches of the fundamentalists and other selfish and unprincipled advisers.

A national government composed of representatives of all parties was to be the firststage of the long awaited transfer of power to a civilian government. The Martial Lawgovernment had invited all political parties to join a National Government (April 1978).It was the need of the hour. The uniqueness of the experiment was undeniable TheNational Government was to come m under the aegis of Martial Law.


Although the wrong doings of the PPP in office were the main factors in makingnecessary the imposition of Martial Law, the PNA politicians defying the PPP regimecannot be absolved of some responsibility for ushering in Martial Law. But nowwhatever had been agreed between Mr. Bhutto and the PNA could be implementedunder a Martial Law. National Government as a Supreme Executive Council. Instead ofa Council of Advisers it would be a Cabinet Constitutional guarantees demanded by thePNA and not given by Mr. Bhutto could be granted through the National Governmentunder the umbrella of Martial Law. Election work the main issue when the Army tookover could thus be completed.

But bitterness between the parties was so intense that this scenario did not succeed. ThePNA refused to sit with the PPP in the envisaged National Government. The PPPthought it better to depict itself as the oppressed and the Army as the usurper. The PPPtactics were to fight as the underdog against the Army so as to regain the people'ssympathy. So initially neither the PNA nor the PPP wanted to combine in a nationalGovernment.

When the Army got rid of the PPP and started the process of accountability, theMilitary Government seemed ethical but if the PPP would now sit with the PNA in aNational Government it would be a farce or so the PNA claimed. To us in the ArmedForces this would not be a farce because we were neutral. Those who wanted to join ornot join would do so of their own accord.

When "accountability before elections" became Zia's slogan, a National Governmentbecame an absolute necessity. Internationally it would have been better than a militarygovernment. The Election Cell started meeting with political leaders, inviting them tojoin in the National Government. I requested politicians to cooperate fully for the goodof the nation.

Some political leaders had recommended that this projected government be installed onJuly 5, 1978, the first anniversary of what they described as "Mr. Bhutto's fall". Gen Ziahad even agreed to it. Cabinets were to be formed both in the centre and the provinces.This was intended to fill the vacuum which existed between the people andgovernment, due to the absence of cabinets. The ministers were to have full authority,and were to fly flags on their residences and cars, a practice which Mr. Bhutto hadstopped.

Gradually Martial Law was to fade out, and power be transferred with ease to civilians,the general aim being to restore democracy quickly. At the time when negotiations weregoing on with the country's political leaders, the Lahore High Court condemned Mr.Bhutto to death. Some people thought a National Government was being formed so asto get rid of Mr. Bhutto. They refused to appreciate the fact that there was a setprocedure after the High Court judgment which would not be circumvented, but their


doubts remained, because they were created by the PPP, the party naturally mostinterested. (The procedure involved was Mr. Bhutto's appeal to the Supreme Court and,if applicable clemency appeals to the Governor of Punjab and to the President ofPakistan).

Talks followed from March to June 1978. The PNA insisted that the NationalGovernment should be only of the PNA parties, with the PPP declared unaccountable.The PNA leaders said they would not compromise and accept the PPP without Mr.Bhutto. At one stage, Zia had offered, in Peshawar and Faisalabad, that if the PNAamalgamated as one party, he would hand over the government even without elections.I requested Mufti Mahmood to announce a shadow government but he could not do it.

The Election Cell visited Karachi and Hyderabad to meet the political leaders to discussthe National Government. Its formation would have been useful for the impendingbudget, and it would have facilitated the transfer of power. On May 23 and 24 the PNAGeneral Council met in Lahore. Mufti Mahmood is believed to have written to Zia afterthis, confirming acceptance of the proposal for a National Government. Zia nevershowed that letter to me, nor did he make any mention of the PNA's acceptance.

Unfortunately, the sincere efforts and good intentions of the Military Government wereinterpreted by some as its weakness. The idea of forming a National Government didnot seem workable, and the emphasis shifted towards a coalition government.

Parleys with various political leaders took place on June 14, Mufti Mahmood, ProfGhafoor, Mian Tufall, Chaudhary Zahur Elahi, Maula Bux Soomro, A.K. Brohi, Gul M.Jogezai, Gen Abbasi, Gen Farman and I were present when Gen Zia openly requestedcooperation. Nawabzàda Nasrullah Khan was not present. Talks were due to follow onJune 16. They continued for three hours with Nawabzada Nasruilah Khan and AshrafKhan present. They finally agreed to form a coalition government with each party togive the names of its candidates for ministers.

But it was not to be. On June 25, 1978 Zia addressed the nation on TV and declared thatthe National Government idea had been dropped. He said Pakistan had manypoliticians but very little politicking. He meant the rival politicians were divided intheir opinions on the formation of a National Government and sharing power with theMartial Law administration till such time as elections could take place.

Zia said that he would appoint the cabinets in the centre and provinces on his own.Association in his cabinet of persons picked for talent would give him the opportunityto serve Pakistan better, and also speed up the process of accountability so that thenecessary conditions for free and fair elections were created.


The very, next day Pir Pagara said that if Zia included any Muslim Leaguer in hiscabinet, the Muslim League would not take any action against them. Perhaps MartialLaw, the PPP and the Muslim League could get together, but Zia was averse to the idea.Other politicians, Air Marshal Asghar Khan and Maulana Noorani, were against anyNational or coalition government being formed. Of all the parties in the PNA, theMuslim League joined the government first, without even consulting the other partnersin the PNA, the cabinet was sworn in on July 5, 1978.

Parleys with the PNA, however, continued. Mufti Mahmood was not certain if the PNAministers would be able to do anything in the cabinet. He ultimately agreed tocooperate, though, on two conditions, firstly that the elections be held sometime in1979, and secondly that steps be taken towards Islamisation.

Though the Federal Cabinet was formed on August 23, 1978, the Provincial Cabinetswere not formed. It was agreed between the PNA and Gen Zia that A. K. Brohi, Ghulamlshaq Khan and Agha Shahi would not be retained as Federal Ministers. But Zia insistedon retaining lshaq Khan and Agha Shahi as Minister. I decided to quit because Zia wasnot fulfilling the agreement. I had laboriously worked out with the PNA. Then Ziaasked, "Murshid, what face would I show to the nation when my own generals, refuse tosit as ministers?"

I replied. "It is very simple. You simply tell the nation that you are civilianizing theCabinet. It would go down as a credit to you, and not as a discredit. The only personswho would curse you would be Gen Hassan and Gen J. S. Mian".


CHAPTER - ELEVENWHO KILLED ZIA?

On August 17, 1988, at about 5 pm local time, I was sitting in the living room of my, sonHamid's villa in Dubai, listening to my grand-daughter Janevi's musings, when thetelephone bell rang. It was Zafar Iqbal Chaudhary, Managing Director, Bank of Creditand Commerce (Emirates). I had known him since 1970 when I visited Abu Dhabi as aleader of an Inter-Services delegation to assess training requirements of the Abu DhabiArmed Forces. He informed me in a choked voice that Gen Zia-ul-Haq had died in anair crash near Bahawalpur. Some other generals and senior officers were also with thePresident in the aircraft, but he did not know the details.

I was sorry to hear the news. I was aggrieved but not shocked. It was tragic but notunexpected. I was mentally prepared to received this news ever since 1983, when I hadwarned, in a press interview, that his prolonged stay in power together with unstableeconomic conditions in the country would lead to political assassinations. Even he wascertain of his impending, violent death. He was always worried about his life andwould not even sleep at night. He preferred to go to sleep after his morning prayers. Hewould not trust anybody with security and safety arrangements. But in the end all theseprecautions did not work. In his characteristic manner, he thought it safer to havecrowd of VIPs with him, violating all protocol and safety precautions. He took theinnocent with the guilty. May God bless their souls.

Who killed General Zia?

The Pakistan Air Force Hercules (C-130) had taken off routinely from the airfield,climbed to about 5000 feet and then suddenly burst into flames, killing Gen Zia and 29others, including US Ambassador Arnold Raphel and Brig Gen Herbert Wassom, theChief US Military Attaché. Circumstances strongly suggested sabotage but there is noproof that murder was committed. Unfortunately, many people wanted him dead. Hehad no friends. He had become friendless because of his own doings. He had stabbedhis friends and well-wishers one by one, increasing the number of his enemies. Heconstantly lived with the fear of a sudden unnatural ending to his life.

Such an end was foreseen by many students of history. Only a few days before the aircrash, Gen Muhammad Azam Khan, in his last open letter published in Pakistaninewspapers, had warned him to immediately resign from both civil and military,appointments and to hand over to the people's representatives by election through theSupreme Court, arguing that this was the only way for him to survive and that he hadonly a limited time to accomplish that.


I wish he was alive. I wanted him to live, so as to face the nation, and to be accountableto it for all that he had done and for all that he had not done. Perhaps every well-wisherof Pakistan thinks the same way.

Did he deserve the death he got?

He died in the same manner as those who got killed in the Ojhri Camp blast. God hashis own methods to dispense justice. May God be merciful to them. The Holy Prophet(PBUH) said that one should pray that Allah may not put one through an unnaturaldeath.

I did not accept Gen Zia's death as the result of an air crash. I interpreted it as murder, apolitical assassination. Since then I have read the condensed version of the main reportof the proceedings of the Board of Inquiry into accident of C-130 BS No. 62-3494 onAugust 17, 1988. It states that the accident was most probably caused through theperpetration of a criminal act or sabotage. The Board also recommended that aninvestigation be ordered to determine the perpetrators of this criminal act of sabotage.The government has so far failed to provide an answer as to how it happened and whodid it. Every Pakistani and well-wisher of Pakistan would like to have an answer tothese unsolved mysteries. It seems that the government is shirking its responsibility byjust saying that it was an act of sabotage and if at all anybody knew the truth he hasopted to remain silent.

I will try to analyze the matter, as my national responsibility, so that things are seen intheir correct perspective. That might also help to keep the record straight. Unlike ournational policy, which has been to keep the people ignorant and in the dark, whether onthe still unsolved assassination of Liaqat Ali Khan in 1951 or the fall of Dacca.

I am not preaching what I myself do not practice. I believe in public and speedyenquiries. An incident took place in 1979 when I was Federal Minister for Petroleumand Natural Resources. At about 10 pm I was informed telephonically by Masih ud Din,Secretary, Ministry of petroleum, that one of the rigs at the Tut oilfield had caught fireand that we had suffered heavy loss of life and material. I was shocked to hear that,because to me it seemed nothing but an outcome of complacency and dereliction ofduty. I instructed the Secretary to provide all help, and relief, charter an aircraft to takeme to the site in the morning and to arrange for Press and Television representatives toaccompany me. I would leave the Chaklala Airport at 6.30 am with all officialsconnected with oil drilling.

When I reached the airport the next day the Secretary told me that the television team,journalists and the staff from the ministry were ready to go but he recommended that Ishould not take them with me otherwise the whole world would come to know what


had happened and we would get a bad name I told him that the rig at the oil field wasnot anybody's personal property. It belonged to the nation and the nation had the rightto know the truth. Instead of the rumors reaching the people would like the truth toreach the people and that too through the official sources. So I took the wholecontingent with me and we reached the oilfield.

Everybody was given the opportunity to go around wherever he wanted to go askquestions from whoever they wanted to ask and assess the things for themselves. Beforeleaving the place I gathered the oilfield staff to address them offered my sympathiesand condolences and promised to do for them whatever was required of me. Ajournalist asked what action would be taken against the people responsible for theaccident, I told him that I would order an inquiry and then take action in the light of thefindings and recommendations of the inquiry. On this the journalist said sarcastically.An inquiry means cold storage. I asked him to explain his point and he told me thatwhenever the government had ordered an inquiry it was interpreted that the matterhad gone into a deep well and that the outcome would never be known. I assured himthat it would not be the case with me as it had never happened that way in myprofession of arms. I asked him to wait and be patient and talk to me after twenty days.I ordered the inquiry got the findings and recommendations examined them andordered necessary action. Some were dismissed demoted transferred some incrementsof pay were stopped while appropriate compensation was paid to the next of kin of thedeceased and others who deserved it. All this was done within the stipulated period infact before the target date fixed. As luck would have it before the expiry of twenty daysI met the same skeptical journalist at the airport when I was going to Lahore and askedhim if he had heard about the outcome of the inquiry. He said very sheepishly that ithad happened for the first time. I told him that I had never been a minister in any of theprevious regimes.

Reverting back to the inquiry ordered to find out about the circumstances in which theHercules crashed and to apportion blame, the report has already been submitted to thegovernment. The condensed version of the main report, retaining the originalinvestigation and analysis of the accident along with the Board's findings andrecommendations has been published. Yet the nation does not know the key answer asto why it happened and who did it, or through whom it happened. Is it because withthe passage of time this matter too would settle at the bottom of the deep well?

The government has been calling the crash an accident, most probably caused through acriminal act of sabotage. I label it a political assassination. Who was responsible for thataccident? Certainly some of those whose duty it was to protect the aircraft and the crew.They could not be ordinary civilians, but were Armed Forces personnel and people onthe payroll of the Ministry of Defence. From both the Army and the Air Force, inuniform and in civvies. Those who had failed to discharge their duty were guilty ofnegligence and dereliction of duty. The C-130 aircraft could only be approached


through these people. There could not be two opinions about that. Someone has beenused as a pawn, as a tool, as a means to that crash, either voluntarily or bought bymoney, but by whom? That is the question.

In my opinion, the main culprit of the "accident" is Gen Zia himself. His policies andactions brought affairs to such a desperate state that the nation had to suffer a loss oftwenty-nine very valuable lives. Zia had a long, list of enemies. His killers could be anyof the following, or a result of collusion between some of them.

a. The USSR. The Russians had complained bitterly about his support to theAfghan Mujahidin. The Soviet Government had repeatedly accused Zia ofviolating the Geneva peace accord. Only two days before the crash, theKremlin had warned that Pakistan's obstructionist policy vis-a-vis theGeneva accord on Afghanistan could not be tolerated.

b. Afghanistan. Zia's death was going to give an immediate and importantbenefit to the Afghan government. The crash also killed Gen AkhtarAbdul Rahman who planned the clandestine policies and played a keyrole in shipping supplies to the Mujahidin. The WAD agents in Pakistanare the prime suspects. In any case, the Afghan regime was likely to doanything that Moscow asked it to do.

c. India. A long-time foe, Pakistan's oldest and most bitter enemy. It hadlong-standing border disputes and fears of the nuclear programme ofPakistan. India also has been accusing Pakistan of stirring up Sikhextremists on the Indian side of the border. Only days before Zia's death,Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi had warned that Pakistan would havecause to regret Its behavior.

d. The USA. It had its own interests. If Zia had lost his grip, a change of facewas desirable. The US Ambassador and the Defence Attaché may havefallen prey to courtesy. They could not refuse a ride with Zia. Washingtonknew by 1988 that Zia could not last much longer as Pakistan's ChiefExecutive.

e. Iran. The Shiite minority in Pakistan thought that Zia espoused the wrongbrand of Islam. Earlier, their leader Allama Arif Hussain al Hussaini wasassassinated, and some of his followers had blamed the crime on Gen Ziaand his supporters. They wanted the Islam of Khawaja Mueen ud DinChishti, and not Wahabism. Ayatollah Khomeni had never granted Zia anaudience, in spite of all his efforts.


f. Political parties of Pakistan. Zia kept promising democracy but neverdelivered it, choosing instead to impose Islamic Law. Some were againstthe imposition of Islamic Law, complete with public flogging and thecurtailment of women's rights. Dissolved Provincial and NationalAssembly members were not all that friendly either. Domestic oppositionparties were after his blood. There had been an attempt on his life in 1982by trying to shoot down his plane with a surface-to-air missile.Fundamentalist Muslims were also against him because Zia had failed toimpose Nizam-e-Mustafa. Most of the politicians considered his elevenand a half year rule as repressive, leaving behind nothing but death andmortgages, hunger and unemployment, exploitation and discrimination,drugs and corruption, heroin and Kalashnikovs.

g. The Pakistani Armed Forces could not be above suspicion. There hadbeen an attempted coup against him in 1980. Whatever device was used todisrupt the controls of the Hercules could not have been used without theactive cooperation of one or more members of the Armed Forces. If thedevice was activated . through remote control, it could be from the groundor from the air, housed in a light aircraft, fighter aircraft or a helicopter.There was a lot of difference between a Chief of Army Staff and a DeputyChief of Army Staff or a Vice Chief of Army Staff. After seeing theretirement pattern of the Deputy and Vice Chiefs of Army Staff, nobodycould ever imagine or think of becoming the Chief of Army Staff in Zia'slifetime.

h. The Ahmadis. The venom that Zia let loose against this minority hadmade them his arch enemies. They had shifted their head office to theUnited Kingdom.

i. Relatives of men and women and children who died in the Ojhri Campblast did not want him alive on personal grounds.

j. People who had suffered at his hands because of intellectually dishonestdecisions taken by him on promotions, appointments and retirements inthe civil service, armed forces, judiciary and other services.

k. Relatives of those whose mercy petitions he had rejected, and especiallythose whom he had promised that nothing would happen to, as well asrelatives of those who were shot by government agencies on his order andpolicies.

l. Some idealists who always thought that Zia was improperly dressed andgot the uniform disgraced by letting his daughter wear it.


One can keep adding to the list if one had the patience, but at this stage I would like tomake some observations about the proceedings of the Board of Inquiry.

a. The Board of Inquiry had a US technical assistance and advisory teamcomprising six USAF officers. I wonder why it was necessary from thevery start of the inquiry proceedings. Our own air force officers arecertainly equally good, if not better in professional competency. In thisinquiry, God knows how many national matters would have beendiscussed which the foreigners had no business to know. Does this meanthat we have no self-sufficiency and sovereignty in our own affairs?Referring the matter to them at a later stage as a consultative body wouldhave been a different matter. Such dependence has lowered our prestigeinternationally. We should respect ourselves and be responsible andanswerable to ourselves in national matters. Internationally there are nofriends or enemies. Every country has its own ulterior motives. Weshould safeguard our own interests.

b. Why were so many VIPs on board one aircraft? Who was responsible forthis? It was widely assumed that the Russians and Afghans were afterZia's blood for supporting the Afghan Mujahidin. Gen Akhtar AbdulRahman was arranging the supplies of weapons to the Mujahidin, andAmbassador Raphel was providing much of the weapons as the USrepresentative in Islamabad. Why were these and other key peopletraveling in the same aircraft? Where and when could there be a betteropportunity for political assassination than this? Was it Gen Zia's doing orwas it completely accidental?

c. The aircraft was at Bahawalpur Airport from 09:27 to 15:46 hours. Whohad access to its cockpit, and with what purpose? There were no telltalesigns it was said, but was any attempt made to trace them?

d. Loading of two crates of mangoes on board at Bahawalpur wasunderstandable. They could be from a friend or a well-wisher in themango-growing area. I But I cannot understand the loading of apresentation case of aircraft models. Where did these models come from?There was no model manufacturing industry in Bahawalpur. If they hadbeen the models of tank MIAI, they could be from there. But certainly notaircraft models. I have my doubts about those models and the intentionsbehind them.


e. It was said that the activation of gases in a container, during flight, eithermanually, remotely or, automatically, would result in the insidiousincapacitation of the flight deck crew. Unless it was automatically done, itwould have had to be activated by someone on board the aircraft,tantamount to committing suicide. Or it would have to be activatedthrough remote control. Minute examination should lead to the correctanswer. Investigations should be pursued.

f. It is normal for autopilot to be engaged once the aircraft is safely airborne.Therefore the incapacitation of the crew had to take place before theengagement of the autopilot. If the autopilot had been engaged, thesituation would have been entirely different, because the aircraft wouldhave continued to fly and given sufficient time for a reaction from peopleon board. It clearly indicates that the people involved were fullyconversant with operational flying and protocol intricacies.

g. Why were proper autopsies of the crew not carried out? Was that lapseintentional or dereliction? If it was intentional, then there were very manyhands behind the scene which must be exposed, for the sake of the well-being of the country.

I have no firm evidence to doubt the findings of the inquiry, but I must warn that itcould be a completely cooked-up report. If I had my way the inquiry would bereopened. In saying this I mean no ill-will to anybody. I only mean goodwill toPakistan.

With Zia's death the general who had appeared on the scene, from nowhere with thepromise of 'FAIRPLAY', suddenly disappeared from the, scene with 'FOULPLAY', Healso practiced Foulplay after promising Fairplay.


CHAPTER - TWELVELOST LABOURS

Ever since the inception of Pakistan, repeated promises and attempts have been made toimprove the lot of unskilled workers and laborers. Unfortunately, none of thesepromises bore any results.

When I was appointed Minister of Labor, I inherited a situation of general despondencyamong the laboring class. I set about developing a comprehensive labor policy forPakistan.

Ever since my refusal, in August 1978, to serve as a Minister in the Federal Cabinet,some of my senior colleagues had been asking me to reconcile with Gen Zia and givehim a helping hand in administering the country. I was not willing because I was quitehappily employed in my job as a Corps Commander. Gen Hassan and Gen J. S. Mianeven used to taunt me that they lost their ministerships because of me. They wanted meto become a Minister again so that they could also rejoin the Cabinet. Gen Zia asked meonce or twice if I had changed my mind about becoming a Minister again. I replied inthe negative, and requested him to let me stay on in my job till retirement (on 30 March1980).

On March 23, 1979, Gen Zia announced that General Elections would be held onNovember 17, that year. A question was raised whether the-Civilian Ministers would beallowed to continue as Ministers till the election, date or would be relieved. Theconsensus of the Corps Commanders and PSO's was that those who were to take part inthe elections must resign, so that a neutral stance could be maintained by thegovernment. There was also a feeling that the country would be better administeredwithout the Civilian Ministers.

The PNA Ministers used to complain that they had no real power authority over thebureaucracy, whereas the civil servants not only listened, but were actually scared ofthe generals who were Ministers.

Gen Zia decided to induct the Generals back into the Cabinet. I was persuaded by theDeputy COAS not to refuse. My refusal would have indicated a .split in the Army,which, in his opinion, would be harmful to the Army. So when Gen Zia asked me tobecome a Minister again I agreed.

He reshuffled the Cabinet on April 21, 1979, and allotted me the portfolios of threeministers viz. Labor, Manpower and Overseas Pakistanis, Petroleum and Natural


Resources and Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas, in addition to my Command of theCorps. In order to keep the bureaucrats happy, he did not give me the EstablishmentDivision which had been with me previously.

Pakistani workers have many excellent qualities. When treated decently and honestly,they are quite capable of producing good work, as seen in the achievements of themillions of Pakistanis working abroad. Through their hard work, in various foreigncountries, they have attained great prosperity. Yet in Pakistan itself the results are verydifferent. Sadly, the conditions are lacking at home in which. their qualities could shine.When Pakistan came into being there were only two textile mills in West Pakistan(present Pakistan), at Lyalipur and Okara, two sugar mills in the Frontier Province andthree cement factories, at Wah, Dandot and Rohri. The crude oil production of thewhole country was just 300,000 barrels, per annum. The total electricity productionthrough thermal plants was 30,000 Kilowatts and another 10,000 kilowatts throughhydel power. It was not sufficient even to provide light to the big cities. There was nomachinery or any arrangements to set up a factory in West Pakistan. Technically trainedmanpower was not there at all in the vast agricultural, tracts of West Pakistan.However, immigrants who came from all over India comprised craftsmen, artisans,engineers, supervisors, professional managers etc. They did not migrate because therewere lucrative jobs waiting for them in West Pakistan, but they migrated for promisedIslamic values. All of them made sacrifices for a love for Islam and a love for Pakistan.They applied themselves to giving industrial uplift to the country.

This Labor Class, as it came to be known, worked day and night for the progress of thecountry and also fought against the enemy, side by side with the soldiers, in each war.They also rose against the dictators to get rid of them when they could not tolerate themany, more. It is tragic that so little has been done for them. Their plight is still pitiable.Their welfare, health, accommodation, training, along with the education of theirchildren were all grossly neglected. Pakistan's workers needed a sound labor policy.

A Tripartite Labor Conference was convened by the Martial Law Governmentimmediately after it came into power in 1977. Employers and Labor failed to make anysubstantial proposals to improve labor-management relations or increase productivity.When the report went to the CMLA, he. directed that a labor policy be formulated onscientific lines. So for the first time in the history of Pakistan, a Labor Commission wasconstituted by the government to examine measures necessary for bringing abouttangible improvements in industrial relations. Recommendations given by the LaborCommission were to form the basis for a national labor policy beneficial to the wholecountry. The Ministry of Labor would examine the Labor Commission'srecommendations consult other departments and ministries on them and then frame itsown recommendations. (Pakistan Times and Nawa e Waqat 12- 7-1979)


I gave the guideline that since Pakistan was an Islamic State, the Islamic concept ofequality would have to be fully enforced in all walks of life and everybody must respectit. The Islamic system i.e. Musawat e Mohammadi if truly implemented could end povertyignorance and unemployment in the country. But the system could not come into forceif everyone worked for that goal Islam was the first religion to introduce the concept of"dignity of labor and hard work" to the world. The Holy Prophet (PBUH) had himselfdone physical labor to set a shining example for his followers. The teachings of Islamwent to the extent that anyone who shirked hard work would not be a friend of Allahthe Almighty or the Holy Prophet. Similarly the Holy Prophet had emphasized to hisfollowers the importance of paying fair wages to the laborer promptly.

Three groups were involved in industry at this time viz labor management and thegovernment. Unfortunately all three were not functioning as they should Workers werenot putting in honest labor, managements were not willing to pay the labor theirrightful dues and government officials were not supervising labor managementrelations properly. The new Labor Policy would make sure that all three functionedproperly. Workers would get fair wages and other facilities employers would get theirrights, while labor officials and inspectors would be held accountable for their actions.

I also emphasized the need for improving training facilities for labor especially for thosewho went abroad to seek employment. Then as now there were very few trainingfacilities for workers Training institutions both in the public and private sectors werenot functioning satisfactorily. I highlighted that the profession of teaching had suffereda lot as it held little attraction for the brightest and most capable professionals. Salarieswere low and other facilities were not available. If the country was to be made,strong and prosperous, first-rate teachers would have to be produced. I directed toTechnical Centres to produce instructors of good quality. As continuity in training wasnecessary to improve performance. National and Provincial Training Boards forworkers were also seriously considered. I directed Justice Attaullah Sajjad on May 7,1979 to have the Labor Commission Report ready for presentation to me within sixweeks. It was ready, by June 20, 1979.

There had been complaints against the Labor Attaches posted in the mission abroad.There were too few of them to deal with the Pakistan immigrant's problems. I discussedthis with Gen Zia and requested him to appoint more Labor Attaches in the countrieswhere we had the most workers, e.g. Saudi Arabia, UAE (Abu Dhabi, Dubai), Kuwait,Libya, Iraq, Oman, Denmark and the United Kingdom. He agreed and, selected the newattaches himself. I briefed them before they left to take up their new assignments. Iasked them to make all-out efforts to promote the image of the country abroad, and toserve Pakistanis working there with complete dedication. They had to look after theinterests of their compatriots and to provide all possible facilities to them.


They were also warned that all types of manpower exporters would be visiting theprospective employers abroad. Strict action would have to be taken against dishonestpromoters, whereas all facilities should be given to honest manpower, exporters. Thenational image should not be tarnished for money. This policy was also stated to theManpower Promoters' Association in Pakistan. Recruiting Agencies responsible forgetting a bad name for the country would get their licenses cancelled. As unskilledmanpower was neither well paid nor much respected, it was planned to launch acollective training programme to produce technically trained tradesmen foremployment abroad.

I visited the Overseas Employment Corporation (OEC) at Rawalpindi to check itsperformance. In spite of the fact that it had to compete against some very wellestablished manpower exporters, it was doing all right. However, I noticed that it wasnot properly organized to serve the backward areas where private entrepreneurshipwas also lacking. In order to help the residents of those areas to get their due chance ofserving abroad, I ordered OEC branches to be opened at Mirpur (Azad Kashmir) andQuetta. Because of heavy population demands from Lahore and Peshawar, I alsosanctioned branch offices at those places.

In June 1979, I led a Labor delegation to the People's Republic of China. The delegation'svisit coincided with the Chinese National People's Congress which was meeting afterabout 10 years. All the top Chinese leaders would be very busy. But there would belittle point of my visiting China if there was no audience with the Premier HuaGuofeng. I had been told that on a recent visit he had not given an audience to ForeignMinister Agha Shahi. Consequently I informed the Chinese Ambassador in Pakistanthat I would lead the Labor delegation only if an audience with Premier Hua Guofengwas confirmed, otherwise I would depute someone else to lead it. After some days heconfirmed that the Premier would grant me an audience for as long as I desired. I wasgrateful and led the delegation.

Premier Hua Guofeng received me after 10 pm on June 26 and we talked for 80 minutes.Much of our discussion concerned foreign policy and Soviet "hegemonism" in Asia.

Our delegation was very impressed by the Management Worker relationship in China.It was based on complete teamwork emanating from very cordial relations. There wasgreat emphasis on the dignity of each and every profession and calling. Pakistanmanagement was not reconciled to the idea of the delegation of power. It was quite theopposite in China, where there was complete decentralization of authority withcommensurate responsibilities. Workers were taken completely into confidence beforesetting annual productivity targets. In fact, the targets were unanimously agreed uponin the Management Worker Join Meetings. This made a very sound base for planning.There were no professional trade union leaders in China were redundant. The


government talked directly with the workers in China the entire nation worked hard toattain self-sufficiency and national self respect. Pakistan could learn a lot from them.

The Labor Commission report was received by July 12, 1979. Its 502 pages contained2.560 recommendations covering the entire spectrum of Labor Management re1ations.It would be thoroughly examined and a new Labor Policy would he announced afterthe approval of the Cabinet. It would help to increase domestic production,consumption and boost export.

The new Labor Policy would enforce Islamic concepts. Fair wages would be ensuredand better facilities for workers training would be created. Labor would be given itsrightful place in society. Some of the points to be included in the Policy were:

a. Pre-requisites of a job and the training facilities for it.

b. Methodology for on-the-job training for upgrading and Promotions.

c. Post retirement rehabilitation schemes.

d. Award of pensions in the private sector.

e. Foolproof safeguards against exploitation of workers both in public and privatesectors.

f. Security of service.

g. Better facilities for medical care and education of children.

h. Compensation in case of an accident.

i. Minimum period of attendance during a calendar year.

j. Incentives -- Profit / bonus linked with productivity.

I talked to the Pakistan National Federation of Trade Unions on July 23, 1979 in Karachiat a two day seminar. I told them that 95% of the Labor Commission recommendationswere unanimous and would be included in the Labor Policy. It would be designed toincrease production while workers' and administrators' rights would be safeguarded.The relationship between Labor and Administration must improve, I said and quotedTipu Sultan: "One day's life of a lion was better than 100 years of a Jackal's life." Livingin honor was a great thing. Those who wanted to live like that had to face many 'hurdles with courage, tenacity and determination.

In September 1979 I led a delegation to Saudi Arabia to see the working and livingconditions of Pakistanis there. I visited the Al-Kharaj Electrification Project being


executed by a Pakistani company. I also visited some camps in the vicinity of Jeddah,and exchanged views with our workers. I also met with the Saudi Labor MinisterIbrahim Ankari in Jeddah and we discussed the following:

a. No sympathy should be shown to illegal immigrants. They should be deported.The Pakistan government would take stern action against them. Action againstthe Manpower Exporters Would also be taken in cases where it was found thatthey had sponsored the immigrants illegally.

b. Bangladeshis and Indians were giving a bad name to Pakistanis. In some casesthey had managed to acquire Pakistani passports and were posing as Pakistaninationals. Any immigrants of that nature when arrested should be deported.

c. Pakistan was more interested in working on specific projects rather thanexporting manpower only. So the Saudi government should consider Pakistanfor projects through normal international competitive channels.

d. Dispatch of the dead bodies of workers who had died in Saudi Arabia to theirnext of kin in Pakistan was normally inordinately delayed, due to lengthyprocedures being adopted by the Saudi government. These procedures must berevised and streamlined, so that corpses are sent to their destination quickly.

e. There were very many pending death compensation claims.

f. Disbursement of old age benefits and Social Security amounts (5 + 8%) should bemade either directly to the individuals or through the Government of Pakistan. Ithad already been inordinately delayed.

g. Work with South Koreans on the Projects on which they were working should beallowed. Their Ambassador had agreed after discussions with me.

On October 16, Gen Zia said in an address: "Labor will not have the right to strike,employer will not have the right to lockout. The Labor Commission report has beenreceived. Decisions on this will be given soon". (Nawa-e-Waqat 17-10-1979)

Talking to the newsmen during a visit to the Pak-German Technical Training Centre inLahore, I told them that the country needed one hundred thousand skilled workersannually for local and overseas requirements, but the training institutes in the countrywere only producing seven thousand, including those trained under crash programmes.The government was trying to improve the working of the technical institutes andensure that the existing capacity was fully utilized.

I also told them that the government would discourage the trend of going abroad foremployment. However, if people wanted to go, they should go at least with some skills.Unskilled, workers got neither proper jobs nor reasonable pay abroad, If they had some


skills, they could get good salaries and also earn a good name for their country. I alsodirected the National Training Bureau to conduct a survey of Vocational and TechnicalTraining Centres to find out the exact number of children of overseas workers, so thatsuitable assistance could be provided for their education. I wanted some places madeavailable for the children of overseas Pakistanis in such institutes, and the Ministry forLabor would pay for it.

On 28 November the Cabinet under the chairmanship of Gen Zia considered the LaborCommission Report, draft Labor Policy and Draft Speech of the Labor Minister. A subcommittee was formed which would examine the reports in detail and put uprecommendations to cabinet. (Nawa-e-Waqat 29-11-1979)

On December 11, 1979, while I was in Karachi with the Chairman and members of theThird Wage Board for Journalists and Press Workers, I asked why there should be aWage Board for Journalists only. Why not a National Wage Board which wouldcontinue fixing the remunerations of the workers according, to prevailing conditions? Inour society we lacked equality and justice. A cook was paid different wages accordingto the status of his employer. The entitlement of a coolie at a railway station was muchless than the entitlement of a loader at the airport. Yet, both were doing the same job.Car drivers, similarly, got different rates of pay. We would have to remove thosedifferences. The word 'labor' had become derogatory in our society. Everyone whoworked for wages, doing physical work or mental work, was a laborer. Henceforth heshould be known as a worker. I was also a laborer or worker, not self-employed but onmonthly wages. I strongly pleaded for the constitution of a permanent Wage Board foreveryone, which would keel) under review the wage structure on the basis of the priceindex prevailing in the country. It was my Endeavour to see the establishment of such aNational Board.

At the Seminar on Accidents Prevention held on September 26, I conveyed my viewsthat "industrial accidents are a source of loss not only to employers and workers, butalso to the entire community. It is necessary from the economic and humanitarianstandpoints to wage war by all possible means against industrial accidents."Inaugurating a Vocational Training Programme of Overseas Workers under theauspices of Overseas Workers Foundation in early February 1980, I said only a united,disciplined and technologically sound Pakistani nation could overcome externalpressures. Economic strength and stability could not be achieved unless the countryhad adequately trained and skilled manpower. resources. Further, unless technicallytrained manpower was sent abroad, men who went out for jobs would be little morethan slaves. The government's bias should therefore be in favor of technical training. AtMirpur, Azad Kashmir, replying to the address of welcome by the Managing Directorof the Overseas Workers Foundation, I said that overseas Pakistanis should investmoney in projects which could contribute to the well being of the country. I was there tolay the foundation stone of a residential school for the female children of Pakistanis


abroad who needed to preserve their culture and Islamic values, which could not beeasily done by sending their daughters to western schools. Pakistan had about 1.7million workers abroad whose children needed attention.

In speech after speech, I was reflecting the draft Labor Policy. But that Policy was nonearer enunciation.On February 13, 1980 the daily Nawa-i-Waqt wrote an editorial"What happened to the Labor Policy?"

I was 'ordered' by Gen Zia to go to Canada on February 18, 1980 and could notinaugurate the Overseas Welfare Foundation Housing Project on February 23. InOttawa, on March 3, I told the Pakistani community that the Overseas PakistanisFoundation had been established to provide them the maximum facilities. TheFoundation had already taken a. number of measures, including a housing project forPakistanis working abroad. Residential plots would be bought in different areas ofPakistan and the Foundation would build houses for its members. I also told them, thatthe Foundation had drawn up a programme of establishing residential schools for girlswhose parents were working abroad. The first of these schools was being established inMirpur. I was determined to make these schools among the best in the country. 900scholarships, based on merit, were to be awarded annually to the children of overseasPakistanis.

I should mention here that when I assumed responsibility as Labor Minister, I checkedwith the Secretary, Ministry of Labor about the prospects of constructing some housesfor workers. He told me that there was 120 million rupees in the Housing Fund. So Iwas mighty pleased that I would be able to get some houses constructed for theworkers. I had also decided that they would be 7 Marlas. (210 sq yards), not 5 Marlas,each. I talked to Gen Zia. He agreed. But the money was not actually made available,either by the CMLA or by the Finance Minister.

In Martial Law, all authority lies with the CMLA. Nobody else wields effective power.So when you can't do anything, why be a Minister? Perhaps, Ghulam Dastgir Khan, mysuccessor can answer this question better.

Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Finance Minister of Pakistan, said on March 10, 1980 (the day I gotback from Canada), that the Labor Policy would be announced soon. But this proved tobe untrue. I resigned as a Federal Minister twenty days thereafter. There have beenmany Labor Ministers since then, but my successor was Ghulam Dastgir Khan,handpicked by Gen Zia, for qualities best known to him, and made Minister overnight.In an interview with the Urdu daily Nawa-i-Waqt, he said that nothing had been doneabout the formulation of the Labor Policy during my period of office. He was notrequired to be honest. He has never held an office of responsibility where honestdecision making was pertinent. The fault was of the man who appointed him. Gen Ziawas an omnipotent Chief Executive from July 5, 1977 to August 17, 1988. He just did not


want the labor Policy to be issued. He needed only to give me a date for itsannouncement, for everything was ready. But he never gave the go ahead.


CHAPTER - THIRTEENA CANADIAN CONNECTION

As President of Pakistan Zia fell prey to many charlatans confidence tricksters andoutright crooks. With his own rather narrow outlook on life Zia seemed to have aspecial weakness for believing the earnest sounding, idealistic -- but all too oftenmisleading speeches of those who professed to be working for the Islamic 'ummah' (orworld community). One of the outstanding examples of this is Zia's uncritical supportgiven to the Institute of Ummah Islamiya Studies of North Halley, Canada.

It wasted a considerable amount of money and effort in schemes which were notinherently unsound, but were certainly mismanaged.

Dr. Saad Gabr originally a Moroccan, was a naturalized Egyptian with a long career asan activist in the Muslim Brotherhood. He was about sixty five when I first met him onZia's insistence. My first impressions were wholly unfavorable, and proved to be quitecorrect, especially on his behavior in financial matters.

Eventually there was a financial liability incurred by Pakistan, though the majority ofthe costs were borne by Saudi Arabia.

Zia's $10,000 gift came from the national exchequer, not from Zia's own personalresources. And the administrative costs of maintaining offices in Pakistan, as well aslocal salaries of employees were paid by the Pakistan government.

An American lady, a Joanne Herring, was supposed to be closely associated with themarketing affairs of the Institute, and Zia appointed this lady Honorary Consul ofPakistan in Houston, Texas a post which I believe she still fills.

But to begin at the beginning.

I was very busy in the supervision and coordination of the overall arrangements for theextraordinary session of the Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference to be held inIslamabad from January 27 to 29, 1980, when I was directed by Gen Zia to receive DrSaad Gabr and attend to him. We met in my office on January 28. He started praisingthe President of Pakistan for the work which he was doing for Islam. He wanted to helpPakistanis to achieve affluency. I was rushed for time, as I had to go to the venue of theConference in Islamabad, so I took him along with me and listened to his long story onthe way. I could see another A K Brohi in him, both for ability and sycophancy. I wasobliged to deal with him as Minister for Labor, Manpower and Overseas Pakistanis.


Dr. Saad Gabr was an adviser to Dr Abdullah Oamer Nasseef, Vice President of KingAbdul Aziz University (KAAU), Jeddah. It had an organization known as TechnologySeminar devoted to serving the cause of promotion of technology in Muslim countries.They had developed and organized a scheme to help uplift the living standard of theMuslim masses working in cottage industries all over the Muslim world. The salientfeatures of the scheme were:

a. Promoting, marketing and exporting of products to earn foreign exchange.

b. Providing technical assistance to improve productivity through quality control.

c. Providing religious guidance to develop a healthy community. They wereimpressed by the President's announcement of Nizam-e-Mustafa. They hadapproached the President in February 1979 and offered their services for a pilotproject in Pakistan. If approved, a comprehensive programme could beestablished when required. The President liked the idea and wanted the proposalto be examined by the Planning Commission. It was examined, and by August1979 the President had approved the following action:

In the first phase,

a. The Export Promotion Bureau (EPB) in collaboration with KAAU wouldorganize export of handicrafts and other cottage industry products;

b. The EPB would integrate the plan with other ongoing programmes;

c. Target markets for specific products would be - indicated to the Bureau;

d. The EPB would be the focal point for information, designing and productionadaptation; and

e. Necessary funds would be provided by the Industrial Development Bank ofPakistan.

The second phase would commence when enough relevant information had beenobtained. A new organization might then become necessary. Further phases woulddepend on success.

According to the Ministry of Planning and Development, a project entitled "ThreadlinesGallery", on somewhat similar lines, was already under successful implementation inthe Ministry of Industries for development and promotion of textile handicrafts in thecountry. Market promotion efforts made by Joanne Herring of the USA had also shownsome success.


I did not show much interest in the project as explained by Dr. Gabr, but we weresupposed to discuss the proposals with the CMLA'a couple of days later.

Dr. Saad Gabr, Gen Rahimuddin, Maj Gen Arif and I met Gen Zia as desired by him Hegave us an exposition of Dr. Gabr's plans and said that it could be a good opening forthe amelioration of the financial conditions of our people. Ultimately it could be goodfor the whole of Ummah Islamiya. Material and conceptual work could be donesimultaneously. An officer had gone from the EPB to the KAAU, Jeddah to discuss themodalities. The operational side of the scheme would be Pakistan's responsibility. Forquality control and setting technical standards, a Special Technical Training Cell (STTC)should be opened at Islamabad. It would work along with the technical trainingprogrammes under the Ministry of Labor. He asked me to help Dr. Gabr find suitableaccommodation for the STTC in Islamabad. The KAAU would have a liaison office inPakistan. Provincial governments would help to locate suitable production centres forcottage industry items. Marketing would be the responsibility of the KAAU, and bedone through Dr. Gabr's outfit in Canada. We were asked to give all possible help to Dr.Gabr to make the project a success. Technical knowhow so received could also be usedfor defence production.

Dr. Gabr explained that the implementation of the project was slow due to thecommunication gap between the EPB and the Technology Seminar of KAAU. Adelegation of experts from King Abdul AzIz University and North Hatley was to arrivein Pakistan by the end of January to visit various handicraft and cottage industriescentres to assess the capabilities of craftsmen and artisans. It had been delayed because,firstly, Dr. Gabr was preoccupied and, secondly, the setting up of the Special TechnicalTraining Cell at Islamabad under the CMLA's secretariat had changed theorganizational set up.

Dr. Gabr also gave details of the North Hatley organization. He suggested that adelegation from Pakistan should first go to Canada, see all these facilities on the groundand then the Saudi and Canadian delegations should come to Pakistan. He alsorequested the President to come to North Hatley for the inauguration ceremony of theInstitute of Ummah Islamiya Studies. The President agreed to look into all this. Iexpressed my reservations and said that the Ministries of Industries and Productionshould be involved in the schemes. Maj Gen Arif did not utter a word.

Gen Zia called me in the first week of February and told me that he had authorized MajGen Shahid Hamid (Rtd), Minister for Information and Broadcasting, Hamid D Habib,Chairman, Export Promotion Bureau, and Akhtar UI Islam, Director, Export PromotionBureau to go to North Hatley, Canada, and New York to see the facilities andarrangements which had been made there for promotion and sale of handicrafts. Healso told me that he was a founder member of the Institute of Ummah Islamiya Studies,North Hatley, along with Dr. Abdullah Oamer Nasseef, Dr. Saad Gabr and Sheikh


Jamjon of Saudi Arabia. Its inauguration was to take place in the first week of March.He was giving a token donation of $ 10,000 towards the Institute. He could not go toattend the inauguration and desired me to go and represent him.

I showed my reluctance, reminding him that Lieutenant Generals who were completingfour years tenure were due for retirement next month and I was one of them. So Iwould like to stay in the country rather than go abroad. There were manyadministrative details I had to attend to prior to March 30, 1980, when I was completingmy four years tenure. I requested Gen Zia to send someone else. But he overruled meand requested me to go as Labor Minister responsible for technical training ofmanpower.

I had not answered him yet when, in the same breath, he said my wife would not beallowed to accompany me. I had no plans to request Gen Zia that he should sanctionher travel, but when he objected unnecessarily, I changed my mind and decided to go. Itold Gen Zia that my wife was a free citizen of Pakistan, had a passport of her own andcould go anywhere in the world unless he had imposed restrictions on her. Gen Zia saidthere were no restrictions. He said the only reason was that if her travel was sanctionedothers would also ask for their wives to go with them. I told him that it was not a goodenough excuse, however she would go with me and I would pay for her. I alsosuggested that, as I would not be staying as Minister for long, he should send someoneelse, either accompanying me or preferably in my place, who could take follow-upaction. He agreed to send Maj Gen Saeed Qadir with me. We left for North Hatley onFebruary 19, via Saudi Arabia.

There were wild guesses in the international press on my sudden departure abroad.Two of these reports stated:

In Pakistan a high Official of the Military Government, Gen F.A. Chishti, left on a tour ofthe USA, Canada, UK and Saudi Arabia yesterday (Tuesday). No announcement hadbeen made about the tour earlier. Radio Pakistan said that besides other things, GenChishti would also have talks with the officials of the World Bank. Names of the othermembers of his delegation have not been disclosed. Official sources in Islamabad saythat' Gen Chishti will meet Pakistani immigrants in all the four countries and he has noplans of meeting with government representatives. But news agencies have reportedfrom Pakistan that the General's visit may also relate to Pakistan's effort to seek military,and economic assistance following Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

(Voice of America reported on February 20.)

One of the high ranking military commanders of Pakistan Lt Gen F A Chishti has left ona tour of foreign countries He would visit Saudi Arabia, Britain, America and Canada.Reuter reports that the Pakistan newspapers have come to know that Gen Chishti wouldfulfill the request mission as the special envoy of the Pakistan CMLA Gen Zia. Duringhis stay in the countries, he is believed to exchange views on more supply of arms to


Pakistan. It may be recalled that the Carter Administration wants to convert Pakistaninto a base for its military tactics.

(Radio Moscow reported on February 21.)

On February 20, we called on Dr. Nasseef at KAAU, Jeddah. He talked highly of Dr.Gabr and his outfits in North Hatley and Montreal. Dr. Gabr as mentioned earlier, wasa Moroccan by birth and an Egyptian through naturalization. A member of the MuslimBrotherhood, he was sentenced to death but managed to escape from Egypt, startedafresh in the UK and finally settled in Canada. All efforts he put in were for Islam, Dr.Nasseef said. (Making money and amassing wealth seemed to. be his hobbies. He gavethe impression of being a spendthrift, but was in. fact very thrifty.) Dr. Nasseefexplained to us the working of the Technology Seminar of the university. Havingperformed Umrah and paid respects to the Holy Prophet (PBUH) we left for London onFebruary 22.

We were in London for four days. I called on our Embassy, met many Pakistanis andhad to speak to the Press. BBC gave full coverage on 26 February 1980. It said "... GenChishti said that in place of a military aid, Pakistan attaches importance to anagreement with the USA under which his country's security is guaranteed against anaggression ... He said that after 1978 military coup in Kabul, Pakistan had arrived on aconclusion that the Soviet Union has now made an entry into Afghanistan forever. Heaccused the USA of not, accepting at that time the view of Pakistan for which it is nowsorry ..." I had also said that honorable and graceful transfer of power had never takenplace before in Pakistan. The present regime would like to hand over power gracefullyand walk out.

On February 27, we left for New York on our way to Canada. We flew by Concorde,after breakfast, and were in New York at breakfast time. It was a novel experience.Princess Grace and the Prince of Monaco were our fellow passengers. It was a matter ofpleasure to see them travelling as commoners. Dr. Gabr received us at the airport. Myson Irfan was also there. He was doing his flying training, at my cost, to get his FederalAviation Authority Commercial Pilot License. He was already a holder of a CommercialPilot License from Pakistan. I had sent him to the USA because, in Irfan's opinion, hewould have better chances of getting a pilot's job with PIA if he had doublequalifications. He got his FAA license but could not get a job with PIA, in spite of hisrepeated efforts because he was my son and I was not in the good books of Gen Zia. Itwas only after Gen Zia's death that PIA accepted him in 1988 as a First Officer.

Irfan was Introduced to Dr. Gabr who suggested that if Irfan would join the Institute ofUmmah Islamiya Studies for training, he would straightaway start, him on sevenhundred dollars a month. He was already paying Faiz, Lt. Gen. Rahim ud Din's son, sixhundred and twenty-five dollars a month as agreed by the President, Gen Zia. I


thanked Dr. Gabr for the offer but declined. I told him that I, would like to maintain myfamily's independence. We stayed overnight in New York.

In the morning a very interesting news item, quoting a radio Moscow Broadcast, wasbrought to my notice. It read, "Pakistan generals have realized that they can get a goodopportunity to secure enormous foreign assistance by joining Washington's politicalgame. Although haggling, over the deal is continuing, the basic factor of the deal isquite clear. (Had the Russians read Gen Zia's mind, or was it that Gen Zia got the cluefrom it!)

We left in a chartered aircraft the next day on a six-day visit to Canada to attend theinauguration ceremony of the Institute of Ummah Islamiya Studies and to see the NorthHatley organization on the ground. At Sherbrook Airport we were received by thePakistan charge d' affaires (we had no ambassador) and the Mayor of the town. Dr.Gabr seemed to have substantial properties in the village of North Hatley, comprisingoffices, living accommodation for students, his own very luxurious home and three orfour other independent houses. He had a fleet of cars. It seemed he was a big businessman and a philanthropist of ample means. We were introduced to Mandi Abdel Jalil ofMorocco and Dr. Ahmed Bahafzullah of KAAU, Jeddah.

The North Hatley Organisation (NHO) was a commercial enterprise established by Dr.Saad Gabr. It was intended:

a. To establish and run departmental stores in Canada and North America.

b. To invest in cottage and small industries in the Muslim countries forproduction of goods that could be sold in NHO Departmental Stores.

c. To invest in profitable business and industry internationally.

On March 1, we were shown the facilities in the promotional show room of Dar Saidalocated in the heart of the business centre of Montreal. We were impressed with thedecor, display arrangements and the quality of goods available in the show room. Thesame evening I presided over a meeting at North Hatley. I emphasized the importanceof the Handicraft Development Project and informed the meeting about the keeninterest shown in it by the President of Pakistan. I was entrusted with the task ofsupervising the project personally and making it a success. I also remarked that due tounchecked immigration of skilled and semi-skilled labor there had been an acuteshortage of such workers in Pakistan. Being minister in charge of manpower andoverseas employment, it was my duty to train a sufficient number of skilled workers tomeet the internal and overseas demands for Pakistani workers. I had alreadyreorganized vocational centres, and had started crash training programmes in Pakistan.


I also told the meeting that, at the suggestion of Dr. Gabr, Gen Zia had approved thesetting up of a Special Technical Training Cell (STTC) at Islamabad in order to providetechnical assistance to our artisans and to ensure production of quality handicrafts. Thiswould serve two purposes, firstly, ensuring improvement in the living and workingconditions of our artisans as well as better earnings for them and, secondly, to producequality goods with a view to earning more foreign exchange for Pakistan.

At a meeting on March 3, Dr. Gabr outlined the salient features of the project and workdone so far. He informed us that the Charity Trust of North Halley, which was a non-profit earning institution, had provided necessary funds for infrastructure facilitiesrequired for marketing of Pakistani handicrafts and cottage industry products inCanada. A development and promotional show room had been established with aninvestment of one million dollars, excluding the cost of the building. A wholesalewarehouse for storing and marketing of Pakistani handicrafts and cottage industryproducts all over Canada had also been set up at a cost of about $60,000 near DorvalAirport, Montreal. Similar facilities would be created in New York, provided theproduction was geared up and supply of goods ensured from Pakistan, but a manager,was already employed there. Dr Gabr claimed that the project would have far reachingeffects on the economy of the country and social and living conditions of the masses ofPakistan. He also observed that the role of the Export Promotion Bureau was vital forsuccessfully running the project and the Bureau, in his view, was the backbone of theproject.

I observed that there was an urgent need for carrying out immediate studies in Pakistanon various handicrafts.

The following aspects should be broadly looked into:

a. Existing production, and how to increase it.

b. How to improve the quality of goods produced at present.

c. Availability of quality raw material to artisans at competitive prices.

d. Improvement in packaging of handicrafts.

e. Gradual improvement in the earning capacity of artisans.

Hamid D Habib, Chairman of the Export Promotion Bureau, said that they had sent across section of handicrafts and cottage industry products for display and were testingthe marketability of those items. I had a quick trip to Ottawa to meet the Pakistanicommunity. After a night stop I returned to North Halley to attend the inauguration


ceremony of the Institute of Ummnah Islamiya Studies, I received a telephone call fromGen. Zia. He wanted to know how many more days I was planning to stay in Canada. Itold him the itinerary. He wanted me to cut short my visit and get back home as soon aspossible, because something very serious had happened, but he would not give me thedetails on the telephone. I said that if he wanted me so badly, I could leave behind GenSaeed Qadir and be with him in no time. He asked, me to stay for the ceremony andthen return.

We attended the cornerstone-laying ceremony of IUISNH on March 5. The Institute,was being established by Dr. Gabr in response to an appeal made by President Ziawhile inaugurating the Shariah Faculty of the Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, inFebruary. Vocational training facilities were to be developed at the Institute. Gen Zia,Dr. Oamer Nasseef, Sheikh Jamjon and Dr. Saad Gabr were to be the Founder Membersof the Institute. Mr. Mandi Abdel Jail, Dr Ahmed Bahafzullah, Maj Gen Saeed Qadirand I were elected as Members, Board of Governors.

One disturbing thing which came to my notice through the international media wasthat the First All Pakistan Local Bodies Convention had started on March 5, with GenZia presiding. This convention was originally supposed to be held at the end of March.Nothing had been mentioned either in the press or by anybody else why thisConvention was summoned in a great hurry when two ministers holding fourministries were abroad. Only the Election Cell members, Maj Gen Jamal Said Mian, MajGen Rao Farman Ali (Rtd), and the Interior Minister, Mahmood Haroon, knew theElection Cell plans which were to be discussed in the convention. Gen Zia, obviously,did not want me present. He had ordered me to be abroad so that he could thwart theefforts to revert to democracy.

On reaching Islamabad Airport, on my hurried return, I was received by Maj. Gen K MArif, COS, to the CMLA. He told me the details of the attempted coup d'état by Maj GenTajjamal Hussain (Rtd). It could not have possibly succeeded. Our army is a verydisciplined force. It would never disobey its chief. That was exactly why Gen Zia wouldnot shed uniform.

I was due to retire from the Army on March 30, 1980. My last official meeting with Ziatook place a few days before that. Zia invited me and my wife to dinner at his officialresidence, but I attended alone.

Also present that evening for dinner were Gen Saeed Qadir and Dr. Saad Gabr. Duringthe meal, I was again asked to stay on as a Federal Minister by Zia, but I rejected theoffer without hesitation. I had already announced my resignation as a Minister onMarch 18 in Lahore.


I thanked Zia, and said, "You have been kind. I assure you, you won't find me doinganything which is anti Pakistan, anti Army or anti Islam, But please don't push me tothe wall. If I am forced, I will hit back and you know I am capable of it. Let us part asfriends."

Zia then said, "I wish you had continued as a Minister."

"I'm sorry," I replied, "I cannot trust you."

By then I had completely lost faith in Zia's intention to fulfill his repeated pledges torestore democracy and transfer power to the people's representatives in Pakistan.

As I left after dinner, Dr. Gabr requested me to drop him at the State Guest Housewhere he was staying. When we reached the State Guest House, he asked me in for acup of green tea. He tried to convince me to continue as a Minister. I told Dr. Gabr that Icould not do it. I could not serve Gen Zia any longer in administering the countrybecause he was not listening to advice, and was taking dishonest decisions. He couldnot be trusted. This discussion continued for about forty five minutes when Gen SaeedQadir also joined us. They would not let me go till I agreed to continue as a minister,they said, but I would not agree. After, about an hour's haggling I managed to leave,telling them that I would do anything else for them, but would not agree to stay in theGovernment with Gen Zia. Although Gen Zia gave me this last supper at his residence,he never dined me out from the Army in the Officers' Mess, according to the traditionsand customs of the service. There were many reasons for that!

Dr. Saad Gabr, Mandi Abdel Jail and Dr. Ahmed ltahafzuilah, all members of the Boardof Governors. IUISNH, called on me at my residence on April 29. They requested me tobecome the head of the Islamabad branch of the Institute of Ummah Islamiya Studies ofNorth Hatley. I thanked them, but told them that I could not accept it without theconcurrence of the President and I would not like the President to be bothered about it.So I asked them to please choose somebody else. They insisted and asked me if I wouldaccept it if the President agreed. I said I would. It would be honorary up to March 30.1981, and thereafter I would, have to be paid. They agreed. Presumably all of them,along with Lt. Gen Rahimuddin, went to Gen Zia on May 1 and got his approval. Dr.Gabr informed me about the decision and said that I would be required to attend ameeting in Jeddah on May 10. We would be leaving for Karachi on May 7, I agreed.

The meeting was held in King Abdul Aziz University, Jeddah, and reviewed theprogress of the activities of handicrafts and other projects in Pakistan, initiallysponsored by the Technology Seminar of the University. In the letter sent to thePresident of Pakistan, jointly signed by Dr. Nasseef and Dr. Saad Gabr, it was statedthat the projects which were based on the studies sponsored or carried out by theKAAU should continue as originally planned, new projects would be initiated from


Islamabad through the branch office and I would henceforth supervise and coordinatethe activities of all projects to ensure 'a smooth, uniform and speedy realization of theobjective.

I came back to Pakistan on May 14 and was required to attend another workingcommittee meeting of the Board of Governors at London on May 22. On return, I wrotea letter to Gen Zia on June 4, 1980, in his dual capacity of Founder Member of the TUIS,North Halley, and President of Pakistan. In addition to details of the organization andits performance I stated that the Islamabad branch has started but was facing teethingproblems as it needed staff and transport, and that I was not in a position to be effectiveas no Pakistan money was available (foreign currency from North Hatley was banked) Irequested a lump sum grant. I never got a reply.

At the board of governors' meeting on May 22, held at London I raised the followingpoints as a matter of policy:

a. As Head of the Branch at Islamabad I was to deal with two types of fundsand two types of currencies. Foreign exchange component received fromNorth Hatley and Pakistan currency component received from theGovernment of Pakistan. Once these currencies come into my charge,would I be the final authority to decide how to spend those amounts?

b. In the discharge of my responsibilities to whom would I be accountable?To the Board of Governors at North Hatley, I supposed, and to nobodyelse. Not even to the Founder Members. That should be in conformitywith the bylaws of the North Hatley Organization

I had requested that the policy decisions on these two points be given to me in writing.Without clear instructions on these points in writing, I would not deal with any moneyexcept travel and incidental, charges. Dr. Saad Gabr told me that he would let me know.Pending that, he said, he would deposit a million dollars in the account. I refused toaccept that. I returned to Pakistan and worked for the Islamabad Branch in an honorarycapacity hoping that the decision would arrive. It never did. I was requested to attendthe Board of Governors' meeting in September 1980. I showed my reluctance because nodecisions were coming forth, either from Gen Zia or from the Head Office at NorthHalley. I was told that the decisions would be taken at the coming meeting at NorthHalley. So I left for London on my way to Canada.

The day I was to leave London for Montreal we had planned a lunch with some friendsand officials. We were waiting for two of them at the hotel when they came in a hurryand said that they would not be able to join us for lunch because they were suddenlyrequired to go to Paris. Gen Zia's plane had been stopped at Paris because there washeroin or narcotics on board. (They were both intelligence officers). They had to rush to


Paris so that the information was not leaked to the Press. Gen Zia was on his way toNew York to address the United Nations General Assembly there.

The meetings of Board of Governors' of the Institute of Ummah Islamiya Studies andthe North Hatley Organization were held from September 29 to October 2. During thesemeetings. I found out that the organizations were not functioning smoothly. There weremany shortcomings. Primarily three elements were involved, viz the local staff i.e.Canadian consultants and solicitors. Arabic speaking members of the Board ofGovernors, and myself. In some of the working meetings when some critical pointwould crop up, the conversation would change to French, when locals were concerned,or to Arabic when other members were concerned. I would be at a loss to understandthe point. I raised its significance but it did not change the modus operandi, so I toldthem that I would not be attending the meetings.

I noticed that there were cars but no chauffeur. The cars were on hire and not theproperty of the North Hatley Organization. Dr Saad Gabr was very secretive abouteverything that he was doing, and would not answer any probing questions. He wouldrefuse to answer any questions connected with funds or finances, including sources ofincome and heads of expenditure. He would proudly display his Pakistani Passportissued to him on orders of the President of Pakistan. The Board of Governors would notgive answer to my questions regarding finances, responsibility and accountability. Itold the Board of Governors that under those conditions it was difficult for me to work.Dr. Gabr said that on his next trip to Pakistan -- to get physical possession of the plotsallotted to Dr. Nasseef and himself by the President of Pakistan, in Islamabad -- hewould meet all my requirements after discussing all points with the President. Herequested me to continue till then.

When I was at North Halley in Canada, Gen Zia was in New York. Hectic activitieswere going on at diplomatic and other levels to arrange that the Canadian Governmentshould invite Gen Zia for a day's official visit. It bore no fruit. Prime Minister Trudeauhad flatly refused. It was from North Halley that I talked to Gen Zia in New York andtold him that I had to undergo bypass heart surgery on October 18 in London. He askedme to meet him in New York. I expressed my inability to do so. We agreed to meet atthe Pakistan Embassy in London on October 6, 1980.

In London I immediately entered hospital for bypass heart surgery. Magdi Yaqub did, aneat job and put four bypasses. In the surgeon's words, before, the operation, it was "amiracle" that I was still alive. It was God's grace, and through well wishers' prayers.

Dr. Gabr visited me at the Princess Grace Hospital after the operation. He left £1,000saying that I would need it. I was reluctant to accept it, but he insisted and gave it tome. This amount was returned to him at the first opportunity, on my next visit toCanada. I am mentioning it because on one of my subsequent trips to KAAU, Jeddah, I


found that there was an impression there that my bypass heart surgery was sponsoredby Dr. Gabr and that he had spent much money on me for it. Not a penny was spent onme by the Institute of Ummah Islamiya Studies, or by the Technology Seminar or byany other foreigner. Let the record be straight.

I went back to the Islamabad Branch office in December 1980. There I found out thatnothing had happened on my request for staff, transport, funds or fixture ofresponsibility vis-a-vis accountability. In other words I could not be effective. This wasbecause my effectiveness was not desired. They had no moral courage to say so either. Isent a message to Dr. Gabr about this state of affairs. He said he would be coming inDecember. He came to Pakistan to attend Gen Zia's daughter's wedding on December25. He asked me if we could meet on December 24, and when I told him we could, heasked if I was going to attend the President's daughter's wedding. I told him that Iwould not be going as, my wife had not been invited. He advised me to attend andrequested me to accompany him to the State Guest House, where the reception wasbeing held on the morning of December 25. I agreed on condition that I would not staythere for long. I would just go, shake hands and come back. He agreed. So we went. Icongratulated Gen Zia on his daughter's wedding and came back. The IslamabadBranch problems remained unresolved.

Dr. Gabr before his return to Canada requested if I could be in North Hatley in January.He wanted to review the plans of the North Hatley Organizations. He told me that hehad also requested Mandi Abdel Jalil to come and that he had agreed. Mandi Jalil and Ihad become quite friendly, so I agreed. I reached North Hatley on January 7, 1981.

Some important events took place on this trip which are worth putting on record.Firstly, Dr. Gabr asked me to accompany him to visit a factory site. He did not tell meany details. His pilot had inadvertently left the layout chart of the factory fullydisplayed on a board. Its function was of a dubious nature, clearly a factory forproducing armaments. I refused to go with Dr. Gabr.

Secondly, I went to meet our Ambassador at Montreal in the office of our ConsulGeneral, Salim Saifullah. From there we went for lunch at the Ambassador's invitation.Dr. Gabr accompanying me. The same night, the office of the Consul General wasburgled. Nothing was taken except a timepiece. The papers in the drawers andcupboards had been displaced. The message was received!

Thirdly, I attended a lunch in Montreal, given in honor of a Prince from Saudi Arabiaby Dr. Saad Gabr. During our conversations at lunch I gleaned some information aboutthe source of income of the North Halley Organization and the desired functions of theInstitute of Umrnah Islamiya Studies. The Prince said that it was unfortunate that nowork was being done in the conceptual field of the Institute. The stress seemed far more


on the material side. Dr. Gabr said that he would discuss it with Gen Zia on his next tripto Pakistan. It was difficult for me to be a party to unknown plans.

Fourthly, Dr. Sand Gabr told me that Lt Gen Akhtar Rahman's son had come from theUSA and was enquiring about my activities. (Gen Akhtar was DGISI and his son was inthe USA studying, but this was a cover.) His coming to North Halley in winter with atemperature at minus 42 degrees Celsius did not bother me. If they wanted to knowwhat I was doing, they were at liberty to do so. I had nothing to conceal. I told Dr. Gabrto accommodate Gen Akhtar's son next to my room so that he could keep watch on meor bug my room if he wanted to. Dr. Gabr obliged. He stayed there for about twelvehours and went away.

I discussed the functioning of the Islamabad Branch with Dr. Gabr and Mandi Jalal.There was no response to my queries about responsibilities and accountability. I toldDr. Gabr that I was resigning as the Head of Islamabad Branch and as Member of theBoard of Governors. He said it was not in his authority to accept the resignations. Thematter would be considered by the Board of Governors when it next met. So, Irequested a meeting. I was told that the Board meeting would take place in April 1981at Islamabad.

The meeting took place at Gen Zia's residence. Dr. Gabr and Dr. Nasseef were present.Sheikh Jamjon's proxy was with Dr. Gabr. I explained the circumstances to the Board,and requested them to accept my resignations. I was asked to give them a few minutesto consider it. I left them alone. I was called in after a few minutes and told that myresignation as Head of the Islamabad Branch was accepted, but would I carry on as aMember, Board of Governors. I kept quiet on the issue. However, I have not met Dr.Gabr or any other member since then. I have not received any message from NorthHalley either since then.

After my resignation as Head of the Islamabad Branch of the Institute of UmmahIslamiya Studies, North Halley, the branch was split into two. The conceptual work wasgiven to the Quid-e-Azam University and the material work was given to the Ministryof Production under Lt. Gen. Saeed Qadir. How much money has come since then?How has it been spent? It is anybody's guess.


CHAPTER - FOURTEENSOLDIERING FOR THE PEOPLE

The armed forces i.e. army, navy and airforce are all central service cadres. Theirloyalties are always to the centre from induction till retirement-even after retirementCivil armed forces i.e. rangers constabulary, levies etc. are political cadres and theirloyalties are to the province to which they belong to.

Article. 244 of the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan deals with the oath to be taken by themembers of the Armed Forces. The text of the oath reads. "I ... do solemnly swear that Iwill bear true faith and allegiance to Pakistan and uphold the Constitution of theIslamic Republic of Pakistan which embodies the will of the people that I will notengage myself in any political activities whatsoever and that I will honestly andfaithfully serve Pakistan in the Pakistan Army (or Navy or Air Force) as required byand under the law."

The Armed Forces should stay away from politics because they do not belong to anypolitical party, but belong to the country. Their behavior should be completely neutraland judicious They must enjoy the full confidence of the masses. If they forfeit thisconfidence, they can never defend the country. They can only enjoy the confidence ofthe people if they are loyal and obedient to the constitutionally elected government. It istherefore the constitutional role of the Armed Forces that they act on each constitutionalorder of the government. Quaid-e-Azam had given similar directions to the ArmedForces, i.e. they should stay loyal to the Constitution and elected government.

The defence of a country is a demanding job. The Armed Forces cannot work at part-time defence and part-time politics. They are on duty 24 hours. When involved inpolitics, they get weak in defence potential. If they stay long in politics, they also startlosing respect. This is generally due to the man, one man only, the decision-maker, thehead of the Armed Forces, the CMLA. Some officers have recommended a role for thePakistani Armed Forces similar to that of the Turkish Armed Forces in their country'spolitics. Yes, but Pakistan is not Turkey. Every country has its own problems and itsown pride. Turkish pride is based on their never having been ruled by any othercountry. Who was responsible for that pride? Naturally the Armed Forces of Turkey.

What a parallel to draw with Pakistan. We have not yet even fixed responsibility, leavealone punishment, on those who brought disgrace to our country and the Armed Forceswith the fall of Dacca. Let us do it now; it is still not too late. Accountability always paysdividends.

The Armed Forces constitutional role is to cooperate with the civil government. In theinitial draft of the 1973 Constitution, Article 243 states the Armed Forces will act under


the supervision of the central government and that the Heads of Army, Navy and AirForce will be appointed by the central government. So the basic control is with the PM.

When Mr. Bhutto wanted to extend to the members of the Armed Forces the rulebanning the participation of civil servants in politics till two years after their retirement,he referred the case to Armed Forces Headquarters for their comments. Gen Tikka Khanwas the COAS and I was the MS at GHQ. The COAS discussed it with me. I told GenTikka Khan that the PM should be advised not to do it because its extension to theArmed Forces would be construed as high-handedness, being a change in the terms ofservice I recommended that this be added for future entrants at the initial grant ofcommission and not made applicable to the current officers cadre. I do not know whattranspired between the PM and the COAS but the PM did not agree and passed the rulethat no member of the Armed Forces could take part in politics till two years after hisretirement from service.

Members of the Armed Forces are basically civilians who voluntarily join the defenceforces for a limited period of their service, and become civilians again after their,retirement. They have every right to take part in political activity after their retirementafter the stipulated period as stated in prevailing orders. It is so in many other countriestoo. The USA is the leading democratic country in the world today. They have a highproportion of retired Armed Forces personnel holding jobs after elections. Why shouldwe be allergic to our members of the Armed Forces who decide to enter politics aftertheir retirement? An administrator gets into office and then motivates the people towork whereas a politician is inducted into office through popular vote and tries toacquire the administrative capability. Neither of them can be successful without havingboth the capabilities of motivating and administering In our country we lay noemphasis on these requirements.

Gen Zia amended Article 243 during Martial Law through Presidential order No 14dated 1985. Two additions were made to the original

a. The President will be the Supreme Commander and the Armed Forceswill be under him (It left the administrative control with the PM but as aninstitution or an entity, the Armed Forces came under the President).

b. The President will appoint the heads of the three services. (Previouslythese appointments used to be made by the PM).

An interesting point to note is that as Gen Zia was the COAS, the actual command ofthe Army went to the Deputy COAS or later the VCOAS. He was de jure COAS. As theappointment of VCOAS was not mentioned in the amendment to the Constitution, itsappointment stayed within the jurisdiction of the PM.


Article 245 states that the Armed Forces will operate under the orders of the centralgovernment and will perform the duties to ward off external threats and help the civiladministration in their duties in aid of civil power.

In an era of constitutional government, soldiers and politicians have their respectivewell-defined spheres. The functions of the Armed Forces are subordinate to the ordersof the civil government. The Armed Forces must leave political and national decision-making to the civilian government. It is that government's job to decide between warand peace and between different political roles. The Armed Forces are allowedcomplete freedom in their professional functioning, but it is civilians who decide theoverall role of the Armed Forces. It is the civilians who are the representatives of thepeople, head of the government or the country. It is they who make generals. Suchcivilian control confines the armed forces to maximizing in professional competency.The Armed Forces' professional role is non-political and rormally, comes into actiononly in response to an external threat. The Army, because of its apolitical tradition andits responsibility for external defence against real threats, has managed to maintain itsfocus on its profession rather than on political roles. The chain of discipline andcommand has never been broken, and the great bulk of the Army has never becomeinvolved in the debilitating intrigues of the political arena. Faced with the real test ofaccountability, it is always ready to act correctly. It has skills that are lacking in the civilbureaucracy:

a. The Armed Forces have a rigid hierarchy where commands are obeyedinstantaneously. (Under war conditions any delay is a matter of life anddeath.

b. The Armed Forces have many specialized branches which can be usedeffectively for civilian purposes as well, e.g. Army Engineers, ArmyMedical Corps, Army Education Corps, Army Signals, Army ServicesCorps, Army Postal Services etc. It possesses all the skills which a civiliangovernment requires and in addition does not have to deal with thedelaying influence of political imperatives.

c. The Armed Forces have technical skills lacking in the civilian populationat large.

d. Armed Forces personnel are better trained as - compared to civiliansbecause of better resources allotted to them by the government due to thedefence needs of the country.

e. During a natural crisis, the armed forces are relied upon more than thecivil e.g. calamities like floods, earthquakes, locusts etc.


f. The Armed Forces have an assigned role of internal security for whichperiodic rehearsals are carried out.

In this context the following quotation may not be out of place.

"It is the duty of the Armed Forces to fight a war, but to decide that war is inevitable ornot, what should be the nature of war, is the duty of the civil government. Basicprinciple of a democratic government and armed forces is that they should maintaintheir organization and discipline ..... When a problem between the government and asection of the people becomes very tense then the individual that suffers the most is thecommon man and the country ...... Under these circumstances one has to call the troopsin support of government ...... whereas the job of the police is to punish, the job ofArmed Forces is to save and protect. Politicians have the right to change their views butthe Armed Forces cannot deviate from their organizations and discipline".

(Daily Musawat, June 4, 1977)

"Some people say that if the Army had not come to help the Government then theGovernment would have succumbed to their demands. That means army is anindependent organization which is a third party between the government and thepeople, which should act independently. But under the, constitution Armed Forces areunder the government and this is the specialty of a superior democratic country"

(Mashrtq, June 7, 1977)

"Some think that the Armed Forces on orders from government should not act to restorelaw and order ...... in other words they 'should remain, silent spectators of nationaldestruction ...... The Armed Forces is a fluid organization which has to face everychallenge ...... Whether the crisis is external, creation or internal, so that peoples' mindscan be made seditious, or seeds of hatred and difference are sown ... If internal crisis isallowed then external crisis cannot be faced effectively......A soldier is required to beextraordinarily patient and firm of will power, should pay no attention to unnecessaryprovocation, criticism and allegations. A soldier always takes: the right step accordingto the prevailing environments.

(Daily Jang, June 8, 1977)

It may not also be out of context here to mention the controversy about the letter whichAir Marshal Asghar Khan wrote to the Armed Forces chiefs and officers during thePNA agitation in 1977. Asghar Khan since then has said many times that he was notasking them to rise against the government. All that he had said according to hisversion was that unlawful commands should not be obeyed and that only lawfulcommands should be obeyed. An official press note in that connection was issued bythe PPP government on May 5 1977 The official spokes man had said:-


It is evident that Pakistan's territorial integrity will be defended within and outside thecountry. The enemy is present outside and within. Who will live if the country isdefeated internally? It is the duty of the Armed Forces that whenever they are orderedthey should obey in aid of civil power.

For this purpose an ordinary, magistrate can also request the Armed Forces for aid onbehalf of the civil administration. As far as the central government is concerned, it is atliberty to make Constitution Clause 245 operative. This is a legal, order and it is theduty of the Armed Forces that whenever they are asked they should protect the life andrespect of the people without any prick of the conscience.

They have done the same by restoring law and order in Karachi, Hyderabad, andLahore thus creating conditions, conducive to negotiations between the politicians.

Every member of the Armed Forces is proud that he has taken part in saving thecountry which was being pushed towards anarchy by selfish people. Their serviceshave been appreciated by those poor and downtrodden masses who had borneunmentionable troubles after elections in addition to the peace loving citizens. Similarlythose who are used to the traditions of democracy' have also praised the conduct of thearmed forces in restoring sanity.

It is quite clear that though all members of the Armed Forces have a right to exercisetheir vote, yet they have no right to take part in active politics. Air Marshal (Retd)Asghar Khan's message is tantamount to undermining the loyalties of the ArmedForces. It is further surprising that a former chief should preach sedition. The questionarises, "did the retired Air Marshal display moral ethics and a clear conscience when hewas with the British and Pakistan Armed Forces or when he was himself a party to theabrogation of the Constitution in 1958."

(Hilal, May 6, 1977)

Hilal is the official. weekly newspaper of the Armed Forces of Pakistan. Its views,therefore can be said to reflect those of the military establishment. In its editorial noteon the above government statement it stated:-

... when the law and order situation within the country starts going out of control of thecivil administration, the Armed. Forces are there to help the government in restoringthe situation.

When the industrial life of the country is paralyzed, business houses are closed down,property is set on fire, human life becomes the cheapest thing of all. Towns, villages anddistricts instead of being the bastions of peace become the killing grounds and then itbecomes obligatory for the government that it should use all forces at its disposal to


protect the life and property of the peace-loving citizens. One of the most effectivesources of help available is the Armed Forces.

When to call in the forces in aid of civil power,, and what duties to entrust to them isdecided by the government of that time which keeps the country's social andinternational situation under vigilance.

There is absolutely no room for doubt that Armed Forces are not the rulers, but an armof the government. Their job is not to take national decisions, but to act on them. That iswhy they keep themselves away from political impurities and are always ready andunited to obey the constitutional government ......."

"Armed Forces have played a crucial role in arresting the country's drift towards anadministrative paralysis and anarchy, cannot be denied ..... The forces unleashed by thepolitical confrontation between the government and the opposition were irrevocablyleading the country towards economic collapse and political chaos. It was evident toeverybody that the fundamental interest in the country could be gravely jeopardized ifthe downward slide continued. The situation was such that it could lead to what aDefence Ministry spokesman called," a defeat from within".

The Army entered Lahore on the night of April 21/22, 1977 with the mission of'preventing Lahore from burning', with a view to restoring peace and tranquility andwith no other purpose at all. Lahore does not belong to an individual or a group ofindividuals or a political party. It is a national asset and the heart of the Punjab. It mustbe the duty of any responsible government to preserve it against lawlessness. ArmedForces have been made the target of provocations, insinuations and invidious onlybecause they have been trying to protect the country from the dangers which many donot perceive. Realism and honesty demand that the people should be thankful to theArmed Forces for playing their appointed role, which is to uphold the Constitution andact as custodians of the 'life, property and honor of the people of Pakistan'.

It has been said that if the government is not legally constituted then all orders issuedby them would also be illegal and it is not obligatory for the Armed Forces to obeythem. Can it ever be part of the Armed Forces' duty to assess whether the government islegal or illegal?

Let us not run away from reality. Instead, we should examine some bitter truths. TheArmed Forces have always been called in aid of civil power whenever it was in troublemay it be floods, locust, internal security, earthquakes, epidemics, tree plantation, lawand order breakdown, counter insurgency, election duties, anti dacoits, displays onarrival of Heads of states or dignitaries. It has always been used as a panacea for all illsof society. As a general statement, one can say that whenever the Armed Forces arecalled in, conditions could have deteriorated to a point where there was no other


option. Their calling, presence and functioning in nation-saving tasks has always beenapplauded. So it can be inferred that whenever there are serious troubles, the takingcharge of the situation by the Armed Forces cannot be in itself unwelcome orundesirable. This is especially true when the political institutions remain unstable andunbalanced due to the mistakes of politicians, mutual confrontation and lack ofprinciples whereas the Armed Forces are well organized. This is also applicable to acoup d'état. The Army assumes a political role because it considers itself the mostefficient institution in the entire country. The reliance of the civilian governments on theArmed Forces for the maintenance of law and order, their help to cope with naturalcalamities, contribution towards developmental and welfare programmes had built theimage of armed forces. Simultaneously this had tarnished the reputation of civilianauthorities.

It is also a fact that the Armed Forces, though welcomed initially, when they dig in theirheels and put on civilian dress, provoke a different reaction from the people. Thingsgradually deteriorate, then a stage comes when those heroes are labeled villains. GenAyub Khan was welcomed when he was persuaded by Iskander Mirza to sack theRepublican Party and given a hero's welcome when he got rid of Iskander Mirza. YahyaKhan was acclaimed a hero when he got rid of Ayub, but Bhutto was received as a herowhen he took over from Yahya. Mr. Bhutto became a civilian Chief Martial LawAdministrator, because without this label he could not control the situation. Thisproved true because in spite of all powers assumed under the constitution prepared oramended by him, he was rocked by the masses. It would have been better if it had nothappened that way, but as it did happen, we cannot change history. The so-calledpeople's and elected government behaved in such a manner that the PNA had to beformed to challenge the PPP's intention to stay in power forever. It was only when Mr.Bhutto realized that it was impossible to create a crack in the PNA that he revertedtowards negotiations. There was an admission of rigging and broad agreement to go forreelections confirming indirectly, the illegality of the government. Mutual lack ofconfidence did not let them finalize the details. In fact there was no intention to do so. Itwas only when the government's malafide intentions became transparent that Gen Ziaordered the takeover. The Armed Forces in this instance acted to save the country frommore bloodshed and anarchy. Daily Hurriyat dated 30, July 77 expressed: Everydemocrat should be grateful to the higher command that they did not think of a militarytake over from 10 March 1977 to 4 July 1977.

One of the most distinguished writers on military matters, Morris Janowitz has written:

"An Army is a crisis organization. Be the crisis an outcome of external aggression or aninternal one engineered to subvert the minds of the people, to sow discord and dissensionand fissiparous tendencies, the Army has to meet the challenge. The external threat canhardly be met if the rear is allowed to crumble. Thus the concern for internal order is aninherent aspect of crisis management for any army in the world. The Army cannot be


lured into inactivity. It must react in all sincerity for the greater good and integrity of thecountry".

The solidarity and well-being of Pakistan takes priority. The Armed Forces desired thatthe decision to take the country out of a quagmire be taken by the nation through theirrepresentatives. That is why it urged the PM to go for re-elections. The Army wantedrestoration of complete democracy in the country. What undermined the civilianinstitutions and the political process more than anything else was the repeated andextensive use of regular troops for the sustenance of civilian authority. This exposed theweakness of the civilian leaders and created the impression that the Armed Forcescould salvage a situation whenever the civil leaders were unable to manage their affairs.This destroyed the inherited principle of civilian supremacy and military aloofnessfrom active politics.

* * *In Aid of Civil Power

Pakistan has been facing internal security (IS) problems ever since it was created.Armed forces had been called in aid of civil power for one reason or the other viz floods,locust, riots, earthquakes, tree plantation etc. As the requirements had been too frequentthe Standing Operating Procedures (SOP)had been worked out so that troops reachwithout any loss of time. These procedures are well known and are rehearsed jointly bythe civil authorities and armed forces in peace time when the conditions are normal.Civil administration provides the list of vulnerable points (VPs) and personalities to beprotected in case of disturbances. These normally include residences e.g. Presidency,PM's residence, Minister's, CJCSC, COAS, Chief Justice, Commissioner, DC's Office,Tehsildar's office etc. Installations e.g. TV station, Radio Station, Telegraph Office, watertanks, bus stops, courts, electric grids, electric companies, sewerage controls, districtjails, police stations, schools, colleges etc., post offices, telephone exchanges, hospitals,airports, railway stations etc. Thereafter plans to protect them are made and rehearsedjointly. VPs or VIPs are jointly identified. Plans made to protect them. So in other wordsthere is nothing important which is not known to the Armed Forces units which are torespond to the call for duties in aid of civil power. Final decision on the list dependsupon the civil authorities who have to send it to the Armed Forces in writing so thatplans may be made accordingly.

Troops are not normally called by the civil authorities unless they feel that the situationis beyond their control. When troops are called in aid of civil power some of theprinciples which are followed are:-

Minimum force is to be used.

Automatic weapons are not used for automatic fire.

No firing in the air. Fire has to be effective,. Not to kill but to incapacitate.


No firing at random but on specific persons as targets as indicated by thecommander.

Injured are, given immediate medical aid.

Civil authorities cannot order troops, to fire.

After taking over the situation the Military Commander decides how to restorenormalcy etc.

For duties in aid of civil power or internal security duties Azad Kashmir NorthernAreas and whole of Pakistan is divided into areas of responsibility which are assignedto various commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Force Pertinent details are asunder:-

a. Lt. Gen, Sawar Khan responsible for IS duties in NWFP.

b. Lt. Gen. F.A. Chishti responsible for IS duties in AK and Northern Areas.He would place his brigade located at Rawalpindi under the command ofGOC Kharian (Maj Gen Shah Rafi Alam) for IS duties in Rawalpindi andIslamabad Districts.

c. Lt Gen Ghulam Hassan Khan responsible for IS duties in his corpsoperational area and Rawalpindi civil division comprising Attock,Rawalpindi, Jhelum and Gujrat Districts. GOC Kharian was responsiblefor Rawalpindi civil division for which he had to take 10 Corps brigadelocated at Rawalpindi under command but for employment in Islamabadand Rawalpindi Districts only.

It may be noted from the above that though located at Rawalpindi I had no duties in aidof civil power or IS duties in Pakistan territory but my Brigade Commander atRawalpindi had to take orders for IS duties etc. from the GOC Kharian to whom he was

also responsible for all commissions and omissions and not to me.

Martial Law Administration

Exposition given in subsequent paragraphs may clarify many doubts. During martiallaw the country is administered by CMLA. He may appoint a Deputy CMLA. (Gen Zianever appointed any). It is divided into various areas of responsibility called zones. egPunjab-Zone A, NWFP Zone B, Sindh Zone C, Baluchistan Zone D, Northern AreasZone E. Each Zone is administered by an MLA. Thus the set up which emerged on 5,July 77 was:

CMLA: Gen M Zia ul HaqMLA Zone A: Lt Gen M. Iqbal KhanMLA Zone B : Lt Gen Sawar Khan


MLA Zone C : Lt Gen Jehanzeb Khan ArbabMLA Zone D: Maj Gen S.M. AbbasiMLA Zone E : Maj Gen C.A. Majid.

A zone is divided into various Sub Zones. These normally coincide with the civiladministrative division boundaries comprising various districts and each Sub Zone isadministered by a DMLA. Each Sub Zone is further divided into Sub-Sub Zone whichnormally correspond to a civil administrative district and is administered by SMLAs(Sub Martial Law Administrators).

So SMLA Rawalpindi and Islamabad was never under my command for Marital Lawduties. He used to take orders directly from the DMLA Rawalpindi Division i.e. GOCKharian, and responded to him. All installations in Rawalpindi and Islamabad districtswere under his command. This naturally included the Rawalpindi District Jail as well.


CHAPTER - FIFTEENCRISES OF FOREIGN POLICY

FOREIGN POLICYThe main purpose of a country's foreign policy is to safeguard its sovereignty andterritorial integrity and to develop economic prosperity for its people. It is governed bymany factors, constant as well as variable. Constant factors are those which areconnected with geography and history. Variable factors are the internal conditions of acountry and the realities of global and regional geo-politico-economic environment.Interaction amongst themselves and between the constant and variable factorsdetermine the foreign policy postures of a country at any given time. The formulation offoreign policy is a continuous process. It is in fact an effort to try and match thedesirables with the possibilities. Irrespective of the genesis of a country, certainprinciples guide the formulation of a successful foreign policy. Some of them are

(a) Permanent interestsCountries do not have permanent friends or permanent enemies. They have onlypermanent interests e.g. safeguarding of territorial integrity, ensuring economicprosperity, ensuring the security and safety of its people. (Only one month after theRussians had carried out their aggression against Afghanistan, President Carter hadsaid, on January 23, 1980, "any attempt by any outside forces to gain control of thePersian Gulf Region, will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the USA andsuch an assault would be met by any means necessary including military force".) Couldit be said in the context of Pakistan? Third world countries, in the face of the self-interest of the . superpowers, are powerless.

(b) Sound national defenceIn modern warfare, no armed forces can defend the country on their own. It has to bethe complete nation at war. There are many contributory factors towards the attainmentof sound defence e.g. quality and quantity of weapons with which the armed forces areequipped, combat competency of the armed forces, mobilization plans and reliability oftheir being honored by the nation, infrastructure required for the operations of war,state of economy and for how long it can sustain the war effort international standing ofthe country, allies (if any) and their reliability, logistic support sufficiency etc.

(c) Peoples' trustIf the people do not trust, the government they will not go along with the government'spolicies. National cohesion is essential.

(d) Self relianceAn essential pre condition for an independent foreign policy is self-reliance.


(e) National unityCultural cohesion of the people and their economic well-being is required in addition tointernational diplomacy.

(f) Geo-political considerationsThe party in power or the ruling class interests and preferences would needexamination.

(g) Short and long term perspectivesInstitutionalization of power and decision-making serves the national interests betterthan management on a day-to-day basis. i.e. Crisis management.

U.S.A.Quaid-e-Azam's guidelines on foreign policy were tantamount to a neutral and non-aligned policy, but as far as the Islamic World was concerned it was not neutral. Heconsidered Islamic countries gains as gains of Pakistan and he believed in defending therights and claims of Islamic countries as of Pakistan. Liaquat Ali Khan and KhwajaNazimuddin followed the same policy. It changed after Khwaja Nazimuddin'sunconstitutional removal. In Mohammad Ali Bogra's time, Pakistan got involved withthe USA in defence pacts and the foreign policy basics underwent change. Until theabrogation of the defence pacts with the USA, during Mr. Bhutto's period, Pakistan'sforeign policy remained almost the same as what Bogra started. Instead of foreignpolicy being non-aligned and non-committed, it was under the USA. A verdict on thedefence pacts with the USA should not be given in a hurry without reviewing therelations with India. There were many problems immediately after Independence e.g.,refugee problems, river water problems, disparity in defence etc., mostly due to India'sobduracy. Pakistan's security was felt to be at stake. So it had to get arms andammunition urgently from anywhere. During the Korean War, when the USArequested all UN members for help, Pakistan had refused. It was then privately askedto send a brigade to Korea, and in return get the equivalent of a division's arms inreturn Pakistan declined saying that it needed troops itself to get the Kashmir issuesolved. When Bogra signed the defence pact with the USA Nehru withdrew his offer tosolve the Kashmir issue. The USA never helped or put pressure on India over Kashmir.Prime Ministers Bogra Ch. Muhammad Ali Suhrawardy and Noon wanted to stay onthe right side of the USA, and never did anything without clearance from the USA forfear of losing their posts. It was so bad in Noon's time that even top secret talks in thecabinet used to be conveyed to the USA not by American agencies but by somePakistanis to keep Pakistan in the good books of the USA. It was the fault of thePakistani rulers that they accepted the USA as their superiors.

It is said that Iskandar Mirza had ordered Martial Law with the USA's. clearance, butAyub removed him without the USA's concurrence. But even during Ayub s period


Pakistan was subservient to the USA It was then that the USA took Pakistan for grantedand cultivated relations with India. Pakistan had the USA's moral help. That is whatforced India to the USSR India continued getting closer to Russia while theconfrontation between the USSR and Pakistan increased. During Yahya's time, Indiaand the USSR signed a pact. Russian help to India dismembered Pakistan. Pakistan wasisolated from the rest of the world in the 1971 War. In spite of Pakistan's defence pactwith the USA Nixon took no interest Pakistan cannot rely on America s friendship.

With the fall of the Shah of Iran and the Soviet thrust in Afghanistan Pakistan became afirst line state for American policy makers. The USA forgot about narcotics, humanrights Martial Law, democracy and nuclear proliferation. It even gave F-16's to Pakistan.It wanted to replace Iran with Pakistan as its key regional ally to secure oil routes. Thistime it was Martial Law again. It was Gen Zia's government.

The main drawback in a Martial Law government is that there is no organizedopposition (Only individual's views like mine can be there). So a single personformulated foreign policy. He did so to retain his chair and benefits and not for the wellbeing of the country. Gen Zia did not respect public opinion he wanted to leave hisaffairs to God and be accountable only to Him. He got Pakistan involved in theAfghanistan issue. After a 3.2 billion dollar economic and military aid agreement withthe USA the relationship entered a new phase. It had no effect on the non aligned statusor Islamic Conference membership. We had not supported the USA fully and made theUSSR our enemy. All the big powers are interested m our 350 mile long BaluchistanCoast. USSR India collusion cannot be ruled out.

In 1980 Brzezinski came and said that the 1959 Agreement is operative. "Pakistan is ourfriend and I have come to tell the world." (I was not allowed to attend the talks I wasnot even introduced to Brzezinski.) If the USA is in earnest let the 1959 Agreement beconverted into a treaty and any attack on Pakistan including an attack from India beconsidered an attack on the USA.

It is said that no party can come into power in Pakistan without American help. This isbecause Pakistan is completely in the lap of the USA. It is also said these days that theUSA is happy because democracy has been restored in Pakistan. But there is aconsensus of opinion that whatever the US policy has been towardsPakistan since 1980in spite of all assurances it is not based on sincerity of purpose. This view also holdsthat when hard times come the USA will leave Pakistan alone in the field as before USleaders statements lead to this feeling. Brzezinski had said if India attacks Pakistan theUSA will not help. To Communists he had said we will fight you Senator PeterGalbraith said the USA should consult India before supplying weapons to Pakistan. TheUS ambassador to Pakistan has been making statements tantamount to interference ininternal matters. Pakistan is not only threatened by Russia and Afghanistan but more soby India. It has previously tried to liquidate Pakistan but when Pakistan talks to the


USA the US runs like hell. It shows no understanding or commitment The USA isfollowing a policy of appeasement. towards India and ignoring Pakistan. Will the USAkeep quiet if India in collusion with the USSR attacks Pakistan? Nuclear technology forPakistan is a danger to peace but to India it is an aid to pursue nuclear programmesWhat contradictions?

AFGHANISTANAfghanistan has remained the main problem of Pakistan's foreign policy in the 1980's.Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan were showing signs of a dramatic improvementshortly before the Saur Revolution took place in Kabul. President Daoud himself hadmade two visits to Pakistan, holding unexpectedly cordial talks with Prime MinisterMr. Bhutto in 1976 and with Gen Zia in 1977 and 1978. Daoud had long been a ferventsupporter of Pakhtoonistan a policy which inevitably brought his country into rivalrywith Pakistan since the early 1950s, when he had served as Afghanistan's PrimeMinister.

President Daoud came to Pakistan in May 1976. I had the honor of meeting him andlistening to some of his ideas about foreign relations. I represented the COAS on mostof the occasions when he was not physically required accompanying him wheneverprotocol demanded. One of the occasions was when Mr. Bhutto took President Daoudto Murree in the helicopter. They conversed profusely on Durand Line economicfacilities Pakhtoonistan Baluchistan and training facilities for the armed forces.President Daoud wanted a helping hand from Pakistan which was not forthcoming. Hewas inclined to recognize Durand Line as an international border. He said if he couldget economic help he could get rid of the Russian yoke.

President Daoud visited Pakistan again in August 1977. Talks took place betweenPresident Daoud and Gen Zia. I recommended that Gen Zia tell Sardar Daoud thatPakistan had no disputes to be resolved with Afghanistan and that if there were anyfrom his side we would be pleased to discuss and settle them. There was the possibilityof getting the long disputed Durand Line recognized as the international frontier.Daoud had shown his willingness to recognize it in 1976 when he had visited Pakistan.I had the opportunity to be present at some of the unofficial talks and discussions.President Daoud seemed deeply worried about the Soviet Union. He wanted goodrelations with Pakistan. There was no Pakhtoonistan problem as the NAP leaders hadsigned the 1973 Constitution.

He was prepared to accept the Durand Line as an international boundary. I had askedGen Zia to clinch this agreement, but Gen Zia had suggested that it would be morebefitting to get it done on his visit to Kabul. President Daoud did not hesitate to agree.Subsequently, when Gen Zia went to Kabul on October 10, 1977, he did not include mein the entourage to accompany him, for reasons best known to himself. (I had about 90kilometer common border with Afghanistan to defend as my area of operational


responsibility and was a witness to Durand Line conversations between PresidentDaoud and Mr. Bhutto and President Daoud and Gen Zia.)

He took Gen Sawar and Gen Hassan. However, in Kabul, to my disappointment andsurprise, there was no agreement or announcement about establishing the Durand Lineas an undisputed border. On his return, I asked Gen Zia what had happened. Gen Ziatold me that President Daoud was under some pressure. Thus we missed twoopportunities, one with Mr. Bhutto and the second with Gen Zia.

President Daoud came back to Pakistan on March 5, 1978 in the course of a tour of theregion. He did not stay for more than a day in any country, but in Pakistan he stayedthree days. He had been to India, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran. Daoud had told KingKhalid that relations with Pakistan would be better. He was introduced to Pakistanipoliticians also. The functions were arranged so as to give President Daoud theimpression of complete reconciliation. At Lahore he talked about love, fraternity andbrotherhood. He said Afghanistan was entering a new period of history. Before goingback to Afghanistan talking to the Press, Daoud clarified that Afghanistan wantedpeaceful negotiations to resolve all its problems with Pakistan. In turn, Gen Ziaresponded saying that with President Daoud's visit, mutual confidence and friendshipwould increase in both countries.

Daoud's three day visit to Pakistan left the impression that Pakistan's relations withAfghanistan were never better. He had said, "Nothing remained of what had kept usapart and all fears and doubts had been allayed. The substance of relations was moreimportant for us than the formalities and words. In a nutshell, except for the day to dayproblems, there is nothing to bedevil relations ..... This was to be his future policy. ButPresident Daoud's change of face might not have been a welcome sight for others. Hewas toppled shortly afterwards.

We were in the middle of a Cabinet meeting on April 27, 1978 when the dramatic newsof a coup in Kabul reached us. We were informed that Daoud had been killed, and thatthe situation was still far from clear in the Afghan capital. The Cabinet meeting was cutshort, but the CMLA asked some of us to stay back to deliberate on the coup inAfghanistan. I gave my views at length. The coup had taken place when PresidentDaoud was in Kabul and not abroad. That meant the intention was not only to take overbut also to arrest him or assassinate him. This could not be a simple affair. It wasdefinitely Russian-sponsored, because Moscow must have been made unhappy by therecent leanings of President Daoud towards Islamic countries, and away from theUSSR. (The USSR was the first country to recognize the new regime in Kabul. Since themajority of the Afghan Air Force officers who had spearheaded the takeover operationhad been trained in Moscow, that was only to be expected.)


It was not difficult to determine the cause or its motives. The assassination of theAfghan Communist chief, Mir Akbar Khyber, on April 18 in Kabul at the hands of arightist, was a good indicator. The coup had met with violent opposition from troopsloyal to the late President. It showed a split in the armed forces. That could be used toour advantage. The new regime should not be recognised. Afghanistan would fallunder total Soviet domination unless we acted swiftly to exploit our potential influence.The defence of Pakistan lay in the defence of Afghanistan. We should install a favorablegovernment in Kabul, using friendly Pushtun tribes. At, the same time, Pakistan shoulduse this golden opportunity to occupy positions on the Durand Line.

I argued that, unlike most coups, this one was not the coming to power of a junta but ofa political party. Afghanistan's traditional role of a buffer between the USSR andourselves was finished. Pakistan must be defended by sitting in Afghanistan. Weshould do whatever we could to arrange a friendly government headed by pro-Pakistanelements in Afghanistan. Tribal leaders might be sponsored to do it. However, myviews did not find favor.

The majority of the members in the meeting did not agree with me, and said that suchan action could not be initiated. It was Afghanistan's internal matter. The cabinetmembers almost pounced on me, and said that tribal area terrain was hostile and wewould not be able to maintain a defensive posture militarily, if required. I told themthat if my troops could sit at an altitude of 12,000 feet throughout the year, eye to eyewith the Indian Army, why could they not sit in a friendly tribal area against an armynot as good as the Indian? I was told I did not understand the mentality of the Pushtuntribesman.

One thing became very clear during that meeting. We knew nothing in depth about ourneighbor Afghanistan, although we claimed a centuries old relationship, both historicaland religious. Our knowledge was superficial and often wrong. Why were we suchstrangers, in spite of being so close geographically? Through this coup Russians couldmean reaching warm waters, stopping China's influence in Asia or getting a lead onAmericans.

The special Cabinet meeting was concluded by Gen Zia, with the instructions that theAfghan issue be kept under constant surveillance by special cell, that it meet at leastonce a week and recommend the course of action to be adopted the deliberations of theCell would be a closely guarded secret. The names of the members would be intimatedlater. I was never made a member of the Afghan Cell Perhaps my knowledge ofAfghanistan was too meager, perhaps 60 miles of common border in my area ofoperational responsibility in Wakhan District/Northern Area was of no importanceperhaps Gen Zia did not want me to know what he was up to or maybe he wanted toplease the majority of the Cabinet members who were quite vocal against my proposals.


At any rate, the first meeting of the Afghan Cell was convened, and I came to know thatI was not a member. I then asked Gen Zia bluntly why he was keeping me out of it. Hisreply was in his typical hypocritical manner he indicated that I would be betteremployed away from it. In spite of this, I tried to keep Myself in the picture regardingthe Afghanistan issue as befitted my responsibility for the area of my operations till myretirement on March 30 1980.

As a result of the coup in Afghanistan the Russian influence had increased manifold. Ithad given a tremendous boost to Soviet prestige in general and had made its influencein Afghanistan a factor to be reckoned with. Afghanistan's position as a buffer state hadbeen compromised. The Russians had for the first time entered the South Asia regionand had in Afghanistan a safe and strategically important base for operations. Theirinfluence would radiate eastwards to Pakistan and India westwards to Iran andsouthwards to the Arabian Sea's warm waters.

In June 1979 I led a delegation to the People's Republic of China I had the honor of anaudience with the Chairman Hua Guofeng where we discussed points of mutualinterest. Our Ambassador Muhammad Younus was also present. Whereas there wasgeneral agreement on all points there was a marked difference of opinion on one point.I had maintained that the coup in Afghanistan was Russian sponsored and that sooneror later the Russians would walk in to pursue their overall designs. The Chairmanmaintained that the Russians were unlikely, to move physically into Afghanistan. ThePremier referred to the situation in Afghanistan particularly to the anti governmentdemonstration of June 24 1979 and enquired about the general situation Afghanistanwas blaming both China and Pakistan for interfering. This was merely an excuse for theTaraki Government's, failures. The Afghan refugees were not all refugees in theconventional sense. Ethnic and tribal affinities had long existed on both sides of theborder and running away from suppression the people of one side had unite natural1ychosen to come and stay with their friends on the other. They had always carriedweapons. There was no plausible method of stopping them from entering Pakistan forrefuge. The Minister then drew attention to the forthcoming Pakistani elections andexpressed fears that the Russians wanted to interfere in the region.

The Premier gave a detailed expose of Russia's expansionist moves. The strategic focusof the Soviet union was in Europe. It had made special efforts in the Middle East andthe Persian Gulf to control the flow of oil to Western Europe. Russia could send itstroops to East Europe but could not do the same for the Middle East the Persian Gulfand Africa where it was utilizing Cuban troops. He also talked about Somalia andEthiopia President Daoud who was beginning to show independence was killed andreplaced by Taraki. In the two Yemen's, two Presidents were assassinated in 24 hours.Their expansionist and interventionist policies were designed to control the sea gates ofthe Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, to starve Europe of its supplies of oil.


In Afghanistan the Russians had succeeded in establishing Taraki s regime and couldtherefore not be expected to leave. Unless the people resisted their encroachment theRussians would not go away by themselves. When the Afghans rose against them therewould be nothing the Russians could do about this resistance. The number of peoplekilled would not matter because many more would rise to replace them. It was,therefore, necessary to support the struggle in Afghanistan.

In the face of Russian expansionism China and Pakistan should heighten their vigilanceand prepare themselves by first getting united and becoming strong themselves.Thereafter, they should unite with the Third and Second World countries to opposeSoviet hegemonism and expansion......

China was aware of the efforts made by Pakistan to resist the Soviet Union ... Since theSoviet Union could do nothing against China and NATO, its efforts were directedtowards the soft South where it could wage wars.

One evening in January 1980, when I was playing golf on the Rawalpindi Golf Course,the club marker came to me and informed me that the Chinese Ambassador was aroundand would like to talk to me for a minute or two. I asked the marker would HisExcellency like to come where I was playing, or would he meet me when I reached theclub house. I was told that he would like to see me on the course. So I said that hewould be welcome. He came, shook hands with me and said that he had a message forme from the Chairman He did not know its full meaning. The message was "General,you were right. He said that and went away. I promised to explain this remark to him atour next meeting. The Russians had arrived I had been right when talking with theChairman in Peking.

The Russian motives in invading Afghanistan were perhaps largely defensive. It was tostave off a victory by Islamic insurgents that might have given dangerous ideas to theUSSR's large Muslim population. But where would the doctrine of self-defence end? InPakistan? The Gulf? The Arabian Sea? Could Islamic fundamentalism become adomestic worry to the Kremlin? Russia's 50 million Muslims make it the world's fifthlargest Muslim State. Most of the Muslims live in Central Asia and the Caucasus borderwith Iran Azerbaijanis, Turkomen and other Muslim minorities in the USSR couldbecome targets of attempts to stir up an Islamic rebellion against all foreign dominationof Muslims. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan also, of course, roused the IslamicStates.

I was made responsible for the emergency meeting of Islamic Foreign Ministers to beheld at Islamabad, on January 26, 1980. It was already January 12, and the time wasvery short. In spite of my being not associated with the Afghan Cell, I accepted theresponsibility. I deployed all available resources and made arrangements for thereceptions accommodation, security, travel, lodging, catering, seating and recreational


arrangements for all those VIPs who were to come. Even Gen Zia agreed it was verywell organized.

I remember one unpleasant decision which I gave on the seating arrangements. Therewas very little space for the Press, in the Press Gallery of the National AssemblyBuilding, the venue of the meeting. About 250 journalists had come from overseasalone. So more accommodation was required. When my attention was drawn to it, Inoticed that the contiguous two galleries were reserved for the bureaucrats. I cancelledtheir reservation. Were they going to tell the world what happened in the conference? Iargued. They did not mind. (I hope!)

The conference went on very well as far as the arrangements were concerned. Butalthough I was supposed to be present throughout, I was not to enter the main hall ofthe conference where the deliberations and speeches were going on. Gen K M Arif asCOS had free access to it, not me. I did not bother about it. I knew Gen Zia's attitude tome too well. We started as strangers in 1976 and were still strangers, because our ideason intellectual honesty were different.

Soon after the Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference, Zbigniew Brzezinski, NationalSecurity Adviser, USA, visited Pakistan's border with Afghanistan (in February 1980)along with Warren Christopher, US Deputy Secretary of State. They had talks with GenZia in Rawalpindi about how to protect the most vulnerable and starategical area of myoperational command, contiguous to china, USSR, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan.Many officials attended these meetings including the DG ISI, Lt Gen Akhtar. I washowever, not even introduced to these gentlemen let alone allowed to participate in thediscussions. The time had come for me to quit office and I was eagerly waiting forMarch 30, 1980.

After Brzezmski had gone Lt Gen Akhtar Abdul Rahman Director General ISI came tomy office in Corps HQ and asked me for a favor. He wanted a little area in theregimental area of my Corps LAA Regiment at Ojhri Camp for the dumping andstorage of some arms and ammunition to be placed at his disposal for some clandestineoperations, I refused. There were no underground storage facilities in that area. It wasinsane to have explosives in the open there because proper igloos did not exist andOjhri Camp was too close to Islamabad Airport the highway and civilian housing. I alsotold him that I was no party to Brezezinski and was not going to be a party to the ISIeither.

He told me that he would refer the matter to Gen Zia which he did Gen Zia then askedme to allot some area to the DG ISI, Lt Gen Akhtar. I again stated my inability to obligeas it was fraught with dangers.


I told Gen Zia that as an instructor in the School of Artillery I had taught for four yearsthat badly stored ammunition would produce unpredictable results (And it certainlydid). Gen Zia asked me what could be done I told him that the DG ISI could have itafter my retirement on March 30, 1980. Lt Gen Jahan Dad Khan, a close colleague of GenZia must have made Ojhri available to him after I handed over the command of theCorps to him.

The risk of storing explosives and ammunition a1 Ojhri Camp was revealed to everyonein April 1988 when huge explosions devastated a wide area and killed over onethousand people by many estimates.

The USSR knows Islam had managed to survive, if not flourish in the Communistworld. If the Muslim rebels in Afghanistan finally succeed in throwing out theCommunist Government an Islamic Republic of Afghanistan sandwiched between Iranand Pakistan, would put a community of Islamic nations with 130 million Muslims onthe southern border of the USSR. Such a force would strengthen the hands of the SovietMuslims living in Turkmenistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirghizia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan andAzerbaijan in their dealings with Moscow. Moscow may not like it. The Russians willnot let Afghanistan go out of their sphere of influence.

Gen Zia's personal commitment and involvement, made the Afghan issue the centraltheme of his government and foreign policy, and indeed of Pakistan's politics. The USA,with the support of its allies, would presumably be prepared to go to war with theUSSR over the Gulf states which supply 60% of the West's oil, but it would not go towar in case of a Russian attack on Pakistan through Afghanistan. So we should try, tokeep the Russians at bay by having a friendly government in Afghanistan.

As far as the Afghan refugees are concerned, they have suffered terribly from the war.Most of them have left everything behind, them. But there are saboteurs and drugsmugglers amongst them. Some of them have bought expensive property in Pakistan.Where did the money come from? Even if it is true that the border has about 300mountain passes in hospitable and inhospitable terrain, ranging from 13,000 to 15,000feet altitude, and it cannot be sealed, refugees could not cross check posts in cars andMercedes Benz trucks without the connivance of the authorities. The refugees must goback, and conditions conducive to their honorable return must be created. But then haseveryone who came through the Khyber Pass gone back? How would they be tackled ifthey chose to turn against Pakistan? The guerrillas are well armed, and security couldpresent big problems.

INDIACertain quarters in Pakistan still feel that India has not accepted Pakistan's existencefrom the core of its heart. India does not want to speak on equal terms but onlyhegemonistically, which Pakistan cannot accept at any cost. India is desirous of


unilateral economic benefits from trade in the region. India is against other countriesstrengthening their defence potential. It is also against Pakistan's peaceful nuclearprogramme which is necessary for economic development.

India has always desired that the root cause of three wars with India and Pakistan,Kashmir, be settled through bargaining, but Pakistan stands on its solution based onUN resolutions. Indian newspapers had reported that Mr. Bhutto and Indira Gandhihad agreed during their talks in Simla in 1972 that the only solution to the Kashmirproblem would be to freeze the line of control with minor adjustments. The SimlaAgreement was only meant to normalize Indo-Pak relations in the wake of war. Thatstage has passed. Pakistan wants to go beyond the Simla Agreement and bring the twoneighbouring countries closer by removing the threat of an armed conflict. A closerelationship with Pakistan based on mutual understanding and peaceful cooperationwould entirely change the atmosphere.

Relations with India have been strained ever since Pakistan's birth. They have foughtthree wars. Indira Gandhi was very hostile to Pakistan. Rajiv Gandhi also suffers fromPakphobia. He always talks about an attack from Pakistan, blaming Pakistan for Sikhterrorist problems. He is making his people successfully believe that Pakistan hasexploded an atom bomb. The Indian leadership is now considering ways and means .todefend itself against a Pakistani attack. Let us take a more detailed look at India.

The Indian Army is equipped with most modern weapons, it has operational plans,mobilization plans and positions prepared along the sensitive borders of Pakistan alongSindh. Most likely stores and ammunition have already been dumped in echelons.

The Punjab situation is not under control because of the Khalistan issue. For this Indiablames Pakistan, to exploit anti-Pakistani feelings, and to cover their own mistakes.

There is Indian obduracy on all disputes-Sallal Dam, Wullar Dam, Indian-heldKashmir.

India blaming Pakistan for training Sikh and Kashmiri saboteurs for operations in India,so that a cause to attack Pakistan can be established.

Psychological warfare, through radio, TV, VCR and books. (The book, Gathering Storm,not written by Benazir Bhutto, but labeled as such to create ill-feeling against theArmy.)

Propaganda against Pakistan so that internationally it may be attacked any time andjustified.


History being used against , the Muslims-invaders, enslavement, inter-marriages,conversion, to Islam by force and taking loot out of India etc.

Atom bomb stunt against Pakistan-including delivery system. False rumors aboutestablishment of American military bases on the Baluchistan Coast.

Pakistan using economic aid from the USA and other countries for defence purposesbecause that much more becomes available to the Pakistan exchequer.

Psychologically preparing Indian nationals for aggression against Pakistan wheneverrequired, to take their attention away from their own social, economic and culturalproblems.

Constantly canvassing USSR that Pakistan would be used against it, especially whenthey have withdrawn from Afghanistan.

Assuring the USSR that India always safeguards Russian interests. Options available toIndia as expressed by their analysts and defence research scholars are:-

a. Continue two way talks with Pakistan and convince Pakistan not to sendsaboteurs and terrorists (though Pakistan is not actually sending these).

b. Destroy anti India (i.e. Khalistan) bases in Pakistan by hot pursuit. (Thereare non setup in Pakistan).

c. Clandestine operations in Sindh and Baluchistan with the goal ofsecession from Pakistan.

India prefers the third option for obvious reasons but it would be better to combine allthree.

India is no longer a secular state. It is a fanatic Brahmin State. All others are beinglabeled as hostile. Anti Muslim riots is a common pattern. Sikhs are being exterminatedSikhs and Hindus are clashing as on two nation theory. Sikhs have given the sacrificeand laid the foundation of Khahstan. It is only a matter of time. It took Muslims 90years to regain freedom in the shape of Pakistan. Indian Held Kashmir shows proPakistan feelings. Indian Held Kashmir Muslims have seen that they are graduallybeing converted in to a minority through settlement of Hindus in great numbers inKashmir. Hindus in Bombay want all others to quit.

The proposal that India and Pakistan renounce war is nothing new. Nehru proposed itin 1949 and it was repeated by India when Mohammad Ali Bogra was PM of Pakistan.It was reiterated again in 1963 when talks on Kashmir failed and in 1965 at Tashkent.


Only a lasting peace would enable India and Pakistan to devote their resources toeradicate poverty and build a sound foundation for a better life for their 900 millionpeople. The geopolitical situation and the tension built up due to the Afghan issuedemand that India and Pakistan should adopt a pragmatic approach to their problems.

Pakistan is a buffer state between Communism and India. If Pakistan goes red Russiacannot be stopped. So India should have friendly relations with Pakistan. Both arepeace loving states and should live in a friendly manner. Pakistan is scared of India andcannot trust it. A peaceful settlement is only likely to be achieved if and when thepropaganda war is stopped. It cannot be done till the Kashmir issue is solved. Thesooner it is settled the better it would be for both nations

USSRPakistan has faced pressure from the USSR, not only because of Afghanistan. At onetime, the USSR was secretly flying military supplies for Ethiopia through Karachi. Ziahad mentioned it to me after I had come back from Somalia. One day it was reported tome that a Russian aircraft had landed at Karachi and was parked near the runway withRussian military guards on it. I ordered that it should not be allowed to take off withoutinspection. The Russians would not agree to the inspection. The Soviet ambassador Mr.Azimov approached Gen Zia and all of us met at Zia's residence. I admitted that I hadstopped the aircraft. The ambassador threatened us with dire consequences. We did notchange our stand. We were then blamed for supplying arms and ammunition toSomalia. I admitted that it was a little token aid to our Muslim friends with which inany case it could not hope to win the war against Ethiopia.

In 1985 Gen Zia said that a superpower had clearly warned that if Pakistan continued tohelp the Afghans it would have to pay for it. Apparently there is no problem with theUSSR as far as bilateral relations are concerned. Pakistan has good relations in the fieldof trade and technology. Soviet Pakistani relations have promoted cooperation in trade,economic, cultural, scientific and technological fields. There have been political contactsbetween the leaders of the USSR and Pakistan for the growth of mutual interest and thedesire to know each other better, only natural for neighboring nations. Both sides haveshown a desire to go on strengthening political, economic, scientific, cultural andartistic contacts and expanding the field of cooperation. Efforts will continue for furtherstrengthening and development of good neighborly cooperation in the interests ofpeace, social progress and understanding between nations.

CHINAThe relationship with the People's Republic of China is an important pillar, of Pakistan'sforeign policy. It is an enduring and close association. Do we really have good relationswith our neighbors -- India, Iran, Afghanistan, USSR? China is the only exception andthe US is too far off to be relied upon.


ISLAMIC COUNTRIESBeing an ideological state. Pakistan has always tried to enhance the cause of UmmahIslamiya and to establish and strengthen brotherly relationships with Muslim countries.As an active member of the Islamic Conference, Pakistan has always tried to establishclose cooperation in political, economic, cultural and social fields with Islamic countries.

NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENTAs a member of the non-aligned movement. Pakistan has steered its course cautiouslyso that it performs its non aligned role effectively. It has fought against pressure frombig powers. It has fought against colonialism, racism and hegemonism.

Pakistan's foreign policy should be to help safeguard its sovereignty and territorialintegrity, to make friends with other nations of the world, to enhance the national imageand prestige of Pakistan abroad, and to help accelerate the process of socio- economicdevelopment of Pakistan and its people.

Pakistan should be against war, oppression, discrimination and inequality. Pakistanshould support peace, freedom, justice, human rights and development of social justice.Above all else, Pakistan should try to follow an independent non- aligned policy.


CHAPTER - SIXTEENGENTLEMAN CADET TO GENERAL

It was early 1946. I was a resident student of RSD College, Ferozepur, India and was inmy final year BA studying economics and political science. One fine morning, asMohsin Sheikh, Ashfaq Ahmad (Talqeen Shah), Mohammad Younus and I came out ofthe college tuck shop, we saw a lot of students gathered round the Principal's office.Apparently a British Officer, a Major in Indian Army, had come from LahoreCantonment and was interviewing boys keen on joining the Indian Armed Forces. Wewondered what he was up to, because World War II had just ended. Why did he needpeople to join the forces? Gossip continued on these points while boys went in and outof the interview room. Since we four were not really interested, and thought it wasbetter to complete our studies than to become mercenaries we did not go in to meet theMajor. But we hung around with the others.

At about four in the afternoon, the Major came out and said, "Well, boys, I am veryencouraged with the response that I have received, from you. I am sorry I can't see anymore of you as I have to go back to Lahore. If any of you are interested I will be at myresidence in Lahore Cantonment tomorrow morning. You are welcome to see me there,if you so desire. Before I leave I would however like to remind you of the centralgovernment's decision that competitions for entry into the Indian Civil Services (ICS)have been stopped and vacancies in future are to be filled by Armed Forces officers whowould be released from the services. You may like, to join the Armed Forces as acommissioned officer rather than wait for the resumption of competitive examinations.Best of luck to all of you." Three cheers for the Major, we said.

All sorts of questions now had us arguing in search of answers. Should we do our BA?What would we get after that? When would the ICS competitive examinations beresumed? What would the life be like as a King's commissioned officer? What would bethe privileges? What would be the hazards? How would the family take it?

In the evening, Younus asked me whether we should attend the economics honors classon the following day, or take a quick trip to Lahore Cantonment to meet the Major andalso see an old friend.

We decided to go Lahore. And early next morning, we boarded the Punjab Mail atFerozepur. We reached Lahore at about half past eight in the morning and it wasraining. The Major's residence was only about four hundred yards from the railwaystation. So we got hold of a Tonga and proceeded there.


We pressed the call bell with thumping hearts. Would we be arrested, chided or treatedas gentlemen? We were still thinking about all this, when a smart and neatly dressedbearer came out and asked us who we were and what we wanted. We told him that wehad come from Ferozepur to meet the Major, as suggested by him yesterday. In a fewminutes the Major in civies now, walked into the room where we were waiting. Hestayed with us for about forty minutes. He offered us a cup of tea, enquired about ourjourney, asked some general questions, and finally gave us some forms to be filled in.Thereafter he said that he had initially selected both of us to appear before an InterServices Selection Board (ISSB) in due course and that we would be informed when.

After about a month we received instructions to proceed to the ISSB at Bareilly. Joiningdates for both of us being different, my friend went first. I followed. I stayed three daysin Barelly. There were about forty candidates from all over India. MSc's from Calcuttaand Madras universities, BA's from United and Central Provinces, Intermediates fromPunjab and North West Frontier Province, some serving soldiers from Indian stateforces, some princes from unknown states, some robust looking Anglo Indians, somewell turbaned smart Sikhs and some meekish young men. Over the three days all of ushad to take several written group and psychological tests, cross obstacle courses,participate in discussions, stay under observation during meals etc. I still remember theinterview I had with the psychiatrist, a British officer in civil clothes. He asked me if Iwould join the ranks or as a Viceroy's Commissioned Officer if I was not selected for theKing's Commission. I told him that under, those circumstances I would prefer tocontinue my studies till graduation then think of doing something thereafter. Off wewent to our homes, without knowing what was in store for us, but certain that out ofour batch of forty five some must have been selected.

I was selected for training as a Gentleman Cadet, Younus could not make it. There weretwo courses to be run, one at the Indian Military Academy, Dehra Dun, for regularcommission, and one at the Officers Training School (OTS), Bangalore, for short servicecommission. The duration of the course at the OTS would be roughly half that of theAcademy. I had a choice, because my age made me eligible for both courses. I opted togo to the OTS, Bangalore. When I reached there, I found that Sikander Lal Chawla andAbdul Ghafoor from Punjab, Newton from Delhi and Jemadar Hazura Singh from theRoyal Indian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers had made it from our batch at theISSB, Barelly. Chawla later retired as a Brigadier in the India Army, Ghafoor as a Lt.Col. in the Pakistan Army, and Hazura Singh died in an accident as Major in the IndianArmy.

At the OTS, Bangalore, we were told that ours was going to be the last Short ServiceCommission Course there and thereafter only the IMA would function. Bangalore was awonderful place. It was also a centre of high technological training in differentdisciplines. I still have a clear impression of the Hindustan Aircraft Factory visited byus, assembling aircraft even at that time, whereas in the areas later known as Pakistan --


East or West -- there was not even a proper nut and bolt factory. The climate remainedmoderate throughout the year. We did not need any woollies, cotton cellular clothingwas good enough throughout the year. I bought my first pair of woolen uniforms, inBombay on my way to Pakistan, in November 1947. Gentleman Cadet (later Lt. Gen)Jahanzeb Arbab was also there at the OTS, Bangalore, where I met him for the first time.

Our head dress in Bangalore, during parade hours was an olive green drill beret with awhite band. Our walking out headgear was a khaki drill side hat with a white band.Peaked hats were only worn by officers and not by GC's of the OTS, Bangalore. Oneafternoon, we saw about six cadets standing outside the Adjutant's office with peakedhats and white bands around them. We asked where they were from and why theywere standing there. We were told that they were Gentlemen Cadets from the School ofArtillery, Deolali, and that having failed to make the grade as Artillery, officers theyhad been switched to Bangalore to continue their training as Infantry Officers.

It had been a career pattern in the Indian Army that cadets who could not make officergrades in the Indian artillery or other arms and services of the Indian Army, used to bereverted to infantry training. In the initial selection., the best cadets used to go to theArmoured Corps and Artillery, the next best to the Engineers, Signals and Infantry. Thesight of these cadets, who included some British nationals amongst them, was verydiscouraging. because only a week earlier six of us, out of a course of 120, of which 50percent were British, had been selected to go to the School of Artillery for training. Nocadet had been earmarked for the Armoured Corps because there was already a surplusof officers. So we were rightly scared as to what would happen to us if we were not ableto make the grade there.

Since ours was going to be the last course, and there would be no OTS to revert to, weinformed our Company Commander, Maj Truss, that we did not want to go to ArtillerySchool. We were told to "shut up" and to do as ordered. So we went to the School ofArtillery. Deolali. There our class started as six, but when we got our commissions, wewere about 30, out of which ten were for the Royal Artillery. The seniors had joined usafter relegation. That is where I met Lt Sawar Khan (later Gen) and Gentleman CadetAkhtar Abdul Rahman Khan (later Gen) for the first time. It was February 1947.

1947 was a year of terrible disturbances during the partition of India. During thesedisturbances I was at Deolali. All kinds of news used to reach us as to what washappening around the country. In June-July the postal systems were disrupted. I had nonews of my parents and other family members from July 1947 onwards till after Ireached Pakistan in November 1947. I had the option of continuing serving in theIndian Army or to opt for Pakistan. I opted for Pakistan. Then came 14 August 1947.India was divided. We got our Independence. Pakistan was created. Long live Pakistan.Those of us who had opted to serve in Pakistan were told by Brig Frowne,Commandant, School of Artillery, that the Pakistan contingent -- comprising Officers,


Viceroy's Commissioned Officers, Non Commissioned. Officers, other ranks andcivilians paid out of the defence budget -- would go to Pakistan by rail, along with thePakistan share of the School of Artillery, guns, prime movers, vehicles, arms,ammunition and technical stores, on a date to be fixed later. It transpired later that ithad been planned by the Indians to derail our train near Bhopal, massacre all ranks andconfiscate the guns arms and ammunition, because of the fear of our likely participationwith all these elements in Kashmir against the Indian Army. This information hadleaked out through a Muslim Moplah infantry officer, who at the time could not beeasily placed from his name as to whether he was Muslim or Christian. He was on thestaff of an army headquarters in Junagarh. Consequently Brig Frowne refused todispatch the Pakistan contingent by train and demanded that it be sent by sea BrigFrowne left India for the UK in 1947 and much later joined the Royal Pakistan Artilleryin 1952 as Commander Corps Artillery.

So far we had been living together quite amicably as one community of bachelor officersin mixed bachelor officers quarters - Hindus Muslims Sikhs Christians. But now ourquarters were segregated. For security reasons all Muslim bachelor or single officerswere lodged in one locality. That was where after some days a Muslim Havildar, atechnical assistant was stabbed and killed in front of our quarters by his non Muslimcolleagues. It happened when we had gone to our mess for dinner and we came toknow about it on our return through the police who had arrived there. Nobody wasarrested or punished.

Our contingent was later moved to Transit Camp Kalyan where we were to stay till ourvoyage to Karachi was arranged. We stayed there for about a month before moving onto Bombay. Very shabby and inhumane treatment was meted out to us during our stayat Kalyan. There was only one dining room for the whole lot of officers single ormarried along with them families, purdah observing ladies and children. All of us wererequired to eat all our meals in just one hour in the dining room. No room service wasallowed. No provision of fresh milk was made for children. There was no runningwater in the living quarters except for half an hour in the morning. The campcommandant whose father had been killed in Hindu Muslim riots at Ferozepur, wastaking revenge in his own manner. Some of us stayed away mostly at Bombay to reducethe congestion in the officers mess at the transit camp. Finally we sailed from Bombayin two ships on different days. I reached Karachi in the first week of November 1947.

It is pertinent to state here that at the time of partition there were no Armour, Artillery.or Infantry regiments or battalions which were totally Muslim units in the Indian Army,whereas there were many complete Hindu and Sikh units. This was due to Britishpolicy since the 1857 War of Independence and, was aimed at preventing IndianMuslims in army service becoming a potential danger to the Raj. As a result, when theArmed Forces partition took place, our share of manpower in uniform arrived asindividuals, platoons or oddly constituted companies. Similarly, as all the ammunition


factories and major military equipment depots were in India, our share of all theseremained in India, in spite of the promises made to Pakistan.

On reaching Karachi, we saw that Pakistan's behavior with the outgoing non-Muslimrefugees was much better than meted out to us by India. After disembarkation atKarachi, it was noticed that while refugees migrating to India were allowed to carryeverything, we had been deprived of our major belongings, including our personalweapons. During the migration of Muslim refugees to Pakistan, the number of womenwho were abducted will never be known accurately. Suffice it to say that thousands offamilies were finished at the hands of non Muslims bands who had the tacit support ofarmy and militia. Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir State were killed under apremeditated set plan. All this was planned to strangle Pakistan at birth.

Pakistan absorbed the influx of refugees by a kind of miracle. They were generally notvery demanding. They accepted whatever was offered, though some locals exploitedthe situation under the pretext of "helping" refugees. Some looted the houses,misappropriated valuables and took over valuable properties becoming rich overnight.There was no check, no ethics and no accountability. This produced a class of upstarts.They assumed the role of administrators and rulers through their ill-gotten wealth.

And suffering through their hands continues till today. Most of the Rehabilitation staffresponsible for giving comfort and justice to refugees were corrupt and dishonest. This,of course, made for dishonest decisions and created avoidable problems for therefugees. Decisions given on property disputes were generally wrong. Nobodybothered. The flood gates were open to the dishonest to become rich. Some of this sameclass later used their new wealth to move into politics.

Today we are being ruled mostly by them or by their children. We have no hope to getrid of these yokes, till we discard the personality-oriented political parties andintroduce parties based on collective leadership in which people come and go, but theparties carry on forever. We cannot give the prerogative to the filthy rich to rule over usforever.


ANNEXURES & APPENDICES


ANNEXURE 'A'

CHISHTI AND AZAD KASHMIR

I

As Minister for Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas, I was responsible for thefollowing achievements:

1. Radio stations at Gilgit and Skardu.

2. Property rights given to refugees from Srinagar valley and Jammu.

3. Pensions granted to war windows of 1947, 1965 and 1971 wars.

4. Introduction of local self-government and right to vote in the Northern Areas.

5. Recovery of money from co-operative banks.

6. Development of road network through the work of Army engineers.

7. Allotment of land to Mangla Dam displaced families in the Jhang district ofPunjab, and monetary grants to them to settle there.

8 Accountability of all office holders through tribunals, without any exception.

9. Local Bodies Elections for the first time held in Azad Kashmir.

10. Abolition of seats quota reserved for AK President, Prime Minister and for AKFederal Minister, with admissions to colleges open only on merit.

11. Additional places reserved for AK students in Medical colleges and EngineeringCollege in Pakistan.

12. Doubling of penalty in case of AK students of. Pakistani Medical andEngineering Colleges who did not return to serve the areas.

13. Improvement of medical facilities in inaccessible areas

During my tenure as Corps Commander of Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas, Idid not let the Indian Army erect pillars or dig a trench or erect barbed wire at anypoint along the line of control, or surrender an inch or territory to them,. It wasunfortunate that under the Simla agreement, de facto and de jure positions of theprevious ceasefire line were not honored, and the areas which were in physical


occupation of the belligerent were retained. This was tacit acceptance of the fact thatwhatever is grabbed by force is retained.

I had requested Gen Zia to take his Cabinet Ministers on an orientation tour of thenorthern Areas. I arranged for them, to be taken to Irshad Pass, Mintika Pass, KhunjrabPass and some important places along the line of control in the Kargil sector. Gen Ziaexpressed his genuine appreciation of the opportunity afforded to him to spend threememorable days in the Northern Areas. He summed up his impression in his letter NO17/3/COAS, dated October, 7, 1978, addressed to me which read: "My visit to theNorthern Areas, on October 3 to 5, 1978 was at once a heartwarming and a rewardingexperience for me. Wherever I went, whatever I saw, whoever I met, left an indelibleimpression on my mind. I have come back with a sense of re-assurance that our menserving in these areas are made of exceptional mettle and capable of rising toimmeasurable heights. Whether it was the enthusiastic welcome by the people on thewaysides, the earnest response of the public at the meetings, the constructive approachof the notables during the exchange of views, the excellent state of organization ofArmy Units, the extraordinary ardour of the troops at work, or the perfect harmonybetween the Military and the Civil, authorities and local population, every feature borethe unmistakable stamp of your guidance and leadership. I wish to thank you sincerelyfor all this ....."

Such letters of appreciation made people jealous of me.

* * * * * * * * *

An ugly situation had developed in 1977 in Kohistan Area, between northern regionand the NWFP. Pakistani and Chinese engineers were working on the Karakorumhighway there. The locals, had blockaded the Chinese route and were not letting themgo to their campsite. Relations between the locals and the Army units had becomebitter. Internal security duties were involved. That area was actually the responsibilityof Lt Gen Sawar Khan, and Maj Gen Fazle Haq. They had shown their inability, though,to handle the situation, So Gen Zia placed Kohistan under my command, and I issuedthe necessary order to deal with the situation. An additional brigade from Lt GenGhulam Hassan Khan was given to me for this. A clash had taken place at Dubair onMay 3, 1977. The situation became extremely complicated due to the security of theChinese and our engineers. A mere show of force could endanger their lives. Thecombined efforts of civil and Army, authorities managed to control the situation. Sixpeople were killed, 57 were held and Karakorum was finally cleared of road blocks.Brig Mir Abdul Nayeem and Mohammad Azam Khan, Commissioner, Hazara Division,had done well. I recommended some of the officers and men for gallantry awards, butthey never received them.

* * * * * * * * *


II

The Sardar Qagum CaseOn June 19 1978 Sardar M A Qayum Khan former President of Azad Kashmir andMember of the Constituent Council of Rabita al Alam al Islami wrote a letter to Gen MZia-ul-Haq CMLA with a copy to me. The contents are given below:-

It is a great irony that my honest and sincere efforts to extend wholehearted cooperationto your government since the very beginning, have ultimately resulted in seriousmisunderstandings and the sword of vengeance drawn against me .... The lobby againstme has gained the upper hand and succeeded in creating the wedge .... My regime shallbe remembered in history as the golden age for rule of law, morality, administration

trust of the people with credibility of course development of the Azad territories andsolidarity with Pakistan compared to all the preceding and the following periods puttogether .... The worst of my enemies, Mr. Bhutto, who publicly slandered his ownchoices, and the handmade government Muzaffarabad also admitted the historicallyeventful tenure of my government .....

.... I wish to draw your attention to the so called charges .... and say that

I. The tale of my accountability is nothing but a deliberate canard meantonly to revile my person.

II. By any standards it appears to be pure and simple vindictive victimizationand not accountability, and I do not merit victimization at the hands of aregime that I have not only wished well, but have desperately strived forits success and sought to enlist cooperation for it inside and outside thecountry.

III. So far the notification is grossly unlawful as it has no legal support. Is itnot strange that the Government issues a notification without any legalcover? Till today no legal cover has been provided to it Complexion of theAzad Kashmir High Court is such at the moment that I would better notgo to them for any redress. The less I say about it the better. It is more of apolitical group than of jurists.

IV. I have been singled out which is again very unfair by any means whilethere have been other Presidents also, and some of them are notoriouslyknown for their misdeeds and even opposition of the basic ideology.


V. Honesty and integrity is my only asset which has been challenged mostmercilessly and unfairly through those who are at the lowest ebb ofhonesty and ability by any yardstick, etc etc.

We as the most aggrieved people at the hands of the previous regime and victims totheir tyranny, were rightly expecting a redress at the hands of this regime .... Ourimpression of brotherhood and equality in rights of citizenship is perhaps anillusion......"

Sardar Sikandar Havat Khan had approached me to get Sardar Qayum's casewithdrawn from the Tribunal. He claimed it was derogatory and an insult to acomponent party of the PNA. I showed my inability and told him that all cases have togo before a tribunal, therefore I could not make an exception. Then he requested me toallow Sardar Qayum to see me. I agreed to this, as I had nothing against him personally.

Sardar Qayum came to me after a day or two and showed his gratitude for all that I haddone for him so far. Thereafter he requested that his case be withdrawn as he was aformer President of AK and an active member of the PNA. I asked hint point blank if heconsidered himself guilty or innocent, He kept quiet. Then I said, if you are guilty thenhow do you expect us to drop the case when the CMLA is laying so much stress onaccountability and if you are not guilty then why do you worry, your respect will beenhanced when the Tribunal declares you innocent. He was rather upset anddissatisfied. He told me in clear terms that he would like to do his best to ensure that hedoes not have to appear before the Tribunal. I told him to please himself. He left myoffice an angry and worried man.

One day Mufti Mahmood talked to me about Sardar Qayum's case and asked me tohelp him to overcome the difficulties and to drop the case against him. I told MuftiSahib that it wasn't me who was insisting upon Sardar Qayum's case because I had nopersonal evolvement in it nor was I gunning for him. It was the Azad KashmirGovernment which had taken up the case as all other cases, and all were equal beforethe law and as per the CMLA's policy, there would be no exceptions. I showed myhelplessness, even if I had wanted to intervene. I advised Mufti Sahib not to make it aprestige point and to let Sardar Qayum's case be dealt with like any other case. MuftiSahib said that he would like to discuss it with Gen Zia. I told him that he could pleasehimself, but he would be wasting his time as there was enough against Sardar Qayumaccording to the Azad Kashmir Chief Executive's reports. Some days after this, Gen Ziawanted me in his office to discuss Sardar Qayum's case so I went and saw him.

Gen Zia told me that Sardar Qayum being a PNA leader and quite helpful incoordinating matters between the PPP and the PNA might be excused and his case notforwarded to the Tribunal, and if already sent it might be withdrawn. I told Gen Ziathat I would give him a clear picture and thereafter accept the directions and decisions


given by the CMLA. So I showed him the letter of Azad Kashmir Chief Executive BrigMohammed Hayat Khan (No CE/977-EC/78, dated June 25, 1978). After reading theletter, Gen Zia said that there would be no change in the decision already taken, andSardar Qayum should try to defend himself. The letter was a damaging indictment ôfQayum's misuse of state funds.

There is an overwhelmingly large number of Cases of grave financial irregularities,favoritism, abuse of power and misapplication and diversion of public moneycommitted by Sardar Mohammad Abdul Qayum Khan, former President AzadGovernment of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, which were brought to the notice ofthis government and it was on the basis of substantial and fully supported andcorroborated proof provided by rebuttable evidence that the matter was finally referredto the Disqualification Tribunal for fair and judicial determination of the issuesinvolved. The instances of the glaring irregularities and corruption are so numerousand overwhelming in number and gravity that all allegation and charges could not beincluded in the reference.

13 main cases for investigation of corruption and misappropriation of public moneywere detailed in the letter, plus 17 additional allegations of financial misconduct andgross irregularities. They included improper awards of contracts to close friends,irregular payments and dealings with state funds and reinstating governmentemployees dismissed on charges of corruption.

I had also shown Gen Zia a letter dated 14, June 1978 which Mir Abdul Aziz Editor Insafhad written to the Azad Kashmir President and Chief Executive. It read:-

"Reference of Sardar Abdul Qayum to a Tribunal for accountability was a very wise step.In fact it was overdue. Otherwise there was an impression that accountability was meantonly for the People Party Azad Kashmir. Even the Chief of the Jamait Islami AzadKashmir recently pointed this out.

I have nothing personal against Sardar Abdul Qayum, but the fact remains that heremained in power in Azad Kashmir for most of the time when Mr. Bhutto was in powerin Pakistan, and the allegations, were brought against him in Pakistan, and theallegations were brought against him in Press, on the platform and even in theAssembly".

* * * * * * * * *

After reading this book i.e. 'Betrayals of Another Kind' Lieut General M. L. Chibber (Retd)of the Indian Army wrote the following letter to me:-

Lieut Gen (Retd) (Retd)


M. L. Chibber20-1A MAX DRIVE

MORRISTOWN NJ 07960 USA19 August

Dear Faiz,

I have just finished reading your book "Betrayals of Another Kind". I enjoyed readingyour frank, upright and candid views and feel that as a fellow soldier I must write toyou to see if I can get you interested in a crusade Indo-Pak Reconciliation. Let me firstintroduce myself.

I started life at OTS Bangalore. We might have had an overlap because Brig Said Azaharand I worked for Maj Trus till August 1946 when we left for IMA to be in the SecondRegular Course. I retired from Udhampur as G.O.C-in-C Northern Command inAugust 1985. Thereafter I was Chief Executive of Management Development Institute atDelhi and currently I am a Nehru Fellow for 1990 and 91 to research the introduction ofNation Service in India. I am here in connection with my research. The address above isthat of my son-in-law as my firm base while I and my wife move around in the U.S.A.We shall return to India on 4 Nov.

My wife and I have been, working for Indo-Pak reconciliation as a small offering to thenext generations and our children. We hope that they will have a more peacefulsubcontinent than what we had. I incidentally have been, of late, trying to build publicopinion in India for our crusade and I frequently write in the press.

On our way to the U.S.A. We stopped in Switzerland to participate in a conference onreconciliation organized by the Moral Rearmament people. It was essentially for theGermans, Poles, the Russians and some other East Europeans. We participated andgave our views on Indo-Pakistan situation and our endeavors. What I saw wasremarkable. The MRA promotes the practice of reconciliation and overcomes "hurts"and "hates" by observing four absolute values which are common to all religions—absolute Honesty. Purity Unselfishness and Love I am mentioning these because I canmake out from your book that you have practiced these.

Besides insisting in the press we also interview people to get and give ideas we havemet about a 100 people so far who have a role from the President of India downwards.On your side Dr. Mubashar Lieut Gen Atiq ur-Rahman (my IMA CompanyCommander) Nasim (your current UNO Ambassador and few others. I hope somedaywe can meet and discuss this matter further, In case you are interested, then do drop aline. With warm regards

Yours


(CHIBBER)

PS

I am writing care Said Azahar and hope that the letter reaches you.

A facsimile of the letter is at Appendix 1. I replied General Chibber's letter on 17,October 1990 at his U.S.A. address. I do not know whether it reached him or notbecause I never got its acknowledgement My reply sent to him was as following:-

Lt Gen F A Chishti (Retd)1 Akbar Road

Rawalpindi Pakistan 46000

Dear General Manohar,

Thanks for your, letter of 19th August which reach ii me a couple of days ago throughBrig Said Azahar. I am glad to know that you have read my book "Betrayals of AnotherKind".

I appreciate your approach We remain comrades in arms. Whereas you have held someappointments of national importance since your retirement in Aug 1985. I have been afree lance critic since my retirement in Mar 1980. Like yourself I also had the honor toserve, in Kashmir and Northern Areas. This should have common direct bearing on ourthinking on the Indo-Pak reconciliation idea which you have undertaken as a crusade. Itis certainly noble and worth attaining but I do not see it materializing because injusticenever breeds cohesion. Unfulfilled promise of India of letting the Kashmiris exercisetheir right of self determination seems to be the main hurdle. Let this hurdle beremoved and reconciliation would follow as fall out.

I am also for love, peace and prosperity, for our posterity in the Subcontinent, but withhonor. To me religion is something between the individual and its creator. Let theindividual practice it the way it wants to. The state should however provide all facilitiesto all citizens to enable them to practice it the way they want to. As far as human rightsare concerned their violation, does not matter how trivial or minor it may be, mustnever go unpunished, First punishment must follow first mistake. Only then can wemake our subcontinent worth living.

Let us practice the traits of intellectual honesty, judiciousness, uprightness, franknessand the courage to call a spade a spade as taught to us in the profession of arms.


I do not mind meeting anybody or attending any meeting on Moral Rearmamentsponsored by anybody and anywhere in the world. We owe better world to ourchildren.

With best wishes to your lady wife who as you say is a, helping hand in your crusade,and warm regards to both of you.

Yours(CHISHTI)17-10-1990

Almost about the same period, when this letter was written, the Kashmiris werestruggling for their rights and giving supreme sacrifices of their lives to attain it. Theywould Inshallah, succeed very soon in their mission.

* * * * * * * * *


ANNEXURE 'B'CHISHTI ON ELECTIONS

Report and Recommendations of the committee for General and Local Bodies Elections(Sent by Lt. Gen Chishti to Gen Zia-ul-Haq, September 30, 1978, Corps HQ letter2197/PA)

General and Local Bodies Elections

Gen Zia wanted a critical analysis of the situation prevailing in the country to be carriedout with a view a determining the time frame, for holding General and Local BodiesElections in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir. For this he appointed a new committee withme as its Chairman. (The CMLA Secretariat letter 571/CMLA of August 17, 1978.) Therecommendations of the committee as follows were sent to Gen Zia under my signature.(My Corps HQ letter 2197/PA dated September 30, 1978)

Commitment

The President has already made an unequivocal reiteration that 1979 will be the year ofGeneral Elections.

Apprehensions

The country is passing through the most critical phase of its troubled existence. It isfacing deep-rooted problems in almost all spheres including political, economical,ideological and psychological spheres. The most dangerous aspect of the situation is thepeople's increasing loss of faith in their destiny as a united nation.

The present mood and psyche of the nation is a pertinent point. The national euphoriaand the dawn of expectations which greeted the military takeover in July 1977 havedisappeared and have given way to national bewilderment, apathy and despondency.Suspicions have arisen regarding the intentions and duration of Martial Law.

While committed to cultivating and promoting the Islamic Ideology on the basis ofwhich it was created, Pakistan has to protect itself from the dangerous cross-lire ofCommunism and Secularism.

The increasing social and economic impoverishment of the masses may erode the veryroots of the polity and lead to the growth of national frustration manifested byparochialism and regionalism in its most virulent from.


No single political party or group seems to be in command of the political situation.

Assumptions

A civilian government is essential for the progress and well-being of Pakistan.

The uncertainty and political vacuum cannot be sustained for long without detrimentalresults.

Leadership cannot be thrust on people.

Steps will continue to be taken to establish the credibility of the Martial Law Regime.

Government would be able to control the law and order situation whatever be thejudgment of Z. A. Bhutto's trial.

Analysis of the Problem

So far in Pakistan, NO government has ever handed over power to, the nextgovernment with honor. They have always been ousted. Se before that stage comes, theMartial Law Regime must hand over gracefully to a civilian government. This is onlypossible after General Elections. Suitable seasons to have elections are spring andautumn. Each one has its pros and cons. To establish the preference, of one over theother some factors have been discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.

The present Federal cabinet should be dissolved well before the election date. After thedissolution, Martial Law will have to show a complete stance of neutrality.

Peace must prevail prior, during and after elections. Choice of the government will bemade by the people.

The integrity of the Armed Forces must be maintained.

Political Environment

The PNA consisted of nine parties. Only a few had some following at the national levelwhereas the remaining parties were merely regional in nature having a limitedinfluence. During the agitation these parties showed complete identity of approach andcooperated till their mission to depose the government was achieved. Soon after theimposition of Martial Law, difference of opinion and cracks appeared. Rightist andLeftist elements of PNA, owing to their un-natural alliance, soon separated. This state ofdiversity and amalgamation tended to compound the problems giving no clear sense of


direction to the nation. Very soon we may expect a fresh alignment and grouping ofpolitical parties purely as a marriage of convenience based on self aggrandizement,similar to the collusion of the PNA as witnessed against the previous government. Inthis context, Jamiat-e-Ulema-i-lslam and the Pakistan Democratic Party may sooner orlater leave the PNA. This would leave only the Muslim League and Jamaat-e-Islamiwith the government. These issues will remain and are likely to be aggravated till suchtime as elections are held. The reading of the situation must ensure that the elections areheld before the massive movement starts. The odd cases of law and order, thoughisolated; are a part of an overall design which must be ruthlessly curbed.

As far as the PPP is concerned, it has demonstrated a semblance of unity and order.Minor dissensions and splits did take place (Maulana Kausar Niazi Group), but notwith any great ramifications. As expected. the party has shown no signs ofdisintegration. It has not met political death. The overall political scenario in the region,i.e. the emergence of a new regime in Afghanistan. recent riots in Iran and seculartrends in India, are likely to throw long shadow on our political developments andparty affiliations/programme/stances/attitudes. As time passes, forces opposing thegovernment, specially the leftists, are gaining more strength. Because of Islamisationand the leaning shown towards orthodox Islam. Shia, Ahmadies, Christians and otherminorities are adopting an anti-Martial Law stance. Fringe groupings and theiralignment are likely to aggravate the situation.

The strength of the PPP lies in the economic contents of its manifesto. Its main theme isthat of socialism with a diluted coloring of Islam. The PNA. under the positive slogan ofNizam-e-Mustafa using the will and the blood of the people initially gained substantialground. But the alliance of convenience soon drifted into insipidity. Due to newgrouping the disintegration process within their lines has become inevitable. A rising ofleftist forces is also pronounced.

(a) In case the elections are held in October 1979, the rift in the PNA and otherrightist elements is likely to accentuate resulting lit a total loss ofconfidence of the public. With the passage of time, PPP would certainlycapitalize on the weaknesses and correspondingly may improve itsposition. By this phenomenon as more time passes the attitude of thegeneral public may harden against the government. This contingencywould allow additional time for political grouping/alignments which isunfavorable to the government.

(b) In case the elections are scheduled for April 1979, national confidencewould be restored in the Military Regime thereby injecting a healthy trendand spirit in national politics. It will wipe out all speculation anduncertainty, and revitalize the Army's image in the eyes of the nation.


Correspondingly, it will weaken the opposition forces and facilitate theemergence of saner and patriotic elements to lead the nation.

Conclusion

i) To arrest further political polarization and deterioration, elections must beheld as soon as possible, preferably in April 1979.

ii) To keep the situation and events under control, political activity should bebanned till such time .as a schedule for the elections is given.

iii) A time schedule for early elections must be drawn up and announced toput the nation at rest.

State of Economy

For underdeveloped nation like us, the economic factor is of an immense importance.Political health, social viability and the military potential of a nation is really dependenton the economic factor. The masses who are poor and unable to make both ends meetare most susceptible to propaganda and exploitation. Therefore, due care must be takento control and minimize national economic vulnerabilities. The annual budgetannounced recently is not in conformity with our professed goals. It is not accepted as apoor man's budget. Promulgation of taxes in the middle of the last financial year wasnot appreciated. The need is to trigger off immediate ameliorative measures. Today, thesalaried men, including the personnel of the Armed Forces, are the most hard-hitpeople. Despite all earnest efforts, the economic situation has not really improved. Aninterim government, as declared by the President, can never overcome a state ofuncertainty about the future, leaving all those who control the economic aspect sittingon the fence and waiting. The slump and lack of confidence of the public, over aprolonged period of time, could well result in agitation and violence for which otherissues are then only an excuse. Hence the urgency to hold elections.

If elections are held in October 1979, the Martial Law government would be obliged toprepare another fiscal budget, i.e. for the year 1979-80, and answerable to the nation forits success or failure. However, with our present economic potential the possibility ofbright prospects is remote. In case elections are conducted in April 1979, an electedgovernment will shoulder this burden and Martial Law Regime would stand vindicatedby fulfilling the, pledge of holding early elections. Moreover, an elected governmentwould be in a better position to solicit economic assistance from external sources,especially the western democracies, who are allergic to military regimes.

Conclusion


Resuscitation and regeneration of the economy would be quicker if elections are heldbefore the fiscal year of 79/80, as it would extirpate tendencies of uncertainty andvacillation.

Armed Forces

On clamping of Martial Law, the Air Force and Navy remained bitter as they were notconsulted. Even today, their participation is negligible and they feel that without rhymeor reason they are getting a bad name. The Army has always acted as a bulwark and isindeed the backbone of the nation. However, in the recent past, its combat worthinesshas deteriorated. No new arms and equipment could be acquired and inducted in theArmed Forces Psychologically the Army mind is geared and trained to operate in amilitary way, so it is disturbing to find the Martial Law government being blamed foractions taken by politicians in the cabinet. Further, there are pressures on the Armypersonnel from vested interests from outside trying to further undermine theirconfidence in themselves and the Army. The cohesion of the Army and the total faith ofthe nation in the Armed Forces must be ensured by reducing their exposure to MartialLaw involvements. The Armed forces should remain an organization in being ensuringnational stability. General feeling exists amongst all rank of the Army to hand overpower to an elected government and revert to professional soldiering and otherpreoccupations as soon as possible.

Conclusion

To maintain the state of morale and proverbial discipline of the Armed Forces it goeswithout saying that elections must be held at the earliest Considering this factor aloneApril 1979 would be preferable.

International Relations

The Russian interest in the region is well-known which has practically manifested itselfby the change in Afghanistan and the current troubles in Iran The furtherance of theseobjectives will include Pakistan. This could be aggravated as a meeting point againstour professed resolve for Islam by the Russian interest coinciding with India's secularapproach. The western world being the champion of democracy, which we also professto believe in, is naturally against a military regime, and so will always have reservationsfor providing economic or other support to such regimes. It is historically true thatwhere inner, cohesion and stability do not exist outside powers particularly the leftistelements, take the maximum advantage by exploiting the disturbed internal condition.

It does not matter what Morarji Desal (PM of India says. It is a fact that India has notreconciled with the existence of Pakistan. Therefore the Armed Forces should notdissipate their effort in running the country.


If we take an overview of the region we find that both our neighbors i.e. Iran andAfghanistan are in a relative state of turmoil. The crisis situation has been engineeredby a power which is hostile to our ideology and alignment. Once the situation stabilizesin Afghanistan she may be inspired to act as an instrument to create chaotic conditionsand instability in Pakistan. Therefore we must endeavor to regain balance and politicalstability before Afghanistan can clear the deck and is in a position to look outward.Time is again at a premium and hence the need for early elections.

Conclusion

April 1979 would be preferable for elections.

Administration.-Law and Order.

It is our basic dilemma Martial Law was imposed with unexpected speed to arrestworsening political and economic conditions manifest in the widely deteriorating lawand order situation in the country. Its imposition reflected the will and its effect was theinherent tall expectations of the people. The bureaucracy, though a small percentage ofsociety, is most influential. It cannot be expected to be loyal to the Military Regime.Some of them indulge in corruption and others act as spectators. The labor force andcertain other insidious elements are becoming a pressure group and are taking undueadvantage of limited political activity and a price hike. With dejection and appallingbewilderment the intelligentsia see the politicians struggling in the wake of vestedinterests. This sense of dissatisfaction may act as a prelude to a gathering storm Minorincidents of law and order, i.e. courting of arrests hunger strikes by the journalistsvituperative propaganda campaigns etc. could be certain pointers of the potential threatwhich is mounting with the passage of time.

If the bureaucracy is incorrigible, and the law and order situation poses a potentialthreat, then we must hasten the process of elections. If the election schedule isannounced in the very near future and elections are promised and held in April 1979, itwould certainly put the nation at rest. If the elections are planned for October 1979,events would keep simmering for a much longer time and may erupt in suddenviolence. The political clout of the PPP should be taken seriously. It would always try tocreate a law and order situation for the government.

Conclusion

An early announcement of a date for elections in April 1979 will take the sting out ofpeople.

Z. A. Bhutto's Trial


As the trial has been prolonged, all eyes are fixed on the outcome of Mr. Bhutto's case.Over a period of five to six years, he had become, through persistent propaganda, apersonality cult to the masses. He certainly has some Appeal for the labor and otherclasses. Whatever the situation, his case has to be decided. There can be threecontingencies:

i) Death penalty is confirmed and sentence executed.ii) Long rigorous imprisonment is awarded.iii) Is set free.

Each one of the above sentence may carry some, if not, far-reaching, repercussions bothinternally and externally. However, in case of extreme punishment, i.e. death penalty,the reaction is likely to be more violent than in other cases. It also may not beexonerated by the civilized world. Some of the allies may show resentment anddisapproval causing a 'cooling' process in mutual relations. However, awarding longimprisonment backed with an early announcement of elections may prove morefruitful. Nonetheless, any further delay in deciding the fate of Mr. Bhutto is thoroughlycounter-productive. It is creating more problems and is attributed as a weakness of thegovernment, giving rise to much speculation and rumor. Certain quarters who wouldhave voluntarily joined and strengthened the hands of the government are sitting andwaiting.

As is evident from the progress of the trial, the case will reach its culmination in about amonth's time, i.e. the verdict of the Supreme Court may be passed by about the middleof November 1978. Let us examine the effects of various punishments as stipulatedabove by confronting them with the options of the date of elections.

a. Death Penalty

The reaction is likely to be violent, but comparatively short-lived. If elections areplanned for April 1979 it may hamper the progress of various modalities of theElection Commission. So, it will become a negative factor. To ensure smooth anduninterrupted progress thorough vigilance and preparation will have to betriggered much in advance. In case the elections are planned for October 1979,the violence would have died its natural death allowing sufficient time forcompletion of the task.

b. Long Rigorous Imprisonment

The general public has so far failed to predict the outcome of Mr. Bhutto's trial.However, if long imprisonment is awarded it may not be more than a storm in atea cup. The general public is likely to be resigned to his fate. However, instances


of minor agitation cannot be ruled out. For this contingency, (elections in) April1979 would suit more aptly.

c. Set Free

If Mr. Bhutto is set free, he is likely to rally a sizable section of the people andcreate a serious crisis. The process of elections would be seriously retarded.

Mr. Bhutto must be tried for other offences as part of accountability. Leaning onthe Kasuri (murder) trial may seem unethical.

Conclusion

Preparations should be made for elections in April 1979, but the date should only beannounced after Mr. Bhutto's present case If the situation is not conducive the electionsshould be held in October 1979.

Options

If 1979 is the year of elections as declared by the President the following options areavailable:

a. Option Alpha, Early elections in April 1979b. Option Bravo, Elections in October 1979

Option Alpha - Elections in April 1979

Advantages:

It will wipe out the state of uncertainty and speculation and rejuvenate healthypolitical and economic activity.

Reinstate the prestige and honor of the Armed Forces and re-establish their goodintentions and credibility.

Allow early disengagement of the Army from civil affairs thereby reverting it toprofessional activity. Dispel doubts of the general public and weaken theopposition forces thereby strengthening the hands of patriotic and sanerelements.

Would cause dissension and split in the opposition leftist forces and maliciouselements of the PPP.


Under an elected government the country will make rapid economic progress byacquiring more assistance from the western world.

Disadvantages:

Less time to prepare for General Elections. Therefore all steps must be taken withurgency and resolution.

Local Bodies Elections will have to be conducted after General Elections.

Would not allow formulation of Provincial cabinets.

Partial completion of the process of accountability.

Option Bravo - Elections in October 1979

Advantages:

More of a cushion period will be available to make foolproof preparations forelections, i.e. electoral rolls, redefining of constituencies, ballot papers etc. Thepresent civil government will be able, to consolidate their gains and mature theirpolicies. Provincial cabinets will have some time to function and establish arapport with the masses. It will be possible to hold Local Bodies Elections priorto General Elections in April 1979.

The process of accountability will be completed.

Disadvantages:

The present regime will be exposed to criticism for a longer time bringing a badname to the Army. The opposition will continue to harden which may present anugly situation as was the case between March 1977 and July 1977.

External pressures are likely to increase against an unelected government.

Will cause lowering of national morale and slowing down of economicemancipation.

In case of any further deterioration of economy and the law and order situation itmight open the floodgates of agitation resulting in a difficult position to control.

The Armed Forces, especially the Army, will be required to withstand heavystrain and friction and their professionalism will suffer.


Option Adopted

Keeping in view our empirical analysis and conclusions as drawn from variousfactors it is recommended that Option Alpha, i.e. holding of elections in April1979, be adopted.

The crisis has accentuated to a grim situation. Events are moving fast and hencea decision should be taken with the same speed and, urgency.

If the elections are to succeed in April 1979, the following actions must becompleted.

a. Radical and revolutionary steps to accelerate the process of elections, i.e.preparation of ballots, electoral rolls, verifications, printing, selection ofstaff must be geared on a top priority basis.

b. Arrangements to ensure a congenial law and order situation must bemade while preparations and election campaigns are in full swing.

c. All-out efforts must be made to improve the general administration andprice control. A short-term measure to improve the availability ofconsumer goods would pay large dividends.

d. The integrity of the Armed Forces must be ensured.

e. Vigilance must be maintained and any labor or political processionsshould be ruthlessly blocked.

f. Corruption and black marketing should be eliminated.

* * * * * * * * *

IILOCAL BODIES ELECTIONS AND ITS

IMPLICATIONS

Introduction

Unlike certain successful democracies, the history of local government in Pakistan hasbeen chequered. For obvious reasons, the British introduced local self-government as ameasure of expediency and broadened its scope gradually. However, the worst times


were to be faced by these institutions after independence. Whatever the short comingsof the system, the Basic Democracies Order of 1959 and the Municipal AdministrationOrdinance of 1960 did provide viable institutions for local development andadministration. The abolition of elected bodies in the rural and urban local areas in June1971 brought an abrupt end to the local government system which had the potential ofbeing developed and utilized for national good. The operation of the ConciliationCourts Ordinance, 1961 was suspended and that of the Muslim Family Law Ordinancemade impossible. The period from June 1971 onwards could be described as thebleakest in the history of local government of Pakistan.

Need for Local Government

The roles of local government institutions are many. In the first place, these institutionsare essential for political health, they serve as a cushion between the broad masses andthe national government and enable the latter to devote themselves to problems ofnational importance. Local governments provide a training ground for the politicalleadership and are cradles of political regeneration. Local institutions also provide amedium through which the functions and powers of government could bedecentralized.

The role of local government in the development of rural and urban areas is alwayssignificant. One of the misfortunes, of rural development in Pakistan has been the lackof consistent institutional support for such efforts. In fact, rural development in all thedeveloped countries has taken place through local government, and there seems to beno other way to secure participation of the public and to introduce accountability insuch programmes.

During the operation of the Conciliation Courts Ordinance, 1961, thousands of cases ofcivil and criminal nature in compulsory or optional jurisdictions of the conciliationcourts were decided locally. Studies indicated that over 65 percent of the cases weredecided by the conciliation courts through an unanimous verdict by representatives ofthe parties. It was for this reason that the appeal from the decisions of these local courtswere insignificant as compared with the appeals against cases decided by the ordinarycourts.

The law and order situation has been a major concern of all governments including thepresent one. However, the potential for improvement in the existing policeadministration is not there. Certain structural changes, will have to be brought about inpolice administration (by way of public participation the maintenance of law and order)if the situation is to be brought under control. For this purpose, the local councils willhave to be invested with limited police powers sooner or later as is the case in mostcountries In Pakistan the system of village police was tried in six districts from 1961-64.It was successful but was abandoned primarily because of the resistance from the police


and revenue departments. The creation of local government is therefore necessary iftheir involvement in the improvement of law and order is desired. It has beenrecognized that agricultural and industrial development in Europe and America is to alarge measure due to the local government.

Structure

At present the Union Councils and Zila Councils in the rural areas and theunion/town/municipal committees and municipal corporations in the urban areas existunder the law and are being looked after by official administrators. There could bemany opinions on the structure of local governments in the rural areas and urban areas.However, there are advantages in building up on the existing structures. Since 1972 andwith the introduction of the integrated rural development programme efforts have beenmade to justify the creation of a local government institution at the Markaz level allover the country. The markaz level institutions are to be between the union councilsand district councils. Even the substitution of union councils by Markaz levelinstitutions (which will cover about 50 villages) has been suggested by certain quarters.In this controversy, the genesis of integrated rural development is lost sight of. We aretrying to stick to this concept even more faithfully than its promoters. We must notmake Pakistan an experimental ground for alien concepts. Experimentation ininstitution building is very costly. This is being increasingly realized even in the mostopulent countries.

In the circumstances, the union councils in the rural areas and the union/municipaltown committees as well as the municipal corporations in the urban areas should berevived through elections. However, the local government institutions at the villagelevel are necessary in addition to the union council. The village level organizationscould make the services of almost three hundred thousand local leaders available forthe promotion of Village. development as well as for the solution of unlimitedproblems.

Finance.

There are many areas in which the autonomy of the local government institutions couldbe secured. However, unless the local governments are financially autonomous theywill remain under perpetual subjugation of higher levels of government and will flopany time the grants are stopped. It appears pertinent to point out that the basicdemocratic institutions in their initial stages made remarkable progress in attaining self-sufficiency in the matter of finances. However, with the introduction of PL-480 grants,the local efforts slowed down. As soon as the PL-480 grants were withdrawn, the ruraldevelopment activity came to a standstill. The effects of federal or provincial subversioncould be similar. It would, therefore, be necessary that the sharing of certain taxes withthe local governments is made mandatory and certain other taxes are exclusively


reserved for local councils. The present taxation powers of local governments have beendescribed as residuary. In Japan, 70%of the national budget is spent through the localauthorities. In Pakistan. it could be empirically proved that the local governments havebeen made to shoulder expenses which should ordinarily be incurred by federal orprovincial governments. Without financial strength, therefore, the creation of localgovernment institutions could prove to be an exercise in futility. In fact, a number ofsteps in this direction could be taken pending elections, so that the local councils whenconstituted do not find themselves presiding over empty treasuries.

Disadvantages

While the importance of local government should be recognized, it should also be keptin view that these institutions will not be able to turn the country into a heaven. On theother hand, partly due to ignorance on the part of elected councilors and partly due tothe election of untested candidates, the local government institutions created in the firstelections will make a large number of mistakes. There will even be cases of corruptionand graft. However, local accountability is always rigorous and the situation wouldimprove in one or two elections. It would be necessary, therefore, to publicize thepossible short-comings of the local government so that the people are vigilant at thetime of elections and the government does not pin unnecessarily high hopes on theyoung institutions.

Elections

A question has arisen whether the local government elections should be held before orafter the elections to the National and Provincial Assemblies. There could be a case forholding local government elections after the General Elections if the local elections wereto jeopardize the General Elections, or time available is inadequate. On the other hand,local bodies elections will sift local leadership and would throw up leaders for GeneralElections who are really interested in national issues.

Another question is how to hold the local elections quickly in the absence of revisedelectoral rolls. In this respect, it may be stated that if the elections are fair, at the locallevel, the existence of a certain number of bogus voters' lists would not make muchdifference because the bogus voters could be detected at the time of voting. Necessaryprovisions can be made for the identification of voters at the polling stations. Analternative to the utilization of the existing electoral rolls is to prepare electoral rolls foreach local area. It may not be necessary to print the rolls prepared for each localarea/ward. This procedure was tried in the 1965 local elections. The results of thatelections were never questioned and the elections to the union and other councils werereasonably fair.


Yet another alternative could be to partly replace the secret ballot type of elections. Thesecret ballot elections besides being costly, time consuming and difficult for quickrepetition might also hamper mass participation in development activities. Ourcommunities in the rural or urban areas are used to such informal elections on severaloccasions. In the USA also it has been shown that notwithstanding provisions for secretballot elections for the village councils, elections at these levels are more often than notthrough, consensus which is reached outside the polling stations. In fact, the villagelevel organizations should be fully representative, commanding general confidence ofthe community and be responsible to the entire village. Elections at the village level,therefore, should try to reflect a consensus. Consensus could be arrived at throughshow of hand or otherwise and the details could be provided in the elections rules to beframed. If this procedure is adopted, there will be no need for electoral rolls at thevillage level.

In the urban areas, the communities at Mohalla level are not usually well-knit becauseof the- fluidity of population. Therefore, in the urban areas, the existing electoral rollscould be utilized or else new unprinted rolls prepared at the ward level, as statedearlier. This work should not take more than a month in any case and it should bepossible to hold local Government Elections within the next three months. Anotherconsideration could be to stagger the local elections. It should be possible to holdelections to the different rural and urban 2-3 month's time. In that way, the existing staffand facilities with the Elections Commission or with the Provincial Governments, as thecase may be, would be adequate and would not need expansion and save unnecessaryexpenditure.

Recommendations

General Elections must be held in April 1979.

Local Bodies Elections can be organized after the General Elections as these arenot really agitating the people. It is not a critical factor.

The process of accountability should be expedited and may continue even afterthe schedule of elections is announced.

The Political Parties Act should be promulgated at the earliest along with thetime schedule.

The present Government must be dissolved ninety days before the election Itwould probably mean that Provincial Cabinets may not be constituted. OnceCabinet is dissolved Military Council should take effective charge of StateAffairs.


Schedule of elections must be announced before the Supreme Court decision onZ. A. Bhutto. It will restrain much of the reaction on the part of the public.

No amendments should be incorporated in the Constitution by the martial LawGovernment. It will create a serious legal crisis.

General Elections should be held under the supervision of the Armed Forces andJudiciary.

Members of the Cabinet (though dissolved) should be allowed to contestelections.

AK elections can be held simultaneously with Pakistan Elections but it will bebetter if these are held (1 week later.

The Army must be kept as a 'Force in being' for any subsequent involvement. Afull-time Election Commission must be appointed so that work can start and thepublic is reassured.

Detailed and independent analysis with regard to holding of elections may, alsobe undertaken by the experts and the Foreign Office.

* * * * * * * * *

Staff Check

Schedule of Electoral Rolls - D Day Basis Days D Day

1. Preparation of Draft electoral rolls 30 15 Nov - 14 Dec. 1978

2. Filling of claims and objections 15 15 Dec -29 Dec. 1978

3. Decision of claims and objections 15 30 Dec - 14 Jan. 1979

4 Printing of final electoral rolls 15 15 Jan -29 Jan 1979

5. Printing of polling schemes and purchase of material 10 30 Jan -09 Feb 1979

6. Calling of nomination papers, scrutiny, appeals, decisions,

allotment of symbols and withdrawals15 10 Feb - 25 Feb 1979

7. Printing of ballot papers 10 26 Feb-05 Mar 1979

8. Preparation of bags and their dispatch of polling stations etc 7 6 Mar 13 Mar 1979

117 days (approximately 4 months)


Notes

1. If delimitation of constituencies is required to be undertaken, work cancommence simultaneously, or the cushion period of one month can beutilized for this purpose.

2. Government machinery will be fully mobilized to complete work as perabove schedule.

3. Printing of lists to be done simultaneously in all Provinces and AK.

4. Work to commence on November 15, 1978.

5. Elections can be held during the first week of April 1979 at the latest.

Representatives of the following political parties met with the Election Cell:

Party Party President

1 Pakistan People's Party (PPP) Begum Nusrat Bhutto

2 Pakistan. Muslim League (Pagara Group) Pir Pagara

3 Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP) Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani

4 Tehrik-e-Istiklal Air Marshal Asghar Khan

5 Jamaat-e-Islami Mian Tufail Muhammad

6 National Democratic Party. (NDP) Sherbaz Mazari

7 Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam .(JUI) Maulana Mufti Màhmud

8 Pakistan Muslim League (Qayum Grpop) Khan Abdul Qayum Khan

9 Pakistan Musawat Party M Haneef Ramay

10 Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP) Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan

11 Pakistan Muslim League (Chatha Group) Khawaja Khair Ud Din

12 People's Progressive Party Maulana Kausar Niazi

13 Liberal Muslim League Justice Shaukat Ali

14 Jinnah Muslim League General Azam Khan

15 Muslim Conference Sardar M Abdul Qayum

16 Jeway Pakistan Party Nabi Bakhsh Zebri

17 Khaksar Tehrik Ashraf Khan

18 National Awami Party Pakhtun Khawa Mahmud Achakzai

19 Gharib Awam Party Tanweer Hussaini

20 Azad Muslim Conference Chaudhary Noor Hussain

21 Azad Kashmir Jamat Islami Colonel Abbasi

22 Azad Kashmir Jamiat Ulema Sahibzada Atteq ur Rehman

23 Azad Kashmir People's Party Sardar Ibrahim

24 Kashmir, Liberation Party Ansari

25 Jamiat Ulema Ehal e Hadis Ehsan Elahi Zaheer

26 Hazab Allah Swad e Azam Maulana Ghulam Ullah

27 Pakistan Millet Party Ahmed Raza Kasuri


ANNEXURE 'C'

CHISHTI'S PRESS CONFERENCES

Press Conference of Lt. Gen Faiz Ali Chishti (Retd) held at Rawalpindi Flying Clubin July 1983.

As know when I retired from the Army in March 1980, on the basis of completion offour year's tenure as Lt. General. I also resigned from all appointments of a federalminister ..... and I suppose my unexpressed resignation as Chairman, Election Cell wentalong with it. Since then I have been observing the events in Pakistan as a commoncitizen dedicated to its well-being and solidarity. Today, I would like to give my viewson the prevailing situation, for whatever they are worth because it is said that somefateful decisions are to be taken by the Chief Executive of the country ..... on or beforeAugust 14, 1983.

I have always preached intellectual honesty and have practiced it all my life, to the bestof my ability. I am proud of saying that whenever required, I have always given mycandid, frank and true opinion, without bias, fear or reservation, not only to the MartialLaw government, but also to the previous government. Federal ministers and othergovernment functionaries, who have listened to me from time to time will certainlysupport this statement of mine, provided they have the moral courage which most ofthem lacked.

It is my conviction that since the death of Quaid-e-Azam, father of the nation, Pakistanhas been a victim of intellectually dishonest decisions taken by the Chief Executives ofthe country, whether civilian or military. Dishonest decisions are taken willingly orunwillingly. Willingly when the incumbent wants to continue to retain the chairunwillingly when the analysis given by the underdogs in dishonest. It is dishonestbecause the tendency is to carry favor with superiors and to give views that wouldplease them or suit them. The originating lower level agencies normally express thetruth, but as it travels up it gets distorted and misconstrued. Hardly works expressed ata lower level becomes "Works hardly" as it reaches the decision maker. Hence a wrongmay be even dishonest decision .... Just two examples will suffice.

i) The grant of an extension in service as C-in-C to Gen (later FM) M Ayub Khan. Hewas made C in C in 1951 and should have retired on completion of his tenure in 1954 or,so and NOT left as C-in-C till 1958 to stage a coup d'état for whatever reasons it wasdone. I am not commenting on the validity or the honesty of the decision to appoint himas C in C or even his promotion to the rank of a general.

ii) The military action in east Pakistan. Before the decision was taken it required thesolution of a simple mathematical equation i.e. "How many people would have to be


killed to bring the situation under control (when the killer is West Pakistani in EastPakistan and those to be killed are all East Pakistanis when you kill one person the ratioto be killed increases algebraically to infinity......) So this would have led to a logicalconclusion of a political solution. When this was explained to the CMLA by me, in mycapacity as Director of Research and Development of the Pakistan Army, I was given areply which I will NOT share with you at present.

Today Pakistan stands at a very critical juncture. Intellectually dishonest decisions willproduce unpredictable results. The law of necessity which justified the imposing ofMartial Law in 1977 has long since ceased to exist. The government should not lean onit any more. It should reinstate or restore the Constitution of 1973 and transfer powerpeacefully to the elected representatives of the people. Steps should also be taken tomaintain the amity between the Armed Forces and the People of Pakistan....

It is my conviction that the whole nation .... appreciates the gravity of the situation.People are praying for national security, solidarity and the well being of the country.They are looking forward to the restoration of democracy under the 1973 Constitution.NO future plans, whether in the economic field or political field, can succeed orproduce results unless the people are involved in their preparation and execution in arespectable manner and they can share the responsibility of formulation of plans. Thiscan only be done when the people have the right to select or reject their rulers NOT BYFORCE but through ballot. They should be allowed to do so through their electedmembers of provincial and national assemblies. Further delay on this issue maycomplicate matters and produce undesirable results.

Accountability, economic stability, restoration of law and order, and the outcome ofpositive results have been used as levers for the continuation of Martial Law. Theresults have been to the contrary. Accountable people stand honored and rehabilitatedand IN COMMAND. Economically we are at the lowest, under terrible debts and highcost of living. Law and order can be deduced from the newspapers which are nothingbut crime reports. Corruption, bribery, accidents, fraud cases etc have increased. Socialevils are creeping in. Parochial and regional feelings are gaining ground which aredetrimental to national integrity. Mutual confrontation of tribes, religious orders,economic groups are hitting hard at the foundations of the country. Unemployment ison the increase Dearness laughs at the salaried people. The nation does NOT even enjoythe rights which it inherited on independence in 1947.

For the last four years or so, the people have been deprived of their basic human rightson the plea of Islamisation. Haquq ul Ibad do not exist. After the introduction of PCOeach ML order has negated the principles of Islam. The entire national life is bound inbetween ML orders. Islam is not allowed to penetrate into ML orders. Islam cannoteven comment on these ML order whereas, as per Islam, Martial Law is un-Islamic.How can you make people believe that Martial Law can introduce Islam when it does


not even give basic rights, i.e. Haquq ul Ibad. No nation can benefit from Islam when itis deprived of justice, freedom of action, freedom of press and speech .... basic rights ...Haquq ul Ibad. It is high time exploitation of Islamisation is stopped and basic humanrights are restored. This country was created in the name of Islam and can only exist ifproperly run on Islamic lines. Haquq Allah and Haquq ul Ibad. Let the governmentgive the nation Haquq ul Ibad completely and the facilities to practice Haquq Allah. LetIslamic Democracy be restored. Let democracy be established.

I request all the political parties .... to ... forget about each others .... past mistakes ....They should learn to coexist with opponents and opposing parties. They should stopmaligning each other's characters and washing dirty linen in public. Let differences ofopinion be resolved in a friendly manner and not transformed to enmity .... Let allparties and Martial Law Authorities sit together and resolve the differences and find aworkable solution.

Simultaneously, the mutual relationship between the Armed Forces and the people ofPakistan should be strengthened. Steps should be taken to remove the lack ofconfidence. For the effective defence of the country, the Armed Forces will always needthe full and complete support of the nation. Let them have it. They should also becomea symbol of defence of the country and be neutral in their dealings. They have only onerole, not political but military, and that is the defence of the country .... The ArmedForces .... can only be efficient when they practice soldiery and NOT Martial Lawduties.

Politicians are valuable assets of our country. But they cannot produce any resultsunless their views are respected. It is not only their right to criticize the government, itis their basic human right to do so. Their voices should not be suppressed.... Inshallah,soon there will be justice, political prisoners will be released, the Press will be free, thejudiciary will be independent (they will soon know the difference between the chiefjustice and acting chief justice), Haquq ul Ibad will be restored and the people will beable to lead a real Islamic life, which at present is non-existent in any of the 43 Muslimcountries of the world, PROVIDED . THERE ARE NO INTELLECTUALLYDISHONEST DECISIONS.

Lt. Gen F. A. Chishti (Retd)

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Chishti denounces the continuation of Martial Law

Former Federal Minister Lt. Gen (Retd) Faiz Ali Chishti has said that there is no hope ofany practical political structure on August 14, nor should the people believe that anypromise of a general election on a date fixed by the present government will be fulfilled.


In an interview to a local Urdu daily, Gen Chishti demanded the immediate release ofAsghar Khan, Benazir Bhutto, Nasruallah Khan and other political prisoners. He saidthat if at all they have committed any crime these political prisoners should be tried inan open court.

Gen Chishti, who was a member of the very first cabinet that Gen Zia ul Haq hadformed after taking over the reins of power said that unless intellectual and professionaldishonesty is removed the problems of the country cannot be solved. He suggested thatin this regard, the process of accountability of the present regime can be started.

He said that though he himself is not a politician, he still demands that a provisionalgovernment should be formed which can hold fair general elections in the countrywithin the stipulated time. He has further suggested that no member of the provisionalgovernment should participate in the general elections, and that it should consist ofhonest and non-controversial persons.

Gen Chishti said that this is the only way, through which the present government cantransfer power in an honorable manner. Because, he said, so far no government has quitoffice on its own. Government has always been forced to do so.

The retired general said that at present, the people do not even have those rights whichthey had inherited at the time of independence in August 1947. He said that in the nameof a promised Islamisation, the people are being denied their fundamental rights for thelast so many years, and that after the imposition of Provisional Constitutional Order(PCO) every act of the present government is un-Islamic.

He said that it is his belief that with a greater unity of the politicians, and with thepower, of millions of citizens of the country, the government can be forced to transferpower. He said that he hopes that soon people's right would be restored, politicalprisoners released, and the courts again given powers to carry out their workindependently, the Press set free from all restrictions, and the people of the countrygiven the option to live in the true Islamic way.

Star News Desk, July 20, 1983.

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Gen Chishti files defamation suit against Mian Tufail

LAHORE, December 27: Former Federal Minister, Lt. Gen (Retd) Faiz Ali Chishti hasfiled a complaint before the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Lahore and the StationHouse Officer, Cantonment, to register a case against the Amir of the (defunct) Jammat-


i-Islami, Mian Tufail Mohammad, under the Pakistan Penal Code for making a falsestatement about his role in the July 5, 1977 takeover of the government by the Armed,Forces.

In his complaint, he said Mian Tufail Mohammad had accused him of staging a coupd'état and installing Gen Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq as the Chief Martial LawAdministrator. This imputation had been made in an interview to the daily Jang,Lahore. The interview was a distortion of facts and intended to malign him and destroyhis image at home and abroad, particularly at home. The interview had tarnished hisimage among political workers, leaders and the Pakistan Army.

He said the 1977 takeover was not individually planned by him, but by the PakistanArmy on the orders of the Chief of the Army Staff, on the basis of the unanimousdecision taken during many deliberations by the corps commanders of the Pakistanarmy and the Chief of Army Staff, to restore democracy in the country which wasdisrupted as a result of mass agitation against rigging during the 1977 general elections.He said that as local commander he was put in charge of OPERATION FAIRPLAY andas an army officer carried it out in letter and in spirit.

Gen (Retd) Chishti said Mian Tufail Mohammad had, in his statement, implied that thetakeover was an individual act. Thus Mian Tufail had deliberately maligned him in theeyes of the people and the Army. He said Mian Tufail had given the interview to a staffreporter of the newspaper who had taped it, and the tape available with the newspaperrepresented irrefutable evidence against Mian Tufail. He requested the police toimpound the tape, and register a case against Mian Tufail

Dawn Friday December 17, 1984

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Chishti speaks out against non-party elections

Today I feel it my national duty to give my views on the current political situationthrough you i.e. THE PRESS, to the government and to my fellow countrymen.

A decision has been made to take the nation to the polls on a NON-PARTY basis Thisseems to have been based on the misconception fed by the results of the Referendumand sycophantic advisors regarding what the nation wants. I think the nation still wantsthe elections on a Party basis.

There is NO politician whose hobby is spending money on elections. Having spendsome money and got himself elected individually on a NON-PARTY basis with an


uncertain tenure, that elected politician would naturally try to get his money back assoon as possible and perhaps make more money than actually spent. This is THE BASISOF CORRUPTION. If the intention is to eradicate corruption, then elections SHOULDNOT BE HELD ON A NON-PARTY basis; on the contrary, they should be held on aparty basis ....

Elections on a Non Party basis will demolish the political institutions and politicalparties in the country. It would bring PYGMIES into the field of politics. To become anMNA one may have to spend ten lakhs and an MPA five lakhs at the minimum. NonParty elections will turn politics into a BUSINESS VENTURE... It would be only asmuggler, a black marketeer, a hoarder or a big landlord who would be able to contestelections on a Non-Party basis.

The coup d'état was staged in 1977 to annul the effect of massive rigging and to restoredemocracy in the country. The Supreme Court had given its verdict accordingly. TheCourt, however, observed as follows:-

"The Court, therefore, expects the Chief Martial Law Administrator to redeem this pledgewhich must be considered in the nature of a mandate from the people of Pakistan whohave by and large willingly accepted his administration as the interim government ofPakistan."

Therefore, it would be seen that to withhold the elections for such a long period and tocontinue with Martial Law is a violation of the order of the Supreme Court. It isunfortunate that the Supreme Court did not suo moto take any action and call upon theCMLA to hold the elections according to his commitment in the Court. It is unfortunatethat the very Court which validated the Martial Law became the victim of theProvisional Constitution Order of 1981 and the superior judiciary of the country wasclipped of its power and today the superior Courts of Pakistan cannot annul anyMartial Law Order or Regulation. It is again unfortunate that the Superior Judiciary didnot rise to the occasion as one man. If it would have, the country's fate would have beendifferent.

I would like to say a few words about the Referendum. The Nation has spoken thetruth, but it is unfortunate that it has NOT been interpreted correctly by thegovernment. The nation had gone for passive agitation and the correct result of theReferendum negates the policies of the government. Therefore in the light of the verdictof the Referendum, the present schedule announced by the CMLA is NOT according tothe wishes of the people of Pakistan. I and my colleagues do not believe inconfrontation but we would like to advise the government and Gen Mohammad Zia ulHaq in particular, to see the writing on the wall, to see what the nation wants and NOTbe misguided or go astray by wrong reports....


I am convinced that at present the nation is not satisfied with the present governmentnor with the political leadership. We are conscious that there are a number or politicalparties. Despite this, they have failed to achieve what the nation wants. Therefore we,the like-minded people in all parts of Pakistan have decided to form a new politicalparty and that party will have in its Central Committee, 25 members from eachProvince, and as such each Province will have equal representation its spokesman willbe elected by its founder members for a period of two years. Likewise there will be aspokesman of the party in each Province. Briefly, the Manifesto of the party will be:

1 Defence of ideological and territorial integrity of Pakistan.

2. Reorganization of the Armed Forces of Pakistan to improve itscapabilities.

3. Free education up to matric, equal opportunities to all on merit basis andfree health facilities for the citizens.

4. To provide maintenance allowance and shelter to the unemployed.

5. A strong and independent Judiciary.

6. To make Pakistan an Islamic Welfare State, but the name of Islam will notbe exploited.

7. To guarantee fundamental rights as contained in the Quran and Sunnah;which are divinely inalienable and cannot be abrogated by any legislation.

8. Joint electorate so that a strong Pakistani Nation should emerge.

9. Women and minorities should be provided with an important role in thenation-building.

10. Elected Chairman of the district will be the boss and NOT the DeputyCommissioner who will be his secretary.

To conclude, I would say that in the face of prevailing circumstances it is high time thatwe, the like-minded people, should be on one political platform and take the nation andthe country out of the quagmire towards a, modern, progressive and scientific IslamicWelfare State. If you agree, please contact Justice (Retd) Shaukat Ali or myself.

Lahore January 13, 1985Lt. Gen FAIZ ALl CHISHTI (Retd)

Spokesman of the New Party


Press Conference by Lt Gen Faiz Ali Chishti (Retd) held at The Hilton, Lahore onJanuary 13, 1985.

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Press Conference of Lt. Gen (Retd) Faiz Ali Chishti

I have decided to meet the Press after the General Elections as I feel that despite theseelections there is no political stability in the country. Rather, the leadership of smallerProvinces is more aggrieved. The nation as a whole wants to get rid of Martial Law.

We know that the major political parties did not participate in the General Elections asGen Mohammad Zia ul Haq ordered the same on a non-party basis. It is also no secretthat the leaders of the political parties and their workers were detained before thegeneral elections, and therefore I cannot describe the general elections impartial and fair.

Gen Zia's Intention to hold General elections was not different from that of Gen YahyaKhan who did not want to hand over power to the civil representatives and wanted todivide and rule. Likewise the mind of Gen Zia was to take the nation to individualelections and, as a consequence thereof, to have such representatives who could be athis beck and call, so that lie and his henchmen could succeed in creating a puppetlegislature and a hen-pecked civil government so that he could rule the country foranother period of five years.

Despite the fact that he and his clique were aware of a weak legislature that wouldemerge as a result of so-called non-party elections, even then Gen Zia made drasticconstitutional amendments which in fact have crippled and paralyzed the NationalAssembly. The manner in which Gen Zia has made amendments in the Constitutionshows that he had no confidence whatsoever in the newly elected members of theNational Assembly. By amending the Constitution through the revival of the 1973Constitution Order 1985, he has in fact abrogated and annulled the Constitution of 1973and given a new one-man Constitution to the nation. Was it justified on his part to do sowhen a new National Assembly had come into being? He has in fact made a mockery ofthe Constitution. It is perhaps the only Constitution in the world which refers to thename of an individual in the Constitution as a Head of State. Gen Zia has become theso-called elected President through the process of referendum in which the nationdecided to stay away. The participation of the nation in the referendum is no secret. Inshort the nation rejected him in the referendum. Yet Gen Zia through a revival of the1973 Constitution Order, 1985 became the President and has assumed the power todissolve the National Assembly and has foisted himself on the nation for a period ofanother five years as against the will and mandate of the nation.


I foresee that the political situation will further deteriorate in Pakistan as the people insmaller provinces feel and rightly too that their participation. In the affairs of thegovernment is lacking and the time may come when the smaller federating units maybe unwilling to be a part of the Federation. Therefore we have to take steps immediatelyso that the smaller provinces remain a part of the Federation and the people of theseprovinces continue to have faith and confidence. For doing this, their participation inthe affairs of the government is a must. To achieve this end it is necessary that thepeople in and out of the National Assembly should fight for their rights for thewithdrawal of martial law and all other, black laws and ask for the restoration of powerof the superior Judiciary.

The nation is watching its representatives very, closely and wants them to honor thecommitment with which they became members of the Provincial and NationalAssemblies. The nation does not believe that its representatives will help to perpetuatea one-man rule rather the nation wants its representatives to eliminate the despotic rulefrom the country....

The Supreme Court unfortunately did not fix a timetable for holding elections andpermitted the stay of one man for an unlimited period. Such a mistake should not berepeated by the National Assembly. The nation wants, through its representatives thecancellation of uncalled for constitutional amendments and the lifting of martial law asearly as possible. The timetable must be given to the nation. The nation cannot be takenfor a ride.

At this juncture I must congratulate a section of the press and the MRD in particular fortheir struggle which they have continued against one-man rule for the last 8 years. It ison account of their struggle that we find a little political activity on the national scene.

I must say that on account of the wrong policies of Gen Zia's government the nation istoday facing load shedding, inflation, a price hike, corruption and unemployment. Inshort, during his tenure, all the important institutions in the Country stand disruptedand the word of Zia is Law....

... the nation must rise as one man to restore democracy and once democracy is restoredthe claim for confederation will evaporate.

Dated April 25, 1985 (Sd/-) Lt Gen (Retired).Faiz All Chishti

Statement of Lt Gen Faiz Ali Chishti (Retd)

I speak because of my conviction that the nation must know. the truth and that historymust be recorded correctly ...... Who does not know the circumstances under which the


Army took over on 5 July 1977 to save the country frorh an impending blood bath? ....Please recall the CMLA's speech "...." we have separated the parties and taken theleaders into protective custody .... elections will be held within 90 days. If it has nothappened it is because the CMLA did not want it to happen Martial Law is always onman's rule arbitrary and absolute The present Martial Law is no exception.

Every other day we read "......killed "in an encounter with police's. "....." Who does notknow what it means? (A police officer should know better than other.) Who does notknow how these encounters are stage-managed? Could not this happen duringOPERATION FAIRPLAY? Were there not parties interested in getting rid of certainpersonalities? ANYBODY could have got killed but this was NOT ALLOWED tohappen - NOT even in self-defence. It was accomplished bloodlessly and NOT a singlebullet was fired. I am grateful to Allah for the guidance given to me and the strength ofcharacter given to my Command.

I did not serve in any individual's private army. I did not become a General as a bountyfrom a General. I served in the Pakistan Army as per Rules and Regulations and badefarewell to the noble profession of arms on 30 March 1980 on completion of therequired length of service as a Lieutenant General. I did not beg for an extension-NOTeven for a single day. Simultaneously I refused to continue as a federal minister andresigned from three ministers......

My conduct throughout my service in the Army, including the Indian Army, has beenstrictly according to the ethical code prescribed for an army officer. I am proud of it andI have no regrets. I have never been employed on 'police' or 'intelligence' duties. I havenever practiced all that goes with such appointments. Through Allah's kindness, I havenever been anybody's lackey and have had the courage to call a spade a spade. I havealso faced the consequences. I have always given unadulterated advice NOT ONLY tothe CMLA and his colleagues but also to the late Prime Minister and his federalministers when called up on to do so. Let history be the judge in evaluating mycontribution.

I have never been afraid of accountability. I have offered myself for it many a time. Infact, I have always been an ardent exponent of the canons of accountability. Nobody isabove the law and everybody is accountable including the chief executive of a country.THIS IS WHAT ISLAM IS. So let us have it. In my opinion, accountability of thefollowing is ultimately inevitable:-

Dismemberment of PakistanPrevailing economic conditionsReferendum 1984Key persons associated with the Martial Law Regime since 5 July 1977.


Whereas the process of accountability for the first two can be initiated withoutdifficulty, no steps can be taken towards the remaining two unless the constitutionalamendment that ".... nothing whatsoever that has been done by the Martial Law Regimesince 5 July 1977 can be accounted for etc etc ...." is vacated through a Presidentialordinance or by an act of the National Assembly. For this, lifting of Martial LawBecomes a pre-requisite. The CMLA will NEVER allow it.

Unless the MNAs honor their commitments made :to the electorate on this point i.e.immediate lifting of Martial Law, they will have no place on the roll of honor beforelong, and will be responsible for further aggravating the constitutional crisis and senseof deprivation of the provinces.....

The Afghan issue need very careful handling. Historically, whosoever has comethrough the Khyber Pass has never gone back. Let there be a clear cut demarcationbetween the Afghan Mujahids and Afghan Refugees. They cannot be synonymous.

Lahore F.A. CHISHTlMay, 15, 1985 Lt. Gen (Retd)


ANNEXURE 'D'

CHISHTI : A BACKGROUND

General FAIZ ALT CHISHTI was born at Jullunder on June 13, 1927. He had hiseducation in MR College, Fazilka and RSD College, Ferozpur. He joined, the OfficerTraining School, Bangalore, in 1946 and was commissioned in the Royal Indian Artilleryin 1947. On Independence, he opted for Pakistan and reached Karachi by sea inNovember 1947. He is a triple graduate viz Punjab University; Command and StaffCollege Quetta; Land Forces War Academy, Istanbul. He is a linguist, proficient in theTurkish language.

In his command assignments, he held appointments as an Artillery BrigadeCommander, an Infantry Brigade Commander. General Officer Commanding anInfantry Division and. General Officer Commanding a Corps. . In 1977, Rawalpindi washis Headquarters and that was when he was ordered by General Zia ul Haq to andexecute OPERATION FAIRPLAY a bloodless coup d'état.

General Chishti had the opportunity to serve in General Headquarters on suchimportant staff appointments as Deputy Director Military Training, Director Researchand Development, and Military Secretary of the Pakistan Army. He was also theChairman of the. Pakistan Army Missile Committee. Earlier, he had been an Instructorin Gunnery and an Instructor in command and Staff College. He was also electedColonel Commandant of the Azad Kashmir Regiment a unique honor for a non-infantryofficer.

He was on the battlefield in the 1947, 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistan Wars. He retiredfrom active service on March 30, 1980 on completion of his four year's tenure as aLieutenant General. During his service he was awarded the Hilai-e-Imtiaz (Military)and Sitara-e-Bisalat.

During General Zia-ui-Haq's Martial Law Regime, he performed, simultaneously withhis duties of..a Corps, Commander, the following duties assigned to him:-

a: Adviser to the Chief. Martial Law Administrator, with the status of aFederal Minister, in charge of the Establishment Division, FederalInspection Commission, Azad Kashmir and Northern Area Affairs fromApril 1978 to July 1978 and thereafter a Federal Minister for the sameportfolios from July 1978 to August 1978.


b. Federal Minister for Labor Manpower and Overseas Pakistanis: Petroleumand Natural Resources, Azad Kashmir and Northern Area Affairs fromApril 1979 to March 1980.

c. Chairman, Election Cell from August 1977 to August 1978 and from April1979 to March 1980.

On retirement from the Army on Mach 30, 1980 he resigned from all the three ministers.He argued that once his commission had expired, there was no. legal justification forremaining in a military government.

During his service career, he led delegations to Abu Dhabi in 1970 as Head .of an Inter-Services Training Team to the United Kingdom in 1976 as Head of an Inter-ServicesDelegation to the British Army Equipment Exhibition: to Somalia in 1977 as Head of aTraining Team; to the United Kingdom and Scandinavian countries in 1978 to assess thefunctioning of Pakistani Embassies: to Saudi Arabia and the People's republic of Chinain 1979 as Head of a Labor and Immigration delegation to Canada in 1980 as Head ofdelegation to the inauguration ceremony of the Institute of Ummah Islamiya StudiesNorth Hatley of which he was elected member Board of Governors.

He has been elected President, Pakistan Golf Association from 1977 to 1983 and electedPresident, Rawalpindi Flying Club from 1977 to 1988. He is a member of the Institute ofStrategic Studies of Pakistan. International Institute of Strategic Studies; London, andThe Royal and Ancient Golf. Club of St. Andrew's, Scotland.


ANNEXURE 'E'

REVIEWS AND OPINIONS

Appendix 1 London Letter 23 November 1989

Appendix 2 "Keh Tuti Jahan Jahan Pey Kamand" 24 December 1989.

Appendix 3 Conflict Bulletin - February 1990

Appendix 4 Insight into alarmist thinking - 2 April 1990

Appendix 5 Zia the man from nowhere - 24 April 1990

Appendix 6 General Chishti's Great Betrayal !- 17 May 1990

Appendix 7 "Salman Rushdi of Pakistan Army"- 23 June 1990

Appendix 8 Cover Up of the Great Betrayal -23 August 1990

Appendix 9 Another Point of View - 28 September 1990

Appendix 10 Chicanery and horse trading -6 November 1990

Appendix 11 Chishti's version of Zia's Martial Law - 7 December 1990

Appendix 12 Betrayals of Another Kind - Summer 1991


ANNEXURE 'E'Appendix 1

LONDON LETTER from ANTHONY HYMAN(The Khaleej Times -23 November 1989)

ONE of the best known generals of Pakistan's army is currently visiting England, and isdue to arrive in the UAE later this month.

General Faiz Ali Chishti appeared on British TV recently, in a long, wide-ranging andremarkably warm interview with London-based journalist Tariq Ali on Pakistanipolitics, and in particular on the Zia-ul-Haq period, on which he has many facts toreveal in a new book. Transcript of the TV Interview is appended below.

Betrayals of Another Kind. Islam, Democracy and the Army in Pakistan, (AsiaPublishing House, 45 Museum Street, London, WC1), gives many originalinterpretations, and claims to set the record straight.

As one of the senior generals of the army in 1977, Faiz Ali Chishti played an importantpart in the first phase of military rule under General Zia.

Both in the TV interview and in entire chapters of his book, Chishti had much to sayabout Gen Zia's character and abilities, the coup in 1977 and what followed it.

He argues in great detail that the armed forces were forced to step in after the Bhuttoregime sank into chaos, but that there was every intention among senior army officers,and by Gen Zia himself at the time, to hold free elections within 90 days.

How it came about that a new dictatorship was imposed on the people of Pakistan, andhow martial law stretched on for years instead of months, is explained in this book.

The major obstacle to holding fresh elections was, he writes, Gen Zia himself, who,claims Chishti, was gradually convinced by a circle of sycophants that he himself wasthe ideal ruler.

TRANSCRIPT OF TV INTERVIEW BY MR. TARIQ ALl

Tariq Ali: Good evening, it is not every day that Bandung File has a general in thestudio, leave alone a general who has written a book. Today we are proud to welcomeGeneral Faiz Ali Chishti now retired, but once a leading general in the Pakistan Armywho has just written a book called "Betrayals of - Another Kind; Islam, Democracy and theArmy in Pakistan".


General Chishti, thank you for joining us this evening. Can I start by asking you whatmade you write a book? After all it is not something for which Pakistani Generals arewell known.

Gen FAC: Thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to be with you. Therewere two main reasons for writing this book. Firstly as there were three partiesinvolved in 1977; the government itself, the P.N.A., and then the Army whichultimately took over. I thought somebody from our side must also state the facts, asthey were so that the history is recorded correctly. Unfortunately in our country thefacts are not told. We believe in giving wrong information. I have gone through manythings, especially during the research, and I found that it was misconstrued versionswrong stories, false things etc. So I thought it as my duty to the nation that whatever Iknew I should record it for history, for posterity, for the research scholars so that we canultimately learn some lessons.

T.A.: Now you, General, were centrally involved as a Corps Commander and asone of Zia's colleagues in the coup d'état, of July 77, which led to ten, eleven years ofmilitary was proposed but the majority of Corps Commanders opposed that decision. Isthere any truth in that?

Gen C : But why, why should these ideas even come to one's mind whether heshould be killed on takeover or not. The takeover, depends, was for what purpose Thetakeover was not for all times to come. The takeover was only to separate the parties sothat the elections can be held again. So if you are thinking of killing the Prime Ministerthen how can you separate the parties and have them come back again. Well

T.A.: That was the claim, of General Zia ul Haq when he made his address tothe nation that within ninety days there would be elections. But it could be argued thathe did not even inform his own high command of what his plans were and that therewere very few plans, in fact, to go for a general election. That he had another plan,which was that the country had to be held together for whatever reasons by the Armyand the second argument you see says that the United States was indirectly involved inthe coup d'état and that Zia was their man.

Gen C: On this question I cannot give any categorical answer because if we say,that Zia had different plans that means the higher command of the Army that is the fiveCorps Commanders were not in picture as to what his thinking was. That means shallwe say, that he took all of them for a ride and then he decided what to do. I do not thinkthat was the case. I do not think so. This is just thoughts in retrospect, fabrications, allthose ideas etc. I do not think so. I think Zia was genuine in separating the parties and,initially, having the elections re-done in ninety days. All those things, all discussions, all


actions which did take place initially were towards that but at a later stage he wentastray.

T.A.: Could that later stage be the reception awarded to Bhutto when he arrivedin Lahore? Lots of people say and your book mentions that fact. It was a turning pointthat when Bhutto arrived in Lahore he himself, it is said, was surprised at the very largecrowd which had turned out to greet him thus indicating that if a general, election washeld Bhutto's People's Party would win and General Zia not being a fool probablyunderstood that if that happens the one thing that would definitely happen is he wouldbe dismissed as Chief Of Staff.

Gen C: During the discussions with the Prime Minister in the Cabinet every timewe have been saying that. To go for elections, People's Party would still win.

T.A. : You knew-that.

Gen C: We never had any doubts that People's Party will not win. Even, to thatextent, we said, even - shall we say, side-tracking this question slightly, even later on weknew that whenever elections are held on party basis People's Party will win. Doesn'tmatter when the elections are held, if the elections are held after two years, five years,ten years. Whenever they are on party basis it will be the Peoples Party which will win.Now coming back to this question again, initially, I have no doubt in my mind, nor didany of other Corps Commanders, that there was any other intention in Zia's mind alsothat it is only a question of separating the parties and having the elections done becauseall steps were towards that. Everything was oriented towards that. The question is as towhen did Zia change his mind. That is the question that you would like to know and inthe book I have tried to give the answer to that also. See General Zia ul Haq had oneweakness, that is, anybody who will go and talk to him will convince him for a thingand the last man who went would perhaps go with the last decision.

T.A. : He was very impressionistic.

Gen C: He was very impressionistic. I do not know what exact word to use.During the routine or even office routine etcetera many a times it happened that I had,in one capacity or the other, gone to General Zia to seek a decision - I have been his staffofficer, say Military Secretary in G.H.Q. when he was the Chief or as a Federal Ministerdealing with three. four ministries or whatever it, was. If I have gone to General Zia fora decision and I have taken a decision from him and two hours thereafter if somebodyhas gone to him he got his mind changed and the decision was changed. There is noreason why that should happen but it did happen. So anybody telling him that whenBhutto comes "he will remove you" etcetera is understood, it is implied, these things donot matter but when somebody tells him that if Mr. Bhutto comes back "he is going tohang you" then perhaps he would think twice and I have no reasons to believe that Zia


did not have full faith in Mr. Bhutto that he would not even touch him. First meetingwhich I have mentioned in my book which.

T.A.: First meeting after Martial Law.

Gen C: After Martial Law on 15 July in 77 on which many things have beenwritten. I was the only witness because I was the only one at that time present.

T.A.: Could you describe that meeting?

Gen C: I have given it in the book. I have written it in the book. It was absolutelypleasant. There was no harsh exchange of words, no ill feelings etcetera. Mr. Bhuttosaid, "Yes, you have taken over, OK, perhaps that was the right thing for you to do butnow the question is how to deal with the situation. How to run this country becauseyours has been a different task, mine has been a different task. You do not know whatare the problems in running Pakistan. Pakistan is not an easy country to govern. It hasmany problems. Therefore, you have done this, OK. It is your judgment. Now clear thedeck and let us do the things again so that we run this country". Now, what I want tohighlight is for the sake of the people. There was no abusing. There was no exchange ofharsh words. There was no - there was absolutely nothing which has been said - evenpeople have gone to the extent that Mr. Bhutto slapped Zia or Zia was harsh and rude.There is no such thing. So I personally think, as I have mentioned that the things wentwrong with telephone call which I have mentioned.

T.A.: You have mentioned that telephone call.

Gen C: And that is where I think Zia got scared, may be worried, and then.

T.A.: You think, in that telephone call, which you described in the book, it isthat you were at General Zia's house

Gen C: Yeah

T.A.: And the phone rang and they said - it is Mr. Bhutto on the phone and hewent to answer the phone and you saw him being angry but does anyone know whattranspired? What Bhutto said to him to make him angry?

Gen C: You see. It is very difficult because, I think he was speaking from Lahoreor where ever, it was after that.

T.A.: After that big meeting.


Gen C: That meeting etcetera. So what could he say? Now, as I am sitting in thelawn and as you know it is Murree and the telephone is in the verandah. If you knowIntelligence School, next to that, the Chiefs house is there. Now I can't listen in what theother side is saying but what-ever this side is speaking I can listen. I could writeperhaps, if I could be dishonest - intellectually, write couple of things but I can't writeanything because I do not know what the talk was but it must be something which lateron, may be as, told by somebody else as to what Mr. Bhutto's intention would be, scaredhim.

T.A.: One of the other things you described in your book is that when Bhuttowas first arrested on the charges of murder and the High Court in West Pakistan. inLahore, rather gave him bail General Zia was very upset by the bail decision andordered General Iqbal, who, was then Corps Commander in Lahore to arrest himimmediately after the bail and Iqbal refused. This is unprecedented, a general refusingto carry out a military commander's order in that fashion, is it not?

Gen C: It is.

T.A.: But Iqbal did it.

Gen C: This is what happened.

T.A.: That indicates another thing that come what may at that stage Zia wasdetermined that Bhutto had to go.

Gen C: I won't answer this question because I am not in a position to do so. Asyou said earlier if it was in Zia's mind to stay or carry on then he may be having manythings in the mind but how I know that Iqbal was given that order was that in caseMr. Bhutto is released on bail he is to be arrested otherwise he may become a law andorder problem. All that I know, Zia was saying that his release may increase the lawand order problems. Therefore he should be re-arrested. I won't link it with that trialetcetera but unless it was in his mind, which may be, I can't say categorically what hismind was but he was worried about the law and order problem. That it may lead tosome law and order problem.

T.A. : The other point you make in the book is that the Martial Law Commanderin the Punjab as Governor could have pardoned Bhutto or could have commuted thedeath sentence to a sentence for life but instead he sent it to General Zia. Now, giventhe Supreme Court decision, which was a split decision - very narrow majority forsustaining the High Court decision in order to hang Bhutto, was there no discussion atall in the upper reaches of the Army, to put pressure on Zia to spare former PrimeMinister's life?


Gen C: One of the solution given was that why should we decide this case? Whynot leave it to the next elected government? That used to be our majority opinion.

T.A. : That it should not be dealt with now.

Gen C: See, the point is what has the Army taken over for. The Army did not takeover to rule over the country for a prolonged period. The Army had taken over to havethe elections done within ninety days. OK if it cannot be done in ninety days do it inhundred days, do it in three hundred and sixty five days, in a year's time etc which wehave been trying. I think my book is full of the authenticated letters which I have beenwriting, actually pressing him hard and hard to go for elections. Now if we have to gofor elections this trial case let it continue. Let it take its own course. Let the nextgovernment come and decide what to do. If it is only when you have the intention notto have the elections done then it will be different but then we the Corps Commanderswon't know. It is his own intention which no body will know except his own self and if,Mister Tariq I would like to say, another thing is that in our country when a person iscondemned, when he is sentenced to death the mercy petitions, they keep on pendingfor years and years. Actually one of the methods to keep the man alive you know ourcountry, is to approach the people and say that 'pend the case'. So what was the hurrythat it should be sent in twenty four hours time. My point in writing this thing issomething which is not appreciated by the people, the facts which are misconstrued.

T.A.: The other thing which you give another version of there were lots ofrumors, as you know, after Bhutto was hanged. One story which is very widespreadand believed by people common people that Bhutto's book Daughter of the East sherefers to this story without saying whether definitely, whether or not it was true andlots of people who saw the dead man's body say that there were no hanging marks onthe neck which are there. What is your information on this?

Gen C: My information. I have given in this book because when I came back fromGilgit, and then I asked General Arif. He was the nearest man who could give the bestinformation and he confirmed it- the man walked up the stairs himself and he washanged. Mr. Addeeb Javdani, I think, has done lot of research on it. He has been writingquite a few articles on this. I do not think there is any truth in it that he was killedbefore he was hanged.

T.A.: In which case why did they bring the hour forward? Normally accordingto the Jail Manual a condemned prisoner is hanged at the crack of the, dawn. If Bhuttowas hanged some hours before that, under the cover of darkness.

Gen C: In the book have I not asked, this question myself?

T.A.: That is why I am asking you?


Gen C: As to why these Jail Manuals were over-ruled, what was the need? Whywas he hanged at night? Violating, I think his worry may be law and order problem.That is, if it is done during the day it may lead to law and order problems. But then,whether it is day or night law and order problem. would be there, if it had to be there. Itwould be the same.

T.A.: It would be the same.

Gen C: It would be the same. Why do it at night? This is the question which Ihave asked myself as to why it was done?

T.A.: General, what do you think is going to happen to Pakistan? We have anelected government again and after a long time and yet we still have a strong andpowerful army in place. Given that there has been the Army has got very used toexercising power. The one thing that did happen with General. Zia is lots of youngarmy officers even got perks. Do you think the temptation is permanently present totake over?

Gen C: This is something which is generally said which is absolutely wrong. TheArmy is never keen to take over. It never was and it never will be but the circumstancesforce them into it. Let the politicians not fail again. I am not ruling out the Army willnot do it. Army will be very very careful. In eighty eight when Zia died it is often saidthat General Beg did very well by not taking over. I personally think he had nooption.

T.A.: I agree with you.

Gen C: He had no option at all and if he had taken over. I think you never study,history with ifs and buts - I think if Beg had ordered Martial Law at that time and takenover. I think the country would have

T.A.: Fallen apart.

Gen C: Fallen apart. A complete blood bath with civil war. He had no option butto let the normal channel take place. Now this leads me to another explanation. Whenthe institutions are not destroyed things can work but when the institutions aredestroyed things do not work automatically. Zia dies. Who becomes the President?When Zia dies in the air-crash. Institutionally, the Chairman of the Senate because it islaid down. It is said that when the President is away it is the Senate Chairman whostarts acting. This is what I have, I think in a way, tried to bring it out in the book. Henever, appointed anybody- as to in case of an accidental death what happens. He leavesall open because he won't trust anybody. If in Zia's time-it was there that the Senate


Chairman, there is no Senate, the Speaker - there is no Speaker because it is Martial Law- so in case of an accidental death there must be some method. Now in this case whenZia dies Beg had nothing else to do but to obey the Acting President of Pakistan whichis there.

T.A.: General Chishti, thank you very much for joining us this evening.

Gen C: Well very kind of you again to call me here. I hope I have been able toclear some points, some doubts. But towards the end I would say that there are manygaps in the book which I would have loved still to clarify but the space was not there.Thank you very much Mister Tariq.



"KEY TUTI JAHAN JAHAN PAY KAMAND"

(Mashriq Weekly, London, 24th December 1989)

TRANSLATION

Review by A. R. BANGISH

".... HIGHLIGHTING THE POINTS WHERE THE LASSO BROKE"

The book under review can undoubtedly, be called impressive. Its author, whoaccording to the publisher, is a "man of inner circle", a general who stayed in the powerjunta after the army took over in 1977. This book is impressive from the point of viewthat it throws light in detail on the political conditions and the character of thepoliticians and the army personnel.

The author states that the democratically elected Prime Minister Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhuttoin collusion with the Army (In General Yahya's regime) never regretted on the demiseof about quarter of a million Bengahes because by doing so the power would havestayed with the West Pakistan. The author also states that General Zia ul Haq whoplayed the role of a ring master in the politics of the country successfully and who wasvery successful in letting the West believe that he could take a stand as a wall againstthe expansionistic designs of the Soviet Union, was a crazy man and he had the craze toget a toilet constructed in every new office which he used. And when he repeatedlybroke the promise to have the elections held freely and judiciously and destroyed thecredibility of the Army all his colleagues viz generals brigadiers colonels corpscommanders and regional martial law administrators were loyal to him to the extent ofstupidity and they never raised a voice against him nor did they ever try to depose him.

Lt Gen Chishti is not tired in praising the organization and professional discipline of theArmy. If we believe in the picture depicted by General Chishti who believes in Godwho had taken an oath to be loyal to the country and is sincere to his mission then aquestion comes to one's mind as to why these brave soldiers lost each war to the Indianswhy did they act madly in East Pakistan and why did they hang the democraticallyelected Prime Minister who single handedly got ninety thousand prisoners releasedfrom Bharti prisoners of war camps.


Basically this book seems to an election manifesto. And one gets a feeling that theauthor is girdling himself to re-enter the politics and wants to declare himself notresponsible for the mistakes made in the Zia era. The problem is that it is difficult toascertain whether General Chishti has written autobiography or history of his time hewants to expose the army for is giving a free gospel on patriotism to his fellowcountrymen.

In the book the author on his own has also commented on the political events eg "Whokilled Zia" in which he has written "Did Zia deserve the type of death which he met. Hedied in the same manner as the people who had died in the Ojhri Blast God has his ownways to dispense justice. The Holy Prophet had said that we should keep on praying toGod that one should not meet an accidental death."

The author states that I do not consider Zia's death as a result of an air crash. It is amurder a political murder. I would like to comment on it as my national duty andresponsibility so that the events may be seen in their correct perspective". He furtherwrites "In my opinion the real culprit of this accident was General Zia himself. Hispolicies and actions had taken the conditions to that pitch that the nation had to bearthe loss of twenty nine very valuable lives. List Of Zia's enemies was very long. Peopleresponsible for his murder can be any of the Russians, Afghanis, Americans, Iranians,Pakistan political parties, Armed Forces of Pakistan, Ahmadies, Ojhri Camp effecteesetc.

Similarly under the title "Bhutto, Zia and Myself" he has mentioned the early events of1977 which were not known to anybody other than these three. He has given as to whatBhutto told Zia in their first meeting after he was taken into custody "Pakistan is not aneasy country to govern. When General Zia would clean the deck then he in collusionwith the Army would jointly administer the governmental affairs, Mr. Bhutto said thathe had no objection in the takeover by the Army. Perhaps that was the only solution.But the important thing is that how to plan for the future events".

Whatever is his intention, in the book it has been assumed that many things would beknown to the people in Asia and the West. There are many references to the names andevents which the readers would not know. Quite frequently he has used their firstnames from which it is definitely not clear about their rank and status. Nor can oneguess their relationship with the author.

Another thing which is felt while reading the book is that the author feels himself to bean intellectual. He considers himself to be superior to his colleagues. In some sentenceshe has depicted harshness for not becoming the deputy to the king, as to why he wasnot made Deputy Chief of the Army Staff or Vice President.


Somebody has said "Morality, and bravery is the synonym for lack of opportunity anddesire". (Perhaps he meant to express "Morality is either lack of courage, or lack ofopportunity, or lack of appetite." After reading General Chishti's book and after comingto know the futile attempt to run him down one cannot come to know as to what waslacked by the author. The fact is that he could never become Martial Law Administratoror COAS He feels hurt about it and reflects it.

The book is published in UK but printed in India. Perhaps for this reason Jammu andKashmir has been shown as part of India on the maps at the start and end of the book,whereas it is a disputed territory. (Publishers say that the map will not make part of thePakistan Edition). The printing is good. Selection of photographs is also reasonable. Thequality of the paper used could be better. The price can also be stated as reasonable.



CONFLICT BULLETIN

Winter Issue February 1990 Research Institute for the Study of Conflict &Terrorism (London)

Book ReviewsBetrayals of Another Kind: Islam, democracy and the Army in Pakistanby Lt. Gen. Faiz Ali Chishti (Retd).

Betrayals of Another Kind: Islam, Democracy and the Army in Pakistan. Lt. Gen. FaizAli Chishti (Retd). Asia Publishing House, London. pound 12.95Reviewed by William Gutteridge

In Conflict Study No. 227 entitled "Pakistan: Towards a Modem Muslim State?"Anthony Hyman discussed the continuing role of the army in Pakistan. If BenazirBhutto is to survive politically, military cooperation to achieve economic reform and themodernization of the infrastructure will be an important indicator of success.

General Chishti until recently an almost unknown figure even apparently to hispublisher, actually participated in the events which brought General Zia ul Haq topower in 1977. According to. Anthony Hyman's own explanatory introduction to thebook it was Chishti who planned the takeover of the capital at the time of the 1977 coup"and it went off like clockwork."

The execution and planning of the coup are treated in detail in this book which is worthreading for this account alone especially as like its predecessors m 1958 and 1969 it was

peaceful and encountered no violent opposition. The chances of failure were however,obviously there General Zia himself had chosen to send his wife and family out of thecountry to London for medical reasons.

The direct topical interest of this book however lies in General Chishti's account of whathappened afterwards essentially the decline, and eventual demise of the Zia regime.

It is a version of Pakistan's recent history which needs to be approached with caution inthe light of the turn of events an element of self-justification is not surprising.Autobiography in such circumstances could be a hazardous undertaking.


The case for regarding General Chishti as an honest, upright professional soldier doeshowever, seem to stand up. It is not only his professed reaction to the ignominioushanging of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto the father of the present Prime Minister, in 1979 whichconveys the impression of Chishti's decency and integrity. (He claims that Ziadeliberately contrived to have him present at Rawalpindi at the time) Chishti's recordon the matter of democratic elections is what is most convincing and certainly welldocumented.

The General's account of the circumstances surrounding Bhutto's hanging is alsocompelling reading in itself though as in other passages there is an occasional confusionin the narrative.

The main thesis of the book is simple and conventional - "power corrupts and absolutePower corrupts absolutely". The army, Chishti willingly admits had to intervene in 1977to prevent impending anarchy. A state of lawlessness prevailed.

The understanding was that the army would be a caretaker pending free and fairelections to be held within 90 days. This was a commitment made and remade byGeneral Zia in his first few months of power.

The hinge of General Chishti's experience, which he has now described was hisappointment as Chairman of the Election Cell and his insistence throughout the periodthat "Martial Law was an unnatural method of governing acceptable as a stop-gapmeasure". When in 1985 a plan for non-party elections was announced, still underMartial Law, he held a press conference issuing a statement to the effect that suchelections were A BASIS FOR CORRUPTION and not a means of extirpating it. Heproclaimed I himself in favor of a state based on democracy and Islam, what he called"a modem progressive and scientific Islamic Welfare State". That such a concept is inpractice elusive Benazir Bhutto would probably agree. No doubt, too, she will privatelyhave sympathy for the sentiments expressed in the final paragraphs of Chishti'sextraordinary book.

He attributes Pakistan's current ills to "a class of upstarts" who "assumed the role ofadministrators and rulers through their ill-gotten wealth." He ends by appealing for ademocratic party system relying on collective leadership. We cannot be concludes "givethe prerogative to the filthy rich to rule over us forever."

In spite of the overtone of naive idealism combined no doubt with genuine Islaimc faithand patriotism, General Chishti's recollections are better documented in a personal waythan most autobiographies. It would also be a "Betrayal of Another Kind" not to drawattention to the serious contribution which he makes to understanding the taxonomy ofmilitary coups.


Any student of these frequent events and of military rule must welcome such a detailedinsider's account however, retrospectively refined. Moreover. General Chishti attemptsto unravel important questions such as "who killed Zia?"add more than a little spice towhat is already a fascinating story.

If the lessons of recent Pakistani history, which the General often implicitly makes clear,were taken seriously enough the prospects of avoiding conflict in a more modernPakistan would be considerably enhanced.


ANNEX URE 'E'Appendix 4

INSIGHT INTO ALARMIST THINKING(The Muslim, Islamabad, 2 April 1990)

REVIEW ARTICLE By: TARIQ RAHMANInsight into alarmist thinking

Faiz Ali Chishti, Betrayals of Another Kind: Islam, Democracy and the Army inPakistan (1989, London & Delhi. Rawalpindi: PCL Publishing House, 1990), pp. 260.Price Rs 300.

Lt General Faiz Ali Chishti has been in the press ever since General Ziaul Haq imposedmartial law on July 5, 1977, removing Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto from the primeministership of Pakistan. Till March 1980, he was a Corps Commander and a ministerand alter that he kept giving statements, generally against Ziaul Haq, off and on. Manypeople believed that he was the power behind the throne and responsible for much thathappened in Zia's early years. That is why a book written by him is a document of greatimportance. It can tell, us much about Zia's martial law and if read in conjunction withother personal accounts such as Rao Rasheed's Jo Main ne Dekha, Kausar Niazi's Aur LineKut Gal and Benazir Bhutto's Daughter of the East, it can help us understand much of thisera of Pakistan's history. Of course, like most personal narratives, the view of thisnarrative is bound to be self-exonerating and opinionated, but the distortionsintroduced by the egoistic element can be corrected through cross-checking with othernarratives. The value of the narrative lies in presenting unknown facts anddocumentary proof of certain events and mental attitudes.

MARTIAL LAW

Chishti's account of the martial law is most valuable in telling us how the professionalmilitary officers may have seen the events of 1977. He contends that Mr. Bhutto'sundemocratic actions, the rigging of the March elections and the brutality of the policemade all the parties come together to form the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). Thisbody came under the influence of the fundamentalists and started raising Islamicslogans later. The army commanders were not in favor of shooting demonstrators andthree senior officers resigned in Lahore. On May 13 Zia asked his Generals whetherthey would suggest that the prime minister ask for a mandate from the people througha referendum. The Generals said that the PM should go for elections and not for areferendum. Gen Zia however, told the PM that his Generals had suggested a


referendum. According to the author, "I was the only one who knew that Gen. Zia hadtold a deliberate lie"

Chishti does not draw any conclusion from this act of Zia but goes on to offer his ownopinion why the military takeover was necessary. He says he told Mr. Bhutto that:

It is the Army which is keeping this country intact. The day the fiber of thisArmy breaks, India will overrun Pakistan. Therefore, please do not destroy thisArmy. Three Brigadiers have already cracked, the junior ranks are cracking. now.So please go for re-elections. You will still win.

He goes on to reveal that the Army Intelligence had indicated that 300 people had beenkilled and 80,000 arrested. He also refers to reports of the Amnesty Internationalaccording to which there had been illegal detention and torturing. Given these facts theArmy Generals must have felt justified if they suggested re-elections. This does notexplain however why martial law was imposed Chishti does indicate that the plan forthe coup was one of the contingency plans made much before the actual takeover. Healso tells us that the talks between the PNA and the PPP were taking place. At 9:30 onthe evening of July 3 and Maj Gen Arif, Maj Gen Riaz Khan went with the author toZia's house. Gen Zia said that he would give the final orders after seeing the outcome ofthe meeting of the PNA and the PPP.

PNA TALKS

Nothing was agreed upon in the meeting and Mr. Bhutto said that he would meet thePNA again on July 4. On the same night says Chishti Gen Zia ordered me to executeOperation Fairplay. The question remains why when most of the killing had occurred mApril and the PPP could meet the PNA again was this time chosen for the coup. Theauthor provides no answer and gives support to the hypothesis that Gen Zia saw hisway to supreme power in the land and did not miss the chance.

Chishti's own theory is that power spoilt him later and he says that the coup waspeaceful (this also exonerates him since he was the one who controlled it) and Bhuttowas allowed to retain some of is privileges for some time. Be that as it may Zia wasprepared for any contingency. The author tells us not only that Zia had sent his familyto England but that a helicopter was ready in Dhamial on the night of the coup Chishtisays he ordered that it should not be allowed to take off unless he allowed it. Onewonders what would have happened if the coup had failed and Zia actually asked thepilot to fly away?

After this comes proof that Chishti and several other people did advise Zia to hold theelections in 1978 or 1979. However Zia did not listen to them. He also suggests that thetrial of Bhutto was a plot between Zia and his newly appointed Governor of Punjab


(Gen Sawar Khan). He points out that the hanging itself was against all regulations.Though he does not say why he did not resign then he does give evidence to supporthis claim that he was not in Rawalpindi when the hanging took place. He claims thatZia had decided to spread rumors that he had tortured Bhutto and he deliberately wentaway from Pindi so as to have an alibi.

This is not the only example of Zia's lack of integrity that he has produced. He also saysthat Zia did not actually take anyone who supported him to task though he talked ofaccountability. Fraudulent and questionable ways of accountability led to politicalpurges but did not actually bring anyone who had betrayed the national trust toaccount. Ziaul Haq was so unscrupulous, according to Chishti that he promoted Armyofficers on the basis of personal choice. In the civil service too, he alleges, officers wereput in without regard to the rules of selection. Moreover Zia did not relinquish theposition of the COAS because:

Our Army is a very disciplined force. It would never disobey its chief. That wasexactly, why Gen Zia would not shed uniform.

There were however, attempts at coups but Chishti gives us no details of these.

The book contains certain appendices some relevant to the main subject of the bookZiaul Haq's rule and others only to the author's role in national and internationalaffairs. Some chapters of the book are not about the sequence of events but containChishti's views about the Army. These views are not different from the views ofPakistani military officers as presented by Stephen P. Cohen in his book The PakistanArmy.

Another chapter which is not relevant from the point of view of the narration of eventsis the autobiographical chapter 16 (Gentleman Cadet to General). This could have comein the beginning if the book had been written in a chronological sequence. As it is thechapter is quite out of place. Indeed the fact that the time sequence has not beenadhered to creates repetition and makes the book less interesting.

The most important contribution of the book is one which the author never intended: itgives us an insight into the military mind. It becomes obvious that the militaryconsiders itself the only institution that can safeguard the integrity of Pakistan. At oneplace the author says that if Zia had died without there having been anyone to take hisplace, anyone in the NWFP, Sindh or Balochistan could have declared his provinceindependent. This is an untenable assumption since Pakistan is a federation by the willof the people and not by military, force. This implies that the will of the people is soweak that anyone can declare the provinces to be independent. It is this fallaciousthinking which has made the governments of Pakistan deny legitimate demands of theprovinces in the past and created ill-will.


The military solution of East Pakistan could not prevent it from becoming Bangladeshand it is evident. That Pakistan is a federation because the people want it to be so andnot because the Army has decided that it should be so. This alarmist thinking gives theArmy too much power and justifies undemocratic acts by those in power. This is not todeny that some people may, or that Gen Chishti may, have sincerely felt that it was theArmy which kept the country together. What needs to be driven home is that thisthinking is fallacious and must be abandoned if the provinces and the Centre are to livein an atmosphere of trust.

Chishti contends that Zia was not popular in the Army nor were all Army officers asreligious as he was. In this he is right for the Army was never given to religiousfundamentalism. The officers were somewhat Westernized and despised the mullahs.They were not, to be sure, leftist in their views but they were a part of the modern, moreor less apolitical, elite which the British had created in the civil service and the armedforces. Zia himself came from a lower middle class family which was religious. Chishtimay not be correct when he conjectures that Zia may have been influenced by thereligious fundamentalists, thought there is reason to believe that he was sympathetic tothem even before the coup. The fact that Zia did manipulate Islamic symbols to stay inpower has been confirmed by Chishti as it has been by others.

Chishti presents the point of view of a professional officer. Even granting that he issincere and has not deviated from the truth, this view is simplistic. The main problem isthat the view is based on the assumption that individual politicians make mistakes andthe Army takes over to correct these mistakes. This is not correct in the case of the othercoups of Pakistan, nor does it seem to be the fact in this case. In fact, it seems moreplausible to conclude on the basis of Chishti's own evidence that, at least Zia if not allthe others, was ambitious of ruling the country. Why, after all did Zia advise the primeminister not to go for elections? Why did he act when a decision could be taken soon?These are not questions which can be easily explained away on the hypothesis that allZia wanted to do was to conduct elections. In any case, political systems are complexand Chishti's theory does not take that complexity into account.

For instance, Army rule reinforces hierarchical and undemocratic tendencies and leadsto an undemocratic culture. Thus, army rule is not beneficial for a country. The authordoes not go into these intricacies of political theory and remains at the level ofindividual actions and personalities in his analysis. He also assumes quite erroneouslythat the middle class professionals who draw salaries are hit by inflation. The peoplewho are really affected are the working masses who live on uncertain and abysmallylow wages. It is this system of production of wealth which the army as well as thecivilian bureaucracy have defended. This is a fact to which the author pays no attention.It is, of course, possible that he is genuinely not aware of these aspects of politics.However, his assumption of neutrality on the part of the Army is not really correct.


Whether he knows it or not, the Army like most other conservative institutions, is onthe side of the status quo. These theoretical attitudes have political implications whichshould be analyzed when the institution is being studied. To concentrate on theindividuals is fundamentally inadequate for a theoretically satisfactory analysis, ofpolitics. However, for such an analysis, books like this serve as original documents.Thus, inspite of its faults and inadequacies. Gen. Chishti's book must be given credit forbeing a valuable document for the study of an important period in the history ofPakistan.



(The Muslim, Islamabad, 24 April 1990)

ZIA: THE MAN FROM NOWHERE,By Jamil Ur-Rehman

Lt Gen Faiz Ali Chishti writes that his former boss Gen Zia ul Haq was the man fromnowhere. Lt Gen Chishti believes that Gen Zia was a CIA man. Perhaps it was due tohis CIA connection that he got the top job of the army superseding six generals senior tohim Chishti poses the question. Was it a deep conspiracy (Zia's appointment as COAS)by someone else who wanted to deal with the democratic elements in Pakistan throughhim?

There are hardly any books by people who have been directly involved in the militarytakeovers in Pakistan Field Marshal Ayub Khan's autobiography 'Friends Not Masters' isself laudatory and a one-sided version of his takeover. A book by General IskanderMirza, deposed and exiled after having masterminded Ayub Khan's takeover, couldhave been an interesting reading and added valuable information to the history ofmilitary takeovers in Pakistan. General Yahya Khan and his colleagues many of themstill alive have never told their story. Therefore it is a welcome surprise to readBetrayals of another kind written by Lt Gen Faiz Ali Chishti the man responsible forexecuting the Operation Fairplay.

Gen Chishti puts the blame squarely on the politicians for the revival of military rule on5 July, 1977. He maintains that it was due to the failure of PPP - PNA negotiations thatforced Gen Zia to step in and save the country from disintegration Gen Chishti claimsthat Mr. Bhutto was told repeatedly by the corps commander that if law and ordersituation did not improve and if he did

[. .501 BETRAYALS OF ANOTHER KINDnot go for reelections, the Army would have no option but to take over. Gen Chishtireveals that Gen Zia was reluctant to take over and nearly risked his life by advancingthe execution of Operation Fairplay, by one day in the lingering hope that politicianswould reach a compromise.

LEGAL ASPECT


Gen Chishti does not talk about the legal aspects of the coup. He does not say whetherthe corps commanders had ever pondered that Operation Fairplay was a violation ofthe Constitution and those who were entrusted with its execution were committingtreason.

If Gen Chishti and his colleagues were only concerned with following their chief. Intheir opinion their first duty was to the chief, everything else including theconstitutional niceties were secondary. Does this mean that the Army Chief hasacquired the right to act extra-constitutionally if and when he felt that integrity of thecountry was at stake?

Pakistan in its short history has suffered three military dictators, all chiefs of the Army.The first military dictator, General Mohammad Ayub Khan, was installed in 1958 byPresident Iskander Mirza. The second military dictator, General Yahya Khan,maneuvered an invitation from the head of state to seize power in 1969. The thirdGeneral Zia ul Haq, took over power in 1977 on his own initiative. That military coupwas planned and executed at the orders, of the army chief without the complicity of thesitting government.

The army rank and file on all three occasions had followed the orders of its chief inblind faith. It had never occurred to the army, from generals at the top to the jawans atthe bottom to question the legitimacy of chief's takeover and his subsequent rule. Thelegitimacy lay in his position as the head of the army and in the success of the coup. Thenavy and Air Force always acquiescing to the army takeover. There is no instance onrecord of any man in uniform resigning his post in protest against the military takeover.In fact, there is no instance of any government servant, high or low, displaying hisdistaste of the military dictatorship by resigning his post. Perhaps it does indicate thatall the three takeovers by the army chiefs were timed to perfection. The public wasready for them. The record shows that a large number of politicians not only welcomedthe military takeovers but were falling all over themselves to extend cooperation to themilitary dictators.

The military takeovers in Pakistan have always been accomplished with remarkableease. It is mainly due to our third-rate political structure, that the chief of army couldsimply walk in and depose the constitutional government without encounteringexpressive resistance from any quarter. This third-rate political structure turns rotten inno time whenever it gets the opportunity to hold power. The army chief thus finds nodifficulty in dismantling a political structure which has been weakened by in efficiencycorruption nepotism and jobbery, It is difficult to explain away this malady. Is it thefrequent interruption of dictatorial rules responsible for our third rate politicalstructure? Or is it our third-rate political structure which facilitates army takeovers?

WHOSE FAULT


It was the weakness of political structure which had led to PNA agitation andsubsequent law and order situation, Mr. Bhutto was holding cabinet meetingsintermittently in which some top army commanders including Gen Zia also took part.At one such meeting Mr. Bhutto asked Gen Zia General you said that the Army wouldsupport the government whole hog, and you would be able to control the situation.How come that the situation is not coming under control? Gen Zia replied that theArmy was doing its best but Gen Tikka Khan Defence Advisor, was not satisfied. Heobserved that if two or three hundred were killed the situation would quickly comeunder control Mr. Bhutto then asked Gen Chishti for his views Gen Chishti beforestating his views got two principles established by questioning Gen Tikka Khan that (1)Army applies minimum force when called out in aid of the civil power and (2) that italways fires to hit, and not in the air. Gen Chishti then addressed Mr. Bhutto, "Sir, 42Bullets Were fired in Multan, and only two people were hit. Where did the other 40Bullets go? 43 bullets were fired in Anarkali Lahore and only two people were hit." GenChishu explained to Mr. Bhutto that Generals are with him but the soldiers who do theactual shooting are not. According to Gen Chishti the soldiers were firing in the air.Which was tantamount to disobedience of orders. Gen Chishti then pleaded with Mr.Bhutto, "It is the Army which is keeping this country intact. The day the fiber of this Armybreaks, India will overrun Pakistan. Therefore, please do not destroy this Army. Three Brigadiershave already cracked, the junior ranks are cracking now. So Please go for reelections You willstill win. Please do not let the cracks Come in the Army".

Gen Chishti has recalled the Proceedings of this Cabinet meeting from memory. Hedoes not say when this particular meeting took place. Memory can play tricks. It is noteasy for the narrator of an event to remain objective particularly when he himself wasinvolved in that event. The whole truth can only be known when the proceedings of theCabinet meetings are made public. It is about time that existing secrecy laws areamended. The new law should remove the secrecy veil from some selective governmentpapers. The government papers of twenty-five year ago or older should not be hiddenfrom the public. The official papers relating to national security can be given a longerlease of secret life. The nation would greatly benefit by leaning about its past from theauthentic government records.

Gen Chishti argues that the Army had taken over as champions of democracy. Then hegoes on to lament that the Army could have kept its credibility if the CMLA had notslipped. "Unfortunately, Zia fell into the trap of sycophants and advisers like A.K.Brohi, Sharifuddin Prizada, the Egyptian Dr. Saad Gabr, the Jordanian Dr Dualbi, AliAhmed Talpur, Justice Cheema and above all Col Siddiq Salik".

Gen Chishti in his capacity, as the chief of Election Cell has extensively discussedvarious politicians and their behavior who used to meet him from time to time. Most ofthem were against holding of general elections in a hurry. It goes on to prove that our


political structure is indeed third-rate. It was these politicians who were responsible instrengthening the hands of Gen Zia and providing him the opportunity to rule at will.



GENERAL CHISHTI'S GREAT BETRAYAL

(MAG 17-23 MAY 1990)

BY PARVEZ ALI

If we begin by accepting that "history is not a web woven with innocent hands" and,that "all great events have been distorted, most of the important causes concealed ....and all who figure are so misunderstood, and misrepresented that the result is completemystification," then Gen Chishti's book Betrayals of Another Kind published only afterthe death of Gen Zia is a queer interesting study. In an attempt to wash himself whiteenough the man who was known to be the 'Iron Man' of Martial Law regime and wholed their 'Operations Fairplay' otherwise 'Foulplay' to the world in July 1977, to commithigh treason against the state. Gen Chishti tries to project himself as an innocent manwho "actually had limited power and authority in the Martial Law government" andwho "was never a Martial Law administrator" notwithstanding his alleged incessantdesire to become Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator, which Zia kept denying tohim on purpose and to Gen Chishti's dismay. Amidst the mid-night raiders whotoppled a constitutionally elected civilian government, Gen Chishti projects himself asthe good guy while others he describes as bad and Gen Zia as the ugly.

The book is full of contradictions and if read in conjunctions with other books on theevents of that traumatic period Gen Chishti would fail the litmus test of being the Mr.Clean and Mr. Straightforward and Mr. Outspoken that he wants his readers to believe.Thus books like If I Am Assassinated by Mr. Bhutto a masterpiece of stunning truths,Aur Line Kat Gal by Mauianã Kausar Niazi, Phir Martial Law Aa Gaya by Prof Ghaffoor,Jo Maine Dekha by Rao Rahshid, Kashmir Banega Pakistan by Sardar Qayyum, give adifferent view of how Martial Law was imposed in the country and the 'dictator' likerole that Gen Chishti played those days.

Gen, Chishti claims that Operation Fairplay was not planned overnight. It was one ofthe contingency plans. He says "I have no regrets about it or for installing Gen Zia asCMLA, because if. Gen Zia had hesitated and waited a little longer, Pakistan mighthave become part of Confederated India." "The logic is both queer and absurt. He says"Zia saw no realistic prospects of a compromise between the PPP and PNA". yet, hecites Mr. Bhutto's Press Conference of 4th July saying "if the PNA w they could come onthe morning of July 5 and sign the agreement. "Gen, Chishti has no explanation to giveif he asked that if Gen Zia had patiently waited for four months, why didn't they waitjust one more day. This is exactly what Prof Ghafoor and Maulana Niazi ask in their


books mentioning that the PPP-PNA accord had been reached, when Martial Law camethrough the chimney after swearing allegiance to Mr. Bhutto. Gen Chishti blames that"the 1977 coup was largely the result of Mr. Bhutto's personal weaknesses and politicalblunders" saying that "Gen Zia did not come into power through a conspiracy. He wassucked in by circumstances". Yet he contradicts himself by saying I believe that it ispossible that the CIA got hold of him (Gen Zia) when he was training in the USA. Maybe Zia's stay in Jordan took him closer to the CIA ... He questions "Did Zia want tobecome COAS or was it a deep conspiracy by someone else who wanted to deal withthe democratic elements in Pakistan through him?"

While the book is studded with Gen Chishti's photographs sitting next to Gen Zia, ashis right hand man, and whom Gen. Zia always called his Murshid the spiritual mentoror guide, he says "I was never a member of Zia's inner circle This is rather impossible tobelieve. The man who was entrusted the exclusive responsibility to execute OperationsFairplay for which Gen Chishti takes pride, who remained Corps Commander ofRawalpindi during Zia's days, who was given important portfolios of three ministries,who was made Chief of the Election Cell and who was called upon by Gen Zia toexecute all top secret, operations cannot claim innocence by saying that Gen Zia nevertrusted him or that he was never in his good books. What is more Gen Chishti himselffrom Jullunder even defies the famous Jullunder Connection calling it merely a figmentof imagination. He talks of Zia's adroitness in manipulating his fellow generals and saysZia used any one and every one irrespective of ethnic groupings. He says there was aclique which grew up around Zia. He had progressively altered the higher echelons ofthe army creating a gang of four with ties reinforced by marriages alliance thus Zia's,son was married to Gen Rahimuddin's daughter, Gen Akhtar's son was married to GenRahim's daughter, Gen Akhtar's son was married to Gen Zahid Ali Akbar's daughter.And there were the top bureaucrats and officers over due for retirement who werepromoted and adopted as his blue-eyed boys and Zia fell into the traps of thesesycophants who made him believe that he was the one chosen by God to do somethingabout Pakistan as he told BBC on April 12, 1978.

PIOUSNESS

The book is a severe and, gruesome commentary against the person of Gen Zia by aperson who was so intimately involved in the conspiracy of imposing Martial Law andremaining with that regime as a front man for three years even though he cites the HighCourt judgment of June 1977 which had declared Martial Law as illegal. He describesGen Zia's colorless personality, who was a deliberate liar who was hypocriticaltreacherous and perfidious who broke all records by making every second decision adishonest decision and whose quirky behavior and foibles were not only a nuisance or,a source of amazement or amusement but proved positively dangerous like his foolishunconsidered action - which inevitably was hushed up - in the burning of the U.S.embassy building- in Islamabad in November 1979. He says Zia was vindictive who


was outwardly all sugar and honey but inwardly he could be venomous and the nationwould come to know more about it as time passed by. He says Zia started deliberatelybuilding up his image as the austere pious man of simple tastes which Gen Chishti callsdistortion of the truth. He says "Zia's public image was that as a pious Muslim (Zia) hadcomplete faith in Allah and resigned himself to what was his fate. Actually he wasconstantly preoccupied and worried about his life and he constantly feared attempts atassassination or a coup. He did not trust doctors and refused to have his gall bladderattended until he was physically helpless. He was so scared of death that he used to goto sleep after morning prayers. Of his hypocrisy he says while there were one set ofrules he prescribed for the poor even during Ramadan luncheons continued to beprepared in the kitchen of the CMLA building in Rawalpindi and he did not appear tomind when others ate or smoked in front of him. So much for his piousness.

Describing Gen Zia as shockingly irresponsible Gen Chishti says he believed in earningcheap popularity even by corrupting other and he gives examples of such bad behavior.He says Gen Zia had a weakness that he could not say no to any suggestion that mightincrease his so called popularity yet according to Gen Chishti Zia always remainedunpopular in the Armed forces inspite of all his efforts to buy popularity. He changedset rules and procedures for promotions in the Army. It even happened that Majorswere simply told by Zia that they were promoted without following usual procedures.It was after all his constituency. Zia according to Gen Chishti was a born procrastinatorand always preferred to give verbal decisions or ignore problems. He always had thehabit of meeting foreign dignitaries alone and it was highly irresponsible that noauthentic minutes were recorded of Zia's meetings with foreign heads of thegovernment. We also know that he used to move around with state files and used toshow them to foreign dignitaries.

He says Zia was extra ordinary lazy with paper work. Necessary office work wassimply ignored, which is why many thousands of files were found awaiting a decisionby Zia at the time of his death in 1988. It is yet another thing that in matters of hisinterest he introduced immediate action throughout. Gen Chishti says "Zia had otherstrange traits, apart from (the) for psychologists to examine. This was what amountedto an obsession with toilets. Zia had a special fancy, almost an obsession with bathroomand toilets. He would not share them with anybody". "He was surprisingly casual aboutthe army uniform". "Zia never stopped - disgracing the army uniform. He used to do ithimself and even let it be done by his daughter. He used to let her dress up improperlyas Colonel, General and go along with him on ceremonial occasion and reception ofdignitaries and guards of honor". Gen Chishti feels that among other reasons Zia couldperhaps have been killed by "some idealists who - always thought that Zia ... got theuniform disgraced by letting his daughter wear it."

One whole chapter of the book is on a mysterious 'Canadian Connection' which GenChishti seems to have purposefully avoided to expose in full. Gen Chishti says "Zia


seemed to have friends with some of the most notorious smugglers of Pakistan such asSeth Abid, the brother-in-law of Masood Mahmood (who got Mr. Bhutto hanged) ... andthe equally notorious Dohsil."Gen Chishti also cites examples of Zia's evil doings andtells us of Zia's plane being stopped in Paris for carrying narcotics/heroin, but this'Canadian Connection' of an organization in North Hatley, Canada, of which Zia wasthe founder member which he describes of a 'dubious nature' needs a thorough probemore so if it is still continuing. Surprisingly, Gen Chishti admits of his being appointedby Gen Zia as a member of the Board of Governors of this operation and as the Head ofits Islamabad branch, he admits of having the 'novel experience' of travelling onConcorde, and chartered flights, to Canada, and Jeddah etc, in connection with thisclandestine operation called North Hatley organization as Zia's representative. Yet hepleads ignorant and innocent saying the main figures in this operation, Dr. Saad Gabr,who was given a Pakistani passport on Zia's orders, would not answer any question onthe operations. He speaks of it being very secretive and says it was difficult for me to bea party to unknown plans, so he resigned. It is surprising that a general who claims that"A general is paid to risk his life for the country, not the country for his life", leaves thereaders groping in the dark on such a dubious, clandestine activity concluding Howmuch money has come since then? How has it been spent? It is anybody's guess. "Asmember of the Board of Governors of such an operation going on in Canada, for whichthe Canadian Prime Minister he says flatly refused to invite Gen Zia for a day's visit toCanada Gen Chishti cannot plead innocent when he associated himself with it for sucha long time and went to lay the foundations of the project at North Hatley. How couldGen Chishti tolerate active association with a Moroccan-born Dr. Gabr who wassentenced to death in Egypt and finally settled in Canada and who was given specialPakistani passport by Zia. Why didn't he question Zia in the national interest on such anoperation, when he cites examples of his bold encounters with Zia on differentoccasions going as far as telling Zia that the best place for his written orders was thedustbin. It is indeed questionable that Gen Chishti who laid the foundation stone of theproject led delegation after delegation to such a dubious project resigned as its Chiefjust because he did not know anything about it. In the garb of promoting export whatdubious activities went around he says he could not make out. When he thought he wasat a loss to understand and could not change the modus operandi he said he would not beattending the meetings?

It is this aspect of pleading innocent wherever an accusing finger, can be raised at hisconduct that continues to annoy a reader Who would for example believe him when heclaims ignorance about the circumstances of Mr. Bhutto's ignoble, cold blooded, andcalculated execution that took place right under his nose when he was the inner circle ofZia? Having played a truant by purposefully hiding himself in Gilgit on the night of theexecution because a senior bureaucrat had informed him of a plot that Zia had hatchedto malign him, he says he does not know anything about what really happened? Hepins responsibility on others like Brig Rahat Latif etc who he says might havemanhandled Mr. Bhutto to extract some confession in return for the promised


promotion from Zia. What about the video tapes on which the hanging ceremony wasrecorded?

One wonders why Benazir Bhutto hasn't dug open the whole truth. His pleadingignorant only goes to show his extreme indolence and ineptness. Who would believehim when he says that he accepted all those portfolios as Minister incharge ofEstablishment where he shunted out all those who were called Mr. Bhutto'ssympathizers, Minister of Labor. Manpower and Overseas Pakistanis, Petroleum andNatural Resources, Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas, in addition to being CorpsCommander and Chief of Election Cell just because he thought that his refusal wouldhave indicated a split in the Army which in his opinion would have been "harmful tothe, Army? So when General Zia asked me to become a Minister again I agreed." Howgood of him to show his national commitment? Who would for example believe himwhen he takes all the credit for executing a coup with military precision and says that"nobody was allowed to get in or get out" of the P.M. House. Yet he says that accordingto intelligence agencies a lot of documents were burnt by Mr. Bhutto with the help ofhis Military Secretary and ADC's and that'boxes full of documents were carried fromthe PM's house-to Larkana on the night of the coup? Who would for example believehim when he says he had no knowledge of the White Papers, and "Zia never consultedme on the white papers" on which his main advisers he says were Gen Arif, Brohi,Sharifuddin Pirzada, Gen Hassan, Ghulam lshaq Khan and Siddiq Salik? Who wouldfor example believe him when he pleads ignorance about the Kasuri murder case andaccountability? He questions who had given details of the doing..." "It were certainlynot the generals. Nor was it the politicians. It was only the record holders who knew thedetails that is to say some key civil bureaucrats, all under the Secretary-General-in-Chief. So the bureaucrats had won the game" as he puts it, as if the Military Junta, himincluded, were composed of angels.

INTRIGUING

Gen Chishti does however deserve credit for continuing advice Gen Zia on holding thepromised elections which is borne out by his official notes sent to Zia that he has cited.As Chief of the Election Cell, he exposes the macabre conspiracy of the political leadersagainst the PPP and his commentary shows the greater intrigues of keeping the PPP outof power come what may. He keeps pleading the holding of elections saying that"Martial Law regime would stand vindicated by fulfilling the pledge of holding earlyelections", or to tell Zia in writing that "to maintain the state of morale and proverbialdiscipline of the Armed Forces it goes without saying that elections must be, held at theearliest." As Chief of the Election Cell his analysis of the PNA's 'unnatural alliance'which having used 'the will and the blood of the people' had 'drifted into insipidity'with 'crack appearing with no clear sense of direction' while the PPP demonstrating'semblance of unity and order' with 'no signs of disintegration' speaks volumes on whyZia never kept his solemn pledge 'for elections that he gave to the nation after reciting


verses from the Holy Qur'an, gave to the supreme Court and even gave at the HolyKaa'ba. His commentary on the conduct of PNA, Muslim Leaguers, JI who opted asjunior civilian partners in the Martial Law regime shows their 'evil designs.' He reportsthat Mr. Jatoi had agreed to become the Prime Minister of the interim government inFebruary 1980. One wonders what the whitewashed uncle has to say on this exposureby Gen Chishti?

Equally ignoble comes out the role of politicians like Maulana Niazi, Hafeez Pirzada,Khawaja Khairuddin, Aslam Khattak, Yousuf Khattak, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan,Mir Afzal Khan and many others who kept advising him and Zia those days, and puthim astray. Yet it was Gen Chishti who went ahead implementing schemes of Nationalgovernment, elections of local bodies and requested politicians to cooperate fully, forthe good of the nation, which kept delaying elections. He says there his rule was just,acting as a Post Office. What an explanation to wriggle out of the conspiracy! GenChishti also deserves credit for advising Zia in writing not to amend the Constitutionbecause 'it will create a serious legal crisis'. He also claims to have refused to Gen Ziaand Gen Akhtar Abdur Rehman of ISI to allow the dumping of gun powder forAfghanistan at the Ojhri Camp, as long as he was the Corps Commander of Rawalpindi,yet he quietly skips telling anything about what happened at Ojhri Camp which killedthousands of people. He takes credit for capturing the Lipa Valley during the days ofMr. Bhutto, but does not mention a single word on the loss of the Siachin Glacier. This isreally intriguing.

One cannot but agree with him into to when he demands accountability sayingintellectual honesty demands it. He wants trials on poor performance of militaryofficers in the wars of 1947, 1965, 1971. He wants trial of Gen Yahya and his colleagueseven in absentia, he pleads release of the Hamoodur Rehman Commission report, hedemands release of Gen Akbar's report on 1971 war which was replaced by Gen Awan'sreport, he demands enquiry on the allotment of thousands of acres of agricultural landto military officers, he demands enquiry on the ill-doing of Gen Zia as to why electionswere postponed why the Constitution was changed, on the December 1984Referendum, on why Zia continued as COAS on extensions up to his death against allarmy rules, he wants enquiry into the property of those who were connected with theMartial Law regimes and the private funds which were slashed away or sent awayabroad. He insists on holding trials of Army officers for their misdoings looting, housebreaking, dereliction of duty, inefficiency, bribery, nepotism, favoritism etc during thewars of 1947, 1965, 1971 and Martial Laws of 1953, 1958, 1969 and 1971. He wantsenquiry on why black money was issued. He says "I gladly offer myself foraccountability" for many of his own decisions.

Gen Chishti knows best that even if the country reaches a point of disaster by the illdoings of the high ups, no one can dare to institute accountability, and that too againstmilitary officers in this country. True that he walked out of Zia's umbrella, the day he


was retired from the army, but no matter how innocent, how outspoken, how righteoushe may paint himself, he cannot wipe himself clean, for having been the chief architectand the chief executor of the 'Operations Fairplay' which ought to be named 'OperationsFoulplay' and for committing high treason against the State. One also wonders whysuch a self proclaimed outspoken and courageous man with conviction had planned thewriting of the book Once Gen Zia Had Left The Throne?



SALMAN RUSHDI OF PAKISTAN ARMY(Pakistan Observer Islamabad 23 June 1990)

Lt General (Retd) Faiz Ali Chishti s newly published book "Betrayals of Another Kind"has been described by the political observers in the capital as yet another attempt todefame the armed forces of Pakistan.

OBSERVER has learnt that the book has been produced as a result of a deal struckbetween the retired General once reported to be on the hit list of AL ZULFIKAR and thePPP in London in 1989. According to reports General Chishti being one of the fewcharacters still alive who were at the helm of affairs at the time of execution of theformer Prime Minister, Z. A. Bhutto was fearful of the possible repercussions of thecase. In order to get his past sins, pardoned he entered into an agreement with the PPPleaders and to establish his change of heart presented this book which is a deliberatedistortion of past events full of disinformation half truths and outright falsehoods.

The book contains 16 chapters including the one narrating his nature of relationshipwith Bhutto and Zia, background of Martial Law imposition, trial of Mr. Bhutto,postponement of general elections process of accountability initiated by the militaryregime and who killed Zia In view of the biased presentation of facts observers feel thatthe book is a continuation of the campaign started in 1971 to defame the Army a link inthe propaganda chain started over Radio, TV and sponsored articles and books like"Pakistan Crisis in Leadership" by Fazal Muqeem and "Witness to Surrender" by SiddiqSalik both commissioned by the PPP governments of Z. A. Bhutto.

Knowledgeable sources who had the opportunity to closely watch the conduct ofGeneral Chishti, are not really to buy the version of events coined by him and opinethat through his shameful work (the book), General Chishti has proved to be the"Salman Rushdi of Pakistan Army". The author has disgraced the uniform which heonce wore to malign and denigrate most of his superiors and colleagues and indirectlythe army - apparently the real target of those at whose behest he authored this spuriousbook.

The most intriguing part of the whole episode, these sources say, is that Chishti touredEngland, Zimbabwe, UAE and perhaps India to seek guidance from his links. The firstedition of the book was published in India (Tricolour Books) in 1989 through Indianassistance. The sources question as to who financed 47,000 copies of the book ofPresident Zia. The number is perhaps largest published in Pakistan in one edition.


Another source claimed that with coming to power of PPP government in 1988, Chishtiwas in panic and despite his big moustaches he was frightened man hiding himselffrom the wrath of the new rulers. He was in a fix what to do because of his role in theexecution of Bhutto as some reports suggested that the General tortured the formerPrime Minister when he was in death cell in Rawalpindi Jail. He asked for abjectapology and undertook any service that was required of him, the source, said addingthat he became the cat's paw to write against Zia and his colleagues and smeared themwith his falsehoods. The way the book has been written it is clear that he was helped byexperts in disinformation and insinuation. Who employed and commissioned theseexperts? Is he the real author or mere rubber stamp? These questions are being asked bythe observers.

Habibur RehmanPakistan

OBSERVEREvenger from Islamabad.

Saturday June 23, 1990.



Cover-up of the great betrayalGhayurl Islam

PAKISTAN has not recovered, even after 13 years, from the shock of the traumaticevents of 1977 and the most repressive regime born out of those events. The long darknight of tyranny, spread over eleven years, has shaken the foundations of the State andsociety which will take a long time to stabilize. The events and the causes have beenwritten about by many people from various angles, but mainly by those who wereinsiders only up to July 4, 1977, and thereafter were excluded from the shaping ofevents.

Now has come aversion from one who was an insider during the dying days of thedemocratic regime and a full player during the stabilization period of the militarydictatorship. Lt. Gen (rid) Faiz Ali Chishti was corps commander of Rawalpindi, and inthat capacity he had seen from close quarters the long-drawn-out negotiations betweenthe PPP Government and the PNA leadership and later was the main actor in theplanning and execution of the infamous "Operation F'airplay" and subsequentconsolidation of the regime.

His book, Betrayals of Another Kind, purports to record the evolution of the mainevents of that period. It is a detailed justification of the military take-over which wasresorted to for patriotic reasons to save the country from civil war and not, he says, inpursuit of any ambition to rule and draw material advantages of State patronage. Thejunta was initially serious, according to Chishti, in holding the promised electionswithin 90 days, but the commitment was betrayed by Gen Zia supported by other,"sycophantic" and "spineless" members of the military council. Chishti says he insistedon fulfillment of the commitment up to the last. However, the book explodes the mythof free and frank discussions in the military high command. The generals are seen in thebook as endorsing whatever the boss desired and never insisting. (Chishti excluded, ofcourse) on ideas not likely to be liked by the top man.

Let us see what Chishti has to say about the takeover. No mention is made of when andby whom the idea of a take-over was first mooted. Chishti must have been a key playerat this stage as he was holding a crucial office and without him no action could havesucceeded. Political scientists had seen a take-over coming nearer as militaryinvolvement had grown greater in stages - the calling of the army in aid of civil power,


martial law. In three cities, participation of generals in political discussions, etc ZulfikarAli Bhutto, despite all his, intelligence and cleverness, displayed his naivete in notrecognizing this fact. Chishti says the army was sucked into the crisis against its will.He even tries to exonerate Gen. Zia. He says: Gen Zia did not come to power throughany conspiracy. He was sucked in by circumstances. But the way Zia schemed to get thejob of COAS and then stooped low to say close to Bhutto, putting himself above anysuspicion, leave no doubt that he was playing for high stakes. According to Chlshti,Gen. Zia proposed that Bhutto be made colonel commandant of his regiment(Armoured corps) - an honour always given to an ex-military officer. On Bhutto's visitto Multan, Gen. Zia, Corps Commander, brought out officers' and jawans wives on thestreets to clap and welcome the Prime Minister, again something that had neverhappened before. Zia made friends with the PPP leaders in Multan, begged invitationsfrom them, got himself recommended to Bhutto for the post of COAS and took an oathon the Quran at Sadiq Hussian Qureshi's house to remain always loyal to Bhutto. This ishow he got the job on March 1, 1976, superseding seven senior generals, against therecommendation of the then COAS Gen Tikka Khan.

In Pakistan, the traditional Opposition leaders play safe; they become brave and defiantonly when they are assured of the covert or overt support of elements in the militarywhich has ruled the country for 23 years. This has been and still continues to be theirtrack record Bhutto himself chose open defiance when he became aware of Yahya'sambitions. The attitude of open defiance and public display of hatred and contempt forBhutto shown by the PNA leaders during the elections and Asghar Khan's statementthat the PNA would not accept Bhutto even if he won may now, in retrospect, be linkedwith what was cooking in GHQ. In his first Press conference, quoted by Chishti, on July14, 1977, Gen Zia said: "On March 10, 1977, the PNA boycotted provincial elections. Sowe had a senior officer's meeting in Rawalpindi and examined angles. One of the plansconsidered was a take-over. All the officers agreed that we should avoid a takeoveruntil forced to as a last resort. Gen Zia did not reveal the exact date, nor does Chishti, ofthe officers meeting. But from the context, it is clear that it was immediately after July10, Between July 10 and 15 there was a lull-no- street demonstrations, no breakdown oflaw and order, no rioting, no killing, no arrests. Then why had the idea of a take-overbeen mooted and why was it discussed? Obviously some of the elements in the armywere in contact with some of the Opposition leaders. This was later hinted at by thePNA leaders themselves (including Mufti Mahmood, Prof. Ghafoor and others) whenthey talked of the intransigence of some of their colleagues who had obstructed apolitical settlement and had preferred a military takeover.

Another hint about outside collusion is dropped when Chishti says that when Gen. Ziamade his first announcement he (Chishti) was surprised to the addition of the lastparagraph which was not there when the Corps Commanders discussed the speech.Chishti writes: "The introduction of this point into the political speech may have been atthe behest of someone else." The point referred to find here was: I must say that the


spirit of Islam, demonstrated during the recent movement, was commendable. It provesthat Pakistan, which was created in the name of Islam, will continue to survive only if itsticks to Islam. This is why I consider the introduction of an Islamic system as anessential prerequisite for the country. Chishti says the introduction of this point did notalarm him then. In fact it should have done for the stated purpose of the take-over wasonly the holding of election within 90 days, not the restructuring of the State andsociety.

The intention of the corps commanders about the stated objective is clean from thefollowing: During our meetings of the Corps Commanders with COAS in the chair,when reviewing law and order situation, we had given the consensus that if thesituation demanded the COAS may impose martial law, but it should be of a temporarynature with only one objective. That objective would be to hold fair and free elections.There were some corps commanders (Gen Arbab was one) who were of the view thatno time limit should be imposed. The election might even be after ten years. There weresome who had no opinion at all, or did not want to express their views lest they opposeGen. Zia's mind. But I was very specific on this point and said that the Constitutionwould be violated or even abrogated if the elections were not held within 90 days.There was no agreement on this till the final day.

With the traditional simplicity of an army officer, Chishti analyses the PPP-PNAstruggle as having, been provoked by the tyrannies the Bhutto regime had perpetratedin strangulating civil liberties, indiscriminate arrests of opponents and theirpersecution. At one point Chishti writes: "It seemed that nobody really wanted Mr.Bhutto to live. The masses who rose against him in the PNA movement were againsthim, the PPP party workers who thought he had deviated from the party manifesto byaligning himself with the feudal lords and the rich did not want him and even the PPPleaders on whom he had kept secret files were not with him. Above all the silentmajority which had suffered at the hands of the so-called PPP workers did not wanthim. Nobody was interested. There were even some who used to tell Gen. Zia openlythat Mr. Bhutto should not be spared

White Paper

All this may be partly true and partly part of the campaign which gave birth to the hugevolumes of White Papers in whose compilation Chishti pleads total non-in-involvementand says: "His (Zia's) main advisers on these issue were Gen. Arif (with his past martiallaw experience ). A. K. Brohi, and Shanfuddin Pirzada (as legal advisers), Ghulam IshaqKhan (Secretary-General-in-chief) and Siddiq Salik (Zia's speech writer).

But one thing is clear. On the eve of the election, the nation stood deeply divided andthe reason, as stated by - political scientist Dr. Mohammad Waseem, was that whileindividual members of the elites had prospered under Bhutto, the over-all thrust of his


reforms and legislative activity in general was in favor of the subaltern class. Bhutto'sGovernment thus manifested significant features of an 'intermediate regime' defined interms of both input of class support and output of class legislation (Politics and theState in Pakistan.) This obviously alienated the elite and the propertied and rich classes,and these included most of the generals. Thus, the military intervention of July 5 was onthe side of the classes alienated from the Bhutto Government. But Chishti says that "Ziatook the initiative and ended the agony of the people". Chishti asserts that the questionof legitimacy of the regime had been settled by "the reaction of relief of the masses onJuly 5, the PPPs acceptance of going to the polls on October 18 and the Supreme Courtjudgment on Begum Nusrat Bhutto's petition".

Regarding support of the masses, it is pertinent to recall that Chishti himself at severalplaces mentions that had the elections not been rigged, Bhutto would still have won andin re-election he was sure to win again. This was the reason why the junta felt jitterywhen Bhutto visited Lahore on August 8 to a roaring welcome: why Zia shied awayfrom holding elections until 'positive results' were ensured: why the PNA leadershipadvised Bhutto's disposal before the elections. The fact is that the military regime neveracquired legitimacy despite attempts to bring the people into submission throughhanging, floggings, incarceration, mass murders in 1983, and the sharpening of ethnicanimosity through encouragement to terrorist gangs (Aligarh Colony, Orangi,Hyderabad, etc).

One myth that some army elements have woven around themselves, and on which thenation is fed, is: "It is the army which is keeping this country intact. The day the fiber ofthis army breaks, India will overrun Pakistan. Men who hold this view need to bereminded that Pakistan was brought into existence by the united will of the people,through a democratic process, not by the army, which either did not exist at that timeand if it did in embryonic form it was serving the interest of the foreigners. The day thearmy alienated the people of East Pakistan, it could not hold the country together. WestPakistan remained together in 1971 not because of the army (It had been beaten) butbecause the people of the four provinces wanted to stay together and it will stay intacttill the people so wish. The sooner the army sheds this notion, of being a 'savior', whichoften prompts it to kill democracy, the better for the country.

Betrayals of Another Kind is more an attempt to hide relevant facts of national interestabout the critical period than to reveal them. Chishti is liberal only in exposing thecharacter of his boss Gen. Zia who is depicted as a sycophant, a liar, promoter offavoritism and nepotism, hypocritical, dishonest having no moral courage, outwardlysugar and honey but inwardly venomous. This assessment of Zia's character will becontested only by those who themselves have a similar make up. As against this Chishtiglorifies himself as being an efficient officer, patriotic, incorruptible, a fearless, of holderof principles, a great lover of democracy, and having managed crises which others were


incapable of doing. If he had his way, he says, he would have held free and fairelections within 90 days.

Chishti writes about other minor events like U.S Embassy blaze, the Canadianconnection (Dr. Saad Gabr), Joan Herring's appointment, Zia's CIA connection, thebehavior of prominent PNA and PPP leaders, the accountability fiasco etc.

Important Events

Two more important events need to be mentioned, Chishti writes that present COPleader ( and now caretaker Prime Minister) Ghulam Mustafa Jatol had almost becomePrime Minister in March 1980 under Zia. He writes: "The veteran Sindhi politician G.M.Jatoi had agreed to become Prime Minister of the interim government in February 1980.I made him meet Zia in February and everything seemed resolved. Then I was sent offto Canada on what turned out to be a fool's errand, and on my return everything hadchanged. Zia was completely in the clutches of the fundamentalist advisers".

Another important event that took place during the time Chishti was still in office wasthe revolution in Afghanistan and the Soviet intervention. Pakistan's policy onAfghanistan crystallized during this period. Chishti defined the long term objective ofthe armed forces in Afghanistan thus: "The defence of Pakistan lay in the defence ofAfghanistan. We should install a favorable government in Kabul". Strategy: "Usefriendly Pushtun tribes. At the same time, Pakistan should use this golden opportunityto occupy positions on the Durand Lines". He further adds:" Pakistan must be defendedby sitting in Afghanistan. We would do whatever we could to arrange a friendlygovernment headed by pro-Pakistan elements in Afghanistan".

Although we aspired to wear the mantle of the British in the region, we were unawareof the country in which we were going to embroil ourselves. About the meeting of thehigh command where Afghanistan was discussed, Chishti himself writes: One thingbecame very clear during the meeting. We knew nothing in depth about our neighborAfghanistan, although we claimed a centuries old relationship both historical andreligious. Our knowledge was superficial and wrong. Such was the leadership whichwas going to install its men in Kabul.

Weapons

After plans had been finalized with Brezezinski, Reagan's National Security Adviser, inFebruary 1980, to receive weapons for Afghan refugees. Lt. Gen. Akhtar AbdulRehmañ, DG ISI, came to Chishti's office and asked him a favour. Chishti writes: "Hewanted a little area in the Regiment at Ojhri Camp, for the dumping and storage ofsome arms and ammunition to be placed at his disposal for some clandestineoperations. I refused. There were no underground storage facilities in that area. It was


insane to have explosives in the open there because proper 'igloos' did not exist, and theOjhri Camp was too close to Islamabad Airport, the highway and civilian housing I alsotold him I was not a party to Brezezinski, and was not going to be party to the ISIeither". The Ojhri Camp became available to the ISI on Chishti's retirement a monthlater.

"The risk of storing explosives and ammunition at Ojhri camp was revealed to everyonein April 1988 where huge explosions deviated a wide area and killed a thousandpeople", writes Chishti.

About the last days of Zia in the chapter Who Killed Zia?, Chishti writes: "He (Zia) wasalways worried about his life, and would not even sleep at night. He preferred to go tosleep after his morning prayers. He would not trust anybody with safety and securityarrangements". At another place Chishti says: "Gen Zia's mission was dignified withmany high sounding descriptions, but in reality his mission was to save his own life,which necessarily involved his staying in power until death".

Speculating on who killed Zia, who had made innumerable enemies, Chishti clinchesthe issue. He writes:. "Whatever device was used to disrupt the controls of the Herculescould not have been used without the active cooperation of one or more members of thearmed forces (His own constituency). They may be people who had suffered at hishands because of intellectually dishonest decisions taken by him on promotions,appointments and retirements in civil services, armed forces, judiciary and otherservices or relatives of those whose mercy petitions had been rejected and speciallythose whom he had promised (Bhutto's murder trial co-accused) that nothing wouldhappen, as well as relatives of those who were shot by government agencies on hisorders and policies.

Chishti speaks derogatively about, a large number of his military colleagues. Most ofthem are alive. That they have not reacted can only lend substance to his assessmentsand charges.


ANNEXURE "E"Appendix '9'

ANOTHER POINT OF VIEW(Dawn 28 September 1990)

BETRAYALS OF ANOTHER KIND by Lt. Gen Faiz Ali Chishti (Rtd) published by PCLPublishing House Rawalpindi, 1990. Pp 290. Rs 300.

The traumatic events of 1977 and the following years which have landed Pakistan in theworst political, economic and, above all, survival crises of its existence have been thesubject of casual study by many writers. They have mainly sought to derive politicaladvantage from their writing.

Betrayals of Another Kind is another kind of writing. It is an account of what happenedin those crucial years by a person who had been privy to the unfolding drama for sometime. Later he was one of the main actors shaping the events Lt Gen (Retd) Faiz AliChishti was the corps commander of Rawalpindi in 1977 and in thatcapacity he was deeply involved in the goings-on at the GHQ.

The book is an attempt to prove that the Army was sucked into the national crisisagainst its will and that it had no ambition to seize power. The book deals in quite somedetails with Bhutto's failings such as the prolonged negotiations with the PNA duringthe critical four months of 1977 the rigging of elections and the excesses committedagainst political opponents.

But these are facts which have already been widely publicized. What is more interestingis the account of events which have so far been shrouded in speculation. Thus Betrayalsof Another Kind throws light on some hazy aspects of Bhutto's murder trial andattempts to clear the author of the charges of having been involved at any stage in thetrial or in Bhutto's execution.

Zia s character has proved to be controversial. For some people he was pious honestpolite and the embodiment of traditional values in personal behavior. For others he wasthe opposite. During his regime the heroin and Kalashnikov culture took birth andprospered. The author of Betrayals of Another Kind projects a highly negative image ofhis chief.


He gives details of the events that took place from January 7, 1977 when Bhuttoannounced the general election up to July 5 when the Army took over. He speaks ingreat detail about the activities of the Election Cell which he was heading. There is aconscious attempt to exonerate the Army high command from the charge of conspiringto take over power until according to the author, the situation seemed to be getting outof control when Bhutto decided to bring his supporters out on the streets in the firstweek of July.

However, Gen Zia had, disclosed on July 14, 1977 in Rawalpindi that the takeover wasconsidered as early as March 10. Chishti writes, quoting Zia: "On March 10, 1977 thePNA boycotted provincial elections. So we had a senior officers' meeting in Rawalpindiand examined all angles. One of the plans considered was a takeover. All the officersagreed that we should avoid a takeover until forced to as a last resort."

One fails to understand how even consideration of a takeover could be justified as earlyas March 10 when the PNA agitation had not yet started. The first protest took place onMarch 15. This fact gives some substance to suspicions that at least some elements in theArmy were in league with some elements in the PNA who were preventing anagreement Mufti Mehmood Prof Ghafoor and some other leaders are on record aboutthe intransigent attitude of their colleagues.

Much has been written on how Gen Zia was selected to be COAS against the advice ofthe incumbent COAS superseding seven Lieutenants General. Chishti writes Zia wasmade COAS because at Sadiq Husain Qureshi s residence in Multan he had taken onoath on the Quran that he would be loyal to Bhutto.

A number of rumors circulating during the early martial law days are confirmed by theauthor. Some of these are: "The veteran Sindhi politician Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi hadagreed to become Prime Minister of the interim government in February 1980. I madehim meet Zia in February and everything seemed resolved. Then I was sent off toCanada, on what turned out a fool's errand, and on my return everything had changed.Zia was completely in the clutches of the fundamentalists and other selfish andunprincipled advisors.

Bhutto's trial understandably receives extensive treatment. According to the author, thefour co-accused of Bhutto had been promised amnesty. He (Chishti) came to knowabout the assurances in July 1978 when Irshad Qureshi, advocate, met him. In Chishti'spresence Gen Ihsan (a confidant of Zia) told the lawyer that since Gen Zia had alreadygiven an assurance to the prosecution that nothing would happen to any of the co-accused, they should not worry. Contrary to this pledge which was also known to GenIqbal, A. K. Brohi, Barrister Anwar and Gen Arif, the accused were hanged.


Chishti is critical of the corruption and the lack of accountability, which crept into theadministration.

Revelations that make interesting reading are about the US embassy blaze, theCanadian connection (Dr. Saad Gabr), Joan Herring's appointment as Honorary Consul,behavior of important PNA and PPP leaders, and the Army's perception of the Afghancrisis in the early days.

The image that Chishti projects of himself as an efficient army, officer, with the capacityof crisis management, patriotism, ardor for democracy, incorruptibility andoutspokenness can be commented upon only by those who know the Generalpersonally or have worked with him.

Rumors in the early martial law days depicted him as the strongman of the junta and apossible rival to Zia. From his own book, he comes out absolutely clean in the company,generally, of sycophants and small characters. Many of the actors, painted in black, arestill alive. It remains to be seen whether and when, they react to the narration of eventsin Betrayals of Another Kind.

GHAYURUL ISLAM


ANNEXURE "E"Appendix 10

CHICANERY AND HORSE TRADING(The Hindu, 8 November 1990)

BETRAYALS OF ANOTHER KIND Islam Democracy and the Army in Pakistan by LtGeneral Faiz Ali Chishti (Retd.) Tricolour Books, 9662b Islam Ganj, Azad Market, Delhi6 Price not stated.

Here is a book on the rise (and fall) of General Zia written by his right hand henchmanLt General Chishti who was called Murshid (guru) by Zia at the time of his accession topower. Gen Chishti s role in the military regime of Zia did not last more than a year orso after which he resigned in protest against Zia continuing his rule without conductingthe elections promised in 90 days. This book is a justification of Gen Chishti's rolel inbringing about the military rule and a condemnation of Zia's regime after he resigned.From the text and even the illustrations there is no doubt the author thinks no end ofhimself an opinion which the reader does not have to share. It must be added that theauthor hails from the Punjab which rules the roost in Pakistan no matter, who is inpower in Rawalpindi.

The book was first published in 1989 by Asia Publishing House London (this Indianedition being apparently published to carry the message to the Indian readershiplanguishing under doses of democracy) and contains an interesting introduction byAnthony Hyman. He poses a very valid question. Why did Pakistan have its firstexperience of military rule within a decade of independence while in the neighboringIndia where there is a large, well disciplined professional force, the tradition of civildominance over the military has been accepted. No answer is given.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto gave Pakistan its first constitution which should have rightly, beenon the Statute Book soon after the formation of Pakistan in 1947 when a ConstituentAssembly, similar to the Indian had been setup. He also held the first elections in thecountry which made him Prime Minister. So much of chicanery double dealing andhorse trading went on that he found himself at loggerheads with the general populaceand the opposition parties and he had to depend on the army and martial law to keephimself in power.

Soon the Army under Zia took over. By sheer force of habit the Pak army took topolitical power like duck to water. Lt General Chishti helped in the process as thetheoretician who was convinced there was no other alternative. In this book be says hesoon parted company with Gen Zia who wanted to cling on to power at all costs. Zia


was a secretive man who could manipulate his army officers and their loyalties bysuitably proffered patronage and threats. As for public pronouncements it was a wellknown joke in Rawalpindi to say that CMLA short for Chief Martial Law Administratormeant Cancel My Last Announcement. Chishti parted company from his Shagrid orChela within a year. This book explains the hows and the whys.

The main theme of Gen Chishti is that there should be accountability in the politicaladministration of the country and every politician should stand or fall by this test. As towho should hold this test of accountability he thinks that officers of probity, like himselfshould judge for themselves through tribunals. He does stretch a point and say thateven military officers are accountable in so far as they are doing a political job as in thecase of Zia himself.

It is obvious that the author s blind spot is the army que army. He is convinced that thePakistan Army is really "Pak" pure as driven snow, steadfast in their attitudes andloyalties to their officers under any circumstances. This obedience and loyalty do notembrace politicians or even elected representatives if they are said to be bad for theircountry by their Supreme in Command. Over the years successive military regimesranging literally, from A to Z (Ayub Khan to Zia) have been lording it over in PakistanMainly the Army be it noted.

The other two wings of the fighting forces have their own grouse as being discriminatedagainst in the matter of distribution of spoils. That this kind of thing is still taking placeis clear from recent events when an elected Prime Minister is dismissed on the dayprevious to her facing a no confidence motion in Parliament. In this instance action istaken by the President but it is clear who pulls the strings. And one presumes the circuswill go on according to a pre orchestrated programme.

The book contains a more or less detailed account of how Bhutto was first protected byGen Chishti against the public and later jailed and put on trial and ultimately hanged.But there is nothing new that we have not learnt from other sources. It is significant thatGen Chishti considered it safe to publish this book only after Gen Zia was well andtruly dead beyond recall and resurrection.

Coming from the Military Secretary (and later officer in charge of the Election Cell foran Election that never took place) during the last days of the Bhutto regime and thetakeover by Gen Zia this book is of some historical interest. Apart from the author'sjustification of the role he played during these times there is nothing to recommend thislook to any serious student of current events.

V Abdulla



CHISHTI'S VERSION OF ZIA'S MARTIAL LAW

In his candidly written book Betrayals of Another Kind, Lieut General Faiz Ali Chishtihas revealed certain dark spots long hidden from the public view by vested interestswho never wanted a just process of accountability to be initiated in the civil andmilitary echelons even after the trauma of surrender in East Pakistan in December 1971.

Says Lt Gen (Retd) Chishti on page 119 of his book (published by Asia PublishingHouse London 1989) that the Hamoodur Rehman Commission constituted in 1972 toenquire into the causes of the surrender, had inter Alia recommended that Yahya Khanthe then President of Pakistan General Abdul Hamid Khan (Chief of Army), Lt Gen S GM Pirzada, Lt Gen Gul Hassan, Maj Gen Umar and Mai Gen Mitha should be tried inpublic on charges of conspiring to usurp power from Field Marshal Ayub Khan andrigging the 1970 elections.

These officers should also be tried for criminal neglect of duty in the conduct of war,both in West Pakistan and East Pakistan....

Lt Gen A. A. K Niazi, Maj Gen Mohammad Jamshed, Maj Gen M Rahim Khan, Brig GM Baqir Siddiqui, Brig Mohammad Hayat, Brig Mohammad Aslam Niazi all be court-martialled. (All these officers served in East Pakistan during the better part of 1971 andsurrendered to India in December).

Who is General Chishti and what were his compulsions to present his version of theevents leading to the imposition of Martial Law in 1979 ? Chishti happened to be thePrincipal Staff Officer in the GHQ under General Tikka Khan then Chief of Army Staff,dealing with postings promotions retirement of the Army's officers cadre. Theappointment is designated as Military Secretary (MS) not be confused with the protocolrelated functions of M.S. to the President, Prime Ministers, Governors etc etc. DisclosesChishti (page 25/26) that one day Tikka Khan called him to send a recommendatoryletter to the Prime Minister, Z. A. Bhutto, for the next Chief of Staff, as General TikkaKhan had refused Bhutto's offer for an extension of one year. Reveals Chishti there wereseven Lieutenant Generals under consideration for the appointment of Chief of ArmyStaff. In order of seniority they were Mohammad Shariff, Aftab Ahmed Awan,Muhammad Akbar Khan, Azmat Bakksh Awan, Malik Abdul Majid, Ghulam JilaniKhan and Mohammad Zia ul Haq. Gen Tikka Khan recommended that Lt GeneralMohammad Akbar Khan be promoted and appointed Chief of the Army Staff. If thatwas not approved then Lt Gen Mohammad Sharif was the second choice. Lt Gen Aftab


and Lt Gen Azmat were not recommended for the post on grounds of ability and LtGen Majid and Lt Gen Zia were not considered for the appointment because they hadjust been promoted and had not acquired the requisite experience desirable for it. LtGen Jilani was unqualified as he had no command experience and was not to beconsidered at all.

Be that as it may, the man from nowhere as Chishti calls Zia ul Haq in his booksucceeded Tikka Khan. Four Lieut Generals senior to Zia ul Haq Aftab, Akbar, AzmatMajid resigned and Chishti a senior Major General found himself promoted andcommanding a corps with HQ based at Rawalpindi. This was the military line-up whenBhutto ordered polls in 1977.

The elections in Pakistan and post election country wide agitation launched by the PNAwere being closely monitored by the world media in general and generals of thePakistan Army in particular. Chishti gives us an independent account from an articlepublished by the Financial Times, London, on 15 April, 1977 on the postelection crisis inPakistan.

"Mr Bhutto has not looked as vulnerable as he does today during the five years since hetook office. Instead of having received the popular mandate which he confidentlyexpected from last month's general election for his second term of office, he faces anation-wide campaign of violence on the streets and civil disobedience that, at the least,is likely to render Government ineffective and at the worst threatens a return to MartialLaw".

And Martial Law it was, as Army perceived it, to save the country's integrity to stopbloodshed and, what was perhaps the most serious aspect of all, to control thecommand crisis within the, Army when three brigadiers commanding brigadesdeployed on internal security duties in Lahore refused in, rapid succession the highercommand's order to use force against the unarmed civilians - men, women andchildren, old and young. General Chishti's account of those fateful days and hismarshalling of facts (page 65) cannot be lightly brushed aside. Chishti's narrative:

It has been alleged by some that even before the elections. the Army, officerswere plotting to overthrow Mr. Bhutto. This is completely untrue. The Armysupported Mr. Bhutto unconditionally from March 7 to July 5, 1977......

Initially nobody was in favor of a take-over, but as time passed, contingencyplans for a takeover had to be made. They were not launched till the Army gotsucked in and was really left with no other option.....

The mass agitation had reached a stage when the Army had to decide whether itshould continue to be a barrier against the masses and get destroyed in the


clashes or to remove Mr. Bhutto. Mr. Bhutto' had been warned many times not tolet the Army be destroyed.......

But there was something more serious and sinister than blood in the streets - wheel jamstrike, bringing the life to a standstill from Wagah to Keamari, refusal of Army officersto order their troops to shoot their countrymen On page 69 of his book Chishti hasgiven us this blood chilling account of one particular Cabinet meeting proceedings.

In the last days of June Mr. Bhutto started calling Generals to Cabinet meeting.sOne night Khar and Pirzada said: The Opposition is not stopping its mischief.We will kill all of them Gen Tikka Khan's tone was even harsher. He said if ten totwenty thousand are killed for Pakistan it does not matter Mr. Bhutto said: Seethe mood of my ministers? What can I do except be with them?' So General Ziatakes the fateful decision in the last week of June 1977, to remove Bhutto'sGovernment. Chishti quotes Zia: I decided that Mr. Bhutto's Government shouldbe finished. Operation Fairplay was planned in my house. It was decided that thedate and time of the operation fairplay would be fixed by the COAS. We kept itto ourselves and even the CGS (Major General Abdullah Malik) was not told ....(page 69)

So, Lieut General Faiz Ali Chishti, Rawalpindi based corps commander and known forhis professionalism, hard work and strict disciplined found himself, withoutvolunteering given the responsibility of implementing Operation Fairplay - euphemismfor the Army coup d'état on the fateful night of 4/5 July 1977, which was carried outwith drill-square perfection and without any bloodshed or damage to property.

Chishti fully supports the imposition of Martial Law in July 1977 as he feared that thebreakdown of command discipline in the army. combined with the threat of Bhutto'scolleagues to kill thousands of citizens, would have triggered a tragic chain of events,inviting Indian aggression and forcing Pakistan to become part of confederated India.But he does not justify the prolongation of the Martial Law, and strongly feels thatelections, as promised (twice) by General Zia should have been held. Chishti alsoblames political leaders for the perpetuation of the military regime, as they demandaccountability first. The net result was that Gen Zia who rose to supreme temporalpower by operation Fairplay and ruled for eleven years without either restoringdemocracy or subjecting the society to an evenhanded judicious accountability, died avictim of Operation Foulplay hints Chishti in Chapter 11.

After the imposition of Martial Law, the Zia Chishti power equation workedsatisfactorily for some time but with the passage of time the king and the reluctant kingmaker developed grave differences of opinion on important policy matters. Chishtireasons:


The main drawback in a Martial Law Government is that there is no organizedopposition (Only individual's views like mine can be there. So a single personformulated foreign policy. He did so to retain his chair and benefits, and not forthe well-being of the country. Gen Zia did not respect public opinion he wantedto leave his affairs to God and be accountable only to Him. page 202)

Gen Chishti in this writer's view had three main aims for writing the book first to putthe record straight as to how he became responsible for executing the coup, second topresent cast-iron proof that he was on inspection tour of the Northern Areas whenBhutto was hanged third to distance himself from Gen Zia's eleven years rule.

What Gen Chishti and others of his class have not understood is that when you come byfire and sword, you stay in power, till removed or moved out or eliminated by fire andsword. There is no such thing as short-term Martial Law? This is the lesson of history.The alternative to the breakdown of civil administration as a result of rampantcorruption administrative efficiency, executive coercion is not the substitution of theconstitutionally elected government by a military junta through a coup. The remedy liesin asking for a fresh mandate from the people. This is what Gen Zia and his colleaguesshould have resorted to in 1977. They did after all retain the institution of Presidencyunder President, Chaudhry Fazal Elahi after the coup, for some time. What factorsstopped them from restoring democracy as repeated promised. The answer to the riddleis provided partly by Chishti in his book. Amos Perimutler pertinently remarks in hisbook of essays, Political Roles and Military Rulers: The military interventionists are on thewhole not "progressive" ... they are not revolutionary and are at best reluctant reformers... They are certainly a ruling class not a revolutionary or progressive social class.

Col (Retd) Syed Ghaffar MehdiNation Daily - Friday 7 December 1990



BETRAYALS OF ANOTHER KIND(An Indian Bookworm's Journal Summer 1991)

This is a fascinating book written, by as the publisher's blurb claims an insider a generalwho was very close to the seat of power after the army took over the reins of power inPakistan in July 1977. Fascinating because it vividly reveals the malaise that afflictstoday's Pakistan her politicians and soldiers alike.

We are told that the democratically elected people's Prime Minister, the late Mr. Z. A.Bhutto had no compunction conniving with the army (under Gen Yahya Khan) inplanning to kill a quarter of a million Bengalis in order to retain power in WestPakistam hands. We are told that the late Gen Zia-ul-Huq, who successfully played thering to all the politics in his country, and conned the West into believing that he wastheir bulwark against the Soviet expansionism was a crank who had a particular fad forbuilding new toilets wherever he had an office. We are also told that while Zia wasplaying havoc with the army's credibility by continuously postponing the longpromised free and fair elections all his army colleagues Generals Colonels Brigadiers,Corps Commanders and regional MLAs were such subservient spineless idiots thatthey never raised a dissenting voice or made any attempt to dethrone him.

Basically the whole narrative of this book reads like an election manifesto creating thefeeling that the author is desirous of getting back politically, in the saddle and isdesperate to establish his innocence in whatever wrongdoing the Zia regime has beenor can be accused of Trouble is it is difficult to make out whether he is writing anautobiography, a history of his time, an expose (of the army establishment) ordelivering a gratuitous sermon in patriotism to his countrymen.

Another flavor permeates from this book. The author betrays his own sense ofsuperiority - an intellectual snobbery over his peers He frequently spills out hisbitterness at not being crowned the king in waiting i.e. deputy CMLA, or COAS or VicePresident, or whatever.

What is most striking is this General's naivete about the power game. His moral outrageat the antics of the late Zia ul Huq does not arouse any sympatric chords in the hearts ofthose who know that the brave (and wiley) will inherit the earth. Intellectuals will beleft to fume and to be cast aside.

Who was it who said - Morality is either lack of courage, or lack of opportunity, or lackof appetite. After reading Lt Gen Chishti s account and of what we have heard of his


failed attempts at outsmarting the late Gen Zia, we do not know what was lacking inthe author's personality. The fact remains, he never made it to the throne of CMLA orCOAS and he is bitter about it.

The book though published in the UK, was printed in India. Hence, perhaps, the mapon end-papers showing Jammu and Kashmir as if it were a sovereign country and not adisputed territory between India and Pakistan.

Khwabi FaisalabadiPage 10: An Indian Bookworms Journal Summer 1991

The Institute of India Studies45 Museum Street, London WC1A 1 LR

betrayals of another kind - sanipanhwar.com of another kind.pdf · m a jinnah, the pakistani nation...

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