beyond abu sayyaf 2002
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Beyond the Abu Sayyaf: The Lessons of Failure in the PhilippinesAuthor(s): Steven RogersSource: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2004), pp. 15-20Published by: Council on Foreign RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20033825
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Beyond the Abu Sayyaf
The
Lessons of Failure
in thePhilippines
Steven
Rogers
On October
i8,2003,
President
eorge
W.
Bush stood before thePhilippineCon
gress and declaredthat thePhilippines
and the
United
States
are bound
by the
strongest ies that two
nationscan share.
The statement as not just the sortof
rhetorical
lourish
hatoften dominatesa
U.S. leader's ddress o a former
olony.
The
long-simmering uslim separatist
rebellion n the southern
Philippines
has
been identified
as a
critical
battle
in
thewar
on
terror,
nd the
Philippinegovernment
has become a key U.S. ally as a result.
In
January 002,6ooU.S. soldiers ere
sent to
supportPhilippine
forces
ighting
theAbu Sayyaf,a loosely rganized ang
of
Islamist
anditsentrenched n the
southern
hilippine
slands f
Basilan
and
Jolo. The operation was a failure: a year
afterthe
deployment, .S.
forceshad
withdrawn
with
theirenemy still
in
place
and the
Philippinegovernment uffering
froma damagingscandal.Since then,
the focusof U.S. assistance as
changed:
military and developmentaid to the
Philippines
has soared owell more
than
$100
million a
year,
andPresidentBush
hasurgedthePhilippineCongress to
increase
ts
own
military appropriations
tomeet the separatistMuslim threat.
The
need for action
is
real.
The chaos
andcriminality
own
by
theAbu
Sayyaf
and theMoro IslamicLiberation
ront
(MILF)
ave createdan
environment
ripe
for
exploitationby
international
terrorists,
nd
Philippinegovernment
attempts
to address he situationhave
been ineffective.
But
Washington's
flawed
understanding
f the
problem
has hamstrung hemission and lowered
its chancesof success.Policymakers
treat
the
conflict as a case of a violent
Muslim population terrorizing ts
Christian
neighbors
under the influence
of radical slamist
agitators.They
em
phasize reports
of al
Qaeda support
and
thepresenceof operativesfromthe
SoutheastAsian
Jemaah Islamiyah
network.
They
have
failed
to
recognize,
however,
hat terrorists id not create
the conflict in the
southern
Philippines
and do not control
any
of the combatants.
The troubles
re rooted in
specific
ocal
issues
that
predate
the
war on terror
by
centuries,
and neither
soldiersnor
money will endMindanao'swar.
STEVEN ROGERS is a journalist based in the
Philippines.
[15]
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Steven
Rogers
MINDANAO'S WAR
Conflicthasplagued the southern slands
of thePhilippines ince1566, hen Spanish
forces, resh romcenturies fwar against
Muslims
in
theirhomeland, ound their
traditional nemies
in
theirnew colony.
Muslim
ferocity
nd
Spanishtorpor
om
bined
to
leaveMindanao
unconquered,
but the reflexive
panishhostility
toward
Muslims was passed
on to
Christian
Filipinos, andMuslims respondednkind.
American forces finallysubdued the
Muslim
chieftains n theearly wentieth
century ut ruledMindanao as an entity
separate
romthe rest
of thePhilippines.
The dividedpopulations ere joinedonly
with
Philippine independence
n
1946.
Ethnic
tensions
plagued
thisunion
fromthe start.Separatist entiment lared
intoconflict
in
1970,afteryears
of
gov
ernment-sponsored
hristian
migration
into
Muslim
regions,
nd
Libyastepped
n
to
support
the
Muslims, serving
as
midwife to theMoro NationalLiberation
Front
(MNLF).
s fightingground
to a
bloody stalemate,
uslim
leaders
rged
Philippinepresident
erdinand arcos to
negotiate
withMuslim rebels.
ependent
on oil
imported
rom
Muslim
countries,
Marcos complied,and apeaceagreement
was concluded n
1976.
With the
truce
signed,
Marcos left
controlofMindanao to
his
subordinates,
who looked
after
their
own interests.
Military
forces
n the
areawere
virtually
abandoned.Soldierswent
into
business,
by
themselves
or
with local
political
overlords.
Former rebels
took
to
crime,
often receivingofficialprotection in
return
for a cut
of the
profits.
Manila's
influence verMindanao
dwindled,
and
the
style
of
governance
embraced
by
the
region's eudal lordsquickly inspireda
new roundof rebellion.
In 1978,disgruntledMNLF embers
under the
leadership
f
aCairo-educated
clericnamedHashim Salamat ormed he
MILF.
alamat's trongreligious dentity
and
non-negotiable oalof an independent
Islamic
tateprovedmore
compelling han
the
MNLF s
Libyan-influenced
ocialism.
The
MILF
uickly
grew
to include ome
12,000
armed
men--concentratedmostly
onMindanao-and claimedthemantle
ofMuslim
resistance. ince
then,despite
twodecades fwarfare
and
negotiation,
government orces avebeenunable
to
es
tablish
asting
ontrol verMILF
erritory.
In
1990,
contactbetween a
young
militant named
AbdurajakJanjalani
and
Osama bin
Laden's
brother-in-law
Mohammed
al-Khalifa
ed to
the
found
ingof anotherMuslim
separatist roup,
the
Abu
Sayyaf,
hich
quickly
ntrenched
itself on the islands of Basilan and
Jolo,
west ofMindanao. The new
group pro
claimed a radical Islamist
ideology
and
gainedearlynotoriety
ith
grenade
ttacks
on Christian
argets.
efore
long,however,
it had diverted
its
energy
to
ransom
driven
kidnapping.
oon,
membersof
the criminal
nderground
ad
emerged
inkey leadershippositions, and the
group's
slamic
dentity
was subordinated
to the
quest
for
profit.
After
Janjalani's
death
in
1998,
theAbu
Sayyaf
deteriorated
into
a loose federation f bandit chiefs
bound
mainly by
convenience.
Despite
the Islamist oundations f
both the
Abu
Sayyaf
and the
MILF,
the
extent
of their inks
to
global
terrorisms
debatable. MILF fighters have trained in
Pakistan and with the Taliban and
have
had
contact
with members
of
al
Qaeda
and
Jemaah Islamiyah.
There
is
no
evidence,
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Beyond
theAbuSayyaf
however,
that
the MILF
is
directed
by
outside powers, and
its
limited
arsenal
corroborateshisindependence.tsnew
chief,
Al-Haj Murad,
who took
over
after
Salamat's
death earlier
this
year,
is
not
considereda religious
extremist.
The
Abu Sayyaf
similarly
shows no
sign
of significant
utside
support,despite
having
initially
received aid and
military
training rom
foreign
errorists.
Widely
circulated
rumors
of Iraqi
funding spring
froma
single,unreliable
source.)
The
group's
ost
importantutside
onnections
are
not terrorists at all;
they
are
police,
military,
and
government
officials,
who
sell
firepower
and
immunity
to
the
brig
ands for
a
share of the
spoils.
COLLISION COURSE
In
March
2000,
the
Abu Sayyaf
took
51hostages
on
Basilan.
A
month later
they
kidnapped 30 more,
of varied
nationalities,
from
a
Malaysian resort.The
tactic
proved
lucrative:heyexchanged ostages or large
ransom
ayments,
ncluding
$25
million
from the
Libyan government.
As
cash
flooded he
impoverishedslands,
men
flocked
to the
group, attracted less by
ideology
than
by
the
promise of
large
guns
and
fast boats.
In
May
2001,
an
Abu
Sayyaf group seized several Filipinos
and two
American missionaries
in an
other
resort raid, setting
the group on a
collision course
with
Washington.
In the
first
months of this
minor
cri
sis,
the
Bush
administration viewed the
hostages
as victims
of crime.
There
was
no
talk
of
terrorism
and
little enthusiasm
for
military action,
or
even
for
restoring
much military aid to the Philippines.
After
September i1, however, theUnited
States
rapidly
reversed
its
position. Manila
was
suddenly reclassified
as a
staunch ally
in the war
on
terror,
and
Washington
rediscovered
he
tiesbetween
Mindanao
and jihad.The Abu Sayyafwas tagged a
terrorist
rganization,
nd in
January
2002,
6oo
U.S.
soldiers
joined 4,000
Filipino troops
n
Basilan.
Philippine
aws
restrict
oreign roops
o training
oles,
but
the
Americans,
thoughdesignated
as
trainers,
nteredhostile
territory ith
explicit
authorization o
fire
f
attacked.
Critics
immediately isputed
Wash
ington's
claim that the
Abu
Sayyaf
was
a
terrorist
rganization,
ather
han
a
crim
inal
syndicate.
hey argued
hat
theMILF
posed a far
greater
danger and that
the
size of the
operation
against
the
Abu
Sayyaf
as
disproportionate
o
the
threat.
Many
Filipinos
suggested
that
the
exer
cise was
intended to
secure
a
U.S. base
in
Mindanao or
prepare
for
a
later
move
against
the MILF and the
communist
New People'sArmy.
Although
U.S.
soldiers
ained
local
approval
y
building
oads
nd
bridges,
he
military
outcome
was
ambiguous
at
best.
The
American
hostages
turned
p else
where, discovered
by Filipino
troops
unconnected o the
operation;
heir
aptors
had
apparently lipped
through
a
U.S.
Navy
cordon. One
hostage
was killed
during the rescue.The operafion halted the
Abu
Sayyaf's
dramatic
expansion,
but
most
of the
group's
leaders and
troops escaped.
In
February2003,
American
and
Filipino officials
announced
nother,
larger
exercise
directed
at theAbu
Sayyaf
presenceon
Jolo.As
forces
prepared or
the
operation,
an
unnamed
Pentagon
spokesman
eclared,
This
is
an
actual
combinedoperation,and it isU.S. forces
accompanying
nd
actively articipating
in
Philippine-led
offensive
operations.
The next
day,
White
House
spokesman
F
O
R E I
G
N
A F FA
I R
S
January
/February
2004
[17]
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Steven
Rogers
Ari Fleischeradded, The
Armed Forces
of the
Philippineswill conduct
operations
supported by U.S. troops against theAbu
Sayyaf group.
The Armed Forces of the
Philippines has the
lead, and U.S. forces
will assist them.
In the
Philippines,
this
was
interpreted
as
a
declaration that U.S.
troops would be
illegally deployed
in
a
combatrole.The
subsequent utcry
forced he
cancellation f
the exercise.
Days
later,
a
bomb
exploded outside
an
airport
in
the
primarily Christian
city
of
Davao.
The next month, another
explosion
hit
a
crowded
Davao wharf,
and
just
before
Philippine President
Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo
left for a
visit
to
Washington
in
May
a
blast
in
the
Christian
town of
Koronadal
raised the
combined
toll
to
50
dead and
zoo
wounded.
Arroyo
has
blamed the
recent
bombings
on
the
MILF,
without
citing any
convincing
evidence. heMILF,hichhadnotprevi
ously designed attacks
to
maximize
civilian
casualties,
as
denied
nvolvement.
Arroyo
returned rom
Washington
with a
substantial
aid
package,
but the
MILF
has not been
added
to
Washington's
list
of
terrorist
organizations,
despite
suggestions
from
Manila officials that
the
designation
was
inevitable.
Negotiations
brokered byMalaysia and encouraged by
the
United States
are in
progress.
The
focus of turmoil has sincemoved to
Manila,
underscoring
he connection
between
Mindanao's conflict and
the
fragile
state
of
Philippine
democracy.
In
July,
convicted
Indonesian
terrorist
Fathur Rohman
al-Ghozi and
two
Abu
Sayyaf
members
walked
out
of Manila's national
police
headquarters. The escape,which clearly
had inside
help, provoked
outrage
in
American
andAustralian
ounterterrorism
circles and
severely
embarrassed
Arroyo.
Two
weeks later,
everal
hundred
soldiers
seized a
commercial
complex in a
1g-hourmutiny,accusing eniormilitary
officials of
selling
arms to the
rebels and
stagingthe
recent
bombings to
encour
age
American
support.Arroyo
called
the
rebellion
an
attempted
coup, but the
participants
claimed
that they
were only
trying o
publicize egitimate
rievances.
The
al-Ghozi
escape,
the
mutiny,
and
subsequent
attempts to
capitalize
on
allegations f corruption ithinArroyo's
family appear
to
be
coordinated
moves
aimedat
undermining he
Philippine
administration
nd
its
generally
pro-U.S.
policies.
Arroyo
is
running
n
the
2004
election, and
opposition
figures till
consider
her a
leading
ontender.
everal
other
candidates
are
prominent
allies of
Joseph
Estrada,
Arroyo's
spectacularly
inept
predecessor.
Estrada built his suc
cessful
campaign
around
quasi-populist
demagoguery, allying
iscontent
with
the
existing
political
order
without
offering
any
practical
alternative. His
administration
had
few definable
poli
cies
beyond
the
pursuit
f
self-interest,
and it
oversaw a
precipitous
decline in
political,
economic,
and
security ondi
tions,
particularly
on
Mindanao.
There
is no shortage of grounds on which to
criticize
Arroyo's
administration,
ut if
her
successor
adopts
the
Estrada
model,
the
consequences-for
Mindanao,
for
the
Philippines,
and
for
the
struggle
against
terrorism
in
Southeast Asia
will be severe.
TREATING
CAUSES,
NOT SYMPTOMS
The situation in the Philippines isnot an
international
crisis
demanding
immediate
intervention.
But if
it is
ignored
or
sub
jected
to
simplistic
short-term
solutions,
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it could
easilybecomeone.Discussions
of a constructive
U.S.
role
typically focus
onpromotingsecurity nddevelopment,
but this
approach
fails
to
recognize
a
simple
truth: he traditional rerogatives
of power
in
the
southern Philippines
are
fundamentallyncompatible
ith either.
A thin veneer of
democratic
institutions
covers
a
society that remains essentially
feudal,
onforming
ess to
democratic
ideals than to the
style
of the
datus, the
warrior-chiefs of old. Leadership is
personal
and
paternalistic and functions
largely
above the
law;
power
flows from
guns
and
money.
President Bush
has
lauded
Arroyo's
commitmentto
bringing
terrorists o
justice.His praise
is somewhat
ustified,
but
terrorism
and
banditry
cannot
really
be controlled
until the
members of the
political and military elite who
cooperate
with terrorists
and
turn
the
powers
of
the state
to
their
own ends are
brought
to
justice
aswell.
The
Philippine govern
ment
has
the
capacity
to do so-it
controls
the
money,
the
justice system,
and the
armed forces-but it
lacks
the will.
Manila's elites
seem
reluctant
to start a
trend that
might
eventually
result
in
restrictions n
their
own power.
Military action alone is not sufficient
as a
strategy.
There
is no
central terrorist
cell
or
evil
genius
in
Mindanao
to
provide
a
discrete
target
forAmerican
action. In
the
face of
overwhelming force
guerrillas
simply
disperse
and take
refuge;
if
one
leader
is
removed,
several
others
emerge.
Military
force
is
nonetheless
a
necessary
component
of
any solution,
because
security
is a prerequisite for progress in other
spheres
of
life.
Development
aid is neces
sary
aswell: Mindanao's
enduring poverty
is
an
effective incubator for
violence. Neither
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_
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S
'_
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Steven Rogers
militarynordevelopment
idwill succeed,
though, ntil the
problems f collusion
andcorruptionredecisively ddressed.
Washington
cannotrootout corruption
in
thePhilippines.The
Philippines'des
perate need for
U.S. aid, however, could
providean incentive
or reform. .S.
policymakers
ustmake clear, ccordingly,
that theUnited States
will
discontinue
aid
if
Manila does
not
take sustained, ag
gressive action against the abuse
of power.
Such demands might draw protest
from
Manila's
political elite, but,
if
presented
effectively,
hey
would
gain
considerable
sympathy among most
of the
population.
There
is a
growing
constituency
for
change
in
the
Philippines.
ublicdiscontent
s
high,
focused
on a
governing class that
has traditionallyunctioned bove
he law.
Issues that
for
decades
had
only
been
dis
cussed
in
private-such
as
cooperation
betweengovernmentfficials ndterrorist
leaders-have inally
ntered ublicdebate.
Such
discontent
is a
powerful
and
unhar
nessedforce.With
effective eadership,
t
could
bring
greatbenefits; xploited y
self-interested
emagogues,
t
could
do
great
damage.
Washington
cannot
lead
a
movement
to
reform the
Philippine
system
of
justice,
but
it
can
at
least
align
itself
with the right side.
ACTING
LOCALLY
Applying
the
simplistic
terms
of the
war
on terror
to
the
fight against
the
Philip
pines'
Islamic
extremists
obscures
the
enormous
complexity
of the
situation.
But continued
fighting
on
Mindanao
could
indeed
generate
the kind of chaos
that terrorists are apt to exploit, channel
ing
the
anger
and lawlessness
of
a cen
turies-old
ethnic
and
political
conflict
to
their
own
ends.
ForU.S.
policymakers,
herefore,
Mindanao is both an
object lesson and a
testcase.As open sponsors f terrorism
fall
topolitical
pressure r
military action,
the focusof
Washington's efforts
will
shift to terrorist
roupsoperating
ithin
countries
hat,
like
the
Philippines,
are
at
least
nominally riendly.
especting
the laws and
political processes of
foreign
governments,
ven
when seriously
lawed,
can
be frustrating.
he answer,
owever,
is
not to ignore
constraints but to
findways
of
operating
ffectively ithin
them.
The
conflict
in the
Philippinesdefies
the
moral
clarity
and
aggressive rhetoric
that the Bush
administration
has
favored
since
September 11, and
recognizing
that
is
the
key to progress. In
the end, only the
Philippine
government
an
bringpeace.
If
negotiations
are
unaccompanied
by
real
change
and
Mindanao
returns
to
the
status quo, as in past attempts to secure
an
end
to
violence,
the
rebellion will
surely
resume.
At
best,
the
United States
can
help suppress
the rebels
militarily
while
encouraging egotiations
and
boosting Manila's
political will
to
achieve
the
meaningful
reform
necessary
for
lasting peace.
Such
a
strategy
will not
assure
success,
but neither will
it
make
the conflict worse. Moreover, it is the
only course
available,
since the
conflict
in
the southern
Philippines
is not
some
nefarious
external
conspiracy
or a
clash
of civilizations but the internal
problem
of
an
allied
sovereign
state.0
[20]
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Volume83No.1