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Swaim, Eugene E.B.F. Skinner and Carl R. Rogers on Behavior andEducation.28 Jul 7248p.Oregon ASCD Curriculum Bulletin P.O. Box 421, Sales,Oregon 97308 ($2.00, payment,must accompany order)Oregon ASCD Curriculum Bulletiti-08 n324 Aug 1974

MF-$0.75 BC Not Available from EDRS. PLUS POSTAGEBehavior; Behavioral Objectives; Behavior Change;*Behavior Theories; *Conditioning; EducationalPhilosophy; *Educational Psychology; EducationalTheories; Humanistic Education; *Learning; OperantConditioning; Psychology; *Self Actualization; SelfConcept; Social BehaviorRogers (Carl); Skinner (B F)

ABSTRACTThe purpose of this study is to analyze the

relationship between the theories of B.F. Skinner and Carl R. Rogers.In sections 2 and 3, the author discusses the Skinnerian and Rogeriantheories by selecting and explicating key elements and delineatingthe general, comprehensive, theoretical position of each. Sections 4and 5 present each man's thoughts on education. Chapters 6 and 7infer some of the issues and problems if each theory were acceptedtotally and applied to a real social setting. Chapter 8 containsconclusions and implications of the study. The main conclusion isthat both Skinner's and Roger's models have their merits, but aneducator cannot value both of them equally without creating aninconsistency within his professional practice. A reasonable approachmight be to consider either set of theories only in selected andlimited educational situations. (Author/DE)

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B. F. Skinner and Carl R. Rogers on Behavior and Education

Prepwed by:Eugene E. Swaim

Graduate StudentUniversity of Oregon

Spode Menbore Marie Service

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e Associable be Superviakaad Conic dam DevelopmentE.O. Box 421alem, Oregon 97308

No. 32430111111

August 1974Price $2.00

FameCharles Gensler

Antedate MomJule CrumeCharline EdwardsChester FrisbieRose Marie ServiceHarold Stauffer

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Oregon ASCD Curriculum Bulletin, P.O. Box 421, Salem, OR 97308

B. F. SKINNER AND CARL R. ROGERS ONBEHAVIOR AND EDUCATION

by Eugene E. Swaim, Ph.D.

Copyrighted by the author on July28, 1972. Reproduced with his perndaslon.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

IntroductionPage

Skinner on Human Behavior 3Rogers on Human Behavior 9Sidnner on Educatkos 13Rogers on Education 22Skinner's Theory in Social Context 29Rogers' Theory in Social Context 35Implications for Education 39

BiblialiraPhY 43

INTRODUCTION

Rapid change in today's society, and subse-quently in today's schools. raises significant ques-tions for the educational theorist, the educator ofteachers. indeed. for all who are engaged in theprocess of education. What will the schools of thefuture be like? What will tomorrow's teachers need toknow that today's teachers do not? How will futureteachers work with students and with one another?How will instruction be defined and carried on? Howwill students do their work? What will be consideredappropriate "wok" for the student? What will be therole of teaching machines. computers. and othereducational technology?

An adequate educational theory must offer atleast temporarily satisfactory answers to two funda-mental questions: first. what part of our presentculture is truly worth transmitting to the nextgeneration. and second. what methods of teaching.carried on in what institutional organizations. will beeffective in transmitting these most precious parts ofour heritage? The essence of these two questionshave probably always been relevant to the efforts ofthose involved in the teaching-learning process.Today. in the American society. many youth feel thatthe traditional wisdom of our culture has beenshattered. Such youth are left with a kind of corrosive

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skepticism that tends to scorn ideological and utopian.approaches to education. One characteristic ofskepticism is a cancerous quality which seems toprohibit the skeptic from recognizing factors essen-tial to his own modes of knowing and behaving. Ifskepticism hi allowed an unlimited control of one'sperspective, learning becomes impossible.

An adalysis of the dynamics of the processusually labeled education reveal certain factors to beessential for human life. On the one hand is acultural framework, some basic elements of whichmust be handed on to individuals. Humans havealways lived in social groups: this fact mandates theprovision for some minimum of social stability. Untilpossibilities are developed. if indeed they can be.which permit human life without numerous. interper-sonal relationships, the cohesive qualities necessaryfor individual existence must depend upon culturalcontrols. The viability of such controls is maintainedlargely, if not completely, through socialization. Onthe other hand is the individual. experiencing hisidiosyncratic existence within the framework providedby his particular culture. The relationship betweensociety and individual is one of existential symbiosis.Neither can exist without the other. Intrinsic in thisrelationship is a paradoxical characteristic of mutualcontrol; the society and the individual each, to somedegree. control the development of the other. What isthe nature of such control of human behavior?

The present study of human behavioral controlfocuses upon two conflicting approaches. those of B.F. Skinner and Carl Rogers. These men participatedin a debate at the convention of the AmericanPsychological Association in the fall of 1956. Theissue that these psychologists (lc bated was the use ofscientific knowledge in molding or controlling humanbehavior. (Rogers and Skinner. 1956) Later. in asymposium forming a part of Rice University's semi-centennial celebration. again Skinner and Rogersargued contrasting views. (Wann. 1%4) Both encoun-ters demonstrated the opposing. and representative.

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positions held by Rogers anti Skinner in whatProfessor Morris Bigge calls "the two most promi-

nent families of contemporary learning theory."(Bigge. 1964:49)

In the debax Skinner and Rogers each empha-sized profound socio-political results that would ensuefrom the acceytance, or rejection. of his ownapproach to the problems of social control"desired" society if accepted. or dire social conse-quence if rejected.

Skinnerian **operant conditioning" rests squarelyin the behavioral tradition, a mechanistic approachwhich emphasizes the importance of stimuli fromexternal environment, and relies upon observablephysical movement. B. F. Skinner sees man as anorganic machine. (Skinner. 1953:46) In his attempt toreduce human psychology to physical terms, such

concepts as individual purpose. spontaniety. mean-ing. and even consciousness are excluded. Skinner'smethodology requires manipulating the environmentalstimuli on the individual in such fashion that it willreinforce movement toward a predetermined goal. ina novel. Walden Two (Skinner, 1948) he visualizes asociety in which people are controlled by a hierarchyof experts. The experts decide what is "good." andthey prescribe appropriat_s conditions of living andlearning.

Rogers, aligning himself specifically with Abra-ham Maslow (Warm. 1964:109). declares himself forthe Third Force Psychology (Goble. 1971), whichembraces elements variously labeled Phenomenology,Existential Psychology, and Gestalt-field theory. Sucha position emphasizes experience, insight andpersonal meaning. Carl Rogers says. "The assump-tion is that the subjective human being has animportance and a value which is basic: that no matterhow he may be labeled or evaluated he is a humanperson first of all and most ,leeply. He is not only amachine, not only a collection of stimulus-responsebonds. not an object, not a pawn." (Rogers, et. al.1967:2) The object of Rogers' method, which is non-directive and non-manipulative, is to permit eachindividual to develop himself along lines of self-selection. Rogers is convinced that. an open socialsituation, characterized by mutual trust and individ-ual growth, will result from his approach tointerpersonal relationships.

A distinctive orientation toward the control of

human action is central in the thought of eachpsychologist. Thus. the divergent psycho-philosoph-ical positions of Skinner and Rogers offer materialwith which one might approach a problem of currentsignificance. Within the general issues of cultural

transmission, a specific question concerns thenecessity of using greater and greater degrees ofcontrol. (Augenstein. 1969) Modern technologicaladvances have placed at man's disposal an increasingarray of agents capable of manipulating humanbeings. Through techno-psychological persuasion bypsycho-biological and pharmachological means as well

as by other technological means such as massconintunication. it is technically conceivable to createa sort of painless concentration camp of the mind forentire societies"artificial cultures." as it were.Both Skinner and Rogers acknowledge this technicalpotential Skinner advocates immediate and maximumuse of techno; . in behavioral control; Rogersstrongly denounce- scch action. The current possibil-ity of carrying eith. ! approach to an extreme is thefact which gives tu .e two approaches such signifi-

cance.The possibi:,.:, of the use of such techniques

thrusts into prominence social, ethical, and religiousquestions of the greatest importance. Every sciencesooner or later get", into areas where major questionsof value arise. Most scientists attempt to evade valuedeci".ions by assigning to themselves a purely instru-mental role, leaving the cultural use of theirdiscoveries to the decisions of others. Skinner andRogers' suggestions regarding educational issues are.however, evidence that, in one sense. neitherpyschologist is uncommitted in cultural matters;neither is neutral. The diametrical nature of theirsuggestions is, nevertheless, very confusing to theeducator. Their conflicting des-Aptions of man andhis behavior may lead the educator to question thecultural reality of both theories.

Not only professional educators, but most peopleof today, are disturbed and confused. They do notknow where to place their loyalties. Although theygive lip service to the concept of freeiom, asocialization process (which takes place in both formaland informal educational settings) has led many tobelieve that all things, including man's thinking andbehavior, are completely determined by forces overwhich men have no control. The behavioristi': orienta-tion in psychology deserves much of the ,:redit forinstilling this view. (Misiak and Sexton, 1966:425)

Much current opposition to it comes from aphenomenological orientation.

Possibly the conflict of these two psycho-philo-sophical orientation is actually a current manifestationof a struggle which has been going on for thousandsof years. The basic elements of man's nature, and ofhis potential for modes of action. have never beenagreed upon. The increasing intensity of today's

social problems leaves no doubt that it is essential foreducators, if not for all people. to see clearly thepossil*: Alternatives for social direction. The Skin -

nerian and Rogerian positions offer the educatordivergent directional emphases for the practice of hisprofession. These positions hold contrasting viewsconcerning the nature of man and different methodsof educating him. The adoption of one approach mayproduce a completely different kind of society fromthat which may be produced from adopting the otherapproach. In Walden Two (Skinner. 1948) Skinneradvocates a technically controlled society. ruled by"Managers." He states plainly his rejection of theWestern democratic tradition. (Skinner. 1953:9-10)Rogers repeatedly argues. from a humanistic perspec-tive. against such scientifically controlled utopianism.(Rogers. 1961:384-401; Rogers and Skinner. 1956:1057-1066)

Within an analysis of the Skinner-Rogersdichotomy. one must first delineate the boundarybetween the two theories. Of equal importance is thedelineation of the boundary between each theory andsocial reality. The obvious assumption is that anytheory. to some degree. is a reduction of reality. Onlyafter clearly drawing the above delineations is itpossible to consider the possibilities of a workingrelationship between the two theories. Such arelationship is controversial at present. T. W. Wannnames several scholars who think " coexistence" ispossible. (Wann. 1964:v) Is "coexistence" a validterm when considering diametrically opposing philo-sophical views? Snygg discusses the confusionresulting in an attempt to adhere to both positions.He says this attempt is analogous to "predicting aneclipse from a synthesis of Ptolemaic and Copernicanfacts. with the earth going around the sun while thesun went around the earth and both stood still."

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(Kuenzli. 1959:7) Yet. Rogers says. "There is a lotabout behaviorism that I accept. I was simply tryingto go beyond it." (Warm. 1964:157) "Coexistence" ofthese opposing psycho-phi!osophical positions seemsto be impossible unless a "complementary" relation-ship can be established. As previously stated. aneffort to study this relationship must consider theviews of both men on two levels. theoretical andpractical.

The method of research used in this study.pealing primarily with ideas. is exploratory in design.(Sellitz. et. al.. 1959:51) The writings of B. F. Skinnerand Carl Rogers are primary sources. Other sourcesin the behavioral and physical sciences contribute tothe process of analysis and elaboration. At the outset.the stated purpose of the study is to analyze therelationship between the Skinnerian and Rogerianpositions and thereby to strengthen one or the otherof two hypotheses: (a) The relationship is one ofantithesis: (b) The relationship is one of complement-tarity. In other words. is an educator, who iscommitted to one theory. precluded from using theother? Or. can an educator be committed to boththeories simultaneously as he practices his pro-fession?

Organization of the study will be accomplishedby dividing it into the following sections. In sectionstwo and three the Skinnerian and Rogerian theorieswill be analyzed by selecting and explicating keyelements and delineating the general. comprehensive.theoretical position of each. In sections four and fiveeach man's thoughts on education will be presented.In chapters six and seven attempts will be made toinfer sonic of the issues if each theory were acceptedtotally and applied to a real social setting. Theconcluding section will contain educational implica-tions of the study.

SKINNER ON HUMAN BEHAVIOR

In the fall of 1 071. an intensification of interestin B. F. Skinner and his work was experienced.especially in certain educational circles. The occasionof renewed interest was the publication of his bookBeyond Freedom and Dignity. (Skinner. 1971) Thetitle alone. not to mention the book's message. isdisturbing to people who favorably view thetraditional democratic values of American society.Skinner is. in this book. stating once again the samethesis he has held since the publication of WaldenTwo. (Skinner, 1948) Freedom and free will are no

more than illusions; whether man will admit it or nothe is controlled completely by external influences. Aconsideration of this fact permits only one reasonablecourse of action. A scientific study of behavior revealstechniques to use in designing a utopian society inwhich man can only behave in modes beneficial toboth himself and the society. Skinner claims to havemade such a scientific study of behavior, and hebelieves an absolutely predictable society can bedesigned. A Harvard professor. Skinner possessescredentials which guarantee him a large audience.

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A writer in Time maeazine says:

Skinner is the most influential of livingAmerican psychologists, and the most con-troversial contemporary figure in the scienceof human behavior. adored as a messiah andabhorred as a menace. As leader of the "be-havioristic" pyschologists, who liken man toa machine, Skinner isAigorously opposedboth by humanists and by Freudian psycho-analysts. (Time. September 20. 1971)

The term most associated with Skinner's brandof behaviorism is operant conditioning. Although hewas influenced by earlier S-R theories, within histhemtical framework Skinner has a particular focus.The emphasis is upon the response and not upon thestimulus. His intent is to show that the cause ofbehavior is the consequence which follows thebehavior, while avoiding notions of purposive behav-ior. A complicated terminology is created with whichto state the theory. Following are some importantterms:

I. Operant is used to distinguish between a reflexand a response. Skinner writes. "The unit of apredictive science is. therefore, not a response buta class of responses. The word 'operant' will beused to describe this class. The term emphasizesthe fact that the behavior operates upon the envi-ronment to generate consequences." (Skinner.1953:65)

2. A response is illustrated by a single instance ir.which a pigeon raises its head. The behaviorcalled raising the head is an operant.

3. In a pigeon experiment, food for the pigeon is thereinforcer.

4. Giving food to the pigeon when a certain responseis observed is called reinforcement. The operant isthe "property" upon which the reinforcement iscontingent; for example. it could be the height towhich the pigeon must raise its head.

5. The change in frequency with which the pigeonraises its head to this height is the process ofoperant conditioning.

6. A point, important to Skinner. is that operant be-havior is emitted, not elicited. (Skinner, 1953:107)Skinner is clear in his theoretical minimization ofstimuli in behavioral study. He believes stimuli areconstantly acting upon the organism, but the func-tional connection is not like that in the reflex.

7. Cortingency is a connecting word, a linkage con-cept. used in developing the behavioral theory. Acontingency contains stimulus, response. and rein-forcement; all three must be specified.

8. Discrimination is what connect' the behavingorganism to a given set of conting,....ies. The con-cept of discrimination has great importance inSkinner's theoretical framework. as well as in thepractical control of behavior. When a discrimina-tion is discovered. or established, the experi-menter (or controller) may alter the probability ofa response by manipulating the discriminativestimulus. (Skinner. 1953:107-108)

Skinner discusses the process of discriminationand discriminative stimuli at length. (Skinner.1953:107-1 t?8. 134, 261-264. 285; 1966:18, 19) Theprocess of discrimination is observed when aresponse is reinforced in the presence or one propertyand extinguished in the presence of others. Whenthis process is established the experimenter hasobtained a powerful control over the subject. Thediscriminative stimuli which improve the efficiency ofbehavior under certain contingencies of reinforcementare important. but they are not to be confused withthe contingencies themselves. Care must also betaken to distinguish the effects of the stimuli from theeffects of the contingencies. (Skinner, 1966:29)Consider the behavior of an organism which seems toevaluate a situation before taking a given action; theobserved pattern of behavior merely resembles thebehavior of an organism whose behavior has beenshaped by prolonged exposure to such situations.

As mentioned earlier. in his effort to avoid allnotions of purposive behavior. Skinner employs apeculiar language which is. at times. exceedinglydifficult to understand. Consider the followingexample. He is arguing that behavior which might becalled "following a plan" or "applying a rule"cannot be observed when behavior is considered to bea product of the contingencies alone. He admits thatrules may be formulated from reinforcing coteingen-cies, and once formulated they may be used asguides; yet, the direct effect of contingencies isdifferent. (Skinner. 1966:29) Skinner cites the case ofa person who declares he is speaking correctlybecause he is following the rules of grammar:

When a man explicitly states his purpose inacting in a given way he may. indeed, beconstructing a contemporary surrogate offuture consequences which will affect subse-quent behavior, possibly in useful ways. Itdoes not follow, however, that the behaviorgenerated by the consequences in the ab-sence of any statement of purpose is underthe control of any comparable prior stimulus.such as a felt purpose of intention. (Skinner,1966:29)

All behavior is caused behavior, For Skinner, acause is a change in an indcpendent variable and aneffect is a change in a dependent variable. A causeand effect connection becomes a functional relation-ship within his theory. He is not interested in how acause produces its effect, only that different eventstend to occur together in a certain order. Anycondition or event that can be shown to have aneffect upon human behavior must be taken intoaccount. Skinner believes that by discovering andanalyzing these causes he can predict behavior, andto the extent he can manipulate the "causes" he cancontrol behavior. (Skinner. 1953:23i

Psychologists using the theory of operantbehavior interest themselves not only in howorganisms behave, but they desire to supplementsuch narrative with consideration of why they behavein certain ways:

What is required is an analysis of the condi-tions which govern the probability that agiven response will occur at a given time.(Skinner. 1966:16)...psychology is con-cerned with establishing relations betweenthe behavior of an organism and the forcesacting upon it. (Evans, 1968:21) We need acomplete account at the external level. Afterall, the organism cannot initiate anythingunless you assume it is capable of whimsicalchanges. As a determinist. I must assumethat the organism is simply mediating therelationships between the forces acting uponit and its own output. and these are thekinds of relationships I'm anxious to formu-late. (Evans. 1968:23)

The rate of responding is considered extremelyimportant data in such scientific analysis. Changes inthe rate of responding are dir.:tly observed andaccurately recorded. Such data are appropriate toscientific formulations. Under skillful experimentalcontrol uniformity and precision can result. Thecumulative record of this process is the essence ofoperant conditioning.

Skinner maintains that verbal communication isnot a substitute for the arrangement and manipula-tion of environmental variables. (Skinner. 1966:23) Hedistrusts efforts to study or shape behavior which relyon verbal communication. On the other hand, somepsychologists rely partially. and some exclusively.upon verbal exchange. Skinner argues that such anapproach is usually favored by psychologits whuformulate their subject matter in mental terms. Hedeplores such practice because precis'm and controlare not maximized. He sees no reason to believe a

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description of the contingencies of reinforcementshould necessarily have the same effect as directexposure to the contingencies themselves. He doubtsif a subject can accurately describe the way in whichhe has been reinforced. Even when the subject hasbeen trained to recognize a few simple contingencies

s then unable to identify or dew-We new orplex ones. Furthermore, certain verbal contingen-

cies between the subject and experimenter wouldhave to be taken into accountfor example theexperimenter's tone of voice. How could suchcontingencies be accurately measured or controlled?( f. Skinner, 1966:12.32)

Skinner's theory emphasizes teihnology, andwith this emphasis comes a technics terminology.(Skinner. 1971:3-24) He sees great vain in thecareful use of his terminology. For example, theconcept of reflex is good because it carries noovertones of the consequences of a response. Theadaptive aspects of behavior are minimized by usingthe term reflex. The term operant is introduced todistinguish between reflexes and responses operatingdirectly on the environment. He would avoid termssuch as "instrumental" or "reward" because theyhave purposive overtones. One should avoid suchexpressions as "the rat uses a lever to obtain food."or "the pigeon is rewarded for behaving in a cetleinway." Reinforcement is a better term because itsimply denotes the strengthening of a response.Even when using the specified terminology, caremust be constantly maintained because the concept ofpurposiveness will tend to creep back into descriptivestatements. For example. "The pigeon was reinforcedfor pecking the key" should be rephrased. (Skinner,1966:15)

In using this theory the experimenter controlsimportant consequences for the subject. The manipu-lator can increase the probability of some behavioroccuring again by reinforcing it, or he can decreasethis probability through some form of punishment orby instituting a procedure labeled extinction. Skinneropposes the use of punishment. (Skinner. 1953:182-194; 1971:60-100) Reinforcement is a manipula-tion of environmental factors that increases the tateof response which it follows. Positive reinforcementrequires use of a stimulus desired by the subject.Negative reinforcement requires the environmentalremoval of an undesirable factor. undesirable fromthe subject's perspective. The process of extinctionmay be initiated by the manipulator in two possiblemodes. Extinction may occur with the presentation ofdisturbing stimuli (Skinner, 1953:58), or it may occur

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when the designated behavior is no longer reinforced.(Skinner, 1952469)

The efficiency of behavior modification may bemaximized by following a few simple rules: (cf.Meacham and Wiesen, 1969:38-46)

I. Define tae consequences (the reinforcers orpunishers) only in terms of how they affect thesubject, not in terms of the experimenter or ofother subject's behavior.

2. Recognize that the effects of reinforcement or pun-ishment are automatic, that is. verbalization in theform of contracts or instructions are not messary.

3. Choose consequences that are closely related tothe desired terminal behavior.

4. Be consistent. a necessity for precision and pre-dictability.

5. Arrange schedule of reinforcement so that conse-quences follow closely the behavior on which theyare contingent.

6. Use care in choosing the amount of reinforcementfor the specific behavioral change. providing thefrequent reinforcement needed for new behavior.

7. Carefully program the entire process of behaviormodification so the subject is able to movesmoothly from one step in the process to the next.

B. F. Skinner states repeatedly that certainassumptions are essential for the study and practiceof his theory. (Skinner, 1953:9, 17, 45-58; 1971:

184-215) The basic assumption concerns the nature ofman. In Skinner's view, man is a physical, passiveproduct of his environment. This physical organism isa responding. not a thinking, animal, and it can andshould be studied essentially as a physical scientiststudies a stone or a tree. Man is more complex thana stone a complexity partially characterized byphysical movementthus the analogy "man themachine." "Man is a machine in the sense that he isa complex system behaving in lawful ways, but thecomplexity is extraordinary." (Skinner, 1971:202) (cf.Skinner. 1953:45-58) The physical organism, man. isstudied only by observing overt reactions. Empiricalrestrictions of scientific method preclude attempts toanalyze the inner workings of the machines.Psychology thus becomes a study of complex patternsof physical movements. "I would define behavior asthe movement of an organism in space with respectto itself or any other useful frame of reference."(Evans. 1968:8) Skinner feels that a description ofman as a machine is an "oversimplification." (Evans,1968:69) He says. "If by 'machine' you simply meanany system which behaves in an orderly way, thenman and all other animals are machines." (Evans,

1968:24) The element that seems tc, be emphasized inhis basic assumption underlying his theory is that thephysical movements of man are connected by invari-ant relatiopships, that is. all behavior is reactionaccording to lawful patterns. Whimsy or caprice arenever observed in behavior. Behavior which appearsirrational is indeed law obeying; the environmentalcause has not yet been identified.

The hypothesis that man is not free is essen-tial to the application of scientific method tothe study of human behavior. The free innerman who is held responsible for the behaviorof the external biological organism is only aprescientific substitute for the kinds ofcauses which are discovered in the course ofa scientific analysis. (Skinner, 1953:447)

Passive man, studied as a group of physicalmovements, does not have attributive characteristicssuch as cordial, !mighty, h Apful. heedless, hard-hearted. or humorous. Accoi ding to Skinner, if thepsychologist uses such adjectives a focus is placed onsome "inner" entity that doesn't really exist; at leastif it does exist it is not available for scientific study.To use such terms results in confusion. Thepyschologist. thinking in terms of "aspect-descrip-tion" (certain attitudes possessed by his subject) failsto advance the techniques of control. By using the"functional analysis" of physical action both theexperimenter and the subject are placed within aformulation which contributes to precision, both inprediction and control. (Skinner, 1953:194-200)

The definition of the nature of man as totallypassive removes any use of such concepts as purpose.Within the theory attempts to remove all suggestionof teleology are constant. Skinner considers Thorn-dike's Law of Effect a step in the right direction.Simultaneous occurence of a response and certainenvironmental events changes the organism andincreases the probability that the same sort ofresponses will occur again. The response Las notbeen altered. By emphasizing change In theorganism, Thorndike's principle "made it possible toinclude the effects of action among the causes offuture action without using concepts like purpose,intuition, expectancy, or utility." (Skinner, 1966:12;1953:60-62) Consider the case of a piano virtuoso. Hedid not become a great pianist because he had thedesire, ambition, or purpose of doing so. His unusualability to play scales smoothly is not the result ofintention. According to the theory of operantconditioning. the smoothly played scales "selectskilled move..-nents." "A pianist neither acquires nor

executes the behavior of playing a scale smoothlybecause of a prior intention of doing so. Smoothlyplayed scales are reinforcing for many reasons. andthey select skilled movements." (Skinner, 1971:204)The behavior of the pianist is the result of specificenvironmental forces which have reinforced theobserved behavior.

Defining man as merely a physical organism andlimiting its study to patterns of physical movementsresults in rather intricate explanations of certainpsychological conceptualizations. Self, self-knowledge. self-control. awareness. and responsibilityare examples. Such concepts are important in someother psychological theories, especially that of CarlRogers. Although They would be considered periph-eral to Skinner's theory, he does not ignore them.

A self is a ref ertoire of behavior appropriate to agiven set of contingencies. (Skinner. 1971:199) Sincean organism may display various patterns of behaviorit may possess many selves. (Skinner, 1971:199) Indiscussing self-..,ontrol he says that a person maycontrol his own behavior if the "individual canidentify the behavior to be controlled." (Skinner.195,3:229) Complications rise because if one allowsthe individual to manipulate external variables thenthe status of "private events" must be discussed in ascience of behavior. (Skinner. 1953:229)

A purely private event would have no placein a study of behavior, or perhaps in anyscience; but events which are, for themoment at least. accessible only to the indi-vidual himself often occur as links in chainsof otherwise public events and they mustthin be considered. In self-control and crea-tive thinking, where the individual is largelyengaged in manipulating his own behavior.this is likely to be the case. (Skinner.1953:229)

Skinner explains that the concepts of self-knowledge and self-control imply two selves. The selfknower is a soda'. product; the known self comesfrom other sources. The controlling self is of socialorigin; the controlled self is of genetic origin.(Skinner, 1971:199) These selves are not persons;they are observed patterns of behavior exhibited bythe same physical organism under different stimuliand contingencies of reinforcement.

Skinner mentions various aspects of self-knowledge. ways in which man observes himself andhis existence, then writes:

Any analysis of human behavior which neg-lected these facts would be defective indeed.

7,

And some analyses do. What is called me-thodological behaviorism limits itself to whatcan be publicly observed; mental processesmay exist. but they are ruled out of scien-tific consideration by their nature. (Skinner.1971:190) The dimensions of the world ofmind and transitions from one world toanother do raise embarrassing problems. butit is usually possible to ignore them, andthis may be good strategy... (Skinner.1971:12)

The environment acts upon the organism and theorganism reacts. "Reflex" is closer to the spirit ofthe theory than "deliberate action." Skinner statesclearly that the behavior of the organism does notdepend upon that organism's awareness of itsenvironment. Awareness is something that is imposedupon the individual by the society. (Evans, 1968:7)Other statements concerning awareness are:

Awareness is a reaction to a part of the en-vironmentlike any other behaviorbut ithappens to be a part of the environmentcontained within the organism itself. (Evans,1968:8) Awareness may help if the problemis in part a lack of awareness. and insightinto one's condition may help if one thentakes remedial action... (Skinner. 1971:192)

Closely related to the idea of awareness is theconceptualization of voluntary and involuntary behav-ior. Skinner writes:

The relation between the discriminativeoperant and its controlling stimulus is verydifferent from elicitation. Stimulus and re-sponse occur in the same order as in the re-flex. but this does not warrant the inclusionof both types in a single 'stimulus-response'formula. The discriminative stimulus doesnotlelicit a response, it simply alters a prob-ability of occurence. The relation is flexibleand continously graded. The response fol-lows the stimulus in a more leisurely fash-ion. and it may be intense or feeble almostwithout respect to the intensity of the stimu-lus. This difference is at the root of the clas-sical distinction beween voluntary and invol-untary behavior. In the present analysiswe cannot distinguish between involuntaryand voluntary behavior by raising the issueof who is in control. It does not matterwhether behavior is due to a willing individ-ual or a psychic usurper if we dismiss all in-ner agents of whatever sort. Nor can wemake the distinction on the basis of control

8

or lack of control. since we assume that nobehavior is free. (Skinner,. 1953:110-111)

Skinner goes on to explain that when all the rele-vant variables have been arranged, an organismeither will or will not respond. If it responds in acertain way then it can; if it does not respond in thatway then it cannot. The organism in fact respondin the only way it can, as determined by that specificset of contingent variables.

Possibilities of self-conflict are not discussedwithin the theory. According to the theory. theorganism is a different self each time is :s observed indifferent environmental situations because the behav-ior pattern is different. No single instance of action.or pattern of behavior, could be more compatible withthe total existence of the organism than any otherpattern since any pattern observed is the onlypossible response permitted by the environmentalfactors. No conflict between the 'rganism and apattern of action would seem possible within thetheory be,,ause the "self' of the organism is thepattern of action. Yet. in discussing self-knowledgeand self-control. Skinner implies the simultaneousexperiencing, by the organism, of two conflictingselves. The controlling self represents the interests ofothers and the controlled self represents the interestsof the individual. (Skinner. 1971:199)

Concepts like "conflict" and "control" appearintricate within a deterministic theoretical formula-tion. Within the theory, both "others" and "theindividual" are animals of no purpose. Presumably, atheoretical distinction is made between "interests"and "purposes" relative to human action.

If the student of human behavior can conceive ofcomplete environmental determinism. the only pos-sible behavior is that behavior which is observed. Thenotion of responsibility is dropped along with the ideaof free will as an inner causal agent. Skinner believesthat "personal responsibility" is associated withcertain traditional techniques of controlling behavior.These traditional techniques which generate "a senseof responsibility," or "an obligation to society" arerelatively ill-adapted to their purpose. When com-pared to the techniques of operant conditioning theyappear extremely inefficient. (Skinner, 1953:116;1971:60-100) The behaviorist position. according toLanger, is undoubtedly the most scientificallyrespectable psychology of today. (Langer. 1964:12)Skinner is considered the current leader.

He has been the subject of a Time magazinecover story. a New York Times interview andeditorial. a Newsweek education column.

such national television shows as Today,Dick Cavett, David Frost, Firing Line andCBS Morning News. His new book was ac-cepted and praised in the August issue ofthe widely circulated magazine. PsychologyToday. The American Psychological Associa-tion gave him its annual award in Septemberand hailed him as "a pioneer in psychologi-cal research, leader in theory. master intechnology, who has revolutionized the studyof behavior in our time. A superlative schol-ar. scientist, teacher and writer." Ac-cording to the Times, his colleagues havejudged him "the most influential psycholo-gist in the country." (Sennett. 1971:1)

Skinnerian theory has gone well beyond earlierforms of behaviorism. Some debt to Watson.Thorndike, Pavlov. ant! others is evident. The sameideals of quantification of behavior and systematicobjectivism govern research projects and theoreticalformulation. Operant conditioning has a differentfocus than does earlier behavioristic theories. Moreevident than this difference, however. is the completeseparation of Skinner's thought from all "non-behavioral" psychology. Concepts found useful bypsychoanalytic. existential. or gestalt psychologistsare irrelevant to the operant theory. The following aresome of Skinner's reactions to concepts which havesome significance in other theories:

I don't see any reason to postulate a needanywhere along thiz line. (Evans, 1968:10)The important thins is to analyze the contin-gencies of reinforcement. not the needs tobe satisfied. (Evans. 1968:10) Emotion. sofar as I am concerned, is a matter of theprobability of engaging in certain kinds ofbehavior defined ')y certain kinds of conse-quences. (Evans, 1968:11) I think an analysiswhich deals with verbal behavior without ap-pealing to mental concepts such as meaningis a step in the right direction. (Evans.1968:15) As far as I'm concerned. the organ-ism is irrelevant either as the site of physio-logical processes or as the locus of mental-istic activities. I don't believe the organismcontributes anything to these overall rela-tionships beyond the fact that it is the be-havior of an organism we are studying.(Evans, 1968:22)

Skinner is not interested in "the fictions ormetaphorical apparatus" which Freudians feel theyobserve in the organism. "So far as I'm concerned.these are .versions of some sort of primitiveanimism.** (Evans. 1968:7) He opposes stating

behavioral linkag;S .in terms of feelings. emotions,recollections, and memories. His interest is in ascience of behavior that is a Van of biology. (Evans.1968:7; cf. Skinner. 1964:79) Skinner's conclusion isthat "in its very brief history. the study of operant

9

behavior has clarified the nature of the relationbetween behavior and its consequences and hasdevised techniques which apply the methods ofnatural science to its investigation." (Skinner.1966:31)

ROGERS ON HUMAN BEHAVIOR

In defining man. Cart Rogers puts greatemphasis upon "the experiencing person." Histheory of personality development represents anapproach to psychology that falls under the genericclassification of phenomenology. Phenomenology re-lates to the individual's unique (phenomenal) world ofexperience. In this discussion, Rogers' theory will belimited to ysychologicat constructs necessary forminimal presentation and understanding of thisthought. Within his frame of reference man'ssubjective, conscious experiences are a fundamentalsource of information. Notions of self-concept.conscious awareness, and interpersonal knowing areexamples of important Rogerian concepts.

The assumption that man is a physical. feeling.consciously experiencing organism is essential in thistheory. (Rogers. 1961:118) Rogers writes of "deeporganismic feelings." Sometimes he uses a termwhich has been popular on college campuses. "gutfeeling." Precise definition of this term is ratherdiffiilt. The implication seems to be that anindividual can know something that is not mentallyknown. It is an "irrational" knowledge which in someway brings the organism closer to reality thanknowledge resulting from mental activity. One mightbe tempted to translate this idea into physicalsensations of the body. Such a "translation" ofRogers' idea would place it in proximity to theorganic machine reacting to environmental stimulithat we met in Skinner's theory.

Rogers states clearly that he wishes to "gobeyond" the machine analogy. so his concept mustbe seen. at least by himself. as theoretically differentfrom that of Skinner. (Wann. 1964:157: Rogers. et.al.. 1967:2) In his discussions of "awareness" and"self," Rogers seems to describe individual experi-ence on a level somewhere between pure animalinstinct and intellectually contrived conceptual pat-terns which have been socially imposed. The conceptmay be identical. or very similar, to the processdescribed by Perls. (Perls, 1947) If one canexperience a process. he may not be able to verballyexpress what has been experienced.

The reader may grasp some of Rogers' thoughtfrom the following quotation:

In writing this book I have often ,thought ofthe idea expressed by a semanticist, that thetrue. the genuine, the real meaning of aword can never he expressed in words, be-cause the real meaning would be the thingitself. If one wishes to give such real mean-ing he should put his hand over his mouthand point. This is what I would most like todo. I would willingly throw away all thewords of this manuscript if I could, some-how, effectively point to the experiencewhich is therapy. It is a process. a thing-in-itself, an experience, a relationship. adynamic. (Rogers. 1951: ix)Much of Rogers' theory centers in the construct

of the self. (Rogers. 1951:15) The self is anabstraction similar to the theological conception of thesoul. The self represents the core of the individual.**As the infant interacts with his environment hegradually builds up concepts about himself, about theenvironment, and about himself in relation to theenvironment." (Rogers. 1951:498) Rogers writes."We may look upon this self-structure as being anorganization of hypotheses for meeting lifeanorganization which has been relatively effective insatisfying the needs of the orgaMsm." (Rogers.1951:191) Rogers. in his concept of set/. seems tomean the locus of evaluation, decision. and life of theindividual. (Rogers. 1961:119)

In his defintion of man's behavior, Rogersparallels existentialist thought in some ways. Indeed,he mentions Kierkegaard on several occasions,pointing out with surprise how clearly the Danishphilosopher seemed to picture what Rogers himselfexperiences in his study of psychology. (Rogt......1961:110) The similarity between existentialism andRogerian theory seems to be the belief in man'sintrinsic ability to direct his own process of develop-ment. Rogers' optimistic view of man's existenceseparates his thought from that pessimistic viewcommonly associated with the thought of someexistential philosophers.

-Rogers' thought can he identified by a positiveprocess in man's development: possibly the mostimportant concept in Rogers' theory is that ofprocess. Students often consider the self his most

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important concept, but in Rogers' thought. the self isthe process. To overemphasize the concept of processin a study of Rogers' theory would be difficultbecause it permeates all his thought. He believes thattruth exists in the "process of becoming"; individualcreation of a tentative personal truth through action isthe essence of personal commitment. His thoughtparallels that of Michael Polanyi. whom Rogersquotes on occasion. (Rogers. 1969:271-275; Polanyi.1958; 1959; 1966)

Rogers sees his explanatory scheme as adeveloping process which he derived primarily fromhis involvement in therapeutic relationships. As aresult of these experiences. he also defines man as aprocess rather than a product. He sees a person "asa stream of becoming." (cf. Allport, 1955) "a fluid

process. not a fixed and static entity; a flowing riverof change, not a block of solid material; a continuallychanging constellation of potentialities. not a fixed

quantity a traits." (Rogers. 1961:122) His extremeemphasis upon process and his consequent neglect ofthe social influences on behavior may be a weaknessin the theory.

Another basic assumption in Rogers' definition ofman is that man has basic tendencies toward positivebehavior. To state that Dr. Rogers feels that impec-cability characterizes man's basic nature might be toostrong. Yet Rogers sees man "when he is hiscomplete organism" as having no negative attributes.(Rogers. 1957:291-300; 1961:105) The organism whohas a complete "awareness of experience" will notonly be a unique individual, but will also blendharmoniously into a perfectly functioning society.(Rogers, 1951:524; 1957:291-300) This optimisticassumption is essential to his views o; control andhuman behavior.

Rogers senses the following reactions to his

assumptions of "a complete and fully functioning"organism:

"Do you mean...man becomes nothing buta human organism. a human animal? Whowill control him? Who will socialize him?Will he then throw over all inhibitions? Haveyou merely released the beast. the id, inman?" Rogers replies, "...the individualhas actually become a human organism, withall the richness which that implies. He is re-alistically able to control himself. and he isincorrigibly socialized in his desires. Thereis no beast in man. There is only man in

man, and this we have been able to re-lease." (Rogers, 1961:105)

As mentioned previously. Rogers' theory, is

based upon his experiences in therapeutic situations.The environmental conditions in therapy may becompared in some respects to the laboratory environ-ment upon which Skinner has based his theory.Certain influential factors in each "artificial" environ-ment contrasts with influences on behavior asexperienced in the larger society. In describing atherapeutic session Rogers uses the term "pureculture." (Rogers. 1961:111-112. 202) What can pureculture be? Rogers' theory deals with individualdevelopment. socialization. enculturation. Accultura-tion. the mixing of two or more cultures, has little orno importance within his context. Obviously his useof the word culture carries its own particulardefinition. A cultural anthropologist does not use theterm as does Rogers.

In the daily life of the individual, thousands ofinfluences that "reside within the social situation"prevent the self from fully experiencing its attitudes.(Rogers, 1961:1 1 1) Away from these social pressures,within the therapeutic relationship, within a "pureculture," the self can fully experience. During thelimited time of the session "the person is his fear, orhe is his anger, or he is his tenderness, orwhatever." (Rogers. 1961:112) Rogers writes.

The essence of some of the deepest parts oftherapy seems to be a unity of experiencing.The client is able to experience his feeling inits complete intensity, as a "pure culture."without intellectual inhibitions or cautions,without having it bounded by knowledge ofcontradictory feelings; and I am able withequal freedom to experience my understand-ing of this feeling, without any consciousthought about it, without any apprehensionor concern as to where this will lead, withoutany type of diagnostic or analytic thinking,without any cognitive or emotional barriersto a complete "letting go" in understanding.(Rogers, 1961:202)

Rogers refers to an "out-of-this-world quality,""a sort of trance-like feeling in the relationship fromwhich both the client and I emerge at the end of thehour. as if from a deep well or tunnel." (Rogers,1961:202) Clearly, "pure culture" means an absoluteseparation from cultural influence. an escape from

"cognitive" and **emotional" inhibitions.The punctual ending of the therapeutic sessions

is evidence of external. or cultural. influence. If,

indeed. the relationship were free flowing with noinhibitions it would continue for an indefinite period.Punctuality is only one of the most obvious exampleswhich could be used to deny the possibility of

experience which is absolutely devoid of culturalinfluence. Observation of Rogers and a client duringa therapeutic session would undoubtedly reveal avariety of "cultural elements" such as seatingarrangements. use of chairs, verbal expressions andso forth. The results of years of socialization canhardly be doffed as one might remove a pair ofovershoes upon entering a room.

In his discussion of the therapeutic climate. pureculture, Rogers seems to be trying to emphasize theimportance. from his point of view, of seeing hisclient as a subject rather than an object, and offocusing upon change in that subject. Rogers may bepicturing a theoretical ideal which in fact cannot belocated in social experience. The intensity ofsocialization pressure may be increased or decreased.An analysis of the Skinnerian and Rogerian ap-proaches to the control of human behavior raises afundamental issue. To what extreme can the intensityof socialization be increased or decreased withineveryday social experience? What is the range ofintensity which may actually be experienced by anindividual within the evolutionary process of culturaldynamics?

Two questions, the importance of which willbecome explicit later, must be raised in connectionwith Rogers' implicit assumptions in "pure culture."Is it possible to totally escape from cultural influence.even for an hour, or does one carry along, bothovertly and covertly, numerous cultural artifacts tothe session? Second, if it were possible to transcendone's culture, how would this "out-of-this-world"experience pertain to ordinary cultural processesupon return from the trance into everyday social life?

Regardless of whether or not one can actuallyexperience the "pure culture" which Rogers des-cribes, the purpose of this ideal is clear. Rogers'effort is to design a certain environment for the self.The reader must see clearly how Rogers uses the ideaof self in order to appreciate his desire for a "pureculture."

In Rogers' definition of man, he sees the SELFas that inner core of the individual which is somehowseparated from the environment. The process bywhich this self is constructed he calls awareness. Thisterm seems to indicate an ability of the individualorganism to distinguish between what that individualis experiencing and what other individuals seem to beexperiencing. In awareness, Rogers also seems toindicate an individual's ability to discriminate withinhis own experiencing.

His argument is that one could watch a person

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moving toward greater self-awareness and see thefollowing: he

...graduall.. reduces the intensional qualityof his reactionshis tendency to see experi-ence in absolute and unconditional terms, toovergeneralize, to be dominated by conceptor belief, to fail to anchor his reactions inspace and time. to confuse fact an(' evalua-ion, to rely on ideas rather than on reality

testingand moves toward a more exten-sional type of reaction. This may be defi ,edas the tendency to see things in limited. If-ferentiated terms, to be aware of space timeanchorage of facts, to be dominated by facts,not by concepts, to evaluate in multipleways, to be aware of different levels of ab-straction. to test his inferences and abstrac-tions by reality insofar as possible. (Rogers,1951:144)

Rogers believes that as the infant develops hedistinguishes a SELF. But the parents and others alsoimpose conceptual patterns upon the Want. As longas the developing child can keep thinking of allexperiences which enhance his self-image as positiveand all experiences which threaten his self-image asnegative, he is psychologically healthy. As soon asthe conceptual patterns, which are imposed byothers, become a part of the evaluation of the SELF,the individual can experience difficulty. He is told,"You are a good boy." "You are a bad boy." "Whatyou did this morning was good." "What you did thisaftbrnoon was bad." All kinds of evaluations, madeby others, become a part of the infant's perceptualfield. "Social experiences" become mixed up with hisown private experience. This results in what Rogerscalls a "distorted symbolization of experience."Because of social pressure, the individual begins todeny to his own awareness some of his actualexperiences. (Rogers. 1951:498-499)

What the individual is actually experiencing isbeing filtered through imposed conceptual patterns.The individual increases the confusion by distortinghis experience in the effort to fit it into the prescribedpattern. Through the practice of distorting experi-ence. in the effort to fit interpersonal impositions, theorganism becomes a "hollow" entity which, inRogers' theoretical description, very much resemblesthe organic machines described by Skinner's theory.Rogers thinks that in the presence of some people wenever know exactly with whom we are. We may viewvarious facades. We wonder what the individualreally feels, indeed sometimes we wonder if he knowswhat he feels. (Rogers, 1961:342)

Rogers advocates self-enhancement. Self-

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awareness is an element in the process toward thegoal of greatest realization of all potentials of theindividual. In order to counteract or minimize theself-destroying results of socialization. Rogers recom-mends a "safe environment" for the individual whoseself-image and self-awareness has suffered from oversocialization. The "pure culture" is such a safeenvironment in Rogers' scheme. A climate can resultfrom lack of cultural design in which the individualfeels less threatened if he does not experience hisfeelings in culturally-designed patterns. The individ-ual. therefore. decreases the denial of his ownfeelings and thus moves toward awareness.

He moves from generalizations which havebeen found unsatisfactory for guiding his lifeto an examination of the rich primary experi-ence upon which they are based, a move-ment which exposes the falsity of many ofhis generalizations and provides a basis fornew and more adequate abstractions.(Rogers, 1951:143)

Little by little the individual finds that it is not onlypossible but extremely satisfying to accept his ownself and self-awareness as the evaluation locus of hisactual experience.

When this happens. values no longer are fixedabsolutes: existence is no longer threatening; theindividual can relax and examine his experience withan open attitude because he is not locked into aconceptual system. He does not feel the constantneed for defense. (Rogers. 1951:151) Rogers writes.

There is no longer the firm. tight gestaltwhich is characteristic of every organizationunder threat, but a loose. more uncertainconfiguration. He begins to explore his con-ceptual field more and more fully. He dis-covers faulty generalizations. but his self-structure is now sufficiently relaxed so thathe can consider the complex and contradic-tory experiences upon which they are based.(Rogers. 1951:193)

In this process the person comes to be, inawareness, what he is in experience. Congruence isthe term Rogers uses to indicate an accuratematching of experience and awareness. (Rogers.1961:339) he gives the following example ofincongruence: A---man becomes angrily involved in agroup discussion. His face flushes: he speaks in anangry tone; he shakes his finger at another person.When one of the group says. "Well, let's not getangry about this." the fellow replies. "I'm not angry;as a matter of fact. 1 don't have any feeling aboutthis at all! I was just pointing out the facts." Of

course. the other men laugh. To them he wasexperiencing anger at the physiological level. Proba-bly several factors are involved in the man's refusalto consciously accept this experience. Yet, evidenceexists that incongruence exists between his experi-ence and his awareness. and between his experienceand his communication. Rogers states that. at themoment, the degree of congruence may not beevaluated by the person himself. (Rogers, 1961:340)

Rogers feels that behavior is not based directlyon something called reality, but rather upon theindividual's perception of that reality. This distinctionis essential in the study of human behavior. "It isnoted that behavior is postulated as a reaction to thefield as perceived. This point is proved every day inour experience. but it is often overlooked. Thereaction is not to reality but to the perception ofreality." (Rogers, 1951:492) A mirage will cause athirsty man to struggle forward in the desert. Thestruggle is "real" action, just as real as it would be ifthe mirage were indeed a "real" lake of water. Aman will work long hours for years, striving formoney because he perceives the money as a source ofsecurity. The money may not in fact satisfy his need.Regarding its motivation of human behavior, themirage perceived as water, or the money perceived assecurity, operates just as efficiently as the "realthing" until the perception changes. Time isinvolved. A future or later perception changes theman's action with respect to the mirage. Theperception must be accounted potent relative tobehavior rather than "reality" or "lack of reality."

Rogers' view of potential human behaviorcontrasts sharply with the view of Skinner. Possiblythis contrast is seen most clearly if the termresponsibility is analyzed in each view. Skinner seesresponsibility exclusively in the sense of an automaticphysical response to environmental stimuli. Onlyupon this basis could he argue that an individual isno more responsible for the act of murder than forthe act of coughing. Both are simply physicalre-actions to the organism's environment. Skinnerargues repeatedly against the use of individualresponsibility as a concept in controlling humanbehavior. (Skinner, 1953:341-344: 1971:71-76) He notonly excludes the concept from his theory, hevigorously opposes its use in any context.

On the other hand. responsibility is an importantbit of Rogers' theoretical foundation. His entiretheory rests upon the ability of the individual self tobe aware of both itself and its environment and torespond efficiently. We gain a clearer understandingof Rogers' thought if we translate "responsibility" as

"ability-to-respond." (cf. Green. 1964) Rogers' ideasseem to parallel, very closely. much existentialthought. He mentions both Kierkegaard and Buberseveral times. On occasions when he is describing theexperience of the person. some of his conceptualiza-tions are close to other existentialists, for exampleSartre and Nietzsche.

In Rogers' therapy sessions, as a client becomesaware of the possibilities of actual choice, much of hisfeeling is similar to that described by Sartre ascharacteristic of existential choice. (Kaufmann,1956:222-311) The individual may feel awesomeresponsibility, anguish, despair. abandonment, to usesome of Sartre's terms. Of course, kinds of feelingsas well as emotional depths as experienced bydifferent persons may vary, A similar parallel car beseen between aspects of Rogers' description of theindividual's experience in becoming confused whenmixing imposed conceptualizations with personalexperience, and that experience described inNietzsche's term resentiment. (Kaufmann, 1967)Rogers' theory seems to rest its full weight upon thepossibility that this "existential choice" is availableto the individual experience.

Rogers' thought contrasts clearly with that ofSkinner at this point. Skinner argues that theindividual has no choice; the physical organism is an"it." possessing only a completely determined actionpattern. Rogers' theory, while maintaining for theindividual the existence of choice, seems to allow himthe possibility of choosing to be manipulated. In someof Rogers' articles he seems to fear the advance oftechnical control as advocated by Skinner. Recog-

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nixing the possibility of Skinner's "world o& control."he sees it as an extremely unpalatable choice.

Rogers cites gains in knowledge which indicatepossibilities of increasing the amount of control overindividual behavior. He even lists steps to consider inthe process of developing this control. (Rogers.1961:387) He tries to give an "objective picture" ofsuch control. (Rogers. 1961:390) but he feelscompelled to state his own opposition. He wouldequate Walden Two with Huxley's Brave New Worldand Orwell's 1984. Rogers wants to feel that he isadvancing science: "I feel that to the limit of myability I have played my part in advancing thebehavioral sciences..." (Rogers. 1961:391), but thethought that what has been learned could be used toturn man into a robot makes him extremely unhappy.

The humanistically-oriented attitude of Rogerstoward the control of human behavior may be almostidentical with that found in a statement by SidneyJourard:

A lot of knowledge about a lot of men, if itis possessed by a few, gives these fewpower over the many. Psychologists seekknowledge about men. Men consent to bestudied by psychologists. The question .is,who is being helped when psychologistsstudy men? If I have knowledge about you, Ican use this to my advantage, and againstyours. If I have knowledge about myself, Ican increase my freedom and my power tolive my life meaningfully. If you have knowl-edge about me, I would like you to enlightenme. not control me. And I would like toknow you. (Jourard, 1968: preface)

SKINNER ON EDUCATION

11. F. Skinner has written a book, the Technologyof Teaching (1968), in an effort to apply his theory of.human behavior directly to educational practice. Herejects traditionally used "metaphors" such as"growth or development," "forming, shaping, orbuilding" the individual. Traditional ways of viewinglearning are also considered inadequate by Skinner.Examples are: we learn by doing, we learn byexperience, and we learn by trial and error. (Skinner,1968:1-8) Such ways of viewing education are to beavoided, not so much because they are wrong, butbecause he considers them incomplete. They do notfully describe the educational process as he definesit.

According to his theory, all learning takes placerelative to three factors which, collectively, he has

labeled "contingencies of reinforcement." Learningrequires a situation in which behavior occurs, theactual behavior. and the consequences of thatbehavior. Doing, experience, and trial and error arerepresentative of the three parts of a set of contin-gencies: doing emphasizes the response; experience.the occasion during which the response occurs; andtrial and error, the consequences.

His educational theory, as does his generaltheory of behavior, centers in the concept of control.If learning is seen merely as the changing of behaviorpatterns according to environmental stimuli, thenteaching is necessarily seen as the manipulation ofthe stimuli to control the change. Skinner esteems theprecision of such control, especially when it iscarefully designed to bring about specific terminal

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behavior. He deplores the vague behavioral goals thathave been used by educators. Terms such as"educating for democracy," "educating the wholechild." and "educating for life" are familiarexamples. How. exactly, are these nebulous goals tobe reached? What is the exact behavior andnecessary set of skills that are desired by those whorecommend such goals?

Today's educational demands will not permitmisty, cloudy cisign if the society is to survive.Skinner sees education as an extremely importantaspect of our lives, and although his theory includesattention to the individual, the urgency of adoptinghis scheme is based upon soceity's needs rather thanindividual needs. His theory is designed to coordinatesocial productivity rather than to encourage idiosyn-cratic development. His central interest is in a kind ofcultural transmission which is effected by usingcarefully planned methods. The precise designpermits each individual one mode of behaving. If allbehavior follows the prescription. the result will be anabsolutely predictable society. Such a society isSkinner's intention rather than development ofindividual potential and the enhancement of personalexperience. (Evans. 1968:68)

Skinner thinks that a carefully designed societywill result in maximized individual development. Hisview is the exact opposite of Rogers' which contendsthat self-enhancement results in the optimum society.Skinner writes, "Education is perhaps the mostimportant branch of scientific technology. It deeplyaffects the lives of all of us." (Skinner. 1968:19)Education, for him, is the effecting of an exact pat-tern of behavior in the life of each person. No longercan we permit the educational system to operate inoutdated modes as directed by traditional conceptual-izations. Educators can, and must, use currentlyavailable technology in the process of molding precisebehavior patterns. The potential role of the educatorin redesigning the society is tremendous.

Although Skinner is somewhat critical of thecurrent use of traditional methods in education. heshould. by no means, be associated with othereducational critics. In some ways Skinner defends oureducational system, and Dewey's ideas as well. Hefeels that American schools are suffering from over-population and from lack of popular support. Yetthese schools are turning out many productivepeople. The schools of today are better than those offifty years ago; earlier schools could not have solvedicurrent problems as well as they are actually beinghandled. Skinner simply feels that improvement ispossible. (Evans, 1968:68)

Skinner, while declaring that educators havedone a good job relative to the resources at theirdisposal and given the attitudes of the public towardsthem, holds that much more could be accomplishedby changing to his approach. For example, the use ofteaching machines might. in addition to increasingthe effectiveness of educational methods. have asalutary effect upon educational philosophy. Byplacing themselves within. and by being subjected to,the educational patterns Skinner prescribes, bothteachers and students will change their ways ofthinking, and therefore. their ways of behaving.Skinner would not use, theoretically, the concept of"Thinking." For him, the use of such conceptsconfuses one who is attempting a scientific analysis ofbehavior.

A fundamental criticism of traditional methodsused in controlling human behavior, especially com-mon in traditional educational practice. centers inSkinner's conceptualization of aversive control.Teachers are committed to a philosophical stancewhich is based upon a "punitive system." Dropouts.truants, and vandals are by-products of this "aversivecontrol." The traditional approach, characterized by anegative reinforcement pattern, is inefficient inproducing the stated goals of education. For example,some teachers assign additional homework as"punishment" and excuse students from 'school 'workas "reward." By such procedure they reinforce kindsof behavior other than that indicated by theeducators' declared goals.

Although now largely in disuse, corporal punish-ment is an example of aversive control. With itsabandonment. teachers merely adopted other kinds ofaversive measures. such as ridicule, scolding,sarcasm, criticism. incarceration, extra work, with-drawal of privileges, forced labor, and ostracism.Skinner maintains that "the student spends a greatpart of his day doing things he does not want to do."(Skinner, 1968:96) In such an educational environ-ment. behavior has not been stated precisely in termsof educational goals: therefore, rather than movementtoward the hazily chosen goals. the educationalexperience merely reinforces techniques of escapeand avoidance. A "technology of teaching" advocatespositive reinforcement of the precisely defined.desired behavior.

Since Skinner wishes to construct an environmentin which the individual is manipulated toward aspecific goal, some might see little basic differencebetween his approach and the coercive methodswhich have been used for generations in controllingbehavior. Skinner distinguishes his approach by

tacitly holding some methods of control as non-coercive. That is control by reward, or "reinforce-ment." is essentially not aversive. Whereas theteacher using the traditional coercive methodsarranged for consequences of undesirable behavior,his plan focuses upon the teacher manipulating theconsequences of desirable behavior. The teachershould not threaten the student with certain penaltiescontingent upon socially undesirable behavior; "Youwill be unable to get a job unless you do your schoolwork well." Rather. the educational environmentshould be arranged so the student will be constantly.consistently. and immediately reinforced for thesocially desired behavior. Within such theoreticalargument the statement, "The problem is to inducepeople not to be good but to behave well" (Skinner,1971:67) makes sense.

Skinner mentions the schools set up by Neill,Tolstoy. Russell. and the social experiments ofanarchists. (Skinner, 1968:102-103) He believes allfailed. He considers them to be therapeutic. possibly.for youth who have been badly treated, but they arenot "educational." Withholding punishment mayhelp a child, but something more is needed. Themissing ingredient is positive reinforcement whichrewards the behavior of a socially adequate person.

Those educators who idealize an abstractionlabeled "freedom" may fail to understand howSkinner is consistently able to advocate a technologyof precise control, based on a deterministic science ofhuman behavior. while holding that each man isabsolutely unique. An educational theory whichdefines teaching as the arrangement of contingenciesof reinforcement in such manner as to precisely andcompletely control the individual's behavior appearsto be inimical to notions of freedom, inquiry, andoriginality. An understanding of Skinner's theorydepends completely upon the adoption of his initialassumptions.

Skinner repeatedly states that individuals haveno choice concerning who they are or what they do;each person is not ling more than the product ofgenetic and social influences. This kind of determinis-tic assumption is useful for the professional, arguesSkinner. because it encourages him to look forcauses. The attitude of the teacher who believes astudent is governed by some inner faculty (forexample. the self of Rogers' theory), or that thestudent acts by caprice. is not likely to look in theclassroom environment for the influencing factors.Skinner believes such a teacher will be less able thanthe determinist to explain a given behavior: also. hewould be less efficient in manipulating a student into

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the precise behavioral patterns which Skinner desires.Further. Skinner points out that behavior labeled

"free" or "non-conforming" is not necessarilydesirable. How useful are the idiosyncrasies of thepsychotic? A nightmare is original, but it is not usefulin behavioristic psycheli,gy. Anarchists and rebels arenot necessarily valuable to either themselves or theirsociety. One can hardly deny Skinner's basic position:"A culture inust remain reasonably stable, but itmust also change if it is to increase its chances ofsurvival." (Skinner, 1968:171) The idiosyncrasieswhich do arise in the behavior of individuals aresometimes useful and sometimes harmful. Thevaluable ones e ill be selected by the greater societyand incorporated within its evolutionary development.With occasional statements. Skinner seems to agree.to some extent, with those who champion "freedom":"so long as obviously dangerous and harmfulvariations can be avoided or dealt with, anythingwhich encourages individuality is probably a move inthe right direction." (Skinner, 1968:172)

For one who holds consistently to the assumptionof environmental determinism, as does Skinner. theindividual can never be "free." The individual ex-periencing an awareness of himself in relation to thevarious elements of a particular situation. and thencognitively making an intelligent choice of behavioralalternatives, is precluded by the assumption ofenvironmental determinism. If environmental condi-tions determine the individual's response, then theindividual is absolutely dependent. He will bedirected in his behavior by other people or he will bedependent upon "things." Skinner does not point outthat such assumption and its resultant state ofdependency may indeed cause the individual to feeldependent on both people and things. Skinnerdiscusses the teaching of a child within a practical.everyday situation. The example he chooses concernsthe problem of the child getting to school on time.Possibly the child is dependent upon his parents'direction. "It's time to go." Or, "Hurry up or you'llmiss the bus." The child can only be "free" fromthis kind of interpersonal direction if he becomesdependent upon clocks or other stimuli which wouldresult in the behavior called "getting to school ontime." The parents and the teacher should recognizeexactly what behavior patterns they are reinforcing.Since Skinner's theory is focused completely onproduct or precisely, designated terminal behavior,he does not discuss the possibility of the individualconsidering the particular situation and then redefin-ing the behavior in terms of how he views itsrelevance in his own life. For example, the high

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school senior might or might not be a "slave" to thebehavior labeled "getting to school on time" or."getting to school on time" might. in some cases. bedefined in terms, by the student, independent ofclocks. Possibly the student might choose not to go toschool at all. Precise definition of terminal behaviorand reinforcing patterns precludes such consider-ations.

How the sentient individual operates within anexistence which allows no personal choices is notquite clear. Skinner says that the individual maystruggle to free himself from the ultimate aversiveconsequences of certain positive reinforcement.Drugs. flattery, and incentive wages are examples ofreinforcements which may be seen temporarily aspositive ones. A powerful technology of education willextend the kind of freedom sought by the individualin this struggle against the control of positivereinforcement by permitting him to behave "underminimal control of practical consequences." (Skinner,1968:172-173; cf. Evans. 1968:54) Tacitly. Skinnerseems to be advocating the education of individualsso they will be able to make choices identical to the"awareness choices" advocated by Rogers. Many ofSkinner's explicit statements will not, however, allowthis interpretation.

John Dewey advocated 'a learning situation inwhich the child learned by doing. Carl Rogersemphasizes individual. personal exploration anddiscovery. Skinner is remarkably similar to thesecredenda in some of his arguments for individualdevelopment. He uses terminology different from thatof Dewey or Rogers, but the tone and goal may byproximate. He provides an illustration in which aparent buys his child a new toy. When (he toy isbrought home. the parent will almost always carefullyinstruct the child concerning the exact mode of itsuse. This corresponds to Skinner's general advocacyof precise behavioral patterns. Yet in this case, heexplicitly deplores such practice. (Skinner. 1968:179)By such action the parent is not arranging contingen-cies which would result in individual exploration andpersonal discovery. Skinner believes the schoolcurriculum is seldom designed to protect or strength-en the contingencies responsible for individualcuriosity and exploration. In the practice described inthe above example. valuable contingencies whichwould shape and maintain such behavior as reachingtoward and grasping a novel object and exploring itspossibilities are destroyed. He believes the child canbe directed yet permitted to "think" as an individual.Exactly how such independent thought fits into thedeterministic philosophic framework is not discussed.

He writes:We can teach the student to think for him-self without sacrificing the advantages ofknowing what others thought. He will notwaste time in discovering what is alreadyknown. but what is known must he transmit-ted in a form he is most likely to usepar-ticularly in those unforeseeable environ-ments in which his contribution as an indi-vidual will be most conspicuous. (Skinner,1968:178-179)

If an "environment" (an actual situation in life)is unforeseeable." then a precise behavior patternfor that situation can neither be designed norpredicted. In such a situation the person's use ofknowledge in a unique "contribution" is identicalwith personally chosen action, as discussed in otherpsychological theories. Skinner's "personal utility"seems close to Dewey's thought. and "individualcontribution" seems close to Rogers' thought.Presumably. theoretical distinctions can be madefrom Skinner's frame of reference. He does notenlarge upon the individual student's unique contri-bution. Within the deterministic theory such contribu-tion could directly result from an unconsciouslypossessed genetic and social heritage. If suchassumption is correct, the individual essentiallycontributes nothing during his own life. Also. thesource of his genetic and social heritage raisesperplexing problems. Skinner advocates ignoring suchembarrassing questi,as. (Skinner. 1971:12)

The quotation above probably does not accuratelyreflect the central thrust of Skinner's educationaltheory. The operant view emphasizes the responseand the contingent consequence. In order to teachany subject from the behaviorist viewpoint, a closeexamination of the terminal behavior is mandatory.Furthermore, if the terminal response is complex, thesequential set of responses must be carefullyspecified. When this task of specification is com-pleted. the student must be analyzed to determinewhich stimuli will operate upon him most efficientlyas reinforcers. A reinforcer may be a smile, verbalpraise. M and M's, or the most generalized reinforcerin our society, money. The educator. as an operantconditioner, can initiate the learning process (definingas response a 'quisition). The educator arranges thereinforcement achedule: he also chooses and preciselydefines the terminal behavior.

The procedural tool which most closely fits thisdefintion of education is the teaching machine.Factual material is presented. a response is required.and reinforcement follows in the form of blinkinglights or some other device to indicate "correct"

answers. The student is, in this way, manipulatedalong a prescribed path of behavioral responses. Inthis approach the curriculum is organized on thebasis of various capacities, or abilities, rather than inspecific subject matter areas, i.e.. history, geographyor literature.

Such curriculum design should not be confusedwith the old idea of "developing mental disciplines."Capacities and abilities refer to skills in oven,individual response to prescribed stimuli. The factthat Skinner's curriculum would focus attention onthe individual student can be misinterpreted. Specificstatements made by Skinner must be used carefully ifthey are to fit the tenor of the total theory. Skinnersays. "I'm much more concerned with the students'so-called personality traitshis interest in what he'sdoing, his perseverance. his ability to stick with anunpleasant task, his enjoyment of literaturethingslike that." (Evans. 1968:70-73) Notice the term''so-called."

In the above quotation. Skinner clearly warnsthat he is using traditional terminology, not theprecise terminology that would accurately reflect histheory. Terms like personality traits. interest,perseverance. ability. and enjoyment must becarefully translated if they are to be congruent withhis total theory. Each term must be made to fit abehaviorism which omits mentalistic processes. Forexample. behavior that has traditionally been ex-plained by the use of the terms interest andperseverance are, in Skinner's theory. explained interms of "not losing the subject." Skinner's studentsare warned early in their laboratory work to "not losetheir pigeon." If the contingencies of reinforcementare planned with enough precision, the subject whosebehavior is being manipulated will be led smoothlyfrom one step to the next. His behavior, whether thesubject is a pigeon or a student. will correspond tothat behavior which has been traditionally attributedto "interest." Continuation of smooth. precisemanipulation is descriptive, for Skinner, of the samebehavior that has been explained by attributing apersonal characteristic of "perseverance" to thebehaving individual.

Skinner's focus on the individual and Rogers'fords on the individual can only be contrasted, notcimpared. The opposing approaches have no funda-mental point in common. For Skinner. the activity ofthe individual must be carefully controlled if theparamount goal, a designed society, is to result. ForRogers, the individual self has an intrinsic value: itshould not be utilized by external agents for purposesof social design. Skinner desires absolute control of

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individual behavior in order to realize a product.Rogers deplores control of individual behavior; hewould minimize such control in order that theindividual could experience a process.

Following the above explanation. the readershould be able to distinguish between skinner'sration of the "student's interest" and Rogers' idea of"personal meaning for the student." In the behav-iorist scheme "interest" means smooth, efficient.external manipulation of the behavior. In thephenomenological scheme. the initiative of behavioris internal; the individual ch vses his mode ofbehavior using some internal frame of referencelabeled meaning. A clear understanding of eithertheory, if examined from the opposing point of view,may be impossible.

Skinner believes that lack of understandinghinders the acceptance of his approach to education.He argues that power frightens people, and theefficiency of his theory of control represents a greatsource of power. He thinks that it is within thiscontext that some. critics of his theory say teachingmachines and programmed learning will meanregimentation. He says that "nothing could be moreregimented than education as it now stands."(Skinner, 1968:90) He cites the required syllabuses,entrance requirements, standardized examinations.certificates, diplomas. and honors for specifiedbehavior. He argues that we do not need to worryabout these conformity-oriented goals because weknow the current methods are so inefficient that thestudents never learn what the stated goals prescribe.(Skinner. 1968:90.91) He would define exactly thedesired behavior, then create the educational environ-ment which will result precisely in that behavior.

Concerning regimentation, Skinner realizes thathis technology could be "misused." It could make allmen alike. It could limit the beneficial effects ofaccidents on the evolutionary development of bothindividual and society. Yet if used "wisely." it couldmaximize the genetic endowment of each individual:it could build the greatest diversity of interests; itcould enable each individual to make the maximumpossible contribution to the survival and developmentof the society. Skinner is emphatic: the means of suchcontrol is available; the technology will be used inone way or another. He hopes it will be used"wisely." (Skinner, 1968:91)

The behaviorist's basic assumptions abouthuman nature and the possibilities of control requirethat he accept a certain view, or at least limit hispossible perceptions, when viewing other theoreticalapproaches. In line with this pattern, Skinne

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declares that the humanist who uses persuasion.argument. inducement. emulation. or enthusiasm toget a student to learn is controlling the student justas much as the person who uses a machine or"programmed learning." The question is merely oneof method. Skinner deplores inefficiency. He thinkstraditional trmulations of the learning process havebeen tried for two or three thousand years and havebeen proved ineffective. His technology of teaching isa new conception focused upon methodology. Skinnerexplains:

The whole thing is a question of method.That's the crux of my argument with CarlRogers: I'd like people to be approximatelyas Rogers wants them to be. I want indepen-dent people. and by that I mean people whodon't have to be told when to act or whodon't do things just because they've beentold they're the right things to do. But howdo you build independence? I'm convincedthat I can specify methods which will bemore effective than Rogers'. I just don'tthink his conception of inner determiners isvalid. We agree on our goals: we each wantpeople to be free of the control exercised byothersfree of the education they have had.so that they profit by it but are not bound byit. and so on. This is all part of the educa-tional design which I'm trying to implement.not only with teaching machines but with theapplication of an experimental analysis toclassroom management. It boils down to aquestion of method. not of the ultimateworth of the individual. I want to preservethe dignity and worth of a man, too. (Evans.19ht4:7-6/4)

This statement must be accepted from Skinner'spoint of view. This is not to say that Rogers wouldagree. nor would one working outside either Rogers'or Skinner's theory necessarily agree. Skinner seesthe essence of his approach. as well as the crux of hisdifference with Rogers. as simply methodologicalprocedure. Does he in fact define independence the

same as Rogers does? How much of their differencescould be centered in fundamental differences in theways they define the human being? What doesSkinner mean. exact/v. by the last statement of thequotation, considering the title and content of hislatest book? (cf. Skinner. 1971) Further discussion ofthese questions will be found in later sections.

Within the present context. we note only that such

questions may hinder the educator's efforts to trans-late psychological theory into educational practice.

A certain amount of frustration may accompany

any effort to put theoretical conceptualizations intoeveryday practice. The problems in attempting toimplement Skinner's theory are great. He realizesthat educational change will come slowly. Some of hisrecommendations could be used as adjuncts to otherkinds of teaching. He is not entirely satisfied withthis measure of improvement. To merely borrow afew of his notions and tack them on to traditionalphilosophy and procedure is really not an implemen-tation of his theory. Yet. exactly how to proceed whenone completely accepts his theory is not evenspecified by Skinner himself'.

Smoothly changing behavior (participation, coop-eration. or interest. in traditional terminology) is vitalto the theory of operant conditioning. Emphasis mustbe focused upon the individual behaving organism.Each must be observed and reinforced appropriately;therefore, an educational situation in which theindividual student can move ahead at his own rate isdesired. Yet Skinner realizes that if every studentwere actually allowed to do so. the confusion wouldbe intolerable. Skinner confesses that he does notknow how to solve such problems. but he feelsstrongly that they cannot by neglected any longer:they must be solved. He states emphatically. "Wesimply must not hole hack quick students or forceslow students to go so fast that they miss importantsteps and hence go still slower and eventuallybecome hopelessly discouraged." (Evans. 1968:74)

An emotion-laden. mentalistic term like "dis-couraged" does not fit into Skinner's behavioraltheory. In the quotation above he is concerned, quiteobviously, with ''losing his pigeon." He is arguingfor individual reinforcement schedules. His advocacyof teaching machines is one of his attempts to solveeducational problems. Machines. correctly designedand programmed. do offer the desired reinforcement.Such machines. however, are not essential foroperant conditioning to take place. Indeed. their usemay not be the most efficient method of practicingbehavior modification in many educational situations.Consider the following example.

Hill Walker and his research associates at theUniversity of Oregon have used behavior modificationtechnology in adverse educational circumstances.Their cart:11111y designed and reported experimentswere undeniably successful in changing and control-ling behavior. (Walker, et. al.. 1971; Walker andBuckley. 1972)

In one experiment twelve students from gradesfour. five and six were selected, all of whompossessed a number of behaviors which inhibitedlearning.

Teacher defiance, distractibility, hyperactivi-ty. and tantrum behavior were attributed tothe group as a whole. Individual behaviorsexhibited were physical and verbal abuse ofpeers. pre-delinquent behaviors (stealing.smoking. glue-sniffing) rejection Of peer in-traction. and excessive verbal outbursts(swearing. loud noises. etc.) These behav-iors were identified as most annoying to theregular classroom teacher; vet the subjectsexhibited many additional behaviors illustra-tive of inadequate social and academic ad-justment. (Walker. et. al 1971:2-3)

Since the students were academically retarded inmath. reading. language. and spelling, instructionalattention was focused on these basic skill areas.Materials used included programmed tests. booksfrom the students' regular classrooms. and someteacher prepared material.

Timers and a display hoard with flashing lightswere essential in effecting the reinforcement sched-ules. Individual timers were placed on each student'sdesk, and they were used in a variety of ways to meetthe specific behavioral requirements of each child. Alarge timer. placed in the front of the room, was usedto record and monitor group behavior. Behaviorcorresponding to that desired by the experimentersresulted in the accumulation of both individual andgroup points. Students could exchange their individu-al points fir free time, model cars. airplanes. games.books. paints, baseballs, and footballs. The groupcould exchange group points for activities of itschoice such as slot car racing. pool. howling.swimming. or museum trips.

Lights and butters informed students how theirbehavior was being evaluated. whether appropriate orinappropriate. Timers were not permitted to run (themethod of gaining points) concurrent with inappropri-ate behavior. Individual misbehnvior stopped thegroup timer as well as the misbehaving individual'stimer. In addition to the focus upon individualreinforcement. a group reinforcing climate wascreated which was particularly potent since itincorporated positive stimuli. (trips and other "fun"activity) and aversive consequences (peer disap-proval) into the same procedure.

After appropriate behavior became fairly stabi-lized. reinforcement schedules were modified in astaging technique designed to phase the studentshack into the regular classroom environment. Anessential part of transferring the student from theexperimental to the normal environment was thechange of focus from the contrived rein forcers

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(trinkets) to the kinds of social reinfiircers whichobtain in the typical classroom. Three months afterthe experiment. six of the students were observed.along with their classmates. in a regular classroomsetting. Data from these observations indicate a highpersistence of treatment effects.

Comparison of pre-experiment and post-experi-ment tests revealed impre..ssi% e academic gains.Walker and his associates beliese that the model ofbehtnior modification they followed was very effectivein changing both wending behavior and academic

The treatment model was very effective inproducing behavior change among the sub-jects in Experiment 1. This group producedappropriate attending belt:whir an average or39 percent of the time airing baseline and90 percent of the time dining treatment. Themean difference of 51 percent between thetwo conditions was swistically significantbeyond .001. (Walker. et. al., 1972:17)

A second experiment was designed to evaluatereinforcement components of the behavior treatmentmodel. (Walker, el. al.. 1971:21-30) Walker and hisassociates' conclusion was as follows:

Three components of the treatment model,token reinforcement, social reinforcement.and aversive controls were evaluated interms of their efficiency or potency in con-trolling the behavior of a second group offive subjects. The results indicated that so-cial reinforcement exercised the greatestcontrol over the subjects' behavior whileaversive controls were slightly less effectivein controlling the same behavior. Token rein-forcement exercised surprisingly little con-trol over the subjects' attending behavior.(Walker, et. al.. 1971:30)

Further experiment by Walker (Walker andBuckley. 1972) show as conclusively as did the firsttwo experiment% that a method of control. generallylabeled behavior modification. works in some educa-tional situations. Timers and lights are substituted forteaching machines. Students do indeed conform tosocially desired behavior. The only major deviationfrom Skinner's theory that was used in Walker'sexperiments was that concerning aversive control.Skinner believes such control is ineffective whileWalker found it to he very effective. Viewed withinan overall evaluation of Skinner's theory, or withinthe context of implementation feasibility, the onepoint of difference may he of no major importance.

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The experimental detail offered above is includedas only one of numerous possible examples whichillustrate conclusively that operant conditioning is aneffective Mea of controlling some behavior. of someindividuals. in some situations. If those persons who

are participating in such a program conform toSkinner's bask assumptions. the efficiency of thebehaviorist theory is unassailable. No comparableexperimental data has been obtained which indicatesthat an entire society, however. can be enticed toaccept Skinner's assumptions.

Different philosophical assumptions seem toenable their respective adherents to view the currenteducational scene with extremely divergent conclu-sions and recommendations. As stated. Skinnerbelieves his educational design would augment theunique individual's opportunities of realizing his ownpotential maximum. relative to his genetic andenvironmental circumstances. His thought may becontrasted with a number of rather vocal critics ofcu.ent educational methods. Paul Goodman (1956:l'462: 1%4). Edgar Z. Friedenberg (1959; 1965). andJules licitry (14h3) share a common belief thatcootempotary society and its educational system limitthe individual in the process of learning. They believethe present system is performing too efficiently in thesocialiiation process. Critics belonging to this groupbeliexe th:lt parents. teachers. guidance counselors.school administrators, and adults in general. seduceand werce youth into paths of self-denial. The adultworld. epitomized in the educational system. fircesthe child Imo too much conformity. (cf. Schrag.146') Essentially. the question being raised is, "Arewe becoming a society of over conformists"? Skinnerbelieves his theory would permit less conformity thanis now stated in educational goals; only theinefficiency of current methodology allows theindividual great flexibility. Rogers and other human-istically oriented psychologists and educators tearSkinner's proposals. (Time. 1971:47-53) They arcafraid the technical. mechanistic approach wouldinduce even greater conformity. Skinner argues thathis methodology could be used to produce regimenta-tion. but that this is not au inevitable result of hissuggest ions.

Commenting on this issue. Skinner makes thefollowing statement:

I think man could be much less conformingthan he is. Our school systems could bringpeople even more under the control of thenatural environment and less under the con-trol of "what other people say." what theyread. what they memorize by way of rituals

which control their daily life. I'm all for that.But that would raise problems on its own; aworld in which people were freely and wildlyoriginal could be a very difficult world to livein. too. A certain amount of conformity isneeded for just the ordinary articulation of agroup. I don't feel. personally, that it is par-ticularly valuable to ride the issue of con-formity in defining a better world. Noncon-formity is not what you want, any more thanconformity. You want people who aremaking the most of themselves, and thisusually means people who are least undercontrol of manners. customs, and otherpeople. I seldom think in terms of conform-ity: I don't think its a useful concept.(Evans, I914:7-1-75)

Again, the reader finds the meaning of Skinner'sspecific statement by carefully aligning it with thetotal theory. Skinner says he wishes people to be"less under the control of what other people say"and more under environmental control. His total

theory advocates precise design of the environment.Distinction between being controlled by what otherpeople say and being controlled by an environmentdesigned by other people is lacking. Presumably thefirst refers to action that results from some verbal.philosophical influence, and the latter is directphysical manipulation.

The degree of efficiency may be the only funda-mental difference between verbal control and non-verbal control. If Skinner's critics are equating controland regimentation and Skinner is not, his statement.as quoted above. will not allay their fears. Conformityis. in many minds, connected to notions of beingcoerced into a pattern of behavior. Such coercion isindeed advocated by Skinner throughout his theory.As he applies his theory to education. Skinner secsthe teacher as the controller whose primary duty is tomanipulate the students along prescribed behavioralpatterns.

The preparation of teachers is of paramountconcern to Skinner. He notes the pedagogy is not aprestigious study. Skinner thinks educational psychol-ogists have spent the last fifty years measuring the

results of teaching without adequately analyzing

teaching itself. Pedagogy has not been a truetechnology of teaching. College teaching has hardlybeen taught at all, while elementary and high schoolteaching has been primarily by a kind of apprentice-ship. Possibly some skills are handed along, but themajor source of teacher education seems to be theyoung teacher's own experience. Some even arguethat a good teacher is simply one who knows his

subject very well. Skinner does not agree. Hebelieves a science of teaching is necessary. Teachersneed the kind of help offered by his scientific analysisof behavior. (Skinner. 1968:93.95) The process of edu-cation is far too important. and too complex. to beleft to casual experience. He believes the teachershould be a specialist in human behavior whoseoccupation is to bring about complex changes incomplex material. His scientific analysis helps theteacher in two ways: it offers standard materials andmethods, and it supplies the understanding of humanbehavior which is essential in creating solutions tonew problems. (Skinner. 1968:255-2561

In his "experimental study" of learning Skinnerhas found that the contingencies of reinforcementwhich are most efficient in controlling the studentcannot be arranged directly through personal media-tion of the teacher. Mechanical and electrical devicesshould be used. As a reinforcing mechanism theteacher is extremely inefficient when compared withmechanical devices such as teaching machines(Skinner, 1968:21.22) Skinner's definition of teachingmust be kept in mind. He says, "That's all teachingis. arranging contingencies which bring aboutchanges in behavior." (Evans. 1968:59; cf. Green.1964) For Skinner. one of the tragedies of currenteducation is that the teacher does not have too manyreinforcers at his disposal. Prizes. tokens. pats on theback. approval, and attention are the kinds ofreinforcer% which are sometimes used by teachers.(Evans. 1968:61.62) Such reinforcing techniques mustbe improved.

All of Skinner's proposals emphasize aficiener.Within his view of educational needs the use ofteaching machines is essential to attain maximumefficiency. Population is not only increasing. but agreater percentage of that larger population desiresan education. Educators must avail themselves ofmore advanced techniques and equipment if theschools are to meet the demands of the society.Remands in most areas of the society lead toinvention and rapid acceptance of labor-savingequipment and methods. According to Skinner.education seems relatively slow to make the 'amekinds of adjustments because or misconceptions ofthe educational task.

For a number of years, of course. audio-visualaids have been used in a supplementaty role.Eventually, they may take the place of lectures.demonstrations, and textbooks. Use of audio-visualaids represents. however. only one function of theteacher. This function is to present material to thestudent so clearly and so interestingly that the

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student learns. According to Skinner another functionmust be facilitated, a function which engages thestudent on an individual basis. He desires the kind ofinterchange which is often possible if the teacher-student ratio is one to one. He refers to the tutorialmethod.

Productive educational interchange. according toSkinner, becomes possible in the tutorial situation.Population pressures have greatly limited this aspectof education. and if educational hardware is usedincreasingly merely to present information, thetutorial teacher-pupil relationship may be destroyedaltogether. Skinner sees this process causing thestudent to become more and more a mere passivereceiver of instruction. He denounces this trend andstates his desire to see teaching machines designedand used which encourage the student to take anactive role in the educational process. Machineswhich present material. test. score. and reinforcecorrect behavior immediately not only engage thestudent in the desired manner but also permit eachindividual to progress at his own speed. (Skinner.1968:29-30)

Such a teaching machine brings the student intocontact with the person who composed the materialwhich it presents. One programmer (theoretically atop expert in his field) is in contact with an infinitenumber of students. Although some educators viewthis process as a form of mass production. Skinnerbelieves the effect upon each student is surprisinglylike that of a private tutor. He feels this comparisonholds in the following respects:

(1) There is a constant interchange betweenprogram and student. Unlike lectures. text-books. and the usual audio-visual aids. themachine induces sustained activity. The stu-dent is always alert and busy. (2) Like agood tutor, the machine insists that a givenpoint by thoroughly understood. either frameby frame or set by set. before the studentmoves on. Lectures. textbooks. and theirmechanical equivalents. on the other hand.proceed without making sure that the stu-dent understands and easily leaves him be-hind. (3) Like a good tutor the machinepresents just that material for which thestudent is ready. It asks him to take onlythat step which he is at the moment bestequipped and most likely to take. (4) Like askillful tutor the machine helps the studentcome up with the right answer. It does thisin part through the orderly construction ofthe program and in part with such tech-niques as hinting. prompting. and suggest-

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ing. derived from an analysis of verbalbehavior. (5) Lastly. of course. the machine.like the private tutor, reinforces the studentfor every correct response, using this imme-diate feedback not only to shape hisbehavior most efficiently but to maintain itin strength in a manner which the laymanwould describe as "holding the student'sinterest." (Skinner. 1968:37-39)

The task of programming the material for thismethod of education is indeed formidable. In a

textbook a confusing passage is not critical: hope-full. it can and will be clarified by the teacher. Incontrast. the machine material must be self-containedand wholly adequate. Skinner recommends thesesteps be followed in the construction of a program.(Skinner. l968:48-49)

(I) Define the field.(2) Collect technical terms. facts. laws. principles.

and cases.(3) Arrange these in developmental orderlinear if

possible. branching if necessary.(4) Distribute the material among the frames Of a

program to achieve an arbitrary density.(5) Choose techniques for strengthening responses

and transferring control from one variable toanother. according to a given schedule.

0) Mechanically seed previously learned terms andfacts among succeeding material to keep it active.

Skinner's educational plan would assign tasks:hat can he mechanized to machines and thus permitthe teacher to assume "his proper role as an indis-pensable human being." (Skinner. 1968:55) Oneteacher could accommodate more students in fewerhours with less routine chores. Possibly his greaterefficiency. Skinner suggests. would be rewarded byincreasing financial remuneration for his services.

Instituting the program would result in variouschanges in educational practice. For example.grouping students in grade levels would not benecessary since each student could move at his own

rate. Grades would change in meaning. Traditionally.a "C" might mean the student had acquired asmattering of the course. If machines instructionassures mastery at every stage. a measurement couldonly indicate how far the student has gone. not howwell he knows the materia..

Students who are able to proceed rapidly couldnot only move vertically to more difficult Material.but they could also enrich and broaden theireducational experience by choosing additional pro-grams in lateral movement. Sutdents who miss schoolfor any reason could pick up exactly where they werewith no problems. Home study could be facilitated.When teachers are unavailable. students could betaught with adequately programmed machines.

The constant theme in Skinner's theory ofeducation is the need to carefully define the exactbehavior we desire. search for the environmentalconditions which reinforce that behavior, and thendesign the most effective contingencies of reinforce-ment. He says to impart knowledge is simply "tobring behavior of given topography under the controlof given variables.** (Skinner. 1968:203; cf. 196b.184)

He concludes his book on education with achapter in which he emphasizes the dire necessity ofimplementing his "technology of teaching" if societyis to survive. Power. control, and his brand ofeducation arc inseparably mixed within his theoreticalformulations:

Absolute power in education is not a seriousissue today because it seems out of reach.However. a technology of teaching will needto be much more powerful if the race withcatastrophe is to be won, and it may then,like any powerful technology, need to becontained. An appropriate coanter-controlwill not be generated as a revolt against co-ercive measures but by a polity designed tomaximize the contributions which euucationwill make to the strength of the culture. Theissue is important because the governmentof the future will probably operate mainlythrough educational techniques. (Skinner.1968:260)

ROGERS ON EDUCATION

Almost twenty years have passed since CarlRoget . was invited to a Harvard conference on-Classrixm Approaches to Influencing Behavior":there. he presented his views. little expecting "thetumult which followed. Feelings ran high." (Rogers.

1961:273-275) The essence of Rogers' approach haschanged little during the intervening years.

Rogers had been requested to put on ademonstration of "student-centered teaching." Hefelt that a two-hour session with such a sophisticated

group, trying to help them formulate their owtpurposes. and responding to their feelings as theystruggled in the experience might be an extremely"artificial" experience. Yet this had been. and stillis. the essence of his educational approach. Hesimply did not know what he would do. or what hewould present. (Rogers. I9(1:273) At this time hewent to Mexico for a winter quarter vacation. He didsome painting, writing, and photography. (TheRogerian teacher focuses upon his own life andexperience). He spent much time on this trip"reading and digesting** the writings of SorenKierkegaard. (Rogers. 1969:151) As the Harvardconference date approached. he was confronted withthe obligation he had accepted.

In the past he had occasionally started classdiscussions by stating some very personal opinion ofhis own. then spending the rest of the session tryingto understand and accept the various reactions andfeelings of the students. Such sessions sometimesresulted in deep "meaningful" experiences for theparticipants. A similar session seemed to be onepossible way of handling the Harvard assignment.Accordingly. he sat down and wrote the feelings hehad at the moment about teaching and learning. Theresult was only three brief pages. He explains. "Isimply put down what I felt. with assurance that .ifhad not got it correctly, the discussion would help toset me on the right track." (Rogers. 1.461:27-1)

At the conference. Rogers used a few momentsto present his views, almost immediately opening themeeting for discussion. He had not realized theinflamatory nature of the brief paper. The meetingexploded with spontaneous. individual reactions tothe presentation. Some felt Rogers was threateningtheir jobs: some felt he was saying things he did notreall mean. Rogers refused to defend himself' fromthe numerous attacks. He tried to accept andempathise with the frustration being felt by theetL.ators. He tried to point out that he had onlystated sonic personal views. He had neither askednor expected others to agree. During the storm ofdiscussion. members of the group expressed a varietyof significant feelings about teaching. It was a verythought-provoking session." (Rogers. 1%1:27.1)

During the day of Rogers' presentation. possiblyfew of the conference members remembered that thismeeting had been billed as a demonstratiot. ofstudent-centered teaching. Some. looking back. mayhave realized that they had indeed lived anexperience of the student-centered educationalapproach. The morning after the conference, asRogers was preparing to leave. one of the partici-

,

23

pants remarked. "You kept more people awake lastnight!" Rogers concluded the experience had been asuccessful one. Keeping people awake is no his goal.but helping them to examine their own experienceand ideas is. (Rogers. 196,1:273-278: cf. 14'69:151-155)

Consider certain factors in the description of thisexperience. Rogers recognizes the dangers of artifici-ality in attempts to create educational "situations."He sees the "good" teacher changing constantly."learning" with the students. and apart from them(both teacher and students being in "process"). Hesees the educational experience as "meaningful" toboth teacher and students: that is. the particulareducational experience is significant to the totalpersonal experience of each person. Rogers did nottry to "teach" the conference members anything. Hedid not have a precise goal. A belief, or a set of faets,as an educational terminus was not Rogers' plan. Hedid not feel threatened as others expresseddivergent views. He did not try to mold thoughtpatterns. In no way did he accept responsibility forwhat the other members chose to believe. He tried tobe himself as honestly as possible, while holding theidentical possibility for each of the other conferenceparticipants. The experience was personally oriented.and it contained many personal interactions betweenindividuals. This. for Rogers, is education.

Several years after its presentation at theHarvard conference, the brief paper was published.( Rogets. 1957b) It has been included in two ofRogers' books. (Rogers. 1%1: 1969) In spite of itsbrevity, this paper contains both his fundamentaltenets and the possible implications of his educationaltheory. His opening statement is profoundly revealingof his entire theoretical attitude. Here it is: "I wish topresent some very brief remarks in the hope that ifthey bring forth any reaction from you. I may getsome new light on my own ideas." (Rogers.1961:275) He does not pretend to impart knowledge:rather. his desire is to share experience and tocompare ideas. He finds it troubling to "think" abouthis experiences and then try to present them logicallyto others because so often these experiences onlyhave meaning for him alone: they may seem absurdto others. Yet he is willing to share some of his ownpersonal "meanings." holding them. even forhimself. on a very tentative basis. He does not arguethat these tenets are logically presented. only thatthey are important and meaningful. as presented. toRogers himself. (Rogers. 1961:275)

In the process of interweaving Rogers' psycho-logical theory with his educational suggestions. oneremembers that the phenomenological view holds

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changing of perceptions, or learning, as a function ofthe needs of the learner. External manipulation of theenvironment might modify behavior: it might not.Such external manipulation of the environment doesnot, from the individual's view. "cause" hisresponse. In the learner's mind, his acts are chosenas the best way to satisfy his immediate need.According to Rogers' theory. underlying all consciousand immediate needs is the maintenance andenhancement of self. In Rogers' view it is importantto realize that although a student may appear to theteacher to be "learning" to improve his performanceon a school lesson. he may really be maintaining astable self-image by appearing to be interested andthus keeping himself out of trouble. Any observableevidence of the "learning" may disappear quicklyand completely as soon as the student feels freedfrom teacher manipulation. The analysis of learningmust always include an appraisal from the student'spoint of view.

A key notion is that the individual's perception ofthe behaviors which lead to self-actualization is thebasis fin- his action. A distorted perception. therefore.may lead the individual toward destruction ratherthan to valid self-actualization. An implied tenet isthat man tries to be 'good." This position contrasts

ith Freud's concepts of the licentious id and thetrannical superego: the position also clearly con-trasts with Skinner's belief in the need for certainkinds of control. Rogers believes if man can perceiveclearly. or be given the opportunity to modifydistorted perceptions. his goe!-directed activity willlead to greater. positive self-actualization. Within thiscontext. the educator should not provide conclusions:he should provide only the opportunity for reducingdistorted perception. Given the opportunity. theindividual will select goals which arc self-actualizing.Further, the individual himself is in the best positionto determine which goals and methods meet thiscriterion.

For Rogers. teaching is the facilitation ofperceptual differentiation. or changes in meaning.Teaching is not a direct act. One cannot hand aperception to another person or cause a perception tooccur. In Rogers' view the problem of teaching is not"How do I present the subject matter?" but rather,"How can I help students perceive personal meaningin the subject matter?" That is, how can the teacherhelp the students relate the subject directly to theirlives? For Rogers. learning is a function of need:need is what the individual perceives as maintainingand enhancing to his self. Therefore. those elementsof "education" that are not perceived as self - relates'

are of little or no significanceprobably not"learned" at all within Rogers' definition of learning.

The following statements summarize some of thefundamental ideas of his educational theory: (cf.Rogers. 1961:276-277)

(1) One pc -son cannot teach another person how toteach.

121 Anything that can be "taught" to another is in-consequential.

(3) The only learning that significantly influencesbehavior is that which is self-discovered and self-appropriated.

(4) Such self-discovered "truth" cannot be directlycommunicated to another.With effort. one may. on occasion. succeed in"teaching" another something. but if this hap-pens it is damaging, not helpful. The person whohas been "taught" begins to distrust his ownexperience. if one's own experience is nottrusted. "significant" learning is stifled.

(5)

As a result of his experiences in therapeutic situ-ations. Rogers has lost interest in "being a teacher,''As he puts it. "1 realize that I am only interested inbeing a learner. preferably learning things thatmatter. that have sonic significant influence on myown behavior." (Rogers. 1961:276) He feels that oneof the best ways to learn is to drop one's defensive-ness and try to understand the °the. person's point ofview. Such practice opens up alto hative perceptions.Education is the process that facilitates personal"understanding." "Teaching." which emphasizesalmost exclusively the teacher's contribution to thelearning process. is rejected by Rogers. The centraltheme of facilitation is found in the teacher being aneffective, fully functioning person who is capable ofaiding the learner in sharpening his own perceptions.

Throughout a study of Rogers' theory. eveciallyas one focuses upon the teacher's role, one must takecare to avoid an easily made misinterpretation.Rogers is not concerned with a licentious experiencein which the learner responds to superficial psycho-logical stimulation. Letting the student "do his ownthing." if that is an unexamined commitment, is notthe teacher's role. Helping the learner in a personal-social definition of problems with personally relevantresolutions is the primary concern of the instructor.Examples of teaching that are commended by Rogerssupport this point. (Rogers. 1961:297-314: 1969:11 -57)

If the teacher is aware of his own experiencingprocess. and if he accepts his own uncertainties. then

the meaning of personal experience may be clarifiedfor both teacher and student. The Rogerian educatorbelieves both teacher and student (as persons)behave, or learn, in terms of what is real to theindividual, what is related to the self at the momentof action. What is actually "out there" (somethingtermed "reality." "factual knowledge." or "empiri-cally substantiated material") is not of centralimportance. Rather. it is the students' interpretationof reality and its perceived effect on his ownscl-system that motivates all of his learning andaction.

Although the student's needs arc all self-related.the sel -concept is linked inseparably to personalprecepis of the physical and social world in which Illyindividual lives. Maintenance of motivation. always aparamount problem of any prescriptixe approach toeducation. is no problem in the Rogerian %iew.Selfmotixation is intrinsic in the process. Rogersxiews motixation as a transactive process in whichinterpretations Of the environment define problems towhich the student chooses to respond. These inter-pretations and definitions, in turn. alter the student'sperceptions of both self and environment. Thestudent is always illOtiVated by being involved in theprocess of definitions. solutions. redetintions. andresolutions of self in relation to the perceiveden% ironment.

Rogers sees the learning-living experience as aprocess which. under optimum conditions, will carritself forward toward goals which are dimly defined.if designated at all: the individual's effort is focusedupon understanding the current meaning of thatprocess. This process is characterized by an ex erchanging complexity. The individual within this kindof educational process can he fascinated.. becausepersonal relexance and participation are guaranteed.He can also become frightened since he is risking hisself. Not only are the parameters of the experiencewithout careful definition; the method, or process. ofgetting whrrexer it is that one is going also lacksspecific delineation. tel. Rogers. 1461:276-2-1 II- theindidual has been socialized to select goals and plancarefully to reach them. he may experience difficultin accepting Rogers' formulations.

Rogers thinks learning can be dix nled into iwogeneral types. These types represent the extremeends of a continuum of meaning. At one end is thekind of task which has no meaning for the individual.He could be forced to memorize nonsense syllables orthe presidents of the United States. Whatever thesubject, nonsense learning is characterized by theseimportant factors: first. no personal meaning is

25

involved and second, the subject is difficult to learnand easy to forget. Rogers believes that largeportions of the present curriculum are of this nature.The second type of learning. at the other extreme ofa meaning continuum, is described as significant.meaningful, and centered in personal experience. Inthe moment-by-moment experiencing of his life theindividual discovers "things" (not objects. or facts,but units of meaning) in a way which involves bothhis thoughts and his feelings. This kind of learningprogresses from a natural curiosity, not fromdrudgery: such learning is relatively easily retainedbecause of the close personal connections to theexperience of the individual involved. (Rogers.

This second type Rogers labels "significantlearning." He writes:

By significant learning I mean learningwhich is more than an accumulation of facts.It is learning which makes a differenceinthe individual's benavior, in the course ofaction he chooses in the future. in his atti-tudes and in his personality. tRogers.1%1:2801

The kinds of changes Rogers believes result from thiskind of learning are:

(I) The person comes to sec himself differ-ently.

(2) He accepts himself and his feelings morefully.

131 He becomes more self-confident andself-directing.

14) He becomes more the person he wouldlike to be.

151 He becomes more flexible. less rigid, inhis perceptions.

(6) He adopts more realistic goals for him-self.

(7) He behaves in a more mature fashion.(8) He changes his maladjustive behaviors.

even such a long-established one aschronic alcoholism.

(9) He becomes more acceptant of others.110) He becomes more open to the evidence.

both to what is going on outside of him-self. and to what is going on inside ofhimself.

III) He changes in his basic personality char-acteristics, in constructive ways.1Rogers. 1%1:280-2811.

These points are taken directly from. and arccompletely consistent with. Rogers' psychological

26

theory of behavior as formulated from his experience'in psychotherapy. He is describing a pervasivelearning which is not just an accretion of knowledge.but it is a learning which interpenetrates everyportion of the individual's existence. (Rogers.1961:279.296. esp. 280)

Rogers' educational focus does not stand alone.The thinking of some other educational theoristsseems in close proximity. Jerome Bruner (1961) pro-poses that learning by discovery brings about acondition in which the solution to the problem (ratherthan teacher approval or approval of other socialagents) is rewarding. Traditional procedures of listen,recite, and reinforce with a grade are exchanged for aclimate allowing the individual student to hypothe-size. question. search. discover. verify. and master.Learning by discovery should. theoretically. result inintrinsic motivation. An assumption underlying thisposition is that a large part of human behavior iscontrolled by a desire for competence. Anyone whohas ever been exposed to children has heard themsay. "I want to do it myself." Every child. everydeveloping person in fact. once he believes himselfcapable of attempting something, wants to try itwithout help. The individual takes pleasure inwhatever he does successfully: he increases hisfeeling of confidence because he has proven hiscompetence to himself. Such experience reinforces forthe person a sense of his own worth. Discoverylearning assumes that an individual. if given theopportunity, will exploit his tendencies to learn moreabout himself and his environment.

An element of optimism pervades Rogers'psychological theory of behavior and carries overconsistently into his educational formulations. Heimplies a positive regard for the student's growthpotential and his possibilities of self-direction. Thetheory. focusing upon self-discovered and self-appro-priated learning as the only significant influence uponbehavior, envisions an educational setting which is tobe contrasted sharply with many current classroomenvironments. Traditionally, the school day has beenbroken into five to eight segments with a particularsubject assigned to each segment. Within eachsegment the teacher might have prepared a numberof readings and assigned problems which are. for onereason or another, significant for the teachernotnecessarily significant for the students.

From Rogers' frame of reference, what is wrongwith this arrangement? First, the procedure lumps allstudents together. That all students are ready to workon the same thing at the same time. can finish in thesame length of time, and can find personal

significance in the same experience, are theassumptions. Second, readings. problems, and exper-iences designed by one person (the teacher) are notnecessarily "real" for the student: indeed, theyusually are not real, according to Rogers. Third, theresponsibility for planning resides in the teacher'shands and little opportunity for student planning isallowed. The implication goes beyond the suggestionof meaningless content: the procedure itself stiflesthe individual student's growth toward uniquepotentials.

Rogers. like Skinner, realizes how formidable isthe task of implementing his own educational theory.To follow his suggestions, in the strictest sense,would result in shocking consequences. Rogers seemsto be feeling the impact of this fact when he writes,"It is when I realize the implications that I shudder abit at the distance I have come from the commonsense world that everyone knows is right." (Rogers,1961:277) These are the consequences which Rogershimself believes his theory implies:

(1) Such experience would imply that we doaway with teaching. People would get to-gether if They wished to learn.

(2) We would do away with examinations.They measure only the inconsequentialtype of learning.

(3) The implication would be that we woulddo away with grades and credits for thesame reason.

(4) We would do away with degrees as ameasure of competence partly for thesame reason. Another reason is that adegree marks an end or a conclusion ofsomething, and a learner is only inter-ested in the continuing porcess oflearning.

(5) It would imply doing away with the ex-position of conclusions, for we realizethat no one learns significantly from con-clusions. (Rogers, 1961:277-278)

The most explicit criteria for determining theeffectiveness of teaching, in Rogers' view, would notbe how active the teacher is. nor how "active" thestudent is, nor what particular technique the teacheris using. Both teacher and student are "learners."Rogers' evaluation of the educational situation wouldbe based on the amount of personal involvement thatis being experienced by the learners. Rogerian"involvement" must be carefully distinguished from"active" in the Skinnerian sense.

Within each theory, the behaving individual

possesses a central importance. Yet, equation of thetwo approaches on the basis that both stressindividual behavior is characteristic of criticallyinaccurate interpretation of one or both theories.Skinnner wishes the individual to be steadily active,participating smoothly. within a carefully designed.manipulator!, syndrome. Rogers' desire for individualinvolvement. on the other hand, concerns internallyinitiated behaviot that is chosen in relation to aninternal frame of reference he has labeled the self.The opposing assumptions each psychologist makesconcerning the individual and the individual'spotential for behaving in certain ways. forms thebasis for an irreconcilable antagonism.

Such antagonism is the salient characteristic ofthe relationship between the two theories. Ananalysis of the relationship reveals numerous pointsof unrelenting conflict. In the preceding paragraphthe role of the individual participation. as seen by thetwo views. was discussed in terms of involvement andactivity. Another example of deep and uncompro-mising opposition centers in the divergent views ofindividual responsibility. For Skinner responsibility isa term denoting physical reaction to stimuli: forRogers it denotes an awareness of ability to act inalternative modes. Contrast, also, the two attitudestoward the word "meaning.** Rogers' entire theoryfocuses upon meaning. It is discovered by theindividual (or individuals. in a Buber I-Thou sense) inthe particular situation. All behavior is contingentupon the meaning for the behaving individual. To thecontrary. Skinner thinks an analysis of behavior whichdoes not use "mental concepts such as meaning is astep in the right direction." (Evans. 1968:15)

Individual involvement, individual responsibility.and individual meaning possibly arc some of the mostobvious examples of terms which reveal the relation-ship between these two psychological adversaries.The basis of the difference in perspectives is formedby their initial assumptions concerning the nature ofman. and the essential antagonism is carried forwardstep by step as each develops his theory of behavior.Culmination of the conflict which has been developingfor more than twenty years can be seen as each manends his career with a focus upon education.

As always. Skinner and Rogers are in directopposition to each other. In the preceding chapterSkinner's approach was discussed. His "technologyof teaching" should be used to prescribe the wayteachers and students behave: precisely what is to belearned would also be prescribed. All is determined.Rogers. on the other hand. expects each teacher andstudent to choose modes of behavior which contribute

27

the greatest personal "meaning." The process ofsuch behavior is what is to be learned. Educationalsuggestions made by Rogers are consistent with histheory of behavior, as further analysis reveals.

Theoretically. individual teachers and studentsare not expected to be copies of Rogers himself. Hewrites. "Every effective educator has his own style offacilitiating the learning of his students." (Rogers,1969:57) He seems to advocate the modification of histheoretical suggestions. especially in the examples ofstudent-centered teaching which he offers. Thefollowing examples illustrate Rogers' approach withinthe context of variety: various types of teachers.various experience levels, and various types ofdesired learning experience.

The first illustrative case comes from anelementary school. Barbara Shiel was a sixth gradeteacher who experimented with the student centeredapproach. (Rogers. 1969:11-27). A successful teacherwith thirteen years of experience, Miss Shielencountered a "problem group" with whom she felt anew approach was needed. While working within thestructure of the curriculum and the specified units ofstudy. she found that most students could assumemuch responsibility for planning their own work andcarrying out their plans. While some students couldnot handles the new freedom at first and needed torevert to a teacher-directed group. all but four wereultimately able to participate in the self-directedprogram. Through the school year the teacherconstantly changed procedures. giving her pupilsfreedom only so far as she felt comfortable in doingso; in the truest sense of the word, the class wasinvolved in an "experiment." According to theaccount given. parents. students, and the teacherconcluded that the self-directed approach wassuccessful.

A second example came from a college. VolneyFaw. of Lewis and Clark College, has experimentedwith his own modification of the student-centeredapproach in his psychology class. Professor Faw'sclasses have much more structure than do some ofthe other examples. Rogers comments on the greatrange of freedom possible within his theory. He feelsA. S. Neill, in his Summerhill School. wouldrepresent one extreme and Professor Faw the otherextreme.

As one instructor teaching a required course inintroductory psychology with a prescribed textbookand curriculum and the same examinations for allsections. Professor Faw is still able to give hisstudents a number of choices of ways to approach thecourse content and make it meaningful to tl-,?n, ;n

28

terms of their own needs and goals. Among thesuggested options are: review of journal articles andpresentation in writing, individual experiments, groupprojects, demonstrations. library-type study, fieldtrips, programmed learning. etc. No one activity isrequired, but it is made clear to the student that hemust participate actively if he is to learn. Evaluationfor the necessary grades is in terms of the qualityand quantity or work produced. Faw actually usessome concepts from Skinner's theory.

The example Rogers gives of his own teachingcomes from the graduate level. (Rogers, 1969:57-97)He declares, "I am sure I would have followed thesame principles. and many of the same procedures,whether it had been an elementary, high school, orcollege course, though I might not have been able tofollow such an unorthodox schedule." (Rogers.1969:57) At the first meeting Rogers suggestedpossible topics and readings but left both completelyopen for individual additions. The class met for "longhours" on several weekends. The requirements wereas follows: (Rogers. 1969:61-62)

1. A list of reading done by each student. Thestudent should indicate how each item was read.i.e.. "skimmed," "read carefully three times."etc.

2. A paper of any length about the student's mostsignificant personal values and the ways they werechanged or not changed by the course.

3. A statement of self-evaluation including criteria ofevaluation, description of ways in which criteriawere met or not met, and the grade the studentfeels appropriate.

4. Personal evaluation of the course in a sealed enve-lope with student's name on outside.

These four requirements were mandatory for receiv-ing a grade in the course. Rogers' description of thiscourse centers primarily upon reactions of variousstudents. The overall impression is almost identicalwith that obtained from reading accounts of hisencounter groups. (Rogers, 1970) He concludes. "Ithad been a course which seemed to me and to thestudents to have been very .,uccessful." (Rogers.1969:57)

The following illustration of Rogers' approach isincluded because it comes from a mature scholar. aphilosopher of education, Samuel Tenenbaum.Tenenbaum was in one of Rogers' classes offered atBrandies University. He wrote an article describingthis experience entitled. "Carl R. Rogers andNon-Directive Teaching." (Rogers, 1961:299-310)

Tenenbaum was so impressed that he experimentedwith the theory and then wrote a second articleentitled. "A Personal Teaching Experience."(Rogers, 1961:310-313)

The frustrations, excitement, failures. and suc-cesses are described by Tenenbaum. With "nodirection" from Rogers. a band of individuals, eachgoing spontaneously in his own way, evolved into acohesive, efficient. study group. alive with deeppersonal involvement and commitment. Tenenbaumtestifies concerning this experience as follows:

As you may know. Rogers believes that if aperson is accepted, fully accepted, and inthis acceptance there is no judgment, onlycompassion and sympathy, the individual isable to come to grips with himself, to devel-op the courage to give up his defenses andface his true self. 1 saw this process work.(Rogers, 1961:305)

According to Tenenbaum's account, most of thestudents were enthusiastic before the end of thecourse. Three or four of the group found the entireexperience distasteful. These few dissatisfied stu-dents were ones who wanted to be presented with aset of facts which they could memorize and give backoil an examination. For the student who defines hiseducational experience within this "factual" frame-work, Rogers' approach will undoubtedly result in acompletely unsatisfactory experience. The studentwho demands "answers" from the instructor, ratherthan look for them inside his own world of meaning.will experience little but frustration within theRogerian approach. The entire process is geared to a'ack of closure. Tenenbaum elaborates:

As Rogers himself points out. there is no fi-nality in the process. He himself never sum-marizes (against every conventional law ofteaching). The issues are left unresolved;the problems raised in class are always in astate of flux, ongoing. In their need to know,to come to some agreement, the studentsgather together. wanting understanding.seeking closure. A grade means an end;but Rogers does not give the grade; it is thestudent who suggests the grade; and sincehe does so, even this sign of completion isieft unresolved, without an end, unclosed.Also, since the course is unstructured, eachhas staked his person in the course; he hasspoken, not with the textbook as the gauge.but with his person, and thus as a self hehas communicated with others, and because

of this, in contradistinction to the impersonalsubject matter that comprises the normalcourse, there develops this closeness andwarmth. (Rogers. 1961:308)

At the time he penned the above description.Tenenbaum was writing and thinking from thestudents' point of view. a number of months later hecomposed the ecstatic reaction. mentioned earlier, tothis type of educational experience, from theteacher's point of view. (Rogers, 1961:310-313)

The strongest previous educational influence onTenenbaum had been that of Kilpatrick and Dewey.Most educators would not classify the thought ofthese two men as tending toward the narrow orprovincial. Tenenbaum thought that he had alwayswelcomed the widest possible discussion. in hisclasses. Yet. teaching had become more and moredifficult for him. He had come to feel that his classeswere listless. that he was simply standing in front ofa group "yammering." (Rogers. 1961:310) He hadnot taught for ten years prior to his experience inRogers' class. After that experience he realized thatalthough he had "encouraged" discussion, he alwayswanted it to come out according to his own way ofthinking. None of the "discussions" in his class hadbeen real discussions. All his questions had been"loaded." After his experience with Rogers he wasnot only more aware of what he was doing. but hetried to relinquish control. He was not completelysuccessful in this effort. He still expressed hisopinions and lectured to the students occasionally. Hedid, however. succeed to an extent that wasextremely rewarding to both himself and thestudents. His personal conclusion follows, as com-municated in a letter to Carl Rogers:

I cannot say I followed you all the way. Dr.Rogers. since I would express opinions andat times. unfortunately. lecture; and that Ibelieve is bad, since Audents, once authori-tative opinions are expressed, tend not tothink. but try to guess what is in the instruc-tor's head and provide him with what hemight like. so as to find favor in his eyes. IfI had it to do over again, I would have lessof that. But I did try and I believe I suc-ceeded in large measure to give to each stu-dent a sense of dignity. respect and accept-ance: farthest from my mind was to check onthem or evaluate and mark them.... Thatthe foregoing was not "biased perception"was evidenced from reports I got outside theclassroom. The students had said such nicethings about me that faculty members

29

wanted to sit in the class. Best of all, thestudents at the end of the course wrote DeanBenjamin Fine a letter in which they saidthe nicest things about me. And the Dean inturn wrote me to that effect. To say I amoverwhelmed by what happened only faintlyreflects my feelings. (Rogers, 1961:312-313)The foregoing illustrations each contain various

aspects of Rogers' thought: in a way they corroborateelements of Rogers' educational theory offered.explicitly and implicitly. earlier in the presentsection. A summary of this theory may be worded asfollows.

Rogers sees education in terms of individualexploration and discovery, individual understanding,individually significant meaning. Though bothSkinner and Rogers focus upon the individual, theessence of their definitions and the resultingimplications for education are completely different.Rogers' theory upholds the individual's ability toselect his own behavior. The learner initiates theprocess, is self-reliant. and evaluates himself and theprocess. Only he, the learner, can know if his needsare being met, if the process has helped him towardhis own goals. The prime element of this process,according to Rogers, is its personal meaning to theindividual. (Rogers, 1969:5)

In Rogers' view, the factor which makeseducation effective (successful) is not the technique ofmanipulation, as advocated by Skinner. but trust.(Rogers. 1969:75) The teacher cannot fake a feeling oftrust. If teacher and student are each true to personalfeelings, each increases his ability to trust himselfand the other. As trust grows, each becomesincreasingly free to modify his own knowledgeboundaries, to explore, discover, "learn," and tochange toward what he wants to be. Both teacher andstudent are freed from feeling compelled to keep up afacade. or a pretense of fitting certain prescribedpatterns.

Rogers feels "teaching" is a vastly overratedfunction. He has no desire to "make" anyone knowanything. He is not sure that anyone knows exactlywhat should be taught. He feels the imposition of astatic way of knowing might make some sense in astatic. primitive society. but it makes no sense in ourmodern. constantly changing society. (Rogers.1969:103) He believes the goal of education in ourrapidly changing society should be the facilitation ofchangehelping the individual learn how to change.One recognizes this position to be in opposition tothat of Skinner, the intrinsic nature of the latternecessarily locking the organism into a pattern. The

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nucleus of Rogers' approach ix contained in hisfollowing statement:

The only man who is educated is the manwho has learned how to learn; the man whohas realized that no knowledge is secure.that only the process of seeking knowledgegives a basis for security. Changingness, areliance on process rather than static knowl-edge. is the only thing that makes sense asa goal for education in the modern world.(Rogers. 1969:104)

Two characteristics are essential for the one whowould facilitate learning. He must be genuine.honest, congruent: he must be himself. Second, hemust be willing to risk. both his self and the processinvolved in the actual situation. Both of these charac-teristics are necessary if manipulation is to be

avoided, and if a trust relationship is to beestablished. If the facilitator is congruent and willingto risk, methods and patterns are eliminated.(Rogers, 1969:129-144) The facilitator who hasestablished a trust relationship is the catalyst whomakes learning possible. (Rogers, 1969:151-166)

The criterion of significance in assessing educa-tional procedures is the size of the contribution thatthe curriculum, in any of its forms, makes to thecause of individual fulfillment. A culture necessarilytransmits, and man necessarily adapts as socializationis experienced; yet, both processes remain ratherpedestrian and insignificant, in Rogers' view. unlessthey contribute directly and substantially to theultimate of total personality development, as evalu-ated by the perceptual stance of the involvedndividual.

SKINNER'S ThEORY IN SOCIAL CONTEXT

The writer's effort to anticipate the results ifSkinner's theory were applied to education in a largesociety, for example that of the United States. is,necessarily and almost completely speculatory. Noevidence is available which would indicate what atotal culture based upon Skinner's assumptions wouldactually be like. Historians do not tell of any nation,and anthropologists do not describe any culture. towhich one could attribute Skinner's guidelines. If anattempt were made to translate the theory into socialpractice. what kinds of conditions and issues mightensue? Two illustrations will be used. One containsdescriptions of control from Skinner's own imagina-tion. The other focuses upon an actual society, thedescription of which closely parallels much ofSkinner's thought, especially in the kind and degreeof control being experienced by the individual.

Skinner has provided some speculative materialin the novel, Walden Two (Skinner. 1948). The storyis. essentially, a description of a small utopiancommunity that has been created according toSkinner's theoretical principles. Throughout the book,Skinner presents his arguments and explicates hisideas through the speeches of his alter ego. Frazier(the community's founder and leader). The storyprogresses as a college professor, Burris. and a fewother observers are conducted on a tour of thecommunity. Events covering each day of the tour areselected so that Frazier can explain to Burris theprinciples upon which the community was founded

(Skinner's theory of behavior). Furthermore. themode of life engendered by such principles isrevealed through glimpses offered Burris as heobserves the people who live in Walden Two.

Because the present study is primarily concernedwith the ways in which psychological theories applyto education. the discussion will be limited to a fewillustrations taken from chapters twelve throughsixteen of Walden Two. In these chapters. Skinnerreveals educational aspects of the community. Thereader, along with Burris, is permitted to catch briefscenes that are, presumably, typical of life from birthto parenthood.

One day Burris is conducted through thecommunal nursery in which all the babies live.(Skinner, 1948:96-99) Their environment and careclosely resembles that of Deborah Skinner, B. F.Skinner's own daughter. (Skinner. 1945:30) Aircribsare used; they control temperature and humidity.They also facilitate sanitation. Parents come aroundevery day or so, for at least a few minutes, to playwith their baby. From birth the infants areconditioned to behave in ways prescribed by Frazierand his assistants. For example, "annoyances" areslowly introduced "much like inoculations" as thebabies are conditioned to tolerate greater and greateramounts of adverse conditions. So complete is thisconditioning that many of the conceptualizations withwhich we traditionally explain, understand, anddescribe our emotional reactions arc never used in

Walden Two. To illustrate the thoroughness of suchconditioning Skinner describes the following incident.

One day an observer was talking to a young ladywho was in charge of a group of children. Apparentlysome of the children were going on a picnic: theywere excitedly preparing for the outing. Theremainder of'the children were working contentedlyat their usual activities. (Skinner. 1948:100.103) Noreason was apparent for some children to go andsome to stay. The young lady was asked about theproblem of jealousy on the part of the slightedchildren. She was completely bewildered. She couldnot understand the question. (Skinner, 1948:101)Frazier later explained that although she had beentwelve years old when Walden Two was founded.such emotions as jealousy had been conditionedcompletely from her behavior. Naturally, the youngerchildren, who had been conditioned from birth, couldexperience no such emotion.

As Skinner describes his vision of the socializa-tion process, he sometimes uses words (as has beennoted in his scientific writing) the meaning of whichmust be changed from that of ordinary usage to thatparticular meaning which fits the behaviorist'stheory. Also, the pictures Skinner offers, throughFrazier, raise certain questions in the reader's mind.but leaves these questions unanswered. The followingis a case in point.

The issue under consideration is that ofself-control. (cf. Skinner, 1948:104-115; 1953:227.241)Frazier explains how children are taught self-controlat Walden Two. At three or four years of age eachchild is given a lollipop that has been dipped inpowdered sugar so that a single touch of the tonguecan be detected. The child is then told that he mayeat the candy later in the day, provided it hasn'talready been licked. Frazier explains that all ethicaltraining at Walden Two is completed by the age ofsix. Self-control (in Skinner's theory, self-manipula-tion of external factors) centers in the simpleprinciple of putting temptation out of sight, aprinciple acquired by Walden children before the ageof four. The following is Frazier's explanation of howsuch control is accomplished.

First of all, the children are urged to exam-ine their own behavior while looking at thelollipops. This helps them to recognize theneed for self-control. Then the lollipops areconcealed. and the children are asked to no-tice any gain in happiness or any reductionin tension. Then a strong distraction is ar-rangedsay. an interesting game. Later thechildren are reminded of the candy and en-

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couraged to examine their reaction. Thevalue of the distraction is generally obvious.Well, need I go on? When the experiment isrepeated a day or so later, the children allrun with the lollipops to their lockers...."(Skinner, 1948:107-108)

Skinner's account of how self'control is taught atWalden Two is incomplete. He does not describe themethods used to endow three and four year oldchildren with the ability to internalize abstractconceptualizations such as "gains in happiness.""reductions in tension." and "the value of distrac-tions." In order for the reader to understand themethods Skinner is advocating, other kinds ofadditional information must be supplied. Exactly whatbehavior is observed (in Skinner's theory all behavioris overt, physically observable) as the tot "examineshis own behavior while he comtemplates a lollipop?"How does staring at a piece of candy "help recognizethe need for self-control?" (The tendency to eat,according to Skinner's own theory. is related to theorganism's state of deprivation). What methods areused at Walden Two should a child decide to eat thecandy immediately? Skinner abhors punishment;therefore, in Walden Two no aversive consequencescould follow such behavior on the child's part.Presumably, by age four. the child has been soconditioned that he is physically unable to make suchdecisions. Yet, if such is the case, why bother withthe lollipop experience? Such "embarrassing prob-lems" may be those Skinner says should be"ignored." (Skinner. 1971:12) In any case, thechildren in Walden Two are exceedingly rapidlearners if measured by "normal" standards used intraditional societies.

While walking through an outdoor setting.complete with flower beds and picnic tables. Burrisobserved a group of "learners." His view of thescene follows:

Large sheets of paper were thumbtacked tothe tables, and several students, most ofthem ten or twelve years old but two orthree certainly no older than eight, weredrawing what looked like Euclidian construc-tions with heavy block pencils. Otherchildren were driving pegs into the groundand running strings from one peg to an-other. Two surveyor's transits and a steelmeasuring tape were in use. So far as Icould see. Euclid was getting a first handexperimental check. (Skinner, 1948:95)

From the descriptions Skinner offers in WaldenTwo. one may surmise that he expects his methods

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would result in precocious social, as well as mental,development. The following scene illustrates suchexpectations.

Just south of the flower gardens. on ablanket spread out upon the warm grass. laya naked baby nine or ten months old. A boyand girl were trying to make her crawltoward a rubber doll. We stopped for a mo-ment on our way to the common rooms toenjoy her grotesquely unavailing efforts.

When we resumed our walk, Frazier saidcasually, "Their first child."

"Good heavens!" I cried. "Do you meanto say those children are the parents of thatbaby?"

"Why., of course. And a very fine baby itis. too."

"But they can't be more than sixteen orseventeen years old!"

"Probably not.""But isn't that rather remarkable? It's

not the usual thing. I hope." My voicetrailed off doubtfully.

"It's not at all unusual with us," Fraziersaid. "The average age of the Walden Twomother is eighteen at the birth of her firstchild. and we hope to bring the figure downstill ferther....1 believe the girl you sawwas sixteen when her baby was born."( Skinner. 1948:129)

The phenomenon illustrated by Skinner's youngcouple is certainly plausible. biologically, althoughnot recommended from a medical point of view. Theexample is remarkable only from certain socialperspectives. In the traditional Western culturalsetting. a degree of freedom and responsibility isassumed that is not known in Walden Two. In atraditional Western society the teenage parentswould, undoubtedly. experience hardships and frus-trations in an attempt to survive economically andsocially. In Skinner's planned society. the youngparents, and their baby, are integrated units withinthe carefully designed social movement. Eachindividual is totally cared for within the master plan;for this security the individual has exchanged hisnotions of freedom. The young parents, for example,do not have to find a job. set up a home. and arrangetheir lives within the confines of a self-imposedbudget: neither are they free to make such personaldecisions. From Frazier's view, there was nothing"remarkable" in the scene.

The examples from Walden Two are provided togive the reader some idea of how Skinner envisionshis theory being translated into cultural reality. The

central issue in the Skinner-Rogers controversy, aswell as that of the present study. concerns control ofbehavior. Certainly the fictitious Walden Two is anexample of absolute control. Yet, could such a degreeof control be accomplished? Could such a schemebecome social reality? Skinner maintains that anessential element, in the realization of his theory. isan unquestioning assumption of the determinednature of man's behavior. (Skinner, 1953:9) Notionsof personal freedom are inimical to his theory, Suchunquestioning acceptance of a dogmatic principle hasessentially the same effect upon an individual'sbehavior as does his acceptance of a religious faiththat demands obedience.

Techniques of religious indoctrination, indeed.offer valuable material to the student of the control ofhuman behavior. To the extent that religious (sacred)behavior is defined synonymously with unquestioningbehavior, any socialization process or any sociallyprescribed behavior can be labeled religiousexactlyto the degree conformity is mandatory for theindividual's cultural viability. A society based uponstrict religious conformity can be experienced associal reality. Such a society can actually maintain adegree of control close to that desired by B. F.Skinner. the following example is offered not as anexample of Walden Two in social reality but toillustrate the possibilities of extinguishing self-aware-ness and personal freedom. The exercise of personalchoice is denied by unquestioned (religious) assump-tions. The following discussion deals with suchassumptions as it focuses upon the Hutterite culture.(Hostetler and Huntington, 1967)

The Hutterites compose a society which offersempirical evidence of possibilities of experiencing lifewithin a degree of control similar to that described bySkinner. In the example of the Hutterite culture wefind a small society of people who are locked intomodes of behavior which can be labeled "doinggood." (cf. Skinner. 1971:67) If one measures"efficiency of socialization" (degree of control) interms of escape percentage. the Hutterite socializa-tion process has a remarkable record. During approxi-mately ninety years of history. a little over 100individuals have voluntarily "escaped" ultimatesocialization by the group. The group numbersaround 20.000 at present. How is this degree ofcontrol realized?

The Hutterite "religion" permeates every aspectof the culture. Within this religio-cultural schema onecan study some of the techniques which mosteffectively permit. and aid. the group to extinguishindividual prerogative. Religious indoctrination andsocialization into the community are the same

process. Within such a cultural setting the"religious" -aspects of achieving behavioral controlmay be more clearly visible than would be the case ifcontrol were discussed only in the psychologicalterminology of B. F. Skinner.

The Hutterite proclaims a dualistic world view;he experiences situations in which the "mystical"knowledge system touches the "practical" events inhis everyday life. and these contact points demandsome kind of explanation if the individual is to avoidcognitive dissonance. Points of ambiguity and contra-diction produce anxiety and fragmentation as the

'individual struggles to match his personal experiencewith the imposed explanation of reality. In exchangefor the kind of psychological security offered by theimposed pattern the individual trades his assumptionof individual awareness and personal knowledge.Therefore, rather than the God of the mystical systemhe verbally claims to follow, he actually follows(worships) Order as patterned by the group. Theinterpersonal social pressure that controls theindividual within the Hutterite culture is identicalwith the implicit interpersonal control of Skinner'splan. Experiencing such total interpersonal control isdependent upon a religious acceptance of funda-mental assumptions. (cf. Skinner. 1953:9, 447) TheHutterite leader insists that the individual shouldaccept patterns of behavior imposed by the particularreligious dogma as "the Will of God." Skinner insiststhat the individual should accept as "scientific fact"the externally determined character with invariablepatterns of all behavior. Neither assumption can bequestioned if control is to be maintained.

Within Hutterite society. "Hutterite Order" isSupreme. and because group pressure is equatedwith "the Will of God," Divine sanction is easilytranslated into space-time relationships of everydaylife. Within this perspective, personal interpretationsof experience becomes rebellion against God. Everypossible element of existence is utilized to keep thepressure of Group Scrutiny bearing directly upon thebehavior of the individual. Constant interpersonalobservation is maintained in order to keep theindividual behaving and viewing his own experiencewithin the confines of interpretations acceptable tothe group. Within such constant surveillance andimposition all the existence of the individual ispatterned.

Space patterns of isolation from other culturalcontact, local colony construction and planning, andeven the architecture of buildings, conform preciselyto that prescribed by the dogma. Moreover, "therigid character of the German sentence structure is

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supportive of the absolution of the authoritypatterns." (Hostetler and Huntington. 1967:12-14)From the pattern of dress alone an individual can bedistinguished as an adult. female, Christian.Hutterite. humble toward the opposite sex. andwhether she is going to work, evening church, orSunday church. Regulatory time schedules are usedto organize every activity and social relationship, t heminutes of the day, seven, days a week, are sopatterned that the individual has no "private time."He has a prescribed place. dress, activity. compan-ion, and attitude for every moment of every day. thefanatical following of patterns is of central importancerelative to the control of the individual's behavior.

The essential element in establishing suchcontrol over individual behavior. in the Hutteritesociety and in Skinner's theory. is identical. Theindividual in each case must accept religiously(unquestionably) the fundamental assumptions of thesystem. The individual Hutterite who does not acceptthe asuniptions of the particular religious dogma isdeclared "ungodly" by their leaders. The individualwho does not accept the assumptions of his particular"technology." Skinner declares "prescientific."(Skinner, 1953:447) In each controlling scheme themethod used to translate the assumption into actioncenters in a type of self-denial which can be labeledreligious. Skinner. in his theory, denies the validity ofall personal interpretations, meaning. introspection,understanding and so forth. Such concepts arerelegated to "mentalistic" explanations which do notenhance prediction and control of behavior. TheHutterites also make every effort to negate privateinterpretations and personal meaning as the individ-ual contemplates his daily experience. Consider howthe Hutterites arrange the contingencies of reinforce-ment to mold individual behavior into a preciselydesigned, and almost completely predictable, society.Compare the similarities which indeed form theessential factors in each technique.

Careful comparison of such similarities indicatethat those living in the. Hutterite culture may be asclose to realizing the degree of control advocated bySkinner as can be found in the history of any society.Basic assumptions are essential to both the Hutteritesand to Skinner. Carefully planned techniques aremandatory in translating theoretical assumptions intohuman behavior. The Hutterites use sacred ritual inthe process of eradicating any glimmers of personalawareness. Time is "set aside" each day (as well as"set apart" from patterned schedules of eating,working and sleeping). Such denial of time seems tobe part of the process in negating personal

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experience. The practice seems to include more thanthe theological term "sanctification" implies. Apsychological anesthetic is used to paralyze individualsensitivity. Long sermons are slowly read; long songsarc sung slowly and without feeling; long ritualprayers are recited. Much of this ritual has beenmemorized: some is read: none is spontaneous. Anypersonal meaning that could have seeped into anindividual's existence during the day is mortified bysuspending time and using ritual to deaden thesenses. The design seems to preclude any savoring orenjoyment of the present. All behavior is designed ona basis of .future expectations. The essential patternstructure for Hutterite life was formulated in thedistant past. in 1540. (Hostetler and Huntington.1967:6) Through a technique of focusing theindividual's attention upon past and future "experi-ence" (neither of which can correspond to the actualongoing experience of the individual) the individual ismade less aware of his own personal feelingsconcerning what is actually happening. Imposedpatterns and explanations can seem more and moreacceptable as the individual denies his self in favor ofthe authority. The authority comes to be accepted asTruth. The explanations and patterns of behaviordesignated by the authority take precedence over theindividual's own private interpretations and choices ofaction. His behavior has been controlled. (cf. Rogers.1951:481-533. especially 498.499)

Clearly, a consideration of the influence of pastexperience and of future expectations is important inany study of behavior. Yet the closest one can cometo actual experience is in the present. Mentalprojection into the past or future is alwaysaccompanied by some degree of fantasy. Somedeviation from what actually happened or whatactually will happen is inevitable. An over-emphasisupon such psychological time journeying can negatepresent experience to a degree which inhibitspersonal choice of alternative actions. Such emphasismay facilitate the manipulatory syndrome an outsideobserver sees in both the Skinner and Hutteriteschemes for control.

The Skinnerian effort is designed to induce theindividual to concentrate upon external causes of hisown behav:lr. to assume that he has no choice. toaccept as scientific fact that he is not free toexperience arbitrary or spontaneous actions. The goalis precisely controlled individual behavior which fitsthe society designed by the manipulators. TheHutterite effort is designed to induce the individual toconcentrate upon future heavenly reward. to assumethat he has no choice. to accept as God's will the

dogma of the sect. The goal is precisely controlledindividual behavior which fits the society designed bythe manipulators. Obviously, the schemes are notidentical. The identical element, which is the mostcritical single element in each scheme. is a kind ofreligiously accepted denial of personal experience.The attention of the individual to his own personal.present experienceto his private, current feelingshas been diverted by inducing him to subscribe tocertain theoretical assumptions. if the individual canbe induced to accept. unreservedly, the psychologicalor theological assumptions he may indeed be contentto have his behavior manipulated by external agents.

To gain such control. then, from a Skinnerianperception. hinges upon the possibilities of inducingindividuals to renounce private interpretations ofexperience and accept Skinner's basic assumptions.That individuals may be influenced, upon occasion, isundeniable. Skinner's plan. however, concerns adesigned society. The size and origin of the socialgroup is of great importance in the analysis of suchgroup control. The fictitious nature of Walden Twolimits its significance. The Hutterite society isrelatively small. 20.000. and this population isseparated into much smaller colonies. The societygrew to its present size from a small group ofreligious zealots and. through the years. infants weretotally socialized to accept the religious dogma oftheir parents. Skinner envisions a similar birth todeath indoctrination in Walden Two. yet. he does notseem to be satisfied with such small-scale andlong-term adoption of his theory. (cf. Skinner, 1971)Skinner would apply his scheme to the United States.For the United States to become such a plannedsociety, millions of adults must be induced to acceptSkinner's assumptions. (cf. Skinner, 1953:447) More-over, great numbers of these adults have a longheritage of belief in the possibilities of personalchoice. Many, as Skinner himself admits (Skinner,1971:26-59) cling to philosophies which have beendeveloped in order to maximize the individual'schoice of action. Can such large numbers of adults beinduced to accept a doctrinaire scheme and a mode ofbehavior opposite from those for which they longhave struggled?

Analytical critique of Skinner's ideas may bedeveloped on two levels: theoretical and practical.The theoretical validity of Skinner's thought isquestionable. To offer illustrations in which individ-uals are, in some ways. influenced, is an insufficientpremise upon which to build the conclusion hedesires. The validity of Skinner's theory rests uponthe argument that if you can control some people. in

some ways. some of the time, then it necessarilyfollows that you can control all people, in all ways,all of the time. Analyzed logically, the argument isfound to contain the "fallacy of composition." Thesimplest type of this fallacy is committed when oneinfers that a whole population has a certain propertyfrom the premise that some constituent part of thatwhole possesses the property (in the present case,the vulnerability to behavioral manipulation). (cf.Copi, 1953:74 -75) Skinner's argument is analogous tocontending that if some people can be hypnotized onoccasion, then all people can be hypnotized for alltime.

A practical criticism is closely related to thetheoretical weakness. Examples of advertising, preci-sion teaching, behavior modification of autisticchildren, and police activity testify to the actuality ofvarious controlling influences on some behavior. Thepresence of government is witness to a general socialacceptance of some degree of behavioral control. Tosuggest. however, that an entire nation of adults,most of whom have always assumed some kinds ofpersonal prerogative, can be induced to assume theinevitability of absolute control is to ignore reason-able probabilities. The present discussion does notimply that Skinner's technology will not work inspecific instances of behavior control. Rather, thecontention is that such situations are limited both insize and social context. Skinner has provided noevidence which reveals inducement on the grandscale required by his plan.

Skinner's suggestions for the control of behaviorcan be questioned by combining both theoretical andpractical weaknesses of his theory. Skinner implies anelite group of planner. or manipulators. expertswhom the rest of the people obey without question.These rulers are called "Managers" in Walden Two.and concerning their decisions the regular membersneither have a voice nor do they desire it. (Skinner,1948:55) To these men Skinner seems to attribute arationality he denies mankind in general. Somehowthe leaders are able to make the kinds of decisionswhich a physical determinism makes impossible forordinary people. From a theoretical point of view, noscientific evidence has been offered to substantiatethe assumption of such a "rationality gap" incognitive ability. Practically. great odds are againstany possibility of inducing citizens of the UnitedStates, long indoctrinated with notions of equality. toaccept the idea of absolute rule by an elite. Thespontaneous question of many would be, "Who isgoing to control the controllers?" This question maybe leveled at his theory from a logical base, and it

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can be leveled at his social plan from the currentpolitical bias called democracy.

Various degrees of control, indeed, are acceptedby individuals in their personal lives, as well ascollectively in societies. An analysis of social influ-ence upon individual psychology. and its consequentaction, demands careful examination and accuratedefintion of commonly used terms and of commonlydesired goals. Education is a case in point. If most ofthe individuals within a society define education asthe imposition of a closed knowledge system upon theperson being socialized, thus conforming his behaviorto a pattern chosen by that society. then in actualexperience individuals will tend to expect and tofollow behavioral dictates from social influences.Parallels of such socialization may be drawn from theHutterite society. from Walden Two, and from certainaspects of public education in the United States. Forany society to continue, such socialization (culturaltransmission) may not fall below some minimumamount. If the culture is not handed down, clearly thesociety will disintegrate. Some continuity and stabilityis essential for social cohesion.

If. on the other hand. education is defined as theprocess of liberating the individual to inquire and toquestion his own personal experience in the effort toconstruct his own private definition of reality, thenindividual control by socialization will be at aminimum, and individual prerogative will be great.For any society to continue. such individual preroga-tive may not rise above some maximum amount. Ifprivate interpretations are allowed to eradicatecultural perceptions, again no cohesive quality will beexperienced and the society will disintegrate.

In their controversy. Skinner and Rogers belaborthe range between the maximum and minimum levelsof behavioral control with social possibility. In thepresent chapter. the argument contends thatSkinner's theory cannot be applied directly to a largesociety such as that of the United States. In the nextsection. Rogers' theory will be placed in socialcontext. Where Skinner exaggerates the upper limitsof possible socialization. possibly Rogers exaggeratesthe lower limits.

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ROGERS' THEORY IN SOCIAL CONTEXT

Rogers' ideas cannot be extrapolated into a totalsocial setting as easily as were Skinner's ideas in thepreceding chapter. Rogers has not written hisequivalent of Walden Two; therefore, one has nospecific example, from the non-directive approach, ofwhat his ideal society would be like. He could not.from his theoretical position, describe the societywhich would result from his suggestions. First, hefocuses on a process, not a product; the end productis never known in the Rogers' scheme. Second.intrinsic in any concept of society are ways ofknowing and behaving. congruent with that particularsociety's cultural framework. Implicit within theconcept of society are "rules" and "control." Theepitome of Skinner's thought is control; that ofRogers is absence of control. To project Skinner'sdesire for maximum control, one has only to increaseand intensify 'the social controls -that have beenimagined and experienced. One can imagine a "1984situation," if only as a horror novel. (Orwell. 1949)To project Rogers' desire for lack of control, one mustenvision a cultural vacuum. An effort to think of asociety in which the individual is completely free fromthe coercion of socialization boggles the imagination.

Some minimum of cultural, cohesive factors mustbe present for a society to exist. Culture enablesinterpersonal relationships to evolve and to functionin the lives of individuals. Culture. the "social glue"which holds a grout of people together in a society.may be labeled cultural tradition. social mores,politically formulated laws, manners, and so forth. MIsuch concepts imply rules of behavior, the essence ofwhich is control. The mind simply cannot handle thenotion of a group of people functioning within thedynamics of everyday life while oblivious to any rulesof conduct.

The intensity of cultural dictates varies withdifferent situations. Within the isolation of thetherapeutic room, Rogers may indeed help his clientfeel a decrease of cultural restraint. His label of suchexperience as "pure culture" has already beenquestioned. If the client's behavior became "pure" orabsolutely culturally unpredictable, Rogers himselfwould declare the client insane. Other than physicalreflex. activity is based upon knowledge. Essential forsuch action is the possession and use of knowledgedefined as the total cognitive framework. Thecognitive framework used by any individual issupplied by his particular society. (cf. Berger andLuckmann. 1967)

The overlooking of an experiential fact, such asthe social influences upon cognition, must beconsidered a basic weakness if found in anyphilosophical position. Such an oversight is commonto some existentialists, who may have influencedRogers' thinking. The essence of the existentialistposition is that the individual can create his ownworld of meaning, "existence precedes essence."(Sartre. 1956) Yet, the philosophical efforts of leadingexistentialists may not only be influenced covertly bycultural' factors. but they are also most clearlycouched within cognitive frameworksparadigms cer-tainly not original to the philosopher. One may askwith Frederick Penis,

What is Tillich without his Protestantism,Buber without his Chassidism. Marcel with-out Catholicism? Can you imagine Sartrewithout support from his Communist ideas,Heidegger without support from language.or Benswanger without psychoanalysis?(Per ls. 1969:60)

Within his theoretical formulations, Rogersimplies that the individual can function outside asocial, cognitive framework. B. F. Skinner, althoughhe did not refer to existentialism, attacked Rogers'thought precisely at the weak point being discussed.Skinner's wording does not obscure an identicalargument:

When you turn the delinquent over to him-self, as some psychologists end psychiatristsfeel you can do, you will be successful onlyif society has in some way implanted thekinds of control which are essential. This isa point on which I argue with Carl Rogers,who claims that somehow or other you aregoing to find within the client himself thecontrolling forces that will solve his problem.His methods work with clients who haveemerged from a tradition such as the Judeo-Christian, which gives them reasons forbehaving well, but if a client suddenly an-nounces, "Ah, yes! I see it now. I shouldmurder my boss!" you don't just let himwalk out of the office. (Evans, 1968:31)

The essence of the above argument againstRogers' theory is applicable also to his educationalviews. Although he seems to be influenced byexistentialist thought in some respects, his thought

must be distinguished in other respects. For example.many people identify existentialist philosophy withthe work of Jena Paul Sartre. Because of the extremepessimism of Sartre's philosophy, existentialism isgenerally considered to present a rather dismalpicture of man's 'existence. To the contrary, Rogers isan incredible optimist. Nowhere is this prevailingoptimism more evident than in one of his assump-tions concerning the nature of man.

While discussing the social reality of Skinner'sthought it was noted that his reasoning contains alogical fallacy. He infers that if something is true ofaconstituent part of the same must necessarily be trueof the whole. Rogers makes a variation of the samelogical error when he reasons that if some of hisclients seem to function better as socializationpressures are decreased, then all men would functionharmoniously if socialization influences were mini-mized on them all. Such a utopian society does notnecessarily follow, either logically or in the realworld. Rogers, however, assumes that an intrinsiccharacteristic of each individual is a tendency to movetoward positive growth. toward "maturity." (Rogers,1961:35) He further declares:

One of the most revolutionary concepts togrow out of our clinical experience is thegrowing recognition that the innermost coreof man's nature, the deepest layers of hispersonality. the base of his "animal na-ture," is positive in natureis basicallysociological, foward moving, rational andrealistic. (Rogers, 1961:91)

Rogers calls his assumption "revolutionary" becausetraditional notions held by dominant Westernreligion, and by psychoanalysis, consider man's basicnature evil, anti-social. Rogers assumes the opposite,that man's basic nature is good. when thisassumption is applied to social dynamics the notion isseen to be analogous to an assumption made manyyears ago in economics. Adam Smith, in hisargument': for a liberal approach to economic policy,assumed an "invisible hand" which guarantees therandom financial efforts of individuals, each seekinghis own good. to result in the greatest collective good.(Smith, 1961:166) Unfortunately, man's experiencehas never supported the existence of such a hand.Rogers seems to imply a similar hand as he poses theassumption that each individual, seeking his ownvalues, will not precipitate anarchy, but willautomatically develop a harmonious society. Hewrites:

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Thus while the establishment of values byeach individual may seem to suggest a com-plete anarchy of values, experience indicatesthat quite the opposite is true. Since all indi-viduals have basically the same needs, inclu-ding the need for acceptance by others, itappears that when each individual formu-lates his own values, in terms of his owndirect experience, it is not anarchy whichresults, but a genuinely socialized system ofvalues. (Rogers, 1951:524)

Precise delineation of Rogers' thought on thesubject of socialization is difficult. Some of his state-ments may appear ambiguous to those not oriented tohis particular psychological view. In the abovequotation he indicates that a culturally. .framed sociali-zation process is unnecessary because the nature ofman is such that social order is a natural result. Yeton occasion, Rogers is aware of the questions whichpermePit; he present discussion. Consider the issues'I; tiuses:

Is social interaction necessary in order for aself to develop? Would the hypothetical per-son reared alone upon a desert island have aself? Is the self primarily a product of theprocess of symbolization? Is it the fact thatexperiences may be not only directly experi-enced, but symbolized and manipulated iiithought, that makes the self possible? Is theself simply the symbolized portion of experi-ence? These are some of the questionswhich shrewd research may be able toanswer. (Rogers, 1951:497)

Rogers acknowledges the basic issue, how canthe self be anything independent of socialization?Yet, he never attends directly to this issue. Histheoretical structure rests heavily on a kind of"knowing" which seems almost outside the cognitivedomain. He constantly places great importance upona kind of "continuing organismic valuing process."As noted earlier, this notion may be associated withthe currently used term, "gut-feeling." Here is adescription of what Rogers believes takes place whenan individual begins to rely on tilt "gut-feeling,"when he begins to behave contrary to the patterns inwhich he has been socialized.

In therapy, as the person explores his phe-nomenal field, he comes to examine thevalues which he has introjected and whichhe has used as if they were. based upon his

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own experience. He is dissatisfied withthem, often expressing the attitude that hehas just been doing what others thought heshould do. But what does he think hrshould do? There he is puzzled and lost. Ifone gives up the guidance of an introjectedsystem of values, what is to take its place?He often feels incompetent to discover orbuild any alternate system. If he cannotlonger accept the "ought" and "should,"the ":ight" and "wrong" of the introjectedsystem. how can he know what values taketheir place? Gradually he comes to experi-ence the fact that he is making value judg-ments in a way that is new to him. and yetin a way that was also known to him in hisinfancy.... He discovers that he does notneed to knoiv what are the correct values:through data supplied by his own organism,he can experience what is satisfying end en-hancing. He can put his confidence in avaluing process, rather than in some rigidsystem of values. (Rogers, 1951:522-523)

Regardless of some of his statements, one mustassume that Rogers does not believe people can livecompletely outside the influence of social demands.He. evidently, advocates the "pure culture" atmos-phere of therapy to help the client become aware ofhis own potential. In case where the individual feelshis life being stifled by introjected social demands. arealization that he is able to reject some of thedemands offers him a possibility of lightening hispsychological burden. Such realization provides alter-natives. for action, a freedom from the opinions ofothers. and a growing respect for himself as areliable source of data with which to evaluate dailyexperience. In some manner (that may remainambiguous to (hose who do not actually experienceit), an "organismic valuing process" enables theindividual to experience personal choice relative tosocialization pressures.

Ten years after Rogers made the abovestatement, he wrote:

Perhaps it will help to understand my des-cription if you think of the individual asfaced with some existential choice: "Shall Igo home to my family during vacation. orstrike out on my own?" "Shall I drink thisthird cocktail which is being offered?" Isthis person whom I would like to have as mypartner in love and in life?" Thinking ofsuch situations, what seems to be true of theperson who emerges from the therapeuticprocess? To the extent that this person is

open to all his experience, he has access toall of the available data in the situation, onwhich to base his behavior. He has knowl-edge of his own feelings and impulses,which are complex and contradictory. He isfreely able to sense the social demands fromthe relatively rigid social "laws" to the de-sires of friends and family. He has access tohis memories of similar situations. and theconsequences of different behaviors in thosesituations. He has a relatively accurate per-ception of this external situation in all of itscomplexity. He is better able to permit histotal organism. his conscious thought partici-pating, to consider, weigh and balance eachstimulus. need, and demand. and its relative.weight and intensity. Out of this complexweighing and balancing he is able to dis-cover that course of action which seems tocome closest to satisfying all his needs inthe situation. long range as well as immedi-ate needs. (Rogers, 1961:118)

The long quotation offers a picture of Rogers'thought on an occasion when he balances some majorelements of his behavioral theory with some of therealities of social demands. In the description, onefinds a socially mature person contemplating asituation and then deciding upon a rational course ofaction. To a man from Mars, not limited by eitherSkinnerian or Rogerian perceptual parameters. suchaction might appear to be identical to that observed ifhe were watching the behavior desired by Skinner ina similar situation. (cf. Evans. 1968:67-68; Wann,1964:184) The critical distinction between the twopsychologists (resulting in an obvious difference ofmethodology) is found in their assumptions concern-ing the nature of man. Skinner assumes the ordinaryman is incapable of rationally assessing a situationand then choosing between alternative courses ofaction, thus the necessity for "expert managers" whoengineer a planned society. Skinner clearly states hisanti-democratic bias. (Skinner. 1953:10-11, 447-448)Rogers, on the other hand, assumes that all people, ifonly permitted to be themselves, are rational, sociallymature individuals capable of solving their complexpersonal problems within an automatically realized,harmonious society. Rogers' position is "ultra-democratic." Such an ultra-democratic approach maywork efficiently with certain segments of a society.(Rogers' educational experience is limited to collegestudents. graduates. and certain groups of adults).Can the notion be considered extreme whenadvocated for children and immature adults?

How can such a democracy be applied to all

social situations? All persons in any given society donot actually correspond to Rogers' assumption. If allwere socially mature adults. possessing cognitiveframeworks well developed both culturally andscholarly. a temporary respite called "pure culture"might indeed facilitate the gaining of fresh perspec-tive. How, one may ask of Rogers, is the educator totransmit those cultural and academic frameworks to achild. using a process which is defined and designedto eliminate precisely the influence of such socializa-tion? One may sech in vain.- within currenteducational efforts, for an example of such "democ-racy" being used to teach all that is nee& ; for life Inthe modern society. Today, educators are wallowingin a deluge of material focused upon "free schools"and similar attempts to circumvent traditional publicschool curriculum. Such attempts represent a fullrange of beliefs. from totalitarianism to anarchy. andtheir methodologies vary in equal degree. (cf. Kozol,1972:51-52) The examples cited by Rogers himself.which were discussed earlier. illustrate such varia-tion. The example of Rogers' own "teaching" issimply an encounter group of graduate students.(Rogers, 1969:57-97) The therapeutic atmospheredominates Rogers' work. (Rogers. 1970)

The practice of encounter-group therapy isincapable of adequately providing much essentialknowledge. Essentially, Rogers arga:s that thelearner must be guaranteed his freedom withoutguaranteeing to society what learning the individualwill acquire. Each individual is guaranteed a privacyon the basis of an optimistic hope that he will assumethe responsibility of helping others. and that all willevolve into a harmonious society. Such extremeemphasis upon idiosyncratic development actuallyprecludes the existence of society. According to onecritic of such emphasis.

Community presupposes a certain continuityof tradition. moral insight and cogn;tive lit-erary standards that set limits upon therange of uniqueness permitted each person.Education has never meant simply learningfor the sake of learning. (Stanley. 1972:51:cf. McCraken, 1970)

Rogers' arguments do not meet the abovechallenge. The salient characteristic of his sugges-tions to the educator is an extreme emphasis onfreedom. such freedom as found in encounter-grouptherapy. This degree of emphasis simply does notallow for cultural transmission. If adhered tocompletely, both individual and society would suffer.Encounter groups do not teach the knowledge and

39

skills necessary for the work done by medical doctorsand civil engineers. How does a twenty-three year oldbecome a professional if he has wasted his firstnineteen years? The cumulative effects upon society'sintellectual life could be catastrophic if the processesof socialization were abandoned. Much of thelearning necessary for life in today's society is simplynot intrinsically interesting to everyone who needs tolearn it. Education. "schooling," can be considered.legitimately. a form of coercion which introducesknowledge and reinforces habits. Later the adult, adifferent person from the child in his insights andambitions. may be very grateful for such coercionregardless of his feelings as a child. Such coercion inyouth may greatly contribute to adult freedom, thatis. to greatly expanded personal choice of action. (cf.Stanley. 1972:51)

One of the nationally known critics of traditionalpublic school education. Jonathan Kozol, has recentlyadmitted failures within the "free school' experi-ments. (Kozol. 1972) Worthwhile education simplydoes not take place when the teacher pretends to be a"pedagogical neuter." Those teachers who doattempt such a charade should become aware thatthey are influencing students not only by the wordsthey say but by their entire life style. (Kozol,1972:51-52) Kozol now admits that some childrenliterally cannot do anything. They need to be taught.not some back-to-nature fun skills like how to buildan Iroquois log canoe, but how to live in theAmerican society of 1974.

Rogers' emphasis does not allow for learningsuch essentials. In his theory. the student's state-ments are accepted: he may say or do whatever hewishes. He searches in the directions he chooses.hoping to discover"meaning" for himself. Theteacher's function is to provide a setting that willencourage uninhibited expiession. and to honestlyreflect the feelings of the student. In a general sense,the teacher's interest does not focus upon the contentof what the student says: he is interested in using thematerial to reflect the feelings of the student. to helphim accept his own feelings and himself. Rogersassumes the student then will move on automaticallyto an adequate perception of the real world. throughthis "accepting process" the student will perceivehimself and life as it is. be better able to cope withhis environment. be "a more fully functioningperson."

Rogers' suggestions may indeed be relevant infacilitating psychological health. Therapeutic value isnot denied, even by B. F. Skinner. The critical flaw inthe Rogers theory comes t4 light when socialimplementation is attempted. He does not adequately

40

account for cultural transmission. On the basis of hisprior assumptions concerning the nature of man.Rogers assumes socialization to be a natural (asopposed to humanly devised) process. Such sweepingassumptions overlook much essential education.Indeed. if it is to be usable. "education forserendipity" (Keen, 1970:38-82) must be balancedwith the control of socialization. (Bernstein, 1971)

To be completely fair with Rogers, one mustrealize that psychologists and educators whose

thought resides within humanistic. phenomenologicalorientations are faced with a fundamental dilemma incommitting to paper that which. according to theirviews. should remain a dynamic interplay betweenperson and person. From such a view the integrationof theory into a reasonable professional practice,when it is done, is a highly individualized processthat cannot be dictated or imposed. possibly not evenadequately described.

IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION

Direct application to educational practice is easilydeveloped within an analysis of the behavioraltheories of Skinner and Rogers. Such practicalapplication is an important part of theoretical analysisbecause theories are useless until they affect action.As Skinner writes.

If this were a theoretical issue only. wewould have no cause for alarm; but theoriesaffect practice A scientific conception ofhuman behavior dictates one practice. a phi-losophy of personal freedom another. Con-fusion in theory means confusion in practice.(Skinner. 1953:9)

In concluding the present study, therefore. majorfocus will be on practical suggestions for theeducator.

Anyone studying the works of these twopsychologists soon realizes that the locus of differ-ence between Skinner and Rogers is not inmethodology alone. To argue that the difference is inmethodology is either the result .of ignorance or of anattempt at adroit deception. To focus attention uponmethod is necessarily to divert it from morefundamental differences. Consider the process eachpsychologist must have followed in developing histheory. He could not have possibly contemplated achoice of method earlier than the third step in thetheoretical formulation. The first step, as thesetheories were formed. concerned the nature of man.and certain assumptions were necessarily made byeach theorist. The second step, intrinsic in theprocess of theory development, concerned the choiceof purpose, or goal. The second step is sometimes sointerrelated with the first that distinction becomesdifficult. Yet. only after the "beginning" and"ending" are designated, theoretically, can attemptsbe made to chart an efficient route (methodology)between the two points.

Consider, as additional explanation to the above

argument. another factor which is intrinsic to alltheory construction. The theorist necessarily desireschange in behavior. and his theory is his attempt tocontrol the change. giving it a certain direction (inSkinner's case. toward externally controlled behavior.in Rogers' case away from externally controlledbehavior). If an observer of the human scene weretotally accepting of what he sees taking place (statusquo), he would feel no need to even describe it.consider the case of an anthropologist writing a letterhome to his parents. He gives some "puredescription" of the native culture in which he isliving. Such action can only indicate he wishes tochange his parent's perception. If change were notdesired, no reason could be given for the description.Even if one could imagine a case where puredescription could be given with no desire for change.to go an iota beyond description is to provideirrefutable evidence that in fact change is desired.

To desire change necessarily mandates someminimum choice of direction. Such choice may bebroadly defined or it can be precisely indicated. Nowif the preceding argument is logically valid. one maystate dogmatically that both Skinner and Rogers aretrying to distinguish between "what is" and "whatought to be." as defined by the assumptions andgoals of each theory. The methodology advocated byeach is merely an outline of how each man is tryingto control change as he desires it. To note that thereis a difference between the Skinnerian and Rogerianapproaches to controlling human behavior is merelyto recognize the obvious. This methodological differ-ence must be considered of secondary importancebecause it only reflects profoundly different opinionsof what man is and what he should be. Theirpositions on the latter are of major importance.

The assumptions each psychologist uses indescribing man, also form the basis for hisexplanation of man's behavior. Each endeavors tosupport his own description of man's nature by

overemphasizing an area of influence on behavior.Human behavior is actually a result of both social roleexpectations and individual need-dispositions; humanbehavior is a function of both role and personality.Just as individuals have certain individual psychologi-cal needs, or need-dispositions, they also acquiresocial roles which are dictated by the positions theyachieve within social institutions. Such social rolesare composed of expectations held by relevant groupsand individuals within the social milieu. Skinneradvocates the use of a description which overempha-sizes external influence such as role expectations.Rogers advocates a description which overemphasizespersonal needs and neglects the social expectations.The propositions of neither Skinner nor Rogers areadequately formulated to accommodate both majorinfluences on behavior. An adequate analysis ofbehavior must consider social expectations andindividual needs. As used here, the terms influenceand control are synonymous.

Each psychologist has a distinctive orientationtoward the concept of control. The position fromwhich each views "control" of behavior is theessence of each theory. Change from status quo isdesired by each theorist; Skinner's desire is towardincreased, more precise, external control, andRogers' desire is toward decreased external control,resulting in increased internal control. Their desirefor a particular change causes each man tooveremphasize one or the other of the two majorcomponents found in human behavior. The over-emphasis, in each case. is of such enormity that anextreme position is created within each theoreticalargument. The overemphasis in each theory is thenucleus. the spirit, the salient distinguishing qualityof that theory. In addition, the overemphasis in eachtheory is precisely the quality in that theory whichmalws impossible the task of matching the theorywith actual social experience. Necessarily. any theoryis a reduction of reality. but such extreme positionsas characterize the thought of Skinner and Rogersmust be considered carefully.

Michael Scriven clearly implies qualities ofunreality in the theories when he speaks of " ...theways I think that one can carry through the programof reconciliation of the defensible forms of phenome-nology and behaviorism." (Scriven, 1964:180) Theoversight of Scriven, and of others who contend that"coexistence" of the two positions is possible.concerns the essence of the theories. What is thecenter. the locus of vitality in case? If by"defensible" Scriven means t1,- I:ars of each man'sthought that conforms to Itl I) ..! experience. noreconciliation is needed. On voes not reconcile

41

reality! Man continually attempts to reconcile theresults of his theoretical speculation with reality. Theoveremphasis, the "indefensible" parts of the twotheories are precisely those elements which call forattempts at reconciliation.

Reality is unitary. Man's theories about realityare the source of conflict between knowledge andbehavior. The personal-social relativism of the Rogersinterpretation, with its reliance upon "reality" asperceived at the moment of experience by theindividual places his whole system apart fromSkinner's deterministic interpretation. An unbridge-able gap separates the adherence to an extremerelativism on the one hand and the adherence to anextreme, absolute determinism on the other. Thetheories are contradictory from a philosophical view.

In actual experience they are also incompatible.If one ignores the impossibility of putting eithertheory totally into social experience and focuses onlyon attempts to follow either theory, contradiction isagain experienced. Either theory will move itsfollowers in the opposite direction from that taken byfollowers of the other theory. In no way do thetheories comiilement each other. To choose Skinner'sfocus on maximized control is necessarily toundermine Rogers' focus on the minimization ofcontrol. To try to follow both is to undermine thevitality of both. To try to follow both, essentially, is toabandon both.

Such basic, and irreconcilable incompatibility isseen clearly when one attempts to apply both theoriessimultaneously in the classroom. How can a teacherdefine precisely the educational goals as Skinneradvocates while permitting each student to choose hisown goals as Rogers advocates? How does a teacherprecisely arrange the learning environment in such away as to control and specify the exact terminalbehavior, while allowing the learner to discover hisown ways of behaving as he progresses toward anunknown or unclearly defined goal? A single decisionof the teacher which allows student prerogativeimpairs the precision of control advocated by Skinner.To manipulate the student toward a prescribedbehavior attacks Rogers' central focus.

A specific example of conflict between the twoapproaches may be discussed within the area oftesting and grading. Within the Skinner theory, thetransmission of factual material and specified behav-ior patterns is the primary business of education;testing the effectiveness of the tr nsmittal is a centralproblem. The tests must be quantifiable. A large por-tion of time is justifiably given to the constructionand validation of the measures and records used inexamining the student's progress toward the prede-

42

termined goals. Grades. or even candy or money. canbe used as reinforcers. The evaluation of thestudent's progress is mandatory within the Rogerianframe of reference, it is not recognizable as the sameprocedure. The question to be asked is not, "Wherehas the student failed in his progress toward thefixed goal?", but rather. "Where is the student in

his own process of perceptual organization?" A

"testing situation" would only be used if it tells thestudent what he wants to know about his ownperformance.

If testing and grading is defined as procedure inwhich the performance of the student is measuredquantitatively or ranked subjectively by the teacherthen. within the Rogerian scheme. it is completelyirrelevant. Any assessment other than that by thelearner is not relevant because he "learns" what issignificant with his own perceptions. Second. compar-ison with other students has little significancebecause each of them is working with different back-grounds. perceptual fields. and educational goals.Third. what does it really mean to the student to belabeled "C" by someone else if the goal of the entireeducational procedure is to develop his ownindependent evaluation and self-adequacy?

The Rogerian teacher would choose to completelyignore the notion of grades. If, under the pressures ofsocial reality (administrative command) grading wererequired of him. student participation would be amajor portion of the effort. Rogers had his studentsgrade themselves. (Rogers. 1969:61-62)

When confronted with two such contradictorytheories. each widely acclaimed. how can the class-room teacher avoid frustration and hopeless confu-sion? He should realize that all theoretical systemsare imperfect in that they fail to desebe withabsolute precision the realities of actual experience.Theories are useful not because they answer all thequestions. or indicate the correct procedure inmanaging all learning situations. but because they doa more or less reasonable job of organizing the vastamount of data relevant to the learning process. Theyprovide frames of reference for an educator to use inthe assessment and development of consistency andeffectiveness in his own teaching.

Both Skinner's and Rogers' models have theirmerits. but an educator cannot value both of themequally without creating an inconsistency within hisprofessional practice. A reasonable approach mightbe to consider either set of suggestions (Skinner. orRogers. on education) only in selected and limitedsocial situations. In which case the work of both mencould be very valuable in actual practice.

If the beginning teacher feels compelled to

adhere to a theory of behavior other than that devisedby himself, either of the two basic directions can begiven priority. If such choice is made, however, theeducator should be aware that both he and hisstudents will be in the process of becoming differentkinds of people than if the other extreme had beenchosen. The Skinner type teacher must wish tocontrol, and students who "do well" in such a settingmust wish to be controlled. The essence of theeducational experience is the observed behavior.Success or failure of the experience is derived fromthe end product, which is usually available, at leasttemporarily. for measurement and evaluation. Thecumulative record indicates what elements of behav-ior were changed in terms of response data. Theteacher necessarily assumes the major responsibilityfor the entire process.

On the other hand, the educator who would be aRogerian teacher must see the essence of educationalexperience in the dynamics of the process of learning.Learning must be seen as an occurring event, not asan event that has occurred. Any "measurement"which might take place in such education is seen bythe behaviorist as extremely "messy" and far fromconclusive. The Rogerian teacher must see therelevant factors of education from a position withemphasizes qualitative rather than quantitative as-pects of life: he should tend to be subjective ratherthan objective. In the Rogerian scheme the teacherrejects major responsibility for the entire process: theresponsibility belongs to the student.

The advisability of exclusive adherence to eitherof the theories may be questioned. If a singulartheoretical framework must be borrowed by thebeginning teacher. theories more acceptable to totalsocial experience could be considered. Variousteaching-learning models are available (Parkinson.1969) (Kapfer and Woodruff. 1972) which coincidemore closely with present social and intellectual pre-scriptions than do either the Skinner or Rogersmodels. Limitations of the present study precludesdetailed descriptions of other models. Such models.however. might be said to contain "defensible"elements from behaviorism and phenomenology.

. variety of models may offer practical methodsby which the teacher can focus upon a theoreticaldimension alien to both Skinner and Rogers.Skinner's overemphasis distorts the nomotheticdimension, which refers to the goals of institutionsand places total attention on "role" in behavior.Rogers' overemphasis distorts the idiographic dimen-sion, which refers to needs of individuals and placestotal attention on "personality" in behavior. TheAmerican society of today needs a new dimension.

Margaret Mead (1959) states that an awarenessof the actual problems of learning would radicallychange current conceptions of education. Tradition-ally. in a slowly changing society. the focus was upona vertical transmission of factual knowledge. The old.mature. experienced teacher handed down informa-tion to young. immature, and inexperienced students.A dramatic change in the rate of social change hascreated a break between past and present educationalneeds. (cf. Toffler, 1970) All persons, of all ages, arehaving to learn all their lives. Such a social conditiondemands an entirely new dimension of learning.Mead calls this new dimension "lateral transmis-sion." Each member of society is both learner andteacher. The old function of education was primarilythe dispensing of facts: the new function of educationi4 the facilitation of "rapid and self-consciousadaption to a changing world." Mead's "laterallearning" seems much closer to Rogers' view than tothat of Skinner.

To be profitable. the "new dimension" mustavoid. however, the cultural weakness of Rogers'theory. Provision must be made for a minimum ofcultural stability in order for the individual to escapethe despair of protean existence. (Lifton. 1967:37-63)Something more than a compromise between nomo-thetic and idiographic emphasis is needed. Could atransactional dimension be formulated which wouldindicate standards of behavior including both individ-ual integration and institutional adjustment? Quitepossibly teaching-learning models may be found bythe beginning teacher which, to him, are practicalattempts at such theoretical synthesis. The student ofteacher education or the beginning teacher might,therefore. profitably examine a variety of theories andmodels.

In concluding the discussion of practical implica-tions of the study. one might consider the actualsituation of a beginning teacher. Prior to the first day

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of teaching. most teachers have deliberately madesome attempt to answer two questions: "Have Isomething to teach?" (Do I know the subject ?), and"How can the teaching be done?" (How do I proposeto present my subject?) Upon beginning to teach. achange occurs. The door of a classroom opens andtwenty of forty pairs of eyes are focused upon thenew teacher. There is a silence laced withexpectancy. Self-examination as to knowledge ofcontent and method drops into insignificance beforethe more immediate challenge: "Can I win and holdtheir attention? Will they follow me. like me. obeyme? What sort of person could be successful in thissituation? What sort of person am 1? How does thissituation I am experiencing add up to something*labeled "education?"

In one fashion or another, for better of for worse.that first day of teaching becomes past experience. Ifthe young teacher elects to continue in theprofession, in the struggle to answer such "original"questions a certain conclusion is reached. Thebeginning educator comes to realize that in order tobe an effective teacher one must be willing toexamine his own basic beliefs about the nature ofman. society, and education. He must examine thecompatibility of his assumptions about the purposesof education with the available information about howlearning takes place in order to develop a workableapproach to teaching. Without such personal analysisthe professional educator can be doomed to founderin a mass of techniques and methods that may ormay not fit his own personality, the needs andexperiences of his students, or the demands of theparticular social situation. At some point, thebeginning teacher must lay aside his books on theoryand philosophy and make a personal commitment inthe process of translating theory into practical,everyday action in the classroom.

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