Bihar REGS:Preliminary Findings from the

2009 Baseline Survey and Next Steps

Puja Vasudeva Dutta, Soumya Kapoor, Rinku Murgai, Manasa Putman, Martin Ravallion and

Dominique van de Walle

India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme

NREGS is the largest antipoverty policy in India’s history (and the developing world’s)

– Objectives:• Primary: Employment generation + poverty reduction• Secondary: Asset creation• Other: Strengthening grassroots democratic processes

India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme

• Phasing in: – Introduced in February 2006 in 200 most backward districts– Expanded to additional 130 districts in 2007 – Now covers all 600+ districts in country

• Centre-state financing shares:– Center pays for: (a) wage costs; (b) 75% of material costs; (c)

administrative costs (subject to a maximum limit) – States pay for: (a) 25% of material costs; (b) other administrative

costs; (c) unemployment allowance

NREGS in theory

• 100 days of unskilled manual work per year guaranteed on demand to all rural households

• Apply to GP for jobcard; apply for work• Wage: state statutory min wage (daily/piece rate)• Wages paid weekly through post office account• Unemployment allowance if work not provided• Machines & contractors not allowed• Projects chosen by gram sabha to reflect village

priorities

NREGS in theory

• Mandated worksite facilities:– Safe drinking water– Shade– First aid kit– Creche (5+ children below age 6)

• Gender equity– Equal wages for men & women– No gender discrimination of any kind– Priority for women: 33% should be women

The BREGS Study

The BREGS Study: what is the reality?

“Gender equality”?What’s that?

Background

• Bihar is one of the poorest states of India• Yet NREGS participation in Bihar is one of

the lowest in India• Why? No demand for BREGS? Or unfulfilled

demand, and why? • How might coverage be increased in a cost-

effective way?

Data 1. Baseline survey• 3,000 randomly sampled households in 150

villages of rural Bihar surveyed in April-July 2009

• 5,200 adult individuals, one male and one female from each household

2. Trial pilots to improve coverage/performance

3. Follow-up survey: same villages/households in April-July 2010

Preliminary Findings from the Baseline Survey*

* These figures are not final and may well change

Three groupsBREGS Demanders (who want BREGS work):

1. Participants in BREGS

2. Non-participants: those who say they would like to work on BREGS but did not obtain work

The rest:

3. Those who do not want to participate in BREGS

Participation is low…

1. Participants:• 24% of households worked in BREGS • 15% of adults worked in BREGS

– 26% of men– 6% of women

• 90% of participants wanted more work

…but demand for work is high

2. Non-participating demanders: Many wanted work but did not get it• 41% of households wanted BREGS work but did

not participate• 36% of adults (43% of men; 30% of women)

3. The rest : 35% did not want BREGS work

Does BREGS guarantee employment?

• Huge excess demand by men and women• Signs of rationing

– People not issued job cards– People turned away from worksites– Worksites not opened

• Women who want BREGS work are less likely to get it than men– 17% of female demanders actually participated– 39% of male demanders actually participated

Not yet

Are there differences between who gets work and who does not?

Pucca roof Pucca floor Owns land Mahadalit SC (other) OBC General0

1020304050607080

2213

41

1124

59

2

2113

37

7

26

53

12

43

25

70

2 7

67

23

%HH by main characteristics

Participants Non-participant demanders Rest

01020304050607080

7 6

32

51

3

51

167

2740

8

4936

168 10

19

73%HH by main income source

Are there differences between who gets work and who does

not?

% Demanders The rest Participants Non-

participants BPL 44 52 29 No ration card 15 16 27 Muslim 3 10 16 Illiterate head Class 8 +

71 7

58 19

42 37

In many respects participants and excess demanders are

similar• Targeting of demand for BREGS is good

when compared to non-participants: – participants are more likely to be lowest caste,

landless, casual laborers, illiterate or poorly educated, poor housing conditions etc.

• But in many respects the non-participating demanders are essentially no worse off than participants.

NREG awareness seems generally low (less so for

participants)

% who answered correctly

Participants Non-participating demanders

Rest

Max no. days? (100/90) 44 24 13 When can work be demanded?

74 56 29

Men & women? 63 50 35 Non-BPL? 65 39 24 Unemployment allowance?

20 21 13

Wage rate? 40 16 8 Contractors allowed? 26 16 13

Awareness is very low for women

% who answered correctly

Participants Non-participating demanders

Rest

M W M W M W Max no. days? (100/90)

52 14 33 13 33 5

When can work be demanded?

77

62

64

46

52

19

Men & women? 64 59 56 43 44 31 Non-BPL? 67 58 45 31 37 19 Unemployment allowance?

23

10

28

13

33

5

Wage? 42 31 23 9 19 3 Contractors? 29 14 23 8 24 8

Perceptions about BREGS

% who answered “yes”

Participants Non-participating demanders

Rest

M W M W M W Can get BREG work when wanted

27

18

10

13

11

10

BREG has increased work opportunities

54

34

23

26

17

15

BREG has reduced migration

36

27

16

22

12

10

BREG work will be here next year

33

13

24

28

18

10

Process: Implementing NREG

•Participatory planning of works

Planning

•HH issued a “job card” on application

Registration

•Adult HH member provided work on demand (s.t. 100 day HH max. limit)

•Unemployment allowance paid if work not provided

•Specified worksite facilities to be provided

Work provision

•Work measurement

•Wages paid on piece-rate basis as per Schedule of Rates

•Payment in cash through bank or post office accounts

Payment of wages

Process issues: jobcards

% Households

Participants Non-participating demanders

Rest

Have jobcard 77 28 11 Of those without :

don’t need did not try tried in process

0 4

22 73

4 11 45 35

62 9 11 11

Why did not try? Don’t know how

91

73

42

No success as don’t know officials

37 55 58

Officials will not give to my family

52 31 29

Process issues: wages

• Wage type: – 65% daily wages; 31% based on work

measurement

• Mode of wage payment:– 45% in own post office accounts– Cash from mates (23%) + contractors (11%)

• Only about half the time were job card entries & signatures done at time of payment

Process issues: worksite characteristics

• Facilities available– Drinking water (64%), Shade for rest (33%), First-

aid kit (16%), Child care facility (6%)

• Use of machines (37%)• Contractor involved (52%)• Worksites where work disrupted (54%)

– Main reasons: Natural causes (59%), stopped by officers (13%), dispute by laborers, farmers, other (25%)

Field observations• Critical role of Mukhiya in program; in practice

Mukhiya often chooses projects and workers• Pressing need for revisions to the Schedule of

Rates – through time and motion studies across regions and groups

• Weakness of transparency mechanisms given high levels of illiteracy

• Possible sources of leakage• Participation of women often conditional on

participation of male HH members

Next Steps: Pilots to Test Actions to Improve BREGS

Is greater awareness the key to expanding coverage, esp. for

women?• Two key findings from baseline survey:

large unmet demand + low awareness.– Awareness is a gender issue.

=> Pilot an “awareness intervention”– Video on NREGA; incl. Govt. videos but

adapted to Bihar– Q&A sessions after– All in random subset of the 150 baseline

villages

Would greater monitoring and auditing help?

• NREGA guidelines are not being followed– Unmet demand– Low wages– Contractors galore!– Low participation in project selection

=> Pilot a “monitoring and auditing” (M&A) intervention – Random sample of GPs get extra M&A– Bihar RD letter sent down announcing M&A

Or are both demand and supply side efforts needed?

• Overlapping the M&A with the awareness intervention

=> Three groups1: Awareness intervention only

2: M&A intervention only

3: Both

Photos of film showing during awareness

intervention