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Tom Kompas Australian Centre for Biosecurity and Environmental Economics Crawford School of Economics and Government Australian National University www.acbee.anu.edu.au .

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Page 1: Biosecurity Kompas Society Risk Analysis · Tom Kompas Australian Centre for Biosecurity and Environmental Economics Crawford School of Economics and Government Australian National

Tom Kompas Australian Centre for Biosecurity and

Environmental Economics Crawford School of Economics and Government

Australian National University

www.acbee.anu.edu.au

.

Page 2: Biosecurity Kompas Society Risk Analysis · Tom Kompas Australian Centre for Biosecurity and Environmental Economics Crawford School of Economics and Government Australian National

The Problem Close proximity between countries and international trade and tourism increases the probability of an incursion and the spread of exotic diseases and pests; ones that can do great harm, and in some cases can be potentially devastating to local industry, animal and human health, and the environment.

Page 3: Biosecurity Kompas Society Risk Analysis · Tom Kompas Australian Centre for Biosecurity and Environmental Economics Crawford School of Economics and Government Australian National
Page 4: Biosecurity Kompas Society Risk Analysis · Tom Kompas Australian Centre for Biosecurity and Environmental Economics Crawford School of Economics and Government Australian National
Page 5: Biosecurity Kompas Society Risk Analysis · Tom Kompas Australian Centre for Biosecurity and Environmental Economics Crawford School of Economics and Government Australian National

Traditional Measures •  Pre-border measures and border quarantine (i.e.,

preventing a potential incursion at the border). •  Limits on imports •  Airport inspections, and inspections of shipping

containers and contents •  Local surveillance programs (preventing spread in

the local environment). •  Screening and local awareness •  Surveillance traps (e.g., insects) •  Blood screening and visual inspection

•  Containment and eradication programs.

Page 6: Biosecurity Kompas Society Risk Analysis · Tom Kompas Australian Centre for Biosecurity and Environmental Economics Crawford School of Economics and Government Australian National

The Economic Puzzle How much should be spent, or what costs should be incurred, for pre-border measures and border quarantine, surveillance and containment/eradication activities to protect human, plant and animal health as well as the environment? How to allocate resources across various threats?

•  Ban imports and close airports? •  Spend $0 on quarantine and surveillance? •  Spend all of GDP on quarantine and surveillance? •  Eradicate? Contain? Neither? •  How to allocate resources across various threats? •  Who Pays? Cost Sharing?

Page 7: Biosecurity Kompas Society Risk Analysis · Tom Kompas Australian Centre for Biosecurity and Environmental Economics Crawford School of Economics and Government Australian National

  Rate of Discount?  Level of rate, time dependent, hyperbolic?

  Non-Market Valuation?  Contingent value, stated preference?

  Value of Information?   Model selection, parameter estimates, value to

precision?   Forward Projections?

  Spatial and density spread? The economics of containment vs. eradication

Page 8: Biosecurity Kompas Society Risk Analysis · Tom Kompas Australian Centre for Biosecurity and Environmental Economics Crawford School of Economics and Government Australian National

A Simple Spread Model for an Invasive

Time

Q(N)

Infected (N)

Page 9: Biosecurity Kompas Society Risk Analysis · Tom Kompas Australian Centre for Biosecurity and Environmental Economics Crawford School of Economics and Government Australian National
Page 10: Biosecurity Kompas Society Risk Analysis · Tom Kompas Australian Centre for Biosecurity and Environmental Economics Crawford School of Economics and Government Australian National

Containment and Eradication The role of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) after an incursion,

or for a potential incursion

Time

Infected (N)

A

Note: The potential size of benefits depend on size of initial entry and the choice of early detection, for a given eradication/containment exercise.

Page 11: Biosecurity Kompas Society Risk Analysis · Tom Kompas Australian Centre for Biosecurity and Environmental Economics Crawford School of Economics and Government Australian National

  FMD is endemic in Vietnam, recently as part of a pan-Asian epidemic beginning in the 1990s.

  Presumed vectors: border trade with China and Cambodia (virus-strain specific).

  Vietnam currently follows a containment campaign, with vaccination to protect non-infected animals, along with control on movements, surveillance and border quarantine. Many areas are in the process of being declared FMD free, and Vietnam cooperates with SEAFMD 2020 in an effort to eliminate FMD from the region.

  Vietnam has recently committed roughly $34 million USD for the containment and eradication of FMD (from 2006 to 2010), spearheaded by an extensive vaccination program.

Page 12: Biosecurity Kompas Society Risk Analysis · Tom Kompas Australian Centre for Biosecurity and Environmental Economics Crawford School of Economics and Government Australian National

Newly Infected Cows and Buffaloes: The Effect of the Vaccination Program (data from January 2006, by month, and

September 2006, by month)

Page 13: Biosecurity Kompas Society Risk Analysis · Tom Kompas Australian Centre for Biosecurity and Environmental Economics Crawford School of Economics and Government Australian National

  Key benefit (foregone loss) parameters

2006 2007 2008

Cattle unit price per kg (USD) 1.62 1.82 2.19 Milk price (farm gate) per litre (USD) 0.31 0.38 0.44 Weight and value loss due to FMD infected animal (%)

40% N(1,0.05)

40% N(1,0.05)

40% N(1,0.05)

Weight per cow/buffalo (kg) 250 250 250

Compulsory culled percentage (%) 2% 2% 2%

Ratio of dairy in the total herd (%) 0.63% 0.63% 0.70% Milk produced per dairy cow (litre/year) 3,816 3,816 4,027 Loss in milk production due to FMD infected animal (%)

50% N(1,0.05)

50% N(1,0.05)

50% N(1,0.05)

Meat production (tonnes) 224,746 273,651 298,739

Page 14: Biosecurity Kompas Society Risk Analysis · Tom Kompas Australian Centre for Biosecurity and Environmental Economics Crawford School of Economics and Government Australian National

  Key cost parameters 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Management expenses 16,313 40,625 55,625 55,625 55,625 Training 34,188 34,188 34,125 Awareness campaign 69,688 69,688 104,500 104,500 104,500 International conference 4,375 4,375 4,375 Domestic conference 1,250 1,250 1,313 Outbreak reporting 8,375 8,438 8,438 Sending sample abroad for virus type separation 2,250 2,250 2,250 Research on causes of FMD 20,000 Development of epidemiology map 2,750 2,750 2,750 Blood test analysis and virus study 7,500 18,750 123,125 123,188 123,188 Sterilization chemical 15,000 15,000 118,125 118,125 118,125 Labour cost for vaccination 1,093,750 1,093,750 1,100,500 1,100,500 1,100,500 Control zone vaccine for buffaloes & cows 1,789,992 2,563,130 2,416,376 2,668,688 2,668,688 Buffer zone vaccine for buffaloes & cows 2,986,853 1,523,375 2,715,037 2,852,750 2,852,750 Contingency fund 1,158,323 1,193,384 4,041,523 4,041,523 4,041,523 Vaccine under Decision 738 for buffalos & cows 190,646 504,225 Total Cost 7,328,064 7,021,926 10,747,998 11,118,148 11,118,148

Page 15: Biosecurity Kompas Society Risk Analysis · Tom Kompas Australian Centre for Biosecurity and Environmental Economics Crawford School of Economics and Government Australian National

CBA for vaccination against FMD in Vietnam   Forward projections of new annual infections (based on

stratified Monte Carlo draws, conditioned by monthly 2006-2008 data on new infections, assuming ongoing and no further gains from vaccination).

0  

500  

1000  

1500  

2000  

2500  

3000  

2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  2017  2018  2019  2020  2021  2022  2023  2024  2025  2026  2027  2028  2029  2030  2031  2032  2033  2034  

Page 16: Biosecurity Kompas Society Risk Analysis · Tom Kompas Australian Centre for Biosecurity and Environmental Economics Crawford School of Economics and Government Australian National

Year Net Present Value (million USD)

Net Present Benefit (million USD)

Net Present Cost (million USD) Benefit Cost Ratio

Mean Standard Error Mean Standard

error Mean Standard error Mean Standard

Error

2040 1,443 324 1,719 320 276 44 6.38 1.57

2027 1,290 263 1,463 260 173 19 8.56 1.81

Page 17: Biosecurity Kompas Society Risk Analysis · Tom Kompas Australian Centre for Biosecurity and Environmental Economics Crawford School of Economics and Government Australian National

4.17   9.11  5.0%   90.0%   5.0%  

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

0.3

2 4 6 8 10

12

14

16

Page 18: Biosecurity Kompas Society Risk Analysis · Tom Kompas Australian Centre for Biosecurity and Environmental Economics Crawford School of Economics and Government Australian National

Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR), 2006-2040

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

2026

2027

2028

2029

2030

2031

2032

2033

2034

2035

2036

2037

2038

2039

2040

Page 19: Biosecurity Kompas Society Risk Analysis · Tom Kompas Australian Centre for Biosecurity and Environmental Economics Crawford School of Economics and Government Australian National
Page 20: Biosecurity Kompas Society Risk Analysis · Tom Kompas Australian Centre for Biosecurity and Environmental Economics Crawford School of Economics and Government Australian National

Surveillance Expenditures S(N)

Earliest Detection

S(N)

Natural Detection

Local Surveillance Measures

N

Time

Q(N)

Infected (N)

Earliest detection

Optimal ‘Early Detection’

S(N) Natural Detection Point

A

Page 21: Biosecurity Kompas Society Risk Analysis · Tom Kompas Australian Centre for Biosecurity and Environmental Economics Crawford School of Economics and Government Australian National

Research Design: Optimal Surveillance •  Benefit: Surveillance ensures ‘early detection’, lowering economic and

environmental losses and pest/disease management costs.

•  Tradeoff: The more early the detection the more expensive the surveillance measure.

•  Objective: Find optimal surveillance expenditures to minimize: •  Economic losses (e.g., plant and animal losses, damage to the

environment, biodiversity losses, trade bans, etc.) •  Eradication and management costs of any pest/disease

incursion •  Surveillance expenditures (e.g. monitoring, the cost of setting

and monitoring traps, etc.)

•  Method: Stochastic (Optimal Control) Bioeconomic Model with a Jump-Diffusion Process.

Page 22: Biosecurity Kompas Society Risk Analysis · Tom Kompas Australian Centre for Biosecurity and Environmental Economics Crawford School of Economics and Government Australian National

Hawkweed Distribution Map

Current infestation 500 ha - 1000 ha (Williams, Hans, Morgan and Holland, 2007)

Page 23: Biosecurity Kompas Society Risk Analysis · Tom Kompas Australian Centre for Biosecurity and Environmental Economics Crawford School of Economics and Government Australian National

Hawkweed spread

Time

Are

a in

hec

tare

s

Page 24: Biosecurity Kompas Society Risk Analysis · Tom Kompas Australian Centre for Biosecurity and Environmental Economics Crawford School of Economics and Government Australian National

Model Parameters   Annual growth rate: 8% - 8.6% (Scott 1993; Johnstone, Wilson and

Bremner, 1999); discount rate 5%   Maximum Carrying Capacity: 26,996,700 ha (DAFF)   Production loss percentage: 15% on improved land and 5% on

unimproved land (Grundy 1989)   Production loss value: $60-$100 ha;$959 million for grazing; $289

million for perennial horticulture (1996 land use commodity) (Brinkley and Bomford 2002)

  Eradication cost: 65 – 83 AUD / ha with multiple treatments (Espie, 2001; Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries, British Columbia, Canada)

  Natural detection: 100 ha   Maximum annual surveillance cost to detect Hawkweed when the

spread is equal or greater than 1 ha: 200,000AUD per year, or approx 4 million NPV over time.

Page 25: Biosecurity Kompas Society Risk Analysis · Tom Kompas Australian Centre for Biosecurity and Environmental Economics Crawford School of Economics and Government Australian National

Costs of controlling Hawkweed

Hectare

Cos

ts in

mill

ion

AU

D

Page 26: Biosecurity Kompas Society Risk Analysis · Tom Kompas Australian Centre for Biosecurity and Environmental Economics Crawford School of Economics and Government Australian National

Hectare

Cos

ts in

mill

ion

AU

D

Sensitivity with the discount rate

Page 27: Biosecurity Kompas Society Risk Analysis · Tom Kompas Australian Centre for Biosecurity and Environmental Economics Crawford School of Economics and Government Australian National

Hectare

Cos

ts in

mill

ion

AU

D

Sensitivity with the damage per hectare

Page 28: Biosecurity Kompas Society Risk Analysis · Tom Kompas Australian Centre for Biosecurity and Environmental Economics Crawford School of Economics and Government Australian National

Hectare

Cos

ts in

mill

ion

AU

D

Sensitivity with the incursion probability

Page 29: Biosecurity Kompas Society Risk Analysis · Tom Kompas Australian Centre for Biosecurity and Environmental Economics Crawford School of Economics and Government Australian National
Page 30: Biosecurity Kompas Society Risk Analysis · Tom Kompas Australian Centre for Biosecurity and Environmental Economics Crawford School of Economics and Government Australian National

Time

Q(N)

Infected (N)

Border Quarantine Measures Quarantine

Expenditures E(N)

Zero entry

Zero entry

E(N)

N

Page 31: Biosecurity Kompas Society Risk Analysis · Tom Kompas Australian Centre for Biosecurity and Environmental Economics Crawford School of Economics and Government Australian National

  Optimal Border Quarantine   Benefit: Less initial entry gives smaller damages (or more benefits)

over time, prior to full saturation.   Trade-off: The smaller is initial entry the more expensive is the border

quarantine program   Objective: Minimize all expenditures: damages (e.g., losses in plant

and animal health, damage to the environment, trade restrictions, containment and eradication costs) plus the cost of the quarantine program itself. (Equivalent to equating the marginal benefits of having less damages to the marginal costs of quarantine expenditures.)

  Conditional on:   Probability of entry   Spatial and density spread, and E(N) function   Prices and costs that may vary over time, discount rate

Page 32: Biosecurity Kompas Society Risk Analysis · Tom Kompas Australian Centre for Biosecurity and Environmental Economics Crawford School of Economics and Government Australian National

Tom Kompas [email protected]

http://www.crawford.anu.edu.au/staff/tkompas.php

www.acbee.anu.edu.au