birth control and women's empowerment

Birth control and women's empowerment

Pierre Andre Chiappori

Sonia Oreffice

Conference: The economics of the family

London, September 2006

Introduction: Abortion and ‘Female Empowerment’

General view: abortion as ‘empowering’ women

• Common claim in feminist and sociological literatures

• However, not obvious: clearly some women are made better off, but should we expect all women to benefit from the reform?

• In particular:– What about women who want children / exclude abortion? – What impact on the ‘market for marriage’? – What consequences on intrahousehold allocations?

Introduction: Abortion and ‘Female Empowerment’

General view: abortion as ‘empowering’ women

• Common claim in feminist and sociological literatures

• However, not obvious: clearly some women are made better off, but should we expect all women to benefit from the reform?

• In particular:– What about women who want children? – What impact on the ‘market for marriage’? – What consequences on intrahousehold allocations?

This paper• Marriage as matching (as opposed to bargaining)• Identical men; women differ in their preferences for

children• Abortion as exogenous change in birth control

technology

This paper• Marriage as matching (as opposed to bargaining)• Identical men; women differ in their preferences for

children• Abortion as exogenous change in birth control

technology

Conclusions

• Two cases (which side in excess supply?), various regimes• Women in excess supply: all women benefit in general• Crucial conditions: technology available to single as well• Plus: comparative statics• Difference with bargaining: the commitment issue

Related work• Akerlof, Yellen and Katz (1996) on out-of-wedlock

child bearing in the United States (‘shotgun marriages’)

– Related issues, different approach– Major differences:

• ‘Change in social norms’• Intrahousehold allocation as exogenous in AYK, whereas

endogeneity crucial here

Related work• Akerlof, Yellen and Katz (1996) on out-of-wedlock

child bearing in the United States (‘shotgun marriages’)

– Related issues, different approach– Major differences:

• ‘Change in social norms’• Intrahousehold allocation as exogenous in AYK, whereas

endogeneity crucial here

• Neal (2004): matching model– Similar approach; different emphasis

• ‘Collective’ models of household behavior– Same family– Idea: endogeneize the sharing rule– Examples: Chiappori-Iyigun-Weiss

The model• Continuum of men and women; one private commodity →

intrahousehold allocation of consumption an issue; children

• Men all identical; quasi linear utility if married; zero utility of children if single.

• Women: quasi linear utility where u distributed of [0,U], density f; note that utility is transferable.

• Unwanted pregnancies, probability p• Income: men Y, women y without children, z < y with children

UHaH,k aH uH.k

Ua,k a uk

The model• Continuum of men and women; one private commodity →

intrahousehold allocation of consumption an issue; children

• Men all identical; quasi linear utility if married; zero utility of children if single.

• Women: quasi linear utility where u distributed of [0,U], density f; note that utility is transferable.

• Unwanted pregnancies, probability p• Income: men Y, women y without children, z < y with children

• Frictionless marriage market (matching model); surplus generated by children

→ equilibria as stable matches

• Mass 1 of women, M of men→ excess supply of women if M < 1

UHaH,k aH uH.k

Ua,k a uk

• Single women– If u < y – z = ū : no children– Otherwise: children

Fertility decisions


• Couples– Efficiency: children if maximizes total surplus

– Hence: children if u >

Fertility decisions

y z uH u ;




• Hence three types of women (depending on preferences): – ‘low’: u < u– ‘intermediate’: u < u < ū– ‘high’: u > ū

Fertility decisions

y z uH u ;




• Hence three types of women (depending on preferences): – ‘low’: u < u never want a child

– ‘intermediate’: u < u < ū want a child only when married

– ‘high’: u > ū always want a child

Fertility decisions

y z uH u ;

Basic graph: husband’s maximal utility (as a function of u)

Stable match: excess supply of women

Y + uH

Y + p.uH

uuu

H

LI

Basic graph: husband’s maximal utility (as a function of u)

Stable match: excess supply of women

u(M)

Y + uH

Y + p.uH

uuu

Married Singles

Number of males

Hence: three cases

Y + uH

Y + p.uH

uuu

Small excess supply of women (SESW)

Hence: three cases

Y + uH

Y + p.uH

uuu

Intermediate excess supply of women (IESW)

Hence: three cases

Y + uH

Y + p.uH

uuu

Large excess supply of women (LESW)

Hence three regimes

1. ‘Large’ ESW → marginal woman high type.– Some H women not matched → out-of-wedlock births– No surplus

Hence three regimes


2. ‘Intermediate’ ESW → marginal woman intermediate type– Marginal woman: u(M) with

– No out-of-wedlock birth unless unwanted; all married couples have children

– Surplus for all married women, increases with M, max for high type

uM

Uftdt M

Y + uH

Y + p.uH

uuu

Intermediate excess supply of women (IESW)

u(M)

Hence three regimes


2. ‘Intermediate’ ESW → marginal woman intermediate type– Marginal woman: u(M) with

– No out-of-wedlock birth unless unwanted; all married couples have children

– Surplus for all married women, increases with M, max for high type

3. ‘Small’ ESW → marginal woman low type– No out-of-wedlock birth unless unwanted; some married couples

don’t have children– Surplus for all married women, independent of M, max for high.

uM

Uftdt M

Y + uH

Y + p.uH

uuu

Small excess supply of women (IESW)

u(M)

Excess Supply of Men

At any stable equilibrium:• All women married, receive all the surplus• ‘High’ and ‘intermediate’ types have

children• ‘Low’ type don’t.

Comparative statics: income

• Women’s welfare non decreasing in y and z. • Assume, for instance, a proportional increase in

y and z. Then: – Less H, more L → fertility decreases– The equilibrium may switch (from LESW to IESW to

SESW) → larger rents for women, smaller for men

→ In a sense, income growth alleviates ESW

uuu

u(M)

Comparative statics: cutting male supply

• Within each regime: – No impact if LESW or SESW– IESW: higher u(M) reduces female surplus

Y + uH

Y + p.uH

Married Singles

u(M)

Comparative statics: cutting male supply

• Within each regime: – No impact if LESW or SESW– IESW: higher u(M) reduces female surplus

• Change of regime: – All women lose – From IESW to LESW: reduces total fertility,

increases out-of-wedlock fertility.

Y + uH

Y + p.uH

uuu

From IESW to LESW

Single parent benefits

• More high type women → fertility increases

• May change regime to LESW → out-of-wedlock fertility increases

• Welfare: within a constant regime– All women gain– Married women (who do not receive the benefit)

may gain more (per capita) than most singles. – Men lose the same amount.

• If regime changes: more complex

Application: the US over three decades

Major trends:


Major trends:1. Per capita benefits increase then decrease

Benefits

Source: Moffit JEL 1992


Major trends:1. Per capita benefits increase then decrease 2. Drop in the ‘supply’ of black, HS drop-out males

Source: U.S. Department of Justice

Source: Western-Pettit, ILRR 2000

Source: Neal JHR 2004

Hence:

• Benefits: – Inverted U-shape– Note that the impact is not differentiated by race

• Supply of male: – Strong reduction of male supply… – … concentrated on young, black, HS dropouts

Hence:

• Benefits: – Inverted U-shape– Note that the impact is not differentiated by race

• Supply of male: – Strong reduction of male supply… – … concentrated on young, black, HS dropouts

Impact on marriage and fertility?

Source: Neal JHR 2004

Legalizing abortion

• ESM: straightforward• ESW: more interesting

Legalizing abortion


u(M)

Y + uH

uuu

Y

Y + p.uH

Legalizing abortion


– Women not wanting kids gain

Legalizing abortion


– Women not wanting kids gain– If LESW: no impact on married women

• Men’s welfare: cannot increase– If LESW: no difference

Legalizing abortion


– Women not wanting kids gain– If LESW: no impact on married women– If S- or I-ESW: all married women gain, including

those who want childrenIntuition: single are better off, and indifference

• Men’s welfare: cannot increase– If LESW: no difference– If IESW: total surplus unchanged, wife’s share

increased

Legalizing abortion




• Men’s welfare: cannot increase– If LESW: no difference– If IESW: total surplus unchanged, wife’s share

increased– If SESW: LT lose unwanted births; for all others,

wife’s share increased

Legalizing abortion




• Men’s welfare: cannot increase– If LESW: no difference– If SESW or IESW:

net transfer to the wife!

‘The Pill’

What if technology reserved to married women?

‘The Pill’


Y + p.uH

Y + uH

u2 u1 u

‘The Pill’


Married Married Singles

Y + p.uH

Y + uH

u2 u1 u

Hence:

• Women with u ≥ u2(M): married, children, lose

• Women with u (M) ≤ u < u2(M): single (instead of married), lose

• Women with u 1(M) ≤ u < u(M): single anyway, no change

• Women with u < u1(M): married (instead of single), gain

Conclusion: most married women lose

Hence:

• Women with u ≥ u2(M): married, children, lose

• Women with u (M) ≤ u < u2(M): single (instead of married), lose

• Women with u 1(M) ≤ u < u(M): single anyway, no change

• Women with u < u1(M): married (instead of single), gain

Conclusion: most married women lose

The new technology helps married women (who do not use it), but only insofar as it is available to

singles

Extension 1: costly access

Y-(1-p)c+uH

u - c u

Y + uH

Y + p.uH

Y

Y+pc

Idea: fixed cost c for all

Extension 1: costly access

• New technology favors all women in general, including those who do not want to use it

(idea: one marginal woman at least uses it)

• However, restrictions to access harm all women in general, including those who do not want to use it and those who can afford it.

• Example: Hyde Amendment (1976)!

• Problem: definition of a ‘market’!

Extension 2: heterogeneous costs

• Idea; ‘psychological’ costs differ

• Extreme case: zero for some, large for others

Extension 2: heterogeneous costs

Y-(1-p)c+uH

Y + uH

Y + p.uH

Y

Y+pc

Extension 2: shotgun marriages

Claim (AYK 96): abortion lead to disappearance of shotgun marriages, which harmed women.



Empirical problems (Neal 2004):

• Why only for poor and minorities?

• Adoptions did not increase.



Empirical problems (Neal 2004):• Why only for poor and minorities?• Adoptions did not increase.

Theoretical problem:

Intrahousehold allocation is not exogenous!

→ ‘female pauperization’ a complex issue…

Extension 3: shotgun marriages (cont.)

In our model:

• Suppressing shotgun marriage does not harm women…

• … unless it cuts the supply of men.

Empirically: unclear

Fraction of single men among all employed men (PSID)

0

0.02

0.04

0.06

0.08

0.1

0.12

1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980

Year

Deviation from the average annual change in the fraction of single men (PSID)

-0.01

-0.008

-0.006

-0.004

-0.002

0

0.002

0.004

0.006

0.008

1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980

‘Female empowerment’: empirical test 1 (Oreffice 2004)

Basic idea: labor supply (CFL 1998)– ‘empowerment’: she receives a larger share

of household resources– If leisure normal:

• she should work less• he should work more

– Need to control for wages, education,…– Findings: Prediction confirmed!

Source: Oreffice 2004

‘Female empowerment’: empirical test 2 (Mazzocco, Chiappori 2004)

Divorce in Ireland

Stylized facts: • legalization of divorce, but actual number very small• Strong labor demand, increase in participation

Theory: • Labor demand → potential empowerment of women • Divorce law as triggering renegotiations• Working women: same effect as before• Non working women: need to ‘build up a threat point’

→ increased participation

Tests: confirm the predictions

Discussion

Heterogeneous males• by income: same• by preferences: supermodular; more complex, similar

predictions

Commitment versus bargaining• Basic insight: ‘market’ conditions matter• One interpretation: commitment (‘prenuptial agreement’)• Alternative polar case: ‘pure’ bargaining.• Differences:

– the existence of an ‘abortion threat’ matters only if credible– therefore: no impact on women unwilling to use abortion.– exclusive availability to married women does not matter

Conclusions

Very simple model …• Multiple dimensions (income,…)• Frictions• Dynamics (age of marriage; divorce;…)

… but some robust conclusions:• Intrahousehold allocation crucial; equilibrium• Various ‘submarkets’ (empirical translation?)

• General insight: an innovation (technology, but also policy,…) can have a major impact on people not directly affected

→ Cost-benefit analysis!

birth control and women's empowerment

Documents

women y

bargainingidentical

utility of children

men excess supply of

identical quasi linear

exogenous change

children equilibria

weissthe modelcontinuum