BODENPLATTEThe Luftwaffe's Last HopeThe Attack on Allied AirfieldsNew Year's Day 1945John Manrho andRonPutzPUBLICATIONSIn memory of Ron Piitz, a dedicated and passionate air war historian.He will be sorely missed. This book is a tribute to his work.First published in 2004 byHikoki Publications LimitedFriars Gate FarmMardens HillCrowboroughEast SussexTN6 1XHEnglandEmail: info@hikokiwarplanes.comWeb: www.hikokiwarplanes.comProject Editor: Robert ForsythProduction Management: Chevron Publishing LimitedDesign and layout: Mark NelsonJacket design: ColinWoodmanMaps: Colin WoodmanISBN 1902109406All rights reserved. No part of this book may bereproduced or transmitted in any fOIm or by any meanselectronic or mechanical, including photocopying,recording or by any information storage withoutpermission from the Publisher in writing. All enquiriesshould be directed to the Publisher.Text:John Manrho and Ron PiitzPrinted by Ofiicine Grafiche DeAgostini, ItalyContentsAuthors' Introduction and CHAPTER10 221Acknowledgements OfPikAs, Orange TailsandHell HawksGlossary 6 Jagdgeschwader 53's French affairCHAPTER1 7 CHAPTER11 247Prelude to theOffensive Lost over AntwerpDecember 1944 - The objectives- Jagdgeschwader 77 orbitingAntwerpPreparations for the attack - PathfindersCHAPTER12 261CHAPTER2 12 Dawn ofa NewEraTheBattle of Gandawa Kampfgeschwader 51andJagdgeschwader 1 and the airfields in Kampfgeschwader 76 buzz and bombwestern BelgiumCHAPTER13 272CHAPTER3 43 AftermathBuzzBomb Alley An assessment and evaluation of the attackJagdgeschwader 2 and Schlachtgeschwader 4head for St.Trond APPENDICES:1. Luftwaffe Order ofBattle: DecemberCHAPTER4 67 31st 1944 275B-78GetsClobbered 2. Luftwaffe Strength Report: DecemberJagdgeschwader 3 hits Eindhoven 31st 1944 2763. German fighter losses on JanuaryCHAPTER5 93 1st 1945 278Raiders of theLost Airfield 4.Ju 88 Lotse losses onJanuary 1st 1945 275Jagdgeschwader 4 in search ofLe Culot 5. Summary Luftwaffe material!personnel losses on January 1st 1945 285CHAPTER6 119 6. Luftwaffe aerial combat claims JanuaryHunting for Volkel 1st 1945 287Jagdgeschwader 6 and problems 7.Allied Order ofBattle Decemberwith Pathfinders 31st 1944 2888.Allied aerial combat 10sses:JanuaryCHAPTER7 140 1st 1945 290Dogfight over Asch 9.Allied materiallosses:JanuaryThe Massacre ofJagdgeschwader 11 1st 1945 29110.Allied aerial combat claims:January/ CHAPTER8 168 1st 1945 296Brusselsrevisited 11. Claims ofAAA units on Allied airfields:Jagdgeschwader 26 and IIl.lJagdgeschwader 54 January 1st 1945 299strike at Evere and Grimbergen 12. Known personnel casualties onthe airfields 300CHAPTER9 198Bull's-eyeonBrussels Index 302Jagdgeschwader 27 and IV/Jagdgeschwader 54re-design MelsbroekAuthors' Introduction and AcknowledgementsOPERATIONBODENPLATTEis anaspect of the1939-1945 air war that will never cease tofascinate. What is so special about thisoperation? Is it thefact that it was thelast full-scaleattackbythe Luftwaffefighter force? Is it the sheernumbersof aircraft that wereinvolvedandlost? Is itthe fate of the many pilots who went missing in actionthat day?Ever since 1945 writers have dedicated pages to thisoperation. Most are to be found in magazines butscarcely a handful ofbooks have been written about thesubject. Credit shouldgoto thelate GermanauthorWerner Girbig who has done so much important workin the clarification of unsolved Luftwaffe losses. In fact,his book 'Start im ]v[orgengrauen' ('Six Months toOblivion') dating back to the 1970s has been thespringboard for manylater works. Whenwe startedresearchinearnest for this book(1993), we decidedto write the ultimate work on UnternehmenBodenplatte making use of all available historicdocuments, informationfromlocal airwarhistorians,but perhaps most importantly by listening to those whoactually flewonthat dayor tothosewhowereatthereceiving end.In our quest for participants we searched all over theworldanddespitethefact that manyof theseformeryoungsters are now well into their seventies andeighties, we managed to contact German, British,American, Canadian, Australian, New Zealand,Norwegian, DutchandPolishairmen, tonamebut afew. The listof people whocontributed with personalrecollections, diary entries and photographs wouldcertainly run to several pages - not to mention relativesof former airmen, the hard-working researchers inofficial archives and institutions, fellow air warhistorians and those who contributed indirectly. Specialthanks should go to the following contributors:Wilhelm Ade,S. Aickelin, WilliamM. Baggs, WWBaird, Eric Bakker, Michael Balss, B. Barion, Karl-PeterBauch, JohnR. Beaman, Bart Beckers, R. Bedacht,Leonhard Beitler, Herbert R. Benson, Ernst-DieterBernhard, SiegfriedBinger, A. Blasius, 1. Bobsien, K.Boenigk, Oscar Boesch, Siegfried Bohmer, RichardBollwerk, Neville Boswell Filby, Eric Bowden, RobertW Bowen, Rolf Braband, Rudolf Braun, GeorgeBrooking, David E. Brown, HermannBruch, RobdeBruin, Robert V Bmlle, H. Buck, Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv Freiburg, Bundesarchiv-Zentral-nachweisstelle Aachen, Helmut Bunje, EberhardBurath, Pawel Burchard, Ewald Bi-isscher, Steve Butte,Donald Caldwell, Pie op den Camp, S.A. Carkeek,Francis Carrodus, Ralph Caskey, Peter Celis, JamesChaney, Carl E. Charles, Johannes Clemens, JohnClopick, Max Collett, CE. Collier, 1. Collin, BillCooper, Jacob L. Cooper, Johnnie Corbitt, CoenCornelissen, Arthur Cossey, Geoffrey Coucke, LucCox, Eddie Creek,]. Dalzell, ChuckDarrow, WE.R.Day, CynrikDe Decker, Richard]. DeBruin, RegisDecobek, Frederick Deeks, Deutsche Dienstelle(WASt), G. Dickinson,Jean Dillen, H. Dolzer,Johan vanDoorn, Siegfried Doppler, Alfred Dors, Michael FDoyle, DRK-Suchdienst, Philippe Dufrasne, Edward FDziadzio,T. Ecker, Werner Eggert, Jochen Eickhoff,Hans Eisen, Phil Evans, Peter Everard, MarcoFernandez-Sommerau, Benjamin Fischer, Paul Fischer,NikolausFischler Graf von Treuberg, LenFisher, DonFlowers, B. Foley, AlanForbes, Robert Forsyth, HughFraser, A. FreifrauvondemBussche, P. French, AlfredFritzsche, Georg Fureder, Klaus-Dieter Gabel,AnthonyGaze, B.H. Gee, Bruno Genne, Albert Gerber, KenGilham, Rudolf Gill, TomGlenn, JerzyGlowczewski, /RonGoebel, HeinzGomann, Rudolf Gammel, JosefGottschalk, Hubert Grabmair, FranciszekGrabowski,Georg Graf von Keller, Haymo von Grebmer, G.Greenough, E. Grinm1, Alfred Grislawski, WGunther,Hansde Haan, BurkhardHackbarth, ErwinHackler,HeinrichHaeffner, James Hall,Rolf Hallenscheid, A.Hameister, Bill Harle,]. Hartkamper,Johannes Hartlein,Karl-HeinzHartmann, TheoHartmann, Hans-Ji-irgenHauprich, Hermann Heck, Peter Heidel, JurgenHeider, HansHeinz, Lothar Hemmerich, G. Hempel,Helmut Heuser, Jan Hey, Werner Hilbert, Gordon M.Hill, MarionHill, M. Himpe, Werner Hoffi11ann, E.Hoffschmidt, Werner Hohenberg, Walter Homeier,John Hommes, H. van Hooven,Jan Horn,Julian Horn,]. Horsfall, M. Hott,W]. van den Hout, Ron Howarth,Roman Hrycak, Bertrand Hugot, Frans van Humbeek,Herbert Huss, Dean Huston, JesseVJamieson, AbJansen, Morton Jessen, Nelson Jesup, Heinz Jirousek,Alexius vonJohannides, CharlesJohnson, James K.Johnson, Hugh Johnston, Arie de Jong, Norman Junes,LotharKabbe, FritzKarch, G. Katz, OttoKeller, FH.Kelley, G.H. Kendall, Barry Ketley, ].N. King, M.Kirbach-Emden, Arthur T. Kirk-Waring, James H.Kitchens, 1. Klein, Otto Kleinert, Rainer Kliemann,JanKloos, HermannKnon, WG. Knox,E. Kogler, StefanKohl,Walter Kohne, Jan Koniarek, Chris Konig, E.Koppe, Gunter Kotschote, Dieter Krageloh, HeinzKraschinski, Paul Krauter, Willi Krauter, G.Kroll, JoeLagana, EdLambert, Ernst Lampferhoff, Herman P.Ledger, A.G. Lee, RVLeetham, Harald Lehmann,RichardLevy, HansHelmutLindner, AdvanLingen,Jean-Yves Lorant, Diether Lukesch, Bert Lunt, CH.Lunt, Samuel Lutz, M. Mackenthun, Rod MacKenzie,Ian Maclaren, E. Manz, Horst Marscheider,].H. Marsh,Michael Matthies, B. Mauch-vonFassong, H. Mayer,Ace McGuire, Armin Mehling, Karl Meinert,Friedrich-Karl Meinhof, H.G. Merriman, Hans Merx,Helmut Metze, Erich Miedl, WilhelmMittag, KeesMol, Eric Mombeek, G.J. Morgan, Michael Mucha,Siegfried Muller, Paul Mungersdorff, Fritz Munninger,Ragnvald Myhre,TheoNau, Gerhard Neumann, PeterNolde, OttoNoth, CNussle, Gerhard Ohlenschlager,Frederick Ollett, Ignacy Olszewski, Frank Olynyk,Hans Onderwater, Karl-Heinz Ossenkop, WayneOwens, Melvyn Paisley, Axel Paul, George Payne,Martin Pegg, Richard Perkins,James L. Perry,Winton P.Perry, M. Peschel, G. Peters, L. Phieler, Gert Poelchau,RobertPowell, Sam Prince, E.J. Pritchard, CProllius,JohnProoi, ShermanPruett, LudwigPurth, CharlesQueen, Gerhard Querengasser, Oliver Randle, LenRead, RichardL. Reeves, WolfgangReschke, JamesRice, Walter Riedel, Alden Rigby, I. Rischbieter,Jean-Louis Roba, JM. Robertson, N.J. Robinson, JoeRoddis,Adrie Roding, Hans WRohde, Hans-JoachimRose,DonRoss, SandyRoss, Robert Roubin, RonRowley, E. Ruhmland, D.R. Russell, Neil G. Russell, L.Rutkowski, Huub van Sabben, Kemal Saied, FrankSalomon, Robert K. Sandager, Frank Sayer, S. Schaupp,Ernst Scheufele, Lothar Schmidt, A. Schmieder, M.Schmieder, Fritz Schmitt, N. Schopper, H. Schulz,Johan Schuurman, U. Schwartz, H. Schwerdtfeger,Malcolm Scott, Mike JA. Shaw, Bodo Siegfried,Ludwig Siegfried,Jack Sinar, Martin van Sleeuwen,TedSmith, L. Soltau, Warren WSorensen, PaulSortehaug,PeterSpoden, ThomasStanton, CeesSteijger, D.A.WStewart, Henry Stewart, G. Strobel, Hennig Strumpell,I. Swoboda, Siegfried Sy, Tadeusz Szlenkier, HenkTalen, C.E. Tansley, H.J.S. Taylor, Friedrich Tazreiter,Walter Tepperis, E. Thomas, Ernst-Aloysius Thome, G.Trager, Billy M. Traylor, Dr. Norman L. Traylor, EwaldTrost, G. Tscheliesnig,JohannTwietmeyer, D.Tyler,AxelUrbanke, G.Uzuber, Etienne Vanackere, Alex Vanags-Baginskis,Thomas EVance,VDK-Kassel, LucVervoort,MichaelVogl, GuntherVowinckel, GVowinckel-Uroye,David Wadman, Gustav-AdolfWaldau, RudolfWalter,Graham Warrener, Robert Webb, Fritz Wegner,Michael Wetz, I.Weyert,TroyWhite,WilhelmWichardt,WilhelmWieschhoff, H. Wiese, PhilippeWillaume,WimWillemsen, DaveWilliams,JohnWilliams, RobertWilliams, AndrewE Wilson, HenkWilson, Guy deWin, L. Wohrle, Hermann Wolf, Gunther Wolf, JaapWoortman, John B. Wray, David Wright, K.Wunderlich, Willy Wuschke, WimWust, Hans Wyssola,Janin 't Zandt, AdvanZantvoort, Karl-Josef Zeidler,Franz Zimmennann, R.J.E.M. van Zinnicq Bergmann,A.Zoli.Our gratitudegoes toall those who contributedbut also those who have failed to see their contributionin print. Be sure that we carefully evaluated everythingwe received from you and be sure we appreciated it.Oneof ourgoalswastodescribeasaccuratelyaspossible, the events takingplace in the morning ofJanuary 1st 1945. Aggregating all these individualstories - taking place in merely a couple of hours overThe Netherlands, Belgium, France and Germany - hasnot been an easy task.We had to refrain from going intothe nightfighter attacks ofDecember 31st 1944 and forreasonsof brevitywealsohadtolet goof anyotherbomberorescortmissionsof the Alliedairforceson( January 1st.Thecontents of the book have been divided intochapters dealingwith the individual attacks oftheLuftwaffeGeschwader. Asa result,thesubjectmatteris dealt with primarily from a Luftwaffe point ofview.Afterall, it was aLuftwaffeoperation. However, wehaveendeavouredtocreateabalancedview of eachattack, showing in just as much detail the Alliedperspective. At the end of each chapter, we havedrawn our conclusions, carefully evaluating allavailableLuftwaffeand Alliedpoints of view. Giventhe huge concentrationof aircraft (bothAlliedandLuftwaffe) withinageographicallylimitedarea andrestrictedby merelya couple of hours of operations,chronologycouldnot alwaysbestrictlyfollowed. Inaddition, for reasons ofclarity, some events takingplaceat thesamepoint of time orlocationare notnecessarily dealt with within the samechapter. Thinkof aircraft fromdifferent unitsshowingupoveroneand the same target. Sources have, where possible,been mentioned in endnotes and detailed appendicesare included at the end of the book.Lossesmentioned withinthecontext of this bookand in the Appendices are solely in relation toUnternehmenBodenplatteanddonot cover January1st 1945 in general. Both Allied and Luftwaffe losses aregivenasaccuratelyaspossible. However, with55-plusyears since the event, losses suffered by the Alliesparticularly cannot be reconstructed with any degree ofcomprehensiveness. For example, losses suffered byalreadydamagedUSAAFbombersontheContinentcannot be traced back to January 1st specifically.Besides, the numbers game is not really that interestingfroma historical point of view. Successand failurearenot theresult of a simpleequationand inthecaseofBodenplatteit iscommonknowledgethat personnellossessuffered bytheLuftwaffeweredisproportionatecompared tothedamagecaused andtheuseful, lastingeffect of this damage. It is thefate of theindividualparticipantswehavefocussedon. Not withoutpride,we can say that as a side effect ofour research the fate of15- missingLuftwaffe pilots- have beenresolved.Eight of them were Bodenplatte pilots. Familymembersfinallyhavea headstonetovisit. Ina similarmanner, withthis book, we hope to have erectedamonument for all those who"were in it"on thatcoldmorningof January1st 1945. It is toyou andyourcomradeswhodid not livetoseetheend of thewar,that we dedicate this book.Webelieve, wehaveexhausted most of the knownsources of expertise and experience on the subject, butfor reasons not known to us, there may be people whohave additional information on UnternehmenBodenplatte who have not yet sought contact with us.This book does by no means imply that we havestopped researching the subject. We encourage anyonewho thinks he can add to- or correct any aspect of thestory, to contact us.Our thanksalsotoHikokiPublications, a devotedaviationpublisher,for itsbelief inthisproject andtoRobert Forsyth at Chevron Publishing for his editorialcommitment and guidance.John Manrho and Ron PutzThe Netherlands 2003GlossaryAAAAAAAwBnAbschussADLSDFCFliegerdivisionFGFSGCSGefechtsstandGeneral der JagdfliegerGeneral der SchlachtfliegerGeschwaderGruppeGruppenkommandeurJafO (JagdfOhrer)JagdabschnittsfOhrerJagddivisionJagdgeschwaderJagdgruppeJagdkorpsJagdverbandenJGKatschmarekKIALuftwaffenkommandoMIANachtjagdgeschwaderNachtschlachtgruppeNFSNSFOFOhrungsoffizierOberkommando der WehrmachtPSPRPR&SURffSch lachtgeschwaderSchwarmSchwarmfOhrerSGStab des General der JagdfliegerStabsschwarmStaffelStaffelkapitanTACTacJRUnternehmenZerstbrerZerstbrergeschwaderzur VerfOgungAnti-Aircraft ArtilleryArtillery Weapons BattalionAerial combat claimAir DispatchLetter ServiceDistinguished Flying CrossFlying DivisionFighter GroupFighter SquadronGroup Communication SquadronField Control Post/HeadquartersCommanding General of the Fighter ArmGeneral of the Ground-Attack ArmWingGroupGroup CommanderArea Fighter CommanderSector Fighter CommanderFighter DivisionFighter WingFighter GroupFighter CorpsFighter UnitsAbbv. for JagdgeschwaderWingmanKilledin ActionLuftwaffe CommandMissingin ActionNight Fighter WingNight Ground Attack GroupNight Fighter SquadronNational SozialistischerPolitical OfficerHigh Command of the German ArmedForcesPierced SteelPlankingRocket ProjectileRepair and Servicing UnitRadio TransmitterGround-Attack WingElement of four aircraftLeader of a SchwarmAbbv. for SchlachtgeschwaderStaff of the General of the Fighter ArmStaff SchwarmSquadronSquadron CommanderTacticalAir CommandTactical Reconnaissance (Mission)OperationDestroyer AircraftDestroyer Wi ngAt disposalCHAPTER 1Prelude to theOffensiveDecember 1944 - The objectives -Preparations for the attack - PathfindersBy the beginning of October 1944 the front line inthe West was relatively stable. The Allied advance waslosing its momentum and simultaneously, when theyreached the Reich's borders, the German defencewas stiffening.OVER the coming months the GermanArmy would be able to hold theirpositions. Also at this time, theLuftwaffe had withdrawn several of itsfighter unitsfi'omthefront andwasre-equippingthem in Germany. 1 More fighter units wereestablished by equipping former Zerstorer unitswith single-engined fighters. In these daysalso, the idea evolved of a massive attack ontheUS Eighth AirForce with some2,500single-engine fighters. This plan, called the 'GrosseSchlag' or 'Great Blow', was developed by the Stabdes General del' Jagdflieger under conunandof Gen.Lt. Adolf Galland. Although thisplanseemstohavebeenfurther discussedduringmeetingswithintheStabandwithin1. Jagdkorpsthe following month, it was already clearby that titne that this attack would not takeplace, as the re-built fighter forces would beneeded elsewhere.Intheautumnof 1944 Adolf Hitlerhadinitiatedthe planto launchan offensive inthe West, whichwas totake place in the Ardennes. Preparations forLuftwaffeparticipationbeganonSeptember16thwhen Adolf Hitler informed GeneralleutnantWerner Kreipe, the Luftwaffe Generalstabschef,about the planned offensive.' On October 21stGeneral Kreipe ordered Luftflotte Reich to preparethe transfer ofsix to seven Jagdgeschwader and oneSchlachtgeschwader to LuftwaffenkonunandoWest.' On November 14th, Goring gave thefollowing orders for the forthcoming attack inthe West:"a.An attack oJII.Jagdkorps, with 3.Jagddivisionattached to it, on enemyfighter-bombersataiifields near thefront line.b.An even more important task oj II.Jagdkorpsisto fly fighter coverJor the Armyto give itfreedomoj movement.BodellplatteTHE LUFTWAFFE'S LAST HOPEc.Schlachtgeschwader 4 istooperate mainly duringthe crossings of the Meuse.d. 3. Fliegerdivisionisto attack airfields with theirjetbombers and other ta/gets with bombers andNachtschlacht units. Nachtjagdgeschwader 2 wasalsoto operate as aNachtschlacht unit with itsJuS8s.The preparations were to be completed byNovember27thandunitsweretobeoperationalwithinthreedays. At thatstageitwasclearthatalargeattackontheAlliedairfieldswasplannedinconjunctionwith the offensive in theWest. OnNovember 18th, this was confirmed by theguidelinesfor 'Unternehmen Wachtam Rhein' asinitiated by the Oberkommando del' Wehrmacht:"... When the weather improves the main task of theJagdverbanden will be tofly coverfor the advancing Panzerunits and their marching routes. Also, a surprise attack onthe frontlineairfields of the enemytactical airforces is tobe executed.JJ 5Handrick and various staff officers. Here Peltz toldhis audience of the plan to attack Allied airfields inthe near future and a master map, showing thefrontline as it then stood, was handed to eachKonunodoreThe operation was then discussed andplanned in minute detail. It was arranged that everyairfield should be attacked simultaneously. Thefollowing code words for the operation wereagreed upon:"'U!rus': Indicatingthat theoperationwas onandthat it would take place within 24 hours_'Teutonicus':Authority to briefthe pilots and toarrangefor aircraft tobearmedandreadyat theedge ofthe airfield.'Hermann':Givingtheexact dateandtimeof theattack.'Dorothea': Indicating a delay in the attack.Gen. Maj. DietrichPeltz,Commanding Officer of II.Jagdkorps, presided overthe meeting on5 December 1944 atFlammersfeld during whichhe outlined the plan toattack Allied airfields.He is seen here in thespring of 1944 whilst hewas commander of IXFI iegerkorps.Fw 190 A-8, WNr. 173943'Black 12' of 2.1JG 1seenat Greifswald in November1944. (Roding)Theseorders were incorporated in the operationalorders of Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model forHeeresgruppeB of December 9th1944.6Bythattime the commanding officers of the]agdgeschwader had also been informed. OnDecember4th, Luftwaffenkommando West issuedan order that the conmlanders of all]agdgeschwaderand ]agdgruppen, except]G300and]G301, were to attend a meeting at theheadquartersof II. ]agdkorpsontheafternoonofthe following day.7The headquarters was situated inan inn at Flanunersfeld, some 10 kilometres south-west ofAJtenkirchen.The meeting was presided byGen.Maj. Dietrich Peltz, whohad been appointedcommanding officer ofII.]agdkorps on November15th. Others present were Obst.Walter Grabmann,Obst. Hanns Triibenbach, Obstlt. Gotthardt/-'Spatlese': Cancelling the attack after take-off.In the early evening the Konunodore andKommandeure returned to their units, probablywith varying thoughts about the mission.OnDecember 4th, one dayearlier than theconference held at theIL]agdkorps headquarters,the first preparations for the mission hadconunenced. OnthisdayL]agdkorps sent orderstoII.!N]G100, I.!N]G101andII.! JG101toprovide]u88stoseveral ]agdgeschwader toactasLotsen" forthenext twoweeks. The Lotsenweretoensureefficientassemblyof strongdayfighterformations in difficult weather. The crews weretoreport to the Gruppenkom.mandeur or thecommanding officer of their advancedetachment. 111 Thesame daysimilar orders weregivenby7. ]agddivisionto II.!N]G6. The nextday 3. ]agddivisionordered II./N]G1andIII.!N]G 1 to provideLotsen for ]G 1."Fortunately, the wardiary of N] G 6 hassurvived, and a fewdetailsareknownaboutthe transfer of theII.!N]G6 Lotsen.Inthe lateafternoonof December 4th, StabN]G 6 received atelephone call fromtheIa of the7. ]agddivision,ordering II./N]G 6,based at SchwabischHall, to prepare 20nightfighter crews forPRELUDETOTHE OFFENSIVE55 Panzer-Grenadiersfrom 1st 55PanzerDivision leibstandarteAdolf Hitler' attached toKampfgruppe Peiperadvance through theBelgian village ofHonsfeld and past anabandoned U5 M3halftrack during theinitial stages ofWachtam Rhein on December16th, 1944. It was crucialthat, as the advanceextended, Germanground forces had airsupport from theLuftwaffe'sJagdgeschwader.All units were to receive two Ju 88s.Thus 72 Ju 88swere to be used as Lotsen. Furthermore at least oneJu 88 ofIV/N]G 1 and oneJu 88 ofI.lN]G 4 werealso used as Lotsen.These Ju 88s were transferred toDrope (II.IJG 1) and Altenstadt (III./JG 2)respectively. These two may have been a latereplacement.Littleis known about anyspecial preparationsthe Ju 88 Lotsen may have taken at theirdestinations or about preparations by theJagdgeschwadertoo. Secrecywasapparentlywellmaintained. In ULTRA transcripts we findonly afewindicationsthatsonlething wasplanned. Thefirst indication was on December 4th whenII. Jagdkorps issuedorders for stockpilingvisualnavigational aidsas 'golden-rain' rocket-flaresandsmoke bombs at several designated pinpoints.Ordersforuse would be given in goodtime, andthe length of operation was scheduled to last onehour.17No writtenobservations were made byAllied Intelligence and it seems that noimportancewasattachedtoII. Jagdkorps'orders.Thenext signal cameonDecember 12thwhenthe first instructions were given by II.Jagdkorps tothe Ju88Lotsenregarding theuse of flareswhenleading fighter formations.18The next day thesameandotherinstructionsontheuseof the Ju88 Lotsen were given by Stab JG 27 to itsGruppen.19Allied Intelligence concluded thatpilot aircraft were to lead formations in thetactical support role rather than on aninterception basis, witha take offat first light.Howmoreaccuratecouldtheybe! However upto then, no indications on the possible targetswereintercepted. OnDecember20th, amessagefrom3. Jagddivisionwas interceptedinwhichit2 Ju 885 toIII.1JG14 Ju 885 to I.lJG1 andII.1JG18 Ju 885 toI.lJG 6,II.1JG 6, III.lJG6 andIV.lJG 5420 Ju 885 to I./JG26,II.1JG 26,111.lJG 26, I.lJG27,II.1JG 27,III./JG 27,IV.lJG 27,I./JG 77,II./JG 77 andIII./JG 7712 Ju 885 to I./SG 4, II.1SG 4,III./SG 4, II.lJG 53, III.lJG 53 andIV./JG 5316Ju 885 to II./JG11, III./JG11,I.lJG 2,II./JG 2,III./JG2, I.lJG 3,III.1JG 3 andIV.lJG 310 Ju 885 to I.lJG 4, II.lJG 4,111.lJG 4, IV.lJG 4 andI./JG11II./NJG 6II.1NJG 1III./NJG 1III./NJG 5II.1NJG 100I.lNJG 101II.1NJG 101transfer to other airfields(which will be identifiedlater) for a period of twoweeks, for a special missionby day fighters. At17.20 hrsthe order was given toHptm. Helmuth Schulte,Kommandeur ofII./NJG 6,to prepare his crews.At 08.00hrsonDecember5th II./NJG 6 confirmedthat 20 crews with theirJu 88s would be sent toten Jagdgruppen ofII. Jagdkorps, where theywould be used as Lotsen.Each Jagdgruppe wouldreceive two Ju88s andthetransfer was tobe reportedby 18.00 hrs. At 14.001mthetransferwaspostponed,as only 14 Ju 88s wereready. 12 Lt. LotharHemmerich, one of thepilots ofII./NJG6, remembers: "The order totransfer fromSchwabisch-Hallcameasa surpriseand was to be executed as soon as possible. Most ofthe crews did not like the idea at all andconsequentlyspiritswerenothigh. I believethatsome crews delayed their transfer flight, whichwas to take place on the same afternoon, byreporting their Ju 88s unserviceable." 13However, several Ju 88s took off in theafternoon ofDecember 5th and by December12thatotal of 18 Ju88s haddepartedfor theirdesignated Jagdgruppen. 14 Theseincludedseveralcrews of 5./NJG6, which had been based atEchterdingensinceNovember 7th. Among themwas Hptm. Fritz Griese, Kapitan of 5./NJG 6.15The following Nachtjagdgeschwader wereordered to provide Ju 88 Lotsen for theJagdgeschwader: 1613( (lell teJ...L(" _THE LUFTWAFFE'S LAST HOPEAbove and below:Lt. Gottfried Just,Staffelkapitan of 2.1JG 1,in the cockpit of hispersonal Fw 190A-B,'Black 9' at Greifswald inNovember 1944. Lt. Justwas shot down and killedon 27 December 1944.Note that the 'Black 9'has been painted over'White 17' aformer StabI.IJG 1aircraft. It isbelieved that Lt. Just wasshot down in thisaircraft. (Roding)was confirmedthat emergencylandinggroundsfor the 'special undertaking' had remainedunchanged. '" This is oneof the first indicationsthat something was imminent, but AlliedIntelligence did not comment. Over the followingdays a message from 3. Jagddivision wasintercepted indicatingthatseveral Gruppen21hadpractisedlow-level attacks onpracticetargets orondummy aircraJt.22 Also, anorder of Stab JG11was intercepted toreport the number oflow-levelattacks by eachof its Gruppen.23Inboth casesthere was no apparent link to the 'specialundertaking.'The last warning came whenon31December, 3. Jagddivision sent a messagethattheem.ergency landing ground for 'specialundertaking' Leeuwarden was 'conditionallyserviceable.'24 Allied Intelligence suggested thatthe special undertaking was no more than supportof the ground offensive - in other words, nothingspecial at all. How wrong could they be?Meanwhile with the start of the 'VonRundstedt Offensive' (theso-called 'Battleof theBulge') onDecember 16th, theactivities of theJagdgeschwader had been concentrated on thesupport of the advancing Panzer Armies.Maximumeffort was given, and even in badweather, the fighter units attempted to providecover to the armour. Onmany occasions theywere interceptedbyfighters of the 2nd TacticalAir Force or NinthAir Force and losses werehigh. During eight days ofoperations betweenDecember 17th-27th the Jagdgeschwader lost 644fighters destroyedand227 damaged. Some 322pilots werekilled, 23captured and133 wounded.Between December 23rdand25ththe losseshadbeenespeciallyhigh; onthese three days alone,363 fighters were lost. In fact, several Gruppen hadlost half of their strengthinoperations over thebattlearea. As theend of December drewnearerand the land offensive seemed to halt, not many oftheKonunodoreandKommandeure thought oftheplannedattackon Alliedairfieldsanylonger.Infact, somehadalreadyassumedtheplantobecancelled." Persistent bad weather conditions hadprohibitedtheoperationfrombeingcarriedoutduring the opening days of the ground offensive.However, the opposite was true and in theearly afternoon of December 31st the codewords 'varus- 'Teutonicus' were issued.'" Thealert was given and the attack wastobeexpectedwithin24hours, meaningthat theattackwouldtake place onJanuary 1st 1945. As previouslymentioned, the code word'Teutonicus' meant thatthe aircraft couldbe preparedandrolledto theedge of the airfield. At approximately18.30 hoursthefinal codeword'Hermann' was giventotheunits as"Aliftrag Hermann1.1.1945 Zeit 09.20. "2"Themissionwas tobe executedon January 1str-,PRELUDETOTHEOFFENSIVEand09.20hourswastheplannedtimetobeoverthe target") - NewYear's Day 1945 would be a dayto remember ...Inhis NewYear'sDaybroadcast, Adolf Hitlerannounced: "The world must knowthat this State/llill, never capitulate... Germany willrise likea phoenix .(I'omits ruinedcities andwill go down inhistory as the miracle of the 20th Century. "Notes'Sueh "sjGl,jGII, /lI./jG 54 andjG 77. Die Ardl'lltlt'I1-0fll:'I1sive1944/1945 byHerll1:lllnjullg, Musterschmidt 3Verlag, 1971, page138.l3"sed onI< AIR 16/1035, No. 84 GroupIntelligence Summary No. 144."" Operational Record Book No. 2800 Squadron.1(,0 According to the Operational Record Book of2ndTAF ConununicationSquadron the attack lasted from 09.26 hrs until 09.53 hrs.'" Logbook F/Lt. Neil G. Russell, No. 416 Squadron.'" Letter Heinz G01I1allli,dated 25.02.1994.'w Letter Ernst Lampferhoffto Gert Poelchau, dated 10.12.1989.'M A. D. I. (K) Report 0.32/1945 and Crashed Enemy Aircraft Report No.264,dated 16thJanuary 1945.'" A.D. I. (K) Report No. 103/1945 and Crashed Enemy Aircraft Report No.264, dated 16th January 1945. Report No. 31/1945.U" Letter Siegfried Sy, dated 29.8.1986.168 AU German reports indicate that Uffz. Leo Speer crashed during thereturn leg of the operation. The crash location seems to indicate that it alsocould have happened on the outward course. However, no proof for thiscould be found.'" Namentliche Verlustmeldung Gefr. Willi Kunz, 7.1JG 26."" Logbooks Uffz. Stumpf, Lt. Seyd, ObIt. Glunz, Lt. Dietze, all[].lJG 26.m Letter Willi Zester, dated 2.2.1954.on Crashed Enemy Aircraft Report No. 264, dated 16th January 1945.l7J Copy Policereport