body 'n soul: voice and movement in keith jarrett's pianism (moreno)

8/12/2019 Body 'n Soul: Voice and Movement in Keith Jarrett's Pianism (Moreno)

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Body'n'Soul?: Voice and Movement in Keith Jarrett's PianismAuthor(s): Jairo MorenoSource: The Musical Quarterly, Vol. 83, No. 1 (Spring, 1999), pp. 75-92Published by: Oxford University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/742261

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The Twentieth Century

B o d y n S o u l ? V o i c e n d ovementn K e i t h J a r r e t t s P i a n i s mJairoMoreno

Not long ago, in the midstof a jazz-quartetessionin which I waspartic-ipating,the recordingengineer complainedabout what he called the"radiator oise"the pianistmade while playing,a hisslike soundthatclosely followedthe pitches of his improvisation.After the engineeraskedhim to tryto keep "it"down, his performancebecameconsiderablystifled;eventuallythis supposedlyharmlessand even sensiblesuggestionby the engineer appeared o paralyze he creativityof an otherwiseratherimaginative improviser.As a sidemanplayingthe bass,the "noise"of thepianistdid not botherme, since I was in someway,I guess,filteringitout andconcentratingon his choice of notes. Fromthe control roomthe engineer,I thoughtat the time, had the necessarydistance to makethe rightcall. Buthearingthe musicalresultsmade me reevaluatethesituation,particularly ince I, too, asa listener,had sometimeswonderedaboutthe "noise" hat one of myfavoritepianists,KeithJarrett,made.Iremembered everalreviews wherecriticsattackedJarrett orwhat theyidentified as an arrogant mpositionof mannerismson the listener,man-nerisms that got in the wayof the "music."Reviewingthe firstvolume of what wouldbecome a popularseries,titled Standards, yJarrett'srio,Owen Cordleof Down Beatstates in1984, "[T]heonly detraction froma perfectrecord sJarrett'smoaningandsingingoverhis piano lines. Embarrassingtuff,but filter it out anddig the music,which is toughand strong."'(DownBeat, it is worthpointing out, is the mostwidelyreadjazzpublicationin the UnitedStates.) Seven years ater,John Ephland,also in DownBeat, writes,"Jarrett'sush chromaticismandgrittyswingmake the balladsslow-dance delights ... (with JerryLewis's mpersonations hankfullyunder-recorded)."2But it is not only Jarrett's oice that criticsobject to. It is, in fact,the movementof his bodyduring ive performanceshat elicits the mostsarcasticresponses.3 n the book TheGreatJazzPianistsSpeaking f TheirLivesandMusic,by LenLyons,one reads,"[I]n peciallyrhapsodicpas-sages... [Jarrett's]enuflectingandgyrating n front of the keyboard

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76 TheMusicalQuarterly

make Elvis look like a mannequin."4 The author John Litweil adopts amore provocative tone, referring to Jarrett's"autoerotic groans, sighs,grunts, and moans, as he leaps from his chair to thrust his pelvis at thekeyboard while he plays."5By 1994 John Andrews of Down Beat summa-rizes the jazzestablishment's attitude: "bashing Keith Jarrett enjoys criti-cal cachet right now."6It is noteworthy, however, that critics such as Andrews, Cordle,and Ephland, among others, also praise the artistry of Jarrett'simprovi-sations and his virtuoso pianism.7 Positive evaluations of his playinghardly drown out the criticism. Despite these concessions, Jarrett'scriticsfocus for the most part on a decidedly negative aspect of his playing: Jar-rett's voice and body movement are sonorous and visual hindrancesinterfering with the beautiful music he produces.The present essay addresses the assumptions these critiques arebased on, assumptions that, however concealed, I believe fuel the criti-cal reception of musical performance as aesthetic experience, the cre-ative processes of jazz improvisation, and, most fundamentally, the rela-tionship between performer and listener.8 My approach is pluralistic,seeking to address these questions from a variety of perspectives. In thefirst section I focus on Jarrett'svoice, elaborating on the distinctionoften made between interiority and exteriority, and so frame the critics'reaction within a critical model based on the concept of logocentrism.Using this concept I consider the notion of performance authenticity,the ontotheological connotations within the very idea of authenticity,and the stability of meaning that authenticists desire in musical sound. Ialso consider the artificial separation between meaning and the material-ity of the voice as a pertinent way to address the critics' misunderstand-ing of cognitive processes in jazz improvisation and their claims abouttimbral purity. Lastly, I discuss the extent to which conventions of per-formance practice discourage instrumentalists to vocalize. A second sec-tion concentrates on the etiquette of the body, sketching a general his-tory of its reception from Aquinas and Descartes to the romantics andtranscendentalists, and to the rise of the aesthetic as a category duringthe late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. I conclude by dis-cussing Jarrett'sbody as a contested site of expression and the constitu-tion of the self, on the one hand, and discipline, on the other. The crit-ics' discourse, I will show, is firmly located within outmoded aestheticboundaries imposed in the nineteenth century. My critique of Jarrett'sreception by the journalistic establishment calls into question the valuesof such an outdated aesthetic and the usefulness of applying such an "artmusic" aesthetic to modem jazz.Critiques of modem jazz-at once apopular and an elitist musical expression-urgently necessitate a recon-sideration of the aesthetic experience.


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Voiceand MovementnJarrett's ianism 77

1Critical accounts of Jarrett'spianism set up a hierarchical oppositionbetween a pure acoustic signal from the piano and the adulterated soundresulting once the human voice is superimposed. An intruder, the voiceis perceived as a separate layer, or, as the critic Owen Cordle puts it, "asinging over."9 (I will discuss the appropriateness of the expression"singing" later.) Here the preposition "over"-with its attendant spatialconnotations-constitutes no empty journalistic jargon. Rather, it sug-gests the existence of an ideal space, the sound of the piano, that canand, in the critics' opinion, should be contemplated without interfer-ence. Their position is predicated on the concept that improvisationalcreation is an internal process of which the piano constitutes its mostintimate (i.e., authentic) expression. We may call this internal processcognitive or imaginative, for at the moment I make no distinction.What is clear is that there exists a well-marked conceptual distance sep-arating inner process and outward expression, and that this dualityestablishes a definite hierarchical ordering and, furthermore, is an ideo-logical imposition that has its roots in logocentrism, a most pervasivetrope in Western epistemology.

Logocentrism, to review, establishes an order of meaning conceivedas foundation (that is, thought, truth, reason, logic, the word, or logos), afoundation that is considered to be prior to and independent of the signsor acts in which they are expressed or made physically manifest.10 It seeslanguage as a mediating system through which thought is realized. Inthis view spoken or, worse yet, written words are physical signifiersstanding for spiritual, transcendental signifieds. There exists in logocen-trism a strong desire for the unmediated, which constitutes a perhapsinsatiable need for self-sufficiency showing itself in attitudes towardmeaning (e.g., the belief that the signified has logical precedence overthe signifier, a logical precedence that is underwritten by a point of pres-ence or fixed origin)."I But in logocentric ideology, a similar attitudeshapes the very idea of the subject's position before the world. That isto say, there must be a validating presence or center that supports theexistence of subjects. According to this, the subject designates an invari-able metaphysical presence, be it essence, existence, God, substance, ortranscendentality, which it realizes and which in this process becomesinternal to it (I will refer to this presence as "inside"). The goal of thehuman subject, under these terms, is to be present to itself, presenceconstituting the nuclear matrix of logocentrism. In fact, the unshakablebelief in the discontinuity between immaterial and material gives"inside" a seeming epistemological stability. This stability, however,exacts a high cost for those elements that are determined to create any


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78 The MusicalQuarterly

kind of distancebetween a metaphysicalpresenceand those domains ofhumanactivity that it seeksto ground.As a system,logocentrismattemptsto delimit potential meaningsand indeterminacies hat wouldinvalidatepresenceas a guaranteeof significationandultimatelyofbeing. Accordingly,a numberof hierarchicallyorganizedoppositionscanbe graftedonto the conceptualscheme of logocentrism: orexample,realityand appearance,meaningandform,essence and accident, imma-terial and material,andthe centralmetaphorof insideandoutside.By wayof examplewe maynote the overtonesof logocentricismaudiblein contemporarydebatesin art-musicquartersabout the rela-tionshipbetween musicalcreation and its reproduction,particularly smanifested n the so-called authenticperformancemovement. The veryideaof authenticityevinces an obsessionwith origin, interpretiveclo-sure,and the illusion of self-presence: he ontologicalstabilityof themusicaltext affordedby the primacygiven to poiesisentails the repres-sion of absence (the performer spires o become, in somesense, the

composer)and of difference(there is only one possible,validexpression-not an interpretation-of a work).Bythis account, the nonauthenticresults rom the expulsionof thoughtfrom a state of graceout into theexteriorityof representation.12 uriouslyenough,while the motto oflogocentrism s contemptusmundi,authenticists,as RichardTaruskinhasnoted, arewilling to give music a rathernarrowdefinition:the timbralqualitiesthat originalinstrumentsproduce.The biblical connotations in the expression"expulsionof thoughtfrom a state of graceout into the exteriorityof representation" boveareparticularlyimely consideringthat compositionalor improvisationalinspiration s still formanybasedupon a metaphysicalor even religiousform of communication.Formanyof Jarrett's riticstoo, I suspect,improvisationconstitutesan internalprocessobserving"amysticalrelianceon illusorynonknowledge," o use Taruskin'swords.13mprovi-sation, in their minds, is not conscious;in fact, a "natural"mprovisersone who appears o suddenlyabandonall accumulatedknowledgein theraptureof creation.14Accordingly, mprovisation s describedas anattributeof the soul, a private,interiorprocess.On the otherhand, theartful,which is to saythe human, is exiled in the exteriorityof the body,which bringsthe interiorprocessto the outside,orrealizes t. As a result,consciousthoughtwould be seen as a layerthat is separated romthesoul, the purityof which it contaminates.The conceptsof unconscious-ness (i.e., naturalness)and the soul in improvisationparallelthe inner,spiritual,and self-sufficientnucleus reifiedby logocentrism.Jarrett,how-ever,wouldhave none of it, since, accordingto him, "one of the badrapsthat improvisation s alwaysgoing to have is that it is an off-the-


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Voiceand Movement nJarrett's ianism 79

top-of your-head,pattern-related,non-intellectual thing. Whereasnreal-ity, withconsciousness,mprovisations a muchdeeperapping f somethingthan any otherprocess."15What are we then to make of Jarrett's"singing" musical lines simul-taneously with the piano? I believe that by this procedure he reveals thepresence of a conscious thought process. He makes explicit the fact thatimagining sound and structuring it around the chord progressions andmelodies of the songs he improvises on entails embodying it in mind,soul, and body (here, body signifies the voice). The sound of his voiceunleashes what in the critics' minds should be a metaphysical presence,which is to say, an invisible or repressed Other. To let this Other becomeaudible is to make a public admission of the presence and power of con-sciousness in improvisation. Once audible, this presence becomes anOther that, in fact, helps divide Jarrett'sself into a pianist and a grunter,or so the critics argue. This Other, the grunter, the voice, competes forour attention in performance and occupies space reserved exclusively forthe musical imagination-in the critics' account of improvisation, thatis. It is as if they do not want to witness the embodiment of the musi-cian's soul, which encompasses the totality of his playing, or, put anotherway, to admit that the doings of the soul in improvisation are as muchmental and physical as they are spiritual. Jarrett, the critics may think,should leave the singing to his practice studio. What they fail to realize,however, is that Jarrett'svocalization constitutes an ontological facet ofmusical creation. That is to say, the sound will not come into beingunless it is imagined. There is a cognitive factor at work in the real-timeprocess of improvising that melds together thought, sentiment, fingeraction, and vocal articulation. Thought and musical realization happenat once; there is neither temporal deferral nor spatial distance separatingthe two.16Just as the essence of language resides not in the distancebetween thought and speech but in the material continuity evidentwhen we, for example, hear ourselves speak, Jarrett'svoice establishes asimilar immediacy between his body (i.e., vocal chords) and the musicalsounds the listeners perceive.17 This is not, however, the kind of un-mediation that logocentrism aspires to; in the present case the voiceprojects onto the outside something that critics suggest is valid only asinteriority. To continue the language analogy, in Jarrett'spianism signi-fier and signified are bound in a sign, where expression is inevitablyjoined both to the emotional and cognitive meaning it ex-presses.18If we consider his voice as gesture-in opposition, that is, to the soundof the piano-we may invoke the logocentric association betweensound and idea as the signifying aspect of musical communication. Inthe critics' account, on the other hand, voice qua gesture is excluded


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fromsignifying unctions,becominga redundant,accessorialrepresenta-tion, one that assumesa disruptiverole in the unwrittenconventions ofperformance-practicetiquette. Defyingthese conventions,Jarrett'svocal pianismconstitutesa site wheremusic,as a metaphysicalentity,becomesphysical,human,sensuous.The objectionto Jarrett's ocal intrusionsstems from their unique-ness as a simultaneouslymaterial/immaterial, song"/thoughtntity,andfrom the waysin which the naturaldialectic it createswith the pianocreatesobstaclesin grasping he unity of expressionandmeaning.Thisis what KajaSilvermanexpresseswhen she notes that "thevoice is thesite of perhaps he most radicalof all subjectivedivisions-the divisionbetween meaningandmateriality."19ut once it is understoodpositivelyas the site wheremeaningand materialityconvergeratherthan divide-a union that makespossiblemeaningfulcommunication-the voiceceases to be seen ashindrance and is regardednstead as a manifestationof the way in which disembodiedand embodiedexpressiondefineoneanother (beingmindful,of coursethat disembodiedexpression s noexpressionat all). The materialityof meaningas sound is a presencealways-already-there, locus of the embodiedcondition of ourbeing inthe world. To acknowledge his is to accept that the vocal, gesturalexpressionof musicis in no wayless significanta partof the whole thanits "pure"ound is. Thus the voice cannot only be a layeringover,asimultaneouscommentaryon the piano line, or even the embodimentof an otherwisepuresoundimage.The jazz mproviser pitomizestheidea of the moment:piano andvoice are united in time, and, in addi-tion, theirsumis inseparableromthe consciousness hat originatesthem both.What Jarrett's ocal chordsproduceis symbolicmaterial nsofarasit resemblesa commonsignifier,namely singing.Butsimplyto interprethis vocal utterancesasfulfillingthe musicalfunction of singingwould beinadequatebecause it would be judginghis vocalizations mproperly san object, ratherthan as a process.ConsideringJarrett'smusicas anobject allowscritics to reifya given improvisationas a finishedwork andthus to impose ontologicalcategoriesusuallyappliedto art-musicscoresin which many,but not all, parametersarecarefully pecifiedandnotated.The informationcontained in a scorebecomesa neat spatialrepresentationof the composers'attemptto limit potentialvariantsinthe reproductionof a finishedwork. But I have already ketchedhow forthe jazz mproviser reation is a process,a dynamic, temporalactivity,one to which a fixedspatialconceptualizationof the workdoes notapply.Thus,Jarrett's tterancesaresignificant n that they allegoricallypoint to anotherdomain.Bythis I mean that the voice representsan


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unseen cognitive reality apprehendedby the consciousnessand thusbecomesa manifestationof an existingbut usuallyrepressedvoice. Theconditions supporting his repressiondemand furtherdiscussion.It is curioushow instrumentalistsareencouraged o sing throughtheir instruments,yet performancepracticeconventions have set strictlimits to the notion. The samedisciplinesystemthat prohibits addingoctave doublingsto a passage n a written scorebyChopin, forexample(which amounts to controllingthe performer'smusicalutteranceunderthe auspicesof respectfor the composer'sntention), seeks also to con-trol movement andgesture.These elements are controlled becausethereis in place a conventional belief in the role of the performer;hus thearticulationsandgesticulationsof the bodyarepartof the mechanicsof reproduction,but not, perverselyenough,of the articulationof mean-ing.20Control is appliedto the signifyingelements of the languageof thebody in orderto obtainhomogeneity in the sociomusicalorderknown asperformance-practice tiquette. The control these conventions haveover the signsof the body,assume,I think mistakenly, he separabilityof the signifiedfrom the signifier, he voice fromthe performer'sxpres-sivity.To illustrate his separation,considerhow instrumental tudioteachersencouragestudentsto internalize heirsinging,becauseduringperformance,accordingto ourconventions, they have to choose oneform of expression: nstrumentor voice, but neverboth. Byconventionthe instrumentalist s askedto have a hold on her voice, becomingaconduit for the composer'sntentions. But this passivity s no morethana simulacrumof a socially imposedcorrectmeaningof music and perfor-mance. The voice, in this case, acquiresa strictlyextramusical tatus,somuch so that "singing"urnsout to be little more than an immaterialsound.A musician's nstrumentbecomes both her voice and her mes-sage,as the internalized ingingvoice is muted.21Sadly,we become"ventriloquists"f ourown soul.22Consequently, n a jazzpianist'scase,conventions of improvisationarerestrictedonly to a kind of digitalexpression,fingertipspressingon keys.There is no allowance forvocal-izationsof anykind, for such expressions ie beyondthe boundariesofacceptedperformancepractice.Jarrett s, afterall, not a singer;we pur-chasehis recordingsexpecting to hear an improviser'soice throughthe piano,not the pianist'svoice. The conductor HermannScherchenhas statedthat orchestralplayersmayhave impressivecontrol on theirinstruments,but often, he comments,"wemiss one thing:the soul of themusic,the song that gives inward ife to musicalsounds.To sing is thelife-functionof music. Where there is no singing,the formsof musicbecome distortedand they move in a senselesstime-order mposedfrom


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without."23wouldputit bluntly:herearetwo kindsofmusic,"music"and"musichatsings." arrettsexpressinghelatter;but he makesmusic hatsingsexplicitly, gainst stablished onventions.Myargu-ment,then,is that theexpectation f theperformer'scquiescenceosilenceduringperformanceriginatesn a seldom-questionediscipli-naryconvention,one thatbearsnosubstantiveonnectionwith musicin the wonderfulensethatScherchen rticulates.arrett'soiceexposesthesubjectivityfperformanceractice nddissolveshe implicit on-tractual bligationsheseconventions avecreatedwith the listener.Anotherchallenge o conventional erformanceracticenJar-rett's ase s the critics' oncernwith timbral urity.Whereas thermusical ulturesegard uzzingounds,or nstance,asbeingmusicallyacceptable,vendesirable,heWestern radition f artmusic reats uchphenomena simperfections,hatis,as non-musicalccurences. hisparticularonvention tems rom henineteenth-centuryotionof thework oncept Werktreue),concept hat notonlyincludesperformancepractices ut,more mportantly,mplicitlyegislates separationbetweenperformerndcomposer.24udgingrom hecritics'bitingcom-mentsonJarrett,t appearssif theyembracehisphilosophywhole-heartedly. o besure, ome nstrumentalistsn thejazz radition avesuccessfullyncorporatedhevoice aspartof theirsignatureound-towit,thebassgreat"Slam"tewart ndthejazzandpopguitaristGeorgeBenson.However,hesemusicians'seof the voiceiscritically,ndthussocially, cceptedbecause f theprecisioni.e.,purity)withwhichtheirsingingmatcheshepitchof their nstruments.he voiceis in thiscasea layeringver, o useCordle'sxpression,ra kindoforchestralevice.Therearealsothosewhose"dirty"ound svalued, uchasMilesDavis.In thiscase,however, qualifierlways ppears isguiseds a compli-ment;namely, owhe managesosuccessfullyxploit imited nstru-mental echniqueo fithis artistic isionandexpression. utthosewhosevoiceovers roduceo-callednoise,andI would nclude n thisgroup, longwithJarrett, abloCasals,GlennGould,andArturoToscanini, resummarilyhastised.Theirvoice isconsiderednannoy-ance.(An interestingxception o thismightbethepianovirtuosoErrollGarner,whosegrunting asbeendeemedacceptable ecausetdoesnot inanysensecompeteortheaural paceof themusic, .e., it issosoftas to bebarely udible).Thesedays his attitude oward xtrane-ous"noise"as adangerousxtrapolation:ith the riseofdigital rans-mission fsound, cratches nourvinylrecordsouldpotentially is-qualifyhoseperformancesrombeingmusic.Thereseems o be amovetowardsnessentializationf timbre.Advancesn electronic eproduc-tionof soundno doubtencouragehislimitedaesthetic,one thatseeks


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VoiceandMovementnJarrett's ianism 83

notonlyto definenoise,but to separatet frommusicandmusicmaking.Withoutdigressingnto a distinction hat couldwelloccupyus forquitesometime-the distinctionbetweennoise andmusic-it isworthobserving, onetheless,hat the ideathat one can or shouldbe abletofilteroutthe noisefrom he musiconceagain llustrateshesuperiorityof the workconcept n ourcurrent erformanceractices.Noiseissepa-rate rommusicbecause heperformersconsideredo beseparateromthecomposerndthecomposition.25

2Ifin thecritics'mindsvocalizationsepresent corruptionfmusicalexpression,henphysical rbodilygesturesareeven worse.Whencriticscomparearretto thoseiconsofAmericanpopularulture,ElvisPresley ndJerryLewis, heir ntention snot to elevateJarretto theirstatus; ather,heyareclaiminghat hisbodymovementduring erfor-mance snothingmore hansuperficialhow-businessosturing,nempty,fat timesentertaining,acade.Thebody sclearly een as thelocusof ultimate xteriorityndasa threat orcontemplationfapurelymusical esthetic-jazzhas,afterall,becomepartandparcelofthe concerthall,the sacredplaceofart-musicxperience.Like heintrusion f thevoice,the intrusion f thebody nto the aesthetic xpe-riencehasa longand variedhistory.Tomymind, hesomatic ngage-mentofJarrett'serformancetylemakes elevantanotherwise isparatecollectionofwriterswho havegreatlynfluenced urunderstandingngeneral. amthinkingofAquinas'smedievalheological iews; healienation f thebody rom he mind ostered yDescartes'spistemol-ogy;andnineteenth-centuryotionsof musicalranscendentalism,ar-ticularlyheabsenceof thebody rom heromanticxperience f theaesthetic.

LongbeforeDescartes evalued hebody nfavorof the mindandthesoulinhis effort o demonstratehe immanence f thelatter,Christ-iantheologians uringheMiddleAgestookmore nterest n thebody,anoutlookcharacterizedy,amongother hings, ssuesof liminality,heightenedonecouldevensaysensual)manner fcommunication,ndthetranscendencef thephysicaln theearthlydomain.26orAquinas,forinstance,hebodycarriedhe imprint f theself's dentity,hesoultakingoverthisfunctiononlyin theabsenceof thebody, hatis,upondying."Me"sexpressedn mybody,or,asAquinasputs t, "whenhingsareastheyshouldbe," hatis,hereon earth.27 nowing, eeling,andexperiencingre ocated n thebody,which n thelate MiddleAgesalso


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furnishesan instrumentof redemption.28 romthe musicalaestheticpoint of view, it shouldalso be noted that afterBoethius the humanvoice was believed to be the only puremusicalinstrument,much to thedetriment of instrumentalmusic.In a generalsense, then, the bodywasa centralsite forexperiencingas well as producingmusic, and, inAquinas'sepistemology, he locusof knowledgeandfeeling.Descartes,on the otherhand, set about the projectof distancingknowledgefrom the sensuous;"leading he way awayfrom the senses . ..towarda clearand distinctvision,"the mindcould enter the firststageofknowledge.29Duringthe questforepistemologicalcertainty, he body,asthe matrix of the senses,is discarded n a moment of radicaldoubt. Buteven when acceptingthe existence of the body,Descartesasserts hathumanaction, "thepowerof self-motion,"as well as sensingand think-ing arenot dependenton the bodyin the sense that they have a physicallocation in the body.30Of particular ignificanceto my mainargument sthat even those mattersmost likely to be bound with the body,such asextension, shape,andmovement,fall now underthe exclusivejurisdic-tion of the mind. The turn toward he inside and the constructionof awall separatingmind andsoul,on the one hand, andbody,on the other,is here definitive;Descartessimultaneouslyplaces the subjectin the fore-ground,while distancingthe "thinkingself" from all else, including,mostfamously, he embodied self. This shift in the conceptualizationofthe body introducesthe notion of objectivityandso bearsdirect influ-ence in conceptions of the bodyin music.Thus, in his Compendiummusicae 1650), Descartesclassified he effect of music on the subjectasan irrationalelement, one incapableof being measuredandbelongingtoaestheticsand metaphysics.31When Baumgarten Meditationeshilosophicae,735) articulates heprinciplesof aesthetics in termsof the mental statesa perceiverexperi-ences, he reclaimsthe sensuousas a form of cognition, the one epistemo-logicalavenue so conveniently blockedby rationalists ike Descartes.But while this conclusionpavesthe wayfor the autonomizationof thesensuous rom the intelligibleandthe recognitionof the sensuousas aform of knowledge,sensationsare themselvescharacterized y an irre-versible turninward.Baumgarten,with his romanticsubjectificationofaesthetic experience,standsin starkcontrastto his successorKant,whoin his critiqueof the aestheticjudgementattributedsuch notions as "dis-interestedattention"and"purposivenesswithout a purpose"o the art-work.Once placedwithin the frameof transcendentalism,however,bywhich tenets music is said to surpasshe worldlyand the particular on-tingenciesand transitoriness f mortals,Kant'snotions of the aestheticjudgementappearsensible,logicaleven.


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The romantic or transcendentalistposition, curiously,opens thegatesof self-expression,yet strivesfor the universal. In particular,musicappearsas a phenomenalmanifestationof things eternal. "Musicbringsbefore us in rhythmandharmonythe formof motion of physicalbod-ies,"states Friedrichvon Schelling in what could well be a manifestoof the bodilycondition of the musicalexperience.Yethe immediatelycounteractssuch impulsesby adding,"[I]t[music] s... pureform,liber-ated fromanyobject or matter.To this extent, music is the artthat isleast limited by physicalconsiderations n that it representspuremotionas such, abstracted romany objectand borne on invisible,almostspiri-tualwings."32The dualityof this account of musicalexperience, bywhich the human and the exalted coalesce, dependsupon "acertainkind of illusion, the abilityto see andhear in a physicalobject or perfor-mance, less the concrete and the physical,than the transcendent," sLydiaGoehrputs it.33Continuing with the metaphorof illusion, it is ashortstep to askingthe performero give him- or herselfto the creativegenius,as E. T. A. Hoffmannfamouslydoes in 1813: "Thetrueartistlives only in the workthat he has understoodas the composermeant itand that he then performs.He is aboveputtinghis own personality or-ward in any way,and all his endeavorsaredirectedtowarda single end-that all the wonderfulenchanting picturesand apparitions hat thecomposerhas sealedinto his work with magicpower maybe called intoactive life, shining in a thousandcolors,and that they maysurroundmankind in luminoussparklingcirclesand, enkindlingits imagination,its innermostsoul,maybear it in rapid light into the faraway piritrealmof sound."34fso much is asked of the performer,what then couldbe demandedof the listener?Farmore,I wouldsuspect.So what of the body?What beginsduringthe post-Enlightenmenteraas an auspiciousmove awayfromreason'sexclusivedominationofknowledgeandexperiencequicklybecomes a turnawayfrom the body.Only by fleeingthe bodyandoccupyingsomeone else'sspace by meansof contemplationis it possibleto attain the highest degreesof the aes-thetic experience,as Hoffmanndescribes t. The transfigurationf theself into an other is consideredan act of redemption,a justifiable nter-pretationgiven the closeness between religionandromanticaesthetics.Or,as Schilling puts it, "[I]t s music that elevates man to the infinite, toGod himself."35n turn,by consideringredemptionas a flight into another foreternity,we maycompare t with ecstasy,a categoryof experi-ence closelyassociatedwith musicalperformance hroughoutvariouscultures.Ecstasymeans"toput out of place,"a condition that wouldseem to have much in commonwith music'sso-calledabilityto trans-portthe listener.But instead of fleeing the presentmoment into pastor


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future, ecstasy is just the opposite. It is an unconditional identificationwith the present and a total suppression of past and future.36Moreimportantly, in contrast to redemption, which again entails a kind of sur-render, ecstasy entails an absolute oneness of the self. Two factors arise,one temporal and the other ontological, a conclusion that I believe,returning to my example, has an interesting bearing on Jarrett'sperfor-mative style.Keith Jarrett is acutely aware that improvising constitutes a unique,unrepeatable experience of time in which there is no room for deferral.37He has stated that "when you are an improviser, a true improviser, youhave to be familiar with ecstasy, otherwise you can't connect with music... when you are an improviser, at eight o'clock tonight, for example,you have to be so familiar with that state that you can almost bring iton."38The "state,"as he calls ecstasy, demands one to focus conscious-ness on the musical moment, a condition that inherently denies thephenomenological separation of sound and gesture, of music and me-dium. The musician (and by this I mean the body and soul of the per-former) is united with the instrument in the creative moment. The body,like the voice, assumes an ever increasing role in communicating to theaudience the power of the moment. However, in the case of Jarrett'sbody movement, we must ask whether his behavior is governed by prac-tical or symbolic considerations, or perhaps even by both. Are his gyra-tions and genuflections expressions of emotional states that cannot becommunicated any other way, or are his gestures symbolic but unessen-tial expressions? Maurice Merleau-Ponty offers an answer: "movementmust somehow cease to be a way of designating things or thoughts, andbecome the presence of that thought in the phenomenal world, and,moreover, not its clothing but its token or its body."39By this accountperception (esthesis) and production (poiesis) are unified, situated, andembodied, rejecting the split of mind and body and refusing to considerthe body as mechanical object. Vocalizations and gestures are not justsupplements of pure signifiers (such as music) whose signification is inde-pendent of the acts through which they are made manifest: Jarrett'sbodymovement and gesturing are, so to speak, significations of the flesh. Froman aesthetic point of view, it should be noted that this position wouldconsider sound and motion to be phenomenologically separable. Weknow that they are not; deferral may operate in the relation betweenthought and the world, but not in thought in relation to the spoken orwritten word, and definitely not in the relation between thought andmusical expression. Jazzimprovisation has a unique way of defying tem-poral deferral. It is ecstatic; it belongs in the immediacy of the moment.


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Where houghtendsandmovementbeginsbecomesmpossibleoseparate; esturesmaybe,afterall,forms fknowledge,ssentialpartsntheproductionf sound.Musicians avelongnotedthisrelationship,pointing oward kindof kineticmusical pistemology.travinskyncereferredo hisfingers shis"inspirers,"ndthoughan avowed ormalist,he alsostated hat"thesightof thegesturesndmovements f the vari-ouspartsproducinghe music sfundamentallyecessaryf it is to begraspedn all its fullness."40t is indeedone ofJarrett'stylistic rade-marks o producencrediblyongmusical hrases, hraseshat,inciden-tally,asinglebreath ouldnotsustain. t is no "theatrical"oincidencethatduringhese ongphrases e isusually ffthepianobench.Thisshouldcomeas no surprise,incethinkingnsound sa transactioninwhichsensebecomesmotionandmotion, ense.Onewondersf,wereJarretto sit,hisfantasticallyongmusical hraseswouldcometocadencesmore requently. ny communicatingignificancearrett'smovementmayhave couldbeequally onsideredractical ndproduc-tive when viewed rom heperspectivef kineticknowledge;t becomespartof thepoieticprocess, dynamicuccessionhatfollows ts ownlogicandcreatesabodily ogos.41Inthe caseofJarrett,ne finalobservationhouldbebroughtobear n the discussion:herelationshipf theperformero the instru-ment tself.JackDeJohnette,hedrummer ithJarrett'srioanda musical ssociate f hissincethe 1960s,hassaid,"Keith eallyhasalove affairwith thepiano, t isarelationship ith thatinstrument."42One is reminded f a famousazzanecdoteaboutJohnColtrane,which,whetherapocryphalrnot,goesto theheartof the matter.AfterCol-tranehadplayednnumerablehorusesn a solo,MilesDavisreportedlyaskedhim,"Hey ohn,whydidn'tyoustop?" oltrane eplied,"Ididn'tknowhow."Davis hensuggested, justakethehornout ofyourmouth[ ]." asieraid handone.Coltrane'soint,asIsee it, is that theinstruments not simply vehicle to express ourself ut becomespartof themusician'self,anextensionof thesubject,not anobject.Thepianopresents nique hallengesn thisregard.t is an intenselyphysi-cal instrument,et inhardly nyother nstrumentsthe humanbodymoreremoved.At best,besides hefingertips,he solesofourshoeswillmakeactualcontact.There s someperversityn this,andalsoin thefactthatwhileit offersheentirespectrumfacousticalrequencies,tdoesnot offer ts voice. Putanotherway, hegrainof thepiano's oice,itsparticularimbral ualities, annotbeshapedbyfinger ction.Apianist'singers ndarms annotaffect hesoundof apianobeyondattackanddynamics;nceproduced,tssound implydiesaway,without


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pate in the moment. A critiqueof Jarrett's oice and movement as anobstacle to the music denies the possibilityof unifyingthe mental, thespiritual, he embodied,and the unrepeatableof in-the-momentcre-ation. If Aquinaswasrightand the self is inscribed n ourbodyandsoul-and I wholly agreewith him-then how can anyonedenyJarrett'srightto a form of expressionthat is of a piece throughtime and space,aself that is not subjectto parsingaccordingto a most pervasive,yet usu-ally unexamined inheritance of ourintellectual tradition?When Jarrett'sbodyappears o takeflightand his voice seems to sing, it is becausehebelieves in the priorityof the improviserasa personwhose imaginationrolls and tumblesfromvocal chordsas well as fingers,whose bodyis notonly instrument,expression,and locus of self, but self itself. In Jarrett'spianism,communication is aural,oral,visual,and kinetic; it encom-passespoiesisand esthesis, logos andpathos.To center music'scommuni-cation in sound alone is to dehumanize t. So as long as we permitthecriticalestablishmentto stomparoundwith their late-romantic deasofthe aesthetic experienceand their logocentristicnotions of music,allthose acts that make a performancea performancewill be regarded s asurplusof humanness.This is somethingthat we simplycannot allowtobe, no matter how heightened the promisesof transcendentalismmaybe. It is not Jarrett's esturesandmoans that are out of place, "layeredover," t is the aesthetic bywhich we measure hem. ForJarrett hemusic is voice, body,andsoul.

NotesAn earlierversion of this articlewaspresentedat the 1996 meetingof the AmericanMusicologicalSociety in Baltimore.The author is grateful o JuliaHubbert or her com-ments on a previousdraftof this article.1. Owen Cordle,review of Standards,Vol. 1, The KeithJarrettTrio,ECMRecords,1983, DownBeat(Jan. 1984):32.2. John Ephland,reviewof Tribute,The KeithJarrettTrio,ECMRecords,1990, DownBeat(May 1991): 30.3. In a personalcommunication,the pianistMichaelCain, who attendeda recordingsessionbyJarrett'srio, told me thatJarrettengageshis body regardless f whether he isplayingbefore an audienceor not. We shall returnto this point.4. Len Lyons,The GreatJazzPianistsSpeakingf TheirLivesandMusic(New York:DaCapo Press,1989), 295. The interestedreadermayobserveJarrett n severalcommer-cially availablevideos;I recommendKeith arrett,SoloTribute,RCA Victor09026-68201-3.5. John Litweiler,TheFreedom rinciple:azzAfter1958 (New York:W. Morrow,1984),233-35.


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6. John Andrews,"CatchingUp with Keith,"Down Beat(Oct. 1994): 55. Andrews'spronouncementseemsprophetic; n a recent article-critique itled "Who'sOverrated?Who's Underrated?"arrett arned threeentries,the highest number, n the "overrated"category.To witness,Bill Milkowski,"And don'tget me startedabout his horriblemewling";and TomTerrell,"[H]ehas become a petulant,arrogant, gomaniacal, elf-proclaimed artiste'who dabbleswanlyin classicalshallows,can't swing, grunts/contortsgrotesquely."azzTimes 7 (Sept. 1997):31, 39.7. Mostcritics, it shouldbe noted, are enthusiastic aboutJarrett'sontributionto jazzpiano. Some exceptions, such as the criticGaryGiddins,do exist. Giddins,for instance,objects to Jarrett's llegedexcessive lyricismand romanticism.8. I do not, in this essay,attemptto place criticismof Jarrett n the context of the ani-mositythat has accompaniedthe jazzestablishment's eactionto his workoutsidejazz,namelythe distrustwith which jazzcriticsview Jarrett'smmenselypopularrecordingsofsolo piano concerts.9. Keith Shadwickwrites ofJarrett'sBye ByeBlackbirda 1993 albumdedicated to thememoryof Miles Davis), "A very worthytributeindeed, althoughhis [Jarrett's]ocalintrusionsare,as usual,a drag."KeithShadwick,review of Bye ByeBlackbird, he KeithJarrettTrio,ECMRecords, 1993, in GramophoneJune 1993): 118-19, 119.10. The classicexpositionof the tenets of logocentrismappears n JacquesDerrida,OfGrammatology,rans.GayatriChakravortySpivak (Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1976).11. See JacquesDerrida,Writing ndDifference, rans. Alan Bass(London:Routledge,1978), 278.12. This is a point that critics of the "authenticperformance"movementhave notmade.Much criticaldiscussion,such as that by RichardTaruskin, enters around tsnineteenth centuryphilosophicalroots(transcendentalism,absolutism, ormalism, ultof the genius,and so on) and its modernistmanifestation(e.g., the dehumanizationofartexpression).See RichardTaruskin,Textand Act: EssaysonMusicandPerformance(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 1995).13. Taruskin,TextandAct, 100-101 passim.14. PaulBerlinerthoroughlydescribes he complex learningprocessesundertakenbyimprovisingmusicians; ee his ThinkingnJazz:TheInfiniteArtof ImprovisationChicago:Universityof Chicago Press,1994). In section 2 of this essayI will discussthe role oftranscendentalismand the aesthetic in moldingconceptions of musicalcreation as nat-ural and of its performanceasdisembodied.15. lan Carr,Keith arrett:TheMan and His Music(New York:Da Capo Press,1991),66. Italicsin original.16. For a discussionof issuesof temporality n jazz mprovisation, ee EdSarath,"ANew Look at Improvisation,"ournal fMusicTheory40 (1996): 1-38.17. JonathanDunsbyaddresses he acoustic differences n the waysinstrumentalistsandsingershear themselvesduringperformancen PerformingMusic:SharedConcerns(Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1995), 60-61.18. JuliaKristevawrites of a kind of primordial emiotic of gesture,suggestinga kind ofkinetic communicationin which no distinction is madebetween signifiedand signifier.This position fits well the perspectiveof the improviser orwhom the doingsof the body


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set forthrelationswithout pointing to specificobjectswithin these relations.See JuliaKristeva,"Legeste, pratiqueou communication?"n Semeiotike:RecherchesouruneSem-analyse Paris:Editionsdu Seil, 1969), 93 passim.19. KajaSilverman,The AcousticMirror:The FemaleVoice n PsychoanalysisndCinema(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress, 1988), 44. Silverman's nsightfulaphorismappears n the context of a broadsynthesisof Frenchpsychoanalytic heoryaboutthevoice and sound;there she deals in particularwith issuesof genderingandsubjectivityin classiccinema.20. See Michel Foucault,Discipline ndPunish, rans.Alan Sheridan(New York:Vin-tage Books, 1977), 136-37.21. I do not intend with this characterizationo indict those musicianswho do notvocalizeas being nonexpressiveor necessarilyrepressed.22. CarolynAbbate, fromwhom I borrow he expression,usesthe notion of ventrilo-quismdifferently.She calls ventriloquism he tendency to considermusic to be unable tospeakfor itself. Mysense is that "disciplined"nterpreters,ike the magicianwith apainteddoll on the lap,undertake o speakformusic without letting others see the phys-ical mechanismby which sound is produced.See CarolynAbbate, UnsungVoices:Operaand MusicalNarrativen theNineteenthCentury Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1991), 16-18 passim.23. Handbook f Conducting,rans.M. D. Calvocoressi(London:OxfordUniversityPress,1993), 29.24. For incisive andcomprehensivetreatmentsof this subjectsee Taruskin,TextandAct, and LydiaGoehr,The ImaginaryMuseumofMusicalWorks:An Essayon thePhiloso-phyofMusic(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1992).25. Simon Frithhas argued hat listeners of popularmusicfeel that they "own" t: "itis not just the recordthat people think they own: we feel that we alsopossessthe songitself, the particularperformance,and its performer."n "Towards n Aesthetic of Popu-larMusic," n MusicandSociety:The Politics f Composition,Performance,ndReception,ed. RichardLeppertand SusanMcClary (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1987), 143. A distinction mustbe made,however,between two formsof possession:that of an ephemeralperformance i.e., the concert), and that which can be repeatedadinfinitum(i.e., the recording).The disembodiedexperienceof recordedperformancesaccentuatesthe sense of ownershipand control that a listenermight exerton music. Fur-thermore, t is there that musicalperformance,ollowing the purchaseof a recording, smost objectified.26. For an excellent introduction to medievalconceptions of the body,see CarolineBynum, "WhyAll the FuzzAbout the Body:A Medievalist'sPerspective,"Critical nquiry22 (1995): 1-33. My accountof Aquina'sviews is indebted to hers.27. Bynum,"WhyAll the FuzzAbout the Body,"22.28. A central tenet of udeo-Christiandoctrine is that bybecomingfleshGod grantsusredemption rom oursins.The role of redemption n Judeo-Christian heology undergoesan interestingtransformationn romanticaccountsof the aesthetic experience,a subjectthat I discussbelow.29. Rene Descartes,Meditations n FirstPhilosophy,rans.DonaldA. Cress(Indianapo-lis: Hackett PublishingCompany),8.


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30. Here we mustkeep in mind that Descartes s as interested n "perspective" she isin establishing"location." n addition,he somewhat extends medievalunifiedtheoriesby locating the soulwithin a specificplace, the pinealgland.Thanks to JuliaHubbertforbringingthese points to my attention.31. Descartes'swritingson music, includingthe Compendium1619), view the subjectfrom either a scientificperspective(i.e., the physicoacousticaspectof sound) or a "com-positional"angle (i.e., the practicalaspectaffordedby the rulesof counterpoint).32. FromPhilosophieerKunst 1802-3), cited in MusicandAestheticsn theEighteenthand NineteenthCenturies, d. Peter le HurayandJamesDay (Cambridge:CambridgeUni-versityPress,1981), 280. Italicsin original.33. Goehr,TheImaginaryMuseum,167. Naturally, his is not to saythat transcenden-talismin music isresponsible orpost-Cartesianviews of the body.Rather,musictran-scendentalismmakesmanifestsome tenets of the Enlightenmentproject.34. E. T. A. Hoffmann,"Beethoven's nstrumentalMusic," n SourceReadingsnMusicHistory,ed. Oliver Strunk(New York:Norton, 1950), 780-81.35. GustaveSchilling, EncyclopddieergesammtenmusikalischenWissenschaften,derUniversalLexikon erTonkunstStuttgart1834-38), s.v."RomantikundRomantisch,"cited in le Hurayand Day,MusicandAesthetics,470.36. I borrow his interpretation rom the novelist Milan Kundera.See TestamentsBetrayed:An Essay nNine Parts,trans.LindaAsher (New York:HarperCollins,1995),84-87.37. The notion of deferral s importantto Derrida's ritiqueof self-presenceas anuclear element of logocentrism.An importantdistinction from this in my discussion sthat I considerimprovisationas act, not as a processdivisibleinto thought and act.38. Art Lange,"TheKeithJarrett nterview,"Down Beat(June 1984): 16-19, 63.39. MauriceMerleau-Ponty,Phenomenologyf Perception,rans.Colin Smith (London:Routledge, 1962), 182.40. IgorStravinsky,Chronicle fMy Life(London:VictorGollanczLtd., 1936), 122.41. This readingappliesKristeva's ategories n "LeGeste, Pratiqueou Communica-tion?"42. Carr,Keith arrett, 7-48.43. There have been attemptsto workout theoriesof motion in musicby associatingmusicalgestureswith bodilymovement symptomaticof humanemotions, moods,andfeelings.While in principlesuch work seeksto reclaim the humanbodyformusic, thesetheoriesquicklydissolveinto a series of repertoiremovesof associatedmeaning.Forasympatheticsummary f this worksee PatrickShove and BrunoH. Repp,"MusicalMotion and Performance:Theoreticaland EmpiricalPerspectives,"n ThePractice fPerformance:tudiesnMusical nterpretation,d.John Rink (CambridgeandNew York:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1995), 55-83.44. RichardLeppert,TheSightof Sound:Music,Representation,nd theHistoryof theBody (Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress,1993), xxi.

body 'n soul: voice and movement in keith jarrett's pianism (moreno)

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