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Reviewer in Land Titles and DeedsProf. Dan Gatmaytan

I. PHILIPPINE LAND LAWS:HISTORY AND APPLICATION

A. The General Rules

The bedrock of all Philippine landlaws is the Regalian Doctrine, which iscontained in Art. XII, Sec. 2 of the 1987Constitution. It provides that all lands of the public domain, except agriculturallands, belong to the State and cannot bealienated. The doctrine, which was firstenacted in the 1935 Constitution, wasadopted to preserve the State’s naturalresources and land in favor of Filipinos.

REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS

160 SCRA 228 (1988)

Facts: Jose dela Rosa sought to register aparcel of land. The land was divided into 9lots. Lots 1-5 were purchased from Balbaliowhile Lots 6-9 were purchased from Alberto.Both Balbalio and Alberto claim to haveacquired the lots by virtue of prescription.

The application was separatelyopposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc.,

Atok Big Wedge Corp. and the Bureau of Forestry Development. Benguet and Atokopposed on the ground of valid mining

claims, while the Bureau of Forestryobjected because the land sought to beregistered was covered by the CentralCordillera Forest Reserve, hence, notsubject to alienation.

The trial court denied theapplication. The CA reversed TC, affirmingthe surface rights of dela Rosa over the landwhile reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their miningclaims.

Held : Benguet and Atok have exclusive

rights to the property by virtue of their respective mining claims.

Ratio:. While it is true that the property wasconsidered forest land, they were removedfrom the public domain and had become

private properties from the perfection of themining claims of Benguet and Atok.

The evidence of open, continuous,adverse and exclusive possession submittedby dela Rosa was insufficient to supportclaim of ownership. Even if it be assumedthat the predecessors-in-interest of delaRosa had really been in possession of theproperty, their possession was not in theconcept of owner of the mining claim but of the property as agricultural land, which itwas not.

The theory of the CA that the land isclassified as mineral underneath andagricultural on the surface is erroneous. It isa well-known principle that the owner of apiece of land has rights not only to itssurface but also to everything underneathand the airspace above it up to a reasonableheight (Art. 437, NCC). The rights over the

land are indivisible and the land itself cannotbe half agricultural and half mineral. Therule is, once minerals are discovered in theland, whatever the use to which it is beingdevoted at the time, such use may bediscontinued by the State (the Regaliandoctrine reserves to the State all mineralsthat may be found in public and even privateland) to enable it to extract the mineralstherein in the exercise of its sovereignprerogative. The land is thus converted tomineral land and may not be used by anyprivate property, including the registered

owner thereof, for any other purpose that willimpede the mining operations to beundertaken therein.

SUNBEAM CONVENIENCE FOODS, INC.VS. COURT OF APPEALS

181 SCRA 443 (1990)

Facts. Director of Lands issued salespatent over two parcels of land in favor of Sunbeam. After registration, the Register of Deeds issued OCT. Subsequently, OCTwas cancelled and TCTs were issued in

favor of Coral Beach Dev’t Corp. TheRepublic instituted before the CFI a civilaction for reversion as the land wasclassified as forest land.

Trial court dismissed the complainton the theory that since the titles sought to

______________________________________________________________________________________ This reviewer is a product of the joint efforts of the members of the LTD Class of 2 nd sem, AY

2000-2001, particularly the graduating class of 2001 (Cheryl Pena, Mona Katigbak, Jun-Jun Bautista,Harvey Braceros, Ato Pagdanganan, Aimee Villaflor, Cherell de Castro, Ian Castillo, Jerome Bonsol,Donna Dideles, Pat Cortes, Tel Recinto, Jem Camania, Ariel Tanangonan), 2002-C (Elvin Cruz, WengLardizabal, Tina Bayhon, Richie Raymundo), 2002-A (Toni Aguilar, Kit Belmonte), 2004-E (PamAbalos, Jary Agbon, Mae Reyes, Chizper de Guzman, Debby Sy). As compiled, edited and annotatedby Tanya Lat (2001-E).

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be cancelled emanated from theadministrative act of the Bureau of LandsDirector, the latter, not the courts, had

jurisdiction over the disposition of the land.CA set aside the Order of Dismissal andordered presiding judge to receive theanswers of Sunbeam and Coral Beach inthe action for reversion.

Ratio: The Regalian doctrine subjects allagricultural, timber and mineral lands to thedominion of the State. Thus, before anyland may be declassified from the forestgroup and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act fromthe government. Even rules on theconfirmation of imperfect titles do not applyunless and until the land classified as forestland is released in an official proclamation to

that effect so that it may form part of thedisposable agricultural lands of the publicdomain.

The mere fact that a title was issuedby the Director of Lands does not confer anyvalidity on such title if the property coveredby the title or patent is part of the publicforest.

Police Power

MINER’S ASSOCIATION VS FACTORAN

240 SCRA 100 (1995)

FACTS: The instant petition seeks a rulingfrom this Court on the validity of two

Administrative Orders issued by theSecretary of the Department of Environmentand Natural Resources to carry out theprovisions of certain Executive Orderspromulgated by the President in the lawfulexercise of legislative powers.

Herein controversy was precipitated bythe change introduced by Article XII, Section2 of the 1987 Constitution on the system of

exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural resources. The optionsopen to the State are through directundertaking or by entering into co-production, joint venture; or production-

sharing agreements, or by entering intoagreement with foreign-owned corporationsfor large-scale exploration, development andutilization.

Pursuant to Section 6 of ExecutiveOrder No. 279, the DENR Secretary issuedon June 23, 1989 DENR AdministrativeOrder No. 57, series of 1989, captioned"Guidelines of Mineral Production Sharing

Agreement under Executive Order No. 279where all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after theeffectivity of the 1987 Constitution exceptsmall scale mining leases and thosepertaining to sand and gravel and quarryresources covering an area of twenty (20)hectares or less, shall be converted intoproduction-sharing agreements withinone (1) year from the effectivity of theseguidelines.

On November 20, 1980, theSecretary of the DENR Administrative Order No. 82, series of 1990, laying down the"Procedural Guidelines on the Award of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement(MPSA) through Negotiation." requiring thepersons or entities to submit Letter of Intent(LOIs) and Mineral Production Sharing

Agreement (MPSAs) within two (2) yearsfrom the effectivity of DENR AdministrativeOrder No. 57 or until July 17, 1991. Failureto do so within the prescribed period shallcause the abandonment of mining, quarry

and sand and gravel claims

ISSUE: In this petition for certiorari,petitioner Miners Association of thePhilippines, Inc. mainly contends thatrespondent Secretary of DENR issued both

Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 inexcess of his rule-making power under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279. Onthe assumption that the questionedadministrative orders do not conform withExecutive Order Nos. 211 and 279,petitioner contends that both orders violate

the non-impairment of contract provisionunder Article III, Section 10 of the 1987Constitution on the ground that

Administrative Order No. 57 unduly pre-terminates existing mining leases and other mining .



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HELD: Well settled is the rule thatregardless of the reservation clause, miningleases or agreements granted by the State,such as those granted pursuant to ExecutiveOrder No. 211 referred to in this petition, aresubject to alterations through a reasonableexercise of the police power of the State.The State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be precluded by theconstitutional restriction on non-impairmentof contract from altering, modifying andamending the mining leases or agreementsgranted under Presidential Decree No. 463,as amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. Police power, being coextensivewith the necessities of the case and thedemands of public interest, extends to all thevital public needs. The passage of ExecutiveOrder No. 279 which superseded Executive

Order No. 211 provided legal basis for theDENR Secretary to carry into effect themandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987Constitution

OPOSA VS FACTORAN224 SCRA 792 (1993)

FACTS: The complaint was instituted as ataxpayers' class suit (minors and parents)and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizensof the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers,

and entitled to the full benefit, use andenjoyment of the natural resource treasurethat is the country's virgin tropicalrainforests. Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered orderingdefendant, his agents, representatives andother persons acting in his behalf to (1)Cancel all existing timber licenseagreements in the country; (2) Cease anddesist from receiving, accepting, processing,renewing or approving new timber licenseagreements."

HELD: All timber licenses may thus berevoked or rescinded by executive action. Itis not a contract, property or a property rightprotected by the due process clause of theConstitution. It is only a license or privilege,which can be validly withdrawn whenever

dictated by public interest or public welfareas in this case. Since timber licenses are notcontracts, the non-impairment clause, whichreads: "SEC. 10. No law impairing theobligation of contracts shall be passed." Inthe second place, even if it is to be assumedthat the same are contracts, the instant casedoes not involve a law or even an executiveissuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses.Hence, the non-impairment clause cannotas yet be invoked. Nevertheless, grantingfurther that a law has actually been passedmandating cancellations or modifications,the same cannot still be stigmatized as aviolation of the non-impairment clause. Thisis because by its very nature and purpose,such a law could have only been passed inthe exercise of the police power of thestate for the purpose of advancing the

right of the people to a balanced andhealthful ecology, promoting their healthand enhancing the general welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract islimited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health,safety, moral and general welfare. Butneither property rights nor contract rights areabsolute; for government cannot exist if thecitizen may at will use his property to thedetriment of his fellows, or exercise hisfreedom of contract to work them harm.

Equally fundamental with the private right isthat of the public to regulate it in thecommon interest.'" In court, the non-impairment clause must yield to thepolice power of the state

Social Justice

DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. FUNTILAR(142 SCRA 57)

FACTS: In 1972, Mariano Funtilar and the

Heirs of Felipe Rosete applied for theregistration of land in Mulanay, Quezon.Such parcel originally belonged to oneCandida Fernandez whose ownership andpossession began sometime during her lifetime and extended until she died in 1936.



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Sometime in 1940, the land was forfeited infavor of the Gov’t for failure to pay realestate taxes but the same was redeemed in1942 by one of the three children of Candida. The land now in dispute wasadjudicated to petitioners-respondents, asheirs of Fernandez. The Director Lands andDir. of Forest Dev’t filed an oppositionalleging that neither applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest possessedsufficient title to the land, not havingacquired the same under any of therecognized Spanish titles under the RoyalDecree of Feb. 13, 1894; that neither havethey been in open, continuos, exclusive andnotorious possession and occupation of theland for at least 30 years immediately filingthe application; and that the land is a portionof the public domain belonging to theRepublic.

The trial court rendered a decisionin favor of the applicants. On appeal, theIntermediate appellate Court affirmed thelower court’s decision. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON applicants-respondents havemet the requirements of possession for atleast 30 years immediately preceding thefiling of their application in 1972 as to entitlethem to registration

Held: Yes. The Court is satisfied from theevidence that long before her death in 1936,

Candid Fernandez already possessed thedisputed property. This possession must betacked to the possession of her heirs,through the administrator and later, to theapplicants-respondents who are her grandchildren. It would also be absurdunder the circumstances that thegovernment would order the forfeiture of theproperty if the property were a forestland.

As to petitioner’s allegation that theland was unclassified public forest untilSept. 15, 1953 when it was declaredalienable and disposable, the Court said that

the Regalian doctrine must be appliedtogether with the constitutional provisions onsocial justice and land reform and must beinterpreted in a way as to avoid manifestunfairness and injustice. A strict applicationof the Heirs of Amunategui vs. Dir. Of

Forestry (applicant shoulders the burden of overcoming the presumption that the landsought to be registered forms part of thepublic domain) is warranted whenever a partof the public domain is in danger of ruthlessexploitation, fraudulent titling, or other questionable practices. But when anapplication appears to enhance the veryreasons behind the enactment of act 496, asamended or the land Reg. Act and CA 141or the Public Land Act, then their provisionsshould not be made to stand in the way of their on implementation. The attempts of humble people to have disposable landsthey have been tilling for generations titled intheir names should not only be viewed withunderstanding but should, as a matter of policy, be encouraged.

REPUBLIC VS. CA (201 SCRA 3)

Private respondents, the Parans,are applicants for registration of a parcel of land in La Trinidad, Benguet which theyclaim to have acquired from their father Dayotao Paran and by actual, physical,exclusive and open possession thereof since time immemorial.. The Dir. of landsfiled an opposition, alleging among others,that the land is part of the public domain.The Office of the Provincial Fiscal likewiseopposed the registration, stating that the

land is within the Central Cordillera ForestReserve covered by Proclamation No. 217dated Feb. 16, 1929. The trial court found infavor of the applicants. The Court of

Appeals dismissed the appeal filed by theSol Gen. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON land is part of the CordilleraForest Reserve and hence not subject toregistration.

Ratio: The applicants are members of theIbaloi tribe whose application for registration

should be considered as falling under Section 48 (c) of CA 141, said subsectionhaving been added by RA 3872 on June 18,1964. Under the said section, members of cultural minorities may apply for confirmationof their title to lands of public domain,



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whether disposable or not . They maytherefore apply for public lands althoughsuch are legally forest lands or minerallands, so long as such lands are in fact suitable for agriculture. However, PD 1073effective January 25, 1977 amended Section48 (c), making the said provision applicableonly to alienable and disposable lands of the

public domain.It is important to note that the

application of the Parans was filed in 1970and the land registration court affirmed their long-continued possession of the lands in1974, that is, during the time when Section48 (c) was in legal effect. Privaterespondents’ imperfect title was perfected or vested by the required period of possessionprior to the issuance of PD 1073 thus, their right in respect of the land they hadpossessed for 30 years could not be

divested by said PD. The Court stressed itspronouncement in Dir. of Lands vs. Funtilar that the Regalian doctrine must be appliedtogether with constitutional provisions onsocial justice and land reform and must beinterpreted in a way as to avoid manifestunfairness and injustice. The Declarationsof Real Property submitted by applicantslikewise indicated that the land had becomesuitable to agriculture. Clearly, therequirements of Section 48 (c) weresatisfied.

Time Immemorial Possession

Time immemorial possession isdeemed to be part of the general rule andnot an exception to the Regalian Doctrine.Land held under a concept of ownershipsince immemorial is deemed to have beenprivate and therefore never to have comewithin the ambit of the Regalian Doctrine.

CARINO VS. INSULAR GOV’T(41 PHIL 935)

FACTS: Plaintiff, an Igorot from Benguet,filed application to Phil. Court of landregistration. For more than 50 years beforethe Treaty of Paris in 1899, the plaintiff and

his ancestors had held the land as owners.They had been recognized as owners by theIgorots. No document of title, however, wasissued from the Spanish crown. Theapplication was granted on 1904. Onappeal to the CFI, on behalf of the Gov’t of the Phils. and also of the US, the applicationwas dismissed. This was affirmed by theSupreme Court. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: WON plaintiff owns the land

Held: Yes. Benguet was inhabited by atribe that never was brought under the civilor military government of the Spanish crown.It seems probable, if not certain, that theSpanish officials would not have granted toanyone that province the registration towhich the plaintiff was entitled by Spanishlaws, and which would have made his title

beyond question good. Whatever may havebeen the technical position of Spain, it foesnot follow that, in the view of the UnitedStates, he had lost all the rights and was amere trespasser when the presentgovernment seized his land. The argumentto that effect seems to amount to a denial of native titles throughout an important part of Luzon, at least, for the want of ceremonieswhich the Spaniards would not havepermitted and had not the power to enforce.

It might, perhaps, be proper andsufficient to say that when, as far back as

testimony or memory goes, the land hasbeen held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed tohave been held in the same way from beforethe Spanish conquest and never to havebeen public land. If there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought togive the applicant the benefit of the doubt.

The older decrees and laws cited bythe counsel for plaintiff indicate clearly thatthe natives were recognized as owningsome lands, irrespective of any royal grant.In other words, Spain did not assume to

convert all the native inhabitants of the Phils.Into trespassers or even into tenants at will.



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ANKRON VS. GOV’T OF THE PHIL.ISLANDS (40 PHIL 10)

FACTS: Petitioner sought to register aparcel of land which he brought from theMoros, which the latter formerly occupied,

cultivated and planted under claim of ownership for more than 44 years. The onlyoppositor was the Director of Lands, allegingthat the land was property of the US under the control and administration of the Gov’t of the Phil. Islands. No proof whatsoever wasoffered by the oppositor. The lower courtordered and decreed that said parcel beregistered in Ankron’s name subjecthowever to the right of the government toopen a road thereon. From that decree, theDir. appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue: WON applicant proved hispossession and occupation in accordancewith the provisions of section 54 (6) of act926

Held: Yes. Under the said paragraph, theimportant requisites for registration are: (1)that the land shall be agricultural public land as defined by the Act of Congress of July 1,1902; and (2) that the petitioner, by himself or his predecessors-in-interest, shall havebeen in the open, continuos possession andoccupation of the same under a bona fideclaim of ownership for a period of ten years

next preceding the taking effect of the said Act.

In the present case the applicantproved and there was no effort to disputesaid proof, that the land in question wasagricultural land and that he and hispredecessors in interest had occupied thesame as owners in good faith for a period of more than forty years prior to thecommencement of the present action. Noquestion is raised nor discussed by theappellant with reference to the right of theMoros to acquire absolute ownership and

dominion of the land which they haveoccupied openly, notoriously, peacefully andadversely for a long period of years.

Whether the particular land isagricultural, forestry or mineral is a question

to be settled in each particular case. Themere fact that land is a manglar (mangroveswamp) is not sufficient in itself to show thatit is agricultural, forestry or mineral. It maybelong to one or the other class.Considering that it is a matter of publicknowledge that a majority of the public landsin the Phils. are agricultural lands, the courtshave a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each casethe lands are agricultural lands.

ABAOAG VS. DIR. OF LANDS(45 PHIL. 518)

FACTS: Petitioners are among thoseIgorots who, in 1884, were given by thegobernadorcillo and principalia of Sison,Pangasinan, a tract of land in order that theymay cultivate the same and increase thepopulation of the said municipality. At thetime of delivery, said land was unoccupiedand unimproved public land. Said ‘Bagos’ or Igorots entered upon said land, tookpossession of it and have continued to liveupon the same and have cultivated it sincethat date. In 1919, petitioner, et al.presented a petition for registration with theCFI of Pangasinan. Oppositors filed amotion to dismiss upon the ground thatpetitioners had not presented proof sufficientto show that they are entitled to theregistration of the land. Said motion was

granted. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: WON dismissal of the case wasproper.

Held: No. No suggestion is made that thegobernadorcillo and the principalia of thetown of Alava, now Sision, were notauthorized in 1884, as representatives of thethen existing Gov’t, to give and to deliver theland in question to the petitioners and their ancestors for the purposes for which theland was so given. Neither was it denied

that it was agricultural land. No pretensionis made that the land might not be registeredunder the Torrens system had thepetitioners invoked the benefits of the publicland law. No contention is made on the partof petitioners that they were ever given a



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title to the land. Their contention is simplythat they were given the land; that theyaccepted the same; that they lived upon theland, and cultivated it, and improved it, andoccupied it to the exclusion of all others for aperiod of about 39 years and that thereforethey are entitled to have the same registeredunder the Torrens system; that they haveoccupied and cultivated the same for aperiod sufficient to give them title and tohave the same registered. This is like thecase of Carino vs. Insular Government.

In the Royal Cedula of October 15,1754: ‘Where such possessors shall not beable to produce title deeds, it shall besufficient if they shall show that ancientpossession as a valid title by prescription.’To this, the Court added that everypresumption of ownership under the publicland laws is in favor of the one actually

occupying the land for many years, andagainst the Government which seeks todeprive him of it.

MANARPAAC VS. CABANATAN(21 SCRA 743)

FACTS: Plaintiffs filed complaint againstdefendants, alleging that they have been,since time immemorial, in possession of twoparcels of land, which were fraudulentlyincluded in the free patent application of defendant. Cabanatan filed a motion to

dismiss. Such was granted by the lower court holding that the free patent havingbeen issued on November 3, 1959 and thefirst complaint was filed on December 7,1960, the action for review of the decree,was therefore filed more than one year after the issuance of the patent. Hence, thisappeal.

Issue: WON dismissal was proper

Held: No. From the averment of facts inthe complaint, it clearly appears that

plaintiffs have been, since time immemorial in possession as owners of the disputed land, have declared the land for tax

purposes in the names of two of them and have built their houses on the land, but thatthrough fraud and irregularity, defendant

succeeded in securing a certificate of title.The foregoing recital of facts are sufficientaverment of ownership. Possession sincetime immemorial, carries the presumptionthat the land had never been part of thepublic domain, or that it had been a privateproperty even before the Spanish conquest.Whether this presumption should hold as afact or not, is a question appropriatelydeterminable only after the parties haveadduced, or at least, are given theopportunity to adduce, their respectiveevidence.

The complaint likewise states asufficient cause for action for recovery of possession of the land. Settled is the rulethat the remedy of the landowner whoseproperty has been wrongfully or erroneouslyregistered in another’s name is, after oneyear from the date of the decree, not to set

aside the decree, but respecting the decreeas incontrovertible and no longer open toreview, to bring an ordinary action in theordinary court of justice for conveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of innocent purchaser for value, for damages.

B. Exceptions

Mining Claims

REAVIS V. FIANZA

40 PHIL 1017 (1909)

The Philippine Act of 1902 provides,“That where such a person or association,they and their grantors have held andworked their claims for a period equal to thetime prescribed by the statute of limitationsof the Philippine Islands, evidence of suchpossession and working of the claims for such period shall be sufficient to establish aright to a patent thereto under this Act, in theabsence of any adverse claim …” Theperiod of prescription is ten years.

Fianza and his Igorot ancestors hadbeen in possession of the land and hadbeen working their mining claims for morethan 10 years but this was before the



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enactment of the Phil. Act of 1902. Reavis,an American, applied for a mining patentover the same land during the effectivity of this law.

Reavis argued that first, ownership of theland surface does not automatically vestownership over the mining rights. Second,mines can only be acquired in accordancewith government-prescribed regulations.Therefore, Fianza had no legal rights to themines since there was no compliance withthe procedural requirements laid down in thePhil. Act. of 1902. Furthermore, Fianza heldno patent.

The Supreme Court did not dealsquarely with the first argument. However,the issue was somewhat more resolved inits disposition of the second argument. Itwas held that Fianza and his ancestors

have, through their possession of more than10 years under Spanish Law and their working of the mining claims within suchperiod, acquired ownership rights over thequestioned land and the mining claims. Thisis notwithstanding the fact that no patentwas held or applied for by Fianza under theprovisions of the Phil. Act of 1902 since theright to have a patent that will confer title isalso a right to have the thing.

MCDANIEL V. APACIBLE AND CUISIA

42 PHIL 749

On June 17, 1916, in accordancewith the Phil. Act of 1902, McDaniel located3 petroleum placer mineral claims inTayabas. Notices of their location wererecorded in the office of the mining recorder.Furthermore, there was continuouspossession and annual assessment workover the said claims.

Act No. 2932 which was approvedon August 31, 1920 provided that “all publiclands containing petroleum or other mineral

oils and gas, on which no patent, at the datethis Act takes effect, has been issued, arehereby withdrawn from sale and aredeclared to be free and open to exploration,location and lease…” On June 18, 1921, inaccordance with Act No. 2932, Cuisia

applied with the Secretary of Agriculture andNatural Resources for a lease of a parcel of petroleum land that included McDaniel’s 3claims.

However, Actd No. 2932 further provided that “parties having heretofore filedclaims for any mineral lands containing saidminerals, shall be given preference to leasetheir respective claims, provided they file apetition to that effect within 6 months fromthe date of the approval of this Act.”Therefore, all parties having mineral claimsprior to the approval of Act No. 2932 haduntil Feb. 28, 1921 to file a petition with theGovernment to lease the correspondingpublic lands. Otherwise, their preferenceover other applicants shall be forfeited.

McDaniel sought to prohibit theGovernment from granting Cuisia’s leaseapplication mainly on the argument that Act

No. 2932 is unconstitutional since it depriveshim of his property without due process of law.

The Supreme Court sustainedMcDaniel’s argument. It held that aperfected, valid appropriation of publicmineral lands operates as a withdrawal of the tract from the body of the public domain,and so long as such appropriation remainsvalid and subsisting, the land coveredthereby is deemed private property. Suchperfected, valid and subsisting appropriationshall be deemed to have taken place when

all the requirements of the law in making thelocation of the mineral placer claims havebeen complied with and the claims werenever abandoned or forfeited. This isnotwithstanding the fact that no patent hasbeen issued since the right to a patent vestsfull equitable title with all the benefits,immunities, and burdens of ownership.Furthermore, the claim and the location isperfected not only against 3rd persons butalso against the Government.

GOLD CREEK MINING CORP. V.

RODRIGUEZ(66 PHIL 259)

On Jan. 1, 1929, Gold Creek MiningCorp. located a mining claim in Benguet.Notice of the location was recorded in the



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office of the mining recorder. Furthermore,there was continuous possession andannual assessment work over the saidclaim. Before Nov. 15, 1935, the date of effectivity of the 1935 Const., Gold CreekMining applied with the Secretary of

Agriculture and Commerce for a patent.However, the Secretary of

Agriculture and Commerce and the Director of the Bureau of Mines refused to approvethe application on the ground that theissuance of the patent amounted to analienation of natural resources which isprohibited under the Constitution.

The Supreme Court held that thepatent must be issued. It is clear that the1935 Constitution prohibits the alienation of natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land. However, “naturalresources” only includes mineral lands of the

public domain and not mineral lands alreadywithdrawn from the public domain prior tothe effectivity of the 1935 Constitution.Perfected, valid and subsisting miningclaims prior to the 1935 Const., whether or not a patent has been issued therefor, areincluded in the latter category. They are nolonger part of the public domain andtherefore, are beyond the constitutionalprohibition on the alienation of naturalresources.

STANDARD MINERAL PRODUCTS, INC.

V. CA

Deeunhong was a registered owner of 120 hectares of land in Antipolo under atransfer certificate of title. Standard MineralProducts, Inc. undertook the prospectingand locating of a mining claim in the saidland without first securing written permissionfrom Deeunhong. After locating a claim,SMPI applied for a mining lease with theBureau of Mines over a portion of the land,which was opposed by the registerd owner.

In a separate civil case for reversion

of the land to the State, it was found that theland was essentially agricultural and notmineral land.

The Supreme Court held that SMPIis not entitled to the surface rights due to itsnon-compliance with the Mining Act

provision which requires written permissionfrom the landowner prior to the prospectingand locating of mineral claims. Such writtenpermission must also accompany theapplication of a mining lease with theBureau of Mines.

Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Titles

SUSI V. RAZON AND DIRECTOR OFLANDS, 48 PHIL 427 (1925)

Susi and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,adverse and public possession since timeimmemorial in the concept of owner and for value of a certain parcel of unregistered land

in Pampanga. On the other hand, Razonwas able to purchase the same parcel of land from the Government for which anoriginal certificate of title was issued.

The Supreme Court held that Susiwas the absolute owner and that the sale toRazon and the corresponding certificate of title issued in her name is null and void.Reiterating the doctrine laid down in Carinov. Insular Govt., the Supreme Court heldthat that there is a presumption juris et du

jure that all the necessary requirementshave been complied with when there hadbeen actual and physical possession,personally or through predecessors, of anagricultural land of the public domain openly,continuously, exclusively, and publicly sinceJuly 26, 1894 with a right to a certificate of title to said land. Therefore, by operation of law, Susi had already acquired not only aright to a grant but a grant from theGovernment much prior to the application of Razon. The questioned land was alreadyprivate and was not part of the publicdomain anymore . Therefore, the Director of Lands no longer had any control or

jurisdiction over Razon’s application.

MERALCO V. CASTRO-BARTOLOME114 SCRA 799 (1982)



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A certain parcel of land waspossessed by Ramos since 1941. In 1947,Ramos sold the land to the Piguing spouses.IN 1976, the Piguing spouses sold the landto MERALCO, a domestic corporation.Subsequently, MERALCO applied for theregistration of the parcel of land which wasopposed by the Republic of the Philippines.

The trial court dismissedMERALCO’S application on the ground thatit is not qualified to apply for registrationsince the Public Land Act allows onlyFilipino citizens or natural persons to applyfor judicial confirmation of their imperfecttitles to public land.

MERALCO argued that first, thequestioned land was no longer public butwas now private land since itspredecessors-in-interest had possessedsuch land in the concept of owner for more

than 30 years. Furthermore, it argued that itinvoked the provision of the Public Land Actin behalf of the Piguing spouses who, asFilipino citizens, could secure judicialconfirmation of their imperfect title to theland.

The Supreme Scourt affirmed thedismissal of MERALCO’s application. It heldthat the questioned land was still public landand shall remain so until a certificate of titleis issued to a Filipino citizen. Consequently,MERALCO, being a juridical person, istherefore disqualified to apply for registration

of such public land.The doctrine enunciated in Susi v.

Razon and Director of Lands that “an open,continuous, adverse and public possessionof a land of the public domain since timeimmemorial by a private individualpersonally and through his predecessorsconfers an effective title on said possessor,whereby the land ceases to be public,”cannot be properly invoked by MERALCOsince its predecessors-in-interest had notbeen in possession since time immemorialor beyond the reach of memory, i.e. before

1880. Citing Oh Cho, the Supreme Courtheld that the immediate predecessors-in-interest must apply for registration of theland in order to secure a grant under thePublic Land Act. Without such registration,

the immediate predecessor-in-interest didnot have any vested right amounting to titlewhich was transmissible.

NOTE: This ruling was subsequently overturned in the case of Director of Lands v. IAC (Acme case).

DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. IAC & ACME146 SCRA 509 (1986)

In the case, the Supreme Court heldthat the ruling in the case of Meralco v.Castro-Bartolome is no longer deemed to bebinding. Notwithstanding the prohibition inthe 1973 and 1987 Constitutions againstprivate corporations holding lands of thepublic domain except by lease notexceeding 1000 hectares, still a privatecorporation may institute confirmationproceedings under Sec. 48(b) of the PublicLand Act if, at the time of institution of theregistration proceedings, the land wasalready private land. On the other hand, if the land was still part of the public domain,then a private corporation cannot institutesuch proceedings.

The correct rule is that alienablepublic land held by a possessor, personallyor through his predecessors-in-interest,openly, continuously and exclusively for theprescribed statutory period (30 years under the Public Land Act, as amended) is

converted to private property by the merelapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.

REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS &PARAN

(AUGUST 21, 1991)

There is no question that a positiveact (e.g., an official proclamation) of theExecutive Department of the Government isneeded to declassify land which had beenclassified as forestal and to convert it intoalienable or disposable lands for agricultural

or other purposes. In the case of Director of Lands vs. Funtilar, the Court considered thereports of the District Forester and theDistrict Land Officer as adequate proof that



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the land applied for was no longer classifiedas forestal.

We consider and so hold that oncea parcel of land Is shown to have beenincluded within a Forest Reservation dulyestablished by Executive Proclamation, as inthe instant case, a presumption arises thatthe parcel of land continues to be part of such Reservation until clear and convincingevidence of subsequent withdrawaltherefrom or declassification is shown. Asimple, unsworn statement of a minor functionary of the Bureau of a minor functionary of the Bureau of ForestDevelopment is not, by itself, such evidence.

OH CHO V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS75 PHIL 890 (1946)

The applicant invokes the LandRegistration Act (Act. No. 496) or should itnot be applicable to the case, then he wouldapply for the benefits of the Public Land Act(C.A. 141)

The applicant failed to show that hehas title that may be confirmed under theLRA. All lands that were not acquired fromthe Government, either by purchase or bygrant, belong to the public domain. Anexception to the rule would be timeimmemorial possession, which would justifythe presumption that the land had never

been public land. The applicant does notcome under the exception, for the earliestpossession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest began in 1880.

As the applicant failed to show titleto the lot, the next question is whether he isentitled to a decree of registration thereof under the provisions of the Public Land Act(C.A. 141). Under the provisions of the Actinvoked by the applicant, he is not entitled toa decree of registration of the lot because heis an alien.

The benefits provided in the Public

Land constitute a grant or concession by theState. Before they could acquire any right,the applicant’s immediate predecessor ininterest should comply with the conditionprecedent, which is to apply for theregistration of the land of which they had

been in possession at least since July 26,1894. This is the applicant’s immediatepredecessors in interest failed to do. Theydid not have any vested right in the lotamounting to title which was transmissible tothe applicant. The only right is their possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their predecessors in interest, may beavailed of by a qualified person buy not bythe applicant, since he is disqualified.

Indigenous Peoples' Rights

PD 705Forestry Reform Code

SECTION 52. Census of kaingineros,squatters, cultural minorities and otheroccupants and residents in forestlands. — Henceforth, no person shallenter into forest lands and cultivatethe same without lease or permit.

A complete census of kaingineros,squatters, cultural minorities and otheroccupants and residents in forest landswith or without authority or permitsfrom the government, showing theextent of their respective occupationand resulting damage, or impairmentof forest resources, shall beconducted.

The Bureau may call upon other

agencies of the government andholders of license agreement, license,lease and permits over forest lands toparticipate in the census.

RA 6657Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program

SECTION 9. Ancestral Lands. — Forpurposes of this Act, ancestral lands of each indigenous cultural communityshall include, but not be limited to,

lands in the actual, continuous andopen possession and occupation of thecommunity and its members: Provided,

That the Torrens Systems shall berespected.



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The right of these communities to theirancestral lands shall be protected toensure their economic, social andcultural well-being. In line with theprinciples of self-determination and

autonomy, the systems of landownership, land use, and the modes of settling land disputes of all thesecommunities must be recognized andrespected.

Any provision of law to the contrarynotwithstanding, the PARC maysuspend the implementation of this Actwith respect to ancestral lands for thepurpose of identifying and delineatingsuch lands: Provided, That in theautonomous regions, the respectivelegislatures may enact their own lawson ancestral domain subject to theprovisions of the Constitution and theprinciples enunciated in this Act andother national laws.

RA 6734Organic Act for AutonomousRegion of Muslim Mindanao

SECTION 2. The Autonomous Regionis a corporate entity with jurisdiction inall matters devolved to it by theConstitution and this Organic Act asherein enumerated:

(1) Administrative organization;(2) Creation of sources of revenues;(3) Ancestral domain and naturalresources;(4) Personal, family and propertyrelations;(5) Regional, urban and ruralplanning development;(6) Economic, social, and tourismdevelopment;

(7) Educational policies;(8) Preservation and developmentof the cultural heritage;(9) Powers, functions andresponsibilities now being exercised by

the departments of the NationalGovernment except:(a) Foreign affairs;(b) National defense and security;(c) Postal service;(d) Coinage, and fiscal and

monetary policies;(e) Administration of justice;(f) Quarantine;(g) Customs and tariff;(h) Citizenship;(i) Naturalization, immigration anddeportation;(j) General auditing, civil serviceand elections;(k) Foreign trade;(l) Maritime, land and airtransportation and communicationsthat affect areas outside theAutonomous Region; and(m) Patents, trademarks, tradenames, and copyrights; and(10) Such other matters as may beauthorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the Region.

ARTICLE XIANCESTRAL DOMAIN, ANCESTRALLANDS AND AGRARIAN REFORM

SECTION 1. Subject to theConstitution and national policies, theRegional Government shall undertakemeasures to protect the ancestraldomain and the ancestral lands of indigenous cultural communities.

All lands and natural resources in theAutonomous Region that have beenpossessed or occupied by indigenouscultural communities since timeimmemorial, except when preventedby war, force majeure, or other formsof forcible usurpation, shall form part

of the ancestral domain. Suchancestral domain shall include pasturelands, worship areas, burial grounds,forests and fields, mineral resources,except: strategic minerals such as



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uranium, coal, petroleum, and otherfossil fuels, mineral oils, and allsources of potential energy; lakes,rivers and lagoons; and nationalreserves and marine parks, as well asforest and watershed reservations.

Lands in the actual, open, notorious,and uninterrupted possession andoccupation by an indigenous culturalcommunity for at least thirty (30)years are ancestral lands.

SECTION 2. The constructive ortraditional possession of lands andresources by an indigenous culturalcommunity may also be recognizedsubject to judicial affirmation, thepetition for which shall be institutedwithin a period of ten (10) years fromthe effectivity of this Act. Theprocedure for judicial affirmation of imperfect titles under existing lawsshall, as far as practicable, apply to the

judicial affirmation of titles to ancestrallands.

The foregoing provisionsnotwithstanding, titles secured underthe Torrens system, and rights alreadyvested under the provisions of existinglaws shall be respected.

SECTION 3. As used in this Act, thephrase "indigenous culturalcommunity" refers to Filipino citizensresiding in the Autonomous Regionwho are:(1) Tribal peoples whose social,cultural and economic conditionsdistinguish them from other sectors of the national community and whosestatus is regulated wholly or partiallyby their own customs or traditions orby special laws or regulations; and(2) Bangsa Moro people regarded

as indigenous on account of theirdescent from the populations thatinhabited the country or a distinctgeographical area at the time of conquest or colonization and who,

irrespective of their legal status, retainsome or all of their ownsocioeconomic, cultural and politicalinstitutions.

SECTION 4. The customary laws,

traditions, and practices of indigenouscultural communities on land claimsand ownership and settlement of landdisputes shall be implemented andenforced among the members of suchcommunity.

SECTION 5. The RegionalGovernment shall require corporations,companies and other entities withinthe ancestral domain of the indigenouscultural communities whose operationsadversely affect the ecological balanceto take the necessary preventivemeasures and safeguards in order tomaintain such a balance.

SECTION 6. Unless authorized by theRegional Assembly, lands of theancestral domain titled to or owned byan indigenous cultural community shallnot be disposed of to nonmembers.

SECTION 7. No portion of theancestral domain shall be open toresettlement by nonmembers of theindigenous cultural communities.

SECTION 8. Subject to theConstitution and national policies, theRegional Assembly shall enact anAgrarian Reform Law suitable to thespecial circumstances prevailing in theAutonomous Region.

ARTICLE XIIIECONOMY AND PATRIMONYSECTION 1. Consistent with theConstitution and national policies, theRegional Government may enact

regional laws pertaining to the nationaleconomy and patrimony applicableand responsive to the needs of theRegion. However, nothing herein shallbe construed as to authorize the



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Regional Government to require lesserstandards respecting the protection,conservation and enhancement of thenatural resources than those requiredby the National Government.

SECTION 2. Except for strategicminerals such as uranium, coal,petroleum, and other fossil fuels,mineral oils, all sources of potentialenergy, as well as national reservesand aquatic parks, forest andwatershed reservations as may bedelimited by national law, the controland supervision over the exploration,utilization and development of thenatural resources of the AutonomousRegion is hereby delegated to theRegional Government in accordancewith the Constitution and nationallaws.

The Regional Assembly shall have theauthority to grant franchises andconcessions but the Regional Governormay, by regional law, be authorized togrant leases, permits and licenses:Provided, That, any lease, permit,franchise or concession shall cover anarea not exceeding the limits allowedby the Constitution and shall subsistfor a period not exceeding twenty-five(25) years; Provided, further, Thatexisting leases, permits, licenses,franchises and concessions shall berespected until their expiration unlesslegally terminated as provided by law;and Provided, finally, That when thenatural resources are located withinthe ancestral domain, the permit,license, franchise or concession, shallbe approved by the Regional Assemblyafter consultation with the culturalcommunity concerned.

SECTION 3. The exploration,

development and utilization of naturalresources, except those enumerated inthe first paragraph of Section 2 hereof,shall be allowed to all Filipinos and toprivate enterprises, including

corporations, associations,cooperatives, and such other similarcollective organizations with at leastsixty percent (60%) of their capitalinvestment or capital stocks directlycontrolled or owned by Filipinos who

are preferably residents of the Region.

SECTION 4. Small-scale mining shallreceive support from and be regulatedby the Regional Government,considering ecological balance, thesafety and health and the interest of the communities and the miners wheresuch operations are conducted.

SECTION 5. The RegionalGovernment may, in the interest of regional welfare and security, establishand operate pioneering utilities. Uponpayment of just compensation, it maytransfer the ownership of such utilitiesto cooperatives or other collectiveorganizations.

SECTION 6. The RegionalGovernment may, in times of regionalemergency declared by the President,when the public interest so requiresand under reasonable terms andsafeguards prescribed by the RegionalAssembly, temporarily take over ordirect the operation of any privately-owned public utility or businessaffected with public interest.

SECTION 7. The Regional Assemblyshall enact laws for the justcompensation, rehabilitation,relocation, and other similar measuresof inhabitants adversely affected in theharnessing of natural and mineralresources in the Region.

The Regional Assembly shall likewiseprovide for the rehabilitation of the

areas affected by said harnessing of natural and mineral resources in theRegion.



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SECTION 8. The RegionalGovernment shall actively andimmediately pursue reforestationmeasures to ensure that at least fifty(50%) of the land surface of theAutonomous Region shall be covered

with trees, giving priority to land stripsalong eighteen percent (18%) in slopeor over by providing infrastructure,financial and technical support toupland communities especially theLumads or tribal peoples.

SECTION 9. The RegionalGovernment shall prohibit the use,importation, deposit, disposal anddumping of toxic or hazardoussubstances within the AutonomousRegion.

SECTION 10. The RegionalGovernment shall adopt policies topromote profit sharing and broadenthe base of ownership of businessenterprises.

SECTION 11. The RegionalGovernment shall provide incentives,including tax holidays, for investors inbusinesses that will contribute to thedevelopment of the Region.It shall provide the same incentives toall companies doing business in theRegion which reinvest at least fiftypercent (50%) of their net profitstherein, and to all cooperatives whichreinvest at least ten percent (10%) of their surplus into socially-orientedprojects in the Region.

SECTION 12. The RegionalGovernment shall give priority to theestablishment of transportation andcommunication facilities for theeconomic development of the region.

SECTION 13. In the delivery of powerservices, priority shall be given toprovinces in the area of autonomywhich do not have direct access tosuch services.

SECTION 14. The RegionalGovernment is hereby empowered tocreate pioneering firms and otherbusiness entities needed to boosteconomic development in the Region.

Agriculture, Fisheries and AquaticResources

SECTION 15. The RegionalGovernment shall recognize, promoteand protect the rights and welfare of farmers, farmworkers, fishermen andfishworkers, as well as farmers, andfishworkers' cooperatives andassociations.

SECTION 16. The RegionalGovernment shall encourageagricultural productivity and promote adiversified and organic farmingsystem.

SECTION 17. The RegionalGovernment shall give top priority tothe conservation, protection, utilizationand development of soil and waterresources for agricultural purposes.

SECTION 18. The Regional Assemblyshall enact on Aquatic and FisheriesCode which shall enhance, develop,conserve and protect marine andaquatic resources, and shall protectthe rights of subsistence fishermen tothe preferential use of communalmarine and fishing resources, includingseaweeds. This protection shall extendto offshore fishing grounds, up to andincluding all waters twelve (12)nautical miles from the coastline of theAutonomous Region but within theterritorial waters of the Philippines,regardless of depth, the seabed andthe subsoil that are included between

two (2) lines drawn perpendicular tothe general coastline from pointswhere the boundary lines of theAutonomous Region touch the sea at



15




low tide and a third line parallel to thegeneral coastline.

Further, it shall provide support tosubsistence fishermen throughappropriate technology and research,

adequate financial, production andmarketing assistance and otherservices.

Fishworkers shall also receive a justshare from their labor in the utilizationof marine and fishing resources.

Science, technology and otherdisciplines shall be developed andemployed to protect and maintainaquatic and marine ecology.

SECTION 19. The Regional Assemblymay, by law, create a Bureau of Agriculture and Fisheries and define itscomposition, powers and functions.

Trade and Industry

SECTION 20. The RegionalGovernment recognizes the privatesector as the prime mover of trade,commerce and industry. It shallencourage and support entrepreneurialcapability in the Region and shallrecognize, promote and protectcooperatives.

SECTION 21. The RegionalGovernment shall promote and protectsmall and medium-scale cottageindustries by providing assistance suchas marketing opportunities, financialsupport, tax incentives, appropriateand alternative technology andtechnical training to produce semi-finished and finished products.

SECTION 22. The Regional

Government shall give support andencouragement to the establishmentof banks in accordance with theprinciples of the Islamic bankingsystem, subject to the supervision by

the central monetary authority of theNational Government.

SECTION 23. Subject to nationalpolicies, the Regional Governmentshall regulate traditional barter trade

and countertrade with neighboringcountries.

SECTION 24. The RegionalGovernment shall encourage, promote,undertake and support theestablishment of economic zones,industrial centers and ports in strategicareas and growth centers of theRegion to attract local and foreigninvestments and business enterprises.

SECTION 25. The RegionalGovernment shall undertake measuresto promote consumer education and toensure that the rights, interests andwelfare of the consumers areprotected.

SECTION 26. The RegionalGovernment shall promote thepreferential use of labor and locallyproduced goods and materials byadopting measures to increase theircompetitiveness.

SECTION 27. Subject to theConstitution and national policies, theRegional Government shall regulateand exercise authority over foreigninvestments within its jurisdiction inaccordance with its goals andpriorities.

Tourism Development

SECTION 28. The RegionalGovernment shall, with the assistanceof the National Government and theparticipation of the private sector,

develop tourism as a positiveinstrument toward acceleratedregional development. Tourismdevelopment shall promote greaterpride in and commitment to the



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nation: Provided, That the diversecultural heritage, and moral andspiritual values of the people in theAutonomous Region shall be primarilyconsidered and respected.

SECTION 29. The Regional Assemblymay, by law, create a Tourism office,and shall define its composition,powers and functions.

RA 7076People's Small-Scale Mining Act

SECTION 7. Ancestral Lands. — Noancestral land may be declared as apeople's small-scale mining areawithout the prior consent of thecultural communities concerned:Provided, That, if ancestral lands aredeclared as people's small-scalemining areas, the members of thecultural communities therein shall begiven priority in the awarding of small-scale mining contracts.

RA 7586National Integrated Protected

Areas System

Sec 4d. "Indigenous cultural community"refers to a group of people sharingcommon bonds of language, customs,traditions and other distinctive culturaltraits, and who have, since timeimmemorial, occupied, possessed andutilized a territory;

SECTION 13. Ancestral Lands andRights Over Them. — Ancestral landsand customary rights and interestarising shall be accorded duerecognition. The DENR shall prescriberules and regulations to govern

ancestral lands within protected areas:Provided, That the DENR shall have nopower to evict indigenous communitiesfrom their present occupancy norresettle them to another area without

their consent: Provided, however, Thatall rules and regulations, whetheradversely affecting said communitiesor not, shall be subjected to notice andhearing to be participated in bymembers of concerned indigenous

community.

RA 7611Palawan Strategic Environmental Plan

SECTION 11.Tribal AncestralLands. — These areas, traditionallyoccupied by cultural minorities,comprise both land and sea areas.

These shall be treated in the samegraded system of control andprohibition as in the othersabovementioned except for strongeremphasis in cultural considerations.

The SEP, therefore, shall define aspecial kind of zonation to fulfill thematerial and cultural needs of thetribes using consultative processesand cultural mapping of the ancestrallands.

RA 7942Mining Act of 1995

SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. —As used in and for purposes of this Act,the following terms, whether in

singular or plural, shall mean:

(a) "Ancestral lands" refers to alllands exclusively and actuallypossessed, occupied, or utilized byindigenous cultural communities bythemselves or through their ancestorsin accordance with their customs andtraditions since time immemorial, andas may be defined and delineated bylaw.

SECTION 4. Ownership of Mineral

Resources. — Mineral resources areowned by the State and theexploration, development, utilization,and processing thereof shall be underits full control and supervision. The



17




State may directly undertake suchactivities or it may enter into mineralagreements with contractors.

SECTION 16. Opening of AncestralLands for Mining Operations. — No

ancestral land shall be opened formining operations without the priorconsent of the indigenous culturalcommunity concerned.

SECTION 17. Royalty Payments forIndigenous Cultural Communities. — Inthe event of an agreement with anindigenous cultural communitypursuant to the preceding section, theroyalty payment, upon utilization of the minerals shall be agreed upon bythe parties. The said royalty shall formpart of a trust fund for thesocioeconomic well-being of theindigenous cultural community.

SECTION 18. Areas Open to MiningOperations. — Subject to any existingrights or reservations and prioragreements of all parties, all mineralresources in public or private lands,including timber or forestlands asdefined in existing laws, shall be opento mineral agreements or financial ortechnical assistance agreementapplications. Any conflict that mayarise under this provision shall beheard and resolved by the panel of arbitrators.

SECTION 19. Areas Closed to MiningApplications. — Mineral agreement orfinancial or technical assistanceagreement applications shall not beallowed:(a) In military and othergovernment reservations, except uponprior written clearance by thegovernment agency concerned;

(b) Near or under public or privatebuildings, cemeteries, archeologicaland historic sites, bridges, highways,waterways, railroads, reservoirs, damsor other infrastructure projects, public

or private works including plantationsor valuable crops, except upon writtenconsent of the government agency orprivate entity concerned;(c) In areas covered by valid andexisting mining rights;

(d) In areas expressly prohibited bylaw;(e) In areas covered by small-scaleminers as defined by law unless withprior consent of the small-scaleminers, in which case a royaltypayment upon the utilization of minerals shall be agreed upon by theparties, said royalty forming a trustfund for the socioeconomicdevelopment of the communityconcerned; and(f) Old growth or virgin forests,proclaimed watershed forest reserves,wilderness areas, mangrove forests,mossy forests, national parks,provincial/municipal forests, parks,greenbelts, game refuge and birdsanctuaries as defined by law and inareas expressly prohibited under theNational Integrated Protected AreasSystem (NIPAS) under Republic Act No.7586, Department AdministrativeOrder No. 25, series of 1992 and otherlaws.

RA 8425Social Reform Agenda

SECTION 4. Adoption and Integrationof Social Reform Agenda (SRA) in theNational Anti-Poverty Action Agenda.— The National Anti-Poverty ActionAgenda shall principally include thecore principles and programs of theSocial Reform Agenda (SRA). The SRAshall have a multi-dimensionalapproach to poverty consisting of thefollowing reforms:

(1) Social dimension access toquality basic services. — These arereforms which refer to equitablecontrol and access to social servicesand facilities such as education,



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health, housing, and other basicservices which enable the citizens tomeet their basic human needs and tolive decent lives;(2) Economic dimension assetreform and access to economic

opportunities. — Reforms whichaddress the existing inequities in theownership, distribution, managementand control over natural and man-made resources from which they earna living or increase the fruits of theirlabor;(3) Ecological dimensionsustainable development of productiveresources. — Reforms which ensurethe effective and sustainable utilizationof the natural and ecological resourcebase, thus assuring greater socialacceptability and increasedparticipation of the basic sectors inenvironmental and natural resourcesconservation, management anddevelopment;(4) Governance dimensiondemocratizing the decision-makingand management processes. —Reforms which enable the basicsectors to effectively participate indecision-making and managementprocesses that affect their rights,interests and welfare.

The SRA shall focus on the followingsector-specific flagship programs:(1) For farmers and landless ruralworkers — agricultural development;(2) For the fisherfolk — fisheriesand aquatic resources conservation,management and development;(3) For the indigenous peoples andindigenous communities — respect,protection and management of theancestral domains;(4) For workers in the informalsector — workers' welfare and

protection;(5) For the urban poor — socializedhousing; and(6) For members of otherdisadvantaged groups such as the

women, children, youth, persons withdisabilities, the elderly, and victims of natural and man-made calamities —the Comprehensive IntegratedDelivery of Social Services (CIDSS).Additionally, to support the sectoral

flagship programs, the following cross-sectoral flagships shall likewise beinstituted:(1) Institution-building andeffective participation in governance;(2) Livelihood programs;(3) Expansion of micro-credit/microfinance services andcapability building; and(4) Infrastructure buildup anddevelopment.

ON LEGAL MYTHS AND INDIGENOUSPEOPLES: RE-EXAMININGCARINO VS. INSULAR

GOVERNMENT(MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN)

Concept of Ownership There is nothing necessary or

natural in ownership, as it is understoodnow under our Phil. Legal System. Theconcept of property and ownership ariseand take shape not because of anyphysical or material attribute of the thingbeing owned. Rather, these concepts

are reflections of human associations inrelation to things. In other words,specific cultures create their own set of property relationships. Under the CivilCode, one is said to own a piece of landwhen he exercise, to the exclusion of allothers, the right to use, enjoy its fruitsand alienate or dispose of it in anymanner not prohibited by law. Amongthe indigenous, unwesternized orunHispanized Phil. Population, there is nosuch concept of individual and exclusiveownership of land. Ownership moreaccurately applies to the tribal right to

use the land or territorial control.Ownership is tantamount to work. Atbest, people consider themselves as'secondary owners' or stewards of theland, since beings of the spirit world areconsidered as the true and primary or



19




reciprocal owners of the land. There isalso the concept of trusteeship since notonly the present generation but also thefuture ones possess the right to the land.

The ‘Relevance’ of Legal Issues:Carino RevisitedIn a paper written by the CordilleraStudies Program, they point outthat the Ibaloi, where Carinobelonged, had no concept of exclusive or alienable ownership.

Ownership, as we understand it,was only a relatively newdevelopment and which by customapplied only to pasture land. Thecourt focused only on the issuewhether plaintiff owned the land,without focusing on the kind of property tenure Carino had withrespect to the land. The law,which the judge wasimplementing, was simply notequipped to assist him discoverthis important point. The ruling in Carino is so broadthat when used indiscriminately asthe sole ground to recognize andprotect ancestral domains it willwork a contradiction. At the sametime that it provides an avenue toprotect ‘native titles,’ it opensfloodgates for enterprisinglowlanders to take advantage of the uplander’s legal ignorance. Their land become as alienable asany other property as conceivedby the national legal system.

The Attempt to entrench Carino as astatutory doctrine



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The subsequent attempt atstatutory articulation – like thePublic Land Act, Sec. 48 (c) of CA141 and RA 3872 – only worsenedthe situation. They seem to buildup on the Carino doctrine. Thetruth is that its concept is totally

different. First, unlike Carino, theprovisions do not requirepossession by individuals under aclaim of private ownership for ‘asfar back as testimony or memorygoes.’ A mere thirty yearspossession is sufficient. Second,Carino establishes the precedentthat the native tittle is ‘presumednever to have been public.’ Sec.48 of CA 141 starts from thepresumption that the land isinitially part of the public domain.Like Carino however, the conceptof ownership remains. Theprevailing rule is that the lapse of 30 years adverse possession isenough to vest title ipso facto. Judicial confirmation is only aformality. These rights however, can work

against indigenous peoples. First, therecognition of his ‘native title’ has servedto make his land alienable in every senseprovided by the national legal system.Its disposition is not confined only tomembers of his kin or of his village.Ironically, while reiterating ‘native’ rightto ancestral land, the decisions make itpossible for a private corporation toacquire the land from the indigenousholder – just what happened in the caseof Acme. Second, the awareness of therights provided by the outsider’s lawswill definitely be a tempting opportunityfor a member of a community to treatland, not as something that sustains lifethat should be revered, but as acommodity that could be sold for profit.

The Bias against indigenous concept

of ownershipOther laws applicable toindigenous cultural communities reveal asimilar bias against indigenous conceptof ownership the constitutionnotwithstanding. The concept of private

right as defined in the Revised ForestryCode excludes orchards and forestssince they are ‘plantations of forest andtrees of economic value.’ The Kalinga,however, would ‘own’ the residentialarea, the sacred shrine, the burialgrounds and possibly the rice terraces.

Likewise, a large part of the ancestraldomain is expressly excluded by theprovision which reads: ‘No land of thepublic domain 18% in slope or over shallbe classified as alienable anddisposable…’ It is obvious that in GranCordillera, which is so mountainous,virtually all populated areas under thisprovision are inalienable andindisposable, such that the land cannotbe owned by the inhabitants thereof.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND INDIGENOUS

PEOPLES (MARVIC LEONEN)

On October 29, 1997, thePresident signed into law Republic ActNo. 8371, otherwise known as theIndigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997.Formally, the law is the legislature’sinterpretation of some key provisions of the Constitution directly relating toindigenous peoples – particularly Sec.22, Article II and Sec. 5, Article XII. IPRAimplements these provisions in thefollowing ways:

Civil and Political Rights

Foremost in the law is itsrecognition of the right to on-discrimination of indigenous peoples(IPs). Discrimination against the‘cultural minority,’ as shown in the casesof People vs. Cayat and Rubi vs.Provincial Board are not only archaic butalso outlawed. IPs are entitled to thesame rights and privileges as citizensand should not be discriminated againstin a any form of employment and shouldreceive more appropriate forms of basic

services. The new law even goes furtherto ensure the rights of women, childrenand civilians in situations of armedconflict. There is also recognition of IPsright to self-governance. Likewise, thenew law defines more precisely the



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concept of customary law, which will beused not only to arrive at an amicablesettlement but also to process it in anacceptable manner – that is, theoffended party may opt to use thecustomary processes rather than havethe offender prosecuted in the courts of

law.

Social and Cultural Rights

IPRA requires that theeducational system should becomerelevant to the needs of children andyoung people as well as provide themwith cultural opportunities. Culturaldiversity is recognized. The rights toreligion as well as to cultural sites andceremonies are guaranteed. It is nowunlawful to excavate archaeological sitesin order to obtain materials of culturalvalue as well as deface or destroyartifacts.

Recognizing Right and Tenureto Natural Resources

IPRA supplements the privatevested rights recognized by theConstitution by the operation of Carnino,through rights acquired under the PublicLand Act and other similar laws. It alsocreates by law other sources as well as adifferent concept of ownership. Bylegislative fiat, ancestral domains and

ancestral lands are now legitimate waysof acquiring ownership. Unlike emphasison individual and corporate holders inthe Civil Code, IPRA emphasizes ‘privatebut community’ property nature of ancestral domains. Aside from not beinga proper subject of sale or any othermode of disposition, ancestral domainholders may claim ownership over theresources within their territory, developthe land and natural resources, stay inthe territory, have the rights againstinvoluntary displacement, regulate theentry of migrants, have rights to safe

and clean air and water, claim parts of reservations and use customary law toresolve their conflicts. These rightshowever need to be qualified by the ff.provisions: 1) Sec. 56: Existing PropertyRights Regimes; 2) Sec. 57: Granting

only priority rights to members of indigenous cultural communities; and 3)Sec. 58: Allows the use of ancestraldomains as critical watersheds,mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries,wilderness, protected areas whendeemed appropriate and with the full

participation of the ICCs/IPs concerned.

Creating a National Commission onIndigenous Peoples

This will act as a mechanism tocoordinate implementation of the law aswell as a final authority that has jurisdiction to issue Certificates of Ancestral Domains/Land Titles.

THE POLICY CONTEXT This includes the direct action

taken by the communities themselves toward off encroachments into theirterritory and threatening their existence,as assisted/organized by various POs andNGOs. There are also various responsesfrom post EDSA governments whichreveal the extent of advocacy forindigenous peoples rights. Lastly, thereis the pressure from internationalfunding institutions like the World Bankand the Asian Development Bank.Funding for projects had a lot to do withthe changing attitude of the governmentrelinquishing control over large portions

of the public domain and recognizingrights of upland migrants.

THE DANGERSIPRA is not the solution to the

various problems of IPs. Being a nationallaw, it is too general to address thediversity of the indigenous communities. The premise of national law is that it canmeet local problems with generalizedsolutions. The premise of culturaldiversity is able to find creative andunique approaches to the issues as theydefine them. The law can also be

diversionary. It can involve peoples andcommunities into concerns and activitieswhich may far be removed from thosewhich might better address theirconcerns – bureaucratisation. Lastly, thepresent language and the new concept



22




of IPRA encourage litigation. Even thosesituations where the law prescribescustomary law will require some form of litigation to determine for instancewhether a particular form is customary,to whom it will apply, etc. Normally, it isthe party that has the most resources

that has the greater possibility of gettinga better judgment. Bsid4es, courts of law provide a culture that is radicallydifferent from that of the indigenouscommunity.

THE POTENTIALSOur own experience has shown

that the laws even when they find theirway to hegemony, is not a monolith thatcould not be challenged. It adjusts topolitical advocacy. They also provide forthe condition for change. The use of lawin many situations of IPs thereforeshould be marginal. Important butmarginal nonetheless. Advocates needto be more strategic – to understand thelong term needs and aspirations of thecommunity as the latter defines them. The challenge for advocates is to knowwhen to use the law, not so much tomaintain the status quo, but to gainleverage for a more just andfundamental change. Its potential liesnot in what it really contains, but in howwe decide and when to use it.

How is IPRA different from Carino?

(1) Carino does not distinguish betweenancestral land and ancestral domain.IPRA does, however.

(2) Carino refers only to land. IPRArefers to land as well as the naturalresources above and below it.

(3) IPRA is applicable only to indigenouspeoples. Carino applies to allpersons who can prove that their

predecessors-in-interest occupiedlands since time immemorial.

II. LAND CLASSIFICATION

Lands of the public domain are classifiedinto 4 categories:

(1) Agricultural land(2) Forest or timber land

(3) Mineral land(4) National parks

THE 1987 CONSTITUTIONARTICLE XII

National Economy and Patrimony

Section 3. Lands of the publicdomain are classified into agricultural,forest or timber, mineral lands, andnational parks. Agricultural lands of thepublic domain may be further

classified by law according to the useswhich they may be devoted. Alienablelands of the public domain shall belimited to agricultural lands. Privatecorporations or associations may nothold such alienable lands of the publicdomain except by lease, for a periodnot exceeding twenty-five years,renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed onethousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not morethan five hundred hectares, or acquire

not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant.

Taking into account therequirements of conservation, ecology,and development, and subject to therequirements of agrarian reform, theCongress shall determine, by law, thesize of lands of the public domainwhich may be acquired, developed,held, or leased and the conditionstherefor.

Section 4. The Congress shall, assoon as possible, determine by law thespecific limits of forest lands andnational parks, marking clearly theirboundaries on the ground. Thereafter,such forest lands and national parks



23




shall be conserved and may not beincreased nor diminished, except bylaw. The Congress shall provide, forsuch period as it may determine,measures to prohibit logging inendangered forests and watershed

areas.

A. Classes of Lands

Public Agricultural Lands

COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 141*AN ACT TO AMEND AND COMPILE THE

LAWS RELATIVE TO LANDS OF THEPUBLIC DOMAIN

SEC. 6. The President, upon the

recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall fromtime to time classify the lands of thepublic domain into —(a) Alienable or disposable,(b) Timber, and(c) Mineral lands,and may at any time and in a likemanner transfer such lands from oneclass to another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition.

SEC. 7. For the purposes of the

administration and disposition of alien-able or disposable public lands, thePresident, upon recommendation bythe Secretary of Agriculture andCommerce, shall from time to timedeclare what lands are open todisposition or concession under thisAct.

SEC. 58. Any tract of land of thepublic domain which, being neithertimber nor mineral land, is intended tobe used for residential purposes or forcommercial, industrial, or otherproductive purposes other thanagricultural, and is open to dispositionor concession, shall be disposed of under the pro-visions of this chapterand not otherwise.

SEC. 59. The lands disposableunder this title shall be classified asfollows:(a) Lands reclaimed by theGovernment by dredging, filing, or

other means;(b) Foreshore;(c) Marshy lands or lands coveredwith water bordering upon the shoresor banks of navigable lakes or rivers;(d) Lands not included in any of the

foregoing classes.

MONTANO V. INSULAR GOVERNMENT12 PHIL. 572

Lands under the ebb and flow of the

tide, being reserved for public uses of navigation and fishery and subject toCongressional regulation, are notunderstood as included in the term "publiclands" when used in general lawsauthorizing private appropriation thereof ashomesteads or otherwise. Swamps andmarshes not available for the purpose of navigation or public uses may be subjectedto private appropriation although covered bythe tides.

Of this character are the manglar or mangrove swamps of the Philippine Islandsin which grow aquatic trees cultivated and incommon use for domestic or commercialpurposes. Such manglares when convertedby man into fisheries and used as such for the statutory period are the subject of privateownership.

JOCSON V. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY39 PHIL. 560

That manglares are not forestrylands, within the meaning of the words"timber lands" in the Act of Congress, hasbeen definitely decided by this court in thecase of Montano vs. Insular Government.



24




Whatever may have been the meaning of the term "forestry" under the Spanish law,the Act of Congress of July 1st, 1902,classifies the public lands in the PhilippineIslands as timber, mineral or agriculturallands, and all public lands that are nottimber or mineral lands are necessarilyagricultural public lands, whether they areused as nipa swamps, manglares[mangroves], fisheries or ordinary farmlands.

ANKRON V. GOVERNMENT40 PHIL. 10 (1919)

The Torrens system does notprovide for registration of public forestry andmineral lands. Under certain conditions,public agricultural lands may be registered.(Sec. 54, Act No. 926.)

Considering that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the landsin the Philippine Islands are agriculturallands, the courts have a right to presume, inthe absence of evidence to the contrary, thatin each case the lands are agricultural lands.The mere fact that a tract of land has treesupon it or has mineral wealth within it, is notin itself sufficient to declare that one isforestry land and the other mineral land.There must be some proof of the extent andpresent or future value of the forestry and of the mineral. The proof must show that it is

more valuable for the forestry or theminerals which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes.

Whether the particular land isagricultural, forestry, or mineral, is aquestion to be settled in each particular case, unless the Bureau of Forestry has,under the authority conferred upon it, prior tothe intervention of private interests, set

aside for forestry or mineral purposes theparticular land in question.

HEIRS OF AMUNATEGUI V. DIRECTOR126 SCRA 69

A forested area classified as forestland of the public domain does not lose such

classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forestcover. "Forest lands" do not have to be onmountains or in out of the way places.Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees,nipa palms, and other tress growing inbrackish or sea water may also be classifiedas forest land. The classification isdescriptive of its legal nature or status anddoes not have to be descriptive of what theland actually looks like. Unless and until theland classified as "forest" is released in anofficial proclamation to that effect so that itmay form part of the disposable agriculturallands of the public domain, the rules onconfirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

Possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into privateownership. A positive act of Government isneeded to declassify land which is classified

as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.

REPUBLIC V. DE PORKAN151 SCRA 88

It is the exclusive prerogative of theExecutive Department of the Government toclassify public lands. The classification isdescriptive of its legal nature or status anddoes not have to be descriptive of what theland actually looks like. Since the disputed

tract of public land is neither timber nor mineral lands, the same is alienable or opento disposition as public agricultural lands,under Section 11, C.A. 141 thru homesteadsettlement or free patent.

Where the possession of a public landdates back to the time of the Spanishcolonial period, such possession of the saidtract of public land has attained thecharacter and duration prescribed by law asthe equivalent of an express grant from theGovernment. The mandate of the law itself is that the possessors "shall be conclusively

presumed to have performed all theconditions essential to a Government grantand shall be entitled to a certificate of title"and by legal fiction, the land ceases to bepublic and thus becomes private land. Titleover the land has vested on the possessor



25




so as to segregate the land from the mass of the public domain. It is not necessary that acertificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sustained by thecourts, an application therefor beingsufficient.

When a homesteader has complied withall the terms and conditions which entitlehim to a patent for a particular tract of publicland, he acquires a vested interest therein,and is to be regarded as the equitable owner thereof, and once the right to a patent hasbecome vested in a purchaser of publiclands, it is equivalent to a patent actuallyissued. From that point the land ceases tobe part of the public domain and becomesprivate. The Director of Lands is divested of control and possession when homesteadapplications are approved and recorded.

Forest Lands

May 19, 1975PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 705FORESTRY REFORM CODE OF THE

PHILIPPINES

Sec. 15. Topography. - No land of the public domain eighteen per cent(18%) in slope or over shall beclassified as alienable and disposable,nor any forest land fifty per cent (50%)in slope or over, as grazing land.

Lands eighteen per cent (18%)in slope or over which have alreadybeen declared as alienable anddisposable shall be reverted to theclassification of forest lands by theDepartment Head, to form part of theforest reserves, unless they arealready covered by existing titles orapproved public land application, oractually occupied openly, continuously,adversely and publicly for a period of not less than thirty (30) years as of the

effectivity of this Code, where theoccupant is qualified for a free patentunder the Public Land Act: Provided,

That said lands, which are not yet partof a well-established communities,

shall be kept in a vegetative conditionsufficient to prevent erosion andadverse effects on the lowlands andstreams: Provided, further, That whenpublic interest so requires, steps shallbe taken to expropriate, cancel

defective titles, reject public landapplication, or eject occupants thereof.

Sec. 16. Areas needed for forest purposes. - The following lands, even if they are below eighteen per cent(18%) in slope, are needed for forestpurposes, and may not, therefore, beclassified as alienable and disposableland, to wit:1) Areas less than 250 hectareswhich are far from, or are notcontiguous with, any certified alienableand disposable land;2) Isolated patches of forest of atleast five (5) hectares with rockyterrain, or which protect a spring forcommunal use;3) Areas which have already beenreforested;4) Areas within forest concessionswhich are timbered or have goodresidual stocking to support anexisting, or approved to beestablished, wood processing plant;5) Ridge tops and plateausregardless of size found within, orsurrounded wholly or partly by, forestlands where headwaters emanate;6) Appropriately located road-rights-or-way;7) Twenty-meter strips of landalong the edge of the normal highwaterline of rivers and streams withchannels of at least five (5) meterswide;8) Strips of mangrove orswamplands at least twenty (20)meters wide, along shorelines facingoceans, lakes, and other bodies of

water, and strips of land at leasttwenty (20) meters wide facing lakes;9) Areas needed for otherpurposes, such as national parks,national historical sites, game refuges



26




and wildlife sanctuaries, forest stationsites, and others of public interest; and10) Areas previously proclaimed bythe President as forest reserves,national parks, game refuge, birdsanctuaries, national shrines, national

historic sites:Provided, That in case an area fallingunder any of the foregoing categoriesshall have been titled in favor of anyperson, steps shall be taken, if publicinterest so requires, to have said titlecancelled or amended, or the titledarea expropriated.

Mineral Lands

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7942

Philippine Mining Act of 1995.

Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. - Asused in and for purposes of this Act,the following terms, whether insingular or plural, shall mean:

(aa) "Minerals" refers to all naturallyoccurring inorganic substance in solid,gas, liquid, or any intermediate stateexcluding energy materials such ascoal, petroleum, natural gas,radioactive materials, and geothermalenergy.(ab) "Mineral agreement" means acontract between the government anda contractor, involving mineralproduction-sharing agreement, co-production agreement, or joint-ventureagreement.(ac) "Mineral land" means anyarea where mineral resources arefound.(ad) "Mineral resource" meansany concentration of minerals/rockswith potential economic value.(ae) "Mining area" means a portionof the contract area identified by thecontractor for purposes of development, mining, utilization, andits sites for support facilities or in the

immediate vicinity of the miningoperations.(af) "Mining operation" meansmining activities involving exploration,feasibility, development, utilization,and processing.

National Parks

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7586National Integrated Protected

Areas System Act of 1992

Sec. 4. Definition of Terms. - Forpurposes of this Act, the followingterms shall be defined as follows:

(b) "Protected area" refers to

identified portions of land and waterset aside by reason of their uniquephysical and biological significance,managed to enhance biologicaldiversity and protected againstdestructive human exploitation;

(c) "Buffer zones" are identifiedareas outside the boundaries of andimmediately adjacent to designatedprotected areas pursuant to Section 8that need special development controlin order to avoid or minimize harm tothe protected area;

(e) "National park" refers to aforest reservation essentially of naturalwilderness character which has beenwithdrawn from settlement, occupancyor any form of exploitation except inconformity with approvedmanagement plan and set aside assuch exclusively to conserve the areaor preserve the scenery, the naturaland historic objects, wild animals andplants therein and to provideenjoyment of these features in suchareas;

(f) "Natural monument" is arelatively small area focused onprotection of small features to protect



27




or preserve nationally significantnatural features on account of theirspecial interest or uniquecharacteristics;

(g) "Natural biotic area" is an

area set aside to allow the way of lifeof societies living in harmony with theenvironment to adopt to moderntechnology at their pace;

(h) "Natural park" is a relativelylarge area not materially altered byhuman activity where extractiveresources uses are not allowed andmaintained to protect outstandingnatural and scenic areas of national orinternational significance for scientific,educational and recreational use;

(i) "Protectedlandscapes/seascapes" are areas of national significance which arecharacterized by the harmoniousinteraction of man and land whileproviding opportunities for publicenjoyment through recreation andtourism within the normal lifestyle andeconomic activity of these areas;

(j) "Resources reserve" is anextensive and relatively isolated anduninhabited are normally with difficultaccess designated as such to protectnatural resources of the area for futureuse and prevent or containdevelopment activities that couldaffect the resource pending theestablishment of objectives which arebased upon appropriate knowledgeand planning;

(k) "Strict nature reserve" is anarea possessing some outstandingecosystem, features and/or species of flora and fauna of national scientific

importance maintained to protectnature and maintain processes in anundisturbed state in order to haveecologically representative examplesof the natural environment available

for scientific study, environmentalmonitoring, education, and for themaintenance of genetic resources in adynamic and evolutionary state;

(l) "Tenured migrant communities"

are communities within protectedareas which have actually andcontinuously occupied such areas forfive (5) years before the designation of the same as protected areas inaccordance with this Act and are solelydependent therein for subsistence; and

(m) "Wildlife sanctuary"comprises an area which assures thenatural conditions necessary to protectnationally significant species, groupsof species, biotic communities orphysical features of the environmentwhere these may require specifichuman manipulation for theirperpetuation.

Sec. 5. Establishment andExtent of the System. - Theestablishment and operationalizationof the System shall involve thefollowing:

(a) All areas or islands in thePhilippine proclaimed, designated orset aside, pursuant to a law,presidential decree, presidentialproclamation or executive order asnational park, game refuge, bird andwildlife sanctuary, wilderness are,strict nature reserve, watershed,mangrove reserve, fish sanctuary,natural and historical landmark,protected and managedlandscape/seascapes as well asidentified virgin forests before theeffectivity of this Act are herebydesignated as initial components of the System. The initial components of

the System shall be governed byexisting laws, rules and regulations,not inconsistent with this Act;



28




(b) Within one (1) year f rom theeffectivity of this Act, the DENR shallsubmit to the Senate and the House of Representatives a map and legaldescription or natural boundaries of each protected area initially

comprising the System. Such mapsand legal descriptions shall, by virtueof this Act, constitute the officialdocumentary representation of theentire System, subject to such changesas Congress deems necessary;(c) All DENR records pertaining tosaid protected areas, including mapsand legal descriptions or naturalboundaries, copies of rules andregulations governing them, copies of public notices of, and reportssubmitted to Congress regardingpending additions, eliminations, ormodifications shall be made availableto the public. These legal documentspertaining to protected areas shall alsobe available to the public in therespective DENR Regional Offices,Provincial Environment and NaturalResources Offices (PENROs) andCommunity Environment and NaturalResources Offices (CENROs) whereNIPAS areas are located;

(d) Within three (3) years from theeffectivity of this Act, the DENR shallstudy and review each area tentativelycomposing the System as to itssuitability or nonsuitability forpreservation as protected area andinclusion in the System according tothe categories established in Section 3hereof and report its findings to thePresident as soon as each study iscompleted. The study must include ineach area:

(1) A forest occupants survey;(2) An ethnographic study;

(3) A protected area resourceprofile;(4) Land use plans done incoordination with the respectiveRegional Development Councils; and

(5) Such other background studiesas will be sufficient bases for selection.

The DENR shall:(i) Notify the public of theproposed action through publication in

a newspaper of general circulation,and such other means as the Systemdeems necessary in the area or areasin the vicinity of the affected landthirty (30) days prior to the publichearing.(ii) Conduct public hearing at thelocations nearest to the area affected;(iii) At the least thirty (30) daysprior to the date of hearing advise alllocal government units (LGUs) in theaffected areas, national agenciesconcerned, people's organizations andnongovernment organizations andinvite such officials to submit theirviews on the proposed action at thehearing not later than thirty (30) daysfollowing the date of the hearing; and(iv) Give due consideration to therecommendations at the publichearing; and provide sufficientexplanation for his recommendationscontrary to the general sentimentsexpressed in the public hearing;

(e) Upon receipt of therecommendations of the DENR thePresident shall issue a presidentialproclamation designating therecommended areas as protectedareas and providing for measures fortheir protection until such time whenCongress shall have enacted a lawfinally declaring such recommendedareas as part of the integratedprotected area system; and

(f) Thereafter, the President shallsend to the Senate and the House of Representatives his recommendations

with respect to the designations asprotected areas or reclassification of each area on which review has beencompleted, together with maps andlegal description of boundaries. The



29




President, in his recommendation, maypropose the alteration of existingboundaries of any or all proclaimedprotected areas, additional of anycontiguous area of public land of predominant physical and biological

value. Nothing contained herein shalllimit the President to propose. as partof this recommendation to Congress,additional areas which have not beendesignated, proclaimed or set aside bylaw, presidential decree, proclamationor executive order as protected area/s.

Sec. 6. Additional Areas to beIntegrated to the System. -Notwithstanding the establishment of the initial component of the System,the Secretary shall propose theinclusion in the System of additionalareas with outstanding physicalfeatures, anthropological significanceand biological diversity in accordancewith the provisions of Section 5(d).

Sec. 7. Disestablishment asProtected Area. - When in the opinionof the DENR a certain protected areashould be withdrawn or disestablished,or its boundaries modified aswarranted by a study and sanctionedby the majority of the members of therespective boards for the protectedarea as herein established in Section11, it shall, in turn, advice Congress.Disestablishment of a protected areaunder the System or modification of itsboundary shall take effect pursuant toan act of Congress. Thereafter, saidarea shall revert to the category of public forest unless otherwiseclassified by Congress: Provided,however, That after disestablishmentby Congress, the Secretary mayrecommend the transfer of suchdisestablished area to other

government agencies to serve otherpriority programs of national interest.

B. The Power to Classify Lands

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 292 Title XIV - ENVIRONMENT AND

NATURAL RESOURCES

Sec. 4. Powers and Functions. -

The Department shall:

(10) Promulgate rules andregulations necessary to:

(a) Accelerate cadastral andemancipation patentsurveys, land useplanning and public landtitling:

(13) Assume responsibility for theassessment, development, protection,licensing and regulation as providedfor by law, where applicable, of allenergy and natural resources; theregulation and monitoring of servicecontractors, licensees, lessees, andpermit for the extraction, exploration,development and use of naturalresources products; theimplementation of programs andmeasures with the end in view of promoting close collaboration betweenthe government and the privatesector; the effective and efficientclassification and subclassification of lands of the public domain; and theenforcement of natural resources andenvironmental laws, rules andregulations;

(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdictionon the management and disposition of all lands of the public domain andserve as the sole agency responsiblefor classification, sub-classification,surveying and titling of lands inconsultation with appropriateagencies;

Chapter 4 - THE DEPARTMENTFIELD OFFICES

Sec. 22. Provincial andCommunity Offices. - The Naturalresources provincial and community



30




offices shall each be headed by aprovincial natural resource officer andcommunity natural resource officer,respectively. They shall take over thefunctions of the district offices of theformer Bureau of Forest Development,

Bureau of Lands, and Bureau of Minesand Geo-Sciences.

Title III - JUSTICEChapter I - GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 4. OrganizationalStructure. - The Department shallconsist of the following constituentunits:(1) Department proper;(2) Office of the GovernmentCorporate Counsel;(3) National Bureau of Investigation;(4) Public Attorney's Office;(5) Board of Pardons and Parole;(6) Parole and ProbationAdministration;(7) Bureau of Corrections;(8) Land Registration Authority;(9) Commission on the Settlement

of Land Problems.

Chapter 9 - LAND REGISTRATIONAUTHORITY

Sec. 28. The Land Registration Authority. - The Land RegistrationAuthority, hereinafter referred to asthe Authority shall continue to exerciseits powers and functions under existinglaw on the Land Titles and DeedsRegistration Authority and those whichmay hereafter be provided by law.

Sec. 29. OrganizationalStructure. - The Authority shall be

headed by an Administrator who shallbe assisted by two (2) DeputyAdministrators, all of whom shall beappointed by the President upon therecommendation of the Secretary.

Sec. 30. Reorganization of Registry Offices in the National CapitalRegion. - The Registries of Deeds inthe National Capital Region is herebyreorganized as follows:

(1) The Registries of Deeds in thecities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay andCaloocan shall be maintained;(2) There is hereby createdRegistries of Deeds in theMunicipalities of Navotas, Malabon,Valenzuela, Mandaluyong, San Juan,Marikina, Las Pinas and Paranaquewith jurisdiction over their respectivemunicipalities;(3) The Registry of Deeds of Pasigshall be maintained with jurisdictionover the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguigand Pateros; and(4) The Registry of Deeds of Makati

shall have jurisdiction over themunicipalities of Makati andMuntinlupa.

C. The Power to Reclassify

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160Local Government Code

Sec. 20. Reclassification of Lands. - (a) A city or municipalitymay, through an ordinance passed bythe sanggunian after conducting publichearings for the purpose, authorize thereclassification of agricultural landsand provide for the manner of theirutilization or disposition in thefollowing cases: (1) when the landceases to be economically feasible andsound for agricultural purposes asdetermined by the Department of

Agriculture or (2) where the land shallhave substantially greater economicvalue for residential, commercial, orindustrial purposes, as determined bythe sanggunian concerned: Provided,



31




That such reclassification shall belimited to the following percentage of the total agricultural land area at thetime of the passage of the ordinance:

(1) For highly urbanized and

independent component cities,fifteen percent (15%);

(2) For component cities and firstto the third class municipalities, tenpercent (10%); and

(3) For fourth to sixth classmunicipalities, five percent (5%):Provided, further, That agriculturallands distributed to agrarian reformbeneficiaries pursuant to Republic ActNumbered Sixty-six hundred fifty-seven (R.A. No. 6657). otherwiseknown as "The ComprehensiveAgrarian Reform Law", shall not beaffected by the said reclassificationand the conversion of such lands intoother purposes shall be governed bySection 65 of said Act.

(b) The President may, when publicinterest so requires and uponrecommendation of the NationalEconomic and Development Authority,authorize a city or municipality toreclassify lands in excess of the limitsset in the next preceding paragraph.

(c) The local government unitsshall, in conformity with existing laws,continue to prepare their respectivecomprehensive land use plans enactedthrough zoning ordinances which shallbe the primary and dominant bases forthe future use of land resources:Provided. That the requirements forfood production, human settlements,and industrial expansion shall be takeninto consideration in the preparation of

such plans.

(d) Where approval by a nationalagency is required for reclassification,such approval shall not be

unreasonably withheld. Failure to acton a proper and complete applicationfor reclassification within three (3)months from receipt of the same shallbe deemed as approval thereof.

(e) Nothing in this Section shall beconstrued as repealing, amending, ormodifying in any manner theprovisions of R.A. No. 6657.

III. THE TORRENS SYSTEM

A. General Themes

Modes of Acquiring Land Titles

(1) Public Grant

The conveyance of public land by thegovernment to a private individual. (i.e.Spanish distribution of Public Lands byissuance of royal grants and concessions)No public land can be acquired by privatepersons without any grant, express or implied from government.

(2) Adverse Possession / Prescription

A possessor of land who may not be theowner, after the lapse of a certain periodprescribed by law, may assert ownershipthereof as against anyone except the trueowner or one with a better title based on anearlier possession which he had notabandoned. Occupancy must be actual or physical, adverse, open and notorious,exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted,coupled with the fact that it must be under claim of ownership. It does not run againstprivate lands brought under the operation of the Torrens system, nor against public landsexcept where the law expressly so provides.It is different from laches.

(3) Accretion



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When soil and earth, weeds and other deposits are washed away from other placesand gradually settle down and attachthemselves to one’s land that used to border on a stream or local body of water, theowner of the land becomes the owner of theadditional areas thus formed. (Art. 457 NCC)It can not be invoked for areas fronting theseashore as alluvial formations become partof the public domain. Does not apply also tolands adjoining a pond or lagoon withrespect to land left dry by the naturaldecrease of water. If the accretion is formedwith the intervention of man, becomes partof the public domain. Lands acquired byaccretion must still be registered to confirmand protect the title of the owner. (also Art461 NCC re: shifting course of riverbeds)

(4) Reclamation

Filling of submerged land by deliberateact and reclaiming title thereto. In thePhilippines, it is only the government thatcan assert title to reclaimed land.

(5) Private Grant or Voluntary Transfer

It is the usual means by which title toland is transferred by the owner himself or his duly authorized representative. Consentof the grantor is an essential element. Thistransfer is given effect by the voluntary

execution of a deed of conveyance in certainprescribed form, completed by recording or registration thereof in a public office. Thelegal title to the land does not pass until theconveyance shall have been registered or made of public record.

(6) Involuntary Alienation

Transfers that do not require theconsent or cooperation of the owner of theland. (i.e. expropriation, condemnation,eminent domain, escheats, forfeiture,

foreclosure,…) Under this mode of acquiringland, the purchasers are generally subject tothe rule of caveat emptor .

(7) Descent or Device

May be acquired by virtue of hereditarysuccession to the estate of a deceasedowner, or by devise if appropriatedispositions were made in the testators will.

(8) Emancipation Patent or GrantLand Reform:

- P.D. 27 / P.D. 266 – making tenant farmersowners of the lands they till upon thefulfillment of certain conditions.

- R.A. 6657 – The Comprehensive AgrarianReform Program (Note, however, that according to Prof. Gatmaytan, CARP fallsunder the mode of involuntary alienation.)

Purpose

The purpose of the Torrenssystem of land registration is to quiet titleto land: to put a stop forever to anyquestion of the legality of the title, exceptas to claims which were noted at the timeof registration in the certificate or whichmight arise subsequent thereto. (Umali v.CA, Cruz v. CA)

The Torrens system facilitatestransactions involving real estate by givingthe public the right to rely upon the face of

a Torrens Certificate of Title, and todispense of the need of inquiring further,except when the party concerned hadactual knowledge of facts andcircumstances that should impel areasonably cautious man to make suchfurther inquiry. (Pino v. CA)

Every registered owner andpurchaser holds title to the property freefrom all encumbrances not noted in thedeed.

In cases where the certificate of title is in the name of the vendor when theland is sold, in the absence of anything toexcite or arouse suspicion, the vendeehas the right to rely on what appears on



33




the certificate of title and is under noobligation to look beyond the certificateand investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of the certificate.(Pino v. CA)

It must be stressed that theTorrens system does NOT create or vesttitle, and has never been recognized as amode of acquiring ownership.

ALBA V. DE LA CRUZ17 PHIL 49 (1910)

FACTS: Agricultural land in Bulacan wasregistered in the names of the petitionersGrey y Alba on Feb. 12 1908 by TC decree.Their parents had obtained the land by

purchase in 1864 as evidenced by a publicdocument. On June 16, 1908 de la Cruzasked for a revision of the case on thegrounds that he is the absolute owner of twoof the lands in question, alleging that thedegree of registration over those lands wasobtained maliciously and fraudulently. Heclaimed that he had inherited the lands fromhis father who had obtained them via stategrant in 1895 as inscribed in the old register of property in Bulacan. TC reopened thecase, noting that the petitioners neglected tomention de la Cruz’s occupancy of the land,

it modified its earlier decree by excluding thetwo parcels of land.

ISSUE: WON the TC could reopen the caseafter its decree of registration had alreadybeen entered earlier. RULING: No. By express provisions of lawall parties are deemed served notice bypublication “to all whom it may concern”.The decree of registration must be held tobe conclusive against all persons whether his name is mentioned in the application,notice, or citation. Such decree could onlyhave been opened on the ground that it hadbeen obtained by fraud. Proof of constructive fraud is not sufficient, theremust be actual or positive fraud to reopen acase. This is not so in this situation, the

petitioners honestly believed that theappellee was occupying the lands as their tenant.

REPUBLIC V. UMALI171 SCRA 647 (1989)

FACTS: The original sale from thegovernment was tainted with fraud becauseit was based on a forgery. However theoriginal OCT was canceled and valid a TCTwas issued. The properties weresubsequently transferred to purchasers ingood faith and for value.

ISSUE: WON the land could revert back tothe state.

RULING: No. A certificate of titlefraudulently secured is not null and void abinitio, it was only voidable and the landremained private as long as title thereto hadnot been voided. There is no allegation inthe complaint filed by the petitioner that anyone of the defendants was privy to the fraudor that they had acquired the subject land inbad faith. Their status as innocenttransferees for value was never questionednor disproved. That status now accords tothem the protection of the torrens systemand renders the titles obtained by themindefeasible and conclusive despite the flawin the TCT.

The real purpose of the Torrenssystem of land registration is to quiet title toland: to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title except claims whichwere noted at the time of registration in thecertificate or which may arise subsequentthereto.

PINO V. CA198 SCRA 434 (1991)

FACTS: Subject lot was originally owned byspouses Juan and Rafaela. When Juan died

ownership was transferred to Rafaela andher two sons: Raymundo and Cicero. The lotwas then sold to Rafaela who acquired titlethereto. She first sold a portion of the lot in1967, then sold the other portion later.



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Ownership was eventually sold to Pino whoregistered the sale in 1970. In 1980 Cicerodied and his heirs instituted suit for nullityand reconveyance against Pino.

ISSUE: WON Pino is an innocent purchaser for value. RULING: Yes. Where the certificate of titleis in the hands of the vendor when the landis sold, the vendee for value has the right torely on what appears on the certificate of title. In the absence of anything to excite or arouse suspicion, the vendee is under noobligation to look beyond the certificate andinvestigate the title of the vendor.

The main purpose of the Torrenssystem is to avoid possible conflicts of titleto real estate and to facilitate transactionsrelative thereto by giving the public the right

to rely upon the face of the TCT anddispense with the need for inquiring further except when the party concerned has actualknowledge of facts and circumstances thatshould impel a reasonably cautious man tomake such further inquiry.

The action had already prescribedbecause it was filed 15 years after the saleand issuance of TCT in 1967. The remedyfor the petitioner is to bring action for damages against those who caused thefraud.

CRUZ V. CA (NOV. 6, 1997)

When the sale was executed,nothing was annotated in the certificate.There can be no reconveyance because theproperty had already been acquired by aninnocent purchaser for value. The realpurpose of the Torrens system of landregistration is to quiet title to land and to puta stop forever to any question of the legalityof the title except claims which have beenrecorded in the certificate of title. Every

registered owner and purchaser holds thetitle to the property free from allencumbrances not noted in the deed.

DELOS REYES V. CA285 SCRA 81 (1998)

FACTS: In 1942 de los Reyes sold only10,000 sqm to Penas who in 1943

registered all 13,405sqm. After 4subsequent sales the land was eventuallyacquired by Cainas. In 1978 the heirs of delos Reyes filed action for reconveyance.

ISSUE: WON an action for reconveyancefiled after more than 30 years may prosper against the holder for value.

RULING: NO. When respondents Cainasas fourth transferee in ownership dealt withthe land in question they were not requiredto go beyond what appeared in the TCT inthe name of their transferor. They wereinnocent purchasers for value havingacquired the property in due course and ingood faith under a clean title i.e. there wereno annotations of encumbrances or noticesof lis pendens at the back. They had noreason to doubt the validity of the title to theproperty. It would be the height of injustice if a valid transaction transferring property tothem would be set aside just toaccommodate parties who heedlessly slepton their rights for more then a third of acentury- having brought action to recover the land only after 36 years from the accrual

of their cause of action.

HEIRS OF DELA CRUZ, CA

FACTS: Petitioners were in actual, physical,continuous and open possession of the landsince 1959, when their predecessor ininterest allegedly bought it from the Madrids.Petitioners only had a photocopy of the deedof sale. The Madrid brothers allegedly soldthe land to Marquez in 1976. The Madridsand Marques obtained TCTs in 1986, the

petitioners then filed this action for reconveyance and damages in the sameyear.



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RULING: The fact that the Madrids andMarquez were able to secure their respective TCTs did not operate to vest

upon them ownership of the property. TheTorrens system does not create or vest title.It has never been recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership especially consideringthe fact that both the Madrids andMarquezes obtained their respective TCTsonly in 1986 27 long years after petitionersfirst took possessions of the land. If theMadrids and the Marquezes wished toassert their ownership they should have fileda judicial action for recovery of possessionand not merely to have the land registeredunder their respective names. The Madridslong inaction or passivity in asserting their rights will preclude them from recovering thesame. Marquez is also not an innocent

purchaser for value as he must have beenfully aware of another person’s possessionof the lot he purchased. One who buyswithout checking the vendor’s title takes allthe risks and losses consequent to suchfailure.

Nature of proceedings

A land registration proceeding isin rem, and therefore, the decree of registration is binding upon and conclusive

against all persons, including theGovernment and its branches. This isirrespective of whether or not they werepersonally notified of the filing of theapplication for registration or haveappeared and filed an answer to saidapplication since all persons areconsidered as notified by the publicationrequired by law. (Cacho v. CA) Notehowever, that in instances where theproperty sought to be registered isoccupied by persons other than the

registrant, mere notice by publication isnot sufficient: they must be given actualand personal notice. Moreover, anallegation of occupancy by such personsmust be stated in the petition for registration. Failure to comply with these

requirements will render the issued decreesusceptible to a petition for reopening or review of the decree of registration. Seesubsequent discussion under Part IV. F.(4).

A decree of registration acquiresfinality and thereby becomes indefeasibleupon the lapse of one year from entrythereof. Once such decree becomes final,it is deemed conclusive not only on thequestions actually contested anddetermined but also upon all matters thatmight be litigated or decided in the landregistration proceedings. (Cacho v. CA)

SAJONAS V. CA

FACTS: Uychocde spouses sold the land tospouses Sajonas in 1984 who had their adverse claim duly registered. Upon fullpayment, the sale was registered in Aug. 28,1985. However the land was also subject toa notice of levy and execution in Feb 12,1985 for debts owed by the Uychocde’s toPilares. The notice of levy and executionwas carried over to the new title. Sajonasfiled a complaint to have the notice removedfrom the new title. Noting their earlier claim,the TC agreed. Their decision was reversedby the CA on the grounds that PD1529 limits

the validity of adverse claims to 30 days..

ISSUE: WON the earlier adverse claim wasinvalid.

RULING: No. Sec. 70 of PD 1529 does notthe limit the effectivity of adverse claims to30 days. To interpret the effectivity period asabsolutely limited to 30 days defeats thepurpose why the law provides for theremedy of inscription of adverse claim.

Annotation is a measure designated toprotect the interest of a person over a piece

of real property where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwiseprovided for by Act 496, now PD 1529. Itserves as warning to third parties dealingwith the said property that someone isclaiming an interest on the same or a better



36




right then registered owner. Under theTorrens System registration is the operativeact which gives validity to the transfer or

creates a lien upon the land. A persondealing with registered land is not requiredto go behind the register to determine thecondition of the property. He is only chargedwith notice of the burdens on the propertywhich are noted on the face of the register or certificate of title.

CACHO V. CA

In the case of Cacho v. US decidedin 1912, the court reserved making a finaldecision on the registration of two parcels of land bought by decedent Cacho.Registration decrees were allegedlysubsequently issued in 1915. In 1978 heir Cacho filed a petition for reconstitution of title. After first going up to the SC,reconstitution was granted by the TC over RP and National Steel as well as the city of Iligan opposition. CA reversed, requiringpetitioner to first fulfill the conditions set forthin the Cacho v. US decision. .

A land registration proceeding is “ inrem” and therefore the decree of registrationis binding upon and conclusive against allpersons including the Government and itsbranches irrespective whether or not they

were personally notified of the filing of theapplication for registration or have appearedand filed an answer to said applicationbecause all persons are considered asnotified by publication required by law.Further more, a decree of registration thathas become final shall be deemedconclusive not only on the questions actuallycontested and determined but also upon allmatters that might be litigated or decided inthe land registration proceedings with thecertification duly issued by the then LandRegistration Commission (now National

Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration) there is no doubt thatdecrees of registration have in fact beenissued in the case at the bench. Also, suchdecrees attained finality upon the lapse of one year from entry thereof. To allow the

final decrees to once again be subject to theconditions set forth in Cacho v. US would betantamount to setting aside the decreeswhich cannot be reopened after the lapse of

one year from the entry thereof. Such actionwould definitely run counter to the verypurpose of the Torrens System.

SPOUSES LEBURADA V. LRA287 SCRA 333 (1998)

FACTS: TC ordered LRA to issue a degreeof registration in favor of the spousesLeburada. LRA refused on the grounds thatits immediate issuance would result in theduplication of titles over the same parcel of land. LRA found that the title issued for thelot could not be found because the TCTcovering them was incomplete/ unreadable.It was waiting for better copies from thePasig register of deeds before proceedingfurther.

ISSUE: WON LRA can be compelled bymandamus to issue the decree.

RULING: NO. A judgment of registrationdoes not become executory until after theexpiration of one year after the entry of thefinal decree of registration. True, land

registration is an in rem proceeding and isbinding upon and conclusive against allpersons including the government, however a court has no jurisdiction to order theregistration of a land already decreed in anearlier land registration case. The LRA ismandated to refer to the TC any doubt itmay have in regard to the preparation andissuance of a decree of registration. As theissuance of the decree is a judicial act andnot merely ministerial, it may not becompelled through mandamus. Given theabove, that LRA hesitates to issue a decree

of registration is understandable. (But toavoid multiplicity of suits, SC ordered LRA tosubmit its report to the TC within 60 days)



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B. The Land RegistrationAdministration

B. THE LAND REGISTRATIONADMINISTRATION

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1529AMENDING AND CODIFYING THE

LAWS RELATIVE TO REGISTRATIONOF PROPERTY AND FOR OTHER

PURPOSES

SECTION 9. Qualifications of

Registers of Deeds and DeputyRegisters of Deeds. — No personshall be appointed Register of Deedsunless he has been admitted to thepractice of law in the Philippines andshall have been actually engaged insuch practice for at least three yearsor has been employed for a like periodin any branch of government thefunctions of which include theregistration of property.

The Deputy Register of Deeds

shall be a member of the PhilippineBar. Provided, however, that noRegister of Deeds or Deputy Registerof Deeds holding office as such uponthe passage of this Decree shall byreason hereof, be removed from officeor be demoted to a lower category orscale of salary except for cause andupon compliance with due process asprovided for by law.

SECTION 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. — The office of

the Register of Deeds constitutes apublic repository of records of instruments affecting registered orunregistered lands and chattelmortgages in the province or citywherein such office is situated.

It shall be the duty of theRegister of Deeds to immediatelyregister an instrument presented forregistration dealing with real orpersonal property which complies with

all the requisites for registration. Heshall see to it that said instrumentbears the proper documentary andscience stamps and that the same areproperly cancelled. If the instrument isnot registrable, he shall forthwith denyregistration thereof and inform thepresentor of such denial in writing,stating the ground or reason therefor,and advising him of his right to appealby consulta in accordance with Section117 of this Decree.

SECTION 11. Discharge of duties of Register of Deeds in case of vacancy, etc. —(1) Until a regular Register of Deeds shall have been appointed for aprovince or city, or in case of vacancyin the office, or upon the occasion of the absence, illness, suspension, orinability of the Register of Deeds todischarge his duties, said duties shallbe performed by the following officials,in the order in which they arementioned below, unless the Secretaryof Justice designates another official toact temporarily in his place:(a) For the province or city wherethere is a Deputy Register of Deeds, bysaid Deputy Register of Deeds, or bythe second Deputy Register of Deeds,should there be one;(b) For the province or city wherethere is no Deputy or second DeputyRegister of Deeds, by the Provincial orCity Fiscal, or any Assistant Fiscaldesignated by the Provincial or CityFiscal;(2) In case of absence, disability orsuspension of the Register of Deedswithout pay, or in case of vacancy inthe position, the Secretary of Justicemay, in his discretion, authorize thepayment of an additional



38




compensation to the official acting asRegister of Deeds, such additionalcompensation together with his actualsalary not to exceed the salaryauthorized for the position thus filledby him.

(3) In case of a newly-createdprovince or city and pendingestablishment of a Registry of Deedsand the appointment of a regularRegister of Deeds for the new provinceor city, the Register of Deeds of themother province or city shall be theex-officio Register of Deeds for saidnew province or city.

SECTION 12. Owner's Index;reports. — There shall be prepared inevery Registry an index system which

shall contain the names of allregistered owners alphabeticallyarranged. For this purpose, an indexcard which shall be prepared in thename of each registered owner whichshall contain a list of all landsregistered in his name.

The Register of Deeds shallsubmit to the Land RegistrationCommission within ten days after themonth to which they pertain hismonthly reports on collections andaccomplishments. He shall also submitto the Commission at the end of December of each year, an annualinventory of all titles and instrumentsin his Registry.

SECTION 13. Chief GeodeticEngineer. — There shall be a Chief Geodetic Engineer in the LandRegistration Commission who shall bethe technical adviser of theCommission on all matters involvingsurveys and shall be responsible tohim for all plats, plans and worksrequiring the services of a geodeticengineer in said office. He shallperform such other functions as may,from time to time, be assigned to himby the Commissioner.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 292ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987

BOOK IV, TITLE III

CHAPTER 9 — LAND REGISTRATIONAUTHORITY

SECTION 28. The Land RegistrationAuthority. — The Land RegistrationAuthority, hereinafter referred to asthe Authority shall continue to exerciseits powers and functions under existinglaw on the Land Titles and DeedsRegistration Authority and those whichmay hereafter be provided by law.

SECTION 29. Organizational

Structure. — The Authority shall beheaded by an Administrator who shallbe assisted by two (2) DeputyAdministrators, all of whom shall beappointed by the President upon therecommendation of the Secretary.

SECTION 30. Reorganization of Registry Offices in the NationalCapital Region. — The Registries of Deeds in the National Capital Region ishereby reorganized as follows:(1) The Registries of Deeds in thecities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay andCaloocan shall be maintained;(2) There is hereby createdRegistries of Deeds in theMunicipalities of Navotas, Malabon,Valenzuela, Mandaluyong, San Juan,Marikina, Las Piñas and Parañaquewith jurisdiction over their respectivemunicipalities;(3) The Registry of Deeds of Pasigshall be maintained with jurisdictionover the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguigand Pateros; and(4) The Registry of Deeds of Makati shall have jurisdiction over themunicipalities of Makati andMuntinlupa.



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C. JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS

BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 129AN ACT REORGANIZING THE

JUDICIARY, APPROPRIATING

FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOROTHER PURPOSES

SECTION 34. Delegated jurisdictionin cadastral and land registrationcases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts,Municipal Trial Courts, and MunicipalCircuit Trial Courts may be assigned bythe Supreme Court to hear anddetermine cadastral or landregistration cases covering lots wherethere is no controversy or opposition,or contested lots the value of which

does not exceed twenty thousandpesos, such value to be ascertained bythe affidavit of the claimant or byagreement of the respective claimantsif there are more than one, or from thecorresponding tax declaration of thereal property. Their decisions in thesecases shall be appealable in the samemanner as decisions of the Regional

Trial Courts.

CIRCULAR NO. 38-97

SUBJECT: Clarification of theExtent of Delegated Jurisdictionunder Administrative Circular No.6-93-A of METCs, MTCCs, MTCsand MCTCs to Hear and DetermineCadastral and Land RegistrationCases

The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 6-93-A isthat only original cadastral or landregistration cases are covered. The

jurisdiction of the First Level Courts,being merely delegated, should belimited to what is expressly mentionedin the delegation.1. There are limits to thedelegation, i.e., either the subjectmatter is an uncontested lot or if

contested the value of the lot shouldnot exceed One Hundred Thousand(P100,000.00) Pesos. There will bedifficulty in the determination of theselimits if and when the First LevelCourts are required to exercise

delegated jurisdiction over petitionssubsequent to original registration.2. A First Level Court should notbe placed in a situation where, indisposing of a matter subsequent toregistration, it will have to consult therecords of another Court whichgranted the original registration.3. To require First Level Courts tohandle petitions after originalregistration would unduly increasetheir dockets already loaded withcases covered by RA 7691, the law ontheir expanded jurisdiction.

Therefore, matters subsequent to theoriginal registration determined bySecond Level Courts, includingpetitions for reconstitution of losttitles, should not be unloaded to theFirst Level Courts. The Second LevelCourts are hereby directed to takecognizance of and exercise jurisdictionover such matters.

MOSCOSO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Petitioner applied for landregistration of a 1,147 square metersresidential lot, claiming that she inherited thesame from her father. The written oppositionhowever substantially allege that theoppositors acquired ownership of the samethrough a deed of donation.

The trial court rendered a decisiondirecting that the title over the land shouldbe registered in the name of the co-ownership of: (1) Andrea M. Moscoso for 13/14 share; and (2) Maximina L. Moron for 1/14 share, subject to the reservation of aroad right-of-way in favor of the governmentof the Philippines. Maximina’s share wasbased on a power of attorney executed inher favor which was treated as a recognitionof her status as a natural child.



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ISSUE: WON the Court of First Instance,acting as a land registration court, has

jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of whether the oppositor is the acknowledgednatural child of Pascual Monge

HELD: untenable

RULING: Firstly, the otherwise rigid rule thatthe jurisdiction of the Land RegistrationCourt, being special and limited in character and proceedings thereon summary innature, does not extend to cases involvingissues properly litigable in other independentsuits or ordinary civil actions. Such is basedthe following premises: (1) Mutual consentof the parties or their acquiescence insubmitting the aforesaid issues for thedetermination by the court in the registration

proceedings; (2) Full opportunity given to theparties in the presentation of their respectivesides of the issues and of the evidence insupport thereto; (3) Consideration by thecourt that the evidence already of record issufficient and adequate for rendering adecision upon these issues.

In addition, considerations of speedy justice and avoidance of multiplicityof suits impel Us to hold and rule that under the facts of the case at bar, the trial court,acting as a land registration court, may adjudicate the land sought to be registered

to either or both of the applicant and oppositor, in whole or in part, based onevidence submitted to the court showing that the party has proper title for registration.(Section 37, Act 496.)

In any event, as the Supreme Courtsaid in Nicanor T. Santos vs. Rosa Ganayo,L-31854, Sept. 9, 1972, 116 SCRA 431,"Whether a particular matter should beresolved by the Court of First Instance in theexercise of its general jurisdiction or of itslimited jurisdiction as a special court (Probate, Land Registration, etc.) is in

reality not a jurisdictional question. It is inessence a procedural question involving amode of practice which may be waived."

OBITER: The proceedings for theregistration of title to land under the Torrens

system is an action in rem, not in personam,hence, personal notice to all claimants of theres is not necessary to give the court

jurisdiction to deal with and dispose of theres, and neither may lack of such personalnotice vitiate or invalidate the decree or titleissued in a registration proceeding, for theState, as sovereign over the land situatedwithin it, may provide for the adjudication of title in a proceeding in rem or in the natureof a proceeding in rem, which shall bebinding upon all persons, known or unknown.

AVERIA JR. VS. CAGUIOA146 SCRA 459 (1986)

FACTS: The petitioner-oppositor refused toparticipate in the hearing of the registrationproceedings below, claiming the respondentcourt, acting as a cadastral court, had nocompetence to act upon the said case under Section 112 of Act 496, because of theabsence of unanimity among the parties asrequired under Section 112 of the LandRegistration Act. The respondent court thenheld the hearing ex parte and later rendereda decision ordering the registration prayedfor on the basis of the evidence presentedby the private respondent herein.

ISSUE: whether or not the court has

jurisdiction to order the registration of a deedof sale which is opposed on the ground of an antecedent contract to sell.

HELD: Yes. Section 2 of P.D. No. 1529 haseliminated the distinction between thegeneral jurisdiction vested in the regionaltrial court and the limited jurisdictionconferred upon it by the former law whenacting merely as a cadastral court. Aimed atavoiding multiplicity of suits, the change hassimplified registration proceedings byconferring upon the regional trial courts the

authority to act not only on applications for "original registration" but also "over all

petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or

petitions."



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Under the amended law, the court isnow authorized to hear and decide not onlysuch non-controversial cases but even thecontentious and substantial issues, such asthe question at bar, which were beyond itscompetence before.

HEIRS OF GONZAGA vs. COURT OFAPPEALS

FACTS: Eugenio, claiming title under (TCT)No. 17519, sold two lots to Gonzaga.for which TCT No. 81338 was issued onNovember 29, 1960. In 1981, Gonzaga soldthe two lots to petitioner Mascariñas andTCT No. 48078 was issued in the latter’sfavor.

However, another subsistingTorrens title covers the same two lots, TCTNo. C-26086, in the name of privaterespondent Sevilla issued on August 2, 1979and is a transfer from (OCT) No. 994 whichwas registered on April 19, 1917. Bothconflicting TCTs were derived from onecommon OCT, viz., OCT No. 994. However,while both the court a quo and therespondent appellate court found that OCTNo. 994 was registered on May 3, 1917, wefind that on the one hand, petitioners' titlesindicate original registration to have beenmade on May 3, 1917, but on the other hand, private respondents' title indicates

original registration to have been made on April 19, 1917.

The court a quo resolved theconflicting claims in favor of privaterespondents.

ISSUE: Between petitioners and privaterespondents, who have the legal and validtitle to the two lots. (OVERLAPPINGTITLES)

HELD: Private respondents. Althoughpetitioner's title was issued in 1940, it will be

noted that petitioner's title over Lots 2693and 2695 both with an area of 599 squaremeters was based on the Cadastral Surveyof Kaloocan City, Cadastral Case No. 34,while private respondents' title was derivedfrom OCT No. 994 issued on April 19, 1917.

In the case of Pamintuan vs. San Agustin,this Court ruled that where two certificates(of title) purport to include the same land,the earlier in date prevails. . . . In successiveregistrations, where more than onecertificate is issued in respect of a particular

estate or interest in land, the personclaiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and the person isdeemed to hold under the prior certificatewho is the holder of, or whose claim isderived directly or indirectly from the personwho was the holder of the earliest certificateissued in respect thereof. Hence, in point of priority of issuance, private respondents' titleprevails over that of petitioner MWSS.

Lastly, a certificate is not conclusiveevidence of title if it is shown that the same

land had already been registered and anearlier certificate for the same is inexistence. Since the land in question hasalready been registered under OCT No. 994dated April 19, 1917, the subsequentregistration of the same land on May 3, 1917is null and void."

Though petitioner Mascariñas maybe a purchaser for value and in good faith,but whose title, which is only a derivative of the void OCT No. 994 dated May 3, 1917,his title could not possibly be of force andeffect more than its parent title.

TAGAYTAY-TAAL TOURISTDEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs.

COURT OF APPEALS (273 SCRA 182;1997)

FACTS: Petitioner was the registered owner of four (4) parcels of land covered by TCTNos. T-9816, T-9817, T-9818 and T-9819.The properties were mortgaged on June 7,1976 to Filipinas Manufacturers Bank andTrust Company by Benjamin Osias,

representing himself as President andChairman of the Board of petitioner.

Because of a dispute regarding thetrue set of officers of the petitioner, theparcels of land allegedly became delinquentin the payment of real estate taxes resulting



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in the sale of the said properties in a publicauction. Respondent City itself was thesuccessful bidder.

On July 14, 1989, respondent Cityfiled for the entry of new certificates of titleover the lots in its name. Said petition wasopposed by herein petitioner, alleging thatthe tax delinquency sale was null and voidfor lack of valid and proper notice topetitioner.

On December 5, 1989, the trial courtdismissed on the ground of laches. CAaffirms.

On July 19, 1991, petitioner filedwith the Regional Trial Court of Cavite,sitting as a regular court, a petition assailingthe authority of respondent City to levy realestate tax on the ground that said propertiesare located in the Province of Batangas.

RTC rules in favor of petioner. No appealwas filed.

ISSUES (a) whether or not the RegionalTrial Court of Cavite, sitting as a landregistration or cadastral court, had

jurisdiction to hear and decide respondentCity's petition for the cancellation of TCT No.T-9816 and TCT No. T-9817 in the name of petitioner and the issuance of new ones inthe name of respondent City despite seriousopposition by petitioner

HELD: negative.

RULING: Here, petitioner had the right toavail of its legal and equitable remedies tonullify the delinquency sale because, firstly,there was lack of notice to it; secondly, theproperties in question became subject of serious controversy before RTC -Cavite andthe SEC; and thirdly, respondent City had noauthority to impose realty tax on petitioner as the properties are actually located inTalisay, Batangas.

Given such facts, The issues raised

before the RTC sitting as a land registrationor cadastral court, without question,involved substantial or controversial mattersand, consequently, beyond said court's

jurisdiction. The issues may be resolved only by a court of general jurisdiction.

It is clear that petitions under Section 75 and Section 108 of P.D. 1529(formerly Sec. 78 and Sec. 112 of Act 496)can be taken cognizance of by the RTCsitting as a land registration or cadastralcourt. Relief under said sections can only begranted if there is unanimity among theparties, or that there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party ininterest; otherwise, the case becomescontroversial and should be threshed out inan ordinary case or in the case where theincident properly belongs. 15

Also, RTC-Cavite, sitting as a landregistration or cadastral court, could nothave ordered the issuance of newcertificates of title over the properties in thename of respondent City if the delinquencysale was invalid because said properties areactually located in the municipality of

Talisay, Batangas, not in Tagaytay City.

ESTATE OF JACOB VS. COURT OFAPPEALS (283 SCRA 474; 1998)

FACTS: Jacob left for the United States, butbefore she did, she asked her son-in-lawQuinto Jr., to pay the real estate taxes onher property. However, Luciano Jr. was notallowed to pay by the City Treasurer's Officeas he had no written authorization from her.In 1984 respondent City Treasurer of

Quezon City sent a notice to MercedesJacob that her real estate taxes on theproperty were delinquent and that the landwas already sold at public auction on 24

August 1983 to private respondent VirginiaTugbang for P6,800.00. Jacob came toknow of the sale on 6 September 1983 whenshe received from respondent CityTreasurer a Notice of Sale of Real Propertyaddressed to her husband. They tried toredeem the property from Tugbang but sheevaded them until the Final Bill of Sale wasissued. On 3 March 1989 TCT No. 81860

was issued in the name of Tugbang.On 17 May 1993 petitioners filed a

complaint for annulment or cancellation of the auction sale, the final bill of sale, TCTNo. 81860, and for redemption of theproperty plus damages. However, the trial



43




court dismissed the petition purportedly for lack of jurisdiction as the petition wasdeemed to be a petition to annul and setaside the Decision canceling Jacob's TCTNo. 39178. The appellate court dismissedthe appeal.

ISSUE: the nature of the petitioners’ action

HELD: It is an action for reconveyance. Thecomplaint alleges that respondent Tugbangprocured a transfer certificate of title uponher fraudulent representation in her petitionfor cancellation of title. This way of acquiringtitle creates what is called "constructivetrust" in favor of the defrauded party andgrants to the latter a right to thereconveyance of the property.

As the petition makes out a case for reconveyance and not a mere annulment of

an RTC judgment as viewed under par. (2),Sec. 9, BP Blg. 129, jurisdiction over thecase is clearly vested in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City as provided in par. (2),Sec. 19, BP Blg. 129.

Moreover, the Regional Trial Courthas jurisdiction over the petition as it may beconsidered only as a continuation of theoriginal proceeding for cancellation of titlewhich in view of its non-litigious character issummary in nature. Furthermore, under Sec.2 of PD 1529, a Regional Trial Court, likethe RTC of Quezon City which issued a new

title to respondent Virginia Tugbang in lieu of the old one, has the authority to act not onlyon applications for original registration butalso over all petitions filed after originalregistration of title, with power to hear anddetermine all questions arising from suchapplications or petitions.

As to whether such an action shouldbe granted requires further evidence culledfrom a full-blown trial.

G.R. No. 120974 (substantially the same

facts)

Under Sec. 55 of the LandRegistration Act, as amended by Sec. 53 of PD No. 1529, 14 an original owner of registered land may seek the annulment of

the transfer thereof on the ground of fraud and the proper remedy is reconveyance.However, such remedy is without prejudiceto the rights of an innocent purchaser for value holding a certificate of title.

The other controversy lies in thefailure of petitioner City Treasurer to notifyeffectively the delinquent taxpayer (Valencia), under the wrong premise that theproperty was still owned by the former registered owner, Alberto Sta. Maria.

In ascertaining the identity of thedelinquent taxpayer, for purposes of notifying him of his tax delinquency and the

prospect of a distraint and auction of hisdelinquent property, petitioner City Treasurer should not have simply relied onthe tax declaration.

IV. ORIGINAL REGISTRATIONPROCEEDINGS

A. Who May Apply

PD 1529, Sec. 14. Who mayapply. - The following persons mayfile in the proper Court of First Instancean application for registration of title toland, whether personally or throughtheir duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through

their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,

continuous, exclusive and notorious possession

and occupation of alienable and disposable landsof the public domain under a bona fide claim of

ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of

private lands by prescription under the provision

of existing laws.


private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.


land in any other manner provided for by law.



44




Where the land is owned in common: all the co-

owners shall file the application jointly.

Where the land has been sold under pacto de

retro: the vendor a retro may file an application

for the original registration of the land, provided,however, that should the period for redemption

expire during the pendency of the registration

proceedings and ownership to the property

consolidated in the vendee a retro, the latter shall

be substituted for the applicant and may continue

the proceedings.

A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply

for original registration of any land held in trust

by him, unless prohibited by the instrument

creating the trust.

Sec. 16. Non-resident

applicant. - If the applicant is not aresident of the Philippines, he shall filewith his application an instrument indue form appointing an agent orrepresentative residing in thePhilippines, giving his full name andpostal address, and shall therein agreethat the service of any legal process inthe proceedings under or growing outof the application made upon his agentor representative shall be of the samelegal effect as if made upon theapplicant within the Philippines. If the

agent or representative dies, or leavesthe Philippines, the applicant shallforthwith make another appointmentfor the substitute, and, if he fails to doso the court may dismiss theapplication.

CA 141, Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,occupying lands of the public domainor claiming to own any such lands oran interest therein, but whose titleshave not been perfected or completed,

may apply to the Court of FirstInstance of the province where theland is located for confirmation of theirclaims and the issuance of a certificate

of title therefor, under the LandRegistration Act , to wit:

(a) Those who prior to the transfer of

sovereignty from Spain to the prior United States

have applied for the purchase, composition or

other form of grant of lands of the public domainunder the laws and royal decrees then in force

and have instituted and prosecuted the

proceedings in connection therewith, but have

with or without default upon their part, or for anyother cause, not received title therefor, if such

applicants or grantees and their heirs haveoccupied and cultivated said lands continuously

since the filing of their applications.

(b) Those who by themselves or through

their predecessors in interest have been in open,

continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession

and occupation of agricultural lands of the public

domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately

preceding the filing of the application for

confirmation of title except when prevented by

war or force majeure. These shall be

conclusively presumed to have performed all the

conditions essential to a Government grant and

shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the

provisions of this chapter.

(c) Members of the national cultural

minorities who by themselves or through their

predecessors-in-interest have been in open,

continuous, exclusive and notorious possessionand occupation of lands of the public domain

suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not,

under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in

sub-section (b) hereof.

DAIS V. CFI51 PHIL. 396 (1928)

The rights to the succession of aperson are transmitted from the moment of

his death; in other words, the heirsimmediately succeed to the dominion,ownership and possession of the property of their predecessor. The fact that the lawprovides for the appointment of a legal



45




administrator for the liquidation of thedeceased's property, and the partitionamong his heirs, does not deprive the heirsof the right to intervene in the administrationof said property for the protection of their interests. Heirs have the right to intervene ina cadastral proceeding for the purpose of objecting to the striking out of an answer filed by the judicial administrator of theintestacy of the petitioners' predecessor ininterest, claiming several parcels of land asthe property of said estate, even when theaforementioned administrator consents to itsbeing stricken out

SANTIAGO V. CRUZ19 PHIL. 145 (1911)

Because applicants own merely anundivided share, less than fee simple, in theland described in the application, theapplication should be dismissed, withoutprejudice to the right of the various ownersof the undivided interests in the land, jointly to present a new application for registration.

Citizenship

As a general rule, only individuals,corporations or associations qualified toacquire or hold lands of the public domainare qualified to be transferees of private

lands, i.e. Filipino citizens. (Sec. 12, Art.XII, 1987 Const.) However, this is subjectto the ff. exceptions:

(1) Aliens can acquire privatelands, but only through hereditary(not testamentary) succession(Ramirez v. Vda. de Ramirez, 111SCRA 704)

(2) Natural-born Filipino citizenswho lost their Phil. citizenship maybe transferees of private lands of up

to a maximum of 5,000 sq. m. of urban land and 3 hectares of ruralland for residential, business or other purposes. (BP 185, asamended by RA 8179)

There are 3 remedies by which privateland may be recovered from disqualifiedaliens:

(1) Escheat proceedings (see Rule

91 of the Rules of Court );

(2) Actions for reversion under thePublic Land Act; and

(3) Actions for recovery filed by theformer (Filipino) owner. Notethat the in pari delicto doctrinewas abandoned in the case of Phil. Banking v. Lui She.

Natural Persons

Const. Art. XII., Sec. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified intoagricultural, forest or timber, minerallands, and national parks. Agriculturallands of the public domain may befurther classified by law according tothe uses which they may be devoted.Alienable lands of the public domainshall be limited to agricultural lands.Private corporations or associations

may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, fora period not exceeding twenty-fiveyears, renewable for not more thantwenty-five years, and not to exceedone thousand hectares in area.Citizens of the Philippines may leasenot more than five hundred hectares,or acquire not more than twelvehectares thereof by purchase,homestead, or grant..

Taking into account the requirements

of conservation, ecology, anddevelopment, and subject to therequirements of agrarian reform, theCongress shall determine, by law, thesize of lands of the public domain



46




which may be acquired, developed,held, or leased and the conditionstherefor.

Sec. 5. The State, subject to theprovisions of this Constitution and

national development policies andprograms, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities totheir ancestral lands to ensure theireconomic, social, and cultural well-being.

The Congress may provide for theapplicability of customary lawsgoverning property rights and relationsin determining the ownership andextent of ancestral domain.

Sec. 7.Save in cases of hereditarysuccession, no private lands shall betransferred or conveyed except toindividuals, corporations, orassociations qualified to acquire orhold lands of the public domain.

Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisionsof Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who haslost its Philippine citizenship may be atransferee of private lands, subject tolimitations provided by law.

CA 141

SEC. 12. Any citizen of thePhilippines over the age of eighteenyears, or the head of a family, whodoes not own more than twenty-fourhectares of land in the Philippines orhas not had the benefit of anygratuitous allotment of more thantwenty-four hectares of land since the

occupation of the Philippines by theUnited States, may enter a homesteadof not exceeding twenty-four hectaresof agricultural land of the publicdomain.

SEC. 22. Any citizen of lawful ageof the Philippines, and any such citizennot of lawful age who is a head of afamily, and any corporation orassociation of which at least sixty per

centum of the capital stock or of anyinterest in said capital stock belongswholly to citizens of the Philippines,and which is organized and constitutedunder the laws of Philippines, andcorporate bodies organized in thePhilippines authorized under theircharters to do so; may purchase anytract of public agricultural landdisposable under this Act, not toexceed one hundred and forty-fourhectares in the case of an individualand one thousand and twenty-fourhectares in that of a corporation orassociation, by proceeding asprescribed in this chapter: Provided,

That partnerships shall be entitled topurchase not to exceed one hundredand forty-four hectares for eachmember thereof. but the total area sopurchased shall in no case exceed theone thousand and twenty-fourhectares authorized in this section forassociations and corporations.

SEC. 23. No person, corporation,association, or partnership other thanthose mentioned in the last precedingsection may acquire or ownagricultural public land or land of anyother denomination or classification,which is at the time or was originally,really or presumptively, of the publicdomain, or any permanentimprovement thereon, or any real righton such land and improvement:Provided, however, That persons,corporations, associations orpartnerships which, at the date uponwhich the Philippine Constitution took

effect, held agricultural public lands orland of any other denomination, thatbelonged originally, really orpresumptively, to the public domain,or permanent improvements on such



47




lands, or a real right upon such landsand Constitution took improvements,having acquired the same under thelaws and regulations in force at thedate of such acquisition, shall beauthorized to continue holding the

same

as if such persons, corporations,associations, or partnerships werequalified under the last precedingsection; but they shall not encumber,convey, or alienate the same topersons, corporations, associations, orpartnerships not included in sectiontwenty-two of this Act, except byreason of hereditary succession, dulylegalized and acknowledged bycompetent courts.

SEC. 44. Any natural-born citizenof the Philippines who is not the ownerof more than twenty-four hectares andwho since July fourth, nineteenhundred and twenty-six or priorthereto, has continuously occupied andcultivated, either by himself or throughhis predecessors-in-interest, a tract ortracts of agricultural public landssubject to disposition, or who shallhave paid the real estate tax thereonwhile same has not been occupied byany person shall be entitled, under theprovisions of this chapter, to have afree patent issued to him for such tractor tracts of such land not to exceedtwenty-four hectares.A member of the national culturalminorities who has continuouslyoccupied and cultivated, either byhimself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of land,whether disposable or not since July 4,1955, shall be entitled to the rightgranted in the preceding paragraph of this section: Provided, That at the time

he files his free patent application he isnot the owner of any real propertysecured or disposable under thisprovision of the Public Land Law

Sec. 48, supra.

KRIVENKO V. REGISTER OF DEEDS79 PHIL. 461 (1947)

There is absolutely no difference in

nature, character, value or importance to thenation between a residential land of thepublic domain and a residential land of private ownership, and, therefore, bothshould equally be considered as agriculturallands to be protected as part of the nationalpatrimony. Specially is this so where theprohibition as to the alienation of publicresidential lots may become superfluous if the same prohibition is not equally applied toprivate residential lots. Indeed, theprohibition as to private residential lands willeventually become more important, for timewill come when, in view of the constantdisposition of public lands in favor privateindividuals, almost all, if not all, theresidential lands of the public domain shallhave become private residential lands.

If the term "private agricultural lands" isto be construed as not including residentiallots or lands not strictly agricultural, theresult would be that aliens may freelyacquire and possess not only residential lotsand houses for themselves but entiresubdivisions, and whole towns and cities,and that they may validly buy and hold intheir names lands of any area for building

homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries,hatcheries, schools, health and vacationresorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds,airfields, and a host of other uses andpurposes that are not, in appellant's words,strictly agricultural. That this is obnoxious tothe conservative spirit of the Constitution isbeyond question.

SAN JUAN V. INTESTATE ESTATE OFSPOUSES SOCCHI, GR L-19467

(1966)

An alien who validly owns agricultural land inthe Philippines, which land is sold at publicauction for tax delinquency, may avail of theright to repurchase the same within one year pursuant to Section 38 of the Assessment



48




Law. Such right is but an incident of the rightof ownership and its exercise by the owner,who happens to be an alien, does not fallwithin the purview of the terms "shall betransferred or assigned" used in Section 5,

Article XIII of the Constitution, or of theterms "encumbered, alienated or transferred" used in the implementingprovision of Section 122, Commonwealth

Act No. 141, otherwise known as PublicLand Act. Moreover, the sale at publicauction by reason of tax delinquency under the Assessment Law does not immediatelydivest the rights of the owner to the propertysold. Indeed it is provided in section 39 of said law that after the sale and beforerepurchase or before the expiration of theterm of one year fixed for such repurchase,the real property shall remain in thepossession of the delinquent taxpayer who

shall have the right to the usufruct thereof. Itis only after failure to redeem within thatperiod and after the final bill of sale is issuedto the purchaser by the Provincial Treasurer that the rights of the owner are definitelydivested.

PHIL. BANKING V. LUI SHE21 SCRA 52 (1967)

If an alien is given not only a leaseof, but also an option to buy, a piece of landby virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot

sell or otherwise dispose of his property, thisto last for 50 years, then it becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divestshimself in stages not only of the right toenjoy the land (jus possidendi jus utendi,

just fruendi and jus abutendi) but also of theright to dispose of it (jus disponendi) —rights the sum total of which make upownership. If this can be done, then theConstitutional ban against alien landholdingin the Philippines, as announced in Krivenkovs. Register of Deeds, is indeed in grave

peril. The contract giving the above rights tothe alien is therefore void.

RAMIREZ V. VDA. DE RAMIREZ111 SCRA 704

The usufruct in favor of an alien isupheld, because the same, albeit a realright, does not vest title to land in the

usufructuary and it is the vesting of title toland in favor of aliens which is proscribed bythe Constitution.

CHEESMAN V. IAC193 SCRA 93

The fundamental law prohibits thesale to aliens of residential land. Section 14,

Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution ordainsthat, "Save in cases of hereditarysuccession, no private land shall betransferred or conveyed except to

individuals, corporations, or associationsqualified to acquire or hold lands of thepublic domain."

Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was chargedwith knowledge of this prohibition. Thus,assuming that it was his intention that the lotin question be purchased by him and hiswife, he acquired no right whatever over theproperty by virtue of that purchase; and inattempting to acquire a right or interest inland, vicariously and clandestinely, heknowingly violated the Constitution; the saleas to him was null and void. In any event, hehad and has no capacity or personality toquestion the subsequent sale of the sameproperty by his wife on the theory that in sodoing he is merely exercising theprerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theorywould permit indirect controversion of theconstitutional prohibition. If the propertywere to be declared conjugal, this wouldaccord to the alien husband a notinsubstantial interest and right over land, ashe would then have a decisive vote as to itstransfer or disposition. This is a right that the

Constitution does not permit him to have.



49




RELLOSA V. GAW CHEE HUN93 PHIL. 827

Sale to alien by Filipino vendor during Japanese occupation null and void,for being contrary to the Constitution. But

vendor can no longer recover the land,because of doctrine of pari delicto. (Note

however that the pari delicto doctrine was

subsequently abandoned in the case of Phil.

Banking v. Lui She, 21 SCRA 52.)

Corporations

REGISTER OF DEEDS V. UNG SUI SITEMPLE, 97 PHIL. 58 (1955)

A deed of donation of a parcel of land executed by a Filipino citizen in favor of a religious organization whose founder,trustees and administrator are non-Filipinos,can not be admitted for registration.

ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OFDAVAO V. LRC, 102 PHIL. 596

(1957)

A corporation sole is a special formof corporation usually associated withclergy, designed to facilitate the exercise of the functions of ownership of the churchwhich was regarded as the property owner.It consists of one person only, and hissuccessors (who will always be one at atime), in some particular, who areincorporated by law in order to give themsome legal advantages particularly that of perpetuity which in their natural personsthey could not have. Through this legalfiction, church properties acquired by theincumbent of a corporation sole pass, byoperation of law, upon his death not to hispersonal heirs but to his successor in office.

A corporation sole, therefore, is created notonly to administer the temporalities of thechurch or religious society where hebelongs, but also to hold and transmit thesame to his successor in said office.

Although a branch of the Universal Roman

Catholic Apostolic Church, every RomanCatholic Church in different countries, if itexercises its mission and is lawfullyincorporated in accordance with laws of thecountry where it is located, is considered anentity or person with all the rights andprivileges granted to such artificial beingunder laws of that country, separate anddistinct from the personality of the RomanPontiff or the Holy See, without prejudice toits religious relations with the latter whichare governed by the Common Law or their rules and regulations.

Even before the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth and of theRepublic of the Philippines every corporationsole then organized and registered had byexpress provision of law (Corporation Law,Public Act. 1459) the necessary power andqualification to purchase in its name private

lands located in the territory in which itexercised its functions or ministry and for which it was created, independently of thenationality of its incumbent unique andsingle number and head, the bishop of thediocese. The Roman Catholic ApostolicChurch in the Philippines has no nationalityand that the frames of the Constitution didnot have in mind the religious corporationsole when they provided that 60 per centumof the capital thereof be owned by Filipinocitizens. Thus, if this constitutional provisionwere not intended for corporation sole, it is

obvious that this could not be regulated or restricted by said provision.

A corporation sole or "ordinary" isnot the owner of the properties that he mayacquire but merely the administrator thereof and holds the same in trust for the church towhich the corporation is an organized andconstituents part. Being mere administrator of the temporalities or properties titled in hisname, the constitutional provision requiring60 per centum Filipino ownership is notapplicable. The said constitutional provisionis limited by it terms to ownership alone and

does not extend to control unless the controlover the property affected has been devisedto circumvent the real purpose of theconstitution. In determining, therefore,whether the constitutional provision requiring60 per centum Filipino capital is applicable



50




to corporations sole, the nationality of theconstituents of the diocese, and not thenationality of the actual incumbent of theparish, must be taken into consideration. Inthe present case, even if the question of nationality be considered, the aforesaidconstitutional requirement is fully met andsatisfied, considering that the corporationsole in question is composed of anoverwhelming majority of Filipinos.

REGISTER OF DEEDS V. CHINABANKING CORPORATION, 4

SCRA 1146 (1964)

The prohibition in the Constitutionagainst the acquisition of lands by aliens isabsolute in its terms. It cannot be limited tothe permanent acquisition of real estate byaliens, whether natural or juridical persons.

A “deed of transfer” in favor of an alien bank,even if it was subject to the obligation thatthe bank dispose of the property within fiveyears from the date of acquisition, isunregisterable.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. INTERMEDIATEAPPELLATE COURT & ACME,146 SCRA 509 (1986)

Supra.

Even on the proposition that theland remained technically "public" land,despite immemorial possession of the Infielsand their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriateproceedings under the Public Land Act,there can be no serious question of Acme'sright to acquire the land at the time it did,there also being nothing in the 1935Constitution that might be construed toprohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to whichthe vendor had already acquired that type of

so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title.The only limitation then extant was thatcorporations could not acquire, hold or leasepublic agricultural lands in excess of 1,024hectares. The purely accidental

circumstance that confirmation proceedingswere brought under the aegis of the 1973Constitution which forbids corporations fromowning lands of the public domain cannotdefeat a right already vested before that lawcame into effect, or invalidate transactionsthen perfectly valid and proper, This Courthas already held, in analogouscircumstances, that the Constitution cannotimpair vested rights.

B. Where to File

PD 1529

Sec. 2. Nature of registrationproceedings; jurisdiction of courts. - Judicial proceedings for theregistration of lands throughout thePhilippines shall be in rem and shall bebased on the generally acceptedprinciples underlying the Torrenssystem.

Courts of First Instance shallhave exclusive jurisdiction over allapplications for original registration of title to lands, including improvementsand interests therein, and over allpetitions filed after original registrationof title, with power to hear and

determine all questions arising uponsuch applications or petitions. Thecourt through its clerk of court shallfurnish the Land RegistrationCommission with two certified copiesof all pleadings, exhibits, orders, anddecisions filed or issued in applicationsor petitions for land registration, withthe exception of stenographic notes,within five days from the filing orissuance thereof.

Sec. 17. What and where to

file. - The application for landregistration shall be filed with theCourt of First Instance of the provinceor city where the land is situated. Theapplicant shall file together with the



51




application all original muniments of titles or copies thereof and a surveyplan of the land approved by theBureau of Lands.

The clerk of court shall notaccept any application unless it is

shown that the applicant has furnishedthe Director of Lands with a copy of the application and all annexes.

Sec. 18. Application coveringtwo or more parcels. - Anapplication may include two or moreparcels of land belonging to theapplicant/s provided they are situatedwithin the same province or city. Thecourt may at any time order anapplication to be amended by strikingout one or more of the parcels or by aseverance of the application.

Sec. 19. Amendments. -Amendments to the applicationincluding joinder, substitution, ordiscontinuance as to parties may beallowed by the court at any stage of the proceedings upon just andreasonable terms.

Amendments which shallconsist in a substantial change in theboundaries or an increase in area of the land applied for or which involvethe inclusion of an additional land shallbe subject to the same requirementsof publication and notice as in anoriginal application.

Sec. 20. When land applied forborders on road. - If the applicationdescribes the land as bounded by apublic or private way or road, it shallstate whether or not the applicantclaims any and what portion of theland within the limits of the way orroad, and whether the applicantdesires to have the line of the way or

road determined.

Sec. 21. Requirement of additional facts and papers;ocular inspection. - The courtmay require facts to be stated inthe application in addition tothose prescribed by this Decree

not inconsistent therewith andmay require the filing of anyadditional paper. It may alsoconduct an ocular inspection, if necessary.

Sec. 22. Dealings with landpending original registration. Afterthe filing of the application and beforethe issuance of the decree of registration, the land therein describedmay still be the subject of dealings inwhole or in part, in which case theinterested party shall present to thecourt the pertinent instrumentstogether with a subdivision planapproved by the Director of Lands incase of transfer of portions thereof andthe court, after notice to the parties,shall order such land registeredsubject to the conveyance orencumbrance created by saidinstruments, or order that the decreeof registration be issued in the name of the person to whom the property hasbeen conveyed by said instruments.

AGUILAR V. CAOGDAN, 105 PHIL. 661

The court that should take cognizance of aregistration case is that which has territorial

jurisdiction over the property.

The Pangasinan court of firstinstance dismissed the registration casewhen it found that the portions of the landcovered by it were actually situated withinthe municipality of San Clement, province of Tarlac, and the dismissal was withoutprejudice. This dismissal has the effect or relinquishing the jurisdiction originallyacquired by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan and of transferring it to the courtof Tarlac was filed sometime before the



52




dismissal of the Pangasinan case can haveno legal adverse consequence. On thecontrary, it was a rectification of an error committed as to venue for indeed the courtthat should take cognizance of thisregistration case is that which has territorial

jurisdiction over the property. This court isthe Court of First Instance of Tarlac.

MANILA V. LACK, 19 PHIL. 234

Before the creation of the Court of Land Registration, jurisdiction to determinethe nature, quality, and extent of land titles,the rival claims of parties contendingtherefor, of their registration (in its former sense), and the legality and effect thereof was vested in the Courts of First Instance of the Islands. They had complete andexclusive jurisdiction thereover. By thepassage of Act No. 496 these courts weredeprived under certain conditions of thepower of determining some of thesequestions and of adjudicating in relation tocertain aspects of others. By that Act, twothings occurred. First, a court of limited

jurisdiction, with special subject matter, andwith only one purpose, was created.Second, by reason thereof courts,theretofore of general, original, andexclusive jurisdiction, were shorn of some of their attributes and deprived of certain of their power.

However, the purpose of the Courtof Land Registration is not to create or vesttitle, but merely to confirm title alreadycreated and vested. The Court of LandRegistration has no authority or jurisdictionto adjudicate rights in lands not registered.Therefore, a judgment of the Court of LandRegistration, after trial, declaring that aparcel of land, excluded from the petitionand from registration, was owned by therespondent and that such ownership wasthe reason for the exclusion of said parcelfrom registration, is not res adjudicata in an

action of ejectment in the Court of FirstInstance, between the same parties, for therecovery of said parcel. Such judgment hasno force or effect as evidence of title in suchaction.

Form and Contents of Application

PD 1529, sec. 15. Form and contents. -

The application for land registration shall be inwriting, signed by the application or the person

duly authorized in his behalf, and sworn to before any officer authorized to administer oaths

for the province or city where the application

was actually signed. If there is more than one

applicant, the application shall be signed and

sworn to by and in behalf of each. The

application shall contain a description of the landand shall state the citizenship and civil status of

the applicant, whether single or married, and, if

married, the name of the wife or husband, and, if

the marriage has been legally dissolved, when

and how the marriage relation terminated. It shall

also state the full names and addresses of all

occupants of the land and those of the adjoining

owners, if known, and, if not known, it shallstate the extent of the search made to find them.

REPUBLIC V. ALON, 199 SCRA 396

The following are the essentialrequisites for original registrationproceedings in accordance with the LandRegistration Act:

1. Survey of land by the Bureau of Landsor a duly licensed private surveyor.

2. Filing of application for registration bythe applicant.

3. Setting of the date for the initial hearingof the application by the Court.

4. Transmittal of the application and thedate of the initial hearing together withall the documents or other evidencesattached thereto by the Clerk of Court tothe Land Registration Commission.

5. Publication of a notice of the filing of theapplication and date and place of hearing in the Official Gazette.

6. Service of notice upon contiguous

owners, occupants and those known tohave interests in the property by thesheriff.



53




publication, mailing and posting. The in remnature of land registration cases, theconsequences of default orders issuedagainst the whole world, and the objective of dissemination of the notice in as wide amanner as possible demand a mandatoryconstruction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.

Dealings Pending Original Registration

See Sec. 22 of PD 1529.

C. Notice of Application,Opposition and Default

Application

OMANDAM VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS(1954)

Facts. Omandam applied for registration,under the Land Registration Act, a parcel of land subject to a mortgage in favor of PNBfor the sum of P600. On the date of hearing,representatives of the Bureau of Lands,PNB and other opponents appeared.Representatives of Bureau of Lands andPNB were given 15 days to file writtenopposition to the application. Except as tothose who had made their appearance ageneral default was entered. After hearing,court decreed registration in favor of Omandam.

Director of Lands filed an oppositionand ten days later, a motion for reconsideration was filed by him predicatedupon newly discovered evidence and lack of notice of the hearing. This was denied by

the Court. Director of Lands filed a motionfor relief from judgment on the ground of excusable neglect. Also denied by the Court.

Held . Order appealed from is affirmed.

Ratio. Appellant points to the lack of hearing on the petition for relief, as providedfor in sections 4 and 6, Rule 38. Accordingto the rule the Court is to require "thoseagainst whom the petition is filed to answer the same within fifteen days from the receiptthereof" "if the petition is sufficient in formand substance to justify such process."

Granting that the means of communication between Occidental Misamisand Manila was faulty as alleged by theappellant, still there is no justification for thedelay in filing his opposition to the

application. The fact that he did not file hisopposition within the period granted or withina reasonable time thereafter led the Court tobelieve that he abandoned his opposition tothe application.

The motion for relief, apart fromfailing to show excusable neglect, does nothave an affidavit of merits. Hence, being aninsufficient petition not only in form but alsoin substance to justify the Court to requirethose against whom it is filed to answer within fifteen days from the receipt thereof,

as provided for in section 4, Rule 38, thehearing provided for in section 6 of the rulewas not available to the party seeking therelief.

Opposition

See Sec. 25 of PD 1529.

NICOLAS VS. PRE, ET AL.97 PHIL 766 (1955)

Facts. Nicolas filed for registration a vasttract of land. Pre, et al., opposed theapplication with respect to a portion of theentire land claiming to be the ownersthereof. During the hearing, on which date



55




Nicolas was able to submit his evidence, theparties agreed to come to an amicablesettlement. The court gave them 5 days.Instead of submitting the proposedsettlement, Nicolas moved to dismiss theregistration proceeding, which was favorablyacted upon. Pre moved to reconsider theorder to give them an opportunity to presenttheir evidence. Pre’s motion was granted.However, Nicolas failed to appear for thereception of evidence. The court declaredPre as owners of the portion of land claimedby them as owners. No appeal was taken.

4 years later, Nicolas sought todeclare the order null and void for lack of

jurisdiction and for violation of Sec. 37 of Act496. TC sustained motion to dismiss filedby Pre. CA affirmed TC.

Held . CA decision affirmed. With the

enactment of Act No. 3621, the oppositor may now not only allege in his answer hisobjections to the application but also to askfor any affirmative relief he may desire (e.g.,ask for the land to be registered in his namein the same proceeding). But the adverseclaimant to whom a portion of the landapplied for has been awarded has to pay tothe applicant such part of said expenses asmay be in proportion to the area awarded.

And inasmuch as the applicant (Nicolas) hadasked for the dismissal of his application,the oppositors (Pre, et al.) ipso facto

acquired the role of applicants on the portionthey claim without any oppositionwhatsoever.

ROXAS, ET AL., VS. CUEVAS, ET AL.8 PHIL. 469 (1907)

Facts. An application for registration of Hacienda Calauang in Laguna was filed.The government and several residents in theadjoining towns, cities and municipalitiesopposed the application. Some oppositors

maintained that the land is the property of the government and a portion thereof isoccupied by them.

The lands in question were originallyCrown lands conveyed to Salgado by a royalgrant. Upon his death, it was sold at auction

to Benito Machado as agent of DomingoRoxas. The applicants herein acquired theproperty by succession.

The lower court found that activepossession was exercised by Salgado andhis successors for a period of 130 yearswhile oppositors’ possession was precariousand doubtful. Court of Land Registrationthus overruled the oppositions of privaterespondents.

The Court adjudged the land to theapplicants except for a portion of the landheld to be public forest.

Held . Judgment of lower court affirmed. If the land as claimed by the oppositorsbelongs to the government, it follows thatthe oppositors cannot have interest in theland as they are not the government butmere citizens. Since the land belongs to the

State, and since the lower court has not soheld it in its judgment, the aggrieved partywould be the State and not a mere citizen,and it is the State that would have beenentitled to appeal from the judgment and notany private individual. But the Insular Government did not appeal.

In order that an application for registration of the title of ownership in theCourt of Land Registration may be object to,the opposition must be based on the right of dominion or some other real right opposedto the adjudication or recognition of the

ownership of the petitioner, whether it belimited or absolute.

Order of Default

The court may, upon motion of theapplicant, order a default to be recorded if no person appears and answers within thetime allowed, and there appears to be noreason to the contrary. The court shallthen require the applicant to presentevidence.

Partial defaults are allowed in landregistration proceedings. (Sec. 26, PD1529)



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YABUT LEE VS. PUNZALAN99 SCRA 567 (1980)

Facts. Spouses Yabut Lee filed anapplication for registration 2 parcels of land.No opposition having been interposed

despite due publication, TC issued an Order of General Default. Due to the transfer of thepresiding judge, however, application wasnot acted upon.

Subsequently, Punzalan filed apetition for reopening and/or review. Heclaimed that the applicants committed fraudin not disclosing that he is the owner of ahouse standing on the lots applied for andthat he has usufructuary rights over saidproperties. TC denied reopening.

Held . Order of General Default set aside.No judgment has yet been rendered by thelower court, much less a decree of registration issued. Petition for reopening isthus premature. In the absence of anydecision and/or decree, there is nothing tobe reviewed or reopened. But in the interestof substantial justice and the speedydetermination of the controversy, the TCshould have lifted the Order of GeneralDefault to allow the Punzalan to file anOpposition to the Application and presenthis evidence.

An Order of General Default isinterlocutory in character and may be

modified or amended at any time prior to therendition of the final judgment.

MANDIAN VS. LEONG103 PHIL 431 (1958)

Facts. Dionisio Leong was sued byMandian, widow and second wife Dionisio’slate father, for usurpation. In answering thecomplaint, Dionisio pleaded that hepossessed and administered the property aspart of the estate of his late father by

agreement with Mandian. Celestino, brother of Dionisio, filed an answer in interventionpleading that the lot was acquired during hissecond marriage to Mandian but title wasplaced in her name because the husband

was not a Filipino citizen. Celestino filedcross-claim against Dionisio for his failure togive his co-heirs any share in the estate’sfruits.

No answer having been filed byDionisio notwithstanding the lapse of 26days after he was served a copy of thecross-claim, court declared him in default.Dionisio sought reconsideration on theground that the period to answer must becounted not from the time he was served acopy but from the time the court admitted it.Lower court denied reconsideration.

Held . Appeal dismissed and trial courtordered to proceed with the hearing of thecase.

Ratio. The order declaring Dionisio indefault is interlocutory and preliminary to the

hearing of the case, and remains under thecontrol of the court, and may be modified or rescinded by it on sufficient ground at anytime before final judgment. Thus, appeal ispremature and improper.

A prerequisite to defendant’s right toappeal is that he file a motion under Rule 38asking that the order of default enteredagainst him be set aside. Once such motionis filed, the defendant, even if his motion isdenied, becomes entitled to all further proceedings including final judgment and

may duly appeal therefrom.

MALAGUM AND ORNOPIA VS. PABLO46 PHIL 19 (1924)

Facts. Andrin and Anacleta Lopez were theapplicants for registration of a parcel of landwhile Malagum and Ornopia appeared asopponents (petitioners in this case). Lower court granted opponents 24 hours to filewritten opposition. Oppositors presented awritten opposition which was not verifiedunder oath. When the case was again called

for hearing, the opponents presented anamended opposition in exactly the samelanguage as the previous opposition butverified in the proper form. Applicantsopposed. Judge denied admission of saidamendment and declared opponents in



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default. Motion for reconsideration was filed.On the same date, court decreed the land infavor of applicants.

Petitioners pray that a writ of mandamus issue ordering the respondent

judge to reinstate the opposition.

Held . Demurrer sustained. Petition suffersfrom defects not curable by amendment.

Ratio. Mandamus will not lie when there isanother plain, speedy and adequateremedy. Petitioners should have taken anexception to the order rejecting their amended opposition or answer and after thedenial of their motion for reconsideration,could have taken their appeal to theSupreme Court. The order excluding their answer was not a minor order within themeaning of Sec. 141 of the Civil Procedure

to which no exception could be taken. Itwas in effect a final determination of their rights and may be appealed as soon as thedecision ordering the issuance of the decreein favor of the adverse party was rendered.

D. Hearing, Judgment and Decree of Registration

PD 1529

Sec. 27. Speedy hearing;

reference to a referee. - The trialcourt shall see to it that allregistration-proceedings are disposedor within ninety days from the date thecase is submitted for decision.

The Court, if it deemsnecessary, may refer the case or anypart thereof to a referee who shallhear the parties and their evidence,and the referee shall submit his reportthereon to the Court within fifteendays after the termination of suchhearing. Hearing before a referee may

be held at any convenient place withinthe province or city as may be fixed byhim and after reasonable noticethereof shall have been served theparties concerned. The court may

render judgment in accordance withthe report as though the facts havebeen found by the judge himself:Provided, however, that the court mayin its discretion accept the report, orset it aside in whole or in part, or order

the case to be recommitted for furtherproceedings:

Sec. 28. Partial judgment. - Ina case where only a portion of the landsubject of registration is contested, thecourt may render partial judgmentprovided that a subdivision planshowing the contested anduncontested portions approved by theDirector of Lands is previouslysubmitted to said court.

Sec. 29. Judgment confirmingtitle. - All conflicting claims of ownership and interest in the landsubject of the application shall bedetermined by the court. If the court,after considering the evidence and thereports of the Commissioner of LandRegistration and the Director of Lands,finds that the applicant or theoppositor has sufficient title proper forregistration, judgment shall berendered confirming the title of theapplicant, or the oppositor, to the landor portions thereof.

Sec. 30. When judgmentbecomes final; duty to causeissuance of decree. - The judgmentrendered in a land registrationproceedings becomes final upon theexpiration of thirty days to be countedfrom the data of receipt of notice of the judgment. An appeal may be takenfrom the judgment of the court as inordinary civil cases.

After judgment has becomefinal and executory, it shall devolve

upon the court to forthwith issue anorder in accordance with Section 39 of this Decree to the Commissioner forthe issuance of the decree of registration and the corresponding



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certificate of title in favor of the personadjudged entitled to registration.

Sec. 31. Decree of registration. - Every decree of registration issued by the

Commissioner shall bear the date,hour and minute of its entry, and shallbe signed by him. It shall statewhether the owner is married orunmarried, and if married, the name of the husband or wife: Provided,however, that if the land adjudicatedby the court is conjugal property, thedecree shall be issued in the name of both spouses. If the owner is underdisability, it shall state the nature of disability, and if a minor, his age. Itshall contain a description of the landas finally determined by the court, andshall set forth the estate of the owner,and also, in such manner as to showtheir relative priorities, all particularestates, mortgages, easements, liens,attachments, and otherencumbrances, including rights of tenant-farmers, if any, to which theland or owner's estate is subject, aswell as any other matters properly tobe determined in pursuance of thisDecree.

The decree of registration shallbind the land and quiet title thereto,subject only to such exceptions or liensas may be provided by law. It shall beconclusive upon and against allpersons, including the NationalGovernment and all branches thereof,whether mentioned by name in theapplication or notice, the same beingincluded in the general description "Toall whom it may concern".

Sec. 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaserfor value. - The decree of registration

shall not be reopened or revised byreason of absence, minority, or otherdisability of any person adverselyaffected thereby, nor by anyproceeding in any court for reversing

judgments, subject, however, to theright of any person, including thegovernment and the branches thereof,deprived of land or of any estate orinterest therein by such adjudication orconfirmation of title obtained by actual

fraud, to file in the proper Court of FirstInstance a petition for reopening andreview of the decree of registration notlater than one year from and after thedate of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall suchpetition be entertained by the courtwhere an innocent purchaser for valuehas acquired the land or an interesttherein, whose rights may beprejudiced. Whenever the phrase"innocent purchaser for value" or anequivalent phrase occurs in thisDecree, it shall be deemed to includean innocent lessee, mortgagee, orother encumbrancer for value.

Upon the expiration of saidperiod of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of titleissued shall become incontrovertible.Any person aggrieved by such decreeof registration in any case may pursuehis remedy by action for damagesagainst the applicant or any otherpersons responsible for the fraud.

Sec. 33. Appeal from judgment, etc. - The judgment andorders of the court hearing the landregistration case are appealable to theCourt of Appeals or to the SupremeCourt in the same manner as inordinary actions:

Sec. 34. Rules of procedure. - The Rules of Court shall, insofar as notinconsistent with the provision of thisDecree, be applicable to landregistration and cadastral cases byanalogy or in a suppletory character

and whenever practicable andconvenient. cdasia

BP 129



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Sec. 34. Delegated jurisdictionin cadastral and land registrationcases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts,Municipal Trial Courts, and MunicipalCircuit Trial Courts may be assigned bythe Supreme Court to hear and

determine cadastral or landregistration cases covering lots wherethere is no controversy or opposition,or contested lot the value of whichdoes not exceed twenty thousandpesos, such value to be ascertained bythe affidavit of the claimant or byagreement of the respective claimantsif there are more than one, or from thecorresponding tax declaration of thereal property. Their decisions in thesecases shall be appealable in the samemanner as decisions of the Regional

Trial Courts.

Rule 143, Rules of Court These rules shall not apply to

land registration, cadastral andelection cases, naturalization andinsolvency proceedings, and othercases not herein provided for, exceptby analogy or in a suppletory characterand whenever practicable andconvenient.

BALTAZAR VS. LIMPIN49 PHIL. 39

Facts: M. Baltazar and J. Limpin filed anapplication for registration. Opposition wasfiled by B. Limpin and the Dir of Lands.David was named as referee and he made areport favorable to the applicants. Noexception was made to the referee’s reportso the judge handed down a decision inwhich he concurred in part and dissented inpart with the referee’s report. Decision wasunfavorable to applicants. Applicantsappealed and filed a petition to order stenographer to transcribe the notes of thetestimony of the referee. TC denied pet bec.referee’s report has become unassailable.

Issue: WON petition to order stenographer should be granted.

Held: Yes. GENERAL RULE: If a party failsto make timely and specific exceptions tothe report of a referee and the report isconfirmed by the trial judge, he is bound bythe findings and cannot be heard to disputetheir truthfulness or escape the legalconsequences flowing therefrom. BUT byvirtue of sec 140 of the Code of CivilProcedure and sec 36 of the LandRegistration Law, the trial judge retains adiscretion to accept the report of the refereein part and set it aside in part or reverse itentirely even where no exceptions to thereferee's report are taken (see sec 27 of PD1529). When the trial judge accepts thereferee’s report in part, the general rule doesnot apply such that the referee’s report does

not become unassailable. Petition granted.

DURAN VS. OLIVA113 PHIL 144

Facts: Duran and Vda. De Duran filed anapplication for registration of land and Olivaet al filed their opposition and MTD on theground of lack of jurisdiction because thelands were already registered. TC grantedMTD. P claims there in no such thing asMTDs in land registration cases.

Issue: WON MTDs are allowed in landregistration cases.

Held: Yes. By express provision of Rule 132(now R143) of the Rules of Court, the rulescontained therein apply to land registrationand cadastral cases in a suppletorycharacter and whenever practicable andconvenient. The Land Registration Act doesnot provide for a pleading similar or corresponding to a motion to dismiss. As amotion to dismiss is necessary for theexpeditious termination of land registration

cases, said motion contained in the Rules of Court can be availed of by the parties.Petition denied.

Evidence Necessary to Prove Title



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RODRIGUEZ VS. DIR OF LANDS31 PHIL 272

Facts: Rodriguez filed an application for registration of land and the Dir of Lands and

several homesteaders filed their opposition.TC denied the application because the areaand boundaries of the land applied for is toouncertain.

Issue: WON the P are entitled to a new trial.

Held: Yes. Only under exceptionalcircumstances should an application for registry in the Court of Land Registration bedismissed. Applicants should be granted anew trial, upon such terms as the court maydeem just and reasonable and to submitadditional evidence in support of his claim of title, when there are strong or reasonablegrounds to believe that he is the owner of allor of any part of the land described in hisapplication. This especially when the onlyground for the dismissal of the application,as is in the CAB, is the lack of formal or perhaps even substantial proof as to thechain of title upon which applicant relies, or as to the precise location of the land, whichthere is reasonable ground to believe can besupplied by the applicant upon his beingadvised as to the nature of the defects or omissions in the evidence offered by him,

such defects or omissions having been theresult of oversight or excusable error on hispart in submitting his evidence in support of his claim of title to the land described in hisapplication.

REPUBLIC VS. LEE

Facts: Lee filed an application for registration of land on the bare statementthat the land applied for has been in thepossession of her predecessor-in-interest for more than 20 years. Director of Lands

opposed. TC granted the application.

Issue: WON Lee’s bare statementconstitutes the “well-nigh incontrovertible”

and “conclusive” evidence required in landregistration cases.

Held: No. The most basic rule in landregistration cases is that "no person isentitled to have land registered under theCadastral or Torrens system unless he isthe owner in fee simple of the same, eventhough there is no opposition presentedagainst such registration by third persons . .In order that the petitioner for the registrationof his land shall be permitted to have thesame registered, and to have the benefitresulting from the certificate of title, finallyissued, the burden is upon him to show thathe is the real and absolute owner, in feesimple." Lee must prove the alleged 20 year or more possession of his predecessors-in-interest by means of factual support andsubstantiation. Lee failed to discharge this

burden to the satisfaction of the Court. Thatthe representing fiscal did not cross-examine her on this point does not help her cause because the burden is upon her.Petition granted.

REPUBLIC CEMENT CORP. VS. CA,CORREA, REGISTER OF DEEDSOF BULACAN (198 SCRA 734)

Facts: Republic Cement Corp (RCC) filedan application for registration of land. Rayo,Mangahas and Legaspi opposed as to a

portion of the land applied for based onownership. Oppositors were later substituted by the purchaser Correa. TCdenied application based on new SC rulingthat “a juridical person, is disqualified toapply for its registration under Section 48 (b)of she Public Land Law” and when itspredecessors-in-interest did not apply for land registration, they did not have anyvested right or title which was transmissibleto the juridical person. Correa filed anaction for recovery. RCC filed a MTD on theground that the land registration case is on

appeal. TC granted MTD. The CA, asregards the land registration case on appeal,ruled that the SC ruling used by TC wasalready overturned, such that juridicalpersons like RCC can now apply for registration. CA ordered registration in favor



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of RCC but excluding certain portions infavor of Correa. RCC appeals CA decision.

Issue: WON CA was correct in giving aportion to Correa.

Held. Yes. Petitioner raises questions of factwhich are not within the province of thepresent recourse. Settled is the rule thatfindings of fact of the Court of Appeals arefinal and binding upon the Supreme Court if borne out by the evidence on record. Areview of the factual findings of the Court of

Appeals is not a function ordinarilyundertaken by the Supreme Court, the ruleadmitting of only a few exceptionsrecognized under decisional law, whichexceptions are not obtaining in the case atbar.

After the death of RCC’s

predecessor-in-interest Felix Mangahas,one-half (1/2) of said land was adjudicatedand partitioned among his five (5) daughtersin a deed of extrajudicial partition. Later,RCC boought the land form the daughters.Based on said transfers, petitioner is nowseeking the registration of the whole of LotNo. 2880 in its name. This we cannot allow.The deeds of sale relied upon by petitioner do not constitute sufficient legal justificationfor petitioner's claim over all of Lot No. 2880.Petitioner's title over said lot, as thesuccessor in interest of said heirs, is limited

only to whatever rights the latter may havehad therein. It is elementary that a grantor can convey no greater estate than what hehas or in which he has an alienable title or interest.

Petitioner's claim over the excessarea is premised on the survey allegedlymade by surveyor Villaruz, but the resultantareas depicted in said survey do not tallywith, but supposedly consist of expandedareas very much larger than, those indicatedfor the lots involved in their respective taxdeclarations. These facts are expressly

stated by the foregoing parties in the deedsof sale they executed in favor of petitioner over the lots covered by the aforestated taxdeclarations. We do not find satisfactory thestilted explanation advanced to justify the

glaringly excessive disparity of areasresulting after the supposed survey.

It does not appear from our scrutinyof the records, despite petitioner'srepresentations in its written offer of evidence filed in the court a quo, that thepurported survey plans of the lots involvedwere actually submitted in evidence therein.Neither was it alleged and proved that theywere approved by the Director of Lands. Ithas long been held that unless a survey planis duly approved by the Director of Lands,the same is of dubious value and is notacceptable as evidence. Indubitably,therefore, the reputed survey and its allegedresults are not entitled to credit and shouldbe rejected. An applicant for registration of land, if he relies on a document evidencinghis title thereto, must prove not only thegenuineness of said title but also the identity

of the land therein referred to. If he onlyclaims a portion of what is included in histitle, he must clearly prove that the propertysought to be registered is included in thattitle.

Spanish Titles

PD 1529, Sec. 3. Status of otherpre-existing land registrationsystem. - The system of registrationunder the Spanish Mortgage Law is

hereby discontinued and all landsrecorded under said system which arenot yet covered by Torrens title shallbe considered as unregistered lands.

Hereafter, all instrumentsaffecting lands originally registeredunder the Spanish Mortgage Law maybe recorded under Section 113 of thisDecree, until the land shall have beenbrought under the operation of the

Torrens system. The books of registration for

unregistered lands provided under

Section 194 of the RevisedAdministrative Code, as amended byAct No. 3344, shall continue to remainin force; provided, that all instrumentsdealing with unregistered lands shall



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henceforth be registered under Section113 of this Decree.

REPUBLIC VS. FELICIANO148 SCRA 424 (1987)

Facts: Feliciano filed a complaint with theCFI of Camarines Sur against the Republicof the Philippines for recovery of ownershipof a parcel of land. Feliciano alleges that hebought the property from Victor Cardiolawho in turn acquired the property from aFrancisco Abrazado. Abrazado’s claim toownership is by virtue of an informacion

posesoria. Feliciano took actual possessionof the land and introduced improvements.Government claimed ownership by virtue of Proclamation 90 which reserved for settlement purposes a tract of land whichincludes Feliciano’s land. Feliciano filed anaction praying that he be declared rightfuland true owner by virtue of the informacion

posesoria of his predecessor-in-interests.

Issue: WON ownership is vested by virtueof the informacion posesoria.

Held/ Ratio Decidendi : No. Theinscription in the property registry of aninformacion posesoria under the SpanishMortgage law was a means provided by thelaw then in force in the Philippines prior to

the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to US,to record a claimant’s actual possession of apiece of land, established through an exparte proceeding. Such inscription merelyfurnishes, at best, prima facie evidence of the fact that at the time the proceeding washeld, the claimant was in possession of theland under a claim of right. The possessoryinformation could ripen into a record of ownership after the lapse of 20 years uponthe fulfillment of the requisites. There is noshowing in the case at bar that theinformacion posesoria held by the

respondent had been converted into arecord of ownership. Such possessoryinformation, therefore, remained at bestmere prima facie evidence of possession.

Tax Declarations

Tax declarations are notconclusive proof of ownership in landregistration cases.

PALOMO VS. CAJANUARY 21, 1997

Facts: Gov General Forbes issued EO 40w/c reserved for provincial park purposes anarea of land. Subsequently the CFI of Albayordered registratiion of 15 parcels of landcovered by EO40 in the name of DiegoPalomo. In 1954, President Magsaysayissued Proc. 47 converting the area of EO40into the “Tiwi Hot Spring National Park”.

The Palomos continued in adversepossession, paying real estate taxes

thereon, and making improvements. In1974, the Govt of the Phils. Filed a case for annulment and cancellation of Certificates of Title involving the 15 parcels. Jundgmentwas rendered in favor of the Republic.

Issue: WON the certificate of titles to the15 parcels are valid and binding.

Held/ Ratio Decidendi: NO. The taxreceipts which were presented in evidencedo not prove ownership of the parcels of land inasmuch as the weight of authority isthat tax declarations are not conclusiveproof of ownership in land registrationcases.

Possession

SOUTH CITY HOMES VS REPUBLIC185 SCRA 693 (1990)

Facts: Lot No. 5005 is a strip of landbetween 2 lots owned by the petitioner.Registration of the strip was issued in the

name of the petitioner, but the order wasreversed by special division of therespondent court. Petitioner argues that thereversal is erroneous.

The 2 adjacent lots are Lot 2381and 2386. Both are now registered with the



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petitioner. He submits 2 theories as to whylot 5005 should also be registered in hisname. First, the strip of land formed part of the 2 lots but was ommitted therefrom onlybecause of the inaccuracies of the oldsystem of cadastral surveys. Second, it hadacquired the property by prescriptionthrough uninterrupted possession in theconcept of owner.

Issue: WON petitioner has acquiredownership over lot 5005 throughprescription.

Ratio: NO. It is obvious that the technicaldescriptions of the two lots do not includethe strip of land between them. Furthermore,the testimony and the evidence presentedfalls short of establishing the manner andlength of possession required by law to vest

prescriptive title in the petitioner to lot No.5005. For one thing, as the SolGen pointsout in his comment, the claim of adverseownership to the strip of land between their respective lots was not exclusive but sharedby the predecessors-in-interest of thepetitioner. The petitioner merely occupiedthe disputed strip believing it to be includedin the 2 lots. However, even if it can beconceded that the previous owners of thelots possessed the strip, the possessioncannot be tacked to the possession of thepetitioner. Possession cannot be

transferred.

Prescription

PARCOTILO VS PARCOTILO120 PHIL. 1231

Facts: The plaintiffs alleged that Pabloowned two parcels of land during his lifetimein Misamis Occidental. In 1918, Pablo andhis wife died of cholera, leaving noascendant or descendant. So it was

claimed by the plaintiffs herein that they areco-owners of the land with the defendantsinvolved. On January 1956, plaintiffs filed acomplaint for partition, claiming that in 1936,defendant Demetrio swore to an affidavitthat he was the only son and heir of Pablo

and in so doing, procured the transfer to hisname of the tax declarations of Pablo’slands. Demetrio then sold a portion of theproperty to a third party, Crispin Prieto. Thedefendants raised various defenses:claiming that it was donated to them since1917 and took possession thereof in 1918 inthe concept of an owner, introducingimprovements to it; the third party claimsinnocent purchaser for value. The trial courtdismissed the complaint, upholdingdefendant’s assertion that it was donatedmortis causa through a testament (withoutrequisite of law) exh 1 conveying it todefendant. And it was also found thatdefendant possessed the land without anyprotesting his occupation thereof, and onlyrecently did plaintiffs raise this claim. TheTC ruled that exh 1 has no probative valuebut it serves as a good ground to base

acquisitive prescription. Hence, this appeal.

Held/ Ratio Decidendi : The SupremeCourt affirmed the findings of the TC. Evenif exh 1 was not executed with all therequisites of a valid will or of a valid donationmortis causa, the said document suppliedthe basis for the claim for the defendant.This claim of ownership by Demetriocoupled with his open, continuous andadverse possession for a period of 38 yearshad ripened into a title by prescription.

And where the lands involved areunregistered and the rights thereto byprescription accrued before the New CivilCode went into effect, the law applicable isSec 41 of Act 190 of the Old Code of CivilProcedure (10 year- period and concept of actual, open, ... possession). Even the Art1137 of the New Civil Code, nevertheless,upholds the claim of defendant since he heldon the property through uninterruptedadverse possession for more than 30 years.

SEMINARY OF SAN CARLOS VS THE

MUNICIPALITY OF CEBU (19 PHIL32)

Facts: The Seminary of San Carlos asks for the registration of two pieces of land locatedin Cebu, alleging as its source of title a royal



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cession from the King of Spain. The City of Cebu denies the title of the petitioner andalleges in itself ownership of the land inquestion, stating that its title is based uponpossession thereof required by law to effecttitle by prescription.

The land in question as claimed by theseminary, includes a portion of one of thepublic squares of that city. So aside fromthe question of ownership, the two relatedmatters resolved by the court involved thequantity of the land and its precise location.

Held/ Ratio Decidendi: After looking at theexhibits to ascertain the exact plan of theland, the Court found that the land describedin petitioner’s exhibits far exceeds the land itwas allowed to claim. It was shown thatindeed, there appears to be a large

difference between the amount of land asdescribed in one of the petitioner’s exhibitsand that included in the plan. But still, thereare enough documents to show that it ownspart of the land. Under the evidence,therefore, the Court concluded that a portionof the land now occupied by the City of Cebu as a public plaza is a land described inthe petitioner’s exhibits and so much saidland is contained in petitioner’s plan, and tothat land, no documentary record or titleappears except that of petitioner’s paper titlewhich the City fails to contradict. The City’s

contention is based solely on long years of actual occupation (prescription). It thensignifies no source from which comes anyright or interest and asserts no ability todisclose any. In fact, exh k was evenpresented by petitioner to show that theCity’s occupation was permissive and notadverse, was under license and not under claim of right, and could not therefore bemade the basis of a prescriptive title. Anyexpress or implied acknowledgment whichthe possessor makes with regard to thedominant rights of the true owner interrupts

the possession held for prescriptivepurposes and defeats the operation of thelaw granting such rights.

Also, the spanish grant (a written instrumentacknowledging the superior title of the

Seminary and limited the purpose of theCity’s possession of the land) given by thegovernor-general then, recognizing theSeminary’s right was binding upon the Cityand conclusive as to the character thereof.But the Seminary is likewise bound to honor the purposes for which the City can occupythe land (so long as the paseo exists).

RAMOS VS CA (FEB. 3, 1999)

Facts: supra

Held/ Ratio Decidendi: Under the law, anaction for reconveyance of real propertyresulting from fraud prescribes in four yearsfrom the discovery of fraud. Discovery of the fraud must be deemed to have takenplace when Lucia Bautista was issued OCTNos. 17811 and 17812 because registrationof real property is considered constructivenotice to all persons and it chall be countedfrom the time of such registering, filing, or entering. An action based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in 10 years.This means that petitioners should haveenforced the trust within 10 years from thetime of its creation or upon the allegedfraudulent registration of property. But as itis, petitioners failed to avail of any of theaforementioned remedies within theprescribed periods. With NO remedy in view,their claims should forever be foreclosed.

Likewise, the Court reiterated on theprotection afforded by the Torrens System(once its title is registered, owner may restsecure.. so no abandonment can workagainst the private respondents.

E. Hearing, Judgment and Decree

Hearing and Notice

GOV’T OF THE PHIL, VASQUEZ,GAYARES VS ABURAL (39 PHIL

996)

Facts: Cadastral proceedings werecommenced in Negros Occidental upon anapplication of the Director of Lands in 1916.



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Notices were issued. Vasquez andGayares, although residing in the samemunicipality and participated in other cadastral cases, did NOT enter anyopposition. Hearing then issued, and thelower court issued a final decree orderingthe Chief of the General Land RegistrationOffice to issue the decrees corresponding tothe lots adjudged in the decision. Eightmonths later, but before the issuance by theLand Registration Office of the so-calledtechnical decree, Vasquez and Gayarescame into the case for the first time, claimingcomplete ignorance of the proceedings. Thelower court however, denied their motion for new trial, saying that there was already adecree rendered by the Court and therebeing no allegation of fraud, the Court hasno jurisdiction to consider this case. Hence,this appeal.

Held/ Ratio Decidendi: The main questionis : When does the registration of title, under the Torrens System of Land Registration,especially under the different Philippinelaws, establishing the Cadastral System,become final, conclusive and indisputable?

As a general rule, registration of title under the cadastral system is final, conclusive andindisputable after the passage of the 30 dayperiod allowed for an appeal from the dateof receipt by the party of a copy of the

judgment of the court adjudicating

ownership without any step having beentaken to perfect an appeal. The prevailingparty may then have execution of the

judgment as a matter of right and is entitledto the certificate of title issued by the Chief of the Land Registration Office. Theexception is the special provision providingfor fraud.

In this case, the Court explainedthat there are 3 actions taken after trial in acadastral case. First , adjudicates ownershipin favor of claimants. Second , declaration bythe court that the decree is final and its order

for the issuance of the certificates of title bythe Chief of the Land Registration Office(such order is made within 30 days fromdate of receipt of a copy of the decision,there being no appeal made). Third ,devolves upon the General Land

Registration Office to prepare the finaldecrees in all adjudicated cases. Indeed,the judgment in a cadastral survey, includingthe rendition of the decree, is a judicial act.

As the law says, the judicial decree whenfinal is the basis of the certificate of title.The issuance of a decree by the LRO isministerial act. The date on which thedefeated party receives a copy of thedecision, begins the running of the time for the interposition of a motion for new trial or appeal. Herein, the claim after 8 months willnot be allowed by the Court.

MAGBANUA, PINEDA VS DIZON,DIRECTOR OF LANDS ANDFORESTRY (73 PHIL. 622)

Facts: Petitioners applied in the CFI of Iloilofor the registration of a parcel of land. Thiswas opposed by the DOL and DOF claimingthat the applicants have no sufficient title tothe land, and that a portion thereof formedpart of the provincial road. Hearing ensued,and in there, an agreement was reachedwherein the applicants ceded to thegovernment the land claimed by it (excludingit in their application). As such, the Courtrendered a decision bestowing parcels Aand C to applicants and ceding parcel B tothe government. The decision was silenthowever to one parcel of land (parcel D). Inthe decision, the applicants were ordered to

submit an amended plan duly approved bythe BOL corresponding to the technicaldescription as agreed upon.

The DOL however filed a motion for reconsideration based on the Court’s failureto include parcel D in its claim. Petitionersopposed the MFR, saying that the judge nolonger has jurisdiction because the decisionhad become final.

Held/ Ratio Decidendi: DOL can file MFRbecause decision is NOT yet final. In viewof the necessity for the applicants to present

a new plan as a result of their agreementwhereby it was agreed that parcels B and Dwere to be excluded in favor of thegovernment. The decision could not acquirefinality until the amended plan waspresented. Indeed, such decisions which



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leave something yet to be done by theparties and the court before it can beenforced, has in various cases beendeclared by the Court as interlocutory and not appealable.

ALINSUNURIN VS. DIR OF LANDS(68 SCRA 177)

FACTS: On Feb. 24, 1964, Alipinoi Alinsunurin filed an application for registration under Act No. 496 of a vast tractof land in nueva Ecija. The director of landsopposed the application, claiming that theapplicant was not in open, continuouspossession of the land for at least 30 years,and that part of the land was a militaryreservation, therefore inalienable land.

On Nov. 19, 1966, the lower courtrendered a decision in favor of theapplicants, ordering the registration of theland in the names of: (ParanaqueInvestment and Devt. Corp. (PIDC/successor-in-interest of Alinsunurin); and (2)Roman Tamayo as to 1/3 portion of the land.

The DOL filed a notice of appealwith the SC. PIDC was furnished a copy of the notice, but no copy was sent to RomanTamayo. Pending approval of the records of appeal, PIDC and RT filed a motion for theissuance of a decree of registration pendingappeal. The DOL opposed.

The lower court on March 11, 1967 orderedthe issuance of a decree of registration of the entire land, 1/3 pro indiviso in favor of RT, and 2/3 in favor of PIDC – the latter subject to the final outcome of the appeal,while the former absolute since RT was notfurnished a Notice of Appeal.

OCT No. 0-311 was isued by theregister of deeds on March 14, 1967. TheDOL filed a petition to nullify the LC’s order dated march 11, 1967, the decree of regissued pursuant thereto, and the OCT No. 0-311 issued by the ROD.

ISSUE: WON the OCT No. 0-3151 may benullified.

HELD: Yes. Under the circumstances of thecase, the failure of the appellants to serve a

copy of their Notice of Appeal to RT is notfatal to the appeal because, admittedly, hewas served with a copy of the original, aswell as the Amended record on appeal inboth of which the Notice3 of Appeal isembodied. Hence, such failure cannotimpair the right of appeal.

What is more, the appeal taken bythe gov't was from the entire decision, whichwas not severable. Thus, the appeal affectsthe whole decision.

In any event, We rule that executionpending appeal is NOT applicable in landregistration proceedings. It is fraught withdangerous consequences. Innocentpurchasers may be misled into purchasingreal properties upon reliance on a judgmentwhich may be reversed on appeal.

A Torrens title issued on the basis of a judgment that is not final is a nullity, as it is

violative of the express provision of the LRAw/c requires that a decree shall be issuedonly after the decision adjudicating the titlebecomes final and executory, and it is on thebasis of said decree that the RODconcerned issues the correspondingcertificate of title.

Consequently, the LC acted w/o jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction inordering the issuances of a decree of reg.Despite the appeal taken from the entiredecision a quo.

DE LOS REYES VS. DE VILLA(48 PHIL 227)

FACTS: Delos Reyes filed an application for the registration of 2 parcels of land situatedin the municipality of Mariaya, Tayabas.The CFI rendered a decision in favor of delos Reyes, ordering the issuance of adecree of registration and OCT as soon asthe decision becomes final. The courtissued an order directing the Land RegOffice to prepare a final decree of registration. Such was issued on Nov 22,

1923.Braulio de Villa filed a petition for

review of the decree under Sec 38 of theLRA, alleging that the registration of landwas obtained by fraud. The petition wasopposed by delos Reyes on the ground that



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it had been presented after the expiration of the time allowed under sec 38. DLRmaintains that the decree of March 31, 1923was the reckoning point of the 1-year periodunder Sec. 38, hence the petition waspresented out of time.

Appelant de Villa contends that the1-yr period commenced on Nov. 22, 1923when the final decree of registration wasissued by the GLRO; therefore, the petitionwas presented well within the one year period provided for in Sec. 38.

ISSUE: When does the one-year period for the petition for review commence?

RATIO: Upon the issuance of the finaldecree of registration, as described under Section 40, by the chief of the general LandReg. Office. De Villa’s petition was timely

presented.The petition for review under Sec.

38 of the LRA must be presented within oneyear after the entry of the decree of registration described and defined in Sec. 40of the same act.

The LRA expressly recognizes 2classes of decrees in land registrationproceedings, namely, decrees of confirmation and registration dealt with insections 30-41 of the Act, and the decreesdismissing the application. It will be notedthat Sec. 38 speaks of the former class.

Sec. 40 defines and describes theform and contents of such decrees. Thedecision of the trial court in a landregistration case, ordering the issuance of adecree of registration within the meaning of Sec. 38 of the LRA.

In preparing and signing the finaldecree of registration, the chief of the GLROacts in his capacity as Chief Clerk of the CFIin land registration matters, and not as anadministrative one. It is the last word of thecourt to the registration and is the basis for the issuance of the certificate of title.

In the absence of evidence to thecontrary, the date noted on the final decreeof registration, as the date of its issuanceand entry, must be regarded as the true dateof such entry, and the year within which a

petition for review must be presented beginsto run from that date.

YUSON VS. DIAZ (42 PHIL. 22)

Facts: Yuson purchased a parcel of landfrom Lopez, to whom OCT no. 999 wasissued by the CFI (Lopez was the applicantfor registration). When Yuson tookpossession of the land, they found therespondents in possession of the part of theland. The latter were asked to leave theland, but they refused. The respondentsclaim that they purchased the land in goodfaith from one Graciano Garcia.

The Land Reg. Court issued a writof possession in favor of Lopez, by virtue of which Lopez was placed in possession of the land. In the case at bar, Yuson filedpetition/motion to issue a writ of possessionto compel the respondents to surrender theland to Yuson.

The respondents maintain that, inview of the right of possession which theyclaim to have acquired over the parcel of land, they cannot be dispossessed thereof by means of a simple motion.

Yuson claims that it is entitled to awrit of possession, relying on Sec. 39 of theLRA. It is claimed that Sec. 39 guaranteesthat the purchaser of registered land for value shall hold the same free and clear

from any and all prior claims andencumbrances, except those set forth in thedecree of registration and those expresslymentioned in the Act as having beenreserved against it.

The CFI Judge refused to issue thewrit of possession. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON the successors-in-interest of the applicants can acquire possession of said parcel of land actually occupied by therespondents by means of a petition askingfor a writ of possession?

Held: No. An independent action for reconveyance or unlawful detainer isnecessary.

Under the facts stated in thedecision, it is improper to issue the



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peremptory writ of mandamus against a judge to compel him to issue a writ of possession in favor of the owner of theregistered land occupied by a third personwho has not been defeated after trial.

Sec. 39 of the LRA w/c states thatan OCT issued by virtue of a decree of reg.

And every subsequent purchaser for valuereceives a certificate and those mentioned inSec. 39. The meaning of the words “freefrom all encumbrances” does not includeadverse possession of a third person whosubsequent to the decree entered andoccupied the said land.

By virtue of Sec. 17 of the LRA, theLand Registration Court may, in casesfalling within its jurisdiction, enforce itsorders, judgments or decrees in the samemanner as the CFI, including a writ of possession. But when OTHER persons have

subsequently entered the property, claimingright of possession, the owner of theregistered property or his successors ininterest CANNOT dispossess such personsby merely asking for a writ of possession.

He who believes himself entitled todeprive another of the possession of realproperty must come to the courts of justice,instituting, as the case may be, and actionfor unlawful entry or detainer, or thereinvindicatory action authorized under theCivil Code.

BLAS, SIMEON VS. DELA CRUZ(37 PHIL. 1)

Facts: Dela Cruz filed an application for registration of a parcel of land under theTorrens system. Blas presented anopposition, claiming that he was the owner of a portion of land described in the petition.Lower court ruled in favor of Blas, but theSC ruled otherwise. The SC ordered thatthe portion w/c was claimed by Blas beregistered in the name of V. dela Cruz.

Blas filed this present petition toobtain an injunction against dela Cruz toprevent him from destroying the buildingsand improvements over the subject land.Blas claims that these byuildings fall under “exceptional encumbrances” provided for

under Sec. 39 of Act 496. Therefore,despite the absence of any notation in thecertificate of title as to these buildings, theseencumbrances must be recognized by delaCruz.

Issue: 1. Does the decree ordering theregistration of land under the Torrenssystem include the buildings andimprovements thereon, when they have notbeen expressly excluded in said decree?

Ans: YES2. May Blas claim said buildings as

his property and remove the same or prevent the owner of the land under saiddecree from removing or destroying thesame, even if he had not made any claim tosaid improvements during the proceedingsfor registration? Ans: No.

Held: The general purpose of the TorrensSystem is to forever foreclose litigationconcerning the title to land. Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet titlethereto, subject only to the exceptions statedby law. If the objector (Blas) may, during thependency of the case, remain silent as tocertain rights, interests or claims existing inor upon the land, and then later, by aseparate action, have such interest litigated,then the purpose of the Torrens System willbe defeated.

IN RE MANILA BUILDINGS AND LOANSASSOCIATION (13 PHIL 575)

Facts: MBLA leased a parcel of land ownedby Benito Legarda, and erected a building of strong materials thereon. On Jan. 14, 1908,MBLA applied to the Court of Land reg. For the registration of a building of strongmaterials erected on ground belonging toanother. The application was denied by theCLR.

MBLA filed an amended application

alleging that the land was registered in thename of Legarda; and that the leasecontract between MBLA and Legarda wasregistered/indorsed on the title deed of thelatter.



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On April 14, 1908, the CLR ruledthat an annotation that the building thereonbelongs to the lessee (MBLA) is sufficientregistration. MBLA appealed to the SC,claiming that Sec. 2 of the LRA allows theregistration of “title to land or buildings or interest therein…”

Held: The use of the phrase “land or buildings or an interest therein,” instead of the single word “land”, is no reason for construing the law as authorizing theregistration of buildings erected on landbelonging to another separately andindependently from the registration of theland. The natural and logical interpretationof such language of the LRA being naturaland logical interpretation of such languageof the LRA being that it authorizes the owner of the land to register together with the land

all the improvements. But under NOcircumstances can registration be appliedfor separately and independently by theowner of the land and by the owner of thebuildings; that is to say that the land of oneperson and the building of another erectedthereon can have no separate legalexistence in the registry as propertyindependent in themselves.

At the expiration of the lease, theowner of the land has the right, not merely acontingent one but a definite right under thelaw, to cause the building erected on his

estate to be taken down without incurringany obligation whatsoever, enforcing against

the lessee the obligation imposed by article1561 (Civil Code), to return the estate in thesame condition in w/c he received it.

D. Remedies

An aggrieved party may take any of the following remedies to challenge the

judgment in a land registration case or the validity of title issued pursuant

thereto:

(1) Motion for New Trial(2) Petition for Relief from Judgment(3) Appeal

(4) Petition for Review of Decree of Registration

(5) Action for Reconveyance(6) Action for Damages(7) Action for Compensation from

the Assurance Fund

(8) Cancellation Suit(9) Quieting of Title

(1) New Trial

Within the 15-day reglementaryperiod for perfecting an appeal, theaggrieved party may file a motion for newtrial under Rule 37 of the Rules of Courtfor one or more of the following causes:

(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which

ordinary prudence could not haveguarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party hasprobably been impaired in hisrights; or

(b) Newly-discovered evidencewhich he could not, withreasonable diligence, havediscovered and produced at thetrial, and which if presented wouldprobably alter the result.

(2) Relief from Judgment

A petition for relief from judgmentunder Rule 38 of the Rules of Court canbe resorted to in instances where the

judgment was entered through fraud,accident, mistake, or excusablenegligence (FAME for short).

This petition must be verified and

filed within 60 days after the petitioner learns of the judgment to be set aside,but not more than 6 months after such

judgment was entered. It must beaccompanied by affidavits showing the



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FAME relied upon, and the factsconstituting the petitioner's good andsubstantial cause of action or defense.

This remedy can be availed of onlywhen the judgment has become final andthe remedies of new trial or appeal are no

longer available.

(3) Appeal

The judgment and orders of the courthearing the land registration case areappealable to the Court of Appeals in thesame manner as in ordinary actions.

(4) Petition for Review of Decree of Registration

A petition for reopening and review of decree of registration under Sec. 32 of PD1529 may be resorted to provided that theff. requisites are present:

(1) the petitioner has a real anddominical right;

(2) that he has been deprivedthereof;

(3) through fraud;(4) that the petition is filed within one

year from the issuance of thedecree; and

(5) the property has not as yet beentransferred to an innocentpurchaser for value

Once the 1-year period lapses, thedecree of registration and the certificate of title issued become incontrovertible, andthe person aggrieved loses his recourse tothis remedy.

However, even if a petition is filed

within 1 year from the entry of the decree,the courts cannot entertain such petition if the rights of an innocent purchaser for value may be prejudiced.

MERCEDES ANICETA GARCIA, ET ALVS. DOMINADOR G. MENDOZA

14 SCRA 691 (1965)

FACTS: Petitioner Mercedes A. Garciaclaims that she and her husband, Cirilo

Mendoza, had purchased Lot No. 32080located in San Carlos City, Pangasinan on

April 24, 1938. They subsequently sold itunder a Pacto de Retro sale to co-petitioners Sps. Dulcesimo Rosario andVioleta Reyes and Erlinda O. Rosario(Petitioners), who then took possession of said lot.

On February 23, 1988, the cadastralcourt issued a decision adjudicating Lot No.32080 in favor of Dominador G. Mendoza(hereafter, Mendoza), their son.

Petitioner Garcia claims that therewas actual fraud because Mendoza falselyclaimed that his father, Cirilo Mendoza,inherited the property from HermenegildoMendoza (Cirilo's alleged father); thatMendoza made it appear that Lot 32080 wasan exclusive property of Cirilo Mendoza,who had been in possession of the lot sinceOctober 15, 1987, and subsequently,donated the same to his son, Mendoza.

On September 2, 1988, thepetitioners filed with the court a petition for review of judgment. This was denied in anOrder dated December 6, 1988. Mendozacountered that a petition for relief from

judgment under Sec. 38, Act No. 496, doesnot apply to a cadastral proceeding.Moreover, Mendoza alleged that he had filedhis claim over Lot No. 32080

ISSUE: WON the remedy of petition for review of judgment exists or is warranted by

Act No. 2259 (Cadastral Act):

HELD: Sec. 11, Act 2259 clearly states thatexcept as otherwise provided by theCadastral Act, all the provisions of the LandRegistration Act are applicable to cadastral

proceedings as well as to the decree andcertificates of title granted and issued under the Cadastral Act.



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SOLEDAD DE G. CRISOLO, IN HERBEHALF AND AS GUARDIAN OFNOEL CRISOLO VS. COURT OF

APPEALS,68 SCRA 435 (1975)

FACTS: Within a year from the issuance of adecree of registration in a land registrationcase, respondent-ward, represented by hisguardian, filed a petition for review of thedecree under Section 38 of Act 496 on theground of fraud which allegedly consisted inpetitioner's taking advantage of the insanityof respondent-ward to secure the executionof a deed of exchange of properties by andbetween the petitioner and said respondent-ward, and in petitioner's instituting the landregistration proceedings while said wardwas confined at the National PsychopathicHospital. The trial court dismissed thepetition and held that Section 38 of Act 496was not applicable because respondent hadopportunity to oppose the registrationproceedings but abandoned his opposition.Private respondent appealed to the Court of

Appeals and when petitioner moved to havethe appeal certified to the Supreme Courtbecause it involved purely questions of law,the Court of Appeals denied the motion andinstead sustained the allegation of fraud. Itrendered a decision reversing that of the trialcourt and remanding the case to the trialcourt for further proceedings. Hence, this

petition for certiorari on the grounds that theCourt of Appeals lacked jurisdiction sinceonly questions of law are involved andprivate respondent is not entitled to the re-opening of the land registration proceedingsbecause he was not denied fraudulently of his day in court but merely abandoned hisopposition thereto despite the opportunitygiven to him to oppose the registration.

ISSUE: whether or not an oppositor, after abandoning his opposition in a landregistration case and after a decision had

been rendered and a decree of registrationissued thereunder, is entitled to a reopeningof the proceedings by means of a petition for review based on fraud under Section 38 of

Act 496

HELD: The record shows that privaterespondent had been duly afforded theopportunity to object to, the registration andsubstantiate the same. The person(s)contemplated under Section 38 of Act 496,to be entitled to a review of a decree of registration, are those who were fraudulentlydeprived of their opportunity to be heard inthe original registration case. Such is not thesituation of the private respondents here.They were not denied their day in court byfraud, which the law provides as the soleground for reopening of the decree of registration. In fact they opposed theregistration but failed to substantiate their opposition.

Mere allegation of fraud is notenough. Specific, intentional acts to deceiveand deprive another of his right, or in somemanner injure him, must be alleged and

proved. There must be actual or positivefraud as distinguished from constructivefraud to entitle one to the reopening of adecree of registration. And it must beextrinsic and not intrinsic fraud. (Grey Albavs. De la Cruz, supra, 17 Phil. 49, 57).

SPOUSES RODOLFO YABUT LEE ANDLYDIA LISCANO, VS. FLORENCIO

P. PUNZALAN, 99 SCRA 567(1980)

FACTS: On May 14, 1968, applicants-appellees had filed before the CFI anapplication for the registration of two parcelsof land (Land Reg. Case No. N-345, LRCRecord No. 34956). No opposition having

been interposed despite due publication, thetrial Court issued an Order of GeneralDefault. In due time, the applicantspresented their evidence before the Clerk of Court who was duly commissioned toreceive the same. The latter submitted hisReport to the Court for proper action but due

to the transfer of then Presiding JudgeJulian E. Lustre to another district, the

Application was unacted upon.On November 26, 1968, appellant

Florencio Punzalan filed a "Petition for Reopening and/or Review" on the claim that



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First Instance of Rizal continued to have jurisdiction over it.

The records were destroyed at thatstage of the case when all that remained tobe done was the ministerial duty of the LandRegistration Office to issue a decree of registration (which would be the basis for theissuance of an Original Certificate of Title) toimplement a judgment which had becomefinal There are however authentic copies of the decisions of the CFI and the Court of

Appeals adjudicating Lots 1, 2 and 3 of PlanPsu-47035 to Estanislao Mayuga. Moreover,there is an official report of the decision of this Court affirming both the CFI and the CAdecisions. A final order of adjudication formsthe basis for the issuance of a decree of registration.

Considering that the Reyes courtwas actually in the exercise of its jurisdiction

as a land registration court when it issuedthe order directing the issuance of a decreeof registration, "substituting therein asregistered owner Dominador Mayuga, in lieuof the original adjudicates, EstanislaoMayuga, based on the affidavit of self-adjudication, subject to the provisions of Sec. 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court," whichorder is in consonance with the ruling of thisCourt in the Guico decision, and thedecisions of the CFI-Rizal and the CA dated

August 19, 1935 and November 17, 1939,respectively, We uphold the validity of said

order and rule that Judge Vera was without jurisdiction to set it aside.

2. A perusal of the records of the casereveals that no factual basis exists tosupport such a conclusion. Even Carpohimself cites no factual proof of his being aninnocent purchaser for value. He merelyrelies on the presumption of good faithunder Article 527 of the Civil Code.

It is settled that one is consideredan innocent purchaser for value only if,relying on the certificate of title, he bought

the property from the registered owner,"without notice that some other person has aright to, or interest in, such property andpays a full and fair price for the same, at thetime of such purchase, or before he hasnotice of the claim or interest of some other

persons in the property." (Cui v. Henson, 51Phil. 606 [1928], Fule v. De Legare, 117Phil. 367 [1963], 7 SCRA 351.) He is notrequired to explore farther than what theTorrens title upon its face indicates. (Fule v.De Legare, supra.) At the time of sale therewas as yet no Torrens title which Carpocould have relied upon so that he mayqualify as an innocent purchaser for value.Not being a purchaser for value and in goodfaith, he is in no better position than hispredecessors-in-interest.

HILDA WALSTROM VS. FERNANDOMAPA, 181 SCRA 431 (1990)

FACTS: Petitioner alleges that her predecessor in interest (Dianson) filed a freepatent application. On April 10, 1933 freepatent was issued in Dianson’s name. Onthe other hand, Mapa, predecessor ininterest of private respondents filedMiscellaneous Sales Application. On May12, 1934, the Director of Lands awardedJosefa Abaya Mapa a tract of land. Diansonfiled a protest against the constructionmade by Mapa on the said land. TheDirector of the Director of Lands awardedJosefa Abaya Mapa a tract of land. TheDirector of Lands decided in favor of Mapa.Nearly two years later, on July 8, 1966,Gabriela Walstrom filed a motion for

reconsideration with the Director of Lands of the decision dated August 12, 1964 of theregional land officer, claiming that she hadacquired the rights and interests of CacaoDianson to the subject parcel of land byvirtue of a transfer of said rights andinterests. by Dianson to one Agripino Farolwho, in turn, transferred the same rights andinterests to Gabriela Walstrom. The Director set aside the previous order, Mapa appealedto DANR Secretary. DANR restated thedecision of the reional land officer in favor of Mapa. Petitioner Hilda Walstrom filed a civil

complaint against the respondents prayingfor the nullification of the Mapas' salespatent and certificates of title issued by theregister of deeds of Benguet Province 11under Section 38 of Act 496 or the Land



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Registration Act. Court dismissed petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

ISSUE: WON the court was correct indismissing Walstrom’s petition

HELD: It is the teaching of the foregoingprovisions that a decree of registration maybe reopened or renewed by the proper Regional Trial Court upon the concurrenceof five essential requisites, to wit: (a) that thepetitioner has a real and a dominical right;(b) that he has been deprived thereof; (c)through fraud; (d) that the petition is filedwithin one year from the issuance of thedecree; and (e) that the property has not asyet been transferred to an innocentpurchaser for value.

An examination of the records of thecase shows non-concurrence of the

essential elements enumerated above.The first element is patently not

present because the petitioner can notallege that she has already a real anddominical right to the piece of property incontroversy. The latest order of the DANRSecretary, dated June 13, 1968, was to givefull force and effect to the regional landofficer's decision, dated August 12, 1964.13 The regional land officer held that thepetitioner's Free Patent Application No. 3-74shall exclude the disputed portion "A" of LotNo. 1, which, instead, shall be included in

the Mapas' Miscellaneous Sales Application.The second element is also absent

since corollary to the aforecited ruling of theDANR Secretary, the petitioner can not aver that she was deprived of property becauseshe did not have a real right over portion"A".

Apropos the third element, therecords are bereft of any indication thatthere was fraud in the issuance of thecertificates of title. As matters stand, theprerequisites have not been complied with.The petitioner's recourse to Section 38

would not have prospered; accordingly, therespondent court's dismissal of petitioner'scomplaint was proper.

Instead of invoking Section 38, thepetitioner should have pressed for thespeedy resolution of her petition with the

DANR. The petitioner avers that since theone-year prescriptive period for seeking

judicial relief provided for in Sec. 38 of theLand Registration Act was about to lapse,she was compelled to file the action to nullifysaid patent. 15 The petitioner's submissionis not correct. Her fear of the futility, or evenonly inefficacy, of exhausting theadministrative remedies granted her by lawis clearly unfounded.

Actual or extrinsic fraud

For fraud to be ground for nullity of a judgment, it must be extrinsic to thelitigation. Extrinsic fraud (also known ascollateral fraud) refers to any fraudulentact of the successful party in a litigation

which is committed outside the trial of acase against the defeated party, or hisagents, attorneys or witnesses, wherebysaid defeated party is prevented frompresenting fully and fairly his side of thecase. Or more simply, a deprivation of aparty of his day in court. Examples of extrinsic fraud include the following:

• failure and intentional omission on

the part of respondents to disclosethe fact of actual physicalpossession of the premises by

petitioner (Nicolas v. Director of Lands, 9 SCRA 934)

• deliberate failure to notify a party

entitled to notice (Stilianopulos v.City of Legaspi, 316 SCRA 523)

On the other hand, intrinsic fraudrefers to acts of a party in a litigationduring the trial which did not affect thepresentation of the case, but did prevent afair and just determination of the case.

Examples of such acts are the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony.It has also been said that if the fraud

alleged in the petition is involved in thesame proceedings in which the partyseeking relief had ample opportunity to



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assert his right, to attack the documentpresented by the applicant for registration,and to cross-examine the witnesses whotestified thereto, then the fraud relied uponis intrinsic. (Frias v. Esquivel, 5 SCRA770)

STERLING INVESTMENTCORPORATION, ET AL VS.HONORABLE V. M. RUIZ, 30

SCRA 318 (1969)

FACTS: Alejandro Cabasbas filed acomplaint to recover land registered in hisname. A compromise agreement wasentered into by the parties. A decision wasrendered based thereon. Later on Cabasbasfiled an amended complaint asking for the

annulment of the compromise based onfraud. He alleged that it was obtainedthrough fraud as it was made to appear before the court of first instance that theconveyance of title was made on February,1946 when in fact it took place onSeptember 14, 1944, in violation of theHomestead Law. The RTC dismissed thecomplaint.

HELD: Fraud relied upon is intrinsic. Itsuffices to refer to the leading case of De

Almeda v. Cruz, 8 a 1949 decision. As

Justice Tuason speaking for the Court madeclear: "Fraud to be ground for nullity of a judgment must be extrinsic to the litigation.Were not this the rule there would be no endto litigations, perjury being of such commonoccurrence in trials. In fact, under theopposite rule, the losing party could attackthe judgment at any time by attributingimaginary falsehood to his adversary'sproofs. But the settled law is that judicialdetermination however erroneous of mattersbrought within the court's jurisdiction cannotbe invalidated in another proceeding. It isthe business of a party to meet and repel hisopponent's perjured evidence."

The latest case in point, decided in1968, this time in an opinion penned byJustice Zaldivar, reiterates the abovedoctrine. 10 Thus: "Not every kind of fraud,

however, is sufficient ground to set aside a judgment. This Court has held that onlyextrinsic or collateral, as distinguished fromintrinsic, fraud is a ground for annulling a

judgment. Extrinsic fraud refers to anyfraudulent act of the successful party in alitigation which is committed outside the trialof a case against the defeated party, or hisagents, attorneys or witnesses, wherebysaid defeated party is prevented frompresenting fully and fairly his side of thecase. On the other hand, intrinsic fraudrefers to acts of a party in a litigation duringthe trial, such as the use of forgedinstruments on perjured testimony, which didnot affect the presentation of the case, butdid prevent a fair and just determination of the case."

ALFREDO FRIAS, ET AL., VS. SANTIAGOESQUIVEL, ET AL.

FACTS: Appellee spouses Alfredo N. Friasand Belen Lustre filed in the Court of FirstInstance of Nueva Ecija an application toregister a residential lot. RespondentsEsquivels opposed the application claimingownership of a portion of 1,357 squaremeters of the land sought to be registered,having inherited the same from their parents, Victoriano Esquivel and CatalinaVillamanca. They also sought the

postponement of the proceedings pendingfinal determination of Civil Case No. 998 of the same court between themselves asplaintiffs and the applicants as defendants,involving the ownership and possession of the land subject of their opposition.

In the civil case mentioned above,the plaintiffs alleged that they, together withtheir youngest sister, Anastacia Esquivel deYambao (who refused to be joined as aparty in the action), inherited pro-indivisofrom their parents, Victoriano Esquivel andCatalina Villamanca, a parcel of land with

improvements thereon situated at Jaen,Nueva Ecija, containing an area of about1,357 square meters; that while saidproperty was still owned in common, on or about July 16, 1951, without their knowledgeand consent, Anastacia Esquivel de



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Yambao sold the whole of it to thedefendants, the Frias spouses, who knew, atthe time of the sale, that their vendor ownedonly a part thereof; that the defendants hadtaken possession of the land and hadrefused to reconvey it to them despiterepeated demands therefor.

The Court issued an order postponing the hearing on the applicationuntil after final adjudication of Civil Case No.998, but on March 24, 1953 issued an order of general default except as against theoppositors and the Director of Lands. On

April 20, 1956 we rendered judgment in CivilCase No. 998 (G.R. No. 8825) declaring thedeed of sale executed by AnastaciaEsquivel valid insofar as Santiago, Felisa,Ceferina and Anastacia, all surnamedEsquivel, were concerned, but invalid withrespect to the minor heirs of the late Alvaro

Esquivel.It appears that, subsequent to our

decision, that is, on February 15, 1957, thechildren of the deceased Alvaro Esquivel —who had attained the age of majority, withthe exception of Alvaro and Reynaldo —and their mother, Perpetua Pada deZaragosa (remarried to Eduardo Zaragosa),as natural guardian of the two minors,executed a deed of sale conveying their one-seventh participation in the land to theFrias spouses. (Exhibit I)

On October 2, 1957, in the aforesaid

registration proceedings, after due noticeand hearing, the Court rendered judgmentadjudicating the land described in the planExhibit A in favor of the applicants andordering its registration in their name. After the same had become final and executory,the Court ordered the issuance of theDecree of Registration, and on December 11, 1957 the Chief of the General LandRegistration Office issued Decree of Registration No. 60798 in favor of the Friasspouses.

On December 8, 1958, Rosario

Esquivel-Gonzales, as the duly appointedguardian of the minors Reynaldo andRicardo Esquivel, filed a verified petition toreopen the decree of registration on theground of fraud becauseIt appears that,subsequent to our decision, that is, on

February 15, 1957, the children of thedeceased Alvaro Esquivel — who hadattained the age of majority, with theexception of Alvaro and Reynaldo — andtheir mother, Perpetua Pada de Zaragosa(remarried to Eduardo Zaragosa), as naturalguardian of the two minors, executed a deedof sale conveying their one-seventhparticipation in the land to the Friasspouses. (Exhibit I)

On October 2, 1957, in the aforesaidregistration proceedings, after due noticeand hearing, the Court rendered judgmentadjudicating the land described in the planExhibit A in favor of the applicants andordering its registration in their name. After the same had become final and executory,the Court ordered the issuance of theDecree of Registration, and on December 11, 1957 the Chief of the General Land

Registration Office issued Decree of Registration No. 60798 in favor of the Friasspouses.

On December 8, 1958, RosarioEsquivel-Gonzales, as the duly appointedguardian of the minors Reynaldo andRicardo Esquivel, filed a verified petition toreopen the decree of registration on theground of fraud that applicants committedfraud in obtaining said decree of registration,and such fraud consists of the following: theherein applicants had falsely represented tothis Honorable Court during the hearing of

their application that they were the ownersof the entire residential lot included in their plan marked as Exhibit "A" and now coveredby the decree of registration, when at thattime they knew fully well they were not theowners thereof in its entirety; that they wereaware of such fraudulent representationwhen they made it because they wereparties in Civil Case No. 998 of this Courtinvolving precisely the validity of their title tothe aforementioned lot; they also knew thaton appeal the case became G.R. No. L-8825 of the Supreme Court which, in a

decision promulgated on April 20, 1956, heldthat the title (a deed of sale) to thatresidential lot claimed by the hereinapplicants is invalid with regard to the minor heirs of the late Alvaro Esquivel', one of them being Reynaldo Esquivel, your



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petitioner's ward, in whose behalf thispetition is being presented.

ISSUE: WON there was actual fraud

HELD: To justify the setting aside or reviewof a decree of registration under Section 38of Act No. 496, the party seeking relief mustallege and prove, inter alia, that theregistration was procured through fraud —actual and extrinsic. It has been held in thisconnection that if the fraud alleged in thepetition to set aside the decree is involved inthe same proceedings in which the partyseeking relief had ample opportunity toassert his right, to attack the documentpresented by the applicant for registration,and to cross- examine the witnesses whotestified relative thereto, then the fraud reliedupon is intrinsic. The fraud is extrinsic if it

was employed to deprive a party of his dayin court, thus preventing him from assertinghis right to the property registered in thename of the applicant (Bagoyboy vs.Director of Lands, 37 Off. Gaz., 1956)

Upon consideration of the factsrelied upon by appellants to justify a reviewof the decree in question, we find that thesame do not constitute the extrinsic fraudrequired as justification for the granting of the relief sought by them.

ALBINO NICOLAS, ET AL. VS. THE

DIRECTOR OF LANDS,9 SCRA 934 (1963)

FACTS: Albino Nicolas, filed an applicationto register under the Torrens System twoparcels of land. On December 19, 1951,Eusebio Coloma, also applied for registration in favor, under the system, thessame parcels. Before the initial hearings of the two applications, Guillermo Camungao(petitioner herein), presented with theRegistration Court, a written appearance,opposing the registration of Lots 2, of both

PSUS, alleging that said lots belonged tohim, having been awarded to him in Sales

Application No. 2091 (E-3989). TheProvincial Fiscal, representing the Director of Lands, filed an opposition to theapplications for registration, alleging that the

lots, are public lands and covered by Sales Application No. 2091 (E-3989) of GuillermoCamungao. On August 22, 1952, the lower court issued an Order of General Default inboth cases, except as to the Director of Lands. A hearing was subsequently held,with notice thereof, sent only to theProvincial Fiscal, as representative of theDirector of Lands. No notice to GuillermoCamungao, was given, in spite of his writtenappearance and opposition to theregistration. Judgment was rendered onSeptember 20, 1955, adjudicating the landsapplied for, in favor of the applicants. The

judgment having become final andexecutory the court a quo issued an order for the issuance of a decree of registration.On January 21, 1956, an Order of evictionwas directed against appellant, and it wasthe first time he came to know that a

decision and decree had been rendered andissued in the registration cases. Camungaofiled a petition to set aside the decision. Thecourt dismissed the petition for review.

ISSUE: WON there was actual fraud

HELD: It is contended that, in cases of thenature of the one at bar, the only basis for the re-opening of the case, is actual fraud.There was allegation of actual fraud in thepetition, such as the failure and intentionalomission on the part of the respondents to

disclose the fact of actual physicalpossession of the premises by petitioner herein. It is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which benefit isobtained to the prejudice of a third person(Estiva vs. Alvero, 37 Phil. 498). In short, theseries of allegations contained in thepetition, portions of which are quotedheretofore, describe fraudulent acts, actualand otherwise. Perhaps, the trial judge hadreasons to doubt the veracity of thesupposed fraudulent acts, attributed torespondents. This doubt, however, should

not have been made the basis of dismissal,because if a court doubts the veracity of theallegations in the petition, the best thing itcould do, would have been to deny themotion to dismiss and proceed with thehearing on the merits, of the petition (De



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89) and the fact that the land sought to beregistered is part of the public domainand incapable of registration, as when itis part of a military reservation (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648).

(5) Action for Reconveyance

Notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title already issued in thename of another person, he can still becompelled under the law to reconvey thesubject property to the rightful owner. Inan action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected asincontrovertible. What is sought instead isthe transfer of the property, which has

been wrongfully or erroneously registeredin another person's name, to its rightfuland legal owner, or to one with a better right. (Walstrom v. Mapa, Jr., 181 SCRA431) The property registered is deemedto held in trust for the real owner by theperson in whose name it is registered.

In filing an action for reconveyance, itis not necessary that the 1-year periodlapse first. Such an action can be filedanytime after the entry of decree of registration provided that is within the

prescriptive period. An action for reconveyance based onan implied or constructive trustprescribes in 10 years.

However, an action for reconveyancebased on an implied trust for co-heirs isimprescriptible.

An action for reconveyance on theground of fraud must be filed within 4years from discovery of the fraud. Suchdiscovery is deemed to have taken place

from the issuance of an original certificate

of title. An action for reconveyance which in

effect seeks to quiet title to property inone's possession is imprescriptible.( Almarza v. Arguelles, 156 SCRA 718)

MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIAS V. COURTOF APPEALS (MARCH 31, 1987)

Facts: Respondent Norma Leuenberger

inherited Lot No. 140 (27.246 has.) from her grandmother Simeona Vda. De Ditching. In1952, she donated a portion (3 has.) of theproperty to the Municipality of Victorias for the ground of a high school. The 4 hectaresof the land was converted into a subdivision.Later, she discovered that part of theremaning portion was being used by theMunicipality as a cemetery from 1934. Shewrote the Mayor demanding payment of rentals and delivery of the area. The Mayor,however, showed her documents showingthat the Municipality purchased the land.

Respondents then filed a complaint for recovery of possession. Municipality’sdefense is that of ownership claiming thatthe land was purchased by it from SimeonaVda. De Ditching. TC decided in favor of Municipality. CA reversed.

HELD: It is undisputed that petitioner hadbeen in open, public, adverse andcontinuous possession of the land for morethan 30 years. Evidence established withoutdebate that the property was originallyregistered in 1916. When Gonzalo Ditchingdied, Simeona became the administratrix of

the property and it was while she wasserving as such that she executed thedocument of sale in favor of the municipality.Unfortunately, the Municipality failed toregister the Deed of Sale. Thus, respondentwas able to register the property under theTorrens System. However, since sheinherited the same from her grandmother only after the latter had already sold theportion to the petitioner, she had no legalright which may serve as basis for her toregister the land.

While an inherently defective Torrens titlemay not ordinarily be cancelled even after proof of its defect, the law neverthelesssafeguards the rightful party’s interest in thetitled land from fraud and improper use of technicalities by allowing such party to



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Ildefonsa exercised a legal fraud when sheexecuted said affidavit. She, therefore, heldin trust the other half of the property in favor of the plaintiffs. The case, however, wasremanded to the TC. TC later held thatalthough the plaintiffs have the right to askfor reconveyance, their cause of action hasalready prescribed.

HELD: The case involves an implied or constructive trust upon the defendants-appellees. The CA declared that Ildefonsaheld in trust the ½ of the property legallybelonging to the plaintiffs, of which thedefendants had full knowledge. The sale infavor of defendants, however, is not void or inexistent, action on which isimprescripltible. It is voidable, at most, andas such valid until revoked within the timeprescribed by law for its revocation.. An

action for reconveyance based on animplied trust prescribes in ten (10) years.The plaintiffs cause of action accrued in1928 when the defendants bought the landand took possession thereof from Ildefonsa.However, plaintiffs-appellants only filed thepresent action for reconveyance onNovember of 1949 or 13 years after theCOA accrued. Thus, the action had longprescribed.

VDA DE JACINTO V VDA DE JACINTO,

5 SCRA 371 (1962)

Facts: The land in question originallybelonged to the now deceased spousesJacinto, both of whom died intestatesurvived by their children named Melchor and Pedro. Melchor also died intestatebefore the estate of their parents could bepartitioned. After the partition, Pedro,besides receiving his share, continuedadministering the properties whichcorresponded to the heirs of his deceasedbrother. Pedro applied for the registration

and succeeded in having the propertiesregistered in his name

When the widow of his deceasedbrother decided to sell the parcel of land,she realized for the first time, that the parceldelivered to her by Pedro had a smaller area

than that which rightfully belonged to her and her son.

HELD: In view of these facts, it would beagainst reason and good conscience not tohold that Pedro committed a breach of trustwhich entitled him to secure registration of the land in question to the prejudice of hiscoheirs. In an action like the present, hemay be ordered to make reconveyance of the property to the person rightfully entitledto it. In fact, it has been held that even inthe absence of fraud in obtainingregistration, or even after the lapse of oneyear after the issuance of a decree of registration, a co-owner of land who appliedfor and secured its adjudication andregistration in his name knowing that it hadnot been allotted to him in the partition, maybe compelled to convey the same to

whoever received it in the apportionment, solong as no innocent third party had acquiredrights therein, in the meantime, for avaluable consideration.

An action to enforce a trust isimprescriptible. Consequently, a coheir who, through fraud, succeeds in obtaining acertificate of title in his name to the prejudiceof his coheirs, is deemed to hold the land intrust for the latter, and the action by them torecover the property does not prescribe.

ALMARZA V ARGUELLES,156 SCRA 718 (1987)

Facts: Lot No. 5815 originally belonged toprivate respondents’ predecessor-in-interest,Grana. The latter sold a portion thereof topetitioner. Said portion was physicallysegregated from the whole lot and wastaken possession of by petitioner.In a cadastral case, the court declaredprivate respondents owner of ½ undividedshare of Lot No. 5815 and a certainPancrudo (deceased) as owner of the other

½. OCT was issued in the name of saidadjudicatees.

Private respondents instituted acomplaint for recovery against the petitioner.The latter interposed a counterclaim for



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reconveyance of the disputed portion of LotNo. 5815.

The LC ordered petitioner to vacateand dismissed the counterclaim of thepetitioner fo the reason that although aconstructive or implied trust was constitutedin favor of petitioner when the disputedportion was included in the OCT issued toprivate respondents, petitioner’s action for reconveyance had prescribed, more thanten years having elapsed from the issuanceof said certificate of title.

HELD: SC reverses. The remedy of alandowner whose property has beenwrongfully or erroneously registered in thename of another is, after one year from thedate of the decree, not to set aside thedecree, but respecting the decree asincontrovertible and no longer open to

review, to bring an ordinary action in theordinary court of justice for reconveyance or if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages. Petitioner availed herself of thisremedy seasonably.

Prescription cannot be invoked in anaction for reconveyance which is in effect anaction to quiet title, against the plaintiff therein who is in possession of the land inquestion. The reason is that as lawfulpossessor and owner of the disputedportion, her cause of action for

reconveyance which, in effect, seeks toquiet title to property in one’s possession, isimprescriptible. The petitioner’s undisturbedpossession over a period of 48 years gaveher a continuing right to seek the aid of aCourt of equity to determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and theeffect on her title.

If ever prescription may be invoked,it may be said to have commenced to runonly from the time the possessor was madeaware of a claim adverse to his own. In thecase at bar, petitioner was made aware of

such adverse claim only upon service on her of the summons in the civil case. As her action for reconveyance, or to quiet title wascontained in her counterclaim, the samecannot be said to have already prescribed.

TAMAYO V CALLEJO,46 SCRA 27 (1972)

Facts: A parcel of land was previouslyowned by spouses Vicente Tamayo and

Cirila Tamayo. They sold the northernportion of said land to Fernendo Domantay,who took possession thereof. Vicente diedand Cirila waived her rights to the remainingportion of their original property to their children, Marcos and Mariano. Thesebrothers were declared the sole heirs of thedeceased. The brothers applied in acadastral proceeding for the registration of the land. The application was granted andOCT was issued in favor of the brothers.

Domantay sold his property in favor of Callejo who took possession thereof.Marcos sold his undivided share to Mariano.Callejo filed a complaint for reconveyanceand damages against Mariano. CFIdismissed the complaint on the ground thatthe land purchased by Domantay from theparents of Mariano is not included in saidtitles of Mariano. The CA reversed andoverruled the plea of prescription set up byMariano upon the theory that the title to saidportion of land now claimed by Callejo isheld in trust by the Tamayos and that theaction to enforce said trust does notprescribe.

HELD: CA affirmed with modification. CAdid not err in overruling the plea of prescription. Prescription of action for reconveyance is reckoned from the date of creation of the express trust. Although thetrust created by the application for registration filed by Mariano and Marcos in1913, and the inclusion in the OCT issued intheir names of the tract of land previouslysold to Domantay and later conveyed toCallejo may have had a constructive or implied nature, its status was substantiallyaffected in 1918 by the following facts,

namely: On the date last mentioned,Domantay and Mariano – the latter acting onhis own behalf and on that of his brother Marcos – executed a public instrumentwhereby Mariano EXPLICITLYacknowledged that his deceased parents



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had sold to Domantay the parcel of landthen held by the latter, and stipulating thatDomantay is the absolute owner of saidland, free from any lien or encumbrancethereon.

This express recognition by Mariano – on his behalf and that of his brother Marcos – of the previous sale made by their parents to Domantay, had the effect of imparting to the aforementioned trust thenature of an express trust – it having beencreated by the will of the parties, “noparticular words” being “required for thecreation of an express trust, it beingsufficient that a trust is clearly intended”.This express trust is a “continuing andsubsisting” trust, not subject to the statute of limitations, at least, until repudiated, in whichevent the period of prescription begins to runonly from the time of the repudiation. The

latter did not take place in the case at bar,until early in June, 1952, when Marianorejected Callejo’s demand that the nowdisputed portion be excluded from the TCTin the former’s name. But then, the case atbar was filed weeks later when the period of prescription had barely begun to run.

The CA declared that the land inquestion is “declared reconveyed” to Callejo.Such reconveyance cannot, however, bedeemed made without a survey defining withprecision the metes and bounds of the areato be segregated for Callejo. Accordingly,

the case was remanded to the court of originfor the preparation of the subdivision plan of the portion to be segregated and the judicialapproval of said plan, and only after suchapproval has become final and executorymay the reconveyance be either made or deemed effected.

JOAQUIN V COJUANGCO,20 SCRA 769 (1967)

Facts: The OCT of the first parcel of land

involved in this case was issued as early as1921. Said parcel was transferred in favor of the defendants who obtained a TCT in their own names in 1928. With respect to thesecond parcel, OCT was acquired in 1925and the land was subsequently transferred

to defendants also in 1925. TCT was issuedto the transferees in 1936.

HELD: The action in this case is one for reconveyance, on the theory that the originalregistered owners were the administrators of those lands, and hence held them in afiduciary capacity. Even assuming that thiswas true, the disabilities imposed by suchrelationship did not extend to the transfereesof said administrators, who acquired theland for value and claimed adverse title inthemselves. The action for reconveyanceon the theory of trust might prosper, if at all,as against the trustees and provided theystill hold the properties, but not as againstthird persons who do not occupy the samefiduciary position.

(6) Action for Damages

PINO V. COURT OF APPEALS,198 SCRA 434 (1991)

FACTS: Rafaela Donato, RaymundGaffud and Cicero Gaffud were co-owners of a lot. The title of the lot wasonly in the name of Rafaela Donato.Donato sold to Pino the lot. A TCT wasissued in the name of Pino. TheGaffuds filed a complaint for nullity of sale and reconveyance against Pino.

HELD: The Supreme Court said that thecomplaint for nullity of sale andreconveyance must fail. Pino is a purchaser in good faith. Where the certificate of title isin the name of the vendor when the land issold, the vendee for value has the right torely on what appears on the certificate of title. In the absence of anything to excite or arouse suspicion, said vendee is under noobligation to look beyond the certificate andinvestigate the title of the vendor appearingon the face of said certificate.

If an action for reconveyance basedon constructive trust cannot reach aninnocent purchaser for value, the remedy of the defrauded party is to bring an action for damages against those who caused the



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1. Any person who sustainsloss or damage under thefollowing conditions:

a) that there was nonegligence on hispart; and

b) that the loss ordamage sustainedwas through anyomission, mistake ormalfeasance of thecourt personnel, orthe Register of Deeds, his deputy, orother employees of the Registry in theperformance of theirrespective dutiesunder the provisionsof the PropertyRegistration Decree;or

2. Any person who has beendeprived of any land orinterest therein under thefollowing conditions:

a) that there was nonegligence on hispart;

b) that he was deprivedas a consequence of the bringing of hisland or interesttherein under theprovisions of theProperty RegistrationDecree; or by theregistration by anyother person asowner of such land,or by mistake,omission ormisdescription in anycertificate of owner’sduplicate, or in anyentry or

memorandum in theregister or otherofficial book or byany cancellation; and

c) that he is barred orin any way precludedfrom bringing anaction for therecovery of suchland or interest or

claim upon thesame.

Sec. 96. Against whom ActionFiled.

• Against the Register of

Deeds of the province orcity where the land issituated and the NationalTreasurer if it is brought torecover for loss or damage orfor deprivation of land or anyestate or interest therein

arising wholly through fraud,negligence, omission, mistakeor misfeasance of the courtpersonnel, Register of Deeds,his deputy or other employeesof the Registry in theperformance of their respectiveduties, the action shall bebrought

• Against the Register of

Deeds of the province orcity where the land issituated and the National

Treasurer, and other personor persons as co-defendantsif it is brought to recover forloss or damage or fordeprivation of land or of anyinterest therein arising throughfraud, negligence, omission,mistake or misfeasance of aperson OTHER THAN courtpersonnel, the Registry of Deeds, his deputy or otheremployees of the Registry

• The Solicitor General must

defend all such suits.• Nothing in this law shall be

construed to deprive theplaintiff of any right of actionwhich he may have against anyperson for such loss, or damage



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TORRES V. COURT OF APPEALS,186 SCRA 672 (1990)

FACTS: Mariano Torres was the owner of a lot and building. Fernandez, Torres’brother-in-law, filed a petition with the

CFI of Manila where he misrepresentedto be Torres’ attorney-in-fact. Healleged that the owner’s duplicate of copy of the title to the lot and buildingwas lost. Fernandez succeeded inobtaining a court order for the issuanceof another copy of the certificate.Fernandez forged a simulated deed of sale in his favor. Thus, the TCT in thename of Torres was cancelled in favor of Fernandez. Fernandez mortgagedthe property to Mota.Torres found out about Fernandez’sTCT. Torres brought an action to annulFernandez’s TCT. Fernandez wasunable to pay his loan obligations.Mota was the highest bidder in thepublic auction of the propertymortgaged.

ISSUE: Who has a better right to theproperty – Torres or Mota

HELD: Torres has a better right over theproperty. As between two persons bothof whom are in good faith and bothinnocent of negligence, the law must

protect and prefer the lawful holder of registered property over the transfer of a vendor bereft of any transmissiblerights. In view of the foregoing, to hold,for the purpose of enforcing themortgage, that Mota was an innocentmortgagee would be futile because asabove shown, no certificate of titlecovering the subject realties inderogation of Torres’ certificate of tilemay validly be issued.

The only possible remedies of Motawould be to go against Fernandez or the

Assurance Fund. However, Mota cannot goafter the Assurance Fund since Mota wasnegligent in protecting her interest. Mota asa creditor and mortgagee should haveinquired as to all the related facts andcircumstances regarding the rentals andtenants. Mota should have looked at thepayment of taxes on the property. It was notenough that Mota should have merely reliedon the title. Thus, Mota’s only remedy is togo after Fernandez.



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FRANCISCO V. NATIONAL TREASURER,(AUGUST 3, 2000)

FACTS: The spouses Milambiling were theowners of a parcel of land. It appearsthat a couple impersonated themselves

as the spouses Milambiling. Theimposters were able to somehowacquire a duplicate TCT over the land.The imposters sold the land to DeGuzman. Milambiling filed an actionagainst De Guzman for declaration of nullity of sale. Milambiling won the suit.De Guzman thus filed an action for damages against the Assurance Fund.

HELD De Guzman cannot recover from the Assurance Fund. Only the followingpersons can recover from theassurance fund:

(3) Any person who sustains loss or damage under the following conditions:

d) that there was nonegligence on his part; and

e) that the loss or damagesustained was through anyomission, mistake or malfeasance of the courtpersonnel, or the Register of Deeds, his deputy, or other employees of the Registry in theperformance of their respective

duties under the provisions of the Property RegistrationDecree; or

Any person who has been deprivedof any land or interest therein under the following conditions:f) that there was no

negligence on his part;

g) that he was deprived asa consequence of the bringingof his land or interest thereinunder the provisions of theProperty Registration Decree; or by the registration by any other person as owner of such land,or by mistake, omission or misdescription in any certificateof owner’s duplicate, or in anyentry or memorandum in theregister or other official book or by any cancellation; and

h) that he is barred or inany way precluded frombringing an action for therecovery of such land or interestor claim upon the same.

De Guzman does not fall under any

of these two cases. The loss or damagewas not due to the omission, mistake or malfeasance of the court personnel or Register of Deeds, his deputy or other employees. Furthermore, they were notdeprived of their land “as a consequence of bringing of the land or interest therein under the provisions of the Property RegistrationDecree. Neither was there deprivation dueto the registration by any other person asowner of such land or by mistake, omissionor misdescription in any certificate or owner’s duplicate or in any entry or

memorandum in the register or other officialbook or by any cancellation.

The Assurance Fund is intended torelieve innocent persons from theharshness of the doctrine that acertificate is conclusive evidence of anindefeasible title to land. De Guzmandid not suffer any injury because of theoperation of this doctrine. De Guzmansought to avail of the benefits of theTorrens System by registering theproperty in his name. That De Guzman

eventually lost the property toMilambiling does not entitle him tocompensation under the AssuranceFund. De Guzman’s recourse isagainst the persons who duped him.



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(8) Others

Cancellation suit involving double title

PAJOMAYO V. MANIPON,

39 SCRA 676 (1971)

FACTS:Both parties claims that they are theexclusive owners of the land in dispute.Pajomayos had with them OCT No. 1089issued by the register of deeds onNovember 27, 1931 in virtue of thehomestead patent. The Manipons on theother hand had OCT No. 14043 issued on

April 1, 1957, in connection with thecadastral proceedings.

ISSUE : Which of the two OCTs should

prevail?

HELD : OCT No. 1089 should prevail.The decree of registration issued in thecadastral proceedings does not have theeffect of annulling the title that hadpreviously been issued in accordance withthe provisions of the Land Registration Law(Act 496).

The law requires that thehomestead patent must be registered in theOffice of the Register of Deeds of theprovince where the land covered by thepatent lies (sec. 122 of Act 496 – LandRegistration Law).

Thus once a homestead patentgranted in accordance with the Public Land

Act is registered pursuant to sec. 122 of Act496, the certificate of title issued in virtue of said patent has the force and effect of aTorrens under the Land Registration Act.

Where two certificates of title areissued to different persons covering thesame land in whole or in part, the earlier indate must prevail as between the originalparties, and in case of successiveregistration where more than one certificate

is issued over the land the person holdingunder the prior certificate is entitled to theland as against the person who relies on thesecond certificate.

Cancellation suit involving non- registrable property (reversion suit)

REPUBLIC V. COURT OF APPEALS,99 SCRA 743 (1980)

FACTS : A motion to reopencadastral case was filed by Alpuerto. After trial the court rendered its decisionadjudicating to him the subject lot andordered the issuance of a decree of registration over the said lot. Hence, LandRegistration Commission issued a decree.This was the basis of the issuance of theOCT. Portions of the lot were subsequentlytransferred to various persons.

Later the provincial fiscal of Quezonfiled a MFR on the ground that the said

decision was obtained through fraud,misrepresentation and deciet. The Director of Land joined the fiscal, on the ground thatthe same was issued on the wrong premisethat i.e. that the decision of the court hadalready become final and executory when infact it had not.

Later the SolGen filed for thegovernment a complaint for annulment,cancellation of titles and for reversion on theground that the decision of the lower courtadjudicating the lot to Alpuerto, its order for the issuance of the decree of registration aswell as the OCT and all the TCTs derivedtherefrom are all null and void and w/o legaleffect because the court had no jurisdictionto allocate the subject land, which isinalienable.

RATIO : CA 141 explicitly states thattimber and mineral lands shall be governedby special laws. And the Forestry Law nowvests in the Director of Forestry the

jurisdiction and authority over forest or timberland.

In one case the SC held that if theland covered by the homestead application

of petitioner was still within the forest zoneor under the jurisdiction of the Bu. of Forestry, the Director of Lands has no

jurisdiction to dispose of said land under theprovisions of the Public Land Law and theapplicant acquired no right to the land.



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Also, if a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act w/c includes, byoversight, lands w/c cannot be registeredunder the Torrens System, or when theDirector of Lands did not have jurisdictionover the same because it is a public forest,the grantee does not, by virtue of the saidcertificate of title alone, become the owner of the land illegally included.

The patent of title thus issued is voidat law, since the officer who issued it had noauthority to do so.

Under this circumstances, thecertificate of title may be ordered cancelledand the cancellation may be pursuedthrough an ordinary action therefor.

The doctrine of estoppel cannotoperate against the State. “It is a well-settledrule in our jurisdiction that the Republic or itsgovernment is usually not estopped by

mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents.

The state may still seek thecancellation of the title issued to Alpuertopursuant to Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act.Such title has not become indefeasible, for prescription cannot be invoked against theState.

(9) Quieting of Title

Art. 476, Civil Code. Whenever

there is a cloud on title to real propertyor any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim,encumbrance or proceeding which isapparently valid or effective but is intruth and in fact invalid, ineffective,voidable, or unenforceable, and maybe prejudicial to said title, an actionmay be brought to remove such cloudor to quiet the title.

An action may also be broughtto prevent a cloud from being castupon title to real property or any

interest therein.

Sec. 1, Rule 63, Rules of Court. Anaction for the reformation of aninstrument, to quiet title to realproperty or remove clouds therefrom,

or to consolidate ownership under Art.1607 of the Civil Code, may be broughtunder this Rule.

REALTY SALES ENTERPRISES V. IAC,

154 SCRA 328 (1987)

Suits to quiet title are not technicallysuits in rem, nor are they, strictly speaking,in personam, but being against the person inrespect of the res, these proceedings arecharacterized as quasi in rem. The judgmentin such proceedings is conclusive onlybetween the parties.

MAMADSUL V. MOSON,190 SCRA 82 (1990)

An action to quiet title isimprescriptible if the plaintiffs are inpossession of the property. The right of aplaintiff to have his title to land quieted, asagainst one who is asserting some adverseclaim or lien thereon, is not barred while theplaintiff or his grantors remain in actualpossession of the land, claiming to beowners thereof, the reason for this rulebeing that while the owner in fee continuesliable to an action, proceeding, or suit uponthe adverse claim, he has a continuing rightto the aid of a court of equity in his favor toascertain and determine the nature of suchclaim and its effect on his title, or to assertany superior equity in his favor. He may waituntil his possession is disturbed or his title isattacked before taking steps to vindicate hisright. But the role that the statute of limitations is not available as a defense toan action to remove a cloud from title canonly be invoked by a complainant when heis in possession. One who claims propertywhich is in the possession of another must,it seems, invoke his remedy within thestatutory period.

Petitioners may wait until their possession is disturbed or their title isattacked before they may take steps tovindicate their right. The statute of limitationis not available as a defense to an action to



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remove a cloud from title over property inpossession of the petitioners.

It is not necessary that the personseeking to quiet his title is the registeredowner of the property in question. "Title" toproperty does not necessarily mean theoriginal transfer certificate of title. It canconnote acquisitive prescription bypossession in the concept of an owner thereof. One who has an equitable right or interest in the property may also file anaction to quiet title under the law.

TAN V. VALDEHUEZA,66 SCRA 61 (1975)

Relying on Section 3 of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court which pertinentlyprovides that a dismissal for failure toprosecute "shall have the effect of anadjudication upon the merits," theValdehuezas submit that the dismissal of civil case 2002 operated, upon the principleof res judicata, as a bar to the first cause of action in civil case 2574. This contention isuntenable as the causes of action in the twocases are not identical. Case 2002 was for injunction against the entry into and thegathering of nuts from the land, while case2574 seeks to "remove any doubt or cloudof the plaintiff's ownership . . ." with a prayer for declaration of ownership and recovery of

possession. Applying the test of absence of

inconsistency between prior and subsequent judgments the failure of Tan, in case 2002,to secure an injunction against theValdehuezas to prevent them from enteringthe land and gathering nuts is notinconsistent with her being adjudged, inCase 2574, as owner of the land with right torecover possession thereof. Case 2002involved only the possession of the land andthe fruits thereof, while case 2574 involvesownership of the land, with possession as a

mere attribute of ownership. The judgmentin the first case could not and did notencompass the judgment in the second,although the second judgment wouldencompass the first. Moreover, the new CivilCode provides that suitors in actions to quiet

title "need not be in possession of saidproperty."

FAJA V. COURT OF APPEALS,75 SCRA 441 (1977)

An action to quiet title to property in thepossession of plaintiff is imprescriptible.One who is in actual possession of a pieceof land claiming to be owner thereof maywait until his possession is disturbed or histitle is attacked before taking steps tovindicate his right, the reason for the rulebeing, that his undisturbed possession giveshim a continuing right to seek aid of a courtof equity to ascertain and determine thenature of the adverse claim of a third partyand its effect on his own title, which right canbe claimed only by one who is inpossession. The right to quiet title to theproperty, to seek its reconveyance andannul any certificate of title covering it,accrues only from the time the one inpossession was made aware of a claimadverse to his own, and it is only then thatthe statutory period of prescriptioncommences to run against such possessor.

Decree of Registration

See Sec. 31, 32, 39 of PD 1529.

GOMEZ V. CA168 SCRA 503 (1988)

FACTS: Petitioners applied for theregistration of their land. After notice andpublication, there being no opposition to theapplication, the trial court issued an order of general default. Later the court issued anorder stating that the decision had becomefinal and directed the Land RegistrationOffice to issue the corresponding decrees of registration over the lots adjudicated in thedecision.

Later it was reported to the court a quo thatsome of the lots subject of the registrationwere already covered by homesteadpatents, issued in 1928 & ’29 and registered



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under the Land Registration Act. Hence thedecision was recommended to be set aside.Lower court set aside the decision.

ISSUE : WON respondent Judgehad jurisdiction to issue the decision settingaside the its earlier decision?

HELD : YES. It is not disputed thatthe first decision had become final andexecutory. However unlike ordinary civilactions the adjudication of land in acadastral or land registration proceedingdoes not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the finaldecree of registration.

As long as the final decree has notbeen entered by the Land RegistrationCommission (now NLTDRA) and the period

of one (1) year has not elapsed from thedate of entry of such decree, the title is notfinally adjudicated and the decision in theregistration proceeding continues to beunder the control and sound discretion of thecourt rendering it.

Petitioners insist that the duty of therespondent land registratoin officials to issuethe decree is purely ministerial. It isministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of the court and the decree mustbe in conformity with the decision of thecourt and with the data found in the record,

and they have no discretion in the matter.However, if they are in doubt upon any pointin relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They are in this respect asofficials of the court and not asadministrative officials, and their act is theact of the court. They are in specificallycalled upon to “extend assistance to courtsin ordinary and cadastral land registrationproceedings”.

RAMOS V. RODRIGUEZ,244 SCRA 418 (1995)

Ramos applied for the registration of a parcel of land. After issuing an order of

general default judge rendered decisionadjudicating said lot to the petitioners;ordered issuance of decree and directedNLTDRA to prepare the decree andcertificate of registration.

NLTDRA however recommendedthat the order be set aside because the saidsubject lot is already covered by a TCT. Thecourt opined that it cannot set aside itsdecision on the basis of the report after thefinality of its decision. It added that theproper remedy of the government was anaction for annulment of judgment. Later however the court set aside its order anddenied petitioner’s application for registration. The court noted that the subjectlot is already covered by an existing TCTand that no final decree has yet been issuedby the LRA.

Petitioner assailed this decision on

the principle of finality of judgments.

RATIO: This issue has already beensettled in a similar case where the courtdeclared that: “However unlike ordinary civilactions the adjudication of land in acadastral or land registration proceedingdoes not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the finaldecree of registration.

As long as the final decree has notbeen entered by the Land Registration

Commission (now NLTDRA) and the periodof one (1) year has not elapsed from thedate of entry of such decree, the title is notfinally adjudicated and the decision in theregistration proceeding continues to beunder the control and sound discretion of thecourt rendering it.”

They also raised the issue of thefunction of LRA as only ministerial. InGomez the SC squarely met this issue:

“Petitioners insist that the duty of therespondent land registratoin officials to

issue the decree is purely ministerial. Itis ministerial in the sense that they actunder the orders of the court and thedecree must be in conformity with thedecision of the court and with the data



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found in the record, and they have nodiscretion in the matter. However, if theyare in doubt upon any point in relation tothe preparation and issuance of thedecree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They are in this respect asofficials of the court and not asadministrative officials, and their act isthe act of the court. They are inspecifically called upon to “extendassistance to courts in ordinary andcadastral land registration proceedings”.

In the case at bar, the LRA is notlegally obligated to follow the court’s order because the subject land sought to beregistered was found to be already decreedand titled under the Payatas Estate.

The one-year period stated in Sec.32 of PD 1529 within which a petition to

reopen and review the decree of registrationis described in Sec. 31 of the said PD whichdecree is prepared and issued by theCommissioner of Land Registration.

E. Certificate of Title

PONCE DE LEON VS. REHABILITATIONFINANCE CORP.,

36 SCRA 289 (1976)

Facts: Ponce procured an industrial loanfrom RFC in 1951. As security, Poncemortgaged a parcel of land in Paranaquewhich was registered in the name of Francisco Soriano (FS) – OCT No. 8094 –married to Tomas Rodriguez. At the time of signing of the mortgage deed, Tomasa wasalready dead leaving her heirs, her children.None of Tomasa’s children signed themortgage deed.

Ponce failed to pay theamortizations due. RFC took steps to extra-

judicially foreclose the mortgagedproperties. Upon foreclosure, RFC

purchased the Paranaque lot.Prior to the expiration of the one-

year period redemption period, FS offered torepurchase the PQUE lot for P14,000, but

the bank (RFC) rejected the offer. RFCscheduled the public sale of the lot.

In 1956, Ponce filed the presentaction questioning the validity of the sheriff’sforeclosure sale, and requesting a writ of P.I.to restrain RFC from carrying out itsschedule sale.

The Sorianos filed a 3rd partycomplaint contending that the mortgage wasvoid insofar as FS is concerned for lack of consideration; and that the PQUE lotbelonged to the conjugal property, and thatTomasa was already dead at the time… andthe heirs who have inherited it have notsigned the mortgage contract.

The TC dismissed Ponce’scomplaint, and declared the mortgage of 1/2of the PQUE lot of void because it belongsto the heirs of Tomasa. All the three partiesappealed.

Issues: WON the TC erred in voiding thesale to the RFC of the PQUE lot, upon theground that the same formed part of theconjugal partnership of the Soriano spouses.

Held/ Ratio Decidendi : The TC erred inapplying the said presumption. The sale toRFC is valid.

It appears that the property wasregistered in the name of “Francisco Sorianomarried to Tomasa Rodriguez,” and thatbased on this fact alone, the TC presumed

that it belongs to the conjugal partnership.The TC erred in applying the saidpresumption.

We should not overlook the fact thatthe title to said property was not a transfer certificate of title, but an original one, issuedin accordance with a decree which, pursuantto law, merely confirms a pre-existing title.Said OCT does not establish, therefore, thetime of acquisition of the PQUE property bythe registered owner thereof.

REYES VS. REYES,

17 SCRA 1099 (1966)

Facts: Mateo, Juan and Francisco Reyesare the registered owners of several parcelsof land covered by OCT No.s 22161 and8066. In 1962, Mateo and Juan filed a



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motion for the issuance of writs of possession over all the lots against Raval.Raval adnmitted that he was in possessionof 22161 but not of 8066, although he isentitled to the possession of both, havingacquired by way of absolute sale fromFrancisco the latter’s undivided 1/3 interestto these discputed lots.

The CFI issued the writes of possession. Raval did not appeal.Subsequently, petuitioners filed an action torecover the products of the disputed landagainst Raval. Raval filed a counter-claimfor partition of the said lots, alleging that heis the co-owner of the properties.

Issues: Who between the petitioners or respondent has a better right to thepossession or custody of the disputedowners’ duplicate of certificates of title?

Held/ Ratio Decidendi : Petitioners areentitled to the possession.

While we agree that the disputedlots are subjects of litigation, we see no validreason to justify, on this ground, thewithholding from the registered owners,such as the petitioners herein, the custodyand possession of the owners’ duplicates of certificates of title.

In a decided case, this court hasalready held that the owner of the land inwhose favor and in whose name said land is

registered and inscribed in the certificate of title has more preferential right to thepossession of the owners’ duplicate thanone whose name does not appear in thecertificate and has yet to establish his rightto the possession thereto.

It being undisputed that respondenthad already availed of an independent civilaction to recover his alleged co-owner’sshare in the disputed lots by filing acounterclaim for partition, his rights appear to be amply protected; and considering thathe may also avail of the provision on notice

of lis pendens for the purpose of recordingthe fact that the lots covered by titles inquestion are litigated in the said Civil case,we again see no justifiable reason for reason for respondent to retain the custody

of the owner’s duplicates of certificates of title.

NATIONAL GRAINS AUTHORITY VS. IAC,157 SCRA 380 (1991)

Facts: In 1971, spouses Vivas executed adeed of sale with a right of repurchase infavor of spouses Magcamit, with a conditionthat the balance of P40,000 was to be paidthe moment the certificate of title is issuedand delivered to the vendees. TheMagcamits have remained in peacefulpossession of the property since then.

In 1975, the OCT covering thesubject property was issued in the names of spouses Vivas w/o the knowledge of theMagcamits. Vivas mortgaged the propertyto the petitioner.

NGA foreclosed the property, andwas able to purchase the same during theauction. TCT No. T-75171 was issued in thename of NGA. Upon learning this, SpousesMagcamit offered to pay P40,000 to Vivasbut the latter refused. NGA claims it is nowthe owner of the property in question. NGAfiled an ejectment suit against Magcamit.

Issues: WON violation of the terms of agreement between the Vivas and theMgcamits to deliver the certificate of title tothe vendees upon its issuance, constitutes a

breach of trust sufficient to defeat the titleand right acquired by NGA, an innocentpurchaser for value.

Held/ Ratio Decidendi : No. NGA won. Itis axiomatic that while the registration of theconditional sale with right of repurchase maybe binding on third persons, it is by provisionof law “understood to be without prejudice toa 3rd party who has a better right”. In thiscase, it will be noted that the 3rd party NGAis a registered owner under the TorrensSystem and has obviously a better right than

private respondents, and that the deed of sale with the suspensive condition is notregistered and is necessarily binding only onthe spouses Vivas and Magcamits.

Registration of title to land under theTorrens System is an action in rem, not in



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personam. Hence personal notice to all isnot necessary..

Where there is nothing on thecertificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or anyencumbrance thereon, the purchaser neednot explore further than what the torrens titleupon its face indicates in quest for anyhidden defect or inchoate right.

Indefeasibility

HEIRS OF VENCILAO VS. CA,(APRIL 1, 1998)

Facts: In 1990, Vencilao filed an action for quieting of title against the spousesGepalago. Complaint was amended to

include an action for reconveyance andcancellation of title.LV claims to have purchased the

land from PNB; and that they are theregistered owners of the land.

The TC appointed a commissioner to survey the property. The commissioner reported that out of the 22,400 sq. m.property claimed by the Vencilaos,Gepalagos were the registered owners. TCruled in favor of the Vencilaos, since theyhave been in possession for more than 30years. CA reversed.

Issues: Who is entitled to the land?

Held/ Ratio Decidendi : Gepalagos areentitled to the land. As a general rule,where the certificate of title is in the name of the vendor when the land is sold, thevendee for value has the right to rely onwhat appears on the face of the title. He isunder no obligation to look beyond thecertificate of title. Exception is when there isanything in the certificate w/c indicates anycloud or vice in the ownership of theproperty.

LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MININGCOMPANY V DUMYUNG, ROD OF

BAGUIO & CFI OF BAGUIO,89 SCRA 532

Facts: Republic of the Phil filed a case for

annulment of 3 free patents on the ground of misrepresentation and false dates andinformations furnished by defendants,Manuel Dumyung, Fortunato Dumyung andDumyung Bonayan. The Rod was made aformal party defendant. Leopant filedmotions for intervention, alleging that aportion of the titled lands in question iswithin the intervenor’s ordinary timber license, and the other portion beingembraced in its mineral claims.

Before the hearing on the 3 civilclaims, Republic filed 3 criminal cases for falsification of public documents, for allegedly making untrue statements in their applications for free patents. The civil caseswere then suspended.

The trial court then dismissed thecriminal case for insufficiency of evidence.

As a result, the defendants filed a motion todismiss the 3 civil cases saying that: (1) thedismissal of the criminal cases also resultedin the dismissal of these civil cases; (2) thecourt has no jurisdiction over the casebecause the certificates of title can no longer be assailed; (3) Leopanto has no legalinterest in the matter.

The CFI then DISMISSED the civilcases ruling that the free patents dulyregistered were indefeasible, as in theTorrens system. Hence, this petition.

Issues: WON the original certificates of titleheld by respondents were indefeasible

WON the respondents are entitledto the benefits of RA 3872

WON the acquittal of therespondents in the criminal cases also

meant extinction of civil cases

Held/ Ratio Decidendi : Case REMANDEDto TC for reception of evidence.



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(1) and (2) No. Under CA 141. timber andmineral lands are NOT alienable or disposable. The principal factual issueraised by the Republic and the intervenor isthat the lands covered by the patents andcertificates of title are timber and minerallands and, therefore, inalienable. Withoutreceiving evidence, the TC dismissed the 3civil cases on the ground that the freepatents were duly registered in the ROD andas such, enjoy the same privileges andsafeguards as the torrens title. And even inits dismissal of the Motion for Reconsideration, it used RA 3872,liberalizing the free patent provisions of thePublic Land Act in favor of the nationalcultural minorities. The SC emphasized thatthe trial court’s assumption that therespondents are protected by RA 3872 isWITHOUT any factual basis. There is no

evidence that respondents are members of the national cultural minorities, that theyhave continuously and cultivated the landsand that they are not the owner of any landsecured or disposable under the Public Land

Act. These QUALIFICATIONS must first beestablished. Thus, it was premature for thetrial court to render that decision. It is well-settled that a certificate of title is void when itcovers property of public domain classifiedas forest or timber and mineral lands. Anytitle issued on non-disposable lots even inthe hands of innocent purchaser for value,

shall be cancelled.

(3) No. The acquittal of the respondents inthe criminal cases for falsification is NOT abar to the civil cases. The criminal casesdealt with falsification using evidence toprove the crime beyond reasonable doubt.Herein, the factual issues are WON lands inquestion are timber or mineral lands and WON respondents are entitled to thebenefits of RA 3872 .

FLORENTINO REYES, ET AL V COURT

OF APPEALS, JACINTA, PAULA,PETRA REYES, 258 SCRA 651

(1996)

Facts: On July 29, 1970, a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Settlement was

allegedly entered into between petitioner Florentino and his sisters (Jacinta, Paulaand Petra). The subject of the allegedpartition was a parcel of land located inMakati, originally registered in the name of their father, Bernardino Reyes. The Deedstipulated that the sisters waived their rights,interests and participation in favor of Florentino. In the deed, a share of 50 m2

was given to Paula. Petitioner thenregisitered the deed and obtained a TCT inhis name, leaving the 50 m2 in the name of Paula.

May 1985, respondents discoveredthe registration of said deed and deniedhaving any knowledge of its execution anddisclaimed having signed the deed andhaving waived their rights. Paula likewisedenied any participation and reiterated that itwas fraudulently prepared by petitioner and

that their signatures were forged. It wasalso asserted that the Notary Public whosigned was not listed as accredited NotaryPublic.

Petitioner, however, even executeda Deed of Absolute Sale and sold someportion to his children. Later on, there wasallegedly another Deed of Partition dividingthe property (participated by Florentino, hischildren and Paula).

As a result, private respondents fileda Complaint for Annulment of Sale andDamages with Prayer for Preliminary

Injunction/ Restraining Order. The Lower Court enjoined the ROD from issuing anddelivering the TCTs and subsequently ruledthat Florentino forged and simulated thecontroversial documents, thereafter orderingthat the documents involved are null andvoid. CA affirmed this decision. Hence, thispetition.

Issues: WON the lower court erred in rulingthat the deed was forged

WON the petitioner acquired the

land by prescription, despite the forgery

Held/ Ratio Decidendi: PETITIONDISMISSED.



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(1) No. Petitioners failed to convincinglyoverturn the factual findings of the lower court -- (a) the signatures were done by oneperson; (b) the acknowledgment was signedby a notary public who was never commissioned as such and no record of thedeed was ever done; (c) the word Pasay,Rizal was superimposed on the wordMakati; (d) the residence certificates wereobtained in Pasay City instead of Makati; (e)the group picture shown could have beentaken on another occasion and notnecessarily before signing the deed.Clearly, the question to be resolved here is aquestion of fact beyond the SC’s power todecide. (Question of Law: when doubt or difference arises as to what the law ispertaining to the case vs Question of Facts:when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of alleged facts) As cited in Chua

Tiong Tay, the SC can only review factualfindings on 10 occasions. Thus, this being apurely question of fact and not covered inthe exceptions, the SC cannot takecognizance of this case. What further strengthens the case of forgery is the factthat CA affirmed the findings. As to theclaim that there was no allegation of deception, the SC held that forgery andsimulation was precisely arrant deception.

And as regards the allegation that adocument duly notarized cannot beimpugned, the SC deemed it baseless,

saying that there was a finding of fact that itwas notarized by an unaccredited NotaryPublic and was not recorded accordingly.

(2) No. The provisions on acquisitiveprescription (Arts 1117 and 1134) will notapply in this case. Petitioners cannot justifytheir ownership and possession of the landsince they did not meet an essentialrequisite, cited in Art 526 -- that of GOODFAITH. The forgery and simulation cannotbe the basis for issuing a just title. Likewise,there can be no acquisitive prescription

considering that the parcel of land in disputeis titled property -- in the name of their father Bernardino, which Florentino does not deny.

As such, their title cannot defeat the realrights of the respondents through their father. In fact, there was not even any

adverse possession since respondentscontinued to reside in the property.

Prescription

Art. 47 of PD 1529 explicitly provides

that title to registered land cannot beacquired by prescription or adversepossession. This is to be contrasted fromunregistered lands and/or publicagricultural lands which can be acquiredthrough adverse, notorious continuouspossession under a claim of ownership for the period fixed by the Public Land Act(CA 141).

SULPICIA JIMENEZ AND TORIBIOMATIAS V VICENTE FERNANDEZ

AND TEDORA GRADO,

184 SCRA 190 (1990)

Facts : The land in question is the easternportion of a 436 m2 residential land locatedin Pangasinan, covered by a TCT under thename of Suplicia Jimenez. The entire landwas originally owned by Fermin Jimenezwho had two sons (Fortunato and Carlos).Fortunato predeceased his father and hadonly one child (Sulpicia). After Fermin’sdeath, the entire land was registered in thename of Carlos and Sulpicia in equal sharespro-indiviso. Later on, Carlos died and

passed possession of the eastern part to hisillegitimate daughter (Melecia) who later soldit to Cagampan then to Grado. Sulpicia, onthe other hand, executed an affidavitadjudicating unto herself the other half of theproperty appertaining to Carlos uponmanifestation that she is the only legal heir of Carlos. Consequently, TCT was issued inSulpicia’s name alone. Sulpicia then filed acase to recover possession of said land fromMelecia. The lower court dimissedSulpicia’s claim, which the Court of Appealsaffirmed. Hence, this petition.

Issues: WON Melecia Jimenez has a rightover the parcel of land

WON the lower court erred indeclaring Grado as the absolute owner citing

Arcuico case (prescription) and laches



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Held: Petition GRANTED.

(1) Melecia has no right. Melecia is anillegitimate daughter of Carlos and could nothave validly acquired the land nor legallyeffect any transfer of it. Only a legitimate,legitimated, adopted or acknowledgednatural child has successional rights. Thiswas embodied in the law then in force (1889Civil Code).

(2) The court erred in relying on the Arcuinocase, concluding that respondents acquiredthe property under litigation by prescription.This cannot be applied in this case becauseherein, Suplicia was a title holder since 1933while in the Arcuino case plaintiffs were notregistered owners. As such, Sulpicia’s titleover the property remained good and

continued to be good when she segregatedinto a new title. Sulpicia’s title beingcovered by the Torrens System could never be defeated by Melecia’s possession nomatter how long. The right of Sulpicia,therefore, is imprescriptible and not barredunder the doctrine of laches. Laches is anequity case, whose application depends ona case-to-case basis and depends on thecourt’s discretion. In the case at bar, thedoctrine is NOT applicable. After all, theprofessed objective of Act 496 (LRA,Torrens System) is to establish the stability

of the landholding system in the Philippines(maintaining the confidence of the people intheir titles). And to this end, the Court ruledthat the right of the appellee to file an actionto recover possession based on its Torrenstitle is imprescriptible and not barred under the doctrine of laches.

URBANO JAVIER, LEONILA ALBIELA VHON. CONCEPCION, HON. AREYES, HON. L REYES, LIM

CHUA, TAN TIAN ON,TAN SIOK

TAN, 94 SCRA 212 (1979)

Facts: On October 17, 1959, respondentsas plaintiffs (Chua, Tan Tian On, Tan SiokTan) filed against herein petitioners with theCFI of Quezon, for reconveyance of a parcel

of land with improvements thereon known asLot 12 and an accounting and recovery of the produce of the land possessed by hereinpetitioners since 1945. Lot 12 is allegedlypart of Lot 6 covered by TCT 16817. InExpediente Nos. 1509 and 1679, said Lot 12was ordered excluded for the reason thatrespondents then were deemed owners of said land.

Defendants then, now petitioners,denied the material averments of thecomplaint and pointed out that Lot 12 couldnever be a part of Lot 6 because betweenthe two lots there exists a big river. It wasalso alleged that Lot 6 was situated withinthe jurisdiction of Dolores, Quezon while Lot12 was situated within the jurisdiction of Candelaria, Quezon. As special defenses,defendants-petitioners alleged that theyacquired Lot 12 partly by purchase and

partly by inheritance; that they have titlegranted by the Spanish government; that thelot was adjudicated to them by CFI of Tayabas; that they have declared the landfor tax purposes; that they have cleared,cultivated and planted on these lands; thatplaintiffs were never the owners of this land,and even if a portion thereof was included intheir title, it was done thru fraud and deceitby making it appear in the application and inthe notices that said Lot 6 belonged to themand is within the jurisdiction of Dolores,Quezon.

The Lower Court found that Lot 12is part of Lot 6 and was accordinglyadjudicated to plaintiffs. This is confirmedby the Commissioner’s Report as maifestedby the Chief Surveyor. Also, it was pointedout that defendant knew that the land iswithin Lot 6 and covered by a title in favor of palintiffs since 1924 -- so, when he filed hisopposition, he did not act in good faith anddid not occupy the land for 30 years(so noprescription). Indeed, no title to registeredland may be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. The CA affirmed this

finding. Hence, this petition.

Issues: WON there was fraud or misrepresentation in the procurement of theTCT



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WON the case is barred by statuteof limitations or by laches

Held/ Ratio Decidendi: Decision affirmed,with modification

(1) No. The existence of actual or positivefraud is a question of fact, and respondentcourt having ruled out the same, the SC hasno basis to sustain the defendants-petitioners’ contention. Lot 12 was clearlyfound to be part and parcel of Lot 6, for which TCT was issued to plaintiffs-respondents and registered in 1941.Likewise, the decree of registration has longbecome final, absent a showing that thesame was questioned within one year after thereof was made. Under Sec 38, a personallegedly defrauded has a year to file acase. Thus, even assuming arguendo that

there was actual or positive fraud in securingthe title, the defendants-petitioners are nowbarred from questioning the same.

(2) No. As the land in registration wascovered by the Torrens System and dulyregistered, the decree of registration can nolonger be impugned on the ground of fraud,error or lack of notice, AFTER the lapse of one year.

Indeed, it is an established rule thatone cannot acquire title to a registered landby prescription or adverse title when

covered by a Torrens tile. Adverse,notorious, continuous possession under claim of ownership fo rthe period fixed bythe law is ineffective against a torrens titleand it is likewise settled that the right tosecure possession under a decree of registration does not prescribe (TuasonCase)

As regards equitable doctrine of laches, it will NOT apply as against theregistered owners. The reliance on Mejia deLucas Case was misplaced becaus ethecircumstance attendant in that case was not

present in this case. The 37 year possession in the case cited and interveningrights of third persons who may beprejudiced due to series of transfers effectedallows the application of laches. But thiswas not the case herein.

* Petitioners, however did not act in bad faithin occupying the land in question (finding of fact), and possession in bad faith onlystarted in 1959 when judicial summons wereserved. As such, in the interest of justice,petitioners are entitled to accounting andreimbursement of necessary and usefulexpenses during its occupation of the land ingood faith.

Collateral Attack

A certificate of title cannot besubject to a collateral attack. It cannot bealtered, modified or canceled except in adirect proceeding in accordance with law.(Sec. 48, PD 1529)

HALILI VS. CIR,257 SCRA 174

FACTS: The original controversy arosewhen the Halili Bus Drivers and ConductorsUnion (PTGWO) filed claims for unpaidovertime pay for 897 Union membersagainst Fortunato Halili. The latter died,thus the claims were made against hisestate. The Union and the administratrix of the estate reached an amicable agreementwhereby the Administratrix would transfer to

the employees title to a tract of land coveredby TCT36389 in Caloocan + additionalamount of P25,000. The administratrixexecuted a Deed of Conveyance of RealProperty, transferring it to the Union. TheUnion requested from the Minister of Labor the authority to sell and dispose of theproperty. Granted. Atty. Pineda,representing the Union, filed a motion withMOLE praying for authority to sell the land toManila Memorial Park Cemetary (MMPCI).Granted by labor arbiter Valenzuela. Titlewas transferred in the name of MMPCI. In aresolution, the SC set aside the orders of labor arbiter Valenzuela saying it was issuedw/o due process of law. Union filed acomplaint with NLRC to compel MMPCI toreconvey the property. NLRC refused totake cognizance of the case (outside of



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jurisdiction). Petitioners thus filed theinstant petition seeking reconveyance.

ISSUE: 1. WON there was jurisdiction ---no, there was none.

2. WON validity of MMPCI’s titlecan be attacked. – no!

RATIO: The petition should definitely bedismissed because the property wasregistered under the Torrens System of registration in the name of MMPCI. Thebest proof of ownership is the Certificate of Title.

Sec 48 of PD 1529 (Prop RegDecree) provides that “a certificate of titleshall not be subject to collateral attack. Itcannot be altered, modified or canceledexcept in a direct proceeding in accordancewith law.”

The Certificate of title, in theabsence of fraud, is the evidence of title andshows the real interest of its owner. Thepetition of the Union seeks for reconveyance, thus in effect seeking thenullification of MMPCI’s title… aba di pwedeyan! This is a collateral attack w/c is notpermitted under the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title.

* additional: 1. The portions of the land havealready been sold out to individual lot buyers(innocent purchasers for value).

H. Cadastral Proceedings

A cadastral proceeding, asdistinguished from a land registrationproceeding, is one where the petition for registration is filed by the government andnot by the persons claiming ownership of the lands subject thereof.

However, as in land registrationproceedings, the objective in cadastral

proceedings is the adjudication of title tolands involved in said proceeding.Cadastral proceedings are in rem, and

judgments therein are binding on thewhole world.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS BENITEZ, 16SCRA 557 (1960)

FACTS: In cadastral proceedings by theDirector of Lands before the CFI, SpousesBenitez and Brillo were declared owners of aparcel of land in tacloban. Decision wasrendered on Dec 29, 1932. 26 years after,they filed a petition before the samecadastral court for reopening of theproceedings. They claim that throughinadvertence, they failed to include a portion(1,805sq m) thus it should be adjudicated tothem pursuant to RA 931. Court admittedthe petition and set the petition for hearing. It

ordered copies of the petition be furnished tothe Solgen, provincial fiscal of Leyte andTacloban.

Cadastral Court granted the petition. Itdeclared the couple as owners of theadditional portion. Spouses moved for writof execution. Occupants of the additionalportion opposed, disputing the validity of thedecision. They were 62 occupants by virtueof permits granted by the Dir. of Lands.Solgen also opposed citing lack of

jurisdiction for the reopening of theproceedings because there was no requisitepublication. Both were denied. MFR.Denied. Present petition.

ISSUE: was there Jurisdiction?

RATIO: The petition to reopen cadastralproceedings is a matter of right granted byRA 931 as long as it is filed within due time.RA 931, parties are given a period of 10years to file a petition for reopening theproceedings in case there was failure to filea claim in the first proceedings. However,the petition must be filed in the same

cadastral proceedings, with the sameprocedures. Thus, it is necessary thatnotice be given to those persons who claiman adverse interest in the land sought to beregistered, as well as to the general public,



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by publishing such notice in 2 successiveissues of the OG, and posting it in aconspicuous place in the land to besurveyed, as well as in the municipalbuilding.

Publication is one of the essential bases of the court’s jurisdiction.

VALISNO VS PLAN

FACTS: In 1964, petitioner-spousesFlordeliza and Valisno purchased 2 parcelsof land from the legal heirs of AgapitoBlanco. They declared the two parcels intheir name for taxation purposes andexercised exclusive possession thereof inthe concept of owners by installing acaretaker (Fermin Lozano). In 1968, privaterespondent Cayaba ousted Lozano from theland. He claims ownership by virtue of adeed of sale in his favor. He then erected a6-door apartment on the land. Petitioner filed complaint for recovery of possession.Resolved in favor of petitioners. CAreversed the decision and dismissedcomplaint, ruling that the land occupied byCayaba has not been successfully identifiedwith the land described in the complaint. CAalso ruled that being the actual possessor of the property, Cayaba possesses it with a

just title. CA gives more weight to Cayaba’sevidence.

In 1979. Cayaba applied for registration inhis name. Petitioners filed opposition. MTD(ground: prior judgment). Granted.Opposition was dismissed. Instant petition.

ISSUE: WON dismissal was proper. – YES.

RATIO: It must be noted that the oppositionpartakes of the nature of an answer with acounterclaim. In ordinary civil cases, thecounterclaim would be considered acomplaint, this time with the original

defendant becoming the plaintiff. Theoriginal plaintiff, who becomes defendant inthe counterclaim may either then answer thecounterclaim or be declared in default, or may file a motion to dismiss the same. Thelatter choice was what respondent Cayaba

opted for. Although such situation rarely, if ever, happens in land registration cases, theirregularity that petitioners complain of stems basically from the infrequent use of amotion to dismiss in land registration cases,and not from it being unauthorized.

There was, in fact, res judicata. With respectto the subject matter, there can be noquestion that the land sought to berecovered by petitioners are the very sameparcels of land being sought to be registeredin Cayaba's and Noriega's names. While thecomplaint in the first action is captioned for recovery of possession, the allegations andthe prayer for relief therein raise the issue of ownership, In effect, it is in the nature of anaction reinvidicatoria. The second case is for registration of title. Consequently, betweenthe two cases there is identity of causes of

action because in action reinvidicatoria,possession is sought on the basis of ownership and the same is true inregistration cases. Registration of title inone's name is based on ownership. In bothcases, the plaintiff and the applicant seek toexclude other persons from ownership of theland in question. The only difference is thatin the former case, the exclusion is directedagainst particular persons, while in the latter proceedings, the exclusion is directedagainst the whole world. Nonetheless, thecause of action remains the same.

* Abellera vs. Farol ruled that "while in acadastral case, res judicata is available to aclaimant in order to defeat the alleged rightsof another claimant, nevertheless, prior

judgment can not be set up in a motion todismiss." This ruling is now abandoned;reversed by this case.

DURAN VS. OLIVA,3 SCRA 154 (1961)

Facts: (SUPRA)

Held: By express provision of Rule 132 of the ROC, the rules contained therein applyto land registration and cadastral cases insuppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. The LRA does



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not provide for a pleading similar or corresponding to a motion to dismis. As amotion to dismiss is necessary for theexpeditious termination of land registrationcases, said motion can be availed of by theparties.

The primary and fundamentalpurpose of the Torrens System of registration is to finally settle the titles toland and put to stop any question of legalityof title thereto. Pursuant to this purpose, ahomestead patent once registered under theLRA cannot be the subject matter of acadastral proceeding, and any title issuedthereon is null and void.

Hearing, judgment and Decree (Sec.38)

WIDOWS AND ORPHANS ASSOCIATIONINC., (WIDORA) VS. CA, ORTIGAS

& CO., 201 SCRA 165 (1991)

Facts: Widora filed an application for registration of a land they acquired from theheirs of Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.Molina and Oritgas & Co. separatelyopposed claiming ownership. Ortigas filed amotion to dismiss alleging that the court hadno jurisdiction, the land being applied for having been already registered under theTorrens System (TS). MTD denied and the

case was set for hearing. TC believesOrtigas’ TCTs were derived form OCT 337,19, 336, 334 (as it appears on its face)pursuant to Decree 1425, NOT OCT 351 asclaimed by Ortigas. If it were really derivedfrom OCT 351 then why didn’t Ortigas havethe same corrected? And besides, Decree1425 covers land which is 4 km. away fromthe land being applied for. So if there was novalid decree of registration, Ortigas’ TCTscannot be valid.

Ortigas brought the case to the CAon certiorari, prohibition and mandamus and

the CA reversed the TC decision anddismissed the case. The CA believedOrtigas’ TCTs are actually derived from OCT351, the latter being issued pursuant toDecree 1425 and that since OCT 351 is acopy of Decree 1425, even though a copy of

Decree 1425 cannot be presented in courtdoes not mean Decree 1425 was not issuedand OCT 351 would suffice to show that adecree of registration was made. Soaccording to the CA, as far as Lots 7 and 8are concerned Ortigas’ TCTs refer to OCT351 and the CA ordered that the mistake inthe TCTs be corrected.

Issue: WON Ortigas’ TCTs are validdespite the absence of a supporting decreeof registration.

Held: No. CA judgment set aside.

Ratio: The evidence presented by Ortigasto prove the existence of a decree of registration is merely secondary (i.e. theplan, testimony of surveyor and OCT 351).Ortigas must satisfy requisites to justify

admission of secondary evidence (1.Execution 2. Lost or destroyed or possession of adverse party). Ortigas’evidence should not have been admitted inthe first place.

A ground for dismissal based ondisputed facts (WON the TCT’s of Ortigaswas supported by a decree of registrationspecifically by Decree 1425) is not a groundfor dismissal. The resolution of thiscontroversy calls for a full-blown trial toafford the parties a day in court.

An order denying a motion to

dismiss is merely interlocutory thus notproper for the an extraordinary writ of prohibition. Interlocutory orders cannot bereviewed by the CA until the LC shall havedecided the merit of the case.

The mistakes that appear in Ortigas’TCTs cannot be corrected except by order of the court in a petition filed for the purposeand entitled in the original case in which thedecree of registration was entered. Thecourt is not authorized to alter or correct acertificate of title if it would mean thereopening of the decreed of registration

beyond the period allowed by law.Respondent court committed a procedurallapse.

The rule that a land registrationcourt has no jurisdiction over parcels of landalready covered by certificate of Title applies



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only where there exists no seriouscontroversy as to the certificate’sauthenticity vis-a-vis the land coveredtherein.

GABRIEL VS. CA, PETRITA PASCUAL,RUDYARDO SANTIAGO,159 SCRA 461 (1988)

Facts: A survey was made for SantiagoQuimson. Land was registered under hisname and an OCT was issued by theRegistry of Deeds. Subsequently acadastral survey (Orani survey) wasconducted which resulted in an increase inthe land. The Cadastral court confirmedQuimson’s title. The lot was subdivided andsubsequently acquired by Eligio Naval.Potenciano Gabriel had a parcel of landsurveyed (2,792,712 sq m designated asPsu 9742) and later it was amended toexclude portions of land owned by Quimson.OCT 1264 with a reduced area (2,436,280sq m) was issued to Gabriel. Another cadastral survey was conducted (Hermosasurvey) and Gabriel’s lot covered by Psu-9742 became Lot No. 557 with a further reduced area (2,096,433 sq m) but no newcertificate of title was issued such that theOCT 1264 continued to subsist with an areaof 2,436,280 sq m. Gabriel passed awayand his heirs (petitioners) divided the land

according to Psu 9742 under OCT 1264(includes land owned by Naval). Petitionersfiled a complaint against Pascual andSantiago (administrators of Naval estate)claiming that respondents usurped the landand that the land was merely loaned to therespondents for dike and water controlpurposes of the latter’s fishpond. The TCdismissed the complaint on the ground thatthe land was in the possession of Naval inthe concept of an owner and the petitioner’sclaim that the land was loaned to Naval wasnot supported by sufficient evidence.

Further the TC found that the right of petitioners was lost by prescription and thatthey were guilty of laches. TC ORDEREDTHE NECESSARY CORRECTION OF THETECHINICAL DESCRIPTION TO MAKE IT

CONFORM TO THE CORRECT AREA. CAaffirmed.

Issue: WON the courts have the authorityto order the necessary corrections of anerroneous techinical description and make itconform to the correct area.

Held: Yes. Petition dismissed. Decisionaffirmed.

Ratio: In cadastral cases, jurisdiction of thecourt over lands already registered is limitedto the necessary correction of technicalerrors in the description of lands, providedsuch corrections do not impair thesubstantial rights of the registered owner,and that such jurisdiction cannot operate todeprive a registered owner of his title. Thecourt also has the power to determine the

priority of overlapping or over-layingregistered title. This power is necessary for a complete settlement of the title to the land,which is the express purpose of cadastralproceedings. Furthermore, in the case atbar, it was not as if the court reopened or setaside a final decree. Therefore the action of the lower court in correcting the error in thetechnical description appearing in Psu 9742is well within its jurisdiction.

The fact that Gabriel did not own theland is shown by the Hermose and OraniCadastre, and by the behavior of Gabriel

himself (even after discovering occupationhe allowed Naval to use and occupy theland). The claim that the land was loanedwas supported by mere oral evidence whichthe SC believes to be insufficient to defeattitle and possession of registered owners.

For failure to prosecute their claimsfor 20 years, petitioners have lost by lachestheir right to recover their property.

REPUBLIC AND DIR. OF LANDS VS.JUDGE ESTENZO

158 SCRA 282 (1988)

Facts: Oct. 31, 1940 Cadastral Courtdeclared Lot No. 8423 of the OrmocCadastral as public land. 32 years later (Jan12, 1972) spouses Adolfo filed a petition to



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re-open the Oct. 31, 1940 decision. Spousesclaimed ownership by virtue of havingpurchased it and as evidenced by a deed of quitclaim and confirmation dated August 28,1969, likewise alleging that due to accident,mistake, and excusable neglect of theprevious claimant, the land was declaredpublic. Director of Lands appeared asoppositor. Judge adjudicated Lot No. 8423in favor of spouses. Rep. and Dir. appealsby certiorari. Petitoner claims spouses’petition is barred by the expiration of theperiod for reopening of cadastralproceedings under RA 931 (Dec. 31, 1968).

Issue: WON spouses are barred.

Held: Yes. Decision set aside.

Ratio: Spouses filed their petition more

than 3 years after the lapse of thereglementary period required by the law.The period having expired, respondent

judge was without jurisdiction when heentertained spouses’ petition to re-open thedecision of the cadastral court.

Spouses claim that assuming theLC has no jurisdiction to re-open thecadastral proceedings their petition may betaken as one for confirmation of imperfecttitle considering the allegation contained inthe complaint. But looking into their petition,the spouses’ cause of action is premised on

RA 931 because it conforms with theconditions to be met before one can avail of the provisions of RA 931 therefore thepetition filed by the spouses cannot be onefor confirmation of imperfect title. If it were aconfirmation of imperfect title, spouses cantake advantage of the extension of periodgranted by RA 6236 (Dec. 31, 1976) but thatlaw does not apply to re-opening of cadastral cases.

Requirements of the rules relative toperfection of appeal in an ordinary caseapply in the same manner to appeals from a

decision of a court of first instance inregistration and cadastral proceedings.Hence, from Aug. 28, 1972 when theassailed decision was received by hereinpetitioners until Sept. 15, 1972 when the

petition was filed, the 30 period had not yetelapsed.

I. Lost or Destroyed Certificates

Lost or Destroyed Certificates(Sec.109, PD 1529)

- In case of loss or theft of an owner’sduplicate certificate of title

-Due notice under oath is required to besent to Reg. of Deeds where land issituated as soon as loss or theft isdiscovered

-Petition to be filed by registered owner or other person in interest

-Notice and hearing required

Reconstitution of Lost or DestroyedOriginal Copies of Certificate of Title

-Denotes restoration of the instrumentwhich is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original form and condition

-Purpose is to have the same reproduced,after proper proceedings, in the sameform they were when the loss or destruction occurred.

OCAMPO V. GARCIA,105 PHIL. 533

FACTS: Appellees ask for the

issuance of another duplicate certificate TCTwhich was lost in the liberation of Manila.They ask as well that the two encumbrances(re appointment of special administrator andsum due to a judgment creditor) thereon



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because such encumbrances no longer existor have been satisfied.

HELD: There is no question that under theforegoing quoted provisions of Act No. 496,the court of first instance, acting as landregistration court, may, upon petition of theregistered owner or other person in interest,after notice and hearing, and uponsatisfactory proof, direct the issuance of anew duplicate certificate of title in lieu of alost or destroyed one, and the cancellationof encumbrances on a certificate of titlewhich have terminated or ceased. Havingshown to the satisfaction of the Court thatthe owner's duplicate of transfer certificateof title No. 28709 had been lost or destroyedduring the battle for liberation of Manila, theappellees are entitled to the issuance of another owner's duplicate TCT. Having also

shown to the Court's satisfaction thatMariano Ocampo y Zamora, who had beenappointed by the probate court to administer the estate of the late Manuel Rivera y

Angeles, died in 1938, and the record of thatfact on the back of the certificate of titlewould serve no useful purpose, theappellees may ask for the cancellationthereof and the Court commits no error indirecting the cancellation of the annotationon the certificate of title of theadministrator's appointment by the probatecourt.

SERRA V. CA,195 SCRA 482

RECONSTITUTION OF TITLE; PURPOSE.— The purpose of the reconstitution of anydocument, book or record is to have thesame reproduced, after observing theprocedure prescribed by law in the sameform they were when the loss or destructionoccurred. The reconstitution of certificates of title should be made, as just stated, in thesame form and exactly as they were at the

time they were lost or destroyed. A personwho seeks a reconstitution of a certificate of title over a property he does not actuallypossess cannot, by a mere motion for theissuance of a writ of possession, which issummary in nature, deprive the actual

occupants of possession thereof.Possession and/or ownership of the propertyshould be threshed out in a separateproceeding

RECONSTITUTION OF TITLE; ACTUAL AND PERSONAL NOTICE TO ACTUALPOSSESSORS, INDISPENSABLE. —Private respondents argue that the hereinpetitioners are bound by the order grantingreconstitution because the reconstitutionproceedings was heard after notices weresent to alleged boundary owners and thepetition was published in the OfficialGazette. However, the petitioner who werein actual possession of the properties werenot notified. Notice by publication is notsufficient as regards actual possessors of the property. In the case of AlabangDevelopment v. Valenzuela, No. 54094,

August 30, 1982, 116 SCRA 277, We heldthat in petitions for reconstitution of titles,actual owners and possessors of the landsinvolved must be duly served with actualand personal notice of the petition.

RECONSTITUTED TITLE A NULLITYWHERE NO ORIGINAL TITLE EXISTS. — If no such original title in fact exists, thereconstituted title is a nullity and the order for its reconstitution does not become finalbecause the court rendering the order hasnot acquired jurisdiction. It may be attacked

at any time. The same rule applies if in factthere is an earlier valid certificate of title inthe name and in the possession of another person/s.

REPUBLIC V CA AND YUPANGCO,OCTOBER 26, 1999

Issue: The question for decision in thiscase is whether in a proceeding for theissuance of an owner’s duplicate certificateof title, the Solicitor General is required to benotified, such that failure to give such noticewould render the proceedings void.

Held: Nothing in the law requires that theOffice of the Solicitor General be notifiedand heard in proceeding for the issuance of an owner’s duplicate certificate of title. Incontrast, §23 of the same law(PD 1529),



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involving original registration proceedings,specifically mentions the Solicitor Generalas among those who must be notified of thepetition. Similarly, §36 provides that thepetition for registration in cadastralproceedings must be filed by the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Director of Lands.

It is only now that the Solicitor General is claiming the right to be notified of proceedings for the issuance of the owner’sduplicate certificate of title. Indeed, the onlybasis for such claim is that the Office of theSolicitor General represents the governmentin land registration and related proceedings.Even so, however, the request for representation should have come from theRegistrar of Deeds of Makati who was theproper party to the case.

Considering that the law does notimpose such notice requirement inproceedings for the issuance of a newowner’s duplicate certificate of title, the lackof notice to the Solicitor General, as counselfor the Registrar of Deeds, was at most onlya formal and not a jurisdictional defect. M

J. Reconstitution of Lost or DestroyedCertificates

What is the purpose of reconstitution?

The purpose of the reconstitution of any document, book or record is to havethe same reproduced, after observing theprocedure prescribed by law in the sameform they were when the loss or destruction occurred. The reconstitutionof certificates of title should be made inthe same form and exactly as they were atthe time they were lost or destroyed.(Serra Serra v. CA, 195 SCRA 482)

How is reconstitution done?

Reconstitution may be done either judicially or administratively /extrajudicially, depending on the sourcedocument which is the basis for the

reconstitution. (See Sec. 5 of RA 26, asamended by RA 6732, as well as Sec. 10-12 of RA 26.)

What is the force and effect of areconstituted title?

A reconstituted certificate of title hasthe same validity and legal effect as theoriginal thereof. (Sec. 6, RA 26) This iswithout prejudice to any party whose rightor interest in the property was duly notedin the original at the time it was lost or destroyed, but entry or notation of whichwas not made on an extrajudiciallyreconstituted certificate of title.

Judicial Reconstitution

Judicial reconstitution partakes of aland registration proceeding and isperforce a proceeding in rem.

The procedure for judicialreconstitution is laid down in Sec.12 (contents of the petition) and 13( publication, posting, and sending by mail of the petition) of RA 26.These requirements are mandatoryand jurisdictional, and non-compliance therewith voids the

reconstitution proceedings.

What are the sources for judicialreconstitution of title?

I) For Original Certificate of Title(C.T)

In the following order:

a) Owner’s duplicate of the CT

b) Co-owner’s mortgagee’s or lessee’sduplicate of said C.T.

(Note that reconstitution based on

(a) and (b) can be done

administratively. However, Sec. 10

of RA 26 allows a petitioner to file



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directly with the RTC. Moreover,

such certificates of title

reconstituted under Sec. 10 are not

subject to the encumbrance

provided under Sec. 7 of RA 26.)

c) Certified copy of such certificate,previously issued by the Reg. Of deeds or by legal custodian thereof

d) Authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, which was thebasis of the certificate of title

e) Deed of mortgage, lease or encumbrance containing descriptionof prop covered by the CT and onfile with Reg. of Deeds, or anauthenticated copy thereof

indicating that its original had beenregistered

f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is a sufficientand proper basis for reconstitution.

II) For Transfer Certificate of TitleIn the following order:

a) The same as sources a, b and c for reconstitution of original CT

b) Deed of transfer or other documentcovered by TCT and on file with theReg. of Deeds, or an authenticatedcopy thereof indicating that itsoriginal had been registered andpursuant to which the lost or destroyed CT was issued

c) The same as sources (e) and (f) for reconstitution of original CT

Can liens and encumbrances bereconstituted?

YES. The sources for suchreconstitution are provided under Sec. 4 of RA 26. Also see Sec. 8-9 of the samelaw.

Who may file a petition for reconstitution?

A petition for reconstitution may befiled with the Register of Deeds by:

(1) the registered owner;(2) his assigns; or (3) any other person having an

interest in the property (Sec. 5,RA 26)

Can the Register of Deeds reconstitutea certificate of title motu proprio?

NO. Sec. 6 of RA 26, which gave theRegister of Deeds such power, has beenexpressly repealed by RA 6732.

When does the order of reconstitutionbecome final?

Upon 15 days from receipt by theRegister of Deeds and by the

Administrator of the Land Registration Authority of a notice of such order or judgment without any appeal having beenfiled by any of such officials. (Sec. 110,PD 1529, as amended by RA 6732)

What is the force and effect of a

fraudulently reconstituted title?

It is void ab initio as against the partyobtaining the same and all persons havingknowledge thereof. (Sec. 11, RA 6732)

What is the remedy of an aggrievedparty to a fraudulently reconstitutedtitle?

Sec. 10 of RA 6732 provides that anyinterested party who by fraud, accident,mistake or excusable negligence (FAME;

note, these are the same grounds for amotion for new trial as well as a petitionfor relief from judgment) has beenunjustly deprived or prevented from takingpart in the proceedings may file a petition



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in the proper court to set aside thedecision and to reopen the proceedings.

The petition must be verified andfiled within 60 days after the petitioner learns of the decision but not more than 6months from the promulgation thereof.

(This is the same as a petition for relief from judgment.)

Can a writ of possession issue inreconstitution cases?

NO. Reconstitution does not confirmor adjudicate ownership over the propertycovered by the reconstituted title, unlike inoriginal land registration proceedings.Thus, a person who seeks a reconstitutionof a CT over a property he does notactually possess cannot, by a mere

motion for the issuance of a writ of possession (which, it must be noted, issummary in nature) deprive the actualoccupants of possession thereof. (SerraSerra v. CA, 195 SCRA 482)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS.COURT OF APPEALS AND

ISABEL LASTIMADO, 94 SCRA865

FACTS:

1. September 11, 1967 - Lastimado filed inthe CFI a Petition for the reopening of cadastral proceedings over a portion of LotNo. 626 of the Mariveles Cadastre.

2. In the absence of any opposition,whether from the Government or fromprivate individuals, Lastimado was allowedto present her evidence ex-parte.

3. October 14, 1967- the trial Court grantedthe Petition and adjudicated the land in favor of Lastimado.

4. The trial Court issued an order for theissuance of a decree of registration onNovember 20, 1967, and on November 21,1967, the Land Registration Commission

issued Decree No. N-117573 in favor of private respondent. Eventually, OCT No. N-144 was also issued in her favor.

5. Lastimado thereafter subdivided the landinto ten lots, and the corresponding titles,TCT Nos. 18905 to 18914 inclusive, wereissued by the Register of Deeds.

6. June 3, 1968 - or within one year fromthe entry of the decree of registration, RPfiled a Petition for Review pursuant to Sec.38, Act No. 496, on the ground of fraudalleging that during the period of allegedadverse possession by private respondent,said parcel of land was part of the U.S.Military Reservation in Bataan, which wasformally turned over to the Republic of thePhilippines only on December 22, 1965, andthat the same is inside the public forest of

Mariveles, Bataan and, therefore, notsubject to disposition or acquisition under the Public Land Law.7. The trial court dismissed the petition onthe ground that the Solicitor General hadfailed to file opposition to the original.Petition for reopening the cadastralproceedings, and was therefore estoppedfrom questioning the decree of registration.The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court'sdismissal.

8. The Supreme Court set aside the

decision of the Court of Appeals as well asthe order of the trial court, and held that thetrial court should have afforded petitioner anopportunity to present evidence in support of the facts alleged to constitute actual andextrinsic fraud committed by privaterespondent. Moreover, the inaction of theSolicitor General cannot operate to bar theaction of the State as it cannot be estoppedby the mistake or error of its official or agents.

Case remanded to the lower court for further

proceedings.

HELD: The essential elements for theallowance of the reopening or review of adecree are: (1) that the petitioner has a realand dominical right; (2) that he has been



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deprived thereof; (c) through fraud; (d) thatthe petition is filed within one year from theissuance of the decree; and (e) that theproperty has not as yet been transferred toan innocent purchaser.

For fraud to justify the review of a degree, itmust be extrinsic or collateral and the factsupon which it is based have not beencontroverted or resolved in the case wherethe judgment sought to be annulled wasrendered. The fraud is one that affects andgoes into the jurisdiction of the Court.

It is error for the lower court to denythe petition for review of a decree of registration filed within one year from theentry of the decree, without hearing theevidence in support of the allegation andclaim that actual and extrinsic fraud hasbeen committed by the applicants. The

lower court should afford the petitioner anopportunity to prove it.

If the allegation of the governmentthat the land in question was inside themilitary reservation at the time it wasclaimed is true, then, it cannot be the objectof any cadastral proceeding nor can it be theobject of reopening under Republic Act No.931. Similarly, if the land in question,indeed, forms part of the public forest, then,possession thereof, however long, cannotconvert it into private property as it is withinthe exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of

Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral Court to register under the Torrens System.

The inaction or neglect of government agencies cannot operate to bar the action by the State as it cannot beestopped by the mistake or error of itsofficials or agents. The State as a persona inlaw is the juridical entity, which is the sourceof any asserted right to ownership in landunder basic Constitutional precepts, and ischarged with the conversation of suchpatrimony.

THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OFMALABON VS. THE HONORABLE

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,MALABON, 181 SCRA 788

1. March 17, 1988 - a Deed of Absolute

Sale of a property covered by TCT No. R-3899 in the name of Salome Castillo in favor of Jose M. Castillo, was presented to theRegister of Deeds in Caloocan City for registration. It could not be given due coursebecause the original of said TCT in theRegistry of Deeds was missing.

2. As the missing title covered a parcel of land in Malabon, Atty. Gaudencio Cena, theRegister of Deeds for Malabon, filed on April12, 1988 in the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, a verified petition for reconstitutionof the original of TCT No. R-3899 under Rep. Act No. 26, which was given duecourse on April 22, 1988. The court’s order setting it for hearing on August 17, 1988 wasordered to be published in two (2)consecutive issues of the Official Gazette asprovided in Section 9 of Republic Act No.26.

3. At the hearing for the purpose of establishing the jurisdictional requirement of publication of the notice of the hearing of thepetition, the petitioner submitted thefollowing exhibits:

a) a certification dated August 10,1988, of the Director of the National PrintingOffice certifying that the order dated April22, 1988 was included in Volume 84, Nos.21 and 22, May 23 and May 30, 1988 issuesof the Official Gazette;b) the sheriffs certificate of posting;andc) the registry return receipts for thecopies of the notices which were sent to theDirector of Lands, the Office of the Solicitor General, the National Land Titles and DeedsRegistration Administration (NLTDRA),

Salome Castillo, and Jose Castillo.

4. November 3, 1988 - the petitioner causedto be marked as Exhibit G the certificate of publication issued by the Director of theNational Printing Office stating that the order



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of the court dated April 22, 1988 waspublished in Volume 84, Nos. 21 and 22,May 23 and May 30, 1988 issues of theOfficial Gazette and that the May 30, 1988issue was released for circulation onOctober 3, 1988. The May 23 and May 30issues of the Official Gazette were alsomarked as Exhibits B-1 and B-2,respectively.

5. The Register of Deeds of Caloocan Citytestified that the original TCT No. R-3899had been missing from the files of his officesince 1981; that the Deed of Sale of theproperty of Salome Castillo in favor of JoseCastillo was presented for registration but itcould not be registered because the originalof TCT No. R-3899 could not be found; andthat he was authorized by the administrator of the NLTDRA to file a petition for

reconstitution of the lost original copy of TCTNo. R-3899.

6. The Regional Trial Court in Malabondismissed the petition for lack of jurisdictionbecause the notice of the petition was notpublished in the Official Gazette "at leastthirty (30) days prior to the date of hearing"(Sec. 9, R.A. No. 26) which had been set on

August 17, 1988. The May 23 and May 30issues of the Official Gazette were actuallyreleased for circulation on October 3, 1988,or forty-seven (47) days after the scheduled

hearing of the petition.

7. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 26provides:

"Sec. 9. A registered owner desiring tohave his reconstituted certificate of titlefreed from the encumbrance mentionedin section seven of this Act, may file apetition to that end with the proper Court of First Instance, giving hisreason or reasons therefor. A similar petition may, likewise, be filed by a

mortgagee, lessee or other lien holder whose interest is annotated in thereconstituted certificate of title.Thereupon, the court shall cause anotice of the petition to be published, atthe expense of the petitioner, twice in

successive issues of the OfficialGazette, and to be posted on the mainentrance of the provincial building andof the municipal building of themunicipality or city in which the landlies, at least thirty days prior to the dateof hearing, and after hearing, shalldetermine the petition and render such

judgment as justice and equity mayrequire. The notice shall specify,among other things, the number of thecertificate of title, the name of theregistered owner, the names of theinterested parties appearing in thereconstituted certificate of title, thelocation of the property, and the dateon which all persons having an interestin the property must appear and filesuch claim as they may have. Thepetitioner shall, at the hearing, submit

proof of the publication and posting of the notice."

ISSUE: Whether the actual publication of the notice of the petition in the OfficialGazette forty-seven (47) days after thehearing, instead of "at least thirty (30) daysprior to the date of hearing" was sufficient tovest jurisdiction in the court to hear anddetermine the petition.

HELD: Evidently, it did not. The purpose of the publication of the notice of the petition

for reconstitution in the Official Gazette is toapprise the whole world that such a petitionhas been filed and that whoever is mindedto oppose it for good cause may do so withinthirty (30) days before the date set by thecourt for hearing the petition. It is thepublication of such notice that brings in thewhole world as a party in the case and veststhe court with jurisdiction to hear and decideit.

In Director of Lands vs. The Court of Appeals and Demetria Sta. Maria deBernal, Greenfield Development

Corporation, Alabang Development Corporation and Ramon Bagatsing (102SCRA 370), this Court ruled that "in allcases where the authority of the courts toproceed is conferred by a statute and whenthe manner of obtaining jurisdiction is



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mandatory, it must be strictly complied with,or the proceedings will be utterly void."

Where there is a defect in the publication of the petition, such defect deprives the courtof jurisdiction (Po vs. Republic, 40 SCRA37). And when the court a quo lacks

jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case, itlacks authority over the whole case and allits aspects (Pinza vs. Aldovino, 25 SCRA220, 224).

Apart from the defective publication of thepetition, another reason for its dismissal isthat the Register of Deeds for Malabon isnot the proper party to file the petition for reconstitution. Section 6 of Republic ActNo. 26, which allowed the Register of Deedsto motu proprio reconstitute a lost or destroyed certificate of title from its

corresponding owner's duplicate certificate,was expressly repealed or declared to be"inoperative" by Section 6 of Republic Act6732, approved on July 17, 1989. A petitionfor reconstitution may now be filed only by"the registered owner, his assigns, or anyperson who has an interest in the property"(Section 12, Republic Act No. 26). In other respects, the special procedure provided inRepublic Act No. 26 remains unchangedand therefore still applies (Zuñiga vs.Vicencio, 153 SCRA 720).

JOSE MANUEL STILIANOPULOS VS. THECITY OF LEGASPI

[G.R. NO. 133913. OCTOBER 12, 1999.]

FACTS:

1. September 26, 1962 - Legaspi City filed apetition for the judicial reconstitution of itstitles to twenty parcels of land, including Lot1, the certificates of which had allegedlybeen lost or destroyed during World War II.

2. September 16, 1964 -, the trial court

ordered the Register of Deeds toreconstitute the OCTs over these lotsincluding OCT No. 665 in favor of the City.

3. August 4, 1970 - the City filed aComplaint for quieting of title over Lot 1

against Carlos V. Stilianopulos alias Chas V.Stilianopulos, Ana Estela Stilianopulos, andthe American Oxygen and AcetyleneCompany. While this case was pending,Carlos V. Stilianopulos died. As aconsequence, TCT No. T-1427 which wasregistered under his name was cancelled,and TCT No. 13448 was issued in the nameof his son, petitioner herein, on July 12,1974.

4. February 29, 1984 - the trial courtrendered its Decision, which upheld thevalidity of TCT No. 13448 and its superiorityto OCT No. 665. Thus, Stilianopulos wasdeclared the lawful owner of the disputedproperty, Lot 1, Psd-3261.

5. The CA reversed the trial court and ruledin favor of the City. Stilianopulos’ recourse to

this Court was dismissed in a MinuteResolution promulgated on August 17, 1988,12 on the ground that the issue raised wasfactual in nature.

6. Stilianopulos filed an action for thecancellation of OCT No. 665, which the trialcourt subsequently dismissed on August 15,1989 on the ground of res judicata. Onappeal, the CA affirmed the trial court,reasoning that petitioner’s action was "anaction for annulment of the order" of thereconstitution of OCT No. 665 and was

therefore not cognizable by the trial court.

7. June 13, 1994 - Stilianopulos again filedbefore the CA a new action for annulment of the September 16, 1964 Order based onthree grounds: "(1) that the Respondent Cityof Legaspi procured OCT No. 665fraudulently; (2) that the original certificateof title which was judicially reconstituted wasnon-existent: and (3) that the court whichordered the reconstitution lacked

jurisdiction."

8. The Court of Appeals ruled that "theprescriptive period for extrinsic fraud haslapsed [and] the petitioner is likewise guiltyof laches in the filing of this case for annulment."



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the possession of the petitioner’s father andwas eventually passed on to him. If acertificate of title has not been lost but is infact in the possession of another person,then the reconstituted title is void and thecourt that rendered the Decision had no

jurisdiction.However, the CA ruled that the

delay of more than twenty years sincepetitioner learned of the reconstituted titlewas unreasonable, giving rise to thepresumption that he had abandoned theidea of seeking annulment of theproceedings on the ground of lack of

jurisdiction, and that he had opted to takeother actions instead. Laches is the failureor neglect, for an unreasonable or unexplained length of time, to do that whichby exercising due diligence could or shouldhave been done earlier, warranting the

presumption that the right holder hasabandoned that right or declined to assert it.This inaction or neglect to assert a rightconverts a valid claim into a stale demand.Laches prevents a litigant from raising theissue of lack of jurisdiction. True, petitioner filed the annulment Complaint right after thedismissal of the cancellation-of-title case,but it is equally true that it was filed onlyafter the quieting-of-title case had beendecided in favor of the respondent. Byparticipating in the quieting-of-title case andarguing therein his defenses against the

legality of the title of the respondent in order to establish his rights over the disputedproperty, petitioner is deemed to havechosen this action over the annulment of thereconstitution proceedings. Annulment of the reconstitution proceedings was belatedlyresorted to only after the CA had reversedthe trial court and upheld the reconstitutedtitle of respondent. Laches bars a party frominvoking lack of jurisdiction for the first timeon appeal for the purpose of annullingeverything done, with his activeparticipation, in the case below. It cannot be

said either that the application of lacheswould work an injustice against petitioner,because he was given a fair chance in thequieting-of-title case to prove his ownershipof the disputed lot.

Furthermore, by seeking thereexamination of the ownership of thedisputed lot, petitioner accepted the

jurisdiction of the court which heard theaction for quieting of title. A litigant cannotinvoke the jurisdiction of a court to secureaffirmative relief and, after failing to obtainsuch relief, to repudiate or question thatsame jurisdiction. Clearly, laches hasattached and barred the petitioner’s right tofile an action for annulment.

We are convinced that indeed res judicata has already set in. This conclusionis the most persuasive argument raised bythe appellate court. The principle applieswhen the following elements are present (1)a judgment has became final; (2) such

judgment was rendered on the merits; (3)the court that rendered it had jurisdictionover the subject matter and the parties; and

(4) there was identity of parties, subjectmatter and causes of action between theprevious and the subsequent action. Thereis identity of cause of action between a casefor annulment of title and one for annulmentof judgment. Causes of action are identicalwhen there is an identity in the factsessential to the maintenance of the twoactions, or where the same evidence willsustain both actions. If the same facts or evidence can sustain either, the two actionsare considered the same so that the

judgment in one is a bar to the other. The

underlying objectives or reliefs sought inboth the quieting-of-title and the annulment-of-title cases are essentially the same —adjudication of the ownership of the disputedlot and nullification of one of the twocertificates of title. Thus, it becomes readilyapparent that the same evidence or set of facts as those considered in the quieting-of-title case would also be used in this Petition.The difference in form and nature of the twoactions is immaterial and is not a reason toexempt petitioner from the effects of res

judicata. The philosophy behind this rule

prohibits the parties from litigating the sameissue more than once. When a right or facthas been judicially tried and determined by acourt of competent jurisdiction or anopportunity for such trial has been given, the

judgment of the court, as long as it remains



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unreversed, should be conclusive upon theparties and those in privity with them. Verily,there should be an end to litigation by thesame parties and their privies over asubject, once it is fully and fairly adjudicated.

Administrative Reconstitution

Administrative reconstitution isthe putting together again/ restoration of the original copies of Original and Transfer Certificates of Title that were lost or destroyed due to fire, flood or other natural calamities without necessity of court proceeding.

It may be availed of only in case of substantial loss or destruction of land titles

due to fire, flood or other force majeurewhere the number of certificates of titleslost or damaged, is at least 10% of thetotal number in the custody of the Register of Deeds, but in no case shall the number of the lost or damaged titles be less than500 as determined by the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority.

What are the source documents onwhich administrative reconstitutionmay be based?

(1) The owner's duplicate of thecertificate of title; (Sec. 2a, RA26)

(2) The co-owner's mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of thecertificate of title; (Sec. 2b, RA26)

(3) For liens and other encumbrances affecting thedestroyed or lost CT, the

annotations or memorandaappearing on the owner's co-owner's mortgagee's or lessee'sduplicate. (Sec. 4a, RA 26)

What are the requirements for administrative reconstitution?

1. Owner’s duplicate copy of theOCT or TCT and 3 clear xeroxcopies. If the owner’s duplicate islost or unavailable, then the co-owner’s duplicate of title and 3

clear/legible xerox copies may besubmitted;

2. Real estate tax receiptrepresenting full payment for thelast 2 years prior to theapplication/petition;

3. Tax declaration or real property;and

4. Others (e.g. power of attorney).

What is the procedure for administrative reconstitution?

(1) The registered owner, his assigns, or other persons having an interest inthe property files a petition with theRegister of Deeds, complying with therequirements imposed by Sec. 5 of RA 26.

(2) If the Register of Deeds has no validreason to deny the petition, he/sheshall reconstitute the certificate of title

accordingly.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS.THE COURT OF APPEALS AND

ANTONINA GUIDO, 204 SCRA 160

FACTS:

1. August 22, 1979 – The RP, representedby the SolGen, filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of Decreto No. 6146,the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 2337

and all titles derived from said decree; andthe declaration of the parcel of land coveredby the decree as belonging to the state,except so much thereof as had been validlydisposed of to third persons. The complaintalleged inter alia, that:



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"15. The alleged DecreeNo. 6146 issued onSeptember 10, 1911 andthe alleged owner's copy of Transfer Certificate of TitleNo. 23377 issued on May12, 1933, both in the nameof Francisco andHermogenes Guido, andwhich supposed owner'sduplicate was made thebasis of the administrativereconstitution of TCT No.(23377) RT-M-0002 onMarch 29, 1976, or about 43years later, are false,spurious and fabricated andwere never issued by virtueof judicial proceedings for

registration of land, either under Act No. 496, asamended, otherwise knownas the Land Registration

Act, or any other law, . . ."

2. The defendants denied that Decreto No.6145 and TCT No. 23377 were false andspurious. They consistently claimed (fromthe trial court up to this Court) that the parcelof land covered by the questioned documentis a portion of the vast Hacienda de Angonoowned by their predecessor-in-interest, Don

Buenaventura Guido y Sta. Ana; that DonBuenaventura Guido left a portion of thehacienda (porcion del plano 11-627) to hisheirs, Francisco and Hermogenes Guido;that the subject matter of the petition is onlya portion of plano 11-827, and covered byDecreto No. 6145, issued on September 1,1911 in the name of the heirs of Buenaventura Guido y Sta. Ana (Franciscoand Hermogenes Guido); that on June 12,1912, OCT No. 633 was issued on the basisof Decreto No. 6145; that the original titlewas subsequently cancelled and in lieu

thereof, TCT No. 23377 was issued on May12, 1933; that the heirs of Francisco andHermogenes Guido adjudicated amongthemselves the estate left by their predecessors and transferred one-half portion thereof to Jose Rojas sometime in

1942, as contained in an Extra-judicialSettlement of Estate with Quitclaim datedDecember 17, 1973.

3. The parties, however, admit that on August 20, 1974, the heirs of BuenaventuraGuido, requested the then Land RegistrationCommission (now Land Registration

Authority) to issue the corresponding originalcertificate of title based on Decreto 6145,which was denied on January 8, 1976.

4. March 29, 1976 - Alfredo Guido,representing the other heirs, filed a petitionfor reconstitution of TCT No. 23377 with theRegistry of Deeds of Morong. The petitionalleged that the original could not be locatedin the files of the Registry of Deeds of Rizalafter he and his co-heirs sought theregistration of their Extra-judicial Settlement

with Quitclaim dated December 17, 1973.The petition was supported by theowner's duplicate copy of the title.

5. The petition for administrativereconstitution of TCT No. 23377 wasgranted and a reconstituted certificate of title[TCT (23377) RT-M-0002] was issued datedMarch 29, 1976.

6. After the reconstitution, the heirspresented before the Registry of Deeds of Morong the Extra-judicial Settlement of

Estate with Quitclaim which they executedon December 17, 1973 in favor of JoseRojas and which they had earlier presentedfor registration.

7. Subsequently, the entire parcel of landcovered by the decree was subdivided intotwenty-one (21) lots and twenty-one (21)different certificates of titles were issued inlieu of the reconstituted TCT No. 23377. On

August 25, 1978, fourteen (14) of thesetwenty-one (21) lots were exchanged withshares of stocks of Interport Resources

Corporation. On April 21, 1980, all thenamed heirs renounced their rights over theproperty in favor of their co-heir AlfredoGuido, Sr. in exchange for monetaryconsiderations.



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8. The court a quo rendered judgmentdismissing the complaint and declaringDecree No. 6145 and TCT No. 23377,genuine and authentic.

9. The decision of the trial court wasappealed by the Solicitor General to theCourt of Appeals which affirmed saiddecision on July 12, 1988.

ISSUES: It is the contention of petitioner that respondent Court of Appeals committedserious errors in the assessment of theevidence on record and acted with graveabuse of discretion in concluding that theRepublic failed to satisfy the requirements of preponderant proof in support of its theory.

HELD:

1. In civil cases, the party having the burdenof proof must establish his case by apreponderance of evidence. The generalrule in civil cases is that a party having theburden of proof of an essential fact mustproduce a preponderance of evidencethereon. By preponderance of evidence ismeant simply evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing than that whichis offered in opposition to it. The term'preponderance of evidence' means theweight, credit and value of the aggregateevidence on either side and is usually

considered to be synonymous with the terms'greater weight of evidence' or 'greater weight of the credible evidence.'

2. The matter of determining which partyhad the preponderant evidence is within theprovince of the trial court before whom theevidence of both parties are presented. Thedecision of who to believe and who not tobelieve goes to the credibility of a witnesswhich, likewise, is within the province of thetrial court.

3. We have carefully gone through therecords of this case and there is no reasonfor this Court to reverse the decisions of both the court a quo and the appellate court.Both courts were one in concluding that thepreponderance of evidence is in favor of the

theory presented by the privaterespondents, i.e., the authenticity of thequestioned documents.4. The fact alone that the petition for reconstitution was approved on the sameday that it was filed did not render theapproval suspect. In administrativereconstitution of a certificate of titlesupported by the owner's duplicate copy of the title, no other requisite was requiredunder Section 6 of Republic Act 26 unlikein judicial reconstitution under Section 12 of the same law. The Register of Deedscorrectly granted the reconstitution on thebasis of private respondents owners'duplicate copy of TCT No. 23377.

5. We find no legal basis for the declarationof the questioned documents as valid onlywith respect to such portions of the property

not possessed and owned by bonafideoccupants with indefeasible registered titlesof ownership or with lengths of possessionwhich had ripened to ownership. Havingbeen found valid and genuine, Decreto No.6145 therefore, possessed all the attributesof a decree of registration. Section 31 of theProperty Registration Decree (P.D. 1529),second paragraph provides:.

“The decree of registrationshall bind the land and quiettitle thereto, subject only tosuch exceptions or liens as

may be provided by law. Itshall be conclusive uponand against all persons,including the NationalGovernment and allbranches thereof, whether mentioned by name in theapplication or notice, thesame being included in thegeneral description "To allwhom it may concern."

6. Likewise, TCT No. 23377, having been

found true and authentic also possessed allthe attributes of a torrens certificate of title.By express provision of Section 47 of P.D.1529, no title to registered land in derogationto that of the registered owner shall beacquired by prescription or adverse



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possession. To declare that the decree andits derivative titles is valid but only withrespect to the extent of the area described inthe decree not possessed by occupants withindefeasible registered titles or topossessors with such lengths of possessionwhich had ripened to ownership is toundermine the people's faith in the torrenstitle being conclusive as to all matterscontained therein. The certificate serves asevidence of an indefeasible title to theproperty in favor of the person whose namesappear therein. After the expiration of theone year period from the issuance of thedecree of registration upon which it is based,it becomes incontrovertible, unlesssubsequent to the issuance of the decree athird party may be able to show that heacquired title thereto by any of the meansrecognized by law.

V. SUBSEQUENT REGISTRATION

The act of registration is theoperative act to convey or affect the landinsofar as third persons are concerned.Thus, the mere execution of deeds of sale, mortgages, leases or other voluntarydocuments serves only as (1) a contractbetween the parties, and (2) as evidenceof authority to the Register of Deeds to

register such documents. They do NOT,in themselves, effect a conveyance or encumbrance on the land. The exceptionto this rule is if the instrument is a will.

The act of registration creates aconstructive notice to the whole world of such voluntary or involuntary instrument or court writ or process.

CAMPILLO VS CA129 SCRA 513 (1984)

The De Vera spouses sold 2 parcels of landto Santos. Sale was not registered. About ayear later, Campillo obtained a judgment for a sum of money against De Vera. Theparcels, still in the De Veras’ name, were

levied upon on execution and Campillo wasable to purchase them at a public auction.TCT was issued to Campillo. Santos soughtto annul sale at public auction, claiming tobe the owner.

HELD: Registration of the sale shall be theoperative act to convey or affect the landinsofar as third persons are concerned. Theproperties were still in the name of the DeVeras. Campillo was not required to lookbehind the register to determine thecondition of the property. He is only chargedwith notice of the burdens on the propertywhich are noted on the face of the register or the certificate of title. To require him to domore is to defeat one of the primary objectsof the Torrens system.

RATIO: A bona fide purchaser for value of

such property at an auction sale acquiresgood title as against a prior transferee of same property if such prior transfer wasunrecorded at the time of the auction sale.

HEIRS OF MARASIGAN VS IAC152 SCRA 253 (1987)

Who has a better right to the property inquestion, the party (Marasigan) who boughtit with a notice of lis pendens annotated atthe back of her title or the party (Marron) in

whose favor the notice of lis pendens wasmade? The appellate court answered thisquestion in favor of the party who had thenotice annotated and who won the litigationover the property.

Marron’s cause of action had not prescribed.While Marasigan acquired the property in1974, it was only in 1977 that the sale wasregistered. It is the act of registration whichcreates constructive notice to the wholeworld. (Sec 52, PD 1529)

Also when Marasigan was issued her TCTthe notice of lis pendens in her predecessors’ title was carried over to her title. In case of subsequent sales or transfers, the Registrar of Deeds is dutybound to carry over the notice of lis pendens



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on all titles to be issued. Otherwise, if hecancels any notice of lis pendens in violationof his duty, he may be held civilly and evencriminally liable for any prejudice caused toinnocent third persons.

A notice of lis pendens means that a certainproperty is involved in a litigation and servesas notice to the whole world that one whobuys the same does it at his own risk. It wasalso a clear notice to Marasigan that therewas a court case affecting her rights to theproperty she had purchased. Consequently,Marasigan was bound by the outcome of thelitigation against her vendors or transferors.

GARCIA VS CA95 SCRA 380 (1980)

In this case two sets of certificates of titlewere issued to different people for the samelots. The 1st set was issued sometime in1920 to Lapus who had bought the parcelsin 1918. However, despite this registeredsale, the OCT was not cancelled and thesale to Lapus was not annotated thereon.The 2nd set of titles was issued in 1963 whenheirs of the original owner, relying on theclean OCT, were able to succeed in havingTCTs issued to them. Eventually, both setsof “owners” entered into transactions withother people who in turn secured TCTs in

their favor. Whose successors in interestwould have a better right?

HELD: Where two certificates (of title)purport to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails. And the rule that in case of double registration the owner of the earlier certificate is the owner of the land applies tothe successive vendees of the owners of such certificates. The vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as against thevendee of the owner of the later certificate.

There can be no doubt that Lapus was aninnocent purchaser for value. He validlytransmitted to his successors-in-interest hisindefeasible title or ownership over thedisputed lots or parcels of land. That titlecould not be nullified or defeated by the

issuance forty-three years later to other persons of another title over the same lotsdue to the failure of the register of deeds tocancel the title preceding the title issued toLapus. This must be so considering thatLapus and his successors-in-interestremained in possession of the disputed lotsand the rival claimants never possessed thesame.

MINGOA VS LAND REG COM200 SCRA 782 (1991)

A deed of donation of several parcels of landwas executed by petitioner in favor of hischildren on July 15, 1987. The deed wasforwarded to the Register of Deeds for registration by registered mail on September 9, 1988. It was entered in the primary entrybook of the Register of Deeds on September 20, 1988 under Entry No. 181. Said Register of Deeds suspended registration of thedonation until the petitioner has secured theproper clearances from the Department of

Agrarian Reform on the ground that under Section 6 of Republic Act 6657 anydisposition of private agricultural lands madeprior to June 15, 1988, when the Act tookeffect, must be registered within three (3)months from said date or on beforeSeptember 13, 1988 to be valid.

HELD: Sec. 56 of PD 1529 requires theRegister of Deeds, upon payment of theentry fees, to enter in the primary book of entry, in the order of reception, allinstruments including copies of writs andprocesses filed with him relative toregistered land the date, hour and minuteshall be noted in said book which shall beregarded as the date of registration of theinstrument and the memorandum of eachinstrument on the certificate title shall bear the same date. Sec. 34 of PD1529 makesthe Rules of Court suppletorily applicable to

land registration and cadastral cases.

Pursuant to Sec 1, Rule 13 of the ROC, incase of filing by registered mail, it is the postoffice stamp on the envelope or the registryreceipt w/c shall be considered as the date



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of their filing, payment, or deposit in court.In the present case, September 9 should beconsidered the date of filing and thus thedeed of donation was filed within the three-month statutory period.

A. Voluntary Registration

Conveyances and other Dealings by Registered Owner

Voluntary dealings with land refer todeeds, instruments or documents whichare the results of the free and voluntaryacts of the parties thereto. These include:

• Sales, conveyances or transfers of

ownership over the titled property;

• Mortgages and leases;

• Powers of attorney;

• Trusts

In voluntary registration, when does aninnocent purchaser for value becomethe holder of a certificate of title?

He becomes the holder of a CT at themoment he presents and files a dulynotarized and valid deed of sale, and thesame is entered in the day book (primaryentry book) AND at the same time he

surrenders or presents the owner'sduplicate certificate of title covering theland sold, and pays the registration fees.(Garcia v. CA, 95 SCRA 380. Contrast this from involuntary registration, whichwill be discussed in the following section.)

It must be noted that an executeddocument or transfer of registered landplaced by the registered owner thereof inthe hands of another operates as arepresentation to a third party that theholder of the document of transfer is

authorized to deal with the land.

PD 1529, Sec. 51. Conveyances and other

dealings by registered owner- An owner of

registered land may convey, mortgage, transfer,

lease, charge, or otherwise deal with the same in

accordance with existing laws. He may use such

forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other

voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law.But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary

instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land; shall take effect as

conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate

only as a contract between the parties and as

evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to

make registration.

The act of registration shall be the operative

act to convey or affect the land insofar as third

persons are concerned, and in all cases under

this Decree, the registration shall be made in the

Office of the Register of Deeds for the province

or city where the land lies.

Sec. 52. Constructive notice upon registration-every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien

attachment, order, judgement, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered,

filed or entered in the Office of the Register of

Deeds for the province or city where the land to

which it relates lies be constructive notice to all

persons from the time of such registering, filing,

or entering.

VILLALUZ V. NEME7 SCRA 27 (1963)

Facts: Maria Rocabo died intestate, leavingthree daughters( Maria, Patricia, andSinforosa)and grandchildren (from her other children who predeceased her), the plaintiffsin this case. She left a parcel of landgranted her under homestead patent andwith original certificate of title. After approval of her application but before thegranting of patent, Maria donated thesouthern portion of the land to her daughter,also named Maria, and donated the northernpart to Patricia in two notarial deeds of

donation giving them the right to present thedeeds of donation to the Bureau of Lands.The daughters forgot to present the deedsof donation and patent was granted in thename of their mother, Maria Rocabo. After their mother’s death, the daughters,



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Sinforosa included, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition among themselves tothe exclusion of plaintiffs. They later declared the land for tax purposes and soldit to Pajarillo, who thereafter sold it to Neme.

Plaintiffs came to know that thelands were in the possession of Neme.They filed a complaint for partition of landand recovery of their share. It alsoappeared that the deeds of sale of the landwere not registered in favor of defendantNeme and not recorded in compliance withthe Public Land Act and the LandRegistration Law; the vendees even failed tohave their deed of sale annotated on thesaid TCT or have the title transferred in their names.

HELD: A deed of extra-judicial partition

executed without including some of theheirs, who had no knowledge of and consentto the same is fraudulent and vicious, andsale of the land subject of the partition didnot prejudice and affect the interest andparticipation of the heirs excluded.

Moreover, the acquisition of the landin question is governed by the Public Land

Act and the Land Registration Law.Considering that the deed of sale had notbeen registered in accordance with thesame laws, the same did not constitute a

conveyance which would bind or affect theland because the registration of a voluntary sale of land is the operative act that transmits or transfers title (Tuason vs.Raymundo, 28 Phil 635).

ALARCON V. BIDIN120 SCRA 390 (1983)

FACTS: Roberto Alarcon leasedSargas a parcel of land he co-owned with acertain Trinidad. In 1926, Alarcon sold a

portion of his undivided share to Sergas.The date of the instrument of sale wasentered on the title as January 5, 1926 andthe date of inscription as May 3, 1963, withthe name of the vendor in the text of the“Escritura de Venta” as Roberto Alarcon

while the typewritten name at its bottomread Alberto Alarcon with a thumbmarkabove it. Alarcon sold another portion of hisshare to Alvarez in 1928. Alvarez sold it toFrancisco, one of the private respondents.

The heirs of Alarcon filed a suit for recovery and questioned the genuineness if the “Escrituras de Venta”, that thethumbmark is not Roberto’s, nor is he

Alberto Alarcon,and that the documents infavor if Alvarez was not signed by Roberto.The lower court dismissed on the ground of laches.

HELD: Decision sustained. Theheirs’ allegation that their father never soldthe disputed land is belied by the Escriturasde Venta he executed, one in favor of Sergas, another in favor of Alvarez.Furthermore, Sergas and Alvarez had taken

adverse possession of the property under the claim of ownership from the time theproperty was sold to them. More than 50years had elapsed since the execution of thedeed of sale in 1926 and 1928 when theheirs instituted their cause of action in 1978.

Land registered under the Torrenssystem may not be acquired by prescriptionor adverse possession. The presumptiongiven by law is in favor of registeredowners. Although title to property is still inthe name of Roberto Alarcon, it has beensubjected to registration in 1963 if the sale

made by him to Sergas. Technically,Sergas became the owner in 1963 of theportion sold to him.

PNB V. CA98 SCRA 207 (1980)

FACTS: Spouses Inigo Bitanga and RosaVer owned a parcel of land. The husbanddied before the issuance of the OriginalCertificate of Title. He was survived by hiswife and children. The wife mortgaged the

entire property to PNB. The mortgagedocument was registered in the day book of the Register of Deeds if Ilocos Norte but wasnot annotated in the Register of Deedswhen the OCT was issued.



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The wife defaulted on her obligations to Manila Trading Company.The company levied upon the property andwas able to buy the same in a publicauction. It thereafter sold its rights over theproperty to Sambrano who securedannotation of the said sale.

She also failed to settle her obligation to PNB, who sold the land atpublic auction with the PNB as the highestbidder. The period for redemption expiredand PNB consolidated title over it, but thedocument of consolidation was notannotated in the owner’s duplicate certificateof title since the wife failed to surrender thesame. Upon PNB’s petition, a owner’sduplicate certificate was issued in its favor.It later sold the land to Reyes.

The heirs of Bitanga filed acomplaint against PNB for reconveyance of

real property and damages and sought toenjoin PNB and Reyes from consummatingthe sale of the property in question andprohibiting the Register of Deeds fromregistering the sale.

HELD: The land was conjugal property,hence, only ½ belongs to the wife and it wasonly this half which was acquired by PNB.

The conjugal character of the landwas not changed even if the tax declarationon the lot was in the name of the wife only.Declaration of ownership for purpose of

taxation is not sufficient evidence of title.The lien by reason or on account of

the mortgage executed by Rosa Ver over the entire parcel of land which was notannotated on the original certificate of titlecould not have attached to the land.Otherwise stated, the failure of theinterested party to appear during theregistration proceedings and to claim suchinterest in the land barred him from havingsuch interest on the certificate of title.

Double Sale

In cases of double sale, the propertybelongs to the purchaser who firstregisters the transaction in his name in theregistry of property.

Forged Documents

Although forged documents aregenerally null and void, they can legally bethe root of a valid title when an innocent

purchaser for value intervenes.

Mortgages and Leases

Sec. 60, PD 1529 requires deeds of mortgage or lease and all instrumentswhich assign, extend, discharge or otherwise deal with the mortgage or leaseto be registered, and such deeds shalltake effect upon the title only uponregistration. Unless recorded, such deedsare not binding on third persons eventhough they are binding between the

parties.

Powers of Attorneys; Trusts

Sec. 64, PD 1529 provides that anyperson may convey or otherwise deal withregistered land through a power of attorney. The instrument granting or revoking the power of attorney must beregistered with the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies.

Note the special provisions in the CivilCode dealing with the requirements for powers of attorney in transactionsinvolving land, particularly Art. 1874, Art.1879, and Art. 1878.

B. Involuntary Dealings

Involuntary dealings refer to writs,orders or processes issued by a court of record affecting registered land which by

law should be registered to be effective.They likewise refer to instruments whichare not the wilful acts of the registeredowner and which may have beenexecuted even without his knowledge or



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against his consent. These dealingsinclude:

• Writs of attachment, injunction or

mandamus;

• Sales on Execution of judgment;

• Sales for taxes;

• Adverse claims;

• Notices of lis pendens

In contrast to voluntary registration, amere entry in the day book (primary entrybook) of the Registry of Deeds in cases of involuntary registration is a sufficientnotice to all persons even if the owner'sduplicate CT is not presented to theRegister of Deeds. (Because the

proceedings were involuntary, the owner'sCT may not be available because the

owner did not freely enter into thetransaction involved.)

What is annotation? What is thepurpose of annotating adverse claims?

Annotation is a measure designed toprotect the interest of a person over apiece of real property where theregistration of such interest or right is nototherwise provided for by Act 496, nowPD 1529. It serves as a warning to third

parties dealing with the said property thatsomeone is claiming an interest on thesame or a better right than the registeredowner.

What are the requisites for a validadverse claim?

(1) The claimant's right or interest inregistered land must be adverse tothe registered owner;

(2) Such right or interest must havearisen subsequent to the date of original registration; and

(3) No other provision is made in theDecree for the registration of suchright or claim. (Sec. 70, PD 1529;

Arrazola v. Bernas, 86 SCRA 279)

Note that a mere money claim CANNOT

be registered as an adverse claim.

When is notice of lis pendens proper?

A notice of lis pendens is proper inactions:

(1) to recover possession of realestate;

(2) to quiet title thereto;

(3) to remove clouds upon thetitle thereof;

(4) for partition; and

(5) any other proceeding of anykind in court directly affectingthe title to the land or the useor occupation thereof or thebuilding thereon. (Sec. 76,PD 1529, Sec. 14, Rule 13,Rules of Court)

What is the nature and purpose of anotice of lis pendens?

The notice of lis pendens, i.e. that realproperty is involved in an action, isintended to constructively advise or warnall people who deal with the property thatthey so deal with it at their own risk, andwhatever rights they may acquire in theproperty in any voluntary transaction aresubject to the results of the action, andmay well be inferior and subordinate to

those which may be finally determinedand laid down therein.

Such notice is ordinarily recordedwithout the intervention of the court where



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the action is pending, as it is but anextrajudicial incident of the pending actionwhich does not affect the merits thereof.

It must be noted that a notice of lis pendens can subsist concurrently with an

adverse claim.

MAGDALENA HOMEOWNERS'ASSOCIATION VS CA,

184 SCRA 3 (1990)

Facts: A part of Lot 15 of Magdalena RollingHills Subdivision, had initially been set asideas the subdivision's "open space," i.e.,reserved for use as a park, playground or recreational zone.However, an amendmentof the plan of the subdivision substituting the

area earlier designated as open space, wasapproved by the City Council of QuezonCity. The Council also authorized thesubdivision for disposition to the public of the former open space. Subsequently, theCFI of Quezon City also approved the sameamended subdivision plan.

The entire Lot 15, including that partthereof originally designated as open spacewas subsequently conveyed to theDevelopment Bank of the Philippines (DBP)by way of dacion en pago and to thirdparties who thereafter constructed houses

thereon.The purchasers of the other subdivision lots, who had organizedthemselves into a non-stock corporationknown as the Magdalena Homeowners

Association, Inc., believed that the act of theQuezon City Government of authorizing therelease of said Lot 15 as open space, after ithad been so declared and earlier dedicatedas such — and its substitution by another portion of the subdivision — was beyond theCity Government's authority. They thereforebrought suit against the Magdalena Estate,Inc. (MEI) in the court of First Instance atQuezon city for the recovery of said Lot 15as "open space" for public use of theresidents of the subdivision.

While the case was pending, noticesof lis pendens were, at the plaintiffs'

instance, inscribed by the Register of Deedsof Quezon City on the Torrens titles of all thelots. The Trial Court then dismissed thecase. The petitioners went up to the Court of

Appeals. While the case was pendingadjudgment, the subdivision owner and DBPfiled separate motions with the Court of

Appeals praying for cancellation of thenotice of lis pendens. These motions weregranted by resolution. Reconsideration wassought and denied by. Hence, the petition atbar.

Issue: WON the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to take cognizance of and grantthe motion to cancel notice of lis pendensalthough no such motion had ever been filedin the lower court.

Held: YES. The notice of lis pendens —

i.e., that real property is involved in an action— is ordinarily recorded without theintervention of the court where the action ispending. The notice is but an incident in anaction, an extrajudicial one, to be sure. Itdoes not affect the merits thereof. It isintended merely to constructively advise, or warn, all people who deal with the propertythat they so deal with it at their own risk, andwhatever rights they may acquire in theproperty in any voluntary transaction aresubject to the results of the action, and maywell be inferior and subordinate to those

which may be finally determined and laiddown therein. The cancellation of such aprecautionary notice is therefore also a mereincident in the action, and may be orderedby the Court having jurisdiction of it at anygiven time. And its continuance or removal— like the continuance or removal of apreliminary attachment or injunction — is notcontingent on the existence of a final

judgment in the action, and ordinarily has noeffect on the merits thereof.

In the CAB, the case had properlycome within the appellate jurisdiction of the

Court of Appeals in virtue of the perfection of the plaintiffs' appeal. It therefore had power to deal with and resolve any incident inconnection with the action subject of theappeal, even before final judgment. The rulethat no questions may be raised for the first



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time on appeal have reference only to thoseaffecting the merits of the action, and not tomere incidents thereof, e.g., cancellation of notices of lis pendens, or, to repeat, thegrant or dissolution of provisional remedies.

Now, a notice of lis pendens may becancelled upon order of the court, "after proper showing that the notice is for thepurpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rightsof the party who caused it to be recorded."

The Court of Appeals found as afact that the case had dragged on and hadbeen unnecessarily prolonged by repeatedamendments of the complaints by theplaintiffs, and that the circumstances onrecord justified the conclusion that theannotation of the notice of lis pendens wasintended to molest and harass thedefendants.

SEVESES VS CA,OCTOBER 13, 1999

Facts: Rexcon Philippines, through itspresident, Reynaldo Reyes entered into acontract of sale on installments of a parcel of land, with private respondent Carreon. Hethen learned that 3 days later, a mortgage infavor of Makati Leasing and FinanceCorporation was annotated on the title. Thiswas later cancelled. But a Deed of AbsoluteSale in favor of Reyes and another

mortgage in favor of Ayala Investment andDev't Corp. were subsequently annotated.Carreon then demanded that title to the landbe restored in the name of Rexcon.

Due to Carreon's failure to pay theother installments, Reyes considered thesale rescinded and instituted an action for rescission before the RTC. Meanwhile,Carreon caused a notice of lis pendens tobe annotated on Reyes' title. The RTCaffirmed Reyes' extra-judicial foreclosure.

Seveses then acquired the landfrom Reyes. Although the notice of lis

pendens was carried over to Seveses' title,Reyes informed him that the pending casehad been terminated inasmuch as no appealwas filed by Carreon. He then obtained aCertificate of Finality from the court. Thusthe notice of lis pendens was cancelled.

However, because he was served anotice of eviction, Seveses learned thatCarreon indeed appealed the decision of theRTC to the CA, wherein he obtained afavorable judgment. This CA decisionbecame final.

Issue: WON a Certification of Finality willsuffice to have a notice of lis pendenscancelled (and save the day for Seveses).

Held: NO. The rules dictate thatcancellation of the notice of lis pendensshould be done with judicial authority. Thus,by virtue of the notice of lis pendens,Seveses is bound by the outcome of thelitigation subject of the lis pendens. As atransferee pendente lite, he stands exactlyin the shoes of the transferor and mustrespect any judgment or decree which may

be rendered for or against the transferor. Hisinterest is subject to the incidents or resultsof the pending suit, and his Certificate of Title will, in that respect, afford him nospecial protection.

YARED VS TONGCO,AUGUST 1, 2000

Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint allegingthat private respondent succeeded in havingthe subject properties registered in his

name, to the prejudice of the other survivingheirs of the previous owners, petitioner among them. Petitioner caused theannotation of notices of lis pendens on thetitles of respondent. The trial courtdismissed the case on the ground of prescription. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal while Tongco then sought to cancelthe notices of lis pendens which was denied.

After 3 Motions for Recon, Tongcosucceeded. When petitioner then sought toreconsider the cancellation, the judgereversed himself. But when Tonco filed

another MR, he was sustained (Leche! Makeup your mind, judge!). Hence, this certiorari to

the SC.



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Held: Eto raw ang importante sa case nito as

per Dan Gat: All petitioner has to do is to

assert a claim of possession or title over thesubject property to put it under the coverageof the rule on lis pendens. It is not necessaryfor her to prove ownership or interest over

the property sought to be affected by lis pendens. (But the petition was dismissed by

the SC for violating the doctrine of judicial

heirarchy. Puede naman kasing dumaan muna sa

CA eh dumiretso agad sa SC.)

VI. REGISTRATION OF PATENTS

Sec. 103. Certificates of titlepursuant to patents. - Wheneverpublic land is by the Governmentalienated, granted or conveyed to any

person, the same shall be broughtforthwith under the operation of thisDecree.

It shall be the duty of the officialissuing the instrument of alienation,grant, patent or conveyance in behalf of the Government to cause suchinstrument to be filed with the Registerof Deeds of the province or city wherethe land lies, and to be thereregistered like other deeds andconveyance, whereupon a certificate

of title shall be entered as in othercases of registered land, and anowner's duplicate issued to thegrantee.

The deed, grant, patent or instrumentof conveyance from the Governmentto the grantee shall not take effect asa conveyance or bind the land butshall operate only as a contractbetween the Government and thegrantee and as evidence of authorityto the Register of Deeds to make

registration.

It is the act of registration that shall bethe operative act to affect and conveythe land, and in all cases under thisDecree, registration shall be made in

the office of the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the landlies.

The fees for registration shall be paidby the grantee. After due registration

and issuance of the certificate of title,such land shall be deemed to beregistered land to all intents andpurposes under this Decree.

ORTIGAS V. HIDALGO,198 SCRA 635 (1991)

FACTS: Estate of Villa claims ownership of subject land. It appears that a certainTeresio Villa applied for the land. However,land was not registered nor decreed to

anybody. No attempt was made to have judicial or administrative confirmation of titleover the land.

Estate of Villa filed criminal chargesagainst settlers in the land, petitionersherein. Petitioners were convicted of squatting. Order of demolition was issued.

Petitioners, meanwhile asked OP togive the land to them. OP ordered Director of Lands to look into the issue. Director of Lands dismissed claim of Estate of Villa andgave due course to application of petitioners.

Petitioners went to SC on certiorariwith prayer for TRO.

HELD: It is clear, therefore, that privaterespondent (estate of Villa) is not theregistered owner of the disputed parcel of land. Assuming arguendo that respondenthad been granted a patent to the land inquestion, the same has never beenregistered with the Registry of Deeds of theprovince where the property is located.Indeed, respondent could offer no proof toshow that the same was registered. Allpatents that may be granted must be

registered since the conveyance of the landcovered thereby is effective only upon suchregistration which shall be the operative actto convey and affect the land (CA 141, Sec.107). Registration is mandatory under thelaw to affect third parties.



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Absent the fact of registration of apatent, title to the land covered thereby,whether it be by sales or homestead, maynot be said to have been perfected and,therefore, not indefeasible. A patentbecomes indefeasible as a Torrens Titleonly when said patent is registered with theRegister of Deeds pursuant to the provisionsof the Land Registration Act.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. CA,17 SCRA 71

Sales application was filed. The landwas advertised to highest bidder and wasawarded to applicant (1928). Havingcomplied with the requirements, Director of Lands signed sales patent in favor of applicant Tolentino (1950). Later, Tolentinolearned that portion of land awarded to himwas covered by homestead application of Braulio Cosme and that homestead patentand OCT was issued to him (1949).

Director of Lands verified thathomestead patent embraced land coveredby sales patent to Tolentino. Director filedaction for cancellation of homestead patentand OCT. An intervenor came out andasked that he be declared a buyer in goodfaith and be recognized owner of theproperty. RTC cancelled homestead patentand OCT and ordered reversion of land.

CA upheld RTC but upon MR reconsideredits decision and reversed RTC.

HELD: The present action is for thecancellation of the patent and certificate of title of the defendant on the ground that theyare an absolute nullity, because the Bureauof Lands had no jurisdiction to issue them atall.

The Government is the proper party to bringan action to cancel a patent and a certificate

of title issued in accordance therewith.

A certificate of title issued pursuant to ahomestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate issued in a judicial proceeding

as long as the land of the domain (Lucas vs.Durian, supra).

A certificate of title issued pursuant to adecree of registration and a certificate of titleissued in conformity therewith are on ahigher level than a certificate of title basedupon a patent issued by the Director of Lands.

Prior to the issuance of a patent and itsregistration, the Government retains the titleto the land. The award thereof, however,confers on the awardee the right to takepossession of the land so that he cancomply with the requirements prescribed bythe law before said patent can be issued inhis favor. Being protected by law, under which it cannot be taken away without dueprocess said right has the effect of

withdrawing the land of the public domainthat is "disposable" by the Director of Landsunder the provisions of the Public Land Act.

DAVID V. MALAY,NOVEMBER 19, 1999

FACTS: Andres Adona applied for homestead patent over parcel of land.

Application was perfected before he died.However, OCT was issued in the name of his mistress after his death. His children by

his mistress partitioned the land amongthemselves. One of them bought theinterests of the others.

Andres Adona’s children, privaterespondents herein, by his legal wife soughtto annul this sale. The action was treated asaction for reconveyance. RTC dismissedcase on the ground of lack of cause of action and prescription. CA reversed RTC.CA said property belongs to estate of

Andres Adona, whose incontestable right isderived from perfected homesteadapplication before his death.

HELD: Estate of Andres Adona is entitled tothe property. OCT in the name of themistress to be cancelled, property to bereconveyed to the private respondents.



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Section 32 of PD 1529 is alsoapplicable to patents. The date of issuanceof the patent corresponds to the issuance of decree in regular cases.

OCT would have becomeindefeasible a year after it was issued hadnot its issuance been attended by fraud.Fraud created implied trust. Fraud gaveprivate respondents right of action.Prescription of this right of action reckonedfrom the time right is disturbed.

FONTANILLA V. CA,NOVEMBER 29, 1999

FACTS: Crisanto and Felician Duanan arehomestead grantees. Their son Luis Duananinherited 4 has of the land. Luis Duanangave two of his children 2 has of hisinheritance. Luis’ children mortgaged theland. Later, Luis’ children sold the land toEduardo Fontanilla and Ellen Fontanilla.

Luis wanted to repurchase the landfrom the Fontanillas. The latter refused onthe ground that Luis, not being the vendor,cannot exercise the right of redemption.

Also, the right to redeem has prescribedsince over 5 years has lapsed from the timeLuis conveyed the property to his twochildren.

HELD: Section 119 of the PD 1529 does not

say that the applicant/legal heir must be thevendor before he can exercise the right of

d ti It l th t th

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