Bokingo vs. CA

Petitioners, Alfredo Bokingo and others, sought the titling of a parcel of land located in Baan, Butuan City before the DENR, Office of the CENRO. Upon knowledge of the respondents, they filed a protest against the petitioners’ application claiming that it inherited the property from their late father, CelestinoBusa. Subsequently, the DENR resolved the protest in favor of the respondents and later on issued a certification that the decision has become final and executory. Later on, the respondents requested for a survey authority from the DENR so that it can survey the land subject matter of the case. On their favor, DENR issued a survey authority allowing them to survey the land. Pursuant to the survey authority, the respondents went to the lot but were unfortunately stopped and told by the petitioners not to enter the lot so they sought help before the Barangay Justice System. Despite this, the petitioners still did not agree for the respondents to survey the land causing the barangay to issue a Certificate to File Action.

Given the Certificate to File Action, the respondents filed a case before the RTC praying that the court will issue a writ of injunction against the petitioners so that respondents can now survey the land. As a response, petitioner moved to dismiss the case for the lack of jurisdiction of RTC. According to petitioner, the issue in the case is the possession of the land and in determining which court has proper jurisdiction over the case. BP 129 as amended by RA 7691 should be followed. The law says that if the assessed value of the property is 20,000 and below, it is MTC that has jurisdiction over the case. Otherwise, it is the RTC. Petitioner points out that the respondent, in its complaint, did not indicate the assessed value of the land so he said that the closest document to base the value of the land is his father’s tax declaration saying that the assessed value of the land is 14, 410. Hence, as petitioner would make the court believe, RTC doesn’t have jurisdiction over the case.

RTC Ruling: It denied the motion to dismiss filed by petitioners.

1. On jurisdiction: It has jurisdiction because the issue in the case is not possession of land but whether it was rightful for the petitioner not to allow the respondents to survey the land. Hence, RA 7691 cannot be used here and that the land need not be assessed of its value in determining which court has jurisdiction since the case filed, as prayed for in the complaint, is primarily to issue a writ of injunction so that petitioners would no longer BITCH AROUND and prevent the respondents from surveying the land.

2. On the right to survey the land: The respondents should not be stopped from surveying the land especially after the petitioner’s application for titling was not granted by DENR.

SO, THE BITCHY PETITIONERS APPEALED TO CA filing a Petition for Certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion.

CA Ruling:

1. It denied the petition. The denial of the RTC of a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and cannot be the subject of certiorari. He should have at least filed for a motion for reconsideration in the RTC before it files a petition for certiorari before CA. Otherwise, outright dismissal by CA is warranted as in this case. If anything, the proper petition was an appeal before the CA and not certiorari.

SO, PETITIONERS APPEALED TO SC and sought for the reversal of CA decision saying that the case filed before the RTC was a possessory action so it’s important to determine the assessed value of the property in order to determine which court has proper jurisdiction.

SC Ruling:

1. It affirmed CA decision. Di judpwedena certiorari iyahanggi file sa CA mgateta. Refer to CA’s reasoning above kaynangopyarasi SC. Chaka na.

2. RTC has jurisdiction. You look at the complaint and the principal relief sought to determine which court has proper jurisdiction. If the principal relief sough is capable of pecuniary estimation, this is where we assess the value to know if it’s MTC or RTC. However, if the principal relief sought is not capable of pecuniary estimation since it’s not money kayinjuctionman judang prayer ani, RTC has jurisdiction. Kelabna dash ang SC sachekani RTC. So settled nani ha, way angal.

Note:

90% of the full text tackles procedural and remedial discussion. Chaka na.Offshoot raang property discussion. Given that, I will quote the only paragraphs related to property. Contrary to the view posited by petitioner Bokingo, the cause of action of the respondents’ complaint is not, as yet, to recover the possession of the subject land. There are three kinds of actions to judicially recover possession of real property and these are distinguished in this wise:

What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a possessory action (accionpubliciana) and from a reinvindicatory action (accionreinvindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question of possession de facto. An unlawful detainer suit (accioninterdictal) together with forcible entry are the two forms of an ejectment suit that may be filed to recover possession of real property. Aside from the summary action of ejectment, accionpubliciana or the plenary action to recover the right of possession and accionreinvindicatoria or the action to recover ownership which includes recovery of possession, make up the three kinds of actions to judicially recover possession.15

Significantly, the respondents’ complaint has not sought to recover the possession or ownership of the subject land. Rather, it is principally an action to enjoin petitioner Bokingo and his representatives from committing acts that would tend to prevent the survey of the subject land. It cannot be said therefore that it is one of a possessory action.

HILARIO vs. SALVADOR

September 3, 1996, petitioners Cesar, Ibarra, Nestor, Lina and Prescilla, all surnamed Hilario, filed a complaint with Romblon RTC against Allan Salvador. They alleged:

1. They are co-owners by inheritance from Concepcion Mazo Salvador a land in Sawang, Romblon. This land was [adjudged] as hereditary share of their father, Brigido M. Hilario, Jr. when their father was still single.

2. In 1989, defendant constructed his dwelling on the property of the plaintiffs' father without the knowledge of the herein plaintiffs.

3. They demand the defendant to vacate the premises but latter said he asked the prior consent of their grandmother, Concepcion Mazo Salvador;

4. Unjustified refusal of the defendant to vacate the property has caused the plaintiffs to suffer shame, humiliation, wounded feelings, anxiety and sleepless nights.

They pray that order be issued for the defendant to vacate and peacefully turn over to the plaintiffs the occupied property. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action. He said:

1) complaint failed to state the assessed value of the land in dispute;

2) Does not sufficiently identify and/or describe the parcel of land referred to as the subject-matter of this action. Both of which are essential requisites for determining the jurisdiction of the Court where the case is filed.

The assessed value was totally absent in the allegation and nothing can be picked up to determine jurisdiction. It can be read between lines though that the assessed value is not more than 20k so under MTC not RTC.

Petitioners opposed motion and said RTC has jurisdiction since court can take judicial notice of the market value of the property w/c was 200/sq. m so 14,7979 sq. m means more or less TV is 3.5M

RTC denied motion to dismiss cause action was incapable off pecuniary estimation so cognizable by RTC

Respondent filed counterclaim and hold that petitioners had no cause of action against him since the property in dispute was the conjugal property of his grandparents, the spouses Salustiano Salvador and Concepcion Mazo-Salvador.

RTC in favor of Petitioners. So respondent filed in CA. CA, reversed RTC and dismiss for want of jurisdiction.

CA : action of the petitioners was one for the recovery of ownership and possession of real property. Absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property the MTC) had exclusive jurisdiction over the action.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction of the case filed?

Petitioners maintain that the RTC has jurisdiction since their action is an accion reivindicatoria, an action incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus, regardless of the assessed value of the subject property, exclusive jurisdiction falls within the said court. They also made mention of the increase in the assessed value of the land in question in the amount of P3.5 million.

The petition has no merit.

SC: Nature of the action and which court has original andexclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is filed.

Don’t agree with petitioner and CA that action of petitioners in RTC was an accion reivindicatoria. It was an accion publiciana.

An accion reivindicatoria, is recovery of possession over the real property as owner. It involves recovery of ownership and possession based on the said ownership.

An accion publiciana is recovery of possession of the right to possess

The action of the petitioners does not involve a claim of ownership over the property. They prayed that the private respondent vacate the property and restore possession thereof to them.

When the petitioners filed their complaint on September 3, 1996, R.A. No. 7691 was already in effect. Section 33(3) of the law provides:

Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases . — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, that does not exceed 20k

Section 19(2) of the law, likewise, provides that:

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases . — The Regional Trial Court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: (2) In all civil actions, which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, that exceeds 20k

The jurisdiction of the court over an action involving title to or possession of land is now determined by the assessed value of the said property and not the market value thereof.

The assessed value - fair market value of the real property multiplied by the assessment level. The fair market value - price at which a property may be sold by a seller, not compelled to sell, and bought by a buyer, not compelled to buy.

The complaint does not contain an allegation stating the assessed value of the property subject of the complaint. The court cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of lands. Absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it cannot thus be determined whether the RTC or the MTC had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners' action.

We note that during the trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence Tax Declaration No. 8590-A, showing that the assessed value of the property in 1991 was P5,950.00. The petitioners, however, did not bother to adduce in evidence the tax declaration containing the assessed value of the property when they filed their complaint in 1996. Even assuming that the assessed value of the property in 1991 was the same in 1995 or 1996, the MTC, and not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners since the case involved title to or possession of real property with an assessed value of less than P20,000.00.

We quote with approval, in this connection, the CA's disquisition: The determining jurisdictional element for the accion reivindicatoria is, as RA 7691 discloses, the assessed value of the property in question. For properties in the provinces, the RTC has jurisdiction if the assessed value exceeds P20,000, and the MTC, if the value is P20,000 or below. An assessed value can have reference only to the tax rolls in the municipality where the property is located, and is contained in the tax declaration. In the case at bench, the most recent tax declaration secured and presented by the plaintiffs-appellees is Exhibit B. The loose remark made by them that the property was worth 3.5 million pesos, not to mention that there is absolutely no evidence for this, is irrelevant in the light of the fact that there is an assessed value. It is the amount in the tax declaration that should be consulted and no other kind of value, and as appearing in Exhibit B, this is P5,950. The case, therefore, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Romblon which has jurisdiction over the territory where the property is located, and not the court a quo. It is elementary that the tax declaration indicating the assessed value of the property enjoys the presumption of regularity as it has been issued by the proper government agency. Unavailing also is the petitioners' argumentation that since the complaint, likewise, seeks the recovery of damages exceeding P20,000.00, then the RTC had original jurisdiction over their actions. Section 33(3) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, quoted earlier, explicitly excludes from the determination of the jurisdictional amount the demand for "interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs." This Court issued Administrative Circular No. 09-94 setting the guidelines in the implementation of R.A. No. 7691, and paragraph 2 thereof states that —

2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19(8) and Section 33(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court. Neither may the petitioners find comfort and solace in Section 19(8) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, which states:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases . — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

xxx xxx xxx

(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00).

The said provision is applicable only to "all other cases" other than an action involving title to, or possession of real property in which the assessed value is the controlling factor in determining the court's jurisdiction. The said damages are merely incidental to, or a consequence of, the main cause of action for recovery of possession of real property. Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners, all the proceedings therein, including the decision of the RTC, are null and void. The complaint should perforce be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 63737 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.

Bongato vs Malvar

This is an issue of ejection cases prescribing and RTC having the jurisdiction over cases being filed for accion publiciana/reivindicatoria

Facts:

Private respondents (spouses Malvar), filed a complaint for forcible entry against petitioner Bongato, alleging that she was unlawfully erected and currently residing in the land the spouses owned. Bongato contended that she just inherited the house from her father and was living there since March 1941. Bongato filed a motion to dismiss saying that MTCC is prohibited under the Rule on Summary Procedure but still MTCC rendered a decision ordering Bongato to vacate the land, pay rentals and attorney’s fees and cost of suit.

RTC affirmed this decision. CA said that MTCC had jurisdiction because it had passed upon the issue of ownership of the property merely to determine possession, giving the jurisdiction.

Issue: WON MTCC has jurisdiction over the case

Ruling:

No. SC said that there is a one-year period to bring an action for forcible entry, which is counted from the date of actual entry of the land, however, if made through stealth, then from the time they learned about the entry. Based on the facts, the cause of action has already prescribed when they filed the ejectment case on July 10, 1992 because Severo Malvar admitted that he had knowledge of Bongato’s entry to the land since 1987.

Therefore, Severo Malvar may be the owner of the land, but possession cannot be obtained by a summary action for ejectment of Bongato who had been there for more than a year. Malvars should have presented their suit before RTC in an acccion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. MTCC should have ruled on the issue of jurisdiction instead of errounously holding that it was a prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure.

ENCARNACION V. AMIGO

FACTS

1. Petitioner Encarnacion is the registered owner of two lots in Isabela covered by two TCTs.

The two lots originally formed part of a single lot owned by Rogelio Valiente.

Rogelio Valiente sold the lot to NicasioMallapitan.

Mallapitan later on sold the same to VictorianoMagpantay in 1985.

When Mallapitan died, his widow, executed an Affidavit of Waiver on April 11, 1995, waiving her right over the property in favor of her son-in-law, petitioner Encarnacion.

Petitioner then caused the subdivision of the lot and the issuance of titles in his name on July 18, 1996.

2. Respondent Nieves Amigo allegedly entered the premises and took possession of a portion of the property sometime in 1985 without the permission of the then owner, VictorianoMagpantay.

Said occupation continued even after petitioner became the owner of the property.

3. Petitioner sent a letter to Amigo on Feb 1, 2001 to vacate the property.

Amigo refused, alleging that he has been in actual possession and occupation of the property since 1968.

4. Petitioner filed a complaint for ejectment on March 2, 2001 before the MTC of Isabela.

Rulings of the lower courts:

MTC – Ruled in favor of petitioner Encarnacion. Ordered respondent to vacate the property.

RTC – Dismissed the case on the ground that MTC had no jurisdiction over the case. Hence, it acquired no appellate jurisdiction.

CA – Remanded the case back to the RTC for further proceedings.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the proper action in this case is accion publiciana and not unlawful detainer as determined by the allegations in the complaint.

RULING

Jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint. From the allegations in the complaint, it appears that petitioner became the owner of the property on April 11, 1995, by virtue of the waiver executed by his mother-in-law. However, he filed the complaint for ejectment only on March 2, 2001 after his Feb 1, 2001 letter demanding respondent to vacate remained unheeded.

While it is true that the demand letter was received by respondent on Feb 12, 2001, thereby making the filing of the complaint for ejectment fall within the requisite of one year from last demand for complaints for unlawful detainer, it is equally true that petitioner became the owner of the property in 1995 and has been since that time deprived of possession of a portion thereof. From the date of petitioner’s dispossession in 1995 up to his filing of his complaint for ejectment in 2001, almost 6 years have elapsed.

The length of time petitioner was dispossessed of his property made his cause of action beyond the ambit of accion interdicaland effectively made it one for accion publiciana which must be filed in the RTC.

PETITION IS DENIED. The Decision of the CA remanding the case to the RTC is AFFIRMED.

Manlapaz v. CA

FACTS

- herein private respondents, as plaintiffs, filed an ejectmentcase in the MTC against herein petitioners, asdefendants, alleging that on or about September 1, 1971 herein petitioners, thru force, intimidation and threats and withthe use of guns, forcibly ousted the private respondents from various lots which private respondents had been occupying and cultivating peacefully, notoriously and continually for more than 10 years.

- Petitioners resisted the ejectment case alleging lack of jurisdiction due to thependency of a Civil Case in the then CFI of Manila

- Stipulation of facts entered into by parties:1)Both parties applied for purchase of subject lots from the Government.2) Land authority dismissed the application of petitioners. On appeal, decesion was reversed and awards in favor of respondents were cancelled.3) Respondents filed for judicial review and annulment of said decision. 4) During the pendency, the Land Authority issued orders of award to petitioners. 5) Respondents also filed an ejectment case. 6) Private respondents have been regularly harvesting an average of 100 cavans per hectare from subject lots. 7) On Sept. 1, 1971, private respondents discovered petitioners' intrusion over the subject property

MTC: In favor of private respondents, petitioners ordered to vacate

CFI Macabebe, Pampanga: During pendency, motion for execution was filed by respondents for failure of petitioners to file a supersedeas bond. CFI Candaba, Pampanga granted this.

CA: Petitioners application for writ of preliminary injunction was dismissed

ISSUES and HELD:

1) W/N the writ of execution was valid when petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which allegedly has not been resolved by respondent court?

- The writ of execution was properly issued pending appeal in the case.

- Under Section8, Rule 70 or RoC, to stay the immediate execution of judgment in an ejectmentproceeding it is required that the defendant-appellant must (a) perfect his appeal, (b) file a supersedeas bond, and (c) periodically deposit the rentals falling due during the pendency of the appeal. Failure to comply with said requirements is a ground for the outright execution of the judgment upon petition of the prevailing party.

- In the instant case, petitioners' failure to file a supersedeas bond. This gave private respondents the right to immediate execution of the judgment whichthe court is bound to grant and enforce.

- The jurisprudence cited by petitioner is not all fours with the case at bar. In those cases, the order of theexecutive department, giving the defendant in the ejectment case preferential rightover the land in dispute, was already final and executory. The rights of thedefendants therein over the property that they claimed were already settled andnot contested by the adverse parties.

- In the present case, the rights of petitioners over the land in controversy is doubtful.

- Moreover, in the present case the decision is not yet final but became executory byreason of the very act of herein petitioners in not filing a supersedeas bondnecessary to stay execution pending appeal as required by Section 8, Rule 70 of theRules of Court.

2) W/N the Municipal Court of Candaba has jurisdiction over the ejectment case for two reasons, namely, (1) a civil case for annulment of the decision of the Office of the President is

still pending final determination in the Court of First Instance of Manila, and (2)there was no compliance with Presidential Decree No. 316 requiring prior referral ofthe ejectment case to the Department of Agrarian Reform.

- Municipal Court has jurisdiction

- Firmly settled is the rule that a municipal court has jurisdiction over forcible entry orunlawful detainer cases even if the ownership of the property is in disputed

- In an action for forcible entry and detainer, the main issue is one of priority of possession. The legal right thereto is not essential to the possessor's cause of action,for no one may take law into his own hands and forcibly eject another or deprivehim of his possession by stealth, even if his title thereto were questionable oractually disputed in another case. If the plaintiff can prove prior physicalpossession in himself, he may recover such possession even from the owner, but onthe other hand, if he cannot prove such prior physical possession, he has no right ofaction for forcible entry and detainer even if he should be the owner of the property.An action for recovery of possession is totally distinct and different from an actionfor recovery of title or ownership. In fact, a judgment rendered in a case for recoveryof possession is conclusive only on the question of possession and not that ofownership. It does not in any way bind the title or affect the ownership of the landor building.

- We have held that in giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and detainerthe purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual possession;and in case of controverted right, it requires the parties to preserve the status quountil one or the other of them sees fit to invoke the decision of a court of competentjurisdiction upon the question of ownership. It is obviously just that the person whohas first acquired possession should remain in possession pending this decision; andthe parties cannot be permitted meanwhile to engage in a petty warfare over thepossession of the property which is the subject of dispute. To permit this would behighly dangerous to individual security and disturbing to social order.Therefore, where a person supposes himself to be the owner of a piece of land anddesires to indicate his ownership against the party actually in possession, it isincumbent upon him to institute an action to this end in a court of competentjurisdiction; and he cannot be permitted, by invading the property and excludingthe actual possessor to place upon the latter the burden of instituting an action totry the property right. In no case may possession be acquired through force orintimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or a right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, mustinvoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver thething. When a person is in possession of the land and has maintained thatpossession for years, he cannot be forcibly dispossessed thereof, even by the owner.

- Further, the authority given to the Bureau of Lands over the disposition of publiclands does not exclude the courts from their jurisdiction over possessory actions, thepublic character of the land notwithstanding.A judgment of the court ordering restitution of a parcel ofland to the actual occupant, who has been deprived thereof by another through theuse of force or another illegal manner, can never be prejudicial interference with thedisposition or alienation of public

lands. On the contrary, if courts were deprived ofjurisdiction over the cases involving conflicts of possession, the threat of judicialaction against breaches of peace committed on public lands would be eliminated,and a state of lawlessness would probably be produced

- the complaint filed before it sufficiently avers that privaterespondents seek to recover possession of the lots from petitioners

- Pending final adjudication of ownership, the municipal court has jurisdiction to determine in the meantime the right of possession over the land.

Spouses Valdez v. CA and Spouses Fabella

Facts:

Spouses Valdez wanted Spouses Fabella out of their land which they (Valdez) claim they acquired from Carolina Realty through a Sales Contract and they filed a case for UNLAWFUL DETAINER

They allege that Spouses Fabella were “without any color of title whatsoever occupied the said lot by building their house in the said lot thereby depriving the herein plaintiffs rightful possession” and despite demands and a barangay conciliation, the Fabellas refused to leave

Fabellas contended that the complaint filed by the Valdezes never proved prior physical possession nor was there any lease contract between them (REQUISITE IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER)

They further contend that the have been in “open, continuous, and adverse possession thereof for more than thirty years”

MTC Ruling: Ruled IN FAVOR OF VALDEZ and ordered FAbellas out

RTC Ruling: AFFIRMED MTC

CA Ruling: REVERSED RTC AND MTC. Valdez failed to make a case for unlawful detainer since they failed to show that they had given Fabellas the right to occupy the land nor tolerated their occupation. No forcible entry too since Valdez never proved prior physical possession of the lot.

Valdez elevate the case to the SC

ISSUE: Whether or not Valdez correctly filed a case of unlawful detainer

RULING: NOOOOOOOO

Valdez claim that alleging that Fabellas unlawfully withheld from Valdez the possession of the property is already sufficient to establish a case for unlawful detainer

HOWEVER, allegations in the complaint FAILED to contain averment that Valdez allowed or tolerated Fabellas to continue occupying the land

Only thing they said was “without any color of title whatsoever occupied the said lot by building their house in the said lot thereby depriving the herein plaintiffs rightful possession”

Missing this in the complaint is FATAL in their case therefore the complaint of unlawful detainer must fail

The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint and when the complaint failes to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, the remedy must be accionpubliciana or reinvidicatoria.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

Supposed act of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered in unlawful detainer. First it was by tolerance then it became illegal.

Caro vs Sulcadito

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the dismissal of Civil Case by the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City as well as the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Gregorio Caro bought a parcel of land known as Assessor's Lot No. 160 from RupertoGepilanoas evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated October 21, 1953. The said lot was situated in SitioBangyan, Barrio Calaya, Municipality of Nueva Valencia, Iloilo City, consisting more or less of 17.9849 hectares. Thereafter, Gregorio Caro sold a portion of the said lot to his son Melchor Caro, consisting of 70,124 square meters, and now identified as Lot No. 4512 of the Cadastral survey of Nueva Valencia, Pls-775. Father and son executed a Deed of Definite Sale dated January 31, 1973 covering Lot No. 4512.

On August 1, 1974, Melchor Caro applied for a free patent before the Bureau of Lands, District Land Office No. 6-1, covering the said area of the property which he bought from his father. The application was, however, opposed by Deogracias de la Cruz. On November 6, 1980, the Regional Director rendered a Decision canceling the said application.

Caro filed a notice of appeal before the Regional Land Office in Iloilo City, docketed as MNR Case No. 5207. However, the appeal was dismissed in an Order dated June 29, 1982, on the ground of failure to file an appeal memorandum within the reglementary period therefor.

On August 29, 1982, Susana R. Sucaldito, as the buyer of Lot No. 4512, filed an Application for a Free Patent covering the said lot, and was issued Free Patent No. 597599 Thereafter, on February 20, 1984, Caro filed a Complaint against Sucaldito for "Annulment of Title, Decision, Free Patent and/or Recovery of Ownership and/or Possession with Damages". He later filed an amended complaint, alleging that he was the owner of the subject lot, and had been in possession of the same "since 1953 and/or even prior thereto in the concept of owner, adversely, openly, continuously and notoriously."

Caro further alleged that since the issuance of the free patent over the subject lot in favor of Sucaldito was wrongful and fraudulent, she had no right whatsoever over the subject lot. Hence, as a "trustee of a constructive trust," she was obliged to return the same to him as the lawful owner.

Issue: Whether or not Caro has the legal personality to file for the reconveyance of the subject land

Ruling: No, Caro has no legal personality to file for the reconveyance of the subject land.

The Supreme Court ruled that under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, or one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit." Corollarily, legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged act. Interest means a material interest in issue that is affected by the questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question involved.

Clearly then, a suit filed by one who is not a party-in-interest must be dismissed. In this case, the petitioner, not being the owner of the disputed property but a mere applicant for a free patent, cannot thus be considered as a party-in-interest with personality to file an action for reconveyance.

To reiterate, the petitioner is not the proper party to file an action for reconveyance that would result in the reversion of the land to the government. The petitioner has no personality to "recover" the property as he has not shown that he is the rightful owner thereof.

BONGATO VS MALVAR

FACTS:

- Respondents filed a forcible entry case against petitioners for unlawfully entering their parcel of land and for erecting a house thereon.

- Petitioner failed to answer the complaint, so he filed for a motion for extension but was denied due to prescription

- When petitioner had a new counsel he then again filed an answer but was denied because it was filed after the 10-day period.

- MTCC then made a decision asking petitioner to vacate the land.

- Petitioner filed motion for reconsideration, which was approved by the judge only insofar as determining whether or not the lot in question has the same location as the one involved in the criminal case for anti-squatting. (Respondent judge warned them that no extension will be granted).

- The criminal case was filed by respondent against petitioner and the same is still pending in the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the MTCC has a jurisdiction over the forcible entry case considering that the 1-year period has already elapsed?

HELD: NO,

For an ejectment case to be successful, plaintiff must first prove prior physical possession and that the 1 year period should be counted from the date of actual possession. In this case, petitioner failed to prove previous actual possession of the land and second, the said house was built in 1935 and the ejectment suit was filed in 1992.

GASATAYA vs. MABASA

FACTS:

-Respondent EdithaMabasa’s father, Buenaventura Mabasa, was granted a homestead patent on Lots 279, 272 and 972 located in Lala, Lanaodel Norte.

-Buenaventura Mabasa mortgaged these lots to secure a loan from DBP. Because of his failure to pay his indebtedness, DBP foreclosed the lots and sold them at public auction where it (DBP) emerged as the highest bidder. DBP then obtained titles to the lots.

-When Buenaventura Mabasa died, respondent EdithaMabasa’s siblings authorized her to negotiate with DBP for the repurchase of the lots. DBP allowed respondent to reacquire the foreclosed properties through a deed of conditional sale for P25,875.

-Subsequently, respondent entered into an agreement with petitioner’s father, SabasGasataya, for the latter to assume payment of her obligation to DBP. They further agreed that SabasGasataya would take possession of the lots for 20 years and develop them into a fishpond. As consideration thereof, respondent received P10,000 cash, in addition to the P25,000 that SabasGasataya had to pay DBP on her behalf.

-Upon representation by SabasGasataya that respondent’s obligation to DBP had already been settled, they entered into another agreement denominated as "Deed of Sale of Fishpond Lands with Right to Repurchase."

-Eight years after the execution of the above deed of sale with right to repurchase, respondent discovered that SabasGasataya had stopped paying DBP. As a result, DBP revoked her right to repurchase the subject lots.

-DBP later on held a public auction of the properties where petitioner (Jessie, the child of sabasgasataya) participated and bid the highest price of P27,200. Eventually, he acquired titles to the lots for which he was issued TCTs.

-Respondent then filed a complaint in the RTC for reconveyance of titles of lands with damages against the gasatayas. She claimed that the latter deliberately reneged on his commitment to pay DBP to: (1) revoke her right to repurchase the lots under the deed of conditional sale and (2) subject the properties to another public auction where petitioner could bid.

-Petitioner and his father denied the allegations saying that the deed of conditional sale assumed by the latter from respondent was rendered ineffective by DBP’s refusal to accept payments thereon.

TRIAL COURT: The trial court ruled in favor of respondent finding that the Gasatayas failed to controvert her claim that they defrauded her just so petitioner could acquire the lots at public auction. According to the trial court, the Gasatayas failed to prove that DBP indeed rejected payments from SabasGasataya.

CA: Affirmed the RTC’s decision and dismissed their appeal for lack of merit. The CA declared: “The contention of respondent that the Gasatayas deliberately chose not to pay DBP as agreed, in order for them to acquire said properties in a fraudulent and treacherous manner, was not fully controverted by them. The Gasatayasfailed to produce evidence to support their defenses.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA decision is correct in affirming the trial court’s order to reconvey petitioner’s titles on the disputed lots to respondent.

SC DECISION: AFFIRMED CA decision.

-Reconveyance is available not only to the legal owner of a property but also to the person with a better right than the person under whose name said property was erroneously registered. While respondent is not the legal owner of the disputed lots, she has a better right than petitioner to the contested lots on the following grounds: first, the deed of conditional sale executed by DBP vested on her the right to repurchase the lots and second, her right to repurchase them would have subsisted had they (the Gasatayas) not defrauded her.

-Petitioner cannot discredit the deed of conditional sale just so he can to keep his titles to the lots. Petitioner should be reminded that DBP revoked respondent’s right to repurchase the lots under said deed because of the deceitful maneuverings that he and his father employed. If we were to sustain petitioner’s argument, then we would, in effect, reward him for his misdeed.

-Neither can this Court uphold petitioner’s contention that his titles are unsullied on the mere fact that he purchased the properties at public auction. Fraud overthrows the presumption that the public sale was attended with regularity. The public sale did not vest petitioner with any valid title to the properties since it was but the consequence of his and his father’s fraudulent schemes.

-The registration of the properties in petitioner’s name did not obliterate the fact that fraud preceded and facilitated such registration. Actual or positive fraud proceeds from an intentional deception practiced by means of misrepresentation of material facts, which in this case was the conscious representation by petitioner’s father (SabasGasataya) that respondent’s obligation to DBP had already been settled. It is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which benefit is obtained, to the prejudice of another. Consequently, fraud is a ground for reconveyance.

-Moreover, the law only protects an innocent purchaser for value and not one who has knowledge of and participation in the employment of fraud. An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in that same property, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before receiving any notice of another person’s claim. Obviously, petitioner was not an innocent purchaser for value.

IDOLOR VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

After petitioner Idolor failed to pay her loan (P520,000) which was secured by a deed of real estate mortgage, the mortgaged property was sold in a public auction to private respondents Spouses de Guzman on May 23, 1997 and the sheriff’s certificate of sale was registered in the register of deeds on June 23,1997.

Petitioner failed to redeem the property within one year from the registration of the sheriff’s sale. On June 25, 1998, however, she filed a complaint to annul the sheriff’s certificate of sale with prayer for he issuance of restraining order due to the alleged irregularity and lack of notice in the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings.

The trial court enjoined private respondent spouses and the sheriffs causing the issuance of a final deed of sale and consolidation of ownership of the property in favor of de Guzman. CA, howver, annulled the assailed writ of preliminary injunction.

The Supreme Court affirmed the CA decision in appeal, ruling that petitioner has no more proprietary right over the foreclosed property to entitle her to the issuance of a writ of injunction; and that their subsequent agreement entitled “Kasunduang Pagaayos” did not novate or extinguish the old obligation because the parties to the new obligation expressly

recognize the continuing existence an validity of the old one and new contracts were not incompatible in all points.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s claim that her proprietary right over the parcel of land was not yet lost?

RULING:

- No, the petitioner has no more proprietary right to speak of over the foreclosed property to entitle her to the issuance of a writ of injunction.

- Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. Before an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present:

1. there must be a right in esse or existence of a right to be protected;

2. the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right

- Failure to establish either the existence of a clear and positive right which should be judicially protected through the writ of injunction or that he defendant has committed or has attempted to commit any acts which has endangered or tends to endanger the existence of said right is a sufficient ground for denying the injunction

- When petitioner filed her complaint for annulment of sheriff’s sale against private respondents with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on June 25, 1998, she failed to show sufficient interest or title in the property sought to be protected as her right of redemption has already expired on June 23, 1998. Petitioner had one year fro the registration of the sheriff’s sale to redeem the property but she failed to exercise her right on or before June 23, 1998.

- It is always a ground for denying injunction that the party seeking it has insufficient title or interest to sustain it , and no claim to the ultimate relief sought. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction.

Petitioner Idolor’s petition is denied and affirmed respondent Court of Appeals decision.

Savellano vs. CA

On 26 May 1993 petitioner Maximo A. Savellano Jr. filed a complaint[3]for "Recovery of Possession of Real Property with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Writs of Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction" against private respondents.

Petitioners Allegation:

-he was the registered owner of three (3) parcels of land situated in Sitio Labahan, San Mateo, Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 459007, 459008 and 459166 portions of which were allegedly occupied by the de Guzmans, Cruz and other John Does without his knowledge and consent for at least a year prior to the institution of his complaint.

Respondents (de Guzman) Allegation:

- they had been in the peaceful possession of the property since 1976 or for more than seventeen (17) years prior to the institution of this complaint. In support thereof Nena de Guzman presented real property tax declarations and tax receipts.

- TCT presented by Savellano did not cover the disputed lot.

Upon agreement by both parties Trial court order the DENR engr. to survey the land and if found out that Savellano really owns the lot then private respondents will vacate the lot.

Upon finding that petitioner Maximo Savellano was the registered owner of the property, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction against private respondents.

Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the survey:

(a) only the monument check was used in the setting of the monuments and relocation survey in violation of Sec. 363 of the Surveyors' Manual of the Philippines;

(b) Engr. Valencia disregarded the natural boundaries in the survey, such as the Susugin Creek;

(c) the report was not approved by the Executive Director of Region IV of the DENR; and,

(d) despite serious objections, Engr. Valencia used only one of the three (3) relative positions in plotting the plan submitted to the court.

On petition for review CA nullified the the Order of the trial court holding that the resolution to vacate granted in the writ of preliminary injunction was patently erroneous since it preempted the decision that would have been rendered by the lower court after trial on the merits. The appellate court further held that the conclusion that private respondents were mere squatters on Maximo Savellanos property should have been threshed out not in the hearing on the application for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction but after trial on the merits.

Issue: whether compelling reasons existed to justify the trial court's grant of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction.

Held: well-settled principle, buttressed by a long line of cases is that injunctions, as a rule, will not be granted to take property out of the possession or control of one party and place it into that of another whose title has not been clearly established by law.

In the case before us, the preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction issued by the trial court practically granted the main relief prayed for even before the hearing of the case on the merits and solely on the basis of a narrative report the accuracy and validity of which are seriously questioned by private respondents. A punctilious perusal of the records leads us to the conclusion that the accuracy and validity of the report are at best debatable and should be ventilated during the trial on the merits before a definite determination can be reached. As succinctly put by the appellate court, "the report cannot be the sole basis of the court to finally rule that the premises occupied by the petitioners are within the subject property owned by private respondent.

The effect of the preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunctions issued by the lower court is to dispose of the main case without trial. Private respondents will have to be hurled off into the streets, their houses built on the premises demolished and their plantings destroyed without affording them the opportunity to prove their right of possession in court. In view of the rights to be affected through the issuance of injunctions, courts should at best be reminded that "(t)here is no power the exercise of which is more delicate which requires greater caution, deliberation and sound discretion, or which is more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuing of an injunction.

FEDERATED REALTY CORPORATION VS CA

FACTS:

-Federated realty corporation is the registered owner of a 543-square meter lot in Apas, Lahug, Cebu City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 119929 that adjoins a military reservation, Camp Lapu-Lapu, where the Command Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines-Visayas Command (AFP-VISCOMM) is situated.

-The lot in question used to be a portion of Lot No. 933 and formed part of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate. In 1932, it was registered in the names of Francisco Racaza, Pantaleon Cabrera and Josefina Martinez per TCT No. RT 2533 (T-13).

-in 1938, Lot No. 933 was one of 18 lots subjected to expropriation proceedings by the government the case entitled Commonwealth of the Philippines v. Borromeo, et al. (Commonwealth case) for the purpose of establishing a military reservation.The Republic deposited P9,500.00 with the Philippine National Bank as a precondition for entry to the lots sought to be expropriated.

-the case rendered that the 18 lots will be converted into a national airport by virtue of a presidential proclamation.

-2 cases were filed involving the 18 subject land (lot no. 932 and lot no. 939) questioning the ownership of the lots. In both cases, the court ruled that both lands would not be transferred to the government because there were no record of payment of compensation. The decisions, did not touch on the state of ownership of Lot No. 933 which was not involved in the cases.

-Lot No. 933 had been subdivided into Lot 933-B under TCT No. 49999 in the name of Francisco Racaza who sold the same to the Cebu Agro Development Corporation (Cebu Agro) and Cebu Agro had Lot 933-B further subdivided into three farm lots to expand its rabbit farm. TCT No. 108002 was issued for Lot 933-B-1, while TCT No. 108001 was issued for Lot 933-B-2 and TCT No. 119740 was issued for Lot 3, All three titles were registered in the names of Arturo Mercader, the President-General Manger of Cebu Agro, and his wife Evangeline Mercader, who religiously paid the real property taxes for the three lots.

-On April 271992, FRC bought Lot 3 from the Mercader spouses and was issued TCT No. 119929. He then hired workers to fence the said lot for the construction of a commercial building but it was halted by Capt. Rogelio Molina together with a jeepload of fully-armed men from the AFP-VISCOMM, and ordered FRCs workers to stop building the structure per instructions of AFP-VISCOMM Commanding General Romeo Zulueta which occurred in 3 instances and that they contend that the subject lot formed part of the military reservation.

-because of the incident, FRC filed a Complaintfor injunction and damages with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu against Captain Rogelio Molina and six John Does. FRC sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to order the respondents to cease, desist and refrain from threatening, intimidating and harassing the workers constructing its fence and to cease, desist and refrain from committing acts of intrusion into and deprivation of subject land, and to cease, desist and refrain from harassing, disturbing and interfering with its peaceful and lawful possession and enjoyment thereof. FRC also prayed that after trial, (i) the injunction be made permanent, (ii) respondents adjudged without any legal right to or interest whatsoever in the parcel of land in litigation, (iii) respondents ordered to pay compensatory and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation.

-respondents admitted that Captain Rogelio Molina ordered FRCs workers to desist from fencing the land in dispute on the ground that said lot is government property. However, they denied that he and his armed men threatened and/or harassed the said workers.

ISSUE: whether or not injunction lies in favor of FRC to prevent the Republic from interfering in the exercise of its rights of ownership over the subject property.

HELD: YES, Injunction lies in favor of FRC.

-According to the SC that injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. The very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction rests in the existence of a cause of action and in the probability of irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary compensation and the prevention of multiplicity of suits.Where facts are not shown to bring the case within these conditions, the relief of injunction should be refused.

-Thus, to be entitled to injunctive relief, the following must be shown: (1) the invasion of a right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (2) the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (3) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

-the second and the third requisites were discussed by the Supreme Court.

-On the second requisite,FRC is a holder of a certificate of title over the lot in question. Records show that each of FRCs predecessors-in-interest was likewise a holder of an indefeasible title. It further allegesthat along with its predecessors-in-interest it has been in open, peaceful and continuous possession thereof since time immemorial, tilling the same and paying all the taxes due thereon.

-the fundamental principle in land registration that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. It becomes the best proof of ownership of a parcel of land. One who deals with property registered under the Torrens system may rely on the title and need not go beyond the same. Such principle of indefeasibility has long been well-settled in this jurisdiction and it is only when the acquisition of the title is attended with fraud or bad faith that the doctrine finds no application.

-The Republic has not presented any title over the subject lot but instead relies heavily on the:

1.Commonwealth and Valdehueza cases in asserting ownership and possession over the same

2.arguing that it was expropriated by the government for military purposes in 1940

3. It further alleges that its possession of the subject lot is evidenced by the existence of military structures on the adjoining lots and that of the Camp Lapu-Lapu arch on the main entrance of the property in question.

-in the Valdehueza case it involves Lot Nos. 932 and 939. It does not in any way deal with the subject property nor were FRC and its predecessors-in-interest made parties thereto. Hence, the ruling therein cannot be applied to the instant case.

-the property in question was indeed subject to expropriation However, the CFI made no mention of the award of the land,the CFI merely fixed the valuation of the lots involved for the purpose of payment of just compensation by the government. Until the government has paid for the value of the lots, ownership shall remain with the respective landowners. There was no

proof presented by the Republic in both cases as to the receipt of the said deposit by the authorized depositary.

-There is also no evidence presented as to the existence of the camps arch on subject lot. It is not even clear where exactly on Lot No. 933 this arch stands. Neither was it shown when the same was constructed. Note that the lot in question is not the entire Lot No. 933, but only a portion thereof. We cannot imagine how fencing a 543-square meter lot can lead to grave and irreparable damage to the Republic

-Since the Republic has failed to prove its indubitable right over the lot in question we have to rule that FRC possesses a clear and unmistakable right over the subject lot that necessitates the issuance of a writ of injunction to prevent serious damage to its interests as titleholder thereto. Meanwhile, FRC may institute a separate proceeding to quiet its title wherein the issue of ownership over the subject property may finally be resolved.

CANLAS v HERRERA

Francisco Herrera (respondent) was the registered owner of the eight parcels of land located in Quezon City. He obtained various loans with L&R Corporation in various sum totaling 420,000. As a security thereof, he executed deeds of mortgage in the favor of the corporation over the eight parcels of land. Upon the maturity of the loan, the respondent failed to pay, as a consequence the lots were extra-judicially foreclosed and were disposed in a public auction were L&R was the highest bidder. Herrera then filed a complaint for injunction in which he succeeded. He was represented by the petitioner in the present case, Atty. Paterno Canlas.

Since there was no imminent end to the litigation in sight, the parties entered into a compromise agreement.

AGREEMENT: L&R Corporation grants Herrera another year to redeem the foreclosed properties subject to the payment of 600,000 with interest. And the parties also stipulated that Atty. Canlas shall be entitled to 100,000 attorney’s fees.

However, Herrera still remained in dire financial straits. Pursuant to the agreement above the records showed that the parties (Herrera and Canlas) executed a “Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Redemption”----- a document that enabled the petitioner:

(1) redeem the parcels in question

(2) to register the same on his name

Moreover, private respondent filed loaned applications to finance a project upon those subject premises only to find out that the properties were already registered to the name of the petitioner (Atty. Canlas).

As a consequence, respondent Herrera caused the annotation of an adverse claim upon the certificate of titles embracing the properties. However, the petitioner moved for the cancellation of the claim and for the issuance of the writ of possession.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled for the conveyance of things in litigation

RULING: By Atty. Canlas’ own account, “due to the lack of paying capacity of respondent Herrera, no financing entity is willing to extend him any loan to pay the price of the mortgaged properties and petitioner’s attorney’s fees.” And for obvious reasons, he placed his interests over and above that of his client. The Court finds the occasion fit to stress that lawyering is not a moneymaking venture.

The Court was also convinced that it was the petitioner who succeeded in having private respondent sign the “Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of Redemption”--- a prepared document that allowed Atty. Canlas to exercise the right of redemption and to acquire ownership thereof.

The redemption was decreed by a compromise agreement between the mortgagor and mortgagee. It did not give Atty. Canlas any right to the properties, much less the right of redemption. Whatever right he had, it was arguably, with respect alone to his remuneration. It did not extend to the lands and assuming that such right exists, it must be in proportion to the “just fees and disbursements” due to him.

But still, Herrera is still obliged to settle his liability for the payment of the property.

Vencilao et al vsVano et al

Topic on writ of possession

Consolidated cases of same parties and parcels of land;

o 1stcase: denying motion declaring herein the defendants (Vano) in default.

o 2nd case: a petition for certiorari of CFI-Bohol decision citing plaintiffs guilty of

contemp.

o 3rd case: a petition for certiorari and prohibition of CFI-Bohol directing demolition of

the houses of the petitioner.

Atong e discuss individually ang mga cases paradililibog! But before aning tanan2, kaningamga cases rooted from the application for registration of parcels of land initiated by the

heirs of Reyes (side sa defendant) on 1950 that was granted by the court. Niamao to sugoddayonniang 1st case……….

1st case (res judicata & default):

this is a complaint for reconveyance of real property with damages and injunction filed by the plaintiffs (Vencilao) before CFI of Bohol, alleging that they are the true owner of the parcels of land including the improvements thereon (inherited daw ningaland nila, unya they are in possession of the land daw for 30 years, nialagotsilanganogiapil daw samga heirs of Reyesilang land ogparegister) either by fraud or mistake with the intention of depriving them of their ownership and possession without their knowledge, not until in 1960’s when agents of the plaintiff attempted to enter the said parcels of land claiming ownership.

But, kaninga case gi dismiss rasadsa CFI on the grounds of res judicata.(ngano res judicata man? E discuss tana later..)

Nianiingon sad diringa on 1964, plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration on cases which were dismissed, niaang plaintiffs sad daw filed a motion to declare the defendants in default samga cases ngawalagi dismiss kay they, the defendants, failed to answer daw the cases on time prescribed by law.

Mao ngathis case reached the supreme court with the following issues:

o Fordismissing this case on grounds of Res Judicata.

This time, kaygi appeal namansa SC, Gi alleged sa plaintiffsngadili applicable ang res judicata, kaywalasilakahibaw about atong application for land registration, nga they were not notified daw sa decision of the registration, etc. but the SC ruled that the allegation of the plaintiffs cannot be entertained because it was not even raised in the lower court and the application of Res Judicata also includes land registration and cadastral proceedings. FINAL NAJUD TO ANG REGISTRATION DECREE OVER THE PARCEL OF LAND.

o was there really a default? (on the side of the defendants)

gi dismiss rani siyanga issue sa SC kay interlocutory rani, not appealeable.

sa 2nd case nata, but before that, naaygi raise nga question ang SC…., SC notified that a lot of oppositors in this case are children of the (original oppositors in the land registration case). Is the decision of the land registration binding and conclusive ba daw to them?A BIG YES, binding and conclusive siya

2nd case (contempt of court):

by this time, the administratixBernardinaLuspo died, so Transfer Certificate of Title of the Parcels of Land was issued infavor of Pedro Luspo. Afterwhich, a series of WRIT OF POSSESSION was issued by the CFI (1959, 1961, 1966…) against the plaintiff, perogahi kayo ang plaintiff nay silaymga guerrilla-like, hide and seek tactics! Ni refusesilaag sign and vacate the land. Because of this, one of the owners of the lot filed a petition for contempt in CFI and was hereby granted.

Hence, the plaintiff raised the issue in SC with the following questions:

o Was there an error when CFI issued Writ of Possession against the plaintiff without

any complaint filed in court for forceable entry and detainer nor recovery of ownership and that they were not parties to the original land registration proceedings?

The plaintiffs contended nasadnga they were not claimants-oppositors nor defeated in the original land registration proceedings kay their names were not included daw in that case. Peroniingon and SC, bisanna..a writ of possession may be issued not only to those defeated in a registration proceedings, apil sad jud tong unlawfully and adversely occupying the land! YES, THE WRIT WAS PROPERLY ISSUED.

On the case of contempt of court, SC did not subscribe to it. It is mandated upon the incumbent of the Sheriff to effectuate the writ that was issued by the lower court, the plaintiff has nothing to do with the delivery of the possession of the land.

3rd case (Writ of Demolition):

On 1971, one of the owners petitioned for a writ of demolition against those who continued refusal to vacate the disputed parcels of land in the CFI and it was granted.

This case reached SC, plaintiff alleged that there was grave abuse of discretion, acted with or without jurisdiction when CFI ordered a writ of demolition against them, but the SC ruled that saktoraang lower court, citing the case of Meralco v Mencias:

kay to effectuate removal samgagahiogulo! It is a REASONABLE NECESSARY to issue writ of demolition.

*note = kamonalang check sa elements of res judicata (basin lang) mangutanasi Atty.

JETRI CONSTRUCTION CORP vs. BPI

Facts:

in 1994, petitioner Jetri Construction Corporation applied for a P20M Credit Facility with Far East Bank and Trust Company, predecessor-in-interest of herein respondent Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI). Granted.

security for the loan: petitioner mortgaged its land (TCT) No. 213950 as well as the 4-storey building erected thereon. (naapuy surety executed by president of Jetri- bound to pay jointly and severally all obligations Jetrimay incur – not so impt.)

Jetri Construction Corp defaulted in paying the loan.It entered into a Loan Restructuring Agreement with the bank - acknowledged that its obligation under the Discounting Line was for the total amount of P22,621,876.37.

Failed to pay under the Loan Restructuring Agreement upon maturity.

Bank foreclosed the real estate mortgage on the property. On 22 November 1999, an auction sale was held; mortgaged property was sold to the bank. The Certificate of Sale was registered and annotated at the back of TCT No. 213950 on 3 December 1999.

Redemption period expired with petitioner failing to redeem the property.

On 28 August 2001, BPI filed before RTC for alleged foreclosure deficiency

Jetri Construction Corporation, simultaneously filed two complaints against respondent BPI and its managing officers, respectively.

o complaint for (a) annulment of mortgage foreclosure; (b) cancellation of

respondent's derivative Transfer Certificate of Title No. 250654; (c) quieting of petitioner's ownership and restoration of title; and (d) indemnity for damages.

o complaint for Estafa before the City Prosecutor's Office of Manila against the

managing officers of BPI for the alleged misappropriation of the Three (3) Million Pesos paid by petitioner as amortization for its loan.

Despite demands, petitioner refused to vacate the premises of the foreclosed property.On 15 August 2003, respondent filed a Petition for the Issuance of Writ of Possession of Real Property

On 28 February 2005, the RTC of Manila issued the writ of possession

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed before CA. Dismissed for failure to file its appellant's brief within the reglementary period despite notice. Motion for reconsideration also denied, thus appeal to SC.

Issue: (main issue of appeal was denied of due process by CA – no merit; but SC still decided to resolve the case to end controversy)

WON questioning the validity of the foreclosure sale be a ground to attack the propriety of the issuance of the Writ of Possession?

Held:

Any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of possession. 

Regardless of whether or not there is a pending suit for annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure, the purchaser is entitled to a writ of possession. Any question regarding the regularity and validity of the sale, is to be determined in a subsequent proceeding. In fact, petitioner itself has already commenced Civil Case No. 04-111298 before the RTC of Manilafor annulment of mortgage foreclosure.

Issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in a public auction is a ministerial act.  After the consolidation of title in the buyer's name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right. 

It was purely ministerial for the trial court to issue a writ of possession in favor of herein respondent upon the latter's filing of a petition. The issue of nullity of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale was of no moment. 

AG Development Corp vs. CA

Facts: 

November 4, 1981 – AG Dev’t Corp and National Housing Authority (NHA) entered into a "Memorandum of Agreement."

MOA – AGDC to construct a dormitory-apartmentcommercialbuilding for NHA for P11M

AGDC executed infavor of NHA a promissory note and a realestate mortgage over the land as a security for the obligation

NHA -made an initial payment of 3M to AGDC to cover a portion of the contract price

August 30, 1983 - NHA rescinded the agreement and demanded theimmediate return of the initial amount paid on the ground that AGDC was not ableto complete the project on time.

AGDC – refused the demand so thereal estate mortgage was extra-judicially foreclosed and the property sold to NHA asthe highest bidder.

The one-year period to redeem having expired, a new TransferCertificate of Title (TCT) was issued in favor of NHA.

Writ of possession was applied for and granted by the RTC of Quezon City

December 3, 1986 - AGDC filed a complaint against NHAfor breach of contract, declaration of nullity of thepromissory note and real estate mortgage, and annulment of foreclosure sale andreversion of possession and title in Makati RTC.

NHA filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of litispendentia, which was denied by the trial court.

While the case was pending, privaterespondent A. Francisco Realty and Development Corp. (AFRDC) filed a Motion tointervene claiming that it is an innocent purchaser for value of the subject propertysince it had already bought the foreclosed property from NHA.

AFRDC filed a motion to dismiss before the Makati RTC, reasoningthat the said court has no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint and annul the writissued by the Quezon City RTC since both are co-equal or coordinate jurisdiction.

The Makati RTC ruled in favor of AFRDC and dismissed AGDC's complaint

Issue: Whether theissuance of a writ of possession by the Quezon City RTC constitutes res judicata asto bar the complaint filed by AGDC

Held: No. Res judicata cannot be applied. 3rd requisite is missing.

Requisites for res judicata to apply:

a) the former judgment must be final;

b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and theparties;

c) thejudgment must be on the merits; and

d) there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, subjectmatter and causes of action.

1. Issuance of a writ of possession is not a judgment on the merits (defined as one rendered after a determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal technical point)

o Writ ofpossession – an order whereby the sheriff is commandedto place a person

in possession of a real or personal property, such as when aproperty is extra judicially foreclosed.

o Issuance of a writ ofpossession to a purchaser in an extra-judicial

foreclosure is merely a ministerial function. As such, the Court neither exercises its official discretion nor judgment.In other words, the issuance of the writ of possession is summary in nature.

2. Issuance of thewrit of possession is simply an incident in the transfer of title

o Doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicialproceedings and

not to the exercise of administrative powers or to legislative,executive or ministerial determination

o Accordingly, cases disposed of on technicalgrounds do not fall within the doctrine

of res judicata.

Maglente VS. Baltazar- Padilla

On January 15, 1985, Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC), entered into a contract of lease for three years with one of the petitioners, Ursula Maglente. The contract stated that, if PRC were to sell the leased property, Maglente would be given the first priority (right of first refusal) to buy it. Furthermore, lessee was prohibited from subleasing any portion of the property without the consent of the lessor. However, after its execution Maglente subleased portions of the property to the respondents.

On March 9, 1987, when the lease contract was about to expire, PRC sent a written offer to sell the leased property to Maglente.

In February 1989, PRC received a letter from respondents expressing their desire to purchase the same property.

On February 23, 1989, PRC filed a complaint for interpleader in the RTC against both petitioners and respondents so they could litigate among themselves on who had the right to purchase the property.

RTC - On March 11, 1991, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioners and declared them as the rightful parties to purchase PRC's property.

CA – Affirmed the decision of the RTC.

… In the case under consideration, the contract of sale was already perfected — PRC offered the subject lot for sale to [petitioners] Maglente and her group. . . Respondent Maglente and her group accepted such offer . . . manifesting their intention to purchase the property as provided for under the lease contract. Thus, there was already an offer and acceptance giving rise to a valid contract. As a matter of fact, [petitioners] have already completed payment of their downpayment of P100,000. Therefore, as borne by evidence on record, the requisites under Article 1318 of the Civil Code for a perfected contract have been met…

A writ of execution was ordered by the RTC directing PRC to execute the contract to sell in favor of Maglente. PRC executed a deed of sale. Petitioners then filed a motion for the issuance of writ of possession but respondents refused to, contending that the

interpleader case only resolved the right of the petitioner to purchase the leased property but did not declare them as owners entitled to the possession.

Now the main issue of the case is W/N Maglente is entitled to a writ of possession after being adjudged (in the interpleader case) as the proper parties to buy the subject property, considering that a "deed of sale" has already been executed in their favor.

SC ruled on the negative.

- A writ of possession shall issue only in the following instances: (1) land registration proceedings; (2) extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of real property; (3) judicial foreclosure of property provided that the mortgagor has possession and no third party has intervened, and (4) execution sales.

- The trial court's decision in the interpleader case (affirmed by both the CA and the SC) resolved the question of who, between petitioners and respondents, had the right to purchase PRC's property. The writ of execution read:

...NOW THEREFORE, [PRC] is hereby ordered to execute a contract of sale/contract to sell in favor of [petitioners] within thirty (30) days from the date of execution hereof…

- Likewise, although it was stated that the contract of sale between petitioners and PRC had already been perfected, SC refrained from declaring the petitioners as the owners since, pending the execution of the deed of sale or delivery of the property, ownership had yet to transfer to them at that time.

- Finally, petitioners cannot recover possession of the property via a mere motion. They must file the appropriate action in court against respondents to recover possession. While this remedy can delay their recovery, this Court cannot permit an abbreviated method without subverting the rules and processes established for the orderly administration of justice.

- WHEREFORE, the assailed order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 38, is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the petition is DISMISSED.