boxed- medieval science and its contributions to the modern world

8/6/2019 Boxed- Medieval Science and Its Contributions to the Modern World

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UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

Boxed: Medieval Science

and its Contributions to theModern WorldHonors Undergraduate Thesis

Joshua Adams

April 11, 2011


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Preface

I started this work over a year ago after finishing my first course on the middle ages by Dr. Charles

Stinger at the University at Buffalo. As a Biological Sciences and History double major, I found myself

interested in the history of science, particular how different time periods affected the modern development

of science. All too often, scientists simply take for granted the maturation of our fields and forget all the

many people and groups that have contributed to sciences current and astonishing intellectual height. I

completed this work with the intent to better understand the nature of medieval science and the nature of

science itself and I finished the work better educated in the development of natural philosophy and with a

greater appreciation for my future career as a physician-scientist.

This work is not intended to be an exhaustive review of medieval science nor is it to be taken as a

history of the middle ages. Instead, I have written this thesis with the idea of looking at several key moments

and by considering select passages from individual medieval intellectuals and scientists to better understand

the nature of medieval thought and science. In addition, I wished to compare medieval thinking with that of

the ancient Greeks, the Scientific Revolution and modern science to better understand not only how

scientific was the middle ages but also the nature of science in general.

I am convinced that modern science is based on a tradition of inquiry that stretches back to the

ancient Greek world and that an understanding of modern science requires an understanding ofallscientific

periods including the middle ages. In this vein, I have brought together the medieval thinkers with their

Greek and modern counterparts.

In the spirit of modern scientific inquiry itself, I draw upon many sources, from historians and

scientists who have come before me. In addition, as a scientist myself, I feel that my own ideas have their

place and I have placed them appropriately in the context of the giants of science upon which science is built.

Buffalo, NY Joshua Adams


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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my mentor, Dr. Charles Stinger, for his time and wisdom that enabled me

to complete this work. I would also like to thank Dr. Jonathan Dewald for his persistence over the years

that have made me the writer I am today. I would also like to thank all the proofreaders and those off

whom I bounced ideas; Timothy Ecker, Alex Sunshine, Charlie Nassor, Adem Aktas, my brother Jonathan

Adams and my parents Clayton and Pamela Adams. Finally I would like to thank the University at Buffalo

Department of History and the University at Buffalo Honors College for the opportunity to write the

undergraduate honors thesis and their support throughout the writing process.


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Image Platos cave. Now, transform that cave into a simple, white box. What do you see? White

walls, an empty background. Now, imagine that your box is actually in another box, this time one that

takes on the shape and feel of your town; when one of your box walls collapses you are suddenly

transported into a wider, more complicated world and you are able to think new thoughts, pose new

questions and explore new ideas. The human mind can be thought of as existing within a box and the

box defines what we are able to discover, what questions we can ask and what answers we are willing to

accept. Keep this box in mind as we ask the deceptively simple question, did the Middle Ages have

science?

Since the early twentieth century, historians have generally assumed that medieval Europeans,

as the progenitors of certain key developments that led to the Renaissance and the Scientific Revolution,

had some form of science. Pierre Duhem saw medieval science as the forerunner of the scientific

revolution, but he did, nonetheless, define the medieval world as scientific

1

. The question is, was it

reallyscientific? Simply because someone asks a question about a natural phenomenon, does that truly

define having science or is science something more, something deeper and more in flux? As a biologist

and a future physician-scientist, I believe that this question is of utmost importance for it not only

defines where science has been but where it will go in the future. An exploration of the medieval mental

landscape and of several high-profile medieval intellectuals provides mixed answers; the landscape is as

unscientific as one can get but the intellectual community appears, on the surface, to embrace science.

By going back to the ancient Greeks, widely acknowledged for holding scientific ideas and methods, and

1Cited in Grant, E. (2010). The Nature of Natural Philosophy in the Late Middle Ages.Studies in Philosophy and

theHistory of PhilosophyJ. Dougherty. Washington, D.C., The Catholic University of America Press:vii.


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then fast forwarding to the Scientific Revolution and the modern era we find that the medieval world

did nothave a core element that science requires all of its investigators: the ability to criticize and

supplant the past. Yet, the medieval world tells us more than what is needed to have science.It tells us

how our mental box defines how we approach the world and how the size and complexity of our

mental sphere does not necessarily predict its future contributions to a major mental expansion. We will

find that the medieval world contributed a major component of what we know now as science: the

ability to recognize the past as a potential resource for advancing scientific thought. What we learn from

analyzing medieval science, or the lack there of, is that our world is not set, not concrete but rather in

flux just waiting for another wall to come crashing down.

Medieval Europe is one of most misunderstood periods in western history for most students.

We romanticize about castles, knights and courtly dramas, we think of great feasts and battles that are

timeless. Like the Roman humanists of the fifteenth century, we do not always try to see the reality of

the situation, a reality that changed over time and was not nearly as rosy as wed all like to imagine2.

Before we can ask the question, did the middle ages have science, we need to ask what the medieval

mental landscape, the medieval me

ntailit, was like. We dont ask if a town has a symphony if we dont

at least know something about it so we should do the same for the medieval world.

If we wish to ask the question, do the middle ages have science, what types of questions should

we ask about the medieval mentailit? One of the most basic types of information used in analyzing a

scientific result are spatial and temporal measurements without which we are unable to draw

conclusions or comparisons to better understand our universe.

Lets start by exploring the medieval concept of space through the work of Gregory, Bishop of

Tours, author ofThe History of the Franks. Written as a history of Gregorys Europe in the mid-sixth

2For certain illusions (or self-delusions) of the Roman humanists, note Stinger, C. L. (1998). Renaissance in Rome,

Indiana University Press:67-71.


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century, Gregory helps paint for us a picture of the medieval concept of space with a story about an

admired saint and hermit, Hospicius.

He was a man of great abstinence, who had iron chains wound round his body, next to the skin,

and wore a hair shirt on top.One of the Longobards drew his sword and made ready to cut off the

recluses head. His right hand was paralyzed in midair as he dealt the blow, and he was unable to draw it

back to his sideThe man was converted on the spot: his head was tonsured, and he became one of

Hospicius most faithful monks3. Whether or not the story is true (and we know that medieval

hagiography had its own narrative conventions which did not necessarily conform to our expectations of

what is history), it helps us to understand the medieval mindset. The image Gregory sets before us is

what French medieval historian, Jacques Le Goff, would refer to as a symbolic and spiritual one, a

total rejection of the world4. Medieval people had a long way to go before they could penetrate the

screen of symbolism and encounter the reality of the world in which they livedFor the reality was not

that the heavenly world was as real as the earthly world, it was that they only formed one world, in an

inextricable mixture which caught men in the toils of a living supernatural5. This is a world where the

supernatural and the physical mixed; imagine for a moment that your world was a combination of the

magical world ofHarry Potterand the scientific world ofStarTrek; how could any of us deal with that,

how could we come to terms with a physical universe when, sitting in the same plane, is a magical,

supernatural and, therefore, uncontrollable universe. It is this universe that would prompt Le Goff to

describe the medieval person as one who held deep contempt for the world, a world he could not

control nor understand. It is this contempt, which explains Gregorys admiration for Hospicius.

Hospicius, it could be argued, does not represent the common man. After all, even Gregory of

Tours himself was Bishop, not Farmer, of Tours. Can we honestly say that Gregorys tale paints an image

3Gregory of Tours(1974). The History of the Franks, Penguin: 333-334

4Le Goff, Jacques. (1990). Medieval Civilization: Blackwell: 138,153,165

5Ibid: 153,165


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of the medieval mindset even though it is from a leading religious figure and about a well-respected

hermit? We must acknowledge that there will be problems in addressing this question; one of the most

important primary sources on medieval commoners, the inquisition records analyzed by Emmanuel Le

Roy Ladurie in his Montaillou, comes from the fourteenth century and only after a papal

inquisition6elicited extensive testimony from illiterate peasants and shepherds, thus giving voice to the

otherwise inarticulate. Instead, we should remind ourselves of two facts. One, Gregory was not a

widely traveled individual; he mainly remained within and around Tours his entire life7. Two, Gregorys

choice of a hermit is highly revealing as hermits were revered by the common people; so Hospicius

actions cannot be taken as merely his own, but rather one idolized by medieval civilization8.

Another way to look at how a people view space is how they approach questions and conflicts in

their world. Modern histories, for example are analyses of facts, concepts and personal backgrounds

that allow us to understand whysomething has taken place. We do not simply want to know the facts

but wish to probe deeper into our world to better understand historical phenomena. Judging both from

the confluence of the supernatural and the physical and Gregory of Tours admiration for Hospicius

conte

mptus mundi, or contempt of the world, we should expect that some early medieval thinkers may

not analyze their world as thoroughly as we. Indeed, when we look at the eighth to ninth century

thinker, Alcuin of York, we get that very impression. In his Grammar, he discusses important facts with

Charlemagne. Both Alcuins and Charlemagnes comments assume the guise of critical analysis. If thou

sayest I am not the same as thou, and that I am a man, it follows that thou art not a man, says Alcuin.

It does replies Charlemagne, But how many syllables has homo? replies Alcuin. This continues with

Charles replying Two and Alcuin explaining how he knows what he knows. It is the end that is most

important. Charlemagne says, I see and understand from what was granted at the start, both that I am

6Ladurie, E.L.R., and B. Bray. (2008). Montaillou: The Promised Land of Error: George Braziller.: vii

7Gregory of Tours. (1974). The History of the Frank,. Penguin: 13

8Le Goff: 184


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homo and that homo has two syllables, and that I can be shut up to the conclusion that I am these two

syllables...9.

Alcuin is hardly getting deep into his material (his proof seems to us superficially tautological);

his analysis is not deep because he belongs to a world that cannot be probed, to a world where the

physical is constantly being interrupted by the supernatural. It makes sense that in such a world, even

intellectuals would have trouble asking and answering more than superficial questions.

So far, we have encountered a landscape that is hardly inviting to scientific discourse and

thought; science cannot exist in a vacuum, one without a proper substrate to study. Before we get

ahead ourselves, we need to be reminded that this is a general overview, one that affected the

generality of medieval people and may have had exceptions. To delve deeper, we need to look at the

second most important measurement: time.

We dont give much thought to time unless were running late at the supermarket when we are

supposed to be at a meeting or when we have an assignment due in twenty minutes and were only

half-way through. Time, however is critical to our lives whether we actively think about it or not.

Imagine a world without time or even a world with only more generalized awareness of time. Could we

accomplish our tasks? More fundamentally, could we measure things, analyze situations and reach

quantitative conclusions? As a scientist, I turn to temporal measurements almost as often as spatial

because they provide valuable information regarding the world around me, how fast it moves and

changes. Now, lets think about the middle ages; this is a world, as weve just discovered, that has little

time for the physical. Does the same hold true for the temporal?

We turn, yet again, to Gregory of Tours. In his preface to History of the Franks, the bishop says,

A great many things keep happening, some of them good, some of them bad. The inhabitants of

9West, Andrew Fleming. (1892).Alcuin and the Rise of the Christian Schools. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons: 81


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different countries keep quarrelling fiercely with each other and kings go on losing their temper in the

most furious way. Our churches are attacked by the heretics and then protected by the Catholics; the

faith of Christ burns bright in many men, but it remains lukewarm in others; no sooner are church-

buildings endowed by the faithful than they are stripped bare again by those who have no faithwhat a

poor period this is! they have been heard to say. He continues at the beginning of Book 1, Proposing

as I do to describe the wars waged by kings against hostile peoples, by martyrs against the heathen and

by the Churches against the heretics, I wish first of all to explain my own faith, so that whoever reads me

may not doubt that I am a Catholic. For the sake of those who are losing hope as they see the end of the

world coming nearer and nearer, I also think it desirable that, from material assembled from the

chronicles and histories of earlier writers, I should explain clearly how many years have passed since the

world began10

. Gregory not only decries the state of his world but then exclaims that the world will

end, that the world is not only in decline but is approaching its death. Time is, to Gregory of Tours, on its

way out.

It is, again, difficult for us to understand Gregorys concept of time; it is one where the end is

known and near, one where time is in constant and in appreciable decline. Jacques Le Goff says it best,

The fundamental assertion was that history has a beginning and an endthe direction of history sloped

downwards in a declineThe scholastics tried to reaffirm this stopping of history and they gave a

rational basis for it by maintaining that historicity was fallacious and dangerous and that the only thing

that counted was eternity outside of time11

.

If time is in decline, does that necessarily preclude its use as a measurement? This is important

because even in the twenty-first century, we hear phrases like, good old days or, what is this world

coming to? and yet we still use time as an accurate and staple measurement in science and our

10Gregory of Tours: 63, 67

11Le Goff: 166, 173


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everyday lives. Did the medieval world, even with its pessimistic outlook on history, still use time? In his

work, The Problem of Unbelief in theSixteenth Century: The Religion of Rabelais, Lucien Febvre argued

that a timeless approach to time prevailed. He remarks that commoners in early modern Europe, as did

their medieval ancestors, regarded time vaguely. There is no need to say that those clocks did not

sound the hours[many times] the night watchman were provided with the hour only approximately, by

means of hourglasses using sand or water12.

Time was not only in decline, but it was also not worth its weight in straw hats; the medieval

landscape was one that saw time in decline and not worth measuring. What then, can we conclude

about the medieval thought landscape by examining their sense of space and time? We can say that the

medieval mindset was one where the physical and the temporal were regarded with, at best, apathy and

at worst utter contempt. This is not a landscape where science would easily find a home.

Are there manifestations of this landscape that might help us determine sciences chances? In

science, we use certain tools to measure and describe our world. We might expect the medieval world,

where the physical and the temporal were rejected, to be deficient in such tools and that is exactly what

we find. We look at two types of tools, nomenclature and standards.

Nomenclature is used for almost everything in modern science. We do not point at a glass

beaker and say, that thingy of watery stuff but rather we say, that beaker of methanol or ketones or

any other organic or inorganic solution. We name living organisms by their genus and species and even

assign proper font (italics) and capitalization to the name; Homo sapiens. Anyone who has ever taken

out a book at a library has dealt with the Dewey decimal system. In total, we use nomenclature every

day to navigate our world whether its scientific or just finding the latest Ken Follett novel. The medieval

12Febvre, L., and B. Gottlieb. (1985). The Problem of Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century, the Religion of Rabelais;

Harvard University Press: 394


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world, on the other hand, did not have such naming structures, and thus was lacking in any standard

nomenclature13

.

Standards are vital because they connect different areas of study and allow experts from many

fields to communicate. You can imagine what would happen if the chemist and the biologist could not

talk to one another; the chemist would know how particulates come together and in suspension and the

biologist would know that if something blocks the various tubules of the kidney that there would result a

malfunction. However, if they could not communicate, then the idea of a kidney stone would be just

outside their grasp. By having standard scientific procedure, measurements and theory, scientists from

multiple fields can build on each others work to create something that neither could produce on their

own. Again, as we see with nomenclature, the medieval world was completely lacking in standards14

.

In our whirlwind tour of the medieval mentailit, we have discovered a world that rejected the

physical and the temporal, rejections that manifested themselves in the absence of nomenclature and

standards. This is nota world where we can imagine science taking hold. Rather, this is one that seems

hostile to science. Return to the image of the box in the opening paragraph. I propose that this medieval

mentailit can be represented as this very box. The medieval world, try as it might, was restrained

within a mental box that, based on its limitations in measurement, nomenclature and standards, was

only able to go so far in studying the universe. We then must ask ourselves the question, does this box

hypothesis hold true? Did the medieval world break out of its box or was it constrained? By comparing

the box to the works of medieval intellectuals we discover a surprising world; the medieval intellectual,

constrained by his box, seems to be far more scientific than would otherwise be expected.

We look at four intellectuals, two from the High Middle Ages, Peter Abelard and Roger Bacon,

and two from the Late, Will iam of Ockham and Thomas Bradwardine. Each tell us something about the

13Febvre and Gottlieb: 389

14Ibid: 401


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medieval intellectual world and reveals a key facet of that world that helped make modern science

possible, along with showing how complicated actually is the history of science.

Lets start by considering one of the most important logicians of the twelfth century, Peter

Abelard. Abelard lived in a time of intellectual renewal throughout Latin Christendom15. This is the

perfect place to begin, as a consideration of logical thinkers naturally connects with a consideration of

the logical thought and analysis seen in science. Abelards famous works include Sic et Non, translated,

Yes and No. Abelards focus throughout the work is simple and direct; he compares ancient thinkers and

church fathers and looks for discrepancies in their statements and works. You might immediately

question why we might study an individual who studied the church and religion rather than science; the

key is not the subject matter but how he analyzes it that tells us much on how the medieval intellectual

approached his world. It is the approach, not the subject that ultimately matters as we will see that the

approach is replicated even when medieval thinkers approach scientific subjects.

Abelard begins his work by explaining what he sets out to accomplish. He says, There are many

seeming contradictions and even obscurities in the innumerable writings of the church fathers. Our

respect for their authority should not stand in the way of an effort on our part to come at the truth. The

obscurity and contradictions in ancient writings may be explained upon many grounds, and may be

discussed without impugning the good faith and insight of the fathers. He continues, Not infrequently

apocryphal works are attributed to the saints. Then, even the best authors often introduce the

erroneous views of others and leave the reader to distinguish between the true and the false.

15King, Peter. (2010). PeterAbelard. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 11.09.20102010 [cited 02.16.2011

2010]. Available from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abelard/.


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Sometimes, as Augustine confesses in his own case, the fathers ventured to rely upon the opinions of

others16

.

What should we take away from Abelards statement? First, it is painfully obvious that he

attempts to understand the ancient thinkers but it is howhe justifies any contradictions that is key.

Abelard criticizes not the church fathers themselves but rather others who may have misinterpreted

their works; he bluntly admits that the fathers should be left in good faith. This is critical as it tells us

that Abelard not only studied ancient sources but was also unable to come out and say that one of them

was wrong. Imagine in our world not everarguing against an author but rather arguing against their

interpreters; we would have a problem moving beyond the past into the future. Keep this in mind when

considering whether or not medieval thinkers were scientific.

Our second voice from the medieval past is Roger Bacon, a thirteenth century, Oxford-trained

thinker on logic, natural philosophy, grammar, and innumerable other topics17

. He provides our first look

into an actual natural philosopher, if there were one in the middle ages, and therefore helps us to

delve deeper into our question. One of Bacons most important contributions to the modern world is his

emphasis on experimental science. Through a look at his work, Opus Majus, we can glean both his views

on experimentation and past sources. What Bacon says is critical not for its obvious promotion of

experimentation but rather for its approach to the ancients. Like Abelard, Bacon reveals the nature of

science in the middle ages but also the nature of science over time.

He starts Part Six, Chapter 1, Having laid down fundamental principles of the wisdom of the

Latins so far as they are found in language, mathematics, and optics, I now wish to unfold the principles

of experimental science, since without experience nothing can be sufficiently known. For there are two

16Abelard, Peter. (2011). From Sic et Non, 1120 [cited April 4th, 2011 2011]. Available from

http://faculty.cua.edu/pennington/churchhistory220/lecture%20four/PeterAbelardSicetNon.htm.17

Hackett, Jeremiah. (2011). RogerBacon. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 04.19.20072007 [cited 02.16.2011

2011]. Available from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/roger-bacon/.


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modes of acquiring knowledge, namely, by reasoning and experience. Reasoning draws a conclusion and

makes us grant the conclusion but does not make the conclusion certain, nor does it remove doubt so

that the mind may rest on the intuition of truth, unless the mind discovers it by path of experienceFor

a man who has never seen fire should prove by adequate reasoning that fire burns and injures things

and destroys them, his mind would not be satisfied thereby, nor would he avoid fire, until he placed his

handin the fire, so that he might prove by experience that which reasoning taught18. This amazing

sections importance will become apparent later on but for now we must recognize that Bacon saw

experimentation as critical to learning.

Why then, do we group Bacon with Peter Abelard, a man who was as far from experimentation

as one could go? The key lies in Bacons following paragraph on Aristotle. He says, Aristotles

statement, then, that proof is reasoning that causes us to know is to be understood with the proviso

that the proof is accompanied by its appropriate experience, and is not to be understood of the bare

proof19

. If we were to read the same line from Aristotle we might conclude that he iswrong but Bacon

avoids that problem but adding his own interpretation; he says that Aristotle is right as long as we take

the text to mean something that conforms with our own understanding of the world. Bacon, like

Abelard, cannot bring himself to completely reject past thinkers but, instead, finds reasons for their

errors not in their own assertions but rather in our interpretation. Keep this in mind, along with

Bacons ideas on experimental science, as we continue our journey through the world of the medieval

intellectual.

We now transition into the Late Middle Ages, approximately 1350 to 1550 as demarcated by the

Black Death in 1347/48 and the beginning of the Counter Reformation in 1543 with the Council of Trent.

18Bacon, Roger. (1962). The Opus Majus of RogerBacon. Translated by Robert Belle Burke. Vol. 2. New York, NY:

Russell and Russell, Inc.: 18319

Bacon. Opus Majus Vol. 2:183-184


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Here we survey two additional thinkers, William of Ockham and Thomas Bradwardine. Each continue

the tale begun with Peter Abelard and reveal more on the nature of medieval science.

William of Ockham, probably best known to many a science student, including myself, for his

axiom known as Ockhams Razor, was a late medieval philosopher in logic, natural philosophy, ethics

and political philosophy. Again, like Bacon, he provides us with a view from medieval natural philosophy.

In Ockhams Summula philosophiae naturalishe remarks on the nature of physics. As we read his

comment, keep in mind Roger Bacon. Is physics a theoretical or practical science? It is wholly or for the

most part theoretical, for it is mainly concerned with things we do not make, such as the earth, heavens,

animals and other bodies20. Remember Bacons stance on experimentation; at that time it was

apparent that medieval thinkers were able to come up with physical ways to understand their universe.

William of Ockhams remark dampens that ability; only things that humans make are considered

practical science, everything else is theoretical. Theoretical science here does not mean something that

needs to be tested but rather something that cannotbe tested because Ockham says that it [physics] is

whollyfor the most theoretical. We have therefore hit a stumbling block; Bacon reveals the ability of

medieval thinkers to approach their world using experimentation but Ockham restricts that

experimentation to only those objects humans can make and therefore draws the curtain on wholly

natural philosophy. Again, like the others weve looked at, keep this in mind as we further probe the

science of the middle ages.

Our final medieval thinker is Thomas Bradwardine, a late medieval mathematician who applied

quantitative measures to Aristotelian physics21

.In his Tractatus de proportionibus, published in 1328,

Bradwardine attempts to identify a rule of dynamics using mathematics, particularly one from Aristotles

20Maurer, A.A. (1999). The Philosophy of William ofOckham in the Light of its Principles: [Pontifical Institute of

Mediaeval Studies].: 381-38221

Spade, Paul Vincent. (2011). Insolubles [Web Site Encyclopedia]. Stanford University, June 26th, 2009 2009 [cited

04.12.2011 2011]. Available from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/insolubles/#3.1.


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Physics22

. Did, then, Bradwardine constitute a modern physicist? The answer is no, not because he did

not employ mathematics but because he never used experimentation23

. Remembering the differences

between Roger Bacon and William of Ockham, this would make sense; Bradwardine is using a similar set

of rules as Ockham, looking at the law from a theoreticaland notpracticaland therefore experimental

point of view.

Even if Bradwardine failed to experiment, we still have one additional question; how did he

relate to Aristotle? Did he come up with something new or even try to contradict the ancient Greek

thinker? Jean Celeyrette says it best, The intent of the medieval master is commentary on and

explication of the books of Aristotle. When the medieval master appears in contradiction with Aristotle,

in general he removes the difficulty with the help of distinctions. If this does not succeed, he can, as we

have seen, choose to ignore the disagreement (as Bradwardine does), to stress it (as Kilvington), or even

to pretend that Aristotle was incorrectly translated (as Oresme [and, as we have seen, Roger

Bacon])24

. Here we have an image of a medieval thinker, a mathematician, who does not experiment

but also finds it difficult to even reject the ancients. Like the others, keep this description in mind as we

continue our question, did the middle ages have science?

What conclusions can we draw from our study of the medieval intellectual? First, on the surface

these thinkers, with the exception of Peter Abelard, appear to be protoscientists. There are some quirks,

which we shall get to in a moment, but for the most part they appear to be early versions of future

thinkers of the scientific revolution. Roger Bacon comes up with an idea on experimental science, drawn

from his study of ancient texts, William of Ockham agrees with the study of science but demarcates

physical from theoretical science on the basis of what humans build and finally Bradwardine shows us

22Laird, Walter Roy and Roux, Sophie. (2008). Mechanics and Natural Philosophy Before theScientific Revolution.

Vol. 254, [Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science]. Boston, MA: Springer.: 5123

Ibid: 5124

Cited in Ibid: 64-65


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just how much the human mind is able to grasp. In total, we seem to have a proto-scientific intellectual

world but we have a problem; this world seemingly is in contradiction with the medieval landscape, the

mentailit, the box, that we earlier laid out. Do they really contradict or is there something that we miss

by isolating the medieval thinkers in their own world? To better understand whether or not the

medieval world truly had science we must compare the medieval thinkers with other, accepted

scientists throughout history. It is natural to begin with the medieval worlds intellectual progenitors,

those they constantly cited, the Greeks.

The ancient Greeks provide an excellent set of sources to which we can compare the medieval

scientific thinkers for two reasons. First, the Greeks are widely acknowledged for their scientific work,

especially in natural philosophy25. Second, the Greeks provide a similar dichotomy between a general

landscape of thought and the intellectuals; most Greeks were not scientists or intellectuals but, as the

broad range of religious and votive structures and art reveal, had their own culture which may appear,

at first glance, to be the antithesis of science26

. We can, then, adequately compare Greek thinkers with

medieval thinkers and recognize that the general landscape may not be a true view of how scientific the

Greeks were. This helps us to fairly access medieval science by looking at the intellectuals rather than

the common landscape for, as weve seen, it is through the medieval intellectual that we have questions

regarding the nature of medieval science.

Coming out of the Geometric Era at the end of the Greek Dark Age were an entirely new class of

thinkers that we now know as the Pre-Socratics27

. Like the medieval intellectual, not all of the Pre-

Socratic philosophers studied what we can identify as a scientific subject. Lets look at three

intellectuals ranging from the sixth to fifth century BC to get a better understanding of the nature of

Greek science and how it compares to the medieval world.

25Hurwit, J.M. (1985). The art and culture ofearly Greece, 1100-480 B.C: Cornell University Press.: 203

26Ibid: 209

27Ibid: 203


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Before we begin, we should understand the nature of our primary sources; they are fragments.

Such sources therefore should make us question the full validity of the argument as much has been lost.

However, we can safely assume, as dangerous as that is, given the strong nature of the comments, that

what we do have conforms to the Pre-Socratic thinkers core ideas. In addition, for ease of reference, I

will refer to each of the Fragments by their number as given by Philip Wheelwright in his seminal book,

The Pre-Socratics. One additional point has to be made; because these are fragments, they are in no

special order. Wheelwright put them together in a logical manner but we must not assume that one

fragment precedes another but rather take all the fragments as one, complete thought.

Lets begin with Xenophanes, a sixth century Greek philosopher. Xenophanes many fragments

range from myth and religion to natural philosophy. Each tell us much about the nature of Greek

thought and provide excellent comparisons to medieval thinkers. In Fragment 8, Xenophanes attacks the

central pillar of Greek education, the poets Homer and Hesiod. Homer and Hesiod attributed to the

gods all sorts of actions which when done by men are disreputable and deserving of blame- such lawless

deeds as theft, adultery and mutual deception28

. Compare to Peter Abelards analysis of the ancient

thinkers; Abelard finds fault with translators and interpreters while Xenophanes finds fault with the

original author. This clear distinction becomes even more clear when looking at Fragments 8 and 17:

Quite evidently the gods have not revealed everything to mortals at the outset; for mortals are obliged,

in the slow course of time, to discover for themselves what is best; The sea is the source of water and

the source of wind. For blasts of wind could not come-to-be within the clouds and blow forth from them

if it were not for the great sea; nor could there be rivers, nor any rain from the sky without it. The great

sea is the begetter of clouds and winds and rivers29. In Fragment 8, Xenophanes explains knowledge to

be something that is unknown; because the gods never gave the Greeks, according to Xenophanes, any

28Wheelwright, Philip. (1997). The Presocratics, Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall.: 33

29Ibid: 33-34


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special knowledge, Greeks of the future must come up with new ideas, for past thinkers will not know

all. This is continued in Fragment 17 where Xenophanes comes up with a theory for water and wind

withoutciting past sources; he comes up with something new.

What Xenophanes implicitly tells us is that the Greeks saw science and philosophy as a rejection,

not an affirmation of the past; theydefined their future and did not need past thinkers. How can we be

sure that Xenophanes was not unique? A look at the later thinker, Thales, shows Xenophanes to be part

of a line of thinking rather than an independent and isolated source.

Most of Thales fragments have been lost; however we have later Greek and Roman thinkers

writings on Thales to provide evidence for his work. This later citation is, as well see later, important in

analyzing the medieval contribution to modern science. In Proclus On Euclid, there is a description of

Thales entering Egypt and bringing knowledge to Greece. The key is what he says next, He [Thales]

discovered a number of propositions himself, and he explained to his successors the underlying

principles of many others. In some cases he employed deduction from universals, in others his approach

was empirical30

. Thales does go into Egypt and brings back ideas but it is not clear whether or not those

ideas are Egyptian or Thales own. What is more important is the greater emphasis given to his own

work that he not only brought into Greece but passed down to his successors. Why would Proclus make

more of a point of Thales own contributions rather than what we learned from Egypt? Although we

might never know, a simple construction is that Thales did not borrow from the Egyptians but rather

used his experiences in Egypt to open his mind to new possibilities that even the Egyptians had yet to

discover. Regardless, Thales follows Xenophanes idea of building new ideas rather than simply adopting

ancient ideas.

30Wheelwright: 49


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A combination of Thales and Xenophanes reveals a Greek world that is a far cry from the middle

ages; the Greeks looked for new ideas, for their philosophy centered on the gods notgranting all

knowledge to humanity forcing human civilization to discover for themselves what is correct. In

addition, they were willing to criticize past thinkers unlike the medieval intellectual. Before we draw

further conclusions on the nature of medieval science, lets look at one final and monumental thinker,

Heraclitus.

Heraclitus of Ephesus is reported to have reached his zenith between 504 and 500 BC and was

widely known for the rest of antiquity for his demanding statements on philosophy and science,

statements that, as well see, made Xenophanes and Thales appear to be less worthy of admiration in

comparison. We can break Heraclitus thoughts down into three types: his rejection of past thinkers as

well see in Fragments 6 and 93; his rejection of the supernatural and spiritual universe in Fragments 11,

29, and 81; and his view of the future in Fragment 19. We use so many of Heraclitus fragments because

of his importance to our question, did the middle ages have science?

Just as weve seen in the previous Pre-Socratic thinkers, Heraclitus thoughts are broken into

fragments; lets begin with his rejection of the past. There are two fragments of note; Much learning

does not teach understanding, otherwise it would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, Xenophanes and

Hectaeus and Homer deserves to be thrown out of the contest and flogged, and Archilochos too31. It

is rare even today to find a philosopher or scientist so adamantly opposed to his predecessors. What is

interesting here is not merely Heraclitus rejection of Homer, as weve seen this is hardly new, but rather

his rejection of Pythagoras. We do not expect to find a great Greek philosopher and scientist rejecting a

man and school that even today we hold in high regard. Could it be that the Greek scientists were at

31Wheelwright: 69,76


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one remove even from our own modern science? Keeping this in mind we continue to Heraclitus

treatment of the supernatural.

In fragment 11 Heraclitus establishes his love of observation, an early form of experimentation.

The things of which there can be sight, hearing, and learning- these are what I especially prize32. In

fragment 29, he completely rejects the supernatural by defining the universe in terms of regular,

coherent and, therefore, decipherable, laws. This universe, which is the same for all, has not been

made by any god or man, but it has always been, is, and will be- and ever-living fire, kindling itself by

regular measures and going out by regular measures33

. Finally, in fragment 81, he asserts that the

universe is ruled by one law, bringing together fragments 11 and 29. Men should speak with rational

awareness and thereby hold on strongly to that which is shared in common- as a city holds on strongly

to its law, and even more strongly. For all human laws are nourished by the one divine law, which

prevails as far as it wishes, suffices for all things, and yet is something more than they34. Amazingly,

Heraclitus not only rejects the supernatural but constructs a vision of the universe that is completely

predicable, observable and understandable. Such a construct helps put the medieval landscape into

perspective, as well see in a moment by showing just has constraining the medieval box could be.

Before we draw conclusions from our study of the Greek thinkers, we need to look at one final

Heraclitus quote, by far my own personal favorite for what it says about the possibilities of the universe.

There are two translations that we can cite, one from Philip Wheelwright and the other from UB

Classics professor, Dr. Thomas Barry. Wheelwright translates, Unless you expect for the unexpected

you will never find [truth], for it is hard to discover and hard to attain35

. Dr. Barry, in his Greek

Intellectual History course at the University at Buffalo in Fall2009, provided a different translation to his

32Wheelwright: 70

33Ibid: 71

34Ibid: 75

35Ibid: 71


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class, of which I was a part that I believe better captures the spirit of the fragment. He translates,

Unless you hope for the unhoped for you will never discover it, for the way to it is trackless and not to

be discovered. Heraclitus is conveying a simple but powerful message; the future is not one that will be

discovered based on the past or, for that matter, ANY past thinking, but rather on an immediate jump

ahead in time. What he describes is what happened in a Zurich patient office in 1905; the relationship

between matter and energy had been attempted before but Albert Einstein did not build off prior

scientists but rather came up with an entirely new theory almost out of thin air. The greatest

discoveries, according to Heraclitus come NOT from a further development of past theory but rather

from a complete departure from the past.

Before we get lost in the ruins of Greece we need to pull ourselves back to the medieval age. We

have already concluded that there is a disconnection between the medieval landscape and the medieval

intellectual when it comes to scientific thought and our detour into the Aegean has helped bring that

distinction into sharper focus. The Greeks, like their medieval counterparts, were divided between the

common man and the intellectual; no doubt the average Greek, as John Hurwitt so put it, had little to no

interest in or knowledge of Heraclitus or the other Greek philosophers; their landscape would have been

just as supernatural, just as mythic and anti-scientific as the medieval one. However, such a landscape

shaped and molded the Greeks; supernatural beings and gods who could care less about human

existence may have helped push the Greek philosopher to find another answer, as Xenophanes sure did.

Can this be the same of the middle ages? Could the medieval box have molded and shaped the medieval

intellectual? We know that the medieval world was one of deep uncertainty and filled with the

supernatural just as the Greek world was. That being true, then how do the two intellectual worlds

compare?


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The Greek intellectual and the medieval intellectual are aligned on many things; both ask

questions and attempt to find answers, both look at past sources and both have some semblance of

observation. There are two key points. First, both the Greek philosopher and the medieval intellectual

had observational skills, thereby linking the two groups and their methods of inquiry. Second, and more

important is how each group viewed the past. The Greeks saw past thinkers as absolutely dead-wrong,

as being misguided and not worth their time in direct study. The medieval intellectual, however, seems

to be stuck in the past, in the Greeks and the church fathers. Even Roger Bacon, an experimentalist,

cannot fully pull his feet out the mud of the past but rather finds contemporary excuses for the

ancients, in his case Aristotles, faults. Can we, therefore consider the medieval world capable of true

science? If we only compare them to the Greeks then the answer is no. Although they were capable of

observation like the Greeks, a point to which I shall return, they would not have been capable of

Heraclitus idea of building a future completely separate from the past. But what if we are judging the

medieval intellectual too harshly? The Greeks may have been progenitors and, while we can find

glimmers of our own civilization in theirs, it does not mean that the medieval intellectual should be

judged only by the Greeks but rather should be judged by his forerunners and his descendents. When

we turn to the Scientific Revolution, we find that the medieval scene is more complicated than we

would imagine just looking at the Greeks; this complication continues as we look at modern thinkers,

among whom I include myself.

The Scientific Revolution, although, as well see, a major departure from medieval thinking,

nonetheless developed in the centuries following the middle ages36. Lets look at the Scientific

Revolution with two questions in mind: How did thinkers of the Scientific Revolution approach the

Greeks and what does their thought say about medieval science?

36Jacob, Margaret C. (2010). TheScientific Revolution: A Brief History with Documents, [The Bedford Series in

History and Culture]. Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martin's.: 4-6


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Lets begin with Nicolaus Copernicus and his On the Revolutions of the HeavenlyOrbs. In her

introduction to her edition of this key work, Margaret C. Jacob cautions us to look at Copernicus

carefully as his attempt to find a better system of motion was dependent on his maintenance of

Aristotelian thought37

. But we will use this caution in a slightly different way; what appears to be a

problem actually reveals one of the most important contributions of the middle ages.

One section in particular is of interest. Copernicus is explaining both what he has done

mathematically and why he set out on the task in the first place. He says, For, first, the mathematicians

are so unsure of the movements of the sun and moon that they cannot even explain or observe the

constant length of the seasonal year. Secondly, in determining the motions of these and of the other

five planets, they do not even use the same principles and hypotheses as in their proofs of seeming

revolutions and motions. So some use concentric circles, while others eccentrics and epicycles38. From

the start, Copernicus seems to be following the Greek path, criticizing the ancient thinkers and arguing

that their work does not add up. Before we jump to conclusions and condemn the medieval thinker, we

should turn to his revealing concluding lines. I pondered long upon this uncertainty of mathematical

tradition in establishing the motions of the system of the spheres. At last I began to chafe that

philosophers could by no means agree on any one certain theory of the mechanism of the universe,

wrought for us by a supremely good and orderly creator, though in other respects they investigated with

meticulous care the minutest points relating to its orbits. I therefore took pains to read again the works

of all the philosophers on whom I could lay hand to seek out whether any of them ever supposed that

the motions of the spheres were other than those demanded by the mathematical schools. Taking

advantage of this, I too began to think of the mobility of the earth, and though the opinion seemed

absurd, yet knowing now that others before me had been granted freedom to imagine such circles as

37Jacob: 45

38Ibid: 47


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they chose to explain the phenomena of the stars, I considered that that I also might easily be allowed

to try whether, by assuming some motion of the earth, sounder explanations than theirs for the

revolution of the celestial spheres might so be discovered39

.

What we just observed was the opening of the medieval box through the past. Copernicus was

willing, like the Greeks to take on the ancient scholars when they were wrong and attempt to find a

better solution to an ancient problem. But that last part is key, it is an answer to an ancientproblem;

Copernicus, unlike the Pre-Socratic philosophers, does NOT attempt to frame his inquiry withoutsome

aid from past thinkers. He, instead, looks to past thinkers as grounding for his current questioning, using

them as sources to construct a better system than they. Historian Eric Cochrane explains it best as the

destruction of the method of argument from authority40. Copernicus does not reject nor does he

adore the past; he uses the best parts as a base and then proceeds to build a system that is better and

more sound than what his predecessors formulated. Is this aspect of Copernicus simply part of the

gradual breaking away from medieval scholasticism or is it more critical? Before we can answer this

question, we need to look at several additional thinkers of the Scientific Revolution and three modern

thinkers.

We now turn to seventeenth-century Francis Bacon and his The Great Instauration, where he

will argue for the need for innovation, for new worlds and humility41

. Here we have one continuous

passage that we shall break down to refine our focus that we started with Copernicus. And then the

way is still to be made by the uncertain light of the sense, sometimes shining out, sometimes clouded

over, through the woods of experience and particulars, while those who offer themselves for guides are

(as was said) themselves also puzzled, and increase the number of errors and wanderers. In

39Ibid: 47-48

40Cochrane, Eric. (1976). Science and Humanism in the Italian Renaissance.American Historical Review, 81 (5):1052-

1053.41

Jacob: 56


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circumstances so difficult neither the natural force of mans judgement nor even any accidental felicity

offers any chance of success. No excellence of wit, no repetition of chance experiments, can overcome

such difficulties as these. Our steps must be guided by clue, and the whole way from the very first

perception of the senses must be laid out in sure plan42

. Lets pause here and take note of two points.

First, Bacon seemingly rejects past thinkers, arguing that even the guides of the past may be uncertain

and mistaken. Second, he also emphasizes that our own experimentation may not be fruitful.

Before coming to conclusions, lets look at what he says next. Not that I would be understood

to mean that nothing whatever has been done in so many ages by so many great labors. We have no

reason to be ashamed of the discoveries which have been made, and no doubt the ancients proved

themselves in everything that turns on wit and abstract meditation, wonderful men. But, as in former

ages, when men sailed only by observation of the stars, they could indeed coast along the shores of the

old continent or cross a few small and Mediterranean seas, but before the ocean could be traversed and

the New World discovered, the use of the mariners needle, as a more faithful and certain guide, had to

be found out43

. Now we have a better picture, and one that is a continuation of what Copernicus said a

century earlier. Bacon does reject past thinkers but not because they were hopelessly ill informed or

bumbling fools as Heraclitus saw Homer and Pythagoras but rather because they couldnot see the truth

for a lack of tools. Bacon and Copernicus are middle men between the obeisance to the past in the

middle ages and the severance from the past in Greece. Again, we need to look at additional thinkers

before concluding whether or not this is unique to the scientific revolution or something more

important.

Before moving on, lets ask one final question of Bacon; did he look for experimentation like the

Greeks and certain medieval intellectuals? He says, In like manner [finding the New World] the

42Cited in Ibid: 57

43Cited in Ibid: 57


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discoveries which have been hitherto made in the arts and sciences are such as might be made by

practice, meditation, observation, argumentation- for they lay near to the senses and immediately

beneath common notions, but before we can reach the remoter and more hidden parts of nature, it is

necessary that a more perfect use and application of the human mind and intellect be introduced44

.

Bacon continues the love of observation first introduced to the western world in ancient Greece and

continued in the middle ages. This love of observation and experimentation is a critical thread that, as

we will see later, is a critical aspect of science and says much on the nature of scientific inquiry

throughout time.

My experience has shown me that almost every scientist has a favorite scientist from each

period in human history and Galileo Galilei is my personal favorite from the Scientific Revolution for one

special reason; among the early modern scientists he comes closest to modern science. He not only

observed his universe but was able to draw conclusions that no one had yet discovered45. Lets look at

one particular passage in his TheStarry Messengerin 1610. Here he describes the surface of the moon

and it is howhe describes both the surface and his method of inquiry that is absolutely critical. These

spots [what we now know as craters] have never been observed by any one before me, and from my

observations of them, often repeated, I have been led to that opinion which I have expressed, namely

that I feel sure that the surface of the moon is not perfectly smooth, free from inequalities and exactly

spherical, as a large school of philosophers considers with regard to the moon and other heavenly

bodies, but that, on the contrary, it is full of inequalities, uneven, full of hollows and protuberances, just

like the surface of the earth itself, which is varied everywhere by lofty mountains and deep valleysNow

the great spots of the moon observed at the same time are not seen to be at all similarly broken or full

of depressions and prominences but rather to be even and uniform, for only here and there some

44Cited in Ibid: 57

45Ibid: 59


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spaces, rather brighter than the rest, crop up, so that if any one wishes to revive the old opinion of the

Pythagoreans, that the moon is another earth, so to say, the brighter portion may very fitly represent

the surface of the land and the darker the expanse of water46

.

I suppose it takes a scientist to get the chills upon reading Galileo but what he has to say speaks

volumes of both the divergence from medieval thinking as well as representing continuity from those

same medieval sources. First, Galileo goes beyond Bacon and Copernicus when he says that HE

discovered something previously unknown to human kind; HE did it, no one else. This is highly reflective

of Heraclitus total rejection of the past for a new kind of thinking. There is however a second point that

is even more important than the first. Galileo may reject past thinkers, he may even see himself as

creating something entirely new; however he bases this on a reading of past thinkers. He knows what

has been said before; he acknowledges them as being right in their own time. Pythagoras and the

Greeks were right in theirtime as Galileo is right in his. He does not attack them as does Heraclitus but

rather states howhe knows more and why; he rejects them without destroying them and this position

is, as well see key.

How do thinkers of the Scientific Revolution compare to the middle ages? For starters,

Copernicus, Bacon and Galileo are more than willing to criticize the past if it so suits them and they are

willing even to assert their own, personal discoveries as independent from anyone else. There is,

however a small but vital thread of continuity from the middle ages to the Scientific Revolution; a

concern to situate their work in relation to the past. Copernicus is most evident while Galileo is less so

but the concept remains. In all cases, past thinkers are not tossed out the nearest air lock but rather

analyzed and revered for their own discoveries in their own time; in essence the past has become the

basis for the future. This is in contrast to the Pre-Socratic habit of destroying, intellectually, the past in

46Cited in Ibid: 61-62


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favor of the future. The medieval worlds foremost hindrance was its dependence on the revered past

or, as Eric Cochrane would put it, the use of argument from authority. Medieval thinkers were not able

to move beyond ancient thinkers simply because they could not reject them; thinkers of the Scientific

Revolution developed a middle ground between the Greeks and the middle ages by rejecting past

thinkers but recognizing them in their own right. This created a situation where science could build upon

on itself, where science could challenge the past while using it for its own gain. This thread, this idea

came not from Greece but from the middle ages and, as well see, shows how important the medieval

world was to the development of modern science even if it itself did not have science.

We cannot answer the question, did the medieval world have science, by only looking at ancient

or early modern examples of accepted science; we must look at modern science. Modern science is one

of the most complicated phenomena in the universe outside the human brain so we must choose our

sources carefully. Well use four sources, the works of Stephen Hawking, a seminal article from the

Journal of CellSciencein 2008, astrophysicist Neil deGrasse Tysons Death by Black Hole and finally my

own understanding of science from my early scientific academic career.

First published in 1988, Stephen HawkingsA Brief History of Time is one of the most

recognizable scientific works written for the layman in the last half-century. Published in2010, The

Grand Design is Hawkings follow up for the second decade of the twenty-first century. What I find most

interesting about the works is how Hawking describes the role of philosophy in science; it is not the

individual comments on philosophy but rather how the 1988 work compares to his 2010 book. InA Brief

History of Time, Hawking describes philosophys role in the following manner; Up to now, most

scientists have been too occupied with the development of new theories that describewhatthe

universe is to ask the question why. On the other hand, the people whose business it is to ask why, the

philosophers, have not been able to keep up with the advance of scientific theories. In the eighteenth


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century, philosophers considered the whole of human knowledge, including science, to be their field

and discussed questions such as: did the universe have a beginning? However, in the nineteenth and

twentieth centuries, science became too technical and mathematical for the philosophers, or anyone

except a few specialists. Philosophers reduced the scope of their inquiries so much that Wittgenstein,

the most famous philosopher of this century, said, The sole remaining task for philosophy is the

analysis of language. What a comedown from the great tradition of philosophy from Aristotle to Kant!

However, if we do discover a complete theory, it should in time be understandable in broad principle by

everyone, not just a few scientists. Then we shall all, philosophers, scientists, and just ordinary people,

be able to take part in the discussion of the question of why it is that we and the universe exist47

.

Setting aside Hawkings incredible ego when it comes to ordinary people we find him sympathetic to

philosophers and even optimistic of their future role in science. How then, does he treat philosophers in

his 2010 work, The Grand Design?

In that work his treatment of philosophy is far blunter, condensed to a single line: Traditionally

these are questions for philosophy, but philosophy is dead48

. Amazing that in the course of only twenty

years, Stephen Hawking has gone from seeing a future for philosophy to utterly rejecting its role in the

world not only in science. What can we take from this and how shall we compare it to previous scientific

thinkers, most notably medieval thinkers? First, we should be aware that The Grand Design was a co-

written book, by both Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow. It could just be that this opinion is not entirely

Hawkings. Another answer is that, perhaps Hawking and Mlodinow simply have rejected their previous

claims; in other words the ancient Greek idea of rejecting the past has been extended to the self.

Hawking not only rejects the past but also his own past thinking. This is an entirely new concept, not

invented by Hawking, but reflected in the twenty-first century. Hawking reveals the extension of the

47Hawking, S.W. (1998).A Brief History of Time: Bantam Books.: 190-191

48Hawking, S.W., S. Hawking, and L. Mlodinow. (2010). The Grand Design, Random House Publishing Group.: 5


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rejection of the past from rejecting anothers past to rejecting your own. This is in complete contrast to

medieval thinkers who could not even get past their own authoritative sources.

Before we jump to conclusions, we should look at several additional sources. In 2008, an

editorial was written to the Journal of CellScienceentitled, The importance of stupidity in scientific

research. With such a title, it was bound to get attention but its contents are more than worth the time

spent reading. The article focuses on a problem in scientific education, a problem that in my own

undergraduate science courses I know only too well; in high school and college we are expected to have

the answer, to know exactly how certain scientific phenomena work and who came to understand that

process, whereas in real world science we encounter natural processes that neither we nor anyone

before us can understand. The author, Martin A. Schwartz from the University of Virginia, concludes his

article Productive stupidity means being ignorant by choice. Focusing on important questions puts us in

the awkward position of being ignorant. One of the beautiful things about science is that it allows us to

bumble along, getting it wrong time after time, and feel perfectly fine as long as we learn something

each time. No doubt, this can be difficult for students who are accustomed to getting the answers right.

No doubt, reasonable levels of confidence and emotional resilience help, but I think scientific education

might do more to ease what is a very big transition: from learning what other people once discovered to

making your own discoveries. The more comfortable we become with being stupid, the deeper we will

wade into the unknown and the more likely we are to make big discoveries49

. How much more

Heraclitian can you get! Schwartz is calling for a sea change in education where the unknown is

emphasized over the known; who cares if we know something, instead we should look for the questions

unanswered and take that unknown path that Heraclitus so urged 2500 years before. The paper

49Schwartz, M. A. (2008). The importance of stupidity in scientific research. Journal of Cell Science, 121 (11):1771-

1771. doi: 10.1242/jcs.033340.


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confirms that modern science needs to reject the past rather than adore it; the medieval world lacked

this one precondition.

So far, the middle ages is not faring well when compared to modern science for it is unable to

question the past. What we must be careful of not doing is assuming that each of the previous authors

simply rejected the past without first considering it, much like the Pre-Socratics who saw no value in the

past. A quick glance at their reference list shows this not to be the case; Hawkings books are filled with

references from past thinkers, and his science, although new, was built off of an understanding of who

came before. Science does not exist in isolation, even if we take Heraclitus at his word and discover

something out of nothing; most science, as I will get to in a moment, starts with a review of all who

came before for we must understand what we know before we can discover what we do not.

If Galileo Galilei is my personal favorite of the scientists in the Scientific Revolution, Neil

deGrasse Tyson is mine for modern scientists. His ability to convey complex scientific terms in fun and

interesting ways is imperative in an increasingly scientifically illiterate world and as a scientist ,as I

regard myself, I find the no-holds-barred and yet understandable approach refreshing. His Death by

Black Hole, a title that should immediately convey why he is so well respected in the academic

community, is a collection of essays that have been written over the past years. Two are particularly

important to our question.

In his On Being Baffled, Tyson argues very much the same argument as Dr. Schwartz. In this

particular case [of a new discovery], the object was eventually identified as an odd, though otherwise

unremarkable, galaxy- but not before millions of readers had been exposed to a parade of selected

astrophysicists saying, I dunno what it is. Such reporting is rampant, and grossly misrepresents our

prevailing states of mind. If the writers told the whole truth, they would instead report that all

astrophysicists are baffled daily, whether or not their research makes headlines. Scientists cannot claim


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to be on the research frontier unless one thing or another baffles them. Bafflement drives discovery50

.

Tyson argues effectively that we will not discover the future of science unless we admit that we do NOT

know the answer, another answer akin to Heraclitus. This is the one thing the medieval intellectual did

not have; he saw the universe as a place where the answers have all been determined, where they are

all available in the ancient texts unlike the modern idea that the answers have NOT been discovered and

wont be until someone today, now figures them out.

He furthers this point in his essay The Perimeterof ignorance where he addresses the problem

of intelligent design. Considered by many to be an extension of creationism, intelligent design argues

that a supreme power, not evolution, guided the development of life in the universe51

. Tyson argues not

against the existence of a god but rather on the nature of scientific philosophy to make the point that

intelligent design is not science. He says, Another practice that isnt science is embracing ignorance. Yet

it is fundamental to the philosophy of intelligent design: I dont know what this is. I dont know how it

works. Its too complicated for me to figure out. Its too complicated for any human being to figure out.

So it must be the product of a higher intelligence. What do you do with that line of reasoning? Do you

just cede the solving of problems to someone smarter than you, someone whos not even human? Do

you tell students to pursue only questions with easy answers? Science is a philosophy of discovery.

Intelligent design is a philosophy of ignorance52. What Tyson effectively does is define science; science

is where human beings attempt to find the unknown, to understand what no one before them could.

This, again is what the medieval world, in its box, was incapable of doing.

My last source is myself. Having worked in biomedical sciences laboratories for the past three

years and having been accepted into an MD/PhD program, I feel qualified to adduce my own definition

of science. Much of what I have to say can be found in Dr. Tysons or Dr. Hawkings work but I have

50Tyson, N.G. (2007). Death by black hole: and othercosmic quandaries: W.W. Norton.: 303-304

51Ibid: 361

52Ibid: 361


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something to add. I see science as do Dr. Tyson and Dr. Hawking, as a philosophy of discovery but I also

see science as something that requires past thinking. Although each does not say it explicitly, Tyson and

Hawking BOTH need to look at what came before them before they can ask any real questions. Before I

could ask a question on the nature of heat shock proteins in a cancer cell model several years ago I first

needed to review the literature to know what my predecessors discovered and knew of the protein and

its effects. I could not start my research if no one came before; I needed some platform off which I could

build. However, I do not restrain myself to those past thinkers; they are merely sources, sources with

which I can argue and even reject but they are sources nonetheless. Science is a philosophy of discovery

but it is also a philosophy that has been constructed over time by countless individuals, each building

from what came before and tearing down what does not fit. When one renovates a building, remodelers

do not tear it down nor do they keep all components; they take what works and reinvent what does not;

science is no different.

It is now time to answer our question; did the middle ages have science? The answer is no, at

least when compared to modern science. The middle ages did have questioning spirits, individuals

striving to understand their world but they did so from within a box, a box rooted in the past. Medieval

thinkers, whether they be Roger Bacon, Peter Abelard or William of Ockham, did move beyond the

constraints of their medieval landscape; they studied a world rife with superstition and even used tools

of analytical thinking not expected by the general mental landscape. What they did NOT dohowever is

somewhat more critical than what they did. They did not escape from the past; each time a medieval

thinker approached a past thinker and disagreed, they would find fault in the translator, as did Peter

Abelard or in the interpretation, as in Roger Bacon. They would not come out and say the past thinker,

the ancient thinker was wrong. Without this ability, they could not, would not discover anything new for

even if they had they would not accept it as it would be considered against the rules, the authorityof

the past. Only when the box was broken down and the walls fell open to a wider, more expansive


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world would science advance. Only when the past became expendable again was science ready to

progress.

Was medieval intellectual thought then worthless? Was it simply a voice in the darkness, a

whimper that would be forgotten? A closer look reveals the medieval world to be, if not scientific, a

progenitor of modern science thought. As weve seen, the ancient Greek pre-Socratics had a difficult

time with the past; they tended to utterly reject it and, although they did not ignore it, they were none

the less unable to accept that anything from the past was worth their time. Now, this is an

overstatement to be sure; Aristotle and others would look at past thinkers; my evidence from Thales

came from later Greeks and Romans who were obviously studying the past. But when the Pre-Socratics

came down to defining their world, they did so with complete disregard in respect to the past; it was

expendable and not worth their time. When we looked at the Scientific Revolution and even the modern

writers we found that, while the Greek idea of rejecting the past was back in full force, it had been

tweaked. No longer was the past something to completely reject and toss out the window but rather

was something to be studied; as Francis Bacon put it, the past thinkers thought that way for a reason

and they were wrong not because they were fools or intellectually handicapped but because they lived

in another time withoutthe tools and the background necessary. From where would this background

come? From the PAST. The middle ages gave us the ability to recognize and respect the past; their total

submission to past authority was the hindering factor, it was the one thing that kept the medieval world

in an intelligent design like mentality. The medieval intellectual was no idiot, no fool and not worthless;

he was a product of his time and of his box and it was this respect for the past, tempered by the

sixteenth century and tempered still today, that helped modern science build on itself and has helped

our world develop.


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We are, indeed, products of the middle ages. The ancient Greeks gave us the ability to question

and to reject past thinkers who we could safely say were wrong. The medieval world, despite its

limitations, gave us the ability to understand and acknowledge the past. One attribute without the other

does not go far; the Greeks were limited in their scientific discourse for many reasons but it is my belief

that one of the major contributors was their rejection of past contributions that kept them from building

off of each other until the days of Aristotle. The medieval world in turn was incapable of rejecting the

past and moving beyond what was already known. Put together, both concepts, both ideas have made

our world scientific. It is quite the irony that, while the medieval world did not have science, without it

our world could not be scientific.


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