Briefing on Track II Peace Dialogue Between Israel and Syria, 2004-2007

By

Geoffrey Aronson, Director for Research and Editor of Report on Israeli Settlement in the

Occupied Territories, Foundation for Middle East Peace

(Note: Since 2004, Jeff Aronson has been part of an unofficial Israeli-Syrian dialogue on an Israeli-Syrian peace that resolves the minor issues that ultimately defeated peace talks between Israel and Syria in the 1990’s, including the issue of land Syria claims to the East of Lake Galillee. Following is a full transcript of Aronson’s talk on this Track II process, including questions and answers, at the Carnegie Endowment, Washington, February 12, 2007.)

Phil Wilcox, President, Foundation for Middle East Peace: Welcome. As you

know, for decades private citizens, retired government officials and others have been involved

in informal, unofficial “Track II” diplomacy. There was a time when the US government

opposed this. Indeed, there is a statute, which I think is still on the books, called the Rogers

Act, which makes it a felony for private citizens to engage in diplomacy. Fortunately, this has

been ignored for a long time, and a great deal of creative work has been done by private

citizens of many countries to try to prepare the ground for official diplomacy and peacemaking.

Track II diplomacy has been a prominent in the Arab-Israeli conflict. To mention a few

examples, there were decades of private contacts between private Israelis, Palestinians and

other Arabs in the ‘70s and ‘80s. American citizens were deeply involved in a process that led

to the commitments of the PLO in the late 1980’s to recognize Israel, forswear violence, and

accept resolution 242.

One of the most stunning examples of Track II Diplomacy were the Geneva Accords

which were developed by a group of distinguished private Israelis and Palestinians and created

what many people still think contains the substance of what an official Israeli-Palestinian peace

will ultimately look like.

More recently, a little known but very interesting Track II process between Israel and

Syria has been going on for three years. I don’t think it is complete by any means. It has

involved Syrians, Israelis, Swiss, Turks, my colleague, Jeff Aronson, and another distinguished

American, Mr. Abraham Soliman, who is here today. Mr. Soliman has devoted many years to

improving relations between the United States and Syria and he is deeply committed to Arab-

Israeli peace.

This Track II process has been going on for three years. It was made public in mid-

January in a series of articles by Akiva Eldar of Ha’aretz, and there were other articles in the

Israeli Press and a good piece in The Economist. We have provided the texts of these articles in

handouts today. This Track II exercise has taken place in the context of overtures from Bashar

al-Assad hinting that Syria was ready for renewed peacemaking with Israel.

Oddly enough, the current American administration has discouraged Israel from

pursuing this; whereas I know of no case, historically, where we have stood in the way of a

potential process that could lead to peace between Israel and one of its Arab neighbors. This

Track II activity also comes at a time when the Iraq Study Group and many American experts

and politicians in both parties have advocated US and Israeli reengagement with Syria. Syria

as one of several important keys to help ease the process of a resolution in Iraq, peace and

stability in Lebanon, a long-sought peace between Israel and Syria, and a final status agreement

for the Israelis and Palestinians.

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Geoffrey Aronson: Thank you, Phil. Thank you all for being here. Thank you, Abe

Soliman, for coming as well. The fact of your presence here is proof that when a tree falls in

the forest there is somebody there to pay attention. In that sense, I think you have distinguished

yourselves from the general response here in the United States in general, and in Washington in

particular, to news of our efforts. Just to take one example, which I think illustrates this lack of

attention that has been paid, there has yet to be one question in the State Department daily

briefing on the efforts that we have been involved in. Not one. This is an issue that has excited

a lot of interest in Israel in the Middle East, in Europe as well. And perhaps as a result of my

appearance here, some of you who may be State Department reporters may feel it worth your

time and that of the US government to at least address the issue of the prospects for engaging in

a dialogue between Israel and Syria.

Let me begin by noting that the responses to our meetings can be divided into, roughly,

two. One focused on the drama: Who met where, how many people, who knew, when, and so

forth; that occupied about 95 percent of the speculation and the reporting on this issue. The

other five percent was devoted to the substance of what we addressed and what I consider to be

the very creative and the very committed efforts on the part of the principals themselves to

address and to overcome the obstacles that have prevented agreement between Israel and Syria

in the past. If you will permit me, I'll turn those tables a bit today and speak more about the

substance and less about the drama.

I will start with the drama. We met over a period of three years in Switzerland at least

six or seven times, and, of course, there were numerous discussions among and between us in

the intervals. I live here outside of Washington, DC; Abe Soliman lives as well here. So, we

were in frequent personal contact. I have had an opportunity to travel frequently to the region

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and, once there, was able to, again, maintain effective communication with the principal

interlocutor on the Israel side, Alon Liel [a retired Israeli diplomat], and others who were part

of the track for a shorter period of time.

Track II discussions are meant to be deniable; these are unofficial contacts. The people

around the table never committed themselves, or described themselves, as officials. There was

always an understanding that this was an unofficial dialogue. It was also understood, however,

that the people sitting around the table were serious, committed individuals with whom one was

not wasting time by traveling long distances for meetings that lasted three, four, or five or only

six hours.

In the course of our work, the seriousness of the interlocutors was checked; it was

checked by the principals themselves; it was checked by third parties, whether the Swiss or the

Turks, and all of whom came to the conclusion that this was an exercise worthy of their

attention and, in some cases, worthy of their time and money.

What was my role? I knew both Abe Soliman; I knew Alon Liel. They did not know

each other. They were traveling in parallel universes, and I was the link that brought them

together. I had been discussing with Mr. Soliman off and on for many years the need --

especially in the aftermath of the failed talks at Geneva almost seven years ago, of the need to

create some sort of framework for resuming an effective dialogue between Israel and Syria.

The same with Alon Liel; Alon, former director general of Israel’s Foreign Ministry, former

Israeli ambassador to Turkey and South Africa, author of books both about the road away from

apartheid in Syria and also the Turkish experiment as a Muslim country with democracy, and

also someone who arranged the meeting between the new prime minister, Ehud Barak and

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Patrick Seale [the British journalist and Syria expert] soon after Barak was elected prime

minister.

How one might start the ball rolling in some fashion -- and it was only after many

months beginning in 2003 of the discussions with each of these gentlemen in turn that we hit

upon a plan. The plan was to get the two of them plus Uzi Arad, who was formerly Prime

Minister Netanyahu’s National Security Adviser, someone who has been engaged in issues

related to Syria for quite sometime -- around the table, and see where that would go. We had

the advantage in our first meeting of financing our extensive travel requirements by a US

benefactor, Bobby Mueller, who may be known to some of you who as someone who has been

very active in the campaign against landmines. And we benefited greatly from his support. We

met in Switzerland, established the ground rules, which were, again, that this was an unofficial

dialogue; that the people around the table were there in their personal capacity, but that they

were in a position to be credible interlocutors and would, to the best of their efforts, seek to

share this information with people in the official tracks if the opportunity presented itself.

The importance of a first meeting in these efforts is to have a second meeting, and we

had a second meeting. As a result of Alon Liel’s chance meeting with the Swiss

representatives who have taken part in financing the Geneva discussions between Israelis and

Palestinians, we managed to bring in the Swiss and to win their agreement to provide what are

called “good offices” -- logistics, travel, and so forth; something that they succeeded in

admirably and for which we are forever grateful.

At that point, they were able to assume the financial burdens associated with this effort

and we met subsequently on five or six occasions. We did not aspire to write a peace treaty. We

did not try to imitate the Geneva experience where they were dotting i’s and crossing t’s and

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trying to write a comprehensive agreement with annexes and maps. What motivated us were

two or three things. The first was, again, to try to focus upon the issues that had proven to be

obstacles in the past; number two, to try to come to some sort of win-win understanding of how

those obstacles might be overcome; and, number three, to instigate a public dance, if you will,

between Israel and Syria, focused on confidence building measures that might jumpstart

attention to this issue.

When we first started this, the issue of discussions between Israel and Syria was

nowhere on the agenda; it was absolutely a non-issue. This was the middle of the intifada.

There was a war raging in Iraq. There was absolutely no public debate in Israel about this –

zero, nor in the US. In contrast, however, I think the Syrian view was fairly consistent. There

was a readiness to engage in an official dialogue. That was a public stance, which,

unfortunately, at that point had not been heeded. And we were well aware of this and in fact

were encouraged by the idea that were the US and Israel to reassess the prospects for an

agreement, they would at the very least find a basic readiness on the part of Damascus to

engage. And to go back to the last point, if there was an operational aspiration on our part, it

was to move beyond a Track II discussion and to facilitate the entry of officials into a dialogue

in which our presence might not be terribly important. We hoped to jumpstart a process and

then bow out gracefully.

Now, so that is the framework. Regarding the substance -- there were two related tracks

to the substance. One is the question of how you excite some sort of interest in this issue. And

in that sense, the focus was on confidence building measures that, for the most part, Syria

might take in order to jumpstart the process in Israel, in order to force them to pay attention.

There was a whole range of issues that we discussed, ranging from visits of Israeli Jewish

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figures to the gravesites of Jewish sages whose tombs are in Damascus; to information

exchanges on prisoners of war, or Syrians and Israelis who are now in the respective jails of

each country; to some sort of movement on resolving the issue of Eli Cohen, the Israeli spy,

who was discovered and jailed and tried and hanged in Damascus in the mid-1960s, and whose

wife and children are still alive.

All of these, we discussed at great length and tried to ascertain what sort of sequence of

steps might work. The other and the more productive aspect of our efforts were focused on

what has come to be known as a non-paper that would contain principles and a framework that

we decided upon for overcoming the obstacles that had precluded agreement in the past. And it

is in that non-paper, I think, that I personally am most proud and that I think offers the best

indicator of the value of the work that we were able to do.

So if you will permit me, I'll just focus for a few minutes on the non-paper itself. The

non-paper was published in Ha’aretz in English. I have subsequently heard many comments

from journalists in the Arab world who, for some reason, were reading from translated copies

of this non-paper which bear no relationship to what we wrote; and so I made a point of

referring them back to the English language text. I'm sure it is available on our website –

www.fmep.org. [Note: See Analysis and Commentary: Syria]

As it was agreed by the parties - and again I'll refer here principally to Alon Liel and

Abe Soliman - there were two issues that obstructed agreement in the past. One was the issue

of water, and the other was the issue of control, access, and sovereignty around the Sea of

Galilee. The other issues are normalization, security, and so forth. I must admit we did not

spend too much time on these because as some of the principals themselves have said, 90

percent of that work has been done.

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The basic territorial and political framework of this entire exercise was a restoration of

Syrian sovereignty to the June 4 [1967 border]. That was the point of departure that was agreed

upon by the two principal parties here. It was recognized that in a formal sense, there is no June

4 border. This is a line that has to be determined in bilateral consultations. That was not a task

that we set for ourselves. We did have maps, but we made no effort whatsoever to draw the

June 4 line.

. Within the context of a restoration of Syrian sovereignty to the June 4 border, it

became apparent to us that there was a great deal of flexibility in how one addresses questions

of water and access. What we hit upon was an understanding in which within the context of a

restoration of Syrian sovereignty, Israel’s control and use of the water resources of the Jordan

and the Sea of Galilee would be recognized and protected.

Concurrently, the Syrians would make no effort to redirect or to interfere with the

natural course of water on the plateau, in the Jordan or the tributaries of the Jordan, and Syrian

access to these resources for residential and fishing purposes would be guaranteed and

recognized. This is to accommodate whatever Syrian fishing fleet would be interested and

reestablishing a presence in the Sea of Galilee.

The other and related element of our efforts was focusing on the question of access by

Israel around the Sea of Galilee. This, for those you who followed the discussions between

Israel and Syria during the Clinton administration -- the talks foundered in large part on

questions of access around the Sea of Galilee.

So, at the suggestion of Mr. Soliman who had been thinking quite creatively about this

for many years, the suggestion was made that within the context of Syrian sovereignty that

some sort of park whose geographic dimension were not agreed upon - would be established in

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part of the Golan Heights, which would solve the question of the apparent contradiction

between sovereignty, control, and access. This would be a park in which permanent settlement

by Syrians or anybody else would not be permitted, like any national park in any part of the

world. The park would be within the context of the de-militarization schemes that were going

to be applied to the Golan Heights as a whole. This would be a means for answering the Syrian

demand for sovereignty and the Israeli concern about access.

There had been other similar ideas mooted during the years about how one solves this

apparent contradiction; this was our contribution. We spent a lot of time thinking about this

and it seems to us that this would, at the very least, serve as the basis for an interesting

conversation between officials from Syria and Israel.

The other issue that we spent a fair a bit of time on was the whole question of the Israeli

civilian settlement infrastructure in the Golan Heights. There are about 33 settlements with

about 18,000 Israelis residing in these areas. There is a flourishing economy; there are

vineyards, and the biggest dairy in the Middle East is in the Golan Heights.

There was a question, number one, about the infra-structure and, number two, about the

timeframe for removing settlers. You may recall that these discussions took place in the thick

of Ariel Sharon’s intention to disengage from the Gaza Strip and the whole question of

evacuating the Gaza Strip, and the settlements there was number one on the agenda. So, to the

extent that that effort influenced us, it put on our table a timeframe, a sequencing for the

withdrawal of settlers, in which there was a great deal of flexibility demonstrated on the part of

both principals.

Within territories in the Golan Heights restored to Syrian sovereignty, at some point

sooner or later, all Israeli civilian settlers and Israeli nationals would be withdrawn

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permanently; there was no doubt about that. There were certainly arguments about this, but,

again, in the kind of collegial environment that we managed to establish, I think we resolved

this issue in a way which is consistent with past practice and which met the satisfactory

response of both the principals. Perhaps I should stop there and we can open the floor to

questions.

Questions and Answers

Q: Ron Kampeas, Jewish Telegraphic Agency. You talked earlier about the

confidence building measures. Did any of these come to fruition as a result of the delegation of

American Jews who did visit the holy sites in Syria? Was that part of it?

A: Aronson: I do not think we are as satisfied as anyone of us would like to be about

the extent and the success of these efforts. One can only hope that in the future, there is a more

visible demonstration of the degree to which each party is prepared to play that game

successfully.

Q: Ted Kattouf, AMIDEAST: I'm somebody having been involved with Syria who

argued in the ‘90s that Assad - the late President Assad - was serious about making peace with

Israel. I'm not sure if I still believe that the son, Bashar Al-Assad can afford final peace with

Israel. I think, certainly, he is sincere about wanting to engage because the process itself is

very useful right now in terms of serious isolation. But a peace agreement almost by definition

would require Syria to reorient its policies vis-à-vis Hezbollah in Lebanon in the government

there; Hamas -- perhaps not Iran directly because it is a little beyond anybody’s right to tell

Syria how to conduct their relationship with Iran. Nevertheless, it certainly would badly affect

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Syria’s relations with Iran. Therefore, I would like to either hear you or Mr. Soliman address

the question as to why Bashar would be willing to trade a relationship right now he can count

on with Iran when he cannot count on much for peace on the Golan with Israel.

A: Aronson: You are starting at the end of the game. You are not starting at the

beginning of the game. The game is a process here whose outcome and whose ramifications

we can only guess at. I think, at the very least, it is my impression, and I think it is the

impression of those with whom I sat at the very least there is a serious and sustained

willingness, on the part of Syria, to address issues that are on the agenda between Syria and

Israel. Now, some of these relate only to the question of territory on the Golan Heights. Some

of them relate to the regional strategic environment. You mentioned Hezbollah; you mentioned

Hamas; Iran. I assume the Syrians also have their interests and concerns. As for the suggestion

that Syria may be interested in the idea of talks and in the fact of talks rather than in resolving

[problems], there are many countries in the world that are engaged in discussions perhaps not

because they intend to see them end successfully, but as a means of kicking the ball down the

road. That in and of itself should not disqualify Syria as a real partner here. But all too often it

is invoked by those who want to abort the process at the beginning before it even starts. The

fact -- and I personally believe that engaging Syria in a serious negotiation will itself change

the environment; it will necessarily have a positive impact on the regional polarization which

we are now suffering from and which to some extent we in the US are responsible for.

A: Ambassador Sam Lewis: I have been appalled by the attitude of the

administration which has clearly encouraged the Israelis to avoid talks with Syria. There have

been lots and lots of back channels -- second-track back channels in the Middle East over the

last three decades. Some have succeeded in turning into formal negotiations; most have not.

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One clear record from a historical record is never has one that was publicized prematurely

before it became an official dialogue ever succeeded. I cannot understand why you felt that it

was a good idea to bring this very creative and very ambitious and admirable effort that you all

have been engaged in into the public arena when it was clear the United States was against it

and was not going to support it, and the Israeli government was against it at that time. What

did you hope to achieve except to make it much more difficult to renew it at some point in the

future?

A: Aronson: These are absolutely fair arguments to make. They were arguments and

considerations that were part of the discussion we had in the period leading up to the decision

on our part taken by everyone to make public our efforts. The non-paper was completed in

2005, so it has been in our possession for quite some time. Had we run to the press soon

thereafter, it would not have mattered and we understood this.

However, in the wake of Israel’s misadventure in Lebanon in the summer, the issue of

what to do about Syria was front and center on Israel’s domestic public agenda. This created a

public environment to which we thought our efforts could be of some value in trying to push

the debate forward. And frankly, the response was far greater and far more intense than anyone

of us had considered. I did not imagine that within two or three hours of the papers hitting the

stands that the Prime Minister of Israel himself would feel called upon in his own fashion to

deny the value of our efforts.

The spotlight was far greater than we had thought it would be. The assessment in Israel,

among those whose judgment about these things is far more expert than mine, is that it served a

real purpose. There is a tremendous public response that is ongoing in Israel. And that I think

is all to the good. And also, it has engaged not only the Israeli public, but Israeli policymakers

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as well, who, of course, are engaging in this issue in a far more intensive way than they were in

the past. And from what I know today, our efforts did absolutely no harm whatsoever. I mean,

the publication of our efforts did not hurt as at all.

I'm not as well versed in the response in Syria, but again, I fall back on the principal

willingness on the part of the Assad regime as a strategic choice made many years ago to

engage in productive negotiations with Israel centered on a return of the Golan Heights to

Syrian sovereignty. They have been fairly consistent with that over the last 15 years or so.

This episode in and of itself is not going to change that, I would hope. In terms of the value of

our efforts themselves and whether or not we as a group have a future, again, to the extent that

our work produced the non-paper, that is it. We do not aspire to dot the i’s and cross the t’s.

We are not writing annexes or going back and poring over maps. However, I remain confident

that there are dimensions to our efforts that are still active, will still be active, and, with God’s

grace, will produce some fruit.

Q: Jerome Segal: What I'm curious about is what were the range of reactions that you

got from this, from people in the government? And if by people who are serious about

promoting Israeli-Syrian peace, there was enthusiasm in believing that, well, this is really a

breakthrough if your assessment is right, then how do you explain the lack of interest in

moving forward in this?

Geoffrey Aronson: Number one, I would suggest that the idea that there is a lack of

interest in moving forward, if you base that only on what has been said publicly and you make

that conclusion, you would be wrong. One should not depend on public responses alone to

inform your judgment, especially when it is related to Track II. Track II by its very nature is a

deniable exercise. If people were to not deny the exercise, they would be undermining the idea

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and what I consider to be the value of Track II. So, one could not expect them to embrace this

publicly. So again, I would not and I’m not prepared to suggest that either of the major parties

here today -- Israel-Syria -- is right now -- is that this effort has ended and that one side is to

blame and the other side is not to blame. That certainly is not the story, as I understand it.

Q: Ethan Hagner: Could you talk about what response you got here in DC and from

people in this government to this proposal?

A: Aronson: Do you hear the silence?

Q: Ted Feifer, U.S. Institute of Peace: I'm interested in how you saw your role. Did

you see yourself as just simply providing good offices for people to meet? Or did you actually

work with the participants, draw from them their ideas on how to find an outcome and feed it

back to the participants? Or did you find your ideas for your proposals elsewhere and feed it

in?

A: Aronson: Well, I think there is probably a bit of everything in that. In a specifically

operational sense, I helped set the dates. I made sure that everybody had a plane ticket. I made

sure that the Swiss had managed to make sure that everybody would be in the same place at the

same time. I created the agendas for the meetings based on consultations with the principals. I

took notes. I wrote the protocols. I revised the protocols after consultation with the principals.

I prepared the drafts of the non-paper and amended them as required.

Generally, however, I was reluctant to supervise in the sense that I did not want it to be

my process by any means. I wanted it to be their process. And so at times, perhaps, I did not

assert some sort of adult supervision when it would have been indicated, if people were not too

happy with someone else or if people walked out of the room. I could have been better at either

keeping them in the room or suggesting that they take a break or putting a stop to certain

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discussions. But the fact that for the most part people kept coming back suggested that they

themselves understood and were cognizant of the value of the exercise that they were engaged

in, and which resulted in a tangible product. So, I think in that sense we all succeeded.

Q: Did the concept of a park come from the Syrians or the Israelis or just flowed from

the discussion?

A: Aronson: Well, it would not come from the Syrians or the Israelis. It came from

Mr. Abe Soliman. It was his idea. But, again, an idea that had been rooted in, I believe, a close

reading of previous efforts.

Q: Jeff, people asked about the reaction in Washington, the reaction in Israel. I'm most

interested in the reaction in the Syria. In Akiva [Eldar’s] stories in Ha’aretz,, this was depicted

as an exploratory exercise initiated by President Assad with the Turks, originally. Further, it

was depicted as a process that was very closely followed by the Syrians in meetings following

each and every round in Damascus. The question is, therefore, first of all, if those depictions

are correct? And, secondly, what kind of a reaction did you get from the Syrian government as

to the content, the actual substance?

A: Aronson: Oh, again, who am I to argue with the star reporter Akiva Eldar? So, I'll

leave what he said to be a reasonable approximation of what happened. But, Abe, did you want

to make a comment about that?

A: Abraham Soliman: Yes. I was not, repeat, I was not speaking for Syria,

representing Syria in any way, shape or form. I want this to be understood. Number two, I

believe the leak on January 16 was wrong. Our work was supposed to be completed trying to

get the agreement from the Syrians and the agreement from Israel about the papers that we put

together. And if we get the agreement of these two governments, then the Israeli government

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will bring a copy of it and come to the US administration here and ask them to adopt our result

as a roadmap for peace between Syria and Israel, and we will disappear. Nobody will hear

about Abe Soliman, Liel or Jeff or anyone else. Unfortunately, January 16 messed it all. I was

on my way to Israel to address the Herzliya conference. I got to Switzerland; I heard about it. I

talked to some in Israel, including Jeff, and I said I'm going back home. [Note: Mr. Soliman

and Mr. Liel briefed the Israeli Knesset Committee on Defense and Foreign Affairs, at the

Committee’s invitation on April 12, 2007.]

Q: Paul Scham, Middle East Institute: Jeff, I wonder if you can give us your

assessment of the Israeli political and public reaction after it became public.

Geoffrey Aronson: The so-called price that Israel would have to pay for an

understanding with Syria is understood, and it was only reiterated, I think, in today’s Ha’aretz

as well, where Olmert himself said, “We understand what the price is here.” Sharon himself

had said this as well. Sharon was not prepared to pay the price. Ehud Barak was almost

prepared to pay the price. Netanyahu, apparently, was not sure if he was prepared to pay the

price.

The real question is to what extent does a rapprochement with Syria fit in to Israel’s

understanding of its interests; and secondly, to what extent does a rapprochement with Syria fit

into those interests in the US?

Now, the fact that we even have to ask such a question today is extraordinary. How can

one suggest that a peace treaty with Syria –- between Israel and Syria -- is not an objective that

is worthy of pursuing? What are we talking about here is resolving an issue that is at the core

of the conflict between Israel and the Arab world, and whose ramifications will have no choice

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but to spill over into other issues that are of strategic importance, not only to Israel, but to the

US as well.”

So, there is absolutely no reason whatsoever to oppose this, absolutely none,

whatsoever, to oppose this. And there are voices in Israel that feel this way. It is also

heartening to know that there are those voices inside who say to themselves, “How can we not

stretch out our hand when the other guy is trying in his own fashion to do so as well?” But the

story is not over yet. The answer has not been given yet.

Q: Farid Ghadry, Reform Party of Syria. I have a very good question to ask about

how do you feel when this issue was exposed in Israel. The people of Israel debated that issue.

I totally agree with you that peace with Syria and Israel is a necessary tool. But how do you feel

about the Syrian people not having the choice to debate that issue, with no human rights and no

conclusive evidence or no means by which they can decide whether this is in their best interest

and the best interest of Syria and the best interest of the Syrian people who actually own the

Golan Heights at the end of the day?

A: Aronson: It is a very important point you raised. One does not feel good when

anyone’s rights to participate in the basic decisions of how they are ruled and how their

interests are formed are denied. Having said that, we are not in a position to choose the people

with whom we sit across the table from. That was certainly not my job here. That was not our

intention. Our intention was focused specifically on trying to discover ways in which issues

that had come between Israel and Syria and, if you will, the people of Israel and the people of

Syria for 50 years could be resolved and meet the reasonable requirements of each of the

parties.

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So we did not aspire to do anything beyond that. Now, to what extent resolving the

issues at stake between Israel and Syria will affect the domestic political situation in Syria or in

Israel is, again, not something that we address, but it is certainly something that might be

worthy or further investigation.

Q: Melissa Mahle, C&O Resources: If you come to the point of concluding in

secret a document that reaches the needs of the ruling elite in Syria and meets the needs of the

decision makers of democracy in Israel, and you proceed on that and you come up with an

agreement that is signed and sealed, and yet you have a regime in Syria that is viewed as

illegitimate by a significant portion of its population, how durable is that going to be? And

how much confidence can the international community -- and probably even more importantly,

how much confidence can Israel have in something like that?

Geoffrey Aronson: Well, unfortunately, diplomacy cannot wait until everybody adopts

the Declaration of Independence as their calling card. One has to see this not as a static process,

but as a dynamic one in which events today influence the events tomorrow and the day after.

Now, of course, one can argue that any kind of agreement with any kind of dictatorial regime

will do nothing but insulate that regime and fortify it. That may be true, but you can also make

the other point -- that to the extent that you pacify the conflict in relations between Syria and

Israel, you go far towards undermining the state of war upon which a regime may be based.

And that need not be only be Syria; it could be anywhere else in the world.

So, I am not prepared to agree to the premise of your point that, as a matter of fact, one

should not make a deal with the bad guys because they are bad guys. Otherwise, we would be

sitting here in Washington saying, “Everybody knows what they are supposed to do and I'm

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just going to sit in my room until they do it.” And of course, that is where we are. It is a silly

argument.

Q: Richard Sullivan, freelance writer: I wanted to talk a little bit about the United

States’ reaction; not limited to the silence that you described, Jeff, but to a comment

Ambassador Wilcox made about the United States inhibiting Israeli-Syrian talks.

A: Aronson: In Washington it is absolutely no secret that the Syrians are wearing the

black hats for all sorts of reasons, whether they do -- have to do with Iraq or Iran or Lebanon,

they are wearing the black hats. That is the prism through which this administration views

anything to do with Syria. And the blackness is so complete and the room is so dark that it is

like trying to escape from a black hole. It is very hard, no matter how bright the light is, to

escape the forces of gravity that have been created around this issue. Now, luckily for us, these

are not forces of nature; these are self-imposed blinders. And one can hope, certainly, that

either by choice or compulsion that policymakers everywhere, and not only here, will see it in

their interest, or be forced to see it in their interest, that re-thinking without repudiating their

understanding of where Syria fits in to the equation is something that is also in their own best

interest to do. And I hope and pray for that day here.

The non-paper did not make any pretense to be comprehensive or detailed. That there

would be a mutual effort on the part of the parties to address questions related to terror and

instability, and so forth was part of the understanding. Now, how specifically the parties want

to interpret that certainly is up to them. In our discussions, there was a considerable

willingness to be forthcoming on the part of both parties about what exactly that meant and the

degree to which common ground could be found between the parties as a way of addressing the

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principal concerns of each of them, whether it is regarding Israel’s occupation or the

Palestinian authority or the political constellation in Beirut, and so forth.

A sense of common conceptual ground was found, and so that the idea that a bilateral

agreement between Israel and Syria would have an influence merely restricted to those two

countries is, at least in our view, not a correct perception of what is on the agenda here.

Q: Jeff, you said the American reaction was one of silence. Can you tell us -- did you

ever brief the administration as you embarked on this initiative? Did you brief them in the

course of it? And were you actively discouraged from continuing?

A: Aronson: I was merely the facilitator here. I did not take any -- I was not part of

any effort. And as far as I know, no effort was made to keep US officials apprised. (Note: Mr.

Aronson has since briefed a group of U.S. officials at their request.)

This administration is not actively invested in a way that no predecessor administration

has been in the political or even the territorial status quo in the Middle East. Unlike all of their

predecessors, they feel that the post-war system has worked to undermine US interests, not to

preserve US interests. Therefore, from the get-go, there is a perception that the status quo

should be undermined, even when the status quo is your ostensible friends, let alone people

who you have defined as your enemies. So, Syria is certainly not understood to be a friend.

And it is an enemy because that is the way their world works, and you do not help your

enemies; you undermine them. And your enemies only become your friends when they do

exactly what you want them to do. And then you undermine them as well because you do not

like them.

Q: Jim Vitarello, Washington Inter-Faith Alliance for ME Peace: Jeff, just from

your own personal point of view, what difference, if any, do you think it would make if -- well,

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whether there was an Israeli-Palestinian agreement before a Syrian-Israeli agreement or vice

versa? And what impact would the success of one have on the other, you think?

A: Aronson: I'm not able to pick and choose the sequence. And I do not spend a lot of

time thinking about were I in such a position, which would I choose? This is like the course of

a stream here. Whatever way you see the water flowing.

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