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BRILLIANT

Grant Agreement: 662167

WP1. Deliverable D1.8

SWOT analysis of R&D&T&E in Baltic countries

Author(s): J. Jagielski, M. Frelek (NCBJ), E. Urbonavičius (LEI), G. Kizane (UL), W. Gudowski

(KTH), L. Juodis, E. Maceika (FTMC), G. Klevinskas (VAE SPB), A. Tkaczyk (UT)

Date of issue of this report: 30 July, 2016

Start date of project: 01/07/2015 Duration: 36 Months

Project funded by the European Commission under the Horizon 2020 Euratom Framework

Programme for Nuclear Research &Training Activities (2014-2018)

Dissemination Level

PU Public X

RE Restricted to a group specified by the partners of the BRILLIANT project

CO Confidential, only for partners of the BRILLIANT project

Ref. Ares(2016)7199642 - 30/12/2016

BRILLIANT D-N°: 1-8 – SWOT analysis of R&D&T&E in Baltic countries Dissemination level: PU Date of issue of this report : 30/07/2016

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Table of content:

PART 1. INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................... 3

PART 2. STRENGTHS ................................................................................................................. 5

PART 3. WEAKNESSES .............................................................................................................. 7

PART 4. OPPORTUNITIES ...................................................................................................... 10

PART 5. THREATS .................................................................................................................... 12

PART 6. CONCEPT DESCRIPTION OF REGIONAL BALTIC “NUCLEAR” CENTERS . 14

PART 7. CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................... 26


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PART 1. INTRODUCTION

The main objective of this report is to analyze the situation in research institutions

involved in nuclear technologies in Baltic region in such areas as: Research, Development,

Training and Education.

This document is treated as a living text and is open for further comments,

modifications and upgrade in order to take into account rapidly changing situation in

participating countries: Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Estonia, and Sweden.

Among important aspects influencing the situation of nuclear technologies in

Baltic countries one should first list general trends in global, regional and national

economies. From global point of view it is clear, that rapid development of Asian countries

is leading to the increasing demand on raw materials supply. In long term this tendency

may lead to the shortages in raw material supply and possible increase of prices. Rising

costs of oil, gas and coal could increase pressure to seek for alternative fuels. A rising

awareness that renewable energy sources may play only a complementary role in global

energy supply (lack of technologies allowing for a massive energy storage) increases the

importance of nuclear power plants as a pedestal of energy mix system. Commercial

introduction of Generation IV reactors expected for a mid-XXI century will drastically

change the situation on global energy markets. Currently the estimated energy resources

on Earth are evaluated as about 37 ZJ (1021 J)1. About half of this resources are in coal,

then comes in roughly equal shares oil and gas and finally about 5% of today energy

resources is in U235. New breeding reactors will change this picture completely.

Possibility to use also U238 as a nuclear fuel (after its transformation to Pu239) will rise

the global repository of energy to something like 2500 ZJ, i.e. maybe even 60 times more

1http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energy_review_2008/STAGING/local_assets/2010_downloads/statistical_review_of_world_energy_full_report_2010.pdf

http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energy_review_2008/STAGING/local_assets/2010_downloads/statistical_review_of_world_energy_full_report_2010.pdf




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than today’s resources. It means that in mid-XXI century the access to most of energy

available on Earth will be possible via nuclear technology. Expected implementation of

fusion technology in XXII century will push the amount of energy available from non-

renewable sources even further. The importance of nuclear energy becomes even more

clear when one realize that the use of Uranium as a main energy source will spare an ever

decreasing amount of oil, gas and coal for chemical industry and for transport needs. It is

clear, that whereas uranium can only be used for energy production, oil, gas and coal are

also valuable raw materials that may be used in very different industrial applications.

Another argument in favour of the nuclear energy is the desire for energy

independence, in which is an important issue in Lithuania, especially after the shutdown

of the Ignalina NPP in 2009. In the case of Poland, there is a desire to reduce unilateral

energy dependence. In Sweden, there is a desire to preserve the equilibrated energy

system. Despite the different motivation all participating countries have reasons to

consider the development of nuclear energy including current technologies and future

Generation IV and fusion systems.


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PART 2. STRENGTHS

The current situation in partner countries is very different. Sweden possess a fully

developed and well established system of nuclear energy production. Latvia has isolated

nuclear installations. In Estonia, two nuclear submarine training reactors were shut down

in 1989 and are currently in a state of temporary storage. Lithuania has significant

experience with former Ignalina NPP and considers to build a new NPP in Visaginas.

Finally Poland has no NPP but possesses the research reactor MARIA mainly used for

scientific and radiopharmaceutical purposes. The state involvement in nuclear technology

may thus be ranked from “user only” to “technology provider” passing through “research

and development” status. This situation should be regarded as a positive variety, as the

role of each partner is rather complementary than competitive, making the collaboration

between partners easier and more logical. The roles of each partner is rather clear, the

detailed task sharing is currently discussed as its possible participation in EuroBALTIC

Research Institute.

All participating countries have rather well developed educational and training

capabilities allowing for both, academic formation of students and organization of

professional training for future constructors or employees on nuclear power plant.

Finally, in most of participating countries nuclear energy benefits from clear support of

governmental organizations. A recent decision of the Swedish parliament to build new

NPP, Polish Nuclear Power Programme and Lithuanian will to build Visaginas NPP are

clear confirmation of national commitment and involvement.

Summarizing strengths in bullets one may wrote:

Increasing understanding on governmental level that nuclear energy is the only

reasonable option for world energy production;

Strong seek for energy independence in Baltic countries;


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Need for independent energy source for backbone regional energy system;

Hands-on experience with nuclear installations (Sweden, Lithuania and Poland);

Existing technological infrastructure that may be used for participation in

construction of nuclear power plants;

Synergic effect of foreign investments in case of the start of nuclear program not

only in nuclear but also in other industrial fields;

Educational and training capabilities allowing for efficient training and formation

of personnel for future NPPs;

Qualified workforce to be used in construction and operation of NPP;

Complementary capabilities in collaborating countries and strong synergic effect

due to sharing of those capabilities;

Task sharing among participating countries logical and accepted.


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PART 3. WEAKNESSES

Unstable financial situation and ever decreasing funding in participating countries and

European Union constitutes a major threat to research programmes in general and in

nuclear technologies in particular. Nuclear science is particularly sensitive on budget cuts

as maintaining research installations that must fulfill high safety requirements is a very

costly process. Moreover, high competent and knowledgeable nuclear specialists may

easily find the job in other, non-nuclear branches. Consequently, lack of stability causes

the flow of skilled personnel from nuclear labs to less demanding (however, sometimes

better paying) areas of activity. Competences in nuclear field are gained only after many

years of education, trainings and work. Unfortunately, current financial system in science

favors the short-term projects (typical grant is limited to three years only) what leads to

frequent changes in research priorities adapting to current trends and temporary

priorities. Moreover, evaluation of short-term projects is focused rather on

accomplishment of formal objectives (timely delivery of formally correct documents)

than on real scientific and technological achievements. Finally, even though in private

communication most of decision makers declare their understanding that nuclear energy

constitutes the best possible option in the long time, the huge distance separating costs

from beneficial effects of the investment (usually several tens of years) largely exceeds 4

years of parliamentary mandate. In consequence politicians may not be interested in

covering the costs of activities that will be beneficial, but not for the current political

option at power. Also, due to the non-consistent strategic view on political level, short-

term low prices of oil and electricity on the market have a long-term negative effect on

the long-term investment substantiation. This point of view with the “only commercial”

treatment of the new built-projects generates a very difficult situation for justification of

nuclear projects due to their high cost and long payback period. Therefore especially the

countries lacking the energy resources in general shall have a long term strategic

planning.


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Despite the fact that in general there is understanding on governmental level about

advantages of nuclear energy and there are plans to construct new NPPs in Lithuania,

Poland and Sweden, often it takes long time to confirm the decisions regarding their

construction. Progress in preparation for construction of new NPPs often is slow and

depends very much on political and economic situation. This unawareness in

implementation of nuclear energy program makes nuclear energy related studies

unpopular and leads to situation with insufficient number of students applying to these

studies in some Baltic countries.

Cooperation between research and industrial partners often is obligatory condition for

application of structural funds or other funding. Unfortunately, it is difficult to find

industrial partner working in nuclear field in the Baltic countries, and due to this nuclear

energy related research is not included in the national smart specialization areas and the

funding is not allocated for this field.

Another weakness comes from a still rather poor acceptance of nuclear technology by

general public. Whereas fusion technologies are surprisingly perceived as “clean” energy,

fission reactors are still loaded with the legacy of Chernobyl, Fukushima and, to the lesser

extent, Three Miles Island accidents. In principal, these historical examples of nuclear

accidents demonstrate that public acceptance might be improved if passive safety

systems would be implemented in new designs. On the other hand, absence of active

international organization as an arbiter who should formulate the stand alone position

about each NPP project would help to improve general public acceptance. Current

developments in the region, e.g., the new build of Belorussian NPP just 40 km from

Lithuanian capital Vilnius without having finished the Environmental Impact assessment

as required by the ESPOO procedure, can have an opposite effect concerning the

acceptance of nuclear energy in Vilnius region and in the whole Lithuania as well.

Moreover, the negative point of view of general public concerning the nuclear energy

could be explained by comparing the prices of electricity from nuclear and other sources:

as long as these are very close, the public might not accept the risks of nuclear energy even

these could be very low (example of Germany). The issue of radioactive waste


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management and disposal deserves special attention, too. In modern countries one of the

major drawbacks of nuclear energy is pointed to be the long lived radioactive waste. The

demonstration of safe and sustainable management of radioactive waste could be one of

the keys to improve the nuclear energy acceptance in general. Definitively, continuous

efforts to improve public acceptance of fission technology are still needed.

Summarizing weaknesses in bullets we obtain:

Lack of the long term, stable financial perspectives for research in nuclear

technology

Lack of passive safety systems ensuring the safe operation of nuclear installations

in all cases of operation.

Lack of demonstration for the public of safe and sustainable management of long

lived radioactive waste.

Lack of long-term strategic view in the energy sector and overemphasis of short

term commercial evaluation.

Lack of active international organization which evaluates and formulates the stand

alone position of each new build NPP.

Outflow of highly skilled personnel and difficulty to employ young brilliant

scientists able to continue high-level studies.

Aging research equipment and insufficient investment in hardware.

Absence of financing mechanisms allowing for long-term research projects.

Very tight safety requirements leading to the abandon of possible development

because of licensing costs.

Paralyzing administrative burdens when timely delivery of unnecessary

complicated formal documents becomes more important than actual scientific or

technological work.

Cooperation between research and industry (incl. SME) still is insufficient.

Insufficient number of students applying to nuclear energy related studies in some

Baltic countries.


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PART 4. OPPORTUNITIES

The main opportunity that may be used in the development of nuclear technologies in

participating countries is the possible use of EU structural funds available in the Baltic

countries and in Poland. The current rules favor the close relations between R&D

organizations with industry with the special priority to direct financial involvement of

industrial partner in R&D activity. These rules pave the way for EU support in research

projects which are needed to develop and to implement nuclear technologies in

participating countries.

The implementation of the highest level safety standards which might generate new

passive safety designs of nuclear reactors is a promising way for nuclear energy in far

perspective.

Another interesting option is the growing interest in development of advanced

manufacturing technologies. Nuclear science is particularly well suited for a role of

“cutting edge” technology dragging behind a number of applications in general

engineering. One of the numerous examples can be the situation in Poland, where in a new

Strategy for Responsible Growth (a governmental document describing strategic axes of

country development) a NOMATEN laboratory is explicitly included. NOMATEN is a new

laboratory planned in NCBJ which role is to develop materials for current and future

nuclear reactors together with materials for high temperature chemical industry and

modern technologies of coal burning. Similar concepts are developed in other countries,

an example may be High Temperature Research Facility near Manchester (United

Kingdom). It seems that modern, state-of-the-art laboratories open for both, research and

industrial users are new and interesting option for scientific and industrial communities

in participating countries.

Development of Regional Baltic “Nuclear” Centers enlarge opportunities of Baltic

countries cooperation in nuclear energy research field and preparation of common


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applications for further regional, EU and other international projects. Baltic center links

with recognized European networks and platforms (ETSON, NUGENIA, SNETP, IGD-TP,

ERDO-WG, ENEN, EERA) will be established and strengthen. These links will open more

possibilities to promote international exchange of PhD students/ young researchers and

to improve research cooperation with industry.

Opportunities may be summarized as follows:

Possible access to EU structural funds that may boost the research and

development of nuclear technologies in participating countries.

Growing awareness that renewable energy sources may only play a

complementary role in an energy mix, will not become a pedestal of nation energy

system.

Increasing costs and decreasing resources of raw materials forcing EU to stimulate

research on energy production technologies that save raw materials (mainly oil,

gas and coal) for chemical industry.

Possible use of achievements of nuclear science in other, non-nuclear areas: high

temperature chemical processing, modern coal burners, radiopharmaceutical,

medical and military.

Increasing need of research and industrial communities in participating countries

to use open access laboratories operating on “technology hotel” principles.

Baltic countries cooperation in nuclear energy research field and preparation of

common applications for further regional, EU and other international projects.

Establishment and strengthen of Baltic Center links with recognized European

networks and platforms (ETSON, NUGENIA, SNETP, IGD-TP, ERDO-WG, ENEN,

EERA);

Promote international exchange of PhD students and young researchers;

Improve research cooperation with industry through active participation in

national and international technological platforms and networks.


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PART 5. THREATS

Despite the declared political will to develop nuclear technologies in participating

countries the actual funding is frequently far from expectations (what is rather obvious)

but also far from real costs of studies that should be performed (what is much more

critical). This is particularly important for “new” countries such as Poland, Lithuania,

Latvia and Estonia. Nuclear technologies are very demanding and lengthy in development.

A new concept needs at least 30 years to grow from first ideas to a mature technology.

Any downturns in research policies during this period may have a devastating effect on

the technology. One of the main problems comes from the fact, that nuclear laboratories

are subjected to very tight safety and security rules, observing them is very costly and

time-consuming process. Even apparently small decrease of national subvention may lead

to very important reductions of research activities, as logical conclusion of the governing

bodies is that safety, security and certifications must be saved at the detriment of science.

This leads to dangerous situation when short term financial objectives are more and more

important than long-term development of new technologies. European funds are far from

being sufficient to finance the development of nuclear technologies, main source of the

money should come from national budgets. These funds are particularly vulnerable to

rapidly changing political priorities and budget cuts.

Another, rather surprising, threat comes from safety and security requirements. It is

obvious, that nuclear laboratories must be subjected to very tight safety requirements.

The problem, however, starts when these requirements are too tight and actually have

reverse effects. One of the examples is that the time spent to deal with the safety issues

exceeds time remaining for a real laboratory work. Numerous and complicated safety,

licensing, health and other formal issues can often lengthen or complicate the processes

to attract, hire, and maintain employment of highly skilled personnel.


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Comparing to the above the real threats related to the normal risks in technology

development, mainly that the planned goals will not be reached, seems to be minor.

Nevertheless, during development of particularly demanding nuclear technologies (HTR,

GFR, MSR and fusion) numerous problems that are difficult to identify today may be

encountered.

Some specific threats include:

Shortfalls in the funding of nuclear science in participating countries may lead to

the abandon and disappearing of nuclear competences. In consequence, when

these competences will be needed it will be necessary to reconstruct it from

scratch.

Growing activity in rapidly developing countries such as China and India may

result in a situation where there is a high demand for new nuclear installations,

which may increase costs and availability of nuclear new build construction.

Unexpected complications in new technology development.


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PART 6. CONCEPT DESCRIPTION OF REGIONAL BALTIC “NUCLEAR”

CENTERS

On the basis of competences and strengths of BRILLIANT partners the concept of Regional

Baltic Nuclear Centers was developed. Below in the table the short description of

specialized centers to be established in each country of BRILLIANT partners is provided

together with SWOT analysis reflecting particularities of project partners.


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Name and location of

the Center

Baltic Reactor Research Centre – Swierk (Poland)

Short description of

current “top

specialization”

related to the concept

of “Regional Centers”

Irradiation of mechanical samples in MARIA reactor, Testing of irradiated materials, Development and testing of experimental devices for in-

core measurements Performing feasibility studies of experiments in MARIA

research reactor, Safety analyses of reactor technology, Trainings for students from other Centers, Hands-on exercises on reactor technology.

Focus of a

“hypothetical”

Regional Center

Development of new materials for current and future generations of nuclear reactors.

Irradiation and testing of irradiated materials. Material analysis using neutron beams.

Description of the

“Mode of Operation”

of the Center (how do

we see operation of

the Center)

MARIA reactor is in principle open for external

collaborations, however, the cost of in-core experiments is

high. Current project allows only for a limited participation

of foreign researchers in experiments. The best solution

seems to be a common proposition of research project

financed by external sources. Access rules to the NCBJ

infrastructure are described in internal documents, in

principle standard information about participant (name,

affiliation, ID number, purpose of the visit) are required

two weeks before the visit.

If – applicable:

experiences in similar

collaborations (if any)

Common experiments with CEA team on experimental

validation of gamma heating simulation codes. Project

composed of the reactor core modelling, simulation of

thermal power, design and construction of gamma

calorimeters and in-core measurements of gamma heating.

In the frames of the project a Ph.D. thesis in co-tutelle is

carried out with CEA and UAM Marseille-Aix.

Beryllium poisoning study: common experimental

programme with CEA Cadarache.


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Assessment of

required legal actions

The regulatory framework and licensing procedures to

transfer the irradiated sample to another country for

analysis will be investigated in the framework of WP 1.4.

SWOT analysis of the

concept

Strengths: 1. Significant infrastructures and technical equipment: MARIA 30MW research reactor, Neutron flux up to 1e14 cm-2sec-1, primarily thermal

neutrons. 12 hot cells equipped with hardness, strength and

Charpy devices, Nanomechanical testing device, NanoTest Vantage

system, X-Ray diffractometer, SEM/EDS microscope, neutron

diffractometers and neutron radiography, Laboratory of Atomic and Nuclear Physics for high-

schools and university students. Used also for professional training in radiation safety,

Seminar room, two permanent exhibitions (Nuclear Wastes, Nuclear Power Plant).

2. National Centre for Nuclear Research(NCBJ) is the largest research Institute in Poland.

3. High scientific potential. 4. Long lasting experience in nuclear research. 5. More than 10 years of MARIA operation ensured.

Weaknesses: 1. Operation of the reactor: 4,000 hours per year in cycles ~ 100 hour. Difficulty for longer irradiation campaigns.

2. Possible conflicts with radioisotopes production 3. Possibility of unexpected shutdowns of the reactor. 4. Limited financial resources. 5. Gap generational between experienced staff and the

young researchers. 6. Small volume of irradiated samples. 7. Low flux of fast neutrons.

Opportunities: 1. The only research reactor in the Baltic Region. 2. Strong need for material and training reactor in Baltic

Region.

Threats: 1. Insufficient financing. 2. Impossibility to fill the generation gap.


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3. Absence of long-term research priorities in participating countries.


the Center

Baltic Center of Nuclear Safety and Energy Security

LEI in cooperation with FTMC, Lithuania


current “top

specialization”



The “Strategic Energy Technology (SET) Plan” of EU

identifies nuclear fission as one of the key low carbon

energy technologies. Nuclear safety is primary priority for

the nuclear energy sector.

All countries around the Baltic Sea are interested to

establish strong cooperation in research of nuclear energy

and ensuring nuclear safety in countries.

In May 2014 the European Commission set out in its

Energy Security Strategy. The energy supply security is

predominant factor for all countries in the Baltic region.

Focus of a

“hypothetical”

Regional Center

The cooperation of organizations in Regional Center will

help to identify the fields (projects), where the

competences can be effectively merged and joint

investigations of nuclear safety and energy security could

be performed.

Energy security and Regional cooperation are key

components implementing the Energy Union Strategy in

the EU (EC initiative announced in February 2015).

Cooperation among countries around the Baltic Sea will

create basis for assessment of national and regional

security of energy supply, including nuclear energy

implementation impact on security level. Assessment of

security of energy supply will address such important

aspects of Energy Union as diversification of energy

sources, reducing of EU countries dependency on energy

imports and fighting against climate change.


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Description of the



we see operation of

the Center)

LEI as coordinating institution of Baltic Center of Nuclear

Safety and Energy Security in cooperation with FTMC will

initiate the following activities:

Regular workshops of participating Baltic organisations for initiation of ideas for new regional, European and international research projects in nuclear safety and energy security fields;

Establishment and periodical revisions of Baltic roadmap identifying areas of Baltic Sea region cooperation in nuclear safety and energy security fields;

Seminars and meetings with a community of science, technology, business, politicians and decision makers of different levels explaining and promoting regional approach to the security of energy supply and nuclear safety and showing their relevance for sustainable energy systems and for societal welfare.

If – applicable:



The experience obtained starting from 2007 in the

realization of the idea to create a Regional Nuclear Safety

Training Centre in LEI, will be applied also for this Baltic

cooperation. Taking advantage of the IAEA the Basic

Professional Training Course for the entire region were

organized by LEI in 2008 and 2009. The total number of

course participants was ~40 each year: half of audience

was composed from participants from several IAEA

Member States from former Soviet Republics and East

Europe, and half from local Lithuanian organisations. This

good practice has not been forgotten and will be applied for

this Baltic cooperation.

Another experience comes from the LEI membership in

European Technical Safety Organisations Network

(ETSON). ETSON aims to develop and promote best

practices in nuclear safety assessment and to contribute to

the harmonisation of nuclear safety practices.

The experiences from ETSON will be used in Regional Baltic

centers and cooperation will allow to reduce regional

disparity and research fragmentation by bringing

organisations from Baltic Sea region under the same


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umbrella with established institutions from Europe with

long experience the European research programs.

Assessment of


None.


concept

Strengths: Skills and experience in nuclear safety and energy security research fields;

Availability and experience in use of computational tools in nuclear safety and energy security research fields

Active participation in international projects (LEI participated in 24 projects in FP7 program, 9 ongoing projects in H2020 in Euratom and Energy programs);

Membership and active participation in European nuclear related networks and platforms (LEI participates in ETSON, NUGENIA, SNETP, IGD-TP, Fusenet, ENSTTI);

LEI has a common doctorate studies with Kaunas University of Technology in a thematic field “Energy and Thermal Engineering” (incl. nuclear).

Weaknesses: Small number of international publications prepared together with partners from other countries;

Cooperation between research and industry (incl. SME) still is insufficient.

Opportunities: Establishment and strengthen of Baltic Center links with recognized European networks and platforms (ETSON, NUGENIA, SNETP, IGD-TP, ERDO-WG, ENEN, EERA);

Promote international exchange of PhD students and young researchers;

Improve research cooperation with industry through active participation in national and international technological platforms and networks.

Threats: Insufficient number of students applying to nuclear energy related studies in some Baltic countries.


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the Center

Baltic Center of Advanced Nuclear Coolant Technology

Development

Institute of Physics, University of Latvia

Miera str 32, Salaspils, Latvia (Riga region)


current “top

specialization”



Liquid metal loops and test stands – different liquid metals: Na, Li, Pb, PbBi, Hg possibility to extend to other metals;

Modelling and calculations of electromagnetic pumping of liquid metals and other magnetohydrodynamic systems;

Measurement and diagnostic systems for liquid metal loops, flow meters and other measurements – development, testing, calibration;

Facility suited for developing test stands, experimental loops and components and measurement systems for liquid metal systems;

Development of electromagnetic pumping of liquid metals;

Leading edge in the world in developing permanent magnet pumping for liquid metals – probably the future technology in the nuclear coolant pumping systems;

Corrosion and material studies in liquid metals and magnetic fields.

Focus of a

“hypothetical”

Regional Center

To support and facilitate the participation of the region in nuclear developments of fast neutron reactors across the EU and in the rest of the world;

Research and developments in the safety of generation IV fast neutron nuclear reactors;

To develop measurement, pumping and other liquid metal systems for fast neutron reactors and other nuclear applications and to facilitate a creation of research and business ecosystem around the center;

To support and develop the regional competence in liquid metal systems for nuclear applications.

Description of the



Coordinate the mobilisation of structural funds for the regional development of liquid metal technologies for nuclear applications;

Training and dissemination of knowledge;


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we see operation of

the Center)

Facilitate regional participation in fast neutron reactor projects;

To offer training – master thesis and PhD for students from other participating institutions.

If – applicable:



IPUL participates in the development of liquid Na system for ASTRID reactor (France);

IPUL participate in Latvia consortium in EURATOM Fusion.

Assessment of



concept

Strengths: Experimental basis; Leading edge technology; Supported by national Smart Specialisation; Good support by the Government if the support is

mobilised for some goal.

Weaknesses: Insufficient local financing; Low lobbying power in international projects; Part of the infrastructure requires upgrades.

Opportunities: To develop into EU center of liquid metal technologies; Creation of scientific and business ecosystem around

liquid metal technologies; Creation of new generation of successful scientists in

liquid metal technologies; Increased lobbying power in international projects.

Threats: Aging leading scientists; Failure to participate in future fast neutron reactor

development projects in EU and in the world.


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Name and location of the Center

Baltic Center of Nuclear E-education Institute of Physics, University of Tartu

W. Ostwaldi 1, 50411 Tartu, Estonia

Short description of current “top specialization” related to the concept of “Regional Centers”

Estonia has long been regarded as a revolutionary country in the fields of information technology, e-commerce, and e-learning. There is an “e-Estonia” movement by Estonian government. Examples of this top specialization include: (1) Estonians are the original authors (inventors) of Skype software and (2) Estonia has permitted internet voting since 2005. The Estonian prime minister recently received wide acclaim in the USA for his interview with The Daily Show: “Estonian Prime Minister Taavi Roivas explains how his country became a world leader in technology”

http://www.cc.com/video-collections/sbjjbj/the-daily-show-with-trevor-noah-exclusive---taavi-roivas-extended-interview/bz2f5k

Focus of a “hypothetical” Regional Center

The Baltic Center of Nuclear E-Education would focus on all aspects of knowledge management and distribution of nuclear educational materials and information, based on the input of the other Regional Centers.

Description of the “Mode of Operation” of the Center (how do we see operation of the Center)

The Center would mainly operate using existing infrastructure at the University of Tartu. The main need would be for additional human resources capacity, to coordinate the knowledge management operations on multiple pillars: 1. strategy and coordination, 2. communication with partner institutions, 3. marketing to potential audience, 4. daily administrative operations, 5. daily technical operations: (a) educational material design specialists, (b) database and network infrastructure developers, and (c) archival and dissemination specialists.

If – applicable: experiences in similar collaborations (if any)

Since 1996, Estonia has implemented the Tiger’s Leap plan, using the national budget to extensively invest in the computer and network infrastructure, emphasizing education. This is one of the reasons that Estonia and particularly University of Tartu is a leader in e-learning and MOOCs (Massive Open Online Courses). http://www.ut.ee/en/current-students/moocs




http://www.ut.ee/en/current-students/moocs


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Assessment of required legal actions

Copyright issues will need to be investigated.

SWOT analysis of the concept

Strengths: Strong computer and network infrastructure;

Good experience with e-learning and MOOCs;

Supported by national Smart Specialisation: “Information and communications technology (ICT) horizontally via other sectors.”

Weaknesses: Limited local financing (important to maintain qualified personnel).

Opportunities: To use Baltic Center of Nuclear E-education as a springboard to further become an EU hub for Nuclear E-education;

Creation of scientific and business ecosystem around Nuclear E-education;

Creation of new generation of successful nuclear specialists with advanced ICT competence.

Threats: Potential reluctance of some nuclear scientists to share their information with a broader public;

Sensitivity of the copyright issue for sharing materials.


the Center

Baltic Center of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Studies

Oskarshamn, Sweden


current “top

specialization”



Oskarshamn is the oldest Swedish “nuclear community”

with 3 BWR reactors. The municipality of Oskarshamn is

well known as an ecologically conscious community with a

lot of “ecological farms” around. It is a perfect case of

ecological reality around nuclear power. Oskarshamn has a

special strategy to become a leader in environmental

friendly nuclear technologies.


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The municipality of Oskarshamn and Nova hosted the

following activities:

- Reactor O3

- Interim Storage of all Swedish spent fuel - CLAB

- Hard Rock Laboratory (500 m under the ground),

which is a model of the geological disposal site

- The Canister Laboratory

Focus of a

“hypothetical”

Regional Center

Oskarshamn possesses not only worldwide unique nuclear

facilities related to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle but also

worldwide recognized and respected human potential in

this field. A lot of experts working since many years either at

the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company

(SKB) ort at the Oskarshamn Kraftgrupp (OKG), a nuclear

reactor operator.

Oskarshamn may become a Baltic Hub in education,

demonstration and operating of key nuclear fuel cycle

facilities.

Description of the



we see operation of

the Center)

The operation of the center may be realised in very different

way. The most favourable in the frame of the European

Union, becoming a European Facility/Center of the Nuclear

Fuel Cycle Studies and a demonstration facility for the

Geological Storage of the Spent Nuclear Fuel.

Main missions: education, capacity building in technical and

NON-TECHNICAL (Social) aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle

and demonstration facility for geological storage studies

and advanced nuclear fuel cycle.

Another mode of operation could be based on international

agreement in the frame of e.g. Council of the Baltic Sea

States.

If – applicable:



Oskarshamn community and SKB are already deeply

involved in a broad international cooperation focused on

geological storage of the spent nuclear fuel. Many

international groups have access to research projects and

many of partners have their own research agenda.

However, this cooperation is based on bilateral agreements

with SKB.


25

Assessment of


The easiest way would be to become a part of the

European Strategy – Connecting Europe Facility (CEF),

which is created for similar projects.


concept

Strengths: Worldwide unique nuclear facilities related to the Nuclear

Fuel Cycle, worldwide recognized and respected human

potential in this field. A lot of experts working since many

years either at the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste

Management Company (SKB) ort at the Oskarshamn

Kraftgrupp (OKG), a nuclear reactor operator.

Having vast experiences in conducting a social dialogue on

location of the Spent Nuclear Fuel facility.

Huge experiences in international cooperation! Strong

Baltic, regional identity.

Young and dynamic municipality, looking for good

investment in technology

Weaknesses: Unclear future of nuclear reactors at Oskarshamn which

can result in

Opportunities: Oskarshamn community is eligible to so called Value Added

Swedish Funds summing up to about 200 M€, a part of the

Nuclear Spent Fuel Management Funds. This funding is

earmarked in a special national agreement related to use of

the spent fuel funds. This funding is independent from the

current and future Swedish nuclear power policy

Threats: Unclear and changing Swedish policy on nuclear power

issues. Can make such cooperation either very easy or more

difficult. But it cannot hinder such cooperation


26

PART 7. CONCLUSIONS

Nuclear energy could allow for the energy independence of Baltic countries and become

a major component of the Polish energy mix, permitting a reliable and long-lasting energy

supply. Sweden currently enjoys improved social and political support for nuclear

technologies, and this may produce positive effects for the neighboring Baltic countries

and Poland as well.

Educational and training capabilities in participating countries seems to be sufficient to

deal with the needs of academic education and training of personnel of future NPPs.

Research and development in several BRILLIANT partner countries could benefit from

investment, modernization and upgrade. Stable financing is clearly needed to allow for

building research capabilities to be able to cope with the exploitation and development of

nuclear technologies in participating countries. Regional cooperation is truly needed and

should be focused on work sharing and cost reduction. The possibility of a EuroBALTIC

Research Institute, a new concept developed in the frame of the BRILLIANT project, may

become a step in regional cooperation in this field.

New generations of nuclear reactors (Generation IV) are feasible and participating

countries may find several niches in this field, particularly in the area of gas-cooled

reactors and metal-cooled systems.

Summarizing:

A long-term vision of world’s evolution should be prepared, pointing to the

development needs for modern energy technologies, with special emphasis to

energy production methods. In the assessment of optimal energy technology, a

solution which is long-lasting, sustainable, environmentally friendly and raw-

materials saving should be sought. This vision may be used in discussions with

decision makers and presentations given to general audience to build awareness

on the necessity to develop energy technologies.


27

Medium-term priorities are to select areas of collaboration between participants

allowing for preparation of common projects in every possible area, from

education and training activity to solving of detailed technological problems.

A short-term priority is to limit the consequences of insufficient financing

including personal and equipment costs. Task sharing between partners may be

one of the possible options.

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