bringing the civil servant back in: public service …number of civil servant has been strictly...
TRANSCRIPT
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2018 EROPA Conference on Public Administration in Managing Global Megatrends:
People, Public Services, Institutions, and Ethics
Bali, Indonesia, September 16 to 20, 2018
Bringing the Civil Servant Back In: Public Service Motivation and
Performance in Japanese Public Sector
Masao Kikuchi, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Public Policy and Management
Department of Public Management
Meiji University, Tokyo, JAPAN
This is a working paper. Please do not cite without author’s permission. Contact: [email protected].
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Introduction
Japanese public administration is currently under new and unique pressure to transform its
organization, management and governance into more elastic and resilient ones for
sustainable service delivery. As Japan is entering the society with declining birth rate and
super ageing population, the government is facing new challenges where the needs for
public services are expanding and more diversified. At the same time, its resources are
scaring due to financial difficulty and political pressure for smaller government (Nakamura
and Kikuchi 2011). In order to fill the gap between what is needed and what can be done, it
is necessary to improve the quality and performance of government.
Public service motivation (hereafter PSM) is becoming important concept and
research agenda both among practitioners, policy makers and public administration
scholars. It is generally believed that public employees are motivated by a sense of service
not found among private employees. Civil servants are characterized by an ethic to serve
the public motivated by a concern for the community and a desire to serve the public
interest (Perry 1996; 1997). Well motivated public employees may go above and beyond
what is asked to perform, with care and compassions to the citizens. PSM constitutes one of
the important attributes of government (Bozeman and Su 2015). To improve the quality and
performance of government, it is necessary to identify and enhance the structure and
meaning of PSM (Camilleri and Vander Heijden 2007; Vandenabeele and van de Walle
2008).
There has been a growth of international research on the PSM after series of initial
research began in the United States (Perry 1996; 1997; Rainey 1982). Scholars in many
countries have increasingly contributed to the accumulation of knowledge about PSM,
especially whether it is possible to measure PSM in a different cultural context using the
same approach. In fact, recent international research developed across countries suggests
that PSM may have cultural differences not only in its conceptual and operational
definitions, but also in prevalence, antecedents, and consequences (Kim et al 2012; Liu,
Tang and Zhu 2008; Perry and Hondeghem 2008). National and regional culture embedded
in public administration in one country may influence the construct of PSM. Unfortunately,
less is known about the impact of recent reforms and sustained features of Japanese
bureaucracy, which is the second biggest economy in East Asia, and known for its strong
and rigid bureaucracy (Gibney 1998).
This paper tries to identify the structure and meaning of PSM in Japanese public
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employees, and to assess the impacts of administrative traditions and organizational
commitment on PSM and performance. First part of the paper investigates the structure and
meaning of PSM in Japanese public employees, in light of the issues of measurement
invariance across cultures and languages. It then tries to identify the effects of traditional
administrational culture and organizational commitment, and relations with PSM and
government performance. By assessing the relationship between PSM and government
performance, this paper tries to contribute to the understandings of distinctive nature, e thos
and attribute of public employees, by reevaluating it as the core values in the context of
post-NPM reflections.
Measuring Public Service Motivation in Japan
There has been a growth of international research on the PSM, especially whether it is
possible to measure PSM in a different cultural context using the same approach. National
and regional culture embedded in public administration in one country may influence the
construct of PSM. In Asia, there are leading research to investigate whether PSM concept is
still relevance in Asian context, and to identify the effects of traditional culture, heavily
influenced by the Confucian values (Chen and Hsieh 2017; Moon and Im 2016;Van der
Wal and Yang 2015). In contrast, there is little empirical research on the structure and status
of PSM in Japanese public employees. There are several review papers on PSM in Japanese
public sector, yet comprehensive empirical research is still underdeveloped (Izumisawa
2014; Mizuno 2016; Tai 2017; Yugami and Sasaki 2013). There needs empirical analysis
whether the PSM concept is still relevant to Japanese public administration, and to identify
the impact of administrative culture and organizational commitment.
Data Collection
In order to test the structure of PSM in Japan, national survey to the civil servant (both
national civil servant status and local civil servant status) was conducted in January 2018.
The survey was commissioned to one of the most credible marketing research companies
and the web based survey was conducted. Valid sample size is 310 and 155 for national
civil servant, and rest 155 for local civil servant status. Question items were developed
based on the previous research of PSM measurement (Chen and Hsieh 2017; Kim et al
2012; Moon and Im 2016; Perry 1996; 1997; Van der Wal and Yang 2015). Kim and other
researchers outside of the United States formed the international research project to tackle
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the issue of variance of PSM measurement, and they developed 16 items and tested in 12
countries (Kim et al 2012). Survey conducted in January 2018 in this research basically
conformed to Kim’s international research efforts. In his project, total 33 question items
were developed to test the four dimensions of PSM, namely, APP (Attraction to Public
Participation), CPV (Commitment to Public Values), COM(Compassion), and SS (Self
Sacrifice).
While this survey tries to measure the PSM of Japanese public employee, at the same
time, it tries to capture the traditional administrative culture influenced by Confucian
values, and organizational commitment. Considering the length of total time required to
respond, and to avoid the large volume of invalid samples with incomplete answers,
question items were compressed by merging questions and by deleting questions that are
irrelevant to Japanese context. As a result, 15 question items were generated; 3 items for
APP (Attraction to Public Participation), 5 items for CPV (Commitment to Public Values),
3 Items for COM (Compassion), and 4 items for SS (Self Sacrifice). In addition to
measurement of PSM, 4 items were generated to measure AC (Administrative Culture), 4
items were generated to measure OC (Organizational Commitment), and 5 items were
generated to measure the performances (for question items, see table 2). All the items were
answered to on a 5-point Likert type scale (1=strong disagreement, 5=strong agreement). In
conducting the survey, question items were randomly distributed in order to avoid the
social desirability bias.
Table 1 reports the background of respondents. Majority of the respondents were men
(81.9%), whereas women accounted for 18.1%. In the international project participating 12
countries, majority of the respondents were women (56.6%), but the survey in Korea
conducted in 2004, majority were men, with 74.5% of total respondents (Kim 2009; Kim et
al. 2012). More than half of the respondents have more than 20 years of service, and it may
represent relatively higher ratio of married status (78.1%). Many reform measures have
taken place in Japanese civil service both in national and local level. As a result, total
number of civil servant has been strictly controlled. At the national level, the law to control
total number of civil service was enforced in 1968, and since then basically the number of
civil servant has been on decline. Number of local civil servant has been on decline more
recently. The way to cut the number of workforce is to reduce the number of newly
recruited young personnel. As a result, average age of civil servant in Japan has been
gradually aged and current average age of national civil service is 43.3, and 42.1 for local
civil service. Higher ratio of respondents with relatively longer year of service may reflect
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this “aging” trend of civil service in Japanese public sector.
Table 1: Background of Respondents
Variables Characteristics Respondents
Male 254 81.9
Female 56 18.1
Not Married 68 21.9
Married 242 78.1
unit: JPY
Under 2 Million 2 0.6
2 to 4 Million 13 4.2
4 to 6 Million 56 18.1
6 to 8 Million 87 28.1
8 to 10 Million 63 20.3
10 to 12 million 30 9.7
12 to 15 Million 17 5.5
15 to 20 Million 7 2.3
20 Million + 2 0.6
D.K 12 3.9
N/A 21 6.8
National Civil Servant 155 50.0
Local Civil Servant 155 50.0
0-5 42 13.5
6-10 37 11.9
11-15 26 8.4
16-20 46 14.8
21+ 159 51.3
Marital Status
Sex
Household Income
National or Local
Year of Service
Ｎ ％
Ｎ ％
Ｎ ％
Ｎ ％
Ｎ ％
Summary of descriptive statistics is reported in table 2. Among measured items for four
dimensions of PSM, the highest mean score (4.18) question item was CPV 4, which asked
“to act ethically is essential for public servants”, whereas the lowest mean score was SS4
(2.74), asking “I would agree to a good plan to make a better life for the poor, even if it
costs me money”. Together with question items on PSM, the survey asked the questions
related to administrative culture and organizational commitment. The highest mean score
(3.90) for administrative culture was AC3 (Keeping high moral is more important as civil
servant than acquiring professional knowledge and skill), and the highest mean score (3.81)
for organizational commitment was OC1 (I would be very happy to spend the rest of my
career with this organization) respectively.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the Survey: Construct of PSM, Administrative Culture, Organizational Commitment and Performance
N Minimum Max Mean
Standard
Deviation
Job Characteristics Certain discretion is given to perform well 310 1 5 3.37 0.939
PSM APP1 I am interested in helping to improve public service 310 1 5 3.33 0.875
PSM APP 2 I like to discuss topics regarding public programs and policies with others. 310 1 5 3.28 0.932
PSM APP 3 I believe that public sector activities contribute to our general welfare in the society. 310 1 5 3.72 0.753
PSM CPV 1 Serving the public interest is more important than helping a single individual. 310 1 5 3.46 0.782
PSM CPV 2 It is fundamental that public services respond to the needs of citizens. 310 1 5 3.99 0.656
PSM CPV 3 Everybody is entitled to good service, even if it costs a lot of money. 310 1 5 3.40 0.848
PSM CPV 4 To act ethically is essential for public servants. 310 1 5 4.18 0.703
PSM CPV 5 I believe that public employees must always be aware of the legitimacy of their activities. 310 1 5 3.94 0.773
PSM COM 1 I feel sympathetic to the plight of the underprivileged. 310 1 5 3.61 0.780
PSM COM 2 I have little compassion for people in need who are unwilling to take the first step to help
themselves
310 1 5 3.19 0.820
PSM COM 3 I get very upset when I see other people being treated unfairly. 310 1 5 3.66 0.838
PSM SS 1 Making a difference to society means more to me than personal achievements. 310 1 5 3.06 0.910
PSM SS 2 I am willing to serve more if my work directly makes citizens happier. 310 1 5 3.50 0.850
PSM SS 3 I believe in putting civic duty before self. 310 1 5 3.26 0.780
PSM SS 4 I would agree to a good plan to make a better life for the poor, even if it costs me money. 310 1 5 2.74 0.851
AC 1 When people are in dispute, they should ask the most senior person to decide who is right. 310 1 5 2.99 0.816
AC 2 Those who are respected by parents should also be respected by their children. 310 1 5 3.36 0.759
AC 3 Keeping high moral is more important as civil servant than acquiring professional knowledge and skill. 310 1 5 3.90 0.733
AC 4 Even if it is a good thing, our activity should be within the range of authority given by the politics and
citizens.
310 1 5 3.48 0.799
OC 1 I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career with this organization. 310 1 5 3.81 1.056
OC 2 This organization has a great deal of personal meaning for me. 310 1 5 3.40 0.979
OC 3 Staying with my organization is a matter of necessity rather than desire 310 1 5 3.27 0.895
OC 4 I would feel guilty if I left my organization now. 310 1 5 2.71 1.191
Performance 1 Efficiency My organization uses the limited resources efficiently as much as possible. 310 1 5 3.43 0.938
Performance 2 Effectiveness: My organization uses the limited resources effectively as much as possible. 310 1 5 3.66 0.872
Performance 3 Fairness: My organization treats citizens fairly as much as possible. 310 1 5 3.84 0.861
Performance 4 Participation: My organization solicits citizens voices and participations as much as possible. 310 1 5 3.29 0.951
Performance 5 Transparency: My organization discloses information to citizens as much as possible. 310 1 5 3.52 0.913
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Testing Public Sector Motivation Dimension with Japanese Public Employees
To identify the structure of Public Service Motivation in Japanese public employee, factor
analysis is conducted whether the four dimensions model based on Perry (1996; 1997) and
international research project can be applied to Japanese context (Kim 2012 et al). In
preparation for the analysis, three items were deleted. COM 2 (corrected reverse score) was
deleted due to weak communality score (.044) after extraction, and CPV 3 and COM 3 were
deleted due to small (smaller than .35) factor loading score. In the final analysis, the KMO
measure of sampling adequacy was .862, Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (p<0.05),
and RMSEA (Root Mean Square Error of Approximation) score was .0025, which is small
enough for good fit of the model.
Table 3: Total Variance Explained
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
1 4.31 39.17 39.17 3.79 34.50 34.50 1.77 16.11 16.11
2 1.21 11.00 50.17 0.62 5.68 40.18 1.74 15.84 31.95
3 1.09 9.91 60.08 0.67 6.13 46.31 1.58 14.36 46.31
4 0.87 7.87 67.95
5 0.70 6.38 74.33
6 0.63 5.69 80.02
7 0.52 4.74 84.76
8 0.48 4.39 89.15
9 0.44 3.98 93.13
10 0.40 3.68 96.81
11 0.35 3.19 100.00
Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings
Factor
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
From the final analysis, three factors are identified and total variance explained is 46.31%.
While previous empirical research on Japanese PSM found two dimensions (CPV and SS,
and APP and COM), and of 24 items generated in Perry’s work in 1997, 19 items fit in the
analysis (Mizuno 2016). Result of the factor analysis of this research found 3 dimensions
with 11 items. The first factor is about the APP (Attraction to Public Policy), and it is
followed by the CPV (Commitment to Public Value) as second factor, and Self Sacrifice (SS)
as third factor. For the reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s alpha) of the extracted three
dimesons (APP, CPV, and SS), APP is .775 and the factor loadings are greater than .50, CPV
is .729 and the factor loadings are greater than .50, and SS is .595 and factor loadings are
greater than .45. Omitted question items in the analysis may have either negative
connotations (COM 2), or stronger meaning than others (COM 3) in Japanese language and
social context.
Many of recent international study of PSM suggest that although PSM is a more or less
universal concept, the focus and empirical nature tends to differ due to a different or partial
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implementation of similar ideas (Vandeabee and Van de Walle 2008). Furthermore, exact
meaning and scaling of PSM dimensions are likely to differ across culture and languages.
There seems to have a number of inherent weakness of PSM measurement instrument for
international research use, yet the findings of this study implies that basically there is a
similar PSM structure and dimensions (three dimension model, not four) within Japanese
public employees. Nevertheless, same as other studies, the result also indicates certain
limitations in its nature. For instance, compassion dimension (COM) was not extracted from
the analysis. Although the compassion can be one of the foundations of the motivations of
public employees as it is the emotions to drive the altruistic action (affective bonds), the
translated question wording may have stronger or aggressive sense of the emotions in
Japanese social and language contexts. To test whether this is because of cultural difference
or not, it may need to have comparative study with neighbor countries sharing common
culture and social values.
Table 4: Rotated Factor Matrix
Confucian Values, Organizational Commitment, PMS and Performance in Japanese
Public Sector
There has been an accumulation of research on cultural impact on public administration in
Asia more recently (Berman 2013a 2013b; Moon and Im 2016; Park et al 2013). These try to
explain both commonality and variance among Asian countries, in addition to the
comparative study between Asia and the Western system (Chen and Hsieh 2017; Moon and
Im 2016; Petrovsky and Rits 2014; Van der Wal and Yang 2015). Unfortunately, less is known
1 2 3
PSM APP1 I am interested in helping to improve public service. 0.749
PSM APP 2 I like to discuss topics regarding public programs and policies with others. 0.698
PSM APP 3 I believe that public sector activities contribute to our general welfare in the
society.
0.569 0.357
PSM CPV 5 I believe that public employees must always be aware of the legitimacy of their
activities.
0.713
PSM CPV 4 To act ethically is essential for public servants. 0.306 0.672
PSM CPV 2 It is fundamental that public services respond to the needs of citizens. 0.477
PSM COM 1 I feel sympathetic to the plight of the underprivileged. 0.429 0.388
PSM SS 1 Making a difference to society means more to me than personal achievements. 0.739
PSM SS 3 I believe in putting civic duty before self. 0.545
PSM SS 2 I am willing to serve more if my work directly makes citizens happier. 0.364 0.481
PSM CPV 1 Serving the public interest is more important than helping a single individual. 0.367
Factor
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
*Rotation converged in 5 iterations
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about the impact of recent reforms and sustained features of Japanese bureaucracy, which is
the second biggest economy in East Asia, and known for its strong and rigid bureaucracy
(Kim 2017; Kim et al. 2012).
Confucian Tradition and Salient Features of Japan’s Bureaucracy
Confucian tradition recognizes the sense of authority formed by the dominant power,
represented in the hierarchy between ruler and people. As the stability of society is based on
unequal relationships between people such as ruler/subject, and older/younger, both formal
and informal structure of authority and power was founded in the political structure and the
social ethos. In other words, “power distance,” that is, the extent to which the less powerful
members of organizations and institutions accept and expect that power is distributed
unequally (Hofstede and Bond 1988). According to Nakane (1970), the structure of Japanese
society is based on the social relations with “the vertical principle.” This hierarchical and
stratified social order based on the cultural tradition is reinforced with the values of
traditional bureaucracy.
Within hierarchy, the leaders or rulers have a moral obligation to ensure peace,
prosperity, and justice so that the people will be happy and able to live full lives
(Frederickson 2002). The people also have a moral obligation to support their leaders so
long as those leaders are meeting their moral obligations to them. Unlike social “contract”
theory which is the basis of western democracy, reciprocity is central to Confucian ways of
governing and governance. High moral commitment is required for the elite rulers as the
social relation is based on the moral obligations. Their source of power is not constitutional
or legal foundation, nor charismatic character; it is high moral obligations of each
bureaucrat. It placed more importance and attention on the good officials, rather than laws
or institutions as primary instruments of governance.
This society’s expectation on high moral obligation toward government officials is well
demonstrated in the fact that government official is required to hold high disciplines even in
a private time. For instance, driving under influence (DUI) is regarded as the
dishonest/discreditable action of the public officials, and is subject to disciplinary action as
it is discreditable affairs for the government. In a normal labor relation, employer cannot
take punitive measure of the employee’s DUI, unless holding the driver’s license is
necessary condition for the employee’s job responsibility (i.e., professional taxi or bus
driver). The DUI by civil servant cases are often covered by the news media for accusing
purpose in Japan.
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If the moral obligation involves integral part of the desired capacity of the government
officials, how can they develop it? It is through the education. Influenced by the Confucian
thought, education is not regarded as to get the specific technical knowledge. The purpose of
the education is not about having, it is about being, to develop one’s humanity. With
understanding and knowledge, person will be moral and behave properly. In Britain, France
and Germany, there are traditions of selecting top bureaucrats from the best students in the
best universities, or from highly selective special colleges for prospective government
leaders still continues in practice. In Japanese context, the University of Tokyo, which was
established as imperial university to train the future bureaucrats in imperial ruling, had been
regarded as “best” school to produce “good official.”
Public policy process in Japan has long been characterized as bureaucracy dominated
decision making, mainly due to its historical evolution and mandarin administrative culture.
The term bureaucrats or literary Kanryo in Japanese means the national elite career civil
service who passed the competitive merit base class 1 civil service exam and does not mean
the local civil service, or support level national civil service (class 2 or 3). Since the
formation of modern nation state as a result of the Meiji Restoration in 1868, strongly
centralized first modern national government was established in order to integrate the past
feudal and decentralized system. Most government officials in Meiji era were recruited from
the former warrior or Samurai class which contributed to the persistence of the old social
status derived from the rigid feudalistic hierarchy (Silberman 1993). This resulted in a strong
sense of Kanson Minpi (public revered, private despised). However, Samurai class was the
only one intellectual class in the whole population in Japan during the Meiji Restoration
period. Samurai class was originally formed as a warrior for tycoon and local lords. Before
Meiji period, there was a long stretching peace reign (Nakamura and Kikuchi 2011). After
Tokugawa tycoon integrated Japanese area, there was a long stretching peace for around 250
years. Under this peace reign, Samurai class, basically trained as warrior, became some kinds
of “government officials” and acknowledged the capacity to control and manage each feudal
state studying through Confucian influenced thoughts.
In 1889, first modern constitution (Meiji Imperial Constitution) was promulgated and the
first modern civil service system and elected legislative branch (Imperial House) was adopted
as an attempt to initiate a modernized government. Nonetheless, common objective among
Meiji leaders were to extend and perpetuate the imperial ruling. In doing so, the power of the
legislative branch was limited and the substantial policy making power was vested in the
hand of national government officials under the name of “Agent of Emperor.” National
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government organization and its staff were intended to strengthen the imperial foundation and
expand the power of sovereign. Under these settings, policy making process was mostly
dominated by the elite national officials (Nakamura 2005; Nakamura and Kikuchi 2011; Tsuji
1984).
The first modern legislative branch (Imperial House) adopted the bicameral system
consisted of elected House of Representative and House of Peers. The branch had powers to
pass the budget. However, one article of the imperial constitution prescribed that in the case
that the legislative branch voted down the budget plan initiated by the cabinet, the prior
year’s budget and appropriate plan were automatically ensured. The lower house of the
legislative branch was elective by the franchised men. Despite the partially democratic will
was reflected in the house, the power and the decision of the legislative branch was ignored.
In the same token, the supreme command power of the Japanese old army was vested in the
emperor, not in the hand of prime minister nor the parliament members.
After defeated in the World War II with the unconditional surrender, Japan was occupied
by the allied forces under the direction of General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme
Commander for the allied forces. The allied forces tried to demilitarize, democratize and
liberalize the Japanese public policy process. Japan's imperial army and navy ministries were
abolished, munitions and military equipment were destroyed, and war industries were
converted to civilian uses. Most of the members of imperial parliament and major politicians
who served as the minister during the wartime were purged. The allied forces employed the
indirect ruling, rather than direct ruling by themselves. To fully liberalize Japanese old regime,
the allied forces did not purge the bureaucracy so as they used the national bureaucracy as
their agent of the reform process.
Figure1: Dynamics of Policy Making Power Balance Before and After the World War II
The fact that among the influential policy making groups in the old regime, only the
bureaucracy was “survived” from the purge by the allied forces demonstrates that how much
the Japanese policy making process dragged the old and traditional regime (Tsuji 1984).
Although Japanese postwar new constitution prescribed that “All public officials are servants
Parliament Bureaucrats
Military
Parliament Bureaucrats
MilitaryPurged
Dissolved
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of the whole community and not of any group thereof.” in Article 15, with its substantial
policy making capacities, its democratization and liberalization were not fully preceded. In
general, the bureaucracy kept the influential powers in national policy making process in the
postwar era. During the rapid economic growth era, especially the MITI (Ministry of
International Trade and Industry) held tremendous sway controlling over the business
community with the industry policies (Johnson 1982). Not only in the policy making process,
the influence of bureaucracy exercised in administrative implementation by issuing the
“administrative guidance”, which was out of legislative control from the parliament.
In addition to the bureaucratic control in the implementation, the bureaucracy in fact
writes the legislative bill on behalf of the cabinet. As the drafting the legislative bill requires
special legal knowledge and skills, the cabinet initiated policies are transformed and drafted
by the bureaucracy, which leave bureaucracy room for the manipulation. The Cabinet
Legislative Bureau, which directly assists the Cabinet on legislative matters and examines the
legislative bills, and other government orders also have influential powers in policy making
and it contributes that the policy making process is limited to the inner community. As a
result, most of the number of the proposed legislative bill to the floor is cabinet initiated bill
and in fact the legislation proposal process is virtually dominated by the bureaucracy and
hence the policy and legislative process is dominated by the bureaucracy.
Administrative Culture, Organizational Commitment and Public Sector Motivation
As has been discussed in previous section, influence of Confucian values in Japanese public
administration is profound. Whether Japanese public employees’ Confucian values and
organizational commitment affect their PSM is an interesting empirical question. To
operationalize the administrative values, four question items were generated to measure
different types of administrative culture influenced by Confucian values. First two items are
on seniority and submission to the authority, as the Confucian sees the society as hierarchy
structure (AC 1: When people are in dispute, they should ask the most senior person to decide
who is right, AC2: Those who are respected by parents should also be respected by their
children.). Third question is on the morality of public employees (AC 3: Keeping high moral
is more important as civil servant than acquiring professional knowledge and skill). Social
relation is based on the moral obligations in Confucian thought, and the source of power of
elite civil servant is not constitutional or legal foundation, nor charismatic character; it is high
moral obligations of each bureaucrat. Last question item is on the legalism or Rechtsstaat
concept (AC 4: Even if it is a good thing, our activity should be within the range of authority
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given by the politics and citizens), as the modern public administration in Japan is under
influences of both Confucian values and continental law systems (Silberman 1993).
Other variables that would affect the PSM of public employees are the organizational
commitment of each employee (Camilleri and Van der Heijden 2007; Moynihan and Pandey
2007). While Confucian value and administrative culture are learned through socialization
both prior and posterior to entering the public sector, and thus can be considered as
organizational antecedent factor of PSM, organizational commitment is considered to be a
bond of the individual to the working organization (Camilleri and Van der Heijden 2007). In
this analysis, three question items to identify different types of organizational commitment
were generated, namely; affective, normative and continuance. The first two question items
are on the affective commitment (OC1; I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career
with this organization; OC 2: This organization has a great deal of personal meaning for me).
Third question item is on the continuance (OC3: Staying with my organization is a matter of
necessity rather than desire), and last question item is on the normative commitment (OC4: I
would feel guilty if I left my organization now).
Basic research question to explore is to examine the impacts of traditional administrative
culture and organizational commitment on the public sector motivations in Japanese public
sector. So the primary hypotheses in this research are; H1: administrative culture influenced
by Confucian value as organizational antecedent has a direct and positive relationship with
public service motivation, H2: organizational commitment as individual antecedent has a
direct and positive relationship with public service motivation. Multiple regression analysis
was employed to test the effects of these organizational and individual factors on public
service motivations. In the independent variables, age and family status are excluded, as it
had high VIF (Variance Inflation Factor), and thus needed to avoid the multicollinearity
effects. Dependent variables are identified three dimensions PSM (APP, CPV, and SS) in the
factor analysis identified in Table 4.
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Table 5: Results of Regression Analysis
PSM APP PSM APP PSM APP PSM CPV PSM CPV PSM CPV PSM SS PSM SS PSM SS
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta
SeniorityAC 1 When people are in dispute, they should ask the most
senior person to decide who is right.0.095 0.035 -0.101 -0.101 0.121* 0.098
SeniorityAC 2 Those who are respected by parents should also be
respected by their children.0.121 0.084 0.142* 0.154** 0.281*** 0.249***
MoralAC 3 Keeping high moral is more important as civil servant than
acquiring professional knowledge and skill.0.110 0.017 0.302*** 0.301*** 0.218*** 0.153**
LegalismAC 4 Even if it is a good thing, our activity should be within the
range of authority given by the politics and citizens.0.085 0.025 0.228*** 0.224*** -0.133* -0.153**
OC 1 I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career with
this organization.0.046 0.040 0.105 0.042 0.168* 0.131*
OC 2 This organization has a great deal of personal meaning for
me.0.439*** 0.416*** 0.175* 0.103 0.063 0.039
OC 3 Staying with my organization is a matter of necessity
rather than desire-0.070 -0.084 0.004 -0.015 -0.061 -0.069
OC 4 I would feel guilty if I left my organization now. 0.052 0.028 -0.053 -0.142* 0.202** 0.132*
Gender (Male=1) -0.020 -0.009 0.000 0.056 0.042 0.073 0.173** 0.138* 0.158
Marital Status (Married =1) 0.036 -0.006 -0.007 -0.012 -0.018 -0.023 -0.019 -0.019 -0.042
National Civil Servant Dummy -0.001 0.022 0.013 0.068 0.091 0.058 -0.034 -0.022 -0.015
Year of Service (5 scale) -0.038 -0.017 -0.025 -0.096 -0.058 -0.101 0.14* 0.173** 0.152**
Size of Organization (5 scale) 0.066 0.048 0.041 -0.054 -0.048 -0.055 -0.004 -0.026 -0.032
Job Characteristics: Certain discretion is given to perform well 0.22*** 0.127* 0.121* 0.158** 0.145* 0.147** -0.028 -0.066 -0.080
Number of Observation 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310
Adjusted R2 0.114 0.282 0.283 0.234 0.065 0.242 0.22 0.163 0.261
F(p-value) 4.971(0.000) 13.133(0.000) 9.721(0.000) 10.426(0.000) 3.147(0.001) 8.039(0.000) 9.698(0.000) 7.009(0.000) 8.788(0.000)
Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Control Variable
Organizational
Commitment
- 15 -
Table 5 reports the summary of regression results. To examine the impact of
administrative culture and organizational commitment respectively, analysis is divided into
three different models (AC for model 1, OC for model 2, and AC and OC for model 3). The
result basically supports the general idea about preserved traditional non-western culture
heavily influenced by Confucian value in the public administration in Asia (Chen and Hsieh
2017; Moon and Im 2016; Van der Wal and Yang 2015). Nonetheless, it did not have
statistically significant impact on APP, which is relatively rational based PSM. For other
types of PSM (CPV and SS), seniority (AC2), moral (AC3), and legalism (AC 4) can be good
predictors of PSM. For organizational commitment, affective commitment (OC2) had a
profound impact on APP, and continuous commitment (OC4) led to self-sacrifice (SS) type of
PSM. Reflecting different dimensions of administrative culture and the organizational
commitment, there are more diversified impacts on different types of PSM identified among
Japanese public officials. Other individual attributions such as year of service, size of
organization, gender, and nature of public employees (whether national civil servant or local
one) did not have significant impact on respective PSM in general. Yet, job characteristics
(discretion) had positive impact both to PSM APP and CPV, which is natural consequence.
More interestingly, longer year of services and men have more positive impact on PSM SS,
which could be interpreted as self-sacrifice based motivation is “constructed” through year of
services than traits in nature. As this is the initial analysis, it needs to have a closer look for
detailed analysis later.
Administrative Culture, Organizational Commitment, Public Sector Motivation and
Performance in Japanese Public Sector
Public Service motivation can be understood as one particular type of intrinsic motivation as
people with high PSM enjoy the activity of doing good for others and they focus on the
meaning, significance, and purpose of given task. It is thus positive effect of PSM on
performance is expected (Petrovsky and Rits 2014). Actually, research findings suggest that
PSM is positively related to performance regardless of the way performance is measured
(Camilleri and Van der Heijden 2007). However, most of the existing empirical research on
PSM and performance rely on self-reported data from the same respondents for both PSM
and performance. It would have a potential common-method bias. Nonetheless, formal
performance measurement system is subjective measures that are strongly influenced by
interpersonal affect with supervisors and coworkers. Within these confines, this study tries to
capture different type of performance from the respondents. To use the perceptual measures
- 16 -
of performance as dependent variables, it is more appropriate and less biased as it is focused
and specific, rather than more general performance questions.
In order to capture multi-dimensional measure of government performance, four
different types of performance question items were generated. First one is on efficiency
(Performance 1: My organization uses the limited resources efficiently as much as possible),
and second one is on effectiveness (Performance 2: My organization uses the limited
resources effectively as much as possible). Another three are on procedural performance such
as fairness (Performance 3: My organization treats citizens fairly as much as possible),
participation (Performance 4: My organization solicits citizens voices and participations as
much as possible), and transparency (Performance 5: My organization discloses information
to citizens as much as possible). Among these five categories of performance, the highest
score is on fairness (3.84), while participation marks the lowest (3.29). Primary objective is to
examine the structure and the impacts of PSM on government performance. So the hypothesis
is generated as follows; H3: public service motivation has a direct and positive relationship
with government performance.
Structural equation modeling (SEM) was employed to test these effects. SEM allows
separate relations for each of a set of dependent variables and provides the suitable and most
efficient estimation for a series of separate multiple regression equations estimated
simultaneously. Unlike multivariate analysis of variance which allows only a single relation
between dependent variable and independent variables, SEM allows multiple relations
between the dependent and independent variables. H1 to H3 are tested in a holistic manner. In
the analysis, various SEM revisions are tested in the light of the cross-validation process.
After removing linkages that were not within the acceptable significance level, the
revised model is shown in Figure 2 with the standardized path coefficients. All the
coefficients achieve statistical significance with p-values less than .001. The chi-square
goodness-of-fit index (p.>.000) indicates that the revised model is rejected. However, because
of relatively large amount of sample size and RMSEA (Root Mean Square Error of
Approximation) score (.073), GFI (Goodness-of-Fit) score (.916), AGFI (Adjusted
Goodness-of-Fit) score (.880), and CFI (Comparative Fitness Index) score (.907), the revised
model is accepted with sufficient support.
- 17 -
Figure2: Antecedents and Consequences to Public Service Motivation in
Japanese Public Sector
Note 1: All the coefficients achieve statistical significance with p-values less than .001.
Note 2: GFI=.916, AGFI=.880, CFI=.907, RMSEA=.073
Figure 2 reports the summary of SEM analysis results. About the possible impacts of
traditional administrative culture and organizational commitment as antecedents to PSM,
administrative culture has a significantly positive relation with PSM. In contrast,
organizational commitment did not have significant direct relation with PSM. Rather,
organizational commitment is proved to be an antecedent to the administrative culture, and
thus indirect relation with PSM. In regards to the relation with PSM and performance (H3), it
has significantly positive relation among them and proved that performance is a consequence
of PSM. Both administrative culture and organizational commitment did not have direct
relation with the performance. Existing empirical studies show a positive relation between
Administrative Culture
Public Service Motivation
Organizational Commitment
Performance
AC2: Seniority
Ac4: Legalism
AC3: Moral
PSM:APP
PSM: SS
PSM: CPV
OC 1: Affective
OC3: Normative
OC2: Affective
Efficiency
Fairness
Effectiveness
Participation
Transparency
.683
.798
.627
.748
.529
.506
.376
.993
.804
.553
.500
.437
.608
.797
.745
.690
.731
- 18 -
PSM and organizational commitment, especially normative and affective ones (Camilleri and
Van der Heijden 2007). Result of this analysis also suggests that both normative and affective
commitments are important factors, yet it has indirect positive relation with PSM. The SEM
result suggests that administrative culture has important and positive impact on PSM, yet the
organizational culture also has important positive impact on PSM. There were few impacts of
organizational difference (national civil servant or local civil servant) and job discretion on
PSM, administrative culture, and organizational commitment. It did not have either revere
causal relation or correlation between organizational commitment and administrative culture
as well.
It also suggests that both organizational (administrative culture) and individual
(organizational commitment) factors are important to improve the PSM. Our research
findings shows that traditional administrative culture, which was once characterized as “rigid”
bureaucracy (Gibney 1998; Silberman 1993), is important factor of PSM in Japanese context.
This organizational culture is reinforced and strengthened by the organizational commitment.
It implies that “building resilience within rigidity” would be most effective and possible
strategy to improve PSM and thus to improve performance of Japanese public sector. This
study also suggest Japanese public sector organizations should review their human resource
policies and strive for efforts aimed at building a proper type and level of organizational
commitment, because the organizational commitment appears to be an important focal link
with both PSM and performance.
As this is an initial analysis, it needs certain caution and consideration in understanding
the result. Although both organizational commitment and administrative culture are viewed as
two important factors of PSM and performance, it should be understood to take into account
the different dimension and component of each concept. Also, as the primary objective of the
analysis was to identify the relationship of administrative culture, organizational commitment,
and performance with PSM as antecedents and consequences, there are potential omitted
contextual variables that could not be measured in this study.
Concluding Remarks
This paper so far tries to identify the structure and meaning of PSM in Japanese public
employees, to test whether the four dimension model of PSM is relevant to Japanese context
(Kim et al 2012). It also tries to investigate the influence of traditional administrative culture,
which is heavily influenced by Confucian tradition, and organizational commitment on the
- 19 -
motivations among public employees and government performance. Given the fact that less is
empirically known about PSM in Japanese public sector, though this is a preliminary report, it
presents important initial empirical findings about the structure and meaning of PSM, and its
relation with administrative culture, organizational commitments, and performance in
Japanese context.
Testing the four dimension model of PSM (APP, CPV, SS and COM), this research
found that three dimension (APP, CPV, and SS) fit in Japanese public employee, which
basically proves that measurement model of PSM evolved in the international research has a
certain explanatory power across regions, culture and languages. This research also tried to
identify the impacts of administrative culture and organizational commitment on PSM and
performance. The results of SEM analysis also suggest that, although lots of reform measures
have taken place in Japanese civil service systems, traditional administrative cultures
influenced by Confucian value are still pervasive among Japanese public employee, and
moreover organizational commitment is important antecedent to the PSM and performance
(Jun and Muto 1995; Silberman 1993).
This is a report of preliminary analysis, and thus more detailed analysis should be
conducted later. At the same time, to have comparability with other recent studies on PSM
and Confucian value in Asian region, same method and model should be employed,
especially among East Asian systems that have similar tradition (Kim 2017). It will enable us
to have a closer look of PSM, and commonality and variance in the region. As is true of any
study, this research has a number of limitations. Although question items were carefully
developed to balance the comparability among regions and fitting to Japanese language and
social context, there needs certain consideration in understanding this study. Also, the
findings and conclusions are based on PSM among limited samples and might be different
when surveying to different agencies. Thus, the potential sampling bias could be unavoidable,
and we need to be cautious to over generalize the findings. It also means that question items
to measure PSM with different samples in various areas of government should be developed
to have more generality of the study.
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[Appendix: Correlation Matrix between Variables]
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38
1. Gender (Male=1 1
2. Age .373** 1
3. Marital Status (Married=1) .258** .266** 1
4. Family Status (Having Child=1) .189**
.368**.707
** 1
5 Household Income 9 Scale 0.049 .278** .173** .143* 1
6. National Civil Servant Dummy .151** 0.007 0.016 -0.041 0.090 1
7. Local Civil Servant Dummy -.151** -0.007 -0.016 0.041 -0.090 -1.000
** 1
8．Year of Service .318**
.537**.194
**.206
**.305
** 0.101 -0.101 1
9. Size of Organization 5 Scale 0.084 -0.036 0.067 0.003 0.059 .264** -.264** .115* 1
10 Job Discretion 0.098 0.082 .145*.126
*.282
** 0.000 0.000 .140* -0.047 1
11. Performance Efficiency 0.008 0.036 0.025 0.047 0.038 0.000 0.000 0.049 0.057 .259** 1
12. Performance Effectiveness -0.008 .116* .118* .117* .172** 0.007 -0.007 .172** 0.109 .237** .448** 1
13. Performance Equity 0.070 0.091 0.057 .119* 0.117 0.086 -0.086 .141* 0.085 .205** .468** .597** 1
14 Performance Participation -0.017 0.109 0.103 .154** .172** -0.031 0.031 .157** 0.024 .227** .429** .616** .443** 1
15 Performance Transparency 0.038 0.073 0.097 0.105 .142* -0.018 0.018 0.103 0.088 .184** .436** .557** .566** .521** 1
16 PSM APP1 0.071 .155** 0.075 .193** 0.081 0.000 0.000 0.074 0.063 .204** .334** .366** .383** .361** .450** 1
17 PSM APP2 0.006 0.016 .118*.115
* 0.056 0.073 -0.073 0.030 0.108 .279**.425
**.335
**.329
**.314
**.383
**.597
** 1
18 PSM APP3 0.012 0.023 0.007 0.092 0.046 0.077 -0.077 0.011 0.042 .219** .264** .343** .355** .268** .286** .521** .492** 1
19 PSM CPV1 .161** .127* 0.006 0.091 .121* 0.033 -0.033 .130* -0.022 .137* .153** .272** .282** .307** .191** .235** .122* .186** 1
20 PSM CPV2 0.070 0.062 .123*.157
** 0.014 0.084 -0.084 0.024 0.071 0.090 .217**.243
**.284
**.150
**.257
**.226
**.221
**.263
**.160
** 1
21 PSM CPV3 0.012 .112* 0.055 0.052 -0.016 -0.019 0.019 0.007 0.058 -0.008 .116* .172** 0.091 0.075 .214** .181** .125* 0.065 .194** .368** 1
22 PSM CPV4 0.075 0.110 0.095 0.066 0.086 0.078 -0.078 0.019 -0.005 .219**.406
**.444
**.519
**.299
**.431
**.407
**.380
**.460
**.268
**.390
**.165
** 1
23 PSM CPV5 0.059 .113* -0.024 -0.014 0.065 0.067 -0.067 0.013 0.012 .185** .288** .285** .359** .149** .309** .299** .286** .369** .280** .375** .212** .576** 1
24 PSM COM1 0.055 .227**
.115*.152
** -0.023 -0.054 0.054 0.066 -0.076 .134*.286
**.392
**.322
**.256
**.313
**.393
**.316
**.329
**.213
**.347
**.308
**.451
**.420
** 1
25 PSM COM2 .171** -0.024 0.018 0.029 0.005 0.099 -0.099 0.097 0.036 0.092 0.004 0.017 0.089 0.050 0.023 0.003 0.027 0.046 .235** -0.021 -0.030 0.040 0.050 -0.056 1
26 PSM COM3 0.102 .188** 0.030 0.072 0.102 0.008 -0.008 0.084 0.089 0.061 .199** .297** .231** .190** .288** .345** .340** .315** 0.110 .218** .179** .391** .296** .433** 0.088 1
27 PSM SS1 .179**
.224** 0.062 0.077 0.005 0.004 -0.004 .159
** 0.041 0.026 .204**.205
**.235
**.185
**.184
**.332
**.235
**.200
**.328
**.137
*.203
**.261
**.194
**.358
** 0.054 .248** 1
28 PSM SS2 0.101 .239** 0.085 .156** 0.031 0.000 0.000 .151** 0.021 .136* .225** .350** .330** .273** .363** .468** .332** .406** .173** .374** .292** .386** .315** .463** -0.008 .360** .416** 1
29 PSM SS3 .158** .226** .138* .147** 0.062 0.087 -0.087 .206** .139* .162** .255** .272** .283** .213** .286** .272** .206** .254** .278** .119* 0.097 .314** .259** .291** 0.049 .313** .429** .406** 1
30 PSM SS4 .142*.270
**.140
* 0.108 0.015 -0.027 0.027 0.110 0.025 -0.007 0.047 .165**.147
** 0.085 .209**
.294**
.162** 0.086 .178
** 0.048 .350** 0.097 0.068 .319
** 0.011 .149**
.439**.401
**.284
** 1
31 AC 1 Seniority -0.014 -0.053 0.034 0.011 -0.090 0.047 -0.047 0.007 0.108 0.033 .113*.138
*.141
*.115
*.143
*.180
**.160
**.113
*.147
**.133
*.195
** 0.104 0.004 0.057 .113* 0.101 .144
*.149
**.115
*.286
** 1
32 AC 2 Seniority 0.005 0.055 0.070 0.110 -0.025 0.038 -0.038 0.103 0.052 .171** .222** .357** .287** .267** .296** .297** .230** .261** .297** .215** .242** .275** .294** .356** .216** .213** .319** .282** .232** .223** .228** 1
33 AC 3 Moral 0.016 .122* 0.109 .139* 0.051 -0.013 0.013 0.071 0.042 0.045 .236** .282** .293** .199** .242** .253** .145* .254** .222** .321** .137* .400** .274** .334** 0.107 .282** .213** .361** .261** 0.103 0.085 .305** 1
34 AC4 Legalism -0.009 -0.038 -0.020 -0.023 -0.034 .146*-.146
* 0.060 0.101 0.055 .152**.210
**.271
**.191
**.218
**.156
**.191
**.218
**.121
*.231
** -0.017 .331**
.192** 0.076 0.052 .117
* -0.010 .112*
.129* -0.028 .312
**.231
**.193
** 1
35 OC 1 Affective .113* 0.109 .191** .204** 0.109 0.006 -0.006 0.090 0.104 .227** .299** .267** .279** .275** .212** .364** .378** .167** .227** .147** .187** .301** .227** .238** -0.006 .157** .275** .249** .278** .131* .134* .234** .289** .161** 1
36 OC2 Affective -0.014 0.048 .129* .118* 0.071 0.000 0.000 0.044 0.050 .245** .339** .366** .367** .311** .371** .492** .532** .326** .128* .238** .155** .387** .209** .256** 0.054 .231** .237** .336** .265** .242** .238** .247** .263** .256** .538** 1
37 OC 3 Continuance 0.050 0.018 -0.012 0.054 -.193** -0.018 0.018 0.037 -0.102 -0.011 0.030 -0.052 0.044 0.071 -0.020 -0.066 -0.096 -0.062 0.067 0.060 0.061 -0.065 -0.012 -0.008 0.070 -0.054 -0.029 -.114* -0.006 -0.008 0.095 0.095 -0.017 0.108 0.070 -0.074 1
38 OC 4 Normative 0.089 -0.021 0.092 0.087 -0.056 -0.057 0.057 0.035 0.062 .177**.219
**.235
**.223
**.175
**.179
**.320
**.316
**.185
**.157
** 0.096 .129*.188
**.148
**.183
** -0.006 .160**
.279**.293
**.275
**.208
**.198
**.287
**.281
**.194
**.457
**.492
** 0.088 1