brink, moral conflict and its structure

8/12/2019 Brink, Moral Conflict and Its Structure

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Philosophical Review

Moral Conflict and Its StructureAuthor(s): David O. BrinkReviewed work(s):Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 103, No. 2 (Apr., 1994), pp. 215-247Published by: Duke University Presson behalf of Philosophical ReviewStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2185737.

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ThePhilosophical eview, ol. 103, No. 2 (April 1994)

Moral Conflict and Its StructureDavid 0. Brink

It s commonlyhought hat heremight e conflictsfobligationsor moral dilemmas nd thattheir xistencewould have seriousimplicationsormoraltheory,metaethics,r deontic ogic.Somealleged mplicationsfmoraldilemmas ependupon their requen-cy. n one suchview,hefact hatmoraldilemmas re so commonplaces severe onstraintsn the prospects ora systematic oraltheory nd on thepossibilityfmoralknowledge.' ut a morecommon iew s that omethingbout the structuref a moraldi-lemmagenerates roublesomer paradoxical mplications.n thisview,he mportantuestions whether here reorcouldbe anymoraldilemmas; heir requencys of ittle r, t most, econdaryimportance.ndeed, fwe understandmoraldilemmas' nivocallyinboth ontexts,hen hequestion ftheir xistencemust epriorto thequestion ftheir requency.n any ase, shallfocus n thissecond, tructuralssue.Beforewe debatewhether here re moraldilemmas, e needto knowwhat ortofconflicts necessaryo producetrouble rparadox n ethical heory.n fact,twillbe useful o reserve heexpressionmoraldilemma' s a term fart hat eferso conflictswith uchconsequences.When thenature f theseconflictsndtheir onsequences re clear,we can ask whethert is reasonableto supposethat here remoraldilemmas.1. PrimaFacie andAll-Things-ConsideredbligationsA moraldilemma nvolves omekindof conflict fobligationsrduties. I shall not distinguishetweenobligations nd duties.Moreover, shall assumethatboth duties nd obligationsre as-cribed sing hemoral ought. ) f an agent s facedwith moral

'See, for example, Thomas Nagel, The Fragmentation f Value re-printed in his. Mortal QuestionsNew York: Cambridge University ress,1979) and Charles Taylor, The Diversity f Goods, in UtilitarianismndBeyond,d. A. Sen and B. Williams New York:Cambridge University ress,1982).

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DAVID 0. BRINKdilemma,he has an obligation to do A and an obligation to do B,but can't do both. This much is clear.2But we need to know moreabout the structure f these obligations. t is common and, I be-lieve, importantto distinguishbetween primafacie and all-things-consideredbligationsor duties. For, shall argue, it is a conflict fall-things-considered,nd not merelyprima facie, duties that s re-quired to generatea moral conflict hatwould have serious impli-cations for ethical theory.I propose tounderstandthedistinction etween prima facie andall-things-consideredbligations n the way that thinkW. D. Rossunderstood his distinction etween prima facie and sans phrase b-ligations.3A primafacie obligationto do x means thatthere is amoral reason to do x or thatx possesses a right-makingharacter-istic. But prima facie obligations can be, and often are, defeatedby other,weightier bligations, ndividually r in concert.A primafacie obligationto do x that s superior to all others constitutes nall-things-consideredbligation to do x. An all-things-consideredmoral obligationto do x means that on balance, or in view of allmorallyrelevantfactors,x is what one ought to do or thatx issupported bythe strongestmoral reasons.Ifprimafacieobligationscorrespondto thepresence ofmorallyrelevantfactorsor right-makingharacteristics,nd an all-things-considered obligation is an undefeated prima facie obligation,then a naturalwayto understand a primafacie obligationto do xis as the claim that ceterisparibus,x is all-things-consideredblig-atory.The fact that x is prima facie obligatoryresultsfrom x'spossessingsome morally elevant actorF and can be derivedfromthe fact thatx is F, togetherwith the generalizationthat F-nessmakes actions prima facie obligatory.This generalizationshould

2Notice three thingsabout my discussion.First, am discussing moralconflicts.There are comparable issues involving conflictingnonmoraloughts and conflicts etween moral and nonmoral oughts,but these willnot be my focus. Second, my focus s on conflicts er accidens, atherthanconflicts erse.Most of my conclusions are easily carried over to conflictsper se. Third,I shall not distinguish etween conflictswhose existence sthe agent's own fault secundum uid) and those that are not (simpliciter).These two orts f conflicts re interestinglyifferent. ut these differencesseem irrelevant o mymain claims.3See W. D. Ross,TheRightnd theGood Oxford: OxfordUniversity ress,Clarendon Press, 1930), 1-20, 28-29, and Foundations f Ethics Oxford:Oxford University ress, Clarendon Press, 1939), 84-86.

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MORAL CONFLICT AND ITS STRUCTUREitself e understood as the claim that ceterisparibus,F-nessmakesactions all-things-consideredbligatory.All else will be equal onlyif the moral factorF is undefeated.will be undefeated if

(a) thereare no competingmoral factors,(b) there are competingfactors hatcancel each other out, or(c) competing factorsnot canceled out do not override F'ssupport or .4On this account,we treatprimafacie obligationsas moral factorsor forces that nteract o as to determineall-things-consideredb-ligations. To determine all-things-consideredbligationswe mustdo moral actor ddition. t is not essential to the factor additionmodel thatwe alwaysbe able to assign precise numericalvalues tothe various moral forcespresent n a situation.What is importantis that the moral status of an act sans phraseresultsfromaddingthemoral forces,positive nd negative, ontributedbythe variousmorallyrelevantfactors; he act withthe highestmoral total s all-things-considered bligatory.5 his, I believe, is a fairly raditionalaccount of prima facie and all-things-consideredbligationsthatwould have appealed to Ross.

4Myviews about the role of ceteris paribus clauses in laws and gener-alizationshavebeen heavily nfluencedbyPaul Pietroski,MeaningNaturally:A PartialDefensefCovariationemanticsPh.D. diss.,MIT, 1990), esp. chaps.4-5. Also see Paul Pietroski, PrimaFacie Obligations,CeterisParibus Lawsin Moral Theory, Ethics 03 (1993): 489-515.5The factor ddition model makes the additive ssumptionhatthe moralstatus f an act sansphrase esults rom dding the moral forces ontributedby the variousmorally elevant actors. his may eem to involve he atomistassumptionhat the value or force ofan individualfactor s independent ofthe other factors n the situation.And the atomistassumption may besuspect. Perhapscertainfactors for example, pleasure) have positivemor-al forceonlywhen combined with otherfactors forexample,when theyare innocent pleasures). If so, doubts about the atomistassumptionmaylead us to questionthe additive ssumption nd the factor ddition model.See Shelly Kagan, The AdditiveFallacy, Ethics 9 (1988): 5-31. But theadditive ssumptiondoes notrequirethe atomist ssumption;we can rejectthe atomist ssumptionthat the moral forceof a factor s independentofall otherfactors nd allow some moral factors o be specified relationallywithoutgivingup the additiveassumptionthatmoral status resultsfromadding the values or forcesof various moral factors. Of course,we cannotspecifymoralfactorsn a maximallyelationalway fwe are to preservethedistinction,ssentialto thefactor dditionmodel,betweenprimafacie andall-things-considereduties or claims.)

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DAVID 0. BRINKSome writers hink hat prima facie obligationsare not genuineobligations and that all genuine obligations are all-things-consid-ered obligations.6 his tendencymaybe reinforced y the factthatthe standard principlesofdeontic logic using the operator for ob-ligation- 'O'-signify an all-things-considered bligation. Thisclaim is harmless f it simply xpresses our intention to call onlyall-things-consideredmoral requirements duties or obliga-tions and to treat primafacieobligation'as a technical term.ButI thinkthatmore than this s usually ntended by those who deny

thatprimafacie obligationsare genuine obligations, nd theirde-nial restson a misunderstanding fprimafacie obligations that tis important o avoid.These writers ometimes say that prima facie obligations aremerely apparent bligations such that theyhave no moral force ifoverridden.7 ut thisdoes not fit ur understanding fprimafacieobligationsorRoss's. As Rosspoints out, we shouldnotunderstandprima facie obligations as the epistemiclaim that certain thingsappear to be obligatory hatmaynot prove to be.8 This readingdoes not implythat there is anymoral reason supportingx cor-responding to the prima facie obligation to do x. Rather,primafacie obligationsshould be given a metaphysicaleading thatrec-ognizes prima facie obligationsas moral forcesthat are not can-celed bythe existenceof other moral forceseven ifthe latterover-ride or defeatthe former.9Now Ross does saythatprimafacie duties are conditional duties6Foot recognizes genuine obligationsthat may be overridden (type-iobligations) and distinguishes hem from the obligation associated withwhat there is the most moral reason to do (type-2obligations), and sorecognizes omething ike thedistinction hat intendbetweenprimafacieand all-things-consideredbligations.But she seems to treat prima facieobligationsepistemically r statisticallysee textbelow) and so does notwant to equate the type-1/type-2istinction ith he prima facie/all-things-

considered distinction. ee Philippa Foot, Moral Realism and Moral Di-lemma, reprinted n Moral Dilemmas,d. C. Gowans (New York:OxfordUniversityress, 1987), 256-57. Because I reject these readingsof primafacie obligations, ur distinctionsre similar.7See Bernard Williams, Ethical Consistency, eprinted n Moral Di-lemmas, ed. Gowans, 125, 126; Bas van Fraassen, Values and theHeart'sCommand, ibid., 141, 142; Ruth Barcan Marcus, Moral Dilemmas andConsistency, bid., 191; Foot, Moral Realismand Moral Dilemma, 257.8TheRight nd theGood, 0.90n the metaphysical eading,a primafacie obligation expressesa protantomoral obligation or moral reason.

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MORAL CONFLICT AND ITS STRUCTUREand not duties proper.'0 This, I believe, reflects nly his decisionto reserve the terms duty' and 'obligation' for all-things-consid-ered moral claims. fwe concede this to him, then we can explainmost of his claims about prima facie obligations on our model.Prima facie obligations re conditionalall-things-considered)utiesin the sense that fall else is equal, then there s not only a primafacieobligation to do x but also a genuine or all-things-consideredobligation.SometimesRoss says hatprima facie obligationsrefer o featuresof an act that tend o make acts of that type all-things-considered)obligatory. This claim admitsof a purely tatisticaleading: thoughtheremaybe nothing bout thistoken act thatmakes itobligatory,it belongs to a typeor class of acts many of whose tokens are (all-things-considered) bligatory.'2 utwe can and should avoid thispurely tatistical eading of Ross's tendency laims.Suppose we have a prima facie obligation to do anything hat sF and thatwe analyzethis s thegeneralization hatceterisparibus,F-nessmakes actionsall-things-consideredbligatory. uppose alsothat all else is usually,but not always, qual. If so, the statisticalclaim is true. But it says nothing about F's contributionto therightness f right cts that are F or about F's role in situations nwhich otherthings re not equal. ButF does have a role and exertsa moral force n every ituation n which it is present. n thisway,the metaphysical eading of prima facie obligations explainswhythe statistical laim is true when it is true and impliesreasonableclaims that the statistical laim does not; so the statistical laimcannot exhaust our account of primafacie obligations.Consider thisparallel.We might nalyzethe claim thatBonny sa valuable playeras the claim that she tends to help her teamwingames. But this should not be analyzed as the purelystatisticalclaim that when she playsher team usuallywins. This does notconveythe idea that she helps produce heir victoriesor the ideathat she is a positiveforce even in the games they ose. We mustunderstand her role as a positivefactorwhen she's on the field,whether heoutcome is a win or a loss.This ishowwe mustanalyze

1?TheRight nd theGood, 9.Ibid., 28-29.2Cf.Foot, Moral Realismand Moral Dilemma, 257.

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DAVID 0. BRINKthe tendencyfor her to win games if this claim is to be an analysisof her being a valuable player.If so, we must reject the purely tatistical eading. Indeed, Rosshimself xplains the tendency laims with an analogy between theway nwhich the interaction f prima facie obligationsdeterminesall-things-consideredightconduct and the way in which vectoraddition determines hetrajectories fphysical bjects nmotion.'3This is precisely he moral forces interpretation f prima facieobligations.'42. Soluble and Insoluble Conflicts nd RegretWhat does this account of prima facie and all-things-consideredobligationshave to do with moral dilemmas?If moral dilemmasare to be paradoxical things, hen it's arguable that the competingmoral claims involved must be equipollent-neither claim shouldbe stronger han the other.This is notjust the epistemicpoint thatthe competingmoral claims seem equally compelling; thiswouldgive us only an epistemic dilemma. Rather,genuine moral dilem-mas must nvolvemetaphysical quipollence; neither claim can beweightier han the other. f so, moral dilemmasmust nvolve nsol-ubleconflicts f prima facie obligations.For there seems nothingvery puzzling about the existence of conflicting rima facie obli-gationsone of which is stronger han the other.However,not everyonethinksthat moral dilemmasrequire in-soluble conflicts.Consider a soluble onflict.There are moral rea-

13The Right nd theGood,29. The analogy is especially strong fmoralfactor ddition ust is moral vector addition. And perhaps it is. However,one apparent disanalogy s that n vectoraddition the output s rarely hesame as any one of the inputs,whereas n moral factor ddition theoutputis usually always?)one of the inputs.We mightnotice that Ross also connects prima facie obligationswithceterisparibus moral claims; see TheRight nd theGood, 0.14Wemightalso notice that our factoraddition model of the relationbetween prima facieobligations nd all-things-consideredbligationsdoesnot imply consequentialismor utilitarianism. hough factor ddition re-quires thatwe add the moral forces,positive nd negative, ssociated withalternative ctions in order to determinewhich action available to theagent is supported by the strongestmoral force, this does not require as-suming thatthe strength f a moral forceis proportional to the amountofgood or value that n action would realize. Thus, Ross can help himselfto the factor dditionmodel, and he is not thereby closet utilitarian.

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MORAL CONFLICT AND ITS STRUCTUREsons to do A and there are moral reasons to do B, but one cannotdo both A and B. Moreover,we assume, though the reasons sup-portingA and those supportingB are both strong, here s in factmore reason to do A. Furthermore, o simplify,et's assume thatthe agent in question recognizesthe greater stringencyf A. Ourtraditionalmodel implies that soluble moral conflictshave a per-fectly traightforwardnalysis.What we have is one prima facieobligation being overriddenor defeatedby another; thisweightierprima facie obligation is the agent's all-things-consideredbliga-tion. But some friendsof dilemmas thinkthatthere is a genuinedilemma even in such a case providedthat the less weightymoralclaim grounds compunction or regret on the agent's part whenshe fails to act on it in order to fulfillher weightierobligation.They take the appropriatenessof attitudes uch as regretor com-punction towardsB to showthat the moral reasons supportingBdo not disappear ust because the reasons for B are defeated bythe reasons forA.15And this must be incompatiblewith the tra-ditional account, for such an account, as Williams claims,musteliminatefrom the scene the oughtthat s not acted upon andso removethe ground of anycompunctionor regret.'6Let us assume, for the sake of argument, hata kind of regrettowards the fact of an unperformedobligation is appropriate.'7

15See Williams, Ethical Consistency, 22-25, 134; van Fraassen, Val-ues and the Heart's Command, 147-48, 151; and Marcus, Moral Dilem-mas and Consistency, 93, 196-97.16'Ethical Consistency, 22-25.171s egret appropriate n soluble conflicts? irst,we must distinguishthe issue of whether t's appropriate to harbor r express egretfromtheissue of whether he thing n question is an appropriatebject f regret. t isonly the latter ssue that s in question. Second, whether ompunction orregret s appropriatedepends, I think, n the object f such attitudes.Wemightdistinguish ome apparently ifferentbjectsof regret.Regretmightfocus on (i) the circumstances hatmake some sort of conflict now) un-avoidable, (ii) the consequences forothersof the unperformed bligation,(iii) the fact hatone obligationremainsunperformed, r (iv) the factthatone performedthe action one did. (Cf. Foot, Moral Realismand MoralDilemma, 257.) Though (i)-type nd (ii)-type egret re arguably ppro-priate,theydo not threaten he traditional ccount; (iv)-type egret eemsclearly nappropriate;only (iii)-type egret s potentially roublesomeforthe traditional ccount. Let me explain briefly.The circumstances hat make conflict navoidable seem an appropriateobject of regret.We wishthe worldwas not such as to make it necessaryto leave one ofour primafacie obligationsunfulfilled. ut therealso seems

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DAVID 0. BRINKThe friends fdilemmas mighthave a reasonable argument gainstthetraditional nalysis f soluble conflictsfthe traditional ccountrelied on an epistemic or purelystatistical eading of primafacieobligations.For then theweaker prima facie claim would or needbe no real moral factorat all; indeed, on the epistemicreading,moral factorsoperate only when they win.'8 If the reasons sup-portingB do not operate whereB is overriddenby A, thenregretor compunction could apparentlybe appropriate onlyfor instru-mentalreasons. If the agent did not feel compunction about herfailure o performB (wherethiscaused someone's suffering), er-haps she would become more callous and fail to do B-type ctseven when theyare (all-things-considered) bligatory.'9This in-to be no basis forparadox here and nothing hat he factor ddition modelof soluble dilemmas cannot explain. Because we want to respond appro-priatelyto all moral forces,we regret that circumstancesrequire us toignore some moral forces n order to attend to stronger nes.(ii)-typeregret s more complicated. Indeed, one may even wonder ifthis s a distinct ategory f regret.Typically, hough not always, ailuretomeet a prima facie obligationresults n hardshipto the person(s) to whomthe obligation was owed. We may regret the fact that this person mustsuffer his hardship and the fact that we play a role in producing thishardship. But thisregret eems perfectly ompatiblewithrecognizing hatit is morallynecessary to cause this hardship in order to avoid violatingstrongermoral requirements. erhapsthisregretjust nvolves he wish thatthings ould have been otherwise uch that causing this hardshipwas notnecessary. f so, it involvesno more than (i)-typeregret.The object of one's regretmay be the unfulfilled, ut weaker,obliga-tion-(iii).-typeregret.One regrets ot performing . But t's also not clearthatthis is a distinctkind of regret.One's reason for regretat not per-formingB mightbe the fact that one would have liked to performB. Butthis sregret hatone wasin a situation uch thatperforming was morallyunavailable (because itwould have been morally rresponsible o act ontheweaker claim). This is (i)-typeregret gain, and poses no problemtothe traditional nalysis f soluble conflicts.Alternatively,hisregretmightinvolvemore; it might nvolve he thought hat n the actual circumstancesone should have performedB, ratherthanA. This is (iv)-type egret.Butit seems precisely nappropriate.Surely, f t is a soluble conflict n whichthere s a greaterobligationto do A, then it is inappropriate owish thatone had performedB, ratherthan A.However,perhaps (iii)-type egretneed not collapse into either i)-typeor (iv)-type egret. t may be appropriate to experience regretor com-punctionat the factof notfulfillingn obligation, venif t s an obligationthat s overriddenbyothers. discussthisformofregret n the text.'8Winning presupposes a contest, nd a contestpresupposes competi-tors. fso, the dea that factor s a factor nly f twinsmaybe incoherent.19Thismaybe Hare's viewabout the sort of regretthat s appropriate

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MORAL CONFLICT AND ITS STRUCTUREstrumental ccount of the appropriatenessof compunctionor re-gret may not seem to ring true.But if we accept the metaphysical eading of prima facie obli-gations and view the function romprima facie obligations nto all-things-considered bligation as moral factor ddition, then we canexplain regretfor failingto performdefeated primafacie obliga-tions. If prima facie obligations are moral forcesthat are at workeven when they re overriddenby competingforces, hen the factthat an agent does not act on her primafacie obligation to do Bexplains the appropriatenessofregretor compunction. nsofar asB is prima facie obligatory, t should be performed; f I do notperform t,whetherA overridesB or not, then I am not respond-ing to moral forces present in the situation. And this might bethoughtto be a cause forgenuine regretand compunction.Per-haps a morallydecent person should have moral attitudes, uch ascompunctionor regret, hattrackmoral forces or factors. f so, Ican acknowledge that regretor compunction is appropriate to-wardsmyfailure to do B while admitting hat it is A that is all-things-considered bligatory.These reactions are sufficientlyc-counted for, n our metaphysical eading, bythe assumptionthatI had a primafacie obligationto do B.203. A Recipe forMoral DilemmasFor these reasons, we should deny that soluble conflicts re gen-uine moraldilemmas.Moral dilemmasmustbe insoluble, nvolvingclaims that are (metaphysically) quipollent.However,we need re-quire onlybroadequipollence. t is not necessarythat the competingclaimsrepresent he same denomination n a singlemoral curren-cy.Between some currencies theremaybe no uniformexchangerate,withthe resultthatwe must recognize pocketsof incommen-surability.f two moral claims are incommensurably tringent,assume that neither s greateror more stringenthan the other. fso, the two claims are broadly equipollent.If a genuine dilemma cannot be a mere conflictofprimafacieobligations but must involve competing claims that are broadlyin cases of moral conflict; ee R. M. Hare, Moral ThinkingNew York:Ox-ford University ress, 1981), chaps. 2-3.20Cf.Ross, TheRight nd theGood, 8.

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DAVID 0. BRINKequipollent, we mightconstrue moral dilemmas as competingall-things-consideredbligations. fso, the recipe formoral dilemmasappears to be something ike this.

1. One has a primafacie obligation to do A.2. One has a primafacie obligationto do B.3. One is under an all-things-consideredbligation to do xjust in case one is under a prima facie obligation to do x,and there s no greater, imple or complex, competingpri-ma facie obligation one is under.4. One's prima facie obligation to do A is no greaterthanone's primafacie obligationto do B, and vice versa.5. One is under no other prima facie obligation, simple orcomplex,thatcompeteswithA or B and that s as greatanobligation.6. Hence one has an all-things-consideredbligation to do A.[1,3-5]7. Hence one has an all-things-consideredbligationto do B.[2-5]8. It is possible for one to do A.9. It is possible forone to do B.10. It is not possible for one to do A and B.

I trust hat the recipe itself s reasonablyclear. For now I just wantto comment on the steps in the recipe that are less familiar ndsay enough to make them nitially lausible.The less familiar tepsare (3)-(5). (3) simply tatesthe apparently raditional dea thatan all-things-consideredbligation is an undefeated prima facieobligation. (4)-(5) describe the conditionsthatmustbe met ifaprimafacie obligation s to be undefeated.(4) may seem to be the crucial step in the recipe. Once wedistinguish he epistemic question of knowingor having ustifiedbeliefthata primafacie obligationis defeated and the metaphys-ical question of itsbeing defeated,we maywonder whetherthereare conflicting ndefeatedprimafacie obligations.We mayadmitthat it is oftenhard to decide which obligation is weightierbutinsist hattheepistemicdifficultyn settling onflicts s no evidencethatthey're nsoluble.Our belief in the frequencyof insoluble conflicts s likelyto

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MORAL CONFLICTAND ITS STRUCTUREdepend upon what we make of the possibility fpockets ofincom-mensurabilitynvolvingmoral claims of different inds (for ex-ample, fidelity nd nonmaleficence). Incommensurability resum-ably will exist only if there are different cales or dimensions ofassessment. et us say thatthere s strongncommensurabilityetweentypesof actsx and y ust in case no token of typex is comparablewithany token of type y; and let us say that there is weak ncom-mensurabilityetweentypes f actsx and y ust in case some tokensoftypex are not comparable with ome tokens oftypey,but someare. Strong incommensurabilitys obviously more radical thanweak incommensurability; eak incommensurabilityllowsforsub-stantial, houghpartial,comparability.2'ven ifwe have differentdimensions of assessment,strongincommensurability eems im-plausibly xtreme.22 owever,weak incommensurabilitytrikesmeas fairly lausible.But while 'm sympathetico thesuggestion hatpockets of incommensurabilityfthis sortexist, don't know howto argue for this claim and won't try.A more secure route for the friend of dilemmas to take is toembrace the theoretical ossibilityfties.The idea, as Ruth Marcusnotes, would be to describe cases of symmetricallytructured on-flicting laims.We might magine a parent who is equidistantbe-tween identicaltwinswho are trapped in a burning building andcan save one but not both. Make the case maximally ymmetrical.The parent's duties conflict nd theirstringencys the same. Per-haps the choice thatthe Nazis forceSophie to make about whichofher childrento sacrifice nvolves uch a conflict.23 arrowequi-

21Wherepartial comparability pplies, the relationnotworse han s nottransitive. f.Derek Parfit,Reasons nd Persons Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, Clarendon Press, 1984), 431. Suppose that A and C are items onone dimension of assessment nd B is an item on another and thatA ismarginallygreater than C. If both A and C are incommensurablewithrespect to B, then C is no worse thanB, and B is no worse than A. But ifA is greater than C, C is worse than A; thus, the relation not worse han snot transitive.22Avery trong ersionof ncommensurability ould be needed to showthat nsoluble moral conflict s so pervasiveas to threatenthe possibilityof systematicmoral theory nd moral knowledge. t is in part because Isee no motivation or thiskind ofincommensurabilityhat think t moreprofitable o examine the structuralssues about moral dilemmas that areindependent of issues about theirfrequency.23William tyron, ophie'sChoiceNew York: Random House, 1979). Ofcourse, Sophie's choice is an insoluble conflict nlyif it is false that her

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DAVID 0. BRINKpollence is not required, but it's more secure, because its theoret-ical possibilitys harder to dispute.244. Paradoxical Implicationsof Genuine DilemmasIfwe follow the recipe, then we have a conflictof all-things-con-sidered obligations.We can then attachan obligation operator toboth A and B. The reason for thinking hat this is the structureof a genuine moral dilemma is thatwhenwe conjoin such a con-flictwith other initiallyplausible claims we get some very trou-blesome results. n fact, he existence of genuine moral dilemmasand the truthof these auxiliaryclaims generate contradictions.In explaining these paradoxes, it will help to represent themsymbolically. adopt the following conventions. 'O(A)' meansthatone ought all-things-consideredo do A or thatA is all-things-considered obligatory. ndeed, unless otherwise ndicated, I shallunderstand 'obligation' to referto all-things-considered bliga-tion. Where I have occasion to represent primafacie obligationssymbolically shall use the lowercase 'o'; 'o(A)' means that oneought prima facie to do A or thatA is prima facie obligatory.'P (A)' means thatA is permissible. * (A)' means thatA is in therelevant sense possible or within the agent's power-roughly,duty not to be involved n the sacrifice f any of her children is greaterthan her dutyto save one ofher children.241nthis way I want to disagree with McConnell (see Terrance Mc-Connell, Moral Dilemmas and Consistencyn Ethics, reprinted n MoralDilemmas,d. Gowans). He wantsto reject moraldilemmasby arguingthatonce we distinguish pistemic nd metaphysicalssues,we should deny thatthereare or could be conflicts etweenundefeatedprimafacie obligations.But, while I agree that we should be skepticalabout the frequencywithwhich insoluble conflicts ccur, thinkthat we must admit thatthey repossible,and the case of symmetricalut conflicting uties demonstratesthis most clearly. too will reject the possibility f moral dilemmas (seesection 5), butbecause I reject 3), not because I believe nsolubleconflictsare impossible.Foot construesher type-2 ughtsas claims about whatthere s mostorbest reason to do and concludes that there cannot be conflicts f type-2oughts see Foot, Moral Realismand MoralDilemma, 256). But conflict-ing actions can both be best as long as the correspondingmoral claimsare broadlyequipollent. If so, then Foot has no groundfordenyingtype-2 conflicts.

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MORAL CONFLICT AND ITS STRUCTUREphysically r psychologicallypossible.25For instance, in the ex-ample described above, it is not possible in the relevant sense,given familiar temporal and physicalconstraints, or the parentto save both of her twins from the burning building. Deonticprinciples or axioms (axiom schemata) are formulated usingGreek letters for example, '(x' and '1'). These principles do fig-ure as axioms or theorems in various systems f deontic logic.However, am concerned onlywith whether they are intuitivelycompelling claims about the systematic elations among familiarmoral and nonmoral properties (for example, the relations be-tween permissibilitynd obligatoriness). f a principle is intuitive-ly compelling, this s presumably defeasible) reason to think hatit should figure s an axiom or theorem n any reasonable systemof deontic logic.

Paradox 1One paradox has been widelyrecognized. It resultsfromcombin-ing moral dilemmas with two standarddeontic principles:a distri-bution principle, often knownas agglomeration,nd the principlethat ought implies can, which 'll dub thevoluntaristrinciple.Agglomeration aysthat fone oughtto do (xand one oughtto doa thenone ought to do both.

(O(ot) & 0(a)) - (c & 13))

The voluntarist rinciple saysthat it is a necessarycondition of

25Thus, e shoulddistinguishhemodalityhat*' signifiesrom hesort fmetaphysicalossibilityhatKO' ignifies. oreover,nsofarsweare concernedwithmpossibility,tis with pecific inds f mpossibility,notwith he ort f mpossibilityhat,fdeterminismstrue, haracterizesan agent's elationoall actions he does notperform.

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DAVID 0. BRINKone's being under an obligation to do axthat (x be possible or bewithin one's power.26

0(at) -o * (a)

By combining agglomeration and voluntarism we get the followingparadox.

1. 0 (A)2. 0 (B)3. -i*(A&B)4. (O (A) & O(B)) - O (A & B)) [agglomeration]5. Hence 0(A & B) [1,2,4]6. O(A & B) -* * A & B) [voluntarism]7. Hence * A & B) [5,6]8. Hence *(A & B) & -i(A & B) [3,7]How impressive are the credentials of the auxiliary principles usedto derive this paradox? A full discussion is not possible here; and,because the other paradoxes are more robust, a full discussion is

26Common sense distinguishes etween two kinds of modalities. Mostofus assume that alternative ctions can each be withinmy powereven ifit is causally determinedwhichone I willperform.But some actions thatare possible n thisquite general way re nonetheless mpossibleor outsidean agent's powersbecause theparticular ontext mposesa sufficienthys-ical or psychologicaldisability for example, as wheretheparent s unableto savebothtwins rom hefire).These actions are impossiblefor heagentin question in a waydifferent rom the wayin which, f determinismstrue,all the actions the agent does not performare impossible. In for-mulatingvoluntarism nd construing moral conflict s a conflict mongduties such that one can performeach but not both, I am relying n aconceptionofpossibilityhat ncludesboth themoregeneraland the morespecificforms fpossibility.o ifdeterminism nd compatibilism re bothtrue,A and B will each be possible in both thegeneraland specific enses,but it will be impossible n the specific ense to do both. In such a case,the voluntarist an accommodate obligationsto do each, but not an obli-gationto do both.If ncompatibilismnd determinism re true, henthereis no distinction o draw betweenthemodalitynwhich t s impossiblefortheparentto save bothchildrenand themodalitynwhich t s impossibleto act otherwisethan one does. A voluntaristwould conclude that therecan be obligations o do only things ne does. Butwe would faceno moralconflicts;A and B are not each within he agent's power, nd, accordingto voluntarism,herecould not be twoconflicting bligations.

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MORAL CONFLICT AND ITS STRUCTUREnot necessary. t is enough to explore some central worries andresources.Consider agglomeration.Where there is no conflictbetween Aand B, it seems harmless to recognize an obligationto do both aswell as obligationsto do each. But it also seems unnecessary;anobligationto do each seems adequate to explain the moral situa-tion.However,perhaps I relyon agglomeration n avoiding ilemmas.Assuming hat want tofulfillmyobligations, want to avoid doingthings hatwillpreventme fromdoing so. IfI believe that oughtto do A and that oughtto do B, not only willtry o avoid doingthings hatwillpreventme fromdoing one or the other, willtryto avoid doing things hatpreventme fromdoing both. Does thispresuppose that have an obligationto do both as well as obliga-tions to do each? I don't think o. All itrequires s that have twoobligationsand a desire to satisfy ach; it does not require a con-junctive obligation.Now, I can think of one argumentfor compound obligations.Consider a case where the agenthas an obligationto do A and anobligationto do B and is able to do bothA and B. In such a caseit seems reasonable to hold that t is impermissible orhim to failto do both.

-iP(-i (A & B))But it also seems reasonable to accept a correlativityrinciple ac-cordingto which (x s obligatoryust in case it is impermissible otto do (x.

P (---Ix) O(ot)But these twoclaims imply hathe has a compound obligation.

1. -P( (A& B))2. ,P( ,(A& B)) O(A & B) [correlativity]3. Hence O(A& B)This argumentestablishesthat there are conjunctiveobligations

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DAVID 0. BRINKwhere each conjunct s obligatory nd bothobligationscan be per-formed.However, t does not establish, s agglomeration claims,thatconjunctiveobligationsfollowfromthe obligatoriness feachofthe twoconjuncts.Moreover, hisparticular outeto conjunctiveobligationswon't work in the case of moral dilemmas. For, as Ishall argue (section 5), in a genuine dilemma,where one cannotdo bothA and B, what s impermissibles to performneither; t isnot impermissible o fail to performboth, providedone performsone of them.

-i P(-i (A & B))If so, the correlativityrinciple does not allow us to generate aconjunctiveobligation n dilemmatic ituations.Indeed, we mightthinkthat t is the correlativityrinciplethatexplainswhythere is a conjunctiveobligationwhen there is one.If so, the existence of conjunctive obligationsin nondilemmaticsituationsprovidesno supportwhatsoever oragglomerationor itsclaim that there are conjunctiveobligations n dilemmas.Nor does there seem to be anyreason to assume the existenceof conjunctiveobligations n dilemmaticsituations, s agglomera-tion would require. Whyshould we assume thatthere's an obliga-tion to do both?Whynot say, nstead,thatthere is an obligationto do A, an obligationto do B, and an obligationto do A or B, butnot n obligationto do both?What about voluntarism?t seems more intuitivelyompelling. tmayseem too harsh to require of people actions thattheycannotperform;the voluntarist nsists hat it be up to us whetherto bemoral. Nonetheless some people claim that there are counterex-amples to thevoluntaristrinciple; hey laimthatthereare impos-sible obligations.We will have more confidence n discardingthevoluntaristrinciple fthere re counterexamplesn nondilemmaticsituations.Some of the counterexamples nvolveobligations hatone is nolonger n a positionto fulfill. or example, t has been claimed thata debtorwho is no longerable to payhisdebt,whether hroughhisownfaultor not, s stillunder the obligationto repayhis debt.27

27See,forexample, Michael Stocker, Moral Conflicts:WhatTheyAreand WhatThey Show, Pacific hilosophical uarterly8 (1987): 104-23.230



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MORAL CONFLICT AND ITS STRUCTUREBut it seems that we can admit that the debtor remainsunderobligations to those whom he owes without ssuming that he hasan obligation to performthe repayment hat he is incapable ofperforming.f the debtor is himself t faultforbecoming unableto pay the debt at the appointed time,thenwhen he fails to paythe debthe can be blamed, not forfailing o pay the debt, but forallowing himself to become unable to pay the debt. Moreover,whetherhis inability o pay is his own faultor not, we can claimthatceteris paribus, he has an obligation to pay back as much as

he can until the original debt is paid, perhaps with interestorcompensatory amages. These claims seem not to requirepositingimpossible obligations.However, tmightbe claimed thatduties of restitution r com-pensationmake sense onlyas a consequence ofbreachingan ob-ligation. f so, a duty o compensate seems to imply hatthedebtorwas obligatedto do somethinghe was unable to do. But this anal-ysis s not mandatory.Some obligations get met; others lapse orend withoutbeing discharged. And obligationscan end or lapsefor variety f different easons.Some ofthe reasonsan obligationlapses maybringno newobligations n itswake, as when a creditorchooses to release the debtor from his obligation.But other rea-sons for the lapse of an obligation may bringnew obligations nitswake. If a debtor is unable to pay as agreed, then his old obli-gation lapses and, ceterisparibus, s succeeded bynew obligationsto repay accordingto a new schedule and to compensatefordam-ages. The voluntarist an appeal to thisview about the successionofobligationsto recognize dutiesof compensation withoutrecogniz-ing impossible obligations. f so, it's not clear that we yethave acounterexample to the voluntarist rinciple.Anotherpossible challenge to voluntarism nvolvesmoral emo-tions. People oftensay that someone ought to have some moralfeelingor attitude forexample, gratitude) n a particular ituationeven iftheperson does not have the attitude nd seems incapablein the circumstances fproducingit.While emotionalsensibilitiesmaybe intentionallyultivated r repressed, t seems they re notunder our directvoluntary ontrol in the required sense. If wehave not cultivated r otherwise cquired the relevantbackgroundsensibilities,tmaynot alwaysbe withinour power to experiencethe appropriateattitudes n the appropriatecontexts.Yet it maynonetheless seem true to saythatwe oughtto have these attitudes.

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DAVID 0. BRINKBut we may question the counterexamplewithoutdisputing hepsychological ssumptionsupon which t relies. For one thing, t'snot clear that this is a case of an impossible obligation. While itmay seem natural to say that the person in question ought to havethese feelings,we need not be ascribing n obligation to him. Weoften say that something ought to be the case withoutascribingobligations to anyone; here we usually mean that it would be agood thing fwhat ought to happen did, or perhaps that t wouldhave been a good thing f what ought to have happened had. No

one thinks hatvoluntarismmust apply to these axiological uses of'ought'. Moreover,we maythink that the person in question hasor had certain obligations, ven ifhe does not have an impossibleobligation. For if he does not have sensibilities hat allow him tohave the appropriate feelings in this situation, he may well beblameworthy orhaving violated an obligation, which was in hispowerto perform, o cultivate he relevant ensibilities nd he maynow have an obligation (to do what he can) to cultivate he rele-vant sensibilities. o, it's not clear thatthere really s any obligationin such cases that the voluntarist annot recognize.I haven't shown voluntarism o be immune to counterexample(and there are the usual problemsabout provingnegativeexisten-tialgeneralizations).Butmy nalysis f thesecounterexamples ug-gestsvoluntarist trategies ordealing with otheralleged counter-examples. To say thatsomeone oughtto have done something hewas unable to do mayreflect n axiological,ratherthan a deontic,judgment; ifso, we can accept the udgmentwithoutrecognizingimpossible obligations.Moreover,we may recognize thatthe agentin such a situationhas or had obligationswithoutrecognizing m-possible obligations.There mayhave been an obligationthe agentviolated in getting nto the predicament,and theremaybe obli-gations to mitigatedamages and provide restitution.We need totestthe adequacy of these strategies n a case-by-case asis.Paradox 2The second paradox also relies on twodeonticprinciples.The firstsaysthat fyou're (all-things-considered)bligatedto do a-,and Lwould prevent -or bringabout not-a,thenyou're obligatednot todo 1.

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MORAL CONFLICTAND ITS STRUCTURE

(0(t) & (a ->- -A)) -> (--i ))

We mightcall thisthe obligationxecutionrinciple,because it ob-ligates us not to do anything hatwould interferewith the execu-tion of our (original) obligations.The second principlesimply laimsthat f t is obligatory o donot-i, then it is not obligatory o do P.0(-i P) -> 0(13)

This statement ftheconsequences ofan obligation sweakerthana thirdprinciplewe are likely o find attractive.

The third rinciple sserts kind ofcorrelativityfobligatorinessndimpermissibilityhat s equivalent o thecorrelativityrinciplewe'vealreadydiscussed -i P(-i ,) O(a)).28 This version fcorrelativitysays hat fnot-1 sobligatory,henP s impermissible,nd vice versa.Because the second principle s weakerthan thiscorrelativityrin-ciple (and for ack ofa bettername), I shallcall itthe weak bligationprinciple.The weak obligationand obligationexecutionprincipleshelp constitute second paradox of moral dilemmas.1. 0 (A)2. 0 (B)3. -,*(A&B)4. Hence B -> -,A [3]5. (O(A) & (B -> A))) 0 (-1 B)) [obligationexecution]6. Hence 0(-i B) [1,4,5]7. 0(-i B) -> 0(B) [weakobligation]8. Hence ,0 (B) [6,7]9. Hence 0(B) & 0(B) [2,8]

28The wo orrelativityrinciplesre equivalents longas we adoptaruleofextensionalityllowing s to substituteogicalequivalents ithinthescopeof thedeontic peratorsO' and 'P'. Then, f we treat itherprinciples an axiom chema,wecanderive heother s an instance.

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DAVID 0. BRINKNow, the basis of the second paradox seems much more securethan that of the first aradox.The obligation execution principle surelyplays an important,though perhaps tacit,role in our moral deliberations. Considersome examples. I recognize an obligationnot to kill nnocentpeo-ple; I know or learn that putting certainsubstance (in an unla-beled spice bottle) in Alan's food would bringabout his death; soI conclude that ought not to put the substance in his food. Or,I recognize an obligation to be with my son on his birthday;receive an invitation o participate n a conferenceon that day; soI conclude that oughtto refusethis nvitation. r, I recognizeanobligationto meet you at the time and place we agreed upon; Irealize thatthe onlywayforme to do so is to catch the noon train;so I conclude that ought to catch the noon train.These commoninferences seem reasonable, because obligatoriness eems to betransmitted romthe action that s the focus of the originalobli-gation to those actions that are required, as means or necessaryconditions,for the performanceof the original obligation.29t's

29Similarprinciples are discussed by van Fraassen, Value and theHeart's Command, 146, and by Judith Thomson, The Realm of Rights(Cambridge:Harvard University ress,1990), 156-57.It shouldbe clear that hisrequiresus to read the embedded conditionalin the obligationexecution principle as asserting ome kind of counter-factual or nomological dependence between1 and ,(x, atherthan as asimplematerialconditional.For instance,we mightrepresent he embed-ded conditionalwith omething ike Stalnaker's corner ; see RobertStal-naker, A Theory of Conditionals, reprintedn Causation nd Conditionals,ed. E. Sosa (New York: OxfordUniversityress, 1975).Someone might think obligation execution too strong a principle. Bycontrapositionwithin bligationexecutionwe get (O(x) & (o( -> , )) -XO(-i 13)).But itmayseem that some nomic consequences (forexample,epiphenomena) of thingswe are obligated to do need not themselves eobligatory. or instance, uppose I am obligated to givea talkon a certaindate at a certain university,ne consequence of whichis that see some-thingof the campus afterthe talk and before returninghome. It mightseem strangeto suppose that am obligatedto see the campus as well asgive mytalk.Upstreamconsequences ofour obligationsmaybe obligatory,but downstream onsequences do not seem to be. But I'm not so sure. Ifdownstream onsequences are genuine consequences,then failure o bringthem about entailsthatone will not havefulfilled ne's originalobligation.Ceteris paribus, f I do not see the campus, then I will not have fulfilledmyobligationto give mytalk.So in one sense failure orealize downstreamconsequences of our obligations preventsour fulfilling hose obligationsmuch as failure o realize upstream onsequences does. If so, perhaps both

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MORAL CONFLICTAND ITS STRUCTUREhard to imagine howwe would findour wayaround in the worldmorally fwe did not accept thisprinciple.And the weak obligationprinciple,as its name suggests, eemsespeciallyuncontroversial.fI'm obligatednot to killmyneighbor,thensurely t's not the case that 'm obligatedto killhim. Indeed,as the stronger, orrelativityrincipleasserts, f 'm obligatednotto killmyneighbor, hen it's mpermissible orme to kill him.Butour second principle s even weaker thanthisplausible thirdprin-ciple; so surely t mustbe acceptable.Paradox 3A thirdparadox resultsfromcombiningthe obligationexecutionand correlativityrincipleswitha principlethat claimsthat fP isimpermissible hen it is not the case thatP is obligatory.

- P(1() ->- 0(1)Because this is a veryweak principle about the consequences ofimpermissibility, will call it the weak impermissibilityrinciple.These threeprinciples nd the assumptionof moral dilemmas cre-ate the following aradox.

1. 0 (A)2. 0 (B)3. - * A & B)4. Hence B -> A [3]5. (O(A) & (B -> A)) -> 0 (-- B) [obligationexecution]sorts of consequences are obligatory nd obligation execution is defensi-ble. Moreover, he friend f obligation execution can recognizean impor-tant pragmatic asymmetry etween upstream and downstream conse-quences. Upstream consequences are or can be part of planning theexecution of one's original obligations, s downstream onsequences can-not.Alternatively,f course,we mightdefend obligationexecutionsimply yinterpreting he embedded conditional as representing narrowerkind ofnomological dependence between an obligation and itsupstreamconse-quences of the sortwhen a would prevent x fromcoming about.

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DAVID 0. BRINK6. Hence 0(-i B) [1,4,5]7. (--, B) -- ,(B) [correlativity]8. Hence ,P(B) [6,7]9. -P(B) -> 0(B) [weak impermissibility]10. Hence ,O(B) [8,9]11. Hence 0(B) & 0(B) [2,10]

Wemight lso noticethattheobligationexecution and correlativityprinciples llow us to generalize the argumentfor (8) to the claimthatin a dilemma, whatever he agent does, she does somethingimpermissible. or these two principles mply hat any action thatleads to the nonperformanceof an obligation is impermissible,and the impossibilityfdoing bothA and B ensures thatwhateverthe agentdoes she willfailto perform n obligation. tfollows hatwhatever he does, she does something mpermissible.We mightconsider thisresultoverly arsh; t s incompatiblewith he generalvoluntarist dea that t ought to be withinour power to live up toour obligationsand to avoid impermissible ctions. In thissense,some may regard this result as a distinctparadox of dilemmas.However, his onclusion does not itself nvolve contradiction ndso is not paradoxical in the strong ense that the other results re.Nonetheless, 11) is a contradiction.Aswith he second paradox,theauxiliarydeonticprinciples n the thirdparadox seem especial-ly compelling. We've already seen the plausibility f the obligationexecution and correlativityheses.The new deonticprinciple s theweak impermissibilityrinciple.But surely hatmustbe true. f it'simpermissible orme to torturemy neighbor,then surely t's notthe case that 'm obligatedto torturehim.5. Reconsideringthe Existenceof Moral DilemmasBecause the paradoxes are generated from the supposition thatthere are moral dilemmas,understood as conflictsof all-things-considered obligation, nd variousdeontic principles,we must re-ject some of the deontic principlesor the suppositionthat thereare moral dilemmas.Which reaction is correct depends on theindependent plausibility f the principlesand the case for dilem-mas. We mustdetermine whichreaction is least costly.The prin-ciples underlying he first aradox-agglomeration and volunta-

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MORAL CONFLICT AND ITS STRUCTURErism-strike me as somewhatuncertain.Rejecting one or both ofthem-especially agglomeration-maybe a cost thatwe could bear.However, the second and third paradoxes rest on more securedeontic foundations.Obligation execution,weak obligation, cor-relativity,nd weak impermissibilityll seem to be fundamental runcontroversial rinciples n ourmoralreasoning. fso, thesecondand thirdparadoxes make the costs of maintaining he existenceof moral dilemmas greater than has generallybeen recognized.We could simply estrict he scope of such principles to nondi-lemmatic situations n order to avoid paradox. But that would bead hoc. We need a principled and independent account of whytheirscope should be limited n just thisway.Moreover, fwe re-strict he scope of these deontic principlesto nondilemmatic itu-ations, then different rinciples will apply to obligations in dil-emmaticand nondilemmaticcontexts.But ifthe sense of deonticterms (such as 'obligation') is determined ointly by the variousdeonticprinciples nwhich the termsfigure, henthisresponse tothe paradoxes appears to have the unwelcomeconsequence of re-quiringus to saythat the term obligation' has differentmeaningsin the two contexts. f so, it is betterto rejectsuch principlesthanto restrict heir scope. But then we must find alternativemecha-nisms (of unrestricted cope) for generatingtheir results n non-dilemmatic ituations.However, see no such mechanisms o serveas alternatives o the principles underlying he second and thirdparadoxes.30 f I am right, riendsof dilemmasrejectsuch princi-ples at a high price.These paradoxes suggestthatwe should examine the case formoral dilemmas more closely. Earlier, presented a prima faciecase for thinking hat moral dilemmas are theoretically ossible.And theyneed be only theoretically ossible-people need neverface a genuine dilemma-in order for ethical theoryto containparadox. Though I agreed thatwe should be skepticalabout thefrequencyof conflicting ndefeated prima facie obligations, ar-

301nthis onnection,t sworth oting hatmy iew boutagglomera-tion s notthatweshouldustrestrictts copeto nondilemmaticituations.That wouldbe ad hoc. I think hatwe shouldreject t and thatwe canidentifydifferentechanismor eneratingompound bligationsn non-dilemmaticituations,amely,hefirstorrelativityrinciple. owever,do notsee any imilarlylausible lternativesoobligation xecution,or-relativity,eakobligation,r weak mpermissibility.

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DAVID 0. BRINKgued that we must allow for their possibility. hey are possibleeither because of weak incommensurabilityetween prima facieobligationsor because of equal stringency f prima facie obliga-tions,such as cases of symmetricallytructured, onflicting bli-gations.As long as we accept the idea that an undefeatedprimafacie obligationyieldsan all-things-consideredbligation,we mustadmitthatmoral dilemmasare possible.It is this dea that we can and should reject.Ordinarily,n un-defeated prima facie obligationdoes constitute n all-things-con-sidered obligation.But not always.Where there is an undefeatedcompetitor, e can conclude thatneitherobligation san all-things-considered obligation.This mayseem to leave the agent confront-ing an insoluble conflictwithno all-things-consideredbligations,and thismayseem puzzling to some. But the agent does face anall-things-consideredbligation; t is to performone or the otherof the conflicting rimafacie obligations.We can see thisbetter fwe allow O' to standforall-things-consideredbligation as usual)and 'o' to standforprimafacieobligation. n an insoluble conflictof undefeated prima facie obligations,the following laims seemtrue.

o (A)o (B)(o (A) > o (B))(o(B) > o(A))O(A V B)l O(A)lO(B)If so, the onlyall-things-consideredbligation n an insoluble con-flict s thisdisjunctive bligation.31 And the disjunctive ll-things-considered obligationfeelsright.Bycorrelativity,fthe agent per-formsneitherdisjunct, he has done something mpermissible. utshe may perform itherof the disjuncts n order to fulfill er all-things-consideredbligation.Whicheverdisjunct he performs,hewill eave a strong indeed, undefeated) primafacieobligationun-

31AlanDonagan discusses some aspects of the disjunctive olution inConsistency n RationalistMoral Systems, eprinted n MoralDilemmas,ed. Gowans,286-87.

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MORAL CONFLICTAND ITS STRUCTUREperformed,and thismay be cause for a kind of regretor com-punctionfor the moral force towhichshe does not respond. Butas long as she performsone of the disjuncts, he will have donenothing mpermissible.This disjunctive nalysisseems fairlynatural as applied to nar-rowlyequipollent moral conflicts; n the case of a tie, it seemspermissible o perform ither alternative. ut the analysis an andshould be extended to moral conflictswhose insolubilitys due toincommensurability.or what makesthedisjunctive nalysis ppro-priate is ust thatwhen all the moral considerations bout the al-ternativeshave been exhausted neithermoral claim is weightierthan the other.And this s truefor any nsoluble conflict,whetherthe insolubility epresents tie or incommensurability.If, as I believe, the disjunctive nalysis of insoluble conflicts sperfectly dequate, then we should deny the possibility f moraldilemmas.32n particular,we should reject step (3) in the recipe

32Thisformof skepticismbout moraldilemmas should sound familiar,because it is similar to my criticism f agglomeration.Here we deny theexistence of genuine dilemmasby admitting nlya disjunctive ll-things-consideredobligation.There we arguedthat ftherewere moral dilemmas,we might void thefirst aradox bydenying gglomeration, nd we mightdo thisby conceding onlya disjunctive bligation.We admitthatan (all-things-considered) bligationto do A and an obligationto do B yieldsadisjunctive bligationto do A or B, butwe denythat tyields conjunctiveobligation to do both A and B. But the presentpoint is not simply hedenial of agglomerationforprimafacie obligations.We can see thissym-bolically.When we deny agglomerationwe assertfourmain claims.

0 (A)0 (B)O(A V B)-,O(A & B)

If we denied the agglomeration of prima facie obligationswe wouldassertfourparallel claims.o (A)o(B)o(A V B)-, o(A & B)

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DAVID 0. BRINKfor moral dilemmasand its claim that an all-things-consideredb-ligation is simply an undefeated prima facie obligation. An all-things-considered bligation representswhat one ought to do inlightof all morallyrelevant factors, ncluding alternatives. f so,then only prima facie obligationsthat are undefeated and defeatall competitors are all-things-considered bligations. In otherwords,to be an all-things-consideredbligation,a primafacie ob-ligation must be overridingnd not simplynot overridden. Buttherecannot be two ncompatibleobligationsofthis ort; tcannotbe truethatA overridesB and thatB overridesA.Recognitionthat nsoluble conflictsgenerate only a disjunctiveobligation tself rovides kind of solution totheseconflicts. hereis no all-things-consideredbligationto do A or B, rather han theother.But there s an all-things-consideredbligationto do one orthe other,rather than some third thing. n particular, hereis anobligationto do one or the other,rather than nothing.To fulfillthis disjunctiveobligation one must choose one or the other,though,by hypothesis, he choice cannotbe guided bymoral con-siderationsabout A or B. Instead, one's choice should be deter-mined bythe greatersalience of one disjunctor bysome (other)randomizingdevice. In this way, ur analysisdoes not itselfmakethe choice. But it does tellus thatwe have an unequivocal duty odo eitherA or B and that, s far as our dutygoes, it doesn't matterwhichwe do. This is itself kind ofguidance.

This parallelswhat I take to be the rightresponse to anothersortof insoluble conflict-the case of Buridan'sAss. Neitherbaleofhayis more desirable than the other, nd so there s no reasonfor theAss to preferone bale ratherthan the other. Nonethelessclaims bout nsoluble onflicts.

o(A)o B)O(AV B),O(A& B)lO(A)lO(B)

The explanation f thesedifferencess thatwhereas gglomerations afunctionhat takesonly all-things-consideredbligationss arguments,premise 3) in ourrecipefor dilemma akesprima acieobligationssinput nd all-things-consideredbligationss output. o, though imilarin part, kepticismbout dilemmasnd skepticismboutagglomerationhavedifferenttructures.

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DAVID 0. BRINKflict. f we bear these formsof residue in mind, see no reason tofind the disjunctive olution implausibly anitary.6. Moral Conflict nd MetaethicsWilliamsbelieves that moral dilemmas have metaethical mplica-tions as well as implicationsfor deontic logic.

It seems to me a fundamental riticismf many thical heories hat heiraccounts f moralconflictnd itsresolution o notdo usticeto the factsofregret ndrelated onsiderations:asically ecause they liminate romthe scene the ought ot acted upon. A structureppropriate o conflictsof beliefs s projectedonto the moral case; one by which the conflict sbasicallydventitious,nda resolutionf tdisembarrassesne of mis-taken iewwhich or while onfusedhe ituation.uch an approachmust e inherentn purely ognitiveccounts f thematter,ince t sjust a questionfwhich ftheconflictingughttatementss true, ndthey annot othbe true, o decide orrectlyor ne of themmust eto be ridof error ith espect o theother.35

Moral conflicts, e concludes, are more like conflicts f desiresthan they are like conflicts of beliefs. 36Insofar as Williams's claim is simply hata cognitivist onstrualof conflicts f obligationcannot accommodate the phenomena ofregretor compunction,his argumenthas alreadybeen addressed(in section 2). As long as we treat prima facie obligations as gen-uine moral factors r forces n the situations o which they pply,we can treat soluble conflicts s cases in which one prima facieobligation overridesanother,and insoluble conflicts s cases ofconflicting ndefeatedprimafacie obligations. n eithercase, wecan explain such regret s is appropriatefor the primafacie obli-gationnot acted upon.But Williams also seems to be offering somewhatdifferent r-gument against cognitivism. e wantsto compare conflicts f be-liefsand conflicts f desire or attitude, nd argue that moral con-flictshave propertiesmore like those of conflicts f attitudethanthose ofconflicts f belief. His argument eems to have thefollow-ing form.35 EthicalConsistency, 25.361bid., 21.

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MORAL CONFLICTAND ITS STRUCTURE1. It is unreasonable to hold conflicting contradictory)be-liefs.2. It can be reasonable to hold conflicting oncognitive tti-tudes towards he same thing.3. In moral conflicts, t is reasonable for the agent to makeconflictingudgmentsabout her obligations.4. Hence judgments and ascriptionsof obligation n cases ofmoral conflict xpressattitudes, atherthan beliefs.5. There should be a uniform semantic treatmentof judg-

mentsand ascriptions f obligation.6. Hence judgments and ascriptionsof obligationexpress at-titudes, atherthan beliefs.

Williams thinks that (2) is obvious, but I'm skeptical. t can bereasonable to hold differentttitudes owardsdifferentspects ofthe same situation.But it's less clear that t can be reasonable tohold different ttitudes owardsone and the same aspect of oneand the same situation.There's no problem takingconflicting t-titudes for example, attraction nd repulsion) towards n objectif we take one attitude oward t qua F and take the other attitudetoward tqua G. For then our attitudes ake different bjects-theyare directed at differentspectsofone and the same object-thoughat a superficial, oarse-grained evel of descriptiontheyboth takex as theirobject. Thus, I can be bothpleased and dismayedby mytoddler'snew resistanceto being dressed: I am pleased insofar sthismeans that he is developing a sense of his own independence(qua F) but dismayed nsofar s dressinghim is now less pleasantand more time-consuming or both of us (qua G). Indeed, it isthese differentropertiesof the same eventthatgroundtheappro-priatenessof my conflicting eactions,presumablybecause our at-titudestowardsobjects are based on theirproperties. f so, this snot an example ofhavingconflicting ttitudes owards ne and thesame thing.It's much less clear that t can be reasonable to hold conflictingattitudes owardsx qua F-where thiscan't be explained awayashaving different ttitudes owardsdifferentonstituent ropertiesof thecomplex property . If t s aspectsofa situation hatgroundor make appropriatecertainattitudes owards t,then there is noreason to expect that it could be reasonable to hold conflicting

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DAVID 0. BRINKattitudes owards ne and the same aspectof a situation.37 tleast,not unless we've alreadybeen convinced of a noncognitivisthesisto the effect hat one and the same naturalproperty f a situationcan make different esponsesappropriate.What about (3)? Is it reasonable forthe agent to make conflict-ing udgments about her obligations? f (3) is to supportthe non-cognitivist onclusion, the conflicting udgments must endorsecontradictory ropositions bout her obligations.Ifmy analysis s correct, t cannot be reasonable to accept con-tradictory ropositions bout the agent's all-things-consideredb-ligations. There are no conflicting ll-things-consideredbliga-tions. In soluble conflicts, here is only one all-things-consideredobligation,and that s to performthe weightierprima facie obli-gation. In insoluble conflicts, he only all-things-consideredbli-gation is the disjunctive bligation.However, there can be conflictingprima facie obligations (inboth soluble and insoluble conflicts).Do these conflicts ieldcon-tradictory ropositionsabout the agent's primafacie obligations?A and B are each primafacieobligatory. resumablywe can acceptan analogue of obligationexecutionforprimafacie obligation.

0(a) & (a ->- -,)) -> o(--I ))

Because A and B are incompatible, my prima facie obligation todo either (for example,A) generatesa primafacie obligationnotto do the other (forexample, B). This allows one to argue as fol-lows.

37In a similarway,Greenspan appeals to emotional conflictto argueagainst a cognitive onstrualof the emotions;see Patricia Greenspan, ACase of Mixed Feelings:Ambivalence and the Logic of Emotion, in Ex-plaining motions,d. A. Rorty Los Angeles: University f CaliforniaPress,1980). Though I do not accept the view that she calls cognitivism-theclaim thatemotions ust are udgmentsor beliefs-I do think hat this ndother cognitivist iewsof the emotions are untouchedby her argument. nparticular, cognitivist iew that holds that emotions are and should begrounded in beliefsabout the natural and evaluativepropertiesof situa-tionscan readily ccommodate conflicts f attitudes, ecause, as I indicat-ed, these conflicting ttitudes ake differentspects of the same situationas their objects. The parallel between Greenspan's and Williams's argu-ments occurred to me during discussionswithTracy saacs.

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MORAL CONFLICTAND ITS STRUCTURE1. o(A)2. o(B)3. -,*(A&B)4. Hence B -> ,A [3]5. (o(A) & (B --> -A)) -> o(-B )) [ obligation execution ]6. Hence o(-i B) [1,4,5]7. Hence o(B) & o(-i B) [2,6]

But, of course, thisconclusion falls shortof the required contra-dictiono(B) & -o(B).

Nor do I see how Williams can get the negation outside of thescope of theprima facieobligationoperator.My havingreason notto perform n act does notprevent herebeing reason toperformit. Indeed, more generally, nalogues ofweak obligation,correla-tivity,nd weakimpermissibilityll failwhenapplied toprimafacie,rather hanall-things-considered,bligation.So premise 3) of Wil-liams's argument s false.This should be clearfrom ur account ofprimafacieobligations.Recall thatprimafacieobligationsrepresent heoperationof mor-al forcesor factors nd that we can representthese moral forcesas moral laws or generalizations.These generalizations mplythatan action is obligatory nsofaras it possesses a morallyrelevantproperty.n moral conflicts, ne and the same action has morethan one morallyrelevantproperty. ctionA is obligatory nsofaras performingtrespondsto one moralforce,while it s not oblig-atory nsofar as performing t fails to respond to another moralforce.There is no contradictionhere, because the logical formofour predications s this:

A is 0 insofar s it is Fand

A is not-O insofar s it is G.245



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DAVID 0. BRINKWilliams's problem is thathe sees contradictory ttitudes nd ob-ligationswhere there are none, and this s because he failsto seethat the attitudes nd obligations in question attach to differentaspects of the same situation.Because of this fact,we can see thatthere is no contradiction.So we should reject thisargumentfornoncognitivism ased on moral conflict.7. ConclusionThere maywell be insolublemoral conflicts, erhaps a greatmany.I have not addressed directly he frequency f such conflicts r thesignificanceof theirfrequency.38 ut moral conflict of this sortdoes not itselfhave paradoxical implicationsfor ethical theory, sfriendsof moral dilemmashave claimed.Whereas the robust nature of the second and thirdparadoxesmotivates reexaminationof the case formoral dilemmas, the ar-gument againstmoral dilemmas s largely ndependentf the deon-tic paradoxes and the plausibility f the deontic principles.An all-things-consideredmoralobligation swhat one oughtto do in lightof all morallyrelevantfactors.To be an all-things-consideredbli-gation, a prima facie obligationmust not onlybe undefeated,itmust defeat competitors; t must be overriding.And, indeed, fa-miliar deontic principles,of the sortdiscussedhere, are plausibleonlywhen applied to all-things-consideredbligations,understoodin thisway.But there cannot be conflicting verridingrequire-ments. So there cannot be conflicting ll-things-consideredbli-gations. n insolubleconflicts, eitherof theconflicting bligationsis an all-things-consideredbligation;the onlyall-things-consideredobligation s thedisjunctive bligationtoperform ne or theotherof the conflicting ndefeated prima facie obligations. fwe under-

38lssuesabout the frequency f moral dilemmas need not be resolvedbyour conclusion thattherecan be no moral dilemmas, providedwe donot understand moral dilemmas' univocallyn both contexts.Whereasthestructural ebate concerns the existenceofconflicting ll-thing-consideredobligations, nd I have argued that therecan be none, the frequency e-bate is easilyunderstood as concerning the existence and frequencyofinsoluble conflicts etweenconflicting ndefeatedprimafacieobligations.Myown view about this,for which I have not argued here, is that therecan be and are such conflicts ut that there is no good reason to thinkthemso common as to be troublesomefor ethicaltheory.

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MORAL CONFLICT AND ITS STRUCTUREstand moral dilemmas as conflicts f all-things-consideredbliga-tions,to whichfamiliardeontic principles apply, as many writershave, then we should agree that moral dilemmas would produceparadox in ethicaltheorybut deny that there are or could be anymoral dilemmas.39We can denythepossibilityfmoral dilemmaswithoutdisputinganyof the moralphenomenologyto which friends fmoral dilem-mas point. ndeed, both the construction nd the resolutionof theparadoxes requireus to understandbetterthedistinction etweenprima facie and all-things-consideredbligations and to do justiceto prima facie obligations. Alleged dilemmas are really conflictsbetween undefeatedprimafacieobligations.Such conflicts an beunfortunate ut are not paradoxical. Indeed, whenwe understandprima facie obligationsas genuine moral factors r forces n situ-ations,we will better understandwhy nsoluble and even solubleconflicts an be unfortunate nd even tragic.40UniversityfCalifornia,an Diego

39Sinnott-Armstrongepresents imself s a friend f dilemmas;he con-strues them as conflicts mong non-overriddenmoral requirements nddenies that theyhave paradoxical implications or ethicaltheory. ee Wal-ter Sinnott-Armstrong,oralDilemmas Oxford: Blackwell,1988). Becausenon-overriddenmoral requirementsust are undefeated prima facie obli-gations, agree that fwe understood moral dilemmas as involving uchconflicts, hen moral dilemmas would have no paradoxical implications.But Sinnott-Armstrong ust deny,what other participantsn the debates(for example, Williams,van Fraassen, Marcus, Foot, and McConnell) as-sume, that moral dilemmas involve conflicts f all-things-consideredbli-gations,to which familiar eontic principles pply.40Thispaper was written uringa fellowship t theCenter forAdvancedStudy n the Behavioral Sciences that was funded by an Old DominionFellowship from the Massachusetts nstitute f Technologyand by grantsfrom the National Endowment for the Humanities (#RA-20037-88) andthe AndrewW. Mellon Foundation. I would like to thankthese nstitutionsfor their upport. would also like to thankNorman Dahl, Alan Donagan,CatherineElgin,Ted Everett,MarkJohnston, errance McConnell, AlisonMcIntyre, uthMarcus,Gene Mason,Paul Pietroski, eter Railton,AmnlieRorty,Alan Sidelle, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong,obert Stalnaker, PeterVranas,Susan Wolf, he editors of the Philosophical eview,nd audiencesat theUniversityfMinnesotaConference on Moral Dilemmas,PrincetonUniversity,he UniversityfVermont,BrownUniversity,he UniversityfWisconsinat Madison,theUniversityfArizona,TuftsUniversity,heUni-versityfVirginia, heUniversityf SouthernCalifornia, nd theUniversityof California t San Diego forhelpfulcommentsand discussion.

brink, moral conflict and its structure

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