BRITISH COLUMBIA ENVIRONMENTAL

ASSESSMENT LAW

NOVEMBER 26, 2012

Overview

• Environmental Assessment Act - Elements

• Environmental Assessment Act – Issues

• BC Auditor General Report

• Northwest Institute Report comparing Federal/Provincial EAs for Prosperity Mine

Environmental Assessment Act

• Environmental Assessment Act (EAA) passed in 1994, amended in 2002

• Environmental Assessment Office (EAO) established under EAA to provide “open, accountable and neutrally administered process” to assess “reviewable projects”

• Reviewable Projects Regulation identified projects to be reviewed (energy, mining, industry)

Purposes

• “promote sustainability by protecting the environment and fostering a sound economy and social well-being”

• “prevent or mitigate adverse effects of reviewable projects”

• Repealed in 2002 amendments

Key Elements • Projects reviewable by virtue of regulation,

EAO executive director discretion, ministerial order

• Reviewable projects not be constructed without provincial EA certificate

• EAO reviewable project determination• EAO makes order on scope, procedures,

methods for project EA • Proponent proposes terms of reference for

EAO approval

Key Elements

• Proponent assembles required information and public input, applies for EA certificate

• EAO reviews application and assessment report for two or more ministers with jurisdiction

• Ministers decide to issue certificate, specify conditions, or refer for further assessment

Key Elements (1994)

• Mandatory project committees to advise ministers (provincial, federal, municipal, regional, First Nations representatives)

• Public advisory committee to make recommendations to project committee

• Mandatory public notice provisions at each of four EA process stages

• Environmental Assessment Board to conduct hearings on projects referred by Ministers

Key Amendments (2002)

• Provided decision-making flexibillity for EAO and Ministers (“less regimented” “more timely and cost-efficient”)

• Mandatory project committees replaced by working groups with reduced role

• Public advisory committees eliminated

• Public consultation mainly by proponent

• Mandatory public notice provisions replaced by policy guidance

Reviewable Project Regulations

• Coal Mine – 100,000 t/yr (1994), 250,000 t/yr (2002)

• Mineral Mine - 25,000 t/yr (1994), 75,000 to/yr (2002)

• Energy Project - 20 MW (1994), 50 MW (2002)

• Urban Transit Rail - 8 km (1994), 20 km (2002)

Implications of Thresholds for Reviewable Project Regulations

• Vancouver Airport Light Rail Project

would not have been reviewed (less than 20km)

• BC Energy Plan opened up hydro development to private sector– January 2009 – 145 water power licences

plus 621 applications (many at 49MW); only 25 subject to BC EA process

Key Issues

• Project Thresholds

• Links to land use planning, strategic EA

• Adequacy of public participation

• Suitability of EA to meet Crown consultation responsibilities

• Rigour of Process

Prosperity Gold/Copper Mine

Prosperity Mine

Prosperity Mine

• Proponent Taseko re-activated BC EA process in 2002, federal process in 2006

• RAs: DFO, Transport Canada, NRCan

• DFO referred project to Environment Minister for panel review in February 2007

• BC decided to proceed with provincial review in June 2008 not joint panel review

• Environment Minister referred to federal review panel in January 2009

Prosperity Mine

• EA processes conducted separately with province approving project before federal panel review completed

• BC approved mine; feds rejected mine on recommendation of federal panel

• Why different findings and conclusions?

Comparison of BC and Federal EA Processes

• Analysis by Northwest Institute July 2011

• BC EAO “only one significant adverse effect” “limited to a discrete location” loss of fish and fish habitat at Fish Lake/Little Fish Lake

• BC ministers advised adverse effects justified by “very significant employment and economic benefits” and proponent’s fish habitat compensation program

Comparison of BC and Federal EA Processes

• Federal panel found eight additional

significant eight adverse effects: grizzly bears, navigation ,local tourism, grazing, First Nation’s trapline, First Nations’ traditional land use and cultural heritage, Aboriginal rights, future generations.

• Proponent’s fish habitat compensation program not viable, mitigation not sufficient

Comparison of BC and Federal EA Processes

• Why divergent outcomes?

• Process: BC “review and comment” process vs. federal panel hearings

• Information: Federal panel had more complete information (DFO, First Nations)

• Expertise: Federal panel members highly qualified (chair with 27 years experience); EAO four staff on working group

Comparison of BC and Federal EA Processes

• Participant Funding – feds yes; BC no

• Significance Determination - EAO used large geographic area as baseline; feds, CEA Agency guidelines

• Mitigation: BC lacked clear mitigation and compensation policies, deferred to future planning efforts; feds “no net loss” fish habitat policy

Comparison of BC and Federal EA Processes

• Standards and Criteria: BC lacks

standards/criteria to guide decision-making comparable to Fisheries Act/SARA

• Legislation: BC Environmental Assessment largely procedural, lacked many substantive aspects of CEAA

• Independence: Federal Panel independent unlike EAO Working Group

Comparison of BC and Federal EA Processes

• Federal panel found eight additional significant eight adverse effects: grizzly bears, navigation,local tourism, grazing, First Nation’s trapline, First Nations’ traditional land use and cultural heritage, Aboriginal rights, and future generations.• Proponent’s fish habitat compensation program not viable, mitigation not adequateWhat accounts for such divergent outcomes? This report reviews and evaluates the• provincial and federal EA processes as they are disclosed in the record provided by the• BC EAO and Federal Review Panel. It concludes that the major differences between the• two processes may be understood by the following differences:• 1. Process: The BC EAO process involved information meetings and a “review and• comment” period in 2009, based on Taseko Mines Ltd.’s initial application. By• contrast, the Federal Review Panel required further information from Taseko• 1 Recommendations of the Executive Director, December 17, 2009, p.22.• Prosperity Mine EA Comparison Report, p.4• and, once the information base was found to be adequate, held public hearings• in early 2010. This led to more informed discussion from all sides.• 2. Information: The two different EA processes, and the timing of decisionmaking,• meant that the Federal Review Panel (and hence federal Cabinet) had• more complete information upon which to base their analysis. For example, the• EAO did not wait for critical information from Fisheries and Oceans Canada, and• from First Nations and their expert advisors, leading to deficiencies in the factual• record placed before the provincial ministers.• 3. Expertise: The Federal Review Panel was highly qualified, with each of its• members being impact assessment professionals with experience of mining• projects. In addition, federal agencies such as Fisheries and Oceans Canada• brought considerable expertise to evaluation of the viability of proposed• compensation measures (e.g. man-made Prosperity Lake), and participant• funding provided by the Federal Review Panel enabled a form of peer review on• several aspects of the project, neither of which were available at the time the• Province approved the project. The provincial Assessment Report discloses four• EAO staff on the working group for the assessment but does not indicate their• qualifications or areas of expertise.• 4. Significance Determinations: A key difference between the BC EAO and• Federal Review Panel is how each assessed the significance of predicted adverse• effects. Many of the impacts found to be significant by the Federal Review Panel• were dismissed as insignificant by the EAO by measuring them against a large• geographic area, in some cases the whole Cariboo-Chilcotin region. By contrast,• the Federal Review Panel adopted established significance determination policies• developed by the Canadian Environmental Assessment Authority. Some adverse• effects found by the Federal Review Panel were not evaluated by the BC EAO.• 5. Mitigation and Compensation: BC lacks clear mitigation and compensation• policies, leaving the EAO somewhat rudderless when it comes to significance• determinations because each and every adverse effect becomes an opportunity• for negotiation. The BC Ministry of Environment developed broadly worded• objectives and “performance measures” to guide compensation for the loss of• Fish Lake, but key issues were deferred to future planning efforts. By contrast,• the Federal Review Panel and Fisheries and Oceans Canada were guided by a• long-established “no net loss” policy for the destruction of fish habitat. A July• 2011 audit by the BC Auditor General recommends that the EAO “work with the• Ministry of Environment to finalize a policy framework that will provide provincial• guidance on environmental mitigation.”• 6. Standards and Criteria: For many environmental values there are no• standards or criteria to guide decision-making in BC provincial legislation, such as• those found in Canada’s Fisheries Act and Species at Risk Act. This is leads to• Prosperity Mine EA Comparison Report, p.5• significance determinations that are highly subjective and malleable. In this• assessment, the BC EAO dismissed wildlife-related concerns expressed by the• provincial Ministry of Environment and missed significant adverse cumulative• effects to the threatened South Chilcotin grizzly bear population.• 7. Legislation: The BC Environmental Assessment is largely procedural and lacks• many of the substantive aspects of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act• (CEAA). Key impact assessment concepts and terminology are not addressed or• defined in the provincial legislation. There are no decision-making criteria such• as those that guide responsible authorities under CEAA.• 8. Independence: The independence of the Federal Review Panel may account• for some of the differences in the outcomes. Given that the EAO found no• significant adverse effects to anything other than fish and fish habitat in the face• of strong evidence to the contrary, the question inevitably arises as to whether• the reporting relationship of the EAO to the relevant provincial ministers subtly or• indirectly affects its judgment, objectivity and neutrality.

Report of BC Auditor General on BC EAO July 2011

• Focused on post-certification • EAO’s oversight of certified projects not

sufficient to ensure that potential significant effects are avoided/mitigated

• EAO not ensuring that:– certificate commitments are measureable,

enforceable– monitoring responsibilities are clearly defined– compliance and enforcement actions are

effective

Report of BC Auditor General on BC EAO

• EAO not evaluating effectiveness of environmental assessment mitigation measures to ensure projects are achieving desired outcomes

• EAO not making appropriate monitoring, compliance and outcome information available to public to ensure accountability