british intellegence in mesopotamia, 1919-1921

Upload: fauzan-rasip

Post on 01-Jun-2018

231 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

  • 8/9/2019 British Intellegence in Mesopotamia, 1919-1921

    1/14

  • 8/9/2019 British Intellegence in Mesopotamia, 1919-1921

    2/14

    British Intelligence

    and the

    Causes

    of

    Unrest

    in

    Mesopotamia,

    1919-21

    A. L. MACFIE

    In

    the autumn

    of

    1920

    Major

    N.N.E.

    Bray,

    a

    special intelligence

    officer

    attached to

    the Political

    Department

    at

    the

    India

    Office,

    wrote

    (in

    one case

    in conjunction with the WarOffice) three major reports on the causes of

    unrest n

    Mesopotamia,

    where a rebellion of substantial

    proportions,

    costing

    tens

    of

    thousands

    of

    lives,

    had

    recently

    broken

    out.

    The conclusions

    drawn

    therein,

    based

    almost

    entirely

    on

    information

    collected

    by

    British

    intelligence,

    were from the

    British point

    of view

    disturbing.

    For

    in

    Bray's

    view the unrest

    n

    Mesopotamia

    was

    the

    product

    not

    only

    of local discontent

    and

    faults

    in

    the

    administration,recently established,

    but also of a wide-

    ranging conspiracy,

    originating

    n

    Berlin

    and Moscow.' With the

    publication

    of Masayuki Yamauchi's The Green Crescent under the Red Star: Enver

    Pasha in Soviet Russia, 1919-22 and other recent studies, it now

    becomes

    possible

    to

    check

    the evidence

    presented by Bray,

    in

    support

    of his

    thesis,

    and test the

    validity

    of his

    conclusions.2

    The

    results

    are

    surprising.

    While

    much, but by

    no

    means all, of the material contained

    in

    Bray's

    reports

    proves reasonably accurate,

    the conclusions drawn, though at

    first

    sight

    valid, must be considered,with the

    advantage

    of

    hindsight,

    misleading.

    Bray's interest

    in

    questions

    concerning

    the

    external causes of

    sedition

    in

    the British Empire in Asia appearsto have originatedin remarks made by

    Sir Charles

    Cleveland,

    Head

    of

    the India

    secret

    service,

    at

    a a

    meeting,

    chaired

    by

    Field Marshal

    Lord

    Nicholson,

    Chief of Staff

    of

    the

    British

    Army, held at the military

    headquartersbuilding, Simla, in 1911. At that

    meeting, supposedly called to review the question of expenditure

    on the

    army

    in

    India,but

    in

    fact

    mainly concerned with the threatposed to

    British

    authority

    in

    the

    subcontinent

    by

    the

    rising

    tide of

    nationalism

    in

    the area,

    Cleveland

    -

    so

    Bray,

    who

    attended the

    meeting, later recalled

    -

    had

    remarked hatin India they did not only have to deal with political agitation,

    but

    also with

    sedition, fostered

    in

    baffling secrecy.

    Unrest

    was

    spreading

    like a

    hidden fire.

    Suppressed

    in

    one place it immediately broke

    out in

    another. 'These

    outbreaks

    are interconnected, highly organised and my

    impression

    ... is

    that they

    are controlled by one great intellect, but whose?

    Middle

    EasternStudies, Vol.35,

    No.1, January1999, pp.165-177

    PUBLISHED

    BY FRANK

    CASS,

    LONDON

    This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Mon, 16 Mar 2015 16:38:17 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

    http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

  • 8/9/2019 British Intellegence in Mesopotamia, 1919-1921

    3/14

    166

    MIDDLE

    EASTERN

    STUDIES

    So far ... unfortunately

    .. with all the

    machinery

    at our

    disposal

    ... we

    have

    been unable to discover.'3

    Thus inspired by Cleveland's

    words,

    in

    1913

    Bray, fully

    convinced

    of

    the urgent need to discover the sources of sedition in Asia, and the identity

    of the

    'one great intellect',

    supposedly controlling

    events

    there,

    obtained

    a

    year's

    leave of absence

    from

    the

    Indian

    army,

    n

    which he was

    serving

    at

    the

    time, and made

    for

    Syria,

    where

    he had

    been led

    to

    believe German

    influence was spreadingrapidly. There he found abundantevidence of the

    spread

    of

    German influence,

    and also of

    the

    rise

    of

    Arab

    nationalism. But

    he failed to discover the

    identity of the 'one great intellect' supposedly

    controlling events. Nevertheless,

    as his

    later accounts

    of the

    causes

    of

    unrest

    in Mesopotamia show, he did not abandonthe quest.

    In the first of his reports,

    entitled 'Mesopotamia. PreliminaryReport on

    Causes

    of

    Unrest',

    drawn

    up

    on the instructions of the

    Secretary

    to the

    Political Department, India

    Office,

    in

    September 1920, Bray fully

    acknowledged the important part played

    in

    the recent uprising

    in

    Mesopotamia by local

    elements, including

    in

    particular pan-Arabs,

    nationalists, 'disgruntled Effendi', tribesmen, 'impatient of their forced

    inaction', 'fanatical' priests, and the educated classes, many of whom,

    'prolific students of history', had adopted the nationalist cause. Left to

    themselves, Bray argued, none of these

    groups

    and

    classes, bitterly

    hostile

    to

    one

    another

    and

    saturated

    with

    intrigue, would have proved capable of

    generating

    a

    concerted action.

    That was

    made

    possible only by

    the existence

    of

    an 'outside influence',

    exercised through

    the medium of

    Berlin and

    Moscow.4

    The objectives of this 'outside influence', exercised throughthe medium

    of Berlin

    and Moscow, were clear:

    (a) By every possible means to discreditthe Entente and sow dissension in

    its

    ranks.

    (b)

    To

    organize

    national

    forces

    in

    Anatolia and Thrace, obtaining men,

    arms and

    money

    from the

    Bolsheviks or Berlin.

    (c)

    To

    prepare

    rebellion

    on

    a

    large

    scale

    in

    Syria

    and

    Mesopotamia.

    (d)

    To

    organize

    all the

    parties

    concerned so

    as to produce simultaneous

    action.

    Unfortunately, owing to the impatience of the tribes, the uprising in

    Mesopotamia

    had

    proved

    premature;

    but efforts

    were

    evidently continuing

    to keep the agitation going and

    frustrate

    all

    attempts

    at

    conciliation.5

    Much evidence was adduced

    by Bray

    in

    supportof

    his

    contention that a

    wide-ranging conspiracy

    existed,

    aimed at the

    Entente Powers in Asia

    and

    channelled

    through

    the

    medium of Berlin and Moscow. On

    or about

    15

    November

    1919,

    he

    asserts,

    a

    'very important' meeting

    was

    held

    at

    This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Mon, 16 Mar 2015 16:38:17 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

    http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

  • 8/9/2019 British Intellegence in Mesopotamia, 1919-1921

    4/14

    CAUSES

    OF

    UNREST

    IN

    MESOPOTAMIA,

    1919-21

    167

    Montreux, presided

    over

    by

    Talaat

    Passa,

    the exiled

    Committee

    of

    Union

    and

    Progress (CUP) leader

    and

    Ottoman Grand Vizier in the First

    World

    War.

    At

    this

    meeting,

    which

    was also attended

    by

    a

    representative

    of

    Emir

    Faisal,

    the leader of

    the

    Arab

    national

    forces

    in

    Syria,proposals

    were,

    it was

    reported,discussed for the

    formation

    of a

    defensive alliance

    between

    the

    Syrian

    nationalists,the Turkish

    nationalists and

    the Arab

    sheikhs

    of

    Arabia.

    The

    Arab

    sheikhs,

    in

    particular,

    might

    be

    united under

    the

    leadership

    of

    Emir

    Hussein, Faisal's

    father, the so-called

    'King

    of

    the

    Hedjaz'.

    In

    December

    1919, at

    a similar

    meeting held

    in

    St

    Moritz,

    attended

    on this

    occasion also

    by

    Amir

    Shakib

    Arslan,

    an

    influential

    Syrian,

    who

    had

    it

    seems

    by

    then

    been

    instructed

    by

    Faisal to

    agree

    to the

    proposals

    put

    forwardby Talaatat Montreux n November,a proposal- so it was reported

    -

    was

    discussed for the

    formation of an

    alliance between

    Enver

    Pasha,

    the

    exiled CUP

    leader and

    Ottoman Minister of

    War

    in

    the First

    World

    War,

    Mustafa

    Kemal, the

    leader

    of the Turkish

    national movement in

    Anatolia,

    the Arab sheikhs

    and the

    Bolsheviks. Emir

    Shakib

    Arslan,

    it

    was

    said,

    was

    instructed to

    go to

    Moscow, to

    make contact

    with the Soviet

    government

    there. But in

    the

    event, it seems,

    he did

    not

    do

    so. Instead he

    is

    reportedto

    have

    sent a letter to

    Litvinoff, the

    Soviet

    representative

    in

    Copenhagen,

    asking him to forwardthe proposalto Moscow. In the meantime letters and

    telegrams,

    despatched by

    the

    Ottoman Minister of

    War and

    others

    in

    Istanbul

    (Constantinople)

    to

    the

    army

    commanders

    n

    Anatolia, intercepted

    by British

    intelligence,

    or

    otherwise

    obtained, indicated that

    the Turkish

    nationalist

    army

    commanders,

    in

    particular the

    commander of

    the

    Thirteenth

    Army

    Corps,

    stationed

    in

    Diarbekir,

    were

    being instructed

    to

    make

    contact with

    leading

    sheikhs

    in

    Syria andIraq

    and promote

    resistance

    to the

    forces of

    the

    occupying

    powers,

    stationed there;

    while various

    agencies, established in Switzerland and other Europeancountries, were

    reported

    to be in

    constant

    touch

    with Arab

    nationalist and

    pan-Islamist

    secret

    societies,

    such as

    Nadi-al-Arabi and

    El

    Ahd,

    operating

    in

    the

    Arab

    provinces.6

    Not

    that

    it

    should be

    assumed,

    Bray

    added,

    thatEmir

    Faisal

    andMustafa

    Kemal were

    entirely

    committed

    to an

    anti-Ententestance. Emir

    Faisal may

    well

    have

    been

    forced by

    the

    extremists

    within his

    movement to

    acquiesce

    in

    action

    distasteful

    to himself

    personally,

    while Mustafa

    Kemal clearly

    hoped that he would be enabled to negotiate a settlementwith the Entente

    Powers,

    freeing him

    from

    his

    dependence on

    Bolshevik andArab

    support.7

    The

    pro-Turkish

    nationalists in

    Syria,Bray

    concluded,had

    been

    steadily

    organizing since the

    conclusion

    of the

    Armistice of

    Mudros (30

    October

    1918),

    but

    it

    was

    only following

    the

    formationof an

    alliance with the

    pan-

    Arab

    movement and

    the

    Arab tribes,

    organized on a

    religious

    basis, that

    they

    had

    become

    capable of

    taking

    effective

    action. Time

    and

    circumstance

    This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Mon, 16 Mar 2015 16:38:17 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

    http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

  • 8/9/2019 British Intellegence in Mesopotamia, 1919-1921

    5/14

    168

    MIDDLE

    EASTERN STUDIES

    had provided the means for

    these arrangements

    o

    be

    made,

    and a

    certain

    degree of co-operation

    had been

    attained;

    but the

    combined

    action

    contemplated had

    not

    yet taken

    place.

    Success

    in

    the future would

    depend

    largely on the strength of the

    pan-Islamist movement. But it should

    not be

    doubted

    that both the

    pan-Islamist

    movement

    and

    the

    various national

    movements concerned derived their inspiration

    from

    Berlin

    -

    through

    Switzerland and Moscow.

    Though quite

    where

    the

    ultimate

    controlling

    forces of the movement lay remained

    in

    doubt:

    'These

    we

    have

    yet

    to find.

    Because we find the threads

    leading to Berlin and Moscow

    it

    by no

    means

    proves that we have reached

    the end of our investigations,

    we

    have

    only

    commenced

    them.'8

    In the second of his reports on the causes of unrest in Mesopotamia,

    entitled 'Mesopotamia: Causes of Unrest

    -

    Report No.11', composed

    about

    the

    same time as the first,

    Bray

    concentrateshis attention on

    the

    Soviet and

    German aspects of

    the

    affair.

    In his

    view,

    the

    Soviets,

    intent on

    promoting

    revolution throughout the

    world, were

    at

    that

    time

    concentrating

    their

    efforts on

    the

    Middle East,

    with the

    avowed

    intent of

    'crushing the

    British

    Empire'.' Their methods of

    procedure, which included the training of

    emissaries

    in

    communist

    principles,

    their

    despatch

    to

    the various countries

    concerned, the organization of secret societies, and the organization of

    revolution 'from within', were

    designed to secure the maximum result with

    the

    minimum forces.

    In

    Anatolia,

    in

    particular,

    a

    coup d'etat might

    be

    attempted, establishing

    a

    Soviet regime;

    and

    in

    northern

    Persia

    a

    military

    occupation.

    In

    this

    way

    the

    Soviet

    Government

    would be enabled

    to

    consolidate and

    organize

    its

    position, and

    from

    the nuclei thus established

    'throw

    out

    her

    sinister tentacles which, groping about in every

    direction,

    seek

    to

    fasten

    themselves on

    local soil, into which their roots will strike,

    giving her a fresh grip of organised conspiracy'.

    The Germans, in Bray's

    view, like the Soviets, saw

    substantial

    advantage

    to

    be gained from the

    spread

    of

    unrest

    and

    revolution

    in

    the

    Middle East; and they too

    actively supported he eastern movement in every

    way possible,

    short of

    direct military involvement. In particular,

    they

    supportedEnver,

    Talaat

    and the other CUP leaders and their

    associates,

    in

    their

    efforts to

    create

    an

    'Asiatic

    Islamic Federation', uniting the various

    national movements

    in

    the

    east.

    The steps which it was believed Enver, Talaatand the other CUPleaders

    and

    their associates had taken to

    create an 'Asiatic Islamic Federation'

    and

    spread opposition

    to the

    Entente Powers

    throughout

    he

    east were recorded

    by Bray

    in his

    second

    report

    in

    some detail. In

    January-February1920,

    so

    it

    was reported, large sums of

    money had been deposited by

    associates of

    Enver

    and Talaat, resident in

    Berlin,

    in

    Swiss banks; and in

    March

    T?A100,000 ad been sent to Istanbul o help the nationalists.' In

    April-May,

    This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Mon, 16 Mar 2015 16:38:17 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

    http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

  • 8/9/2019 British Intellegence in Mesopotamia, 1919-1921

    6/14

    CAUSES OF

    UNREST IN

    MESOPOTAMIA,

    1919-21 169

    Talaat,who

    had in the

    meantime been

    appointedhead

    of

    the

    Asiatic Islamic

    Federation

    branch in Berlin,

    had

    travelled

    to

    Italy,

    where

    he had

    met

    Emmanuel

    Carasso,

    the CUP leader and

    GrandMaster of

    the

    Turkish

    Lodge

    (according to

    Bray

    the

    whole

    of

    the CUP was in the hands of

    the

    Freemasons).

    In

    May-June,

    NejmeddinMolla, at

    a

    meeting

    of

    Young

    Turks,

    Arab

    nationalists

    and Persian

    nationalists, held

    at

    Lugano,

    had

    informed the

    delegates that Mustafa

    Kemal and

    the

    Soviets

    had

    reached

    agreement,

    and

    that

    operations

    on

    a

    large

    scale

    might

    be

    commenced

    in the

    autumn;

    and

    in

    June Talaat had

    organized

    a conference

    in

    Berlin,

    to

    protest

    against

    the

    decisions made

    by

    the

    Entente Powers at the

    San

    Remo

    conference.'2

    Finally, in

    July-August Talaat

    had

    held a

    meeting

    at

    Lucerne,

    attended

    by

    Ismail Hakki Pasha, Fuad Selim and Nedjmeddin Molla, at which it had

    been

    announced that

    the CUP

    and

    the Turkish

    nationalists had reached

    complete agreement.'3

    Meanwhile,

    in

    May 1920, so

    it

    was

    reported,

    Enver

    had

    signed

    an

    agreement

    with

    the

    Bolsheviks to the

    effect that

    Turkey

    would

    institute the

    same

    economic

    system

    as

    Russia;

    and

    the

    Soviets

    and

    the Turkish

    nationalists,

    who

    had

    recently established

    direct

    contact,

    had

    concluded

    a

    secret

    treaty, providing

    for

    mutual

    support

    in

    the

    struggle

    against

    the

    imperialpowers. Lenin would, it was agreed, despatch a military force to

    assist the Turkish

    nationalists in

    Anatolia

    and

    supply

    arms and

    ammunition,

    manufactured

    in

    factories

    set up

    by Krupp,

    the

    German steel

    firm,

    in

    Petrograd.'

    The conclusions

    drawnby Bray from

    the

    evidence

    he had

    presented

    in

    his

    second report

    were,

    from

    the Britishpoint

    of

    view, disturbing:

    It would

    be a

    dangerous

    policy to

    rely on extraneous

    circumstances

    relieving

    us

    of

    our

    dangers,

    unless

    we organize

    our

    resistanceand co-

    ordinate

    these different

    factors

    of

    hostility

    to

    Bolshevism;

    we

    must

    remember

    that our

    opponent

    is

    working on

    a

    highly organized

    and

    single

    minded

    system;

    we have

    to

    oppose

    an

    organized resistance.

    If

    it

    is considered

    that the

    Bolshevist

    regime

    will

    be

    destroyed

    or that

    by

    obtaining peace

    it

    will

    confine

    itself to its own affairs

    it

    by

    no

    means

    follows

    that our

    difficulties will

    disappear.The

    extremist

    section of

    Eastern

    hought have been

    roused

    and

    organized.

    Hundredsof

    capable

    men have

    been

    schooled in

    the

    principles of

    Bolshevism,

    whilst the

    more moderateelements have been instructed n ideals, the fulfilment

    of which

    must tend to

    weaken

    Western

    Control.

    The ball

    has

    been set

    rolling.

    It is

    inconceivable that

    such an

    extensive

    organizationwith

    its

    myriads

    of

    propagandists should

    suddenly

    or

    even

    in

    a

    long period

    become

    innocuous. We have

    therefore two

    separate

    forces to

    contend

    against (1)

    The

    possibility

    of

    the success

    of the

    Bolshevik

    world

    This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Mon, 16 Mar 2015 16:38:17 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

    http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

  • 8/9/2019 British Intellegence in Mesopotamia, 1919-1921

    7/14

    170 MIDDLE

    EASTERN STUDIES

    revolution, (2) The possibility of EASTERN

    NATIONAL

    MOVEMENTS,

    strengthened by Bolshevik

    organization combining

    in

    an anti-

    European

    cause.'5

    In a

    separate section

    of his

    second report, entitled 'Appreciation of the

    Situation', Bray

    noted

    that, according

    to

    the

    intelligence reports received,

    Djemal Passa, the exiled CUP leader and ruler of

    Syria

    in

    the First World

    War,

    had been

    recently

    sent to

    Afghanistan,

    to

    strengthen

    he

    revolutionary

    party there;

    and

    that,

    in

    order to

    promote

    the

    spread

    of revolution

    throughout

    the

    east,

    Talaat had

    been

    charged

    with the direction of the

    revolutionary movement in Syria, Egypt and

    Arabia; Djavid, the former

    CUP leader,with the direction of the movement in Greece, ItalyandFrance;

    and Enver with the direction of the movement

    in

    the Caucasus.'6

    In the third study of the causes

    of

    unrest

    in

    Mesopotamia, entitled

    'Cause of the Outbreak

    in

    Mesopotamia',

    which

    though published

    as a

    General

    Staff

    paper by the

    War

    Office,

    in

    October 1920, bears

    the

    unmistakable

    imprint

    of

    Bray's

    personality

    in

    its

    composition,

    the

    author,

    after

    summarizing

    the contents of the two

    previous papers, completed

    his

    analysis

    of the

    situation.

    The

    outbreak

    n

    Mesopotamia,

    he

    concluded,

    was

    inspired initially by the failure of the Kurds and Arabs to secure the

    independencethey had supposedly been promised by the Entente Powers

    in

    the course of the

    First World War.As a

    result,

    in

    south eastern

    Kurdistan,

    Syria

    and

    Mesopotamia they

    had been

    persuaded

    to take direct action.

    In

    south

    eastern Kurdistan

    he Kurdish

    National Committee had called on the

    tribes to 'cast off the British

    yoke

    and declare

    independence

    under Turkish

    sovereignty'.'7

    In

    Syria

    Emir

    Faisal

    had

    allowed

    himself

    to be declared

    king;

    and

    in

    Mesopotamia

    the

    tribes, encouragedby Syriannationalists,

    had

    risen.

    But the true

    origins

    of the

    uprising lay elsewhere,

    in

    plans hatched

    in

    Europe

    for a

    wide-ranging assault

    on

    the British

    Empire

    in

    Asia, involving

    an alliance of Turkish

    nationalists, Syrian nationalists,

    Arab Nationalists

    and Arab sheikhs.

    In

    November

    1919

    Talaat and

    a

    number of Arab and

    Turkish

    eaders had attended the Montreux

    meeting; and

    in

    December they

    had

    attended the St

    Moritz meeting.

    In

    May 1920 Enver, who it was

    reported had travelled to Moscow,

    'possibly via Switzerland', attended a

    meeting

    of

    the Third

    International

    n

    the

    Russian capital, at which Lenin

    personally expounded

    his

    design

    for

    a

    wide-ranging assault on British

    imperialismin the east, striking hardestat India; and about the same time a

    secret

    treaty

    was concluded

    between

    the

    Soviet

    government

    and

    a number

    of Islamic countries.

    Meanwhile,

    in

    April

    Talaat

    had travelled

    to

    Italy

    to

    meet Emmanuel Carasso.

    In

    May he had travelled to Switzerland to meet

    Djavid; and on

    25

    May

    he

    had attendeda pan-Islamistmeeting at St Moritz,

    also

    attended

    by Djemal,

    at which a

    representativeof the Soviet

    government

    This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Mon, 16 Mar 2015 16:38:17 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

    http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

  • 8/9/2019 British Intellegence in Mesopotamia, 1919-1921

    8/14

    CAUSES OF UNREST

    IN

    MESOPOTAMIA,

    1919-21

    171

    had promised to

    guarantee he

    independence of Azerbaijanand

    send 20,000

    men to

    help

    the Turkish

    nationalists

    in

    Anatolia.

    Finally,

    in

    May-June,

    reports were

    received of an

    Islamic conference held

    in

    Munich,

    at which

    plans, supposedly drawn up

    by

    Mustafa Kemal and the

    Bolsheviks, for

    'large scale

    military

    operations'

    in

    the east, were discussed; and

    in

    July

    reports were

    received

    of a 'Muslim

    Conference', to be held

    in

    Erzerum.8

    Following the May 1920

    meeting

    of the Third

    International,Enver,

    it

    was reported,

    had

    departed

    for

    Baku

    where, according

    to a Moscow

    wireless report, he had

    represented

    he 'Union of

    RevolutionaryPeoples

    of

    Morocco,

    Tunis, Tripoli,

    Turkey

    and Arabia' at the

    Congress

    of the

    Peoples

    of the

    East,

    held there

    in

    September.

    Meanwhile

    Djemal,

    it was

    reported,

    accompaniedby a mixed Turko-Bolshevikmission, had arrivedat Herat,on

    his way to

    Kabul.'9

    'Thus, to

    recapitulate,'Bray

    or the anonymous authorof the WarOffice

    reportconcludes,

    'the month of

    May

    this

    year

    (1920) (markedby

    the close

    of

    the San Remo

    Conference,

    abortive

    industrial

    agitations

    in

    France,

    pronounced aggravation of the Irish

    situation, and

    the

    meeting

    of the

    representatives

    of the

    'Third International'at the Moscow

    Foreign Office)

    found

    co-ordinated

    plans

    on foot for:

    (a)

    Kurdishand Arab resistance to the

    French and British

    in

    Syria

    and

    Mesopotamia,

    (b) TurkishNationalist

    resistance

    to

    the terms of the

    Treaty,assisted

    by Italy,

    and the

    Soviets,

    (c)

    A

    Bolshevik

    advance across the

    Caspian.

    ... The above

    indicates the inception

    of a general

    strategic plan

    directed, ostensibly from Moscow, against France and England, but

    more

    particularly he latter.

    The Moscow

    Direction had a gap in their

    line of attack

    against the BritishEmpire

    which they were

    prepared o

    fill in

    with

    a combined movement of

    Turks, Arabs

    and Kurds ...

    Enver ...

    controlled the

    connecting lever

    ... Thus the true causes of

    the

    present

    outbreak n

    Mesopotamia

    may

    be

    summarizedas follows:

    (a)

    The

    terms of the

    Sykes-Picot

    Agreement which, aggravated by

    divergentdepartmental

    policy

    in

    Arabia

    and

    prematuredevelopments

    of the administration in Mesopotamia accompanied by British

    demobilization

    -

    (b)

    Drove the Arabs

    back into

    the arms of the Young

    Turks,who were

    ready to fit Arab

    co-operation into

    -

    (c)

    A

    preconceived

    Bolshevik plan of attack against

    the British

    This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Mon, 16 Mar 2015 16:38:17 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

    http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

  • 8/9/2019 British Intellegence in Mesopotamia, 1919-1921

    9/14

    172

    MIDDLE

    EASTERN

    STUDIES

    Empire

    as soon as it was

    clear

    that

    -

    (d)

    The terms of the

    Turkish

    Treaty

    were such as to restore

    the

    Turkish

    Nationalists to the Committeeof Union and Progresscontrol.

    In these

    circumstances

    it would

    be idle to search for local

    causes

    otherwise than

    to learn

    how to avoid

    presenting

    the

    enemy

    with

    material

    for propaganda

    or

    disproportionate

    vaporation

    of prestige.20

    The conclusions

    to

    be drawn

    from

    the

    above analysis

    of

    events taking

    place

    in Europe and the

    Middle East

    were evident:

    As

    long as the Moscow

    Direction

    survives

    to absorb

    into

    its

    organization, thrive on and exploit agencies of local discontent,

    Nationalism

    will

    be the instrument

    of Internationalism,

    and until the

    International

    Monster

    has been

    starved, or severed

    at

    the neck,

    its

    variousheads will

    have

    to be dealt

    with

    in

    detail

    when

    and wherethey

    21

    rise.

    How far,

    it

    might

    be enquired,

    was

    the

    information,

    collected by

    British

    intelligence,

    contained in the

    three

    studies of the causes

    of

    unrest

    in

    Mesopotamia,accurate;andhow far were the

    conclusions drawn

    valid?

    The

    material

    collected

    by Masayuki

    Yamauchi

    and other students

    of

    the subject

    would

    suggest

    that, while

    the information

    collected was

    for

    the

    most part

    accurate enough,

    the conclusions

    drawn

    were

    dangerously

    misleading.

    Thereis no

    doubt that,

    in the periodof their

    exile,

    Enver,Talaat,

    Djemal and

    the

    other CUP leaders

    and their associates

    in

    Europe had,

    from the

    beginning

    engaged,

    in

    conjunction

    with

    elements

    within the

    German and

    Soviet

    governments,

    in

    organizing

    a

    wide-ranging

    conspiracy,

    aimed

    at the

    destruction

    of the British

    Empire

    in

    Asia.

    But their efforts

    had proved

    almost

    entirely

    ineffective.

    For

    the

    movements, groups

    and

    factions

    they

    were attempting

    to unite proved

    to be

    riddled with mutual

    suspicion,

    hostility and distrust.

    The

    facts,

    as

    collected

    by Masayuki

    Yamauchi,

    drawn for the most part

    from letters written

    by the main participants

    at the time, tend

    to confirm

    the

    information

    collected by

    British

    intelligence,

    used by

    Bray and

    the War

    Office author

    n

    their three

    reports,

    though

    not

    in

    all

    cases.

    In

    Berlin,

    where

    he arrived

    n

    the early

    part of 1919, following

    an

    abortiveattempt

    o join the

    Army of Islam in the Caucasusmade following his flight to the Crimeain

    November 1918,

    Enver,

    according

    to

    Masayuki

    Yamauchi,

    quickly

    made

    contact

    with Karl

    Radek,

    the noted communist

    agitator

    and

    publicist,

    then

    confined

    in Moabit

    prison.

    Persuaded

    by

    him of the

    advantages

    to be

    gained

    from the

    formation

    of a

    Bolshevik-Islamic

    alliance, with the

    support and

    approval

    of Hans

    von

    Seeckt,

    a German

    general,

    who had

    held the

    post

    of

    This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Mon, 16 Mar 2015 16:38:17 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

    http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

  • 8/9/2019 British Intellegence in Mesopotamia, 1919-1921

    10/14

    CAUSES OF

    UNREST

    IN

    MESOPOTAMIA,

    1919-21

    173

    Chief of the

    OttomanGeneralStaff in the First

    World

    War,

    he then set

    out

    to

    travel

    by

    plane

    to

    Moscow,

    where after

    an

    incredible series of

    delays,

    involving air

    crashes,

    emergency

    landings

    and

    periods

    of

    imprisonment,

    he

    arrived

    in

    August

    1920.

    There (where

    it is

    evident he could not

    have

    attended

    the

    meeting

    of the

    Third

    International

    held

    in

    May)

    Enver

    made

    immediate contact

    with a

    numberof Bolshevik

    leaders,

    including

    Trotsky,

    Chicherin, Karakhan and

    Zinoviev,

    who

    appeared

    willing

    at

    the time

    to

    support

    his

    plans for the

    formation of a

    Turkish-German-Bolshevik

    alliance.

    Following

    his

    attendance at the

    Congress of the

    Peoples

    of

    the

    East, held

    in

    Baku

    in

    September,

    at which he

    was not well

    received,

    he

    returned o

    Moscow, and

    thence to

    Berlin, where

    he set about

    organizingthe

    Union of Islamic RevolutionarySocieties, which he and his colleagues had

    already agreed

    to set

    up.

    Representatives

    of

    various overseas

    branches

    were

    then

    appointed,

    including

    Dr

    Fuad

    Bey

    for

    Egypt,

    Emir

    Shakib Arslan

    for

    Syria, Djemal

    and

    BarakatullahEffendi for

    India,

    and Talaat for

    Berlin.

    Meanwhile

    in

    Anatolia

    Mustafa Kemal would

    be

    expected

    to

    organize

    a

    'centre',

    as

    would Halil

    Pasha,

    Enver's

    uncle,

    in

    east Turkestan

    Kashgar)

    and

    Djemal

    in

    Afghanistan.22

    Whilst

    in

    Moscow

    in the

    summer

    of 1920

    Enver,

    according to

    Masayuki

    Yamauchi, claimed that he had facilitated an agreement between the

    Bolsheviks

    and

    MustafaKemal.

    He also

    claimed that

    Trotskyhad

    promised

    to

    support

    he

    despatch of one or

    two

    cavalry

    divisions,

    recruited

    n

    Muslim

    lands, for

    service in

    Anatolia.23

    Meanwhile,

    in

    Berlin and

    other

    European

    towns and cities,

    Talaat

    who,

    unlike

    Enver,

    had made

    straightfor the

    German

    capital,

    following his

    flight

    from the

    Ottoman

    Empire, worked

    assiduously to

    encourage

    and unite the

    various

    Islamic

    groups,

    opposed to

    the

    imperial

    powers,

    publishing

    periodicals in Turkish and Arabic, and despatching TeshkilatiMahsusa

    (Special

    Organization)agents

    to

    Iran,

    India,Afghanistan

    and the

    Caucasus

    to

    promote

    revolution

    there.

    Surprisingly,

    no

    mention is made

    in

    Masayuki

    Yamauchi's

    account

    of the

    Montreux

    conference,

    andlittle or no

    mention

    of

    the

    Lugano and Munich

    conferences.

    Though

    it

    is noted that

    Talaatmade

    contact

    with

    members of the

    Egyptian national

    movement

    in

    Constance in

    July

    1920,

    and

    with

    Muhammed

    Ali,

    the leader of

    the

    Caliphate

    movement,

    in

    Rome

    in

    August.24

    Djemal, according to Masayuki Yamauchi, like Talaat, made

    immediately

    for

    Berlin,

    following his

    flight from

    the

    OttomanEmpire.

    In

    January

    1919

    he

    informed

    Djavid that it was

    his

    intention to

    leave

    in

    the

    very

    near

    future for

    Afghanistan,

    where

    he hoped to set

    up an

    anti-British

    front.

    But

    he did not in

    fact do

    so. Instead, in

    July he

    moved to

    Klosters

    Platz

    in

    Switzerland

    where, apart

    from a brief

    visit to

    Munich,

    he stayed

    until

    November.25

    Only

    then

    did he set out

    for

    Afghanistan,

    travelling

    This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Mon, 16 Mar 2015 16:38:17 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

    http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

  • 8/9/2019 British Intellegence in Mesopotamia, 1919-1921

    11/14

    174

    MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

    (according

    to

    Azade-Ay-e

    Rorlich) by way

    of

    Stettin,

    in

    the

    company

    of

    500

    prisoners

    of

    war, returning

    home.26

    Throughout

    he remained in close

    touch

    with the other CUP

    leaders,

    Mustafa Kemal

    and a number

    of German

    and

    Soviet

    officers and

    officials sympathetic

    to his cause.

    In

    June

    1920,

    for

    instance, he asked

    Mustafa Kemal to despatch

    competent

    officers to

    Kabul;

    and

    in

    November

    he

    was

    in

    touch

    with

    General Kress von Kressenstein.

    Whereas the information

    provided by

    British

    intelligence

    in

    the

    three

    reports

    drawnup by Bray and the WarOffice

    may

    be considered

    reasonably

    accurate,

    the

    conclusions derived

    from

    it,

    that there existed

    a

    wide-ranging

    conspiracy, unitingvirtually

    all of the enemies of the

    Entente

    in

    Asia,

    must

    be

    considered misleading

    in

    the extreme. The Union of

    Revolutionary

    Societies, organizedby Enver,Talaat,Djemaland theirassociates, in Berlin,

    Moscow andelsewhere, far from

    representing

    all

    the anti-imperialist

    groups

    in the

    Islamic

    world, proved to

    be little more than a

    skeleton

    organization,

    incorporatingonly

    a handful of

    members, mainly CUP.27

    German

    support

    for the

    organization, though

    significant,proved

    in

    the end to be

    of little

    value, for the

    Germanswere

    simply not

    in

    a position at

    the

    time to

    mount a

    major

    campaign; while Soviet

    support

    proved

    unreliable,

    for

    the

    Bolsheviks,

    like

    their Tsarist

    predecessors,

    had no

    desire

    to

    encourage

    the

    spread of pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism n Central Asia. Throughout it

    would seem that

    the

    Soviets, while apparently

    offering

    support,

    surreptitiously obstructed

    Enver's efforts to

    organize

    a

    force

    in

    Transcaucasia

    made

    up

    of Muslim

    troops; andthey

    offered

    to

    despatch

    only

    Russian units

    to assist

    Mustafa Kemal and the

    Turkish nationalists in

    Anatolia.28t

    was the

    discovery of the

    nature and extent

    of Soviet

    duplicity

    that later

    persuaded

    Enver

    to abandon his

    plans for the

    organization

    of an

    alliance

    of all

    the

    anti-imperialist forces

    in

    Asia and

    opt instead for

    participation n the Basmachi revolt, then taking place in easternBukhara.'9

    Nor

    was

    there any love

    lost between

    Mustafa Kemal

    and the

    Bolsheviks.

    Mustafa

    Kemal

    wished merely to use the

    threat of a

    Turkish-Bolshevik

    alliance

    to

    force the

    Entente Powers

    to negotiatea

    satisfactorypeace treaty;

    and his

    negotiations

    with

    the

    Soviets,

    in

    which, as Masayuki Yamauchi

    and

    other

    scholars have

    indicated, Enver

    played

    little

    or

    no part, were

    designed

    to

    produce

    not

    an

    anti-imperialist

    alliance,

    but secure

    frontiers

    n

    the

    east for

    the new

    Turkish

    nation-state he and his

    colleagues were

    in

    the

    process of

    settingup in Anatolia.30As for the Syriannationalists and the Arabsheikhs,

    they

    remained as

    deeply

    divided as

    ever,

    as

    later events

    in

    Syria,

    Mesopotamia and

    Arabia

    showed. The

    British,

    in

    short, in the

    period

    immediately

    following the end

    of the FirstWorldWar,

    had far more

    to fear

    from

    local

    sources

    of

    instability

    and discontent in

    the

    Middle East thanthey

    had

    from

    any

    wide-ranging conspiracy,

    controlled

    by remote forces,

    originating

    in

    Berlin

    and

    Moscow.3

    This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Mon, 16 Mar 2015 16:38:17 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

    http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

  • 8/9/2019 British Intellegence in Mesopotamia, 1919-1921

    12/14

    CAUSES OF UNREST IN MESOPOTAMIA, 1919-21

    175

    The extent of the mutual suspicion,

    hostility and distrust

    that

    divided

    many of the

    members of the Union of Islamic

    Revolutionary

    Societies is

    best

    illustrated

    by the struggle

    for

    power that took place

    between Enver and

    his supporters,

    and

    Mustafa

    Kemal,

    the leader of the Turkish national

    movement in

    Anatolia. As Masayuki Yamauchi makes

    clear,

    from Enver's

    point

    of view the Union of Islamic

    Revolutionary

    Societies

    was

    intended

    merely as a

    'foreign policy

    tool

    of the

    Young

    Turks

    in

    exile',

    a means

    by

    which they

    might

    retrieve

    the

    position

    of

    leadership, supposedly

    'usurped'

    by Mustafa

    Kemal, they

    had lost as a

    result of the defeat inflicted on

    the

    Ottoman Empire

    by

    the

    Entente Powers

    in

    the First World War.32

    o

    this

    end, in

    1920-21, Enver had repeatedly requested the

    Bolshevik leaders to

    set up, finance and supporta Muslim Army in Transcaucasawhich, with

    himself at its head, might at the appropriatemoment

    enter Anatolia

    and re-

    establish CUP control

    there;

    and

    in

    the autumn of

    1920 he

    had

    actually

    dispatched

    a

    numberof

    agents

    to eastern

    Anatolia,

    to

    prepare

    he

    ground

    for

    his return. But

    Mustafa Kemal, well aware of his

    rival's

    intentions,

    had

    taken

    immediate

    steps

    to block

    any

    move he

    might

    make.

    In

    April

    1921

    he

    had had several of Enver's

    agents arrested

    or

    otherwise dealt with, and

    in

    May he had issued strict

    instructions that

    should

    Enver

    appear

    in

    eastern

    Anatolia he should be at once arrestedand sent, under armed guard, to

    Ankara.

    Officers and troops loyal to Envershould be dismissed or

    posted to

    the

    western front. As a result Enver's

    plans for

    an imminent

    return

    to

    Anatolia, and

    by extension

    his

    plans for the creation

    of a

    Bolshevik-pan-

    Turkish-pan-Islamist ront, were frustrated.33

    The

    conclusions drawn by Bray

    in

    the

    three reports

    on

    the causes

    of

    unrest

    in

    Mesopotamia

    show all too

    clearly

    the

    dangers

    involved

    in

    interpreting

    nformation collected by the intelligence services. For if

    acted

    upon, without further consideration, they may well have led British

    officials,

    involved

    in

    policy making

    in

    the Middle

    East,

    to make a series of

    false

    moves. But

    fortunately, from the point of view of future

    British

    influence

    in

    the

    area, many British

    officials, such as Sir Horace Rumbold,

    High

    Commissioner

    in

    Istanbul, and Sir

    Percy Cox, High Commissionerin

    Baghdad, remained

    generally persuaded of

    the primacy of local factors in

    the

    determination of

    events.34

    As

    a

    result

    fears

    of

    a Bolshevik-pan-

    Turkish-pan-Islamistalliance, originating

    in Berlin and Moscow, were

    not

    allowed to dominate Britishpolicy-making in the Middle East, and a series

    of

    local

    settlements

    were

    arrived

    at,

    negotiated for the most part on a case

    by

    case basis.

    Yet until at

    least the end of

    the Turkish

    war of

    independence

    the

    British intelligence services, heavily

    influenced by Bray's

    analysis of

    events,

    remained

    generally convinced of the existence and

    importance of

    some

    such all

    embracing conspiracy.35

    This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Mon, 16 Mar 2015 16:38:17 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

    http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

  • 8/9/2019 British Intellegence in Mesopotamia, 1919-1921

    13/14

    176

    MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

    NOTES

    1.

    British Public

    Record

    Office,

    FO 371 5230

    E12339

    Mesopotamia.

    PreliminaryReport

    on

    Causes

    of Unrest

    by Major

    N.N.E.

    Bray,

    M.C.

    Special Intelligence

    Officer attached

    to

    Political

    Department, ndia Office; FO

    371

    5231 7765

    Mesopotamia.

    Causes of the Unrest

    ReportNo.11;WO

    33 969

    Cause

    of

    the Outbreak

    n

    Mesopotamia.

    2.

    MasayukiYamauchi,TheGreen Crescent

    under

    the Red

    Star:

    EnverPasha in Soviet

    Russia,

    1919-1922 (Institutefor the

    Study of Languages and Cultures

    of

    Asia and

    Africa, Tokyo,

    1991). See also

    Azade-Ayse

    Rorlich,

    'Fellow Travellers:

    Enver

    Pasha and the Bolshevik

    Government,1918-1920',

    Asian

    Affairs,

    new

    series,

    Vol.13

    (October 1982);

    and

    Salahi

    R.

    Sonyel,

    'Mustafa Kemal and

    Enver in

    Conflict,

    1919-22',

    Middle

    Eastern

    Studies, Vol.25,

    No.4

    (October1989).

    3.

    N.N.E. Bray,ShiftingSands (Unicorn

    Press,

    1934), pp.8-15.

    See also H.V.F.

    Winstone,

    The

    Illicit Adventure

    JonathanCape,

    1982), pp.60-1.

    4. Mesopotamia,

    PreliminaryReport

    on

    Causes of Unrest, p.3.

    5.

    Ibid., p.4.

    6.

    Ibid., pp.4-7.

    7. Ibid.

    8.

    Ibid., p.7.

    9.

    Mesopotamia,

    Causes of Unrest

    -

    ReportNo.11,p.4.

    10.

    Ibid., p.5.

    11.

    Ibid., p.8. The precise nature

    of

    these

    payments

    remains

    n

    doubt.

    They may

    well

    have come

    from

    accounts,

    held

    by

    the

    exiled CUP leaders in

    European banks.

    Masayuki

    Yamauchi

    argues that the

    claim,

    made

    by

    Falih

    Rifki, that

    the CUP leaders had

    distributed3 million

    gold

    liras

    among

    themselves

    towards he end

    of

    the

    First

    World

    War acks

    credibility,

    but

    he

    admits that Talaat in particularmay well have deposited considered sums of money in

    Europe.Djemalcertainly

    believed

    so,

    and

    Enver claimed that he was indebted o

    Talaat.

    See

    Masayuki

    Yamauchi,

    The

    Green Crescentunder the Red

    Star:

    EnverPasha in

    Soviet

    Russia,

    1919-1922, pp.20-3.

    Enver is said to

    have received

    500,000

    marks from

    Karakhan,

    n

    January1921, to help pay

    for

    his activities.

    12.

    At the San

    Remo

    Conference

    he Entente

    Powers

    completed

    theirwork on the

    drafting

    of

    the

    Turkishpeace

    treaty and allocated

    mandates or a numberof the states

    they

    intended o set

    up

    in

    the Middle East.

    13.

    Mesopotamia,Causes of

    Unrest

    -

    ReportNo.11,pp.6-9.

    14.

    Ibid., pp.10-

    11.

    15.

    Ibid., p.12.

    16. Ibid., pp.14-15.

    17.

    Cause of the Outbreakn

    Mesopotamia,p.5.

    18.

    Ibid., pp.5-1

    1.

    19.

    Ibid., p.13.

    20.

    Ibid., pp.11-12.

    21.

    Ibid., p.12.

    22.

    Masayuki

    Yamauchi,

    The

    Green

    Crescentunder

    the

    Red

    Star:

    EnverPasha in Soviet Russia,

    1919-1922, Chs.1-3.

    MasayukiYamauchishows

    that for much

    of the period 1919-20 the

    British

    had little or no idea where Enver

    was;

    though of course they knew

    that he was in

    Berlin in

    January-February 920, when he made

    contact with

    MajorIvorHedley, a member

    of the

    British

    military

    mission

    there,

    and

    in

    Baku

    in

    September

    1920, when he attended he

    great Congress of the Peoples of the East, held in the city. In July 1920 British military

    intelligence

    in

    Istanbul

    suggested

    that

    he had gone to

    Azerbaijan;and for a time British

    agents

    in

    Meshed believed him to

    be

    in

    Turkestan.Nor had they

    any idea how

    Enver got to

    Moscow.

    In

    fact, as

    MasayukiYamauchiand

    Azade-Ayae

    Rorlich have shown, in 1919-20,

    disguised at times

    as

    a

    delegate

    of the

    Turkish Red

    Crescent

    and as a

    Jewish German

    communist,

    he

    made as

    manyas four

    attempts o reach the

    Soviet capital, the

    first three by

    plane. He

    eventually arrived n August 1920

    travelling by train

    and ship, by way of Stettin

    and

    Konigsberg.

    23.

    Ibid.,

    pp.26, 29,

    38. A

    treaty was

    concluded by

    the Soviets andthe Turkish

    nationalists n

    This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Mon, 16 Mar 2015 16:38:17 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

    http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

  • 8/9/2019 British Intellegence in Mesopotamia, 1919-1921

    14/14

    CAUSES OF UNREST IN MESOPOTAMIA,

    1919-21

    177

    March 1921, the contents of which had been largely agreed

    in

    the autumnof 1920.

    24. Ibid., p.38.

    25. Ibid., pp.l1-12, 28, 30.

    26. Azade-AyaeRorlich, 'Fellow Travellers:EnverPasha and the Soviet

    Govemment,

    1918-20',

    p.291. Djemal

    was

    reported by British intelligence

    to have lived in

    Berlin, Geneva

    and

    Milan,and even to have travelledto Moscow and Istanbul.His plans to promote revolution

    in India were, it seems, highly ambitious, nvolving the creationof a great state or federation

    of states in CentralAsia which, acting in conjunctionwith the Soviets, might provide the

    jumping off groundfor an assault on the British Empire in Asia.

    27. Ali Fuat Cebesoy,MustafaKemal's ambassadornMoscow,wrote that theLeagueof Islamic

    Revolutionary Societies was simply another title

    for the exiled

    remnants

    of

    the CUP. See

    MasayukiYamauchi,The Green Crescent

    under the Red Star:

    Enver

    Pasha

    in

    Soviet

    Russia,

    1919-22,

    p.35.

    28.

    Ibid.,,

    pp.35-6, 61-2.

    29. On Enver's part n the Basmachirevolt see Salahi R. Sonyel, 'Enver Pashaandthe Basmaji

    Movement in CentralAsia', andMarthaB. Olcott, 'The Basmachi or Freemen'sRevolt

    in

    Turkestan,1918-24', Soviet Studies, Vol.33 (July 1981).

    30. For an account of Mustafa Kemal's dealings with the Soviets see Hikmet Bayur, 'Genel

    Savaatan Sonra Antlaamalarimiz',Belleten,

    Vol.30

    (1966);

    and A.L.

    Macfie,

    The Straits

    Question (Institute or Balkan Studies, Salonica, 1993), pp.122-4.

    31. It

    is evident of course that

    the

    ideologies of Marxism,socialism

    and

    anti-imperialismwould

    in due course pose a serious threat o the survival of the British Empire in Asia.

    32. MasayukiYamauchi,

    The Green

    Crescentunder

    the Red Star: Enver

    Pasha

    in

    Soviet Russia.

    1919-1922, p.46.

    3 3. Ibid., pp.46-60.

    34. In October 1922, for example, Sir Horace Rumbold, n a letter despatchedto Lord Curzon,

    the British foreign secretary,wTote: I have always maintained hat Mustafa Kemal adjusted

    the closeness of his relationswith Russia to the necessities of his immediatesituation,never

    going further

    n

    that direction han

    it

    was absolutely necessary

    to

    do,

    and

    that Russia has at

    no time acquiredsuch influence as to be able to dictate the foreign policy of Angora.' See

    FO 371 7906 6468 Rumbold o Curzon, 17 October 1922.

    35. See B.N.

    $im?ir

    (ed.),

    British Documentson Atatairk

    Ankara,

    Turk Tarih

    Kurumu),Vol.IV,

    No.12,

    Enclosure.