british jews and israel

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Committed, concerned and conciliatory:

The attitudes o Jews in Britain towards Israel

Initial ndings rom the 2010 Israel Survey

David Graham and Jonathan Boyd

Institute or Jewish Policy Research July 2010

jpr/report

Supported by


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The Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR) is a London-based

independent Jewish research institute. It aims to advance the prospects o

Jewish communities in Britain and across Europe by conducting research

and developing policy in partnership with those best placed to infuence

Jewish lie.

Authors

Dr David Graham is Director o Social and Demographic Research at JPR. Dr

Graham completed his DPhil at the University o Oxord and is the oremost

expert in the demography o Jews in Britain, having published widely on the

subject. He was previously Senior Research Ocer at the Board o Deputies

o British Jews.

Jonathan Boyd is Executive Director o JPR. A specialist in the study ocontemporary Jewry, he is a ormer Jerusalem Fellow at the Mandel Institute

in Israel, and has held proessional positions in research and policy at the

JDC International Centre or Community Development, the Jewish Agency,

the United Jewish Israel Appeal and the Holocaust Educational Trust.

Research advisors

Professor Stephen H Miller OBE is Emeritus Proessor o Social Research,

City University, Chairman o JPRs Policy Research Advisory Group and

Member o JPRs Board o Directors.

Professor Steven M Cohen is Research Proessor o Jewish Social Policy,

Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute o Religion, and Director o the

Berman Jewish Policy Archive @ NYU Wagner.

Professor Stanley Waterman is Emeritus Proessor o Geography at the

University o Haia and ormer Director o Research at JPR.


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JPR Report July 2010 Committed, concerned and conciliatory: the attitudes o Jews in Britain towards Israel 1

Table of Contents

1 Foreword 3

2 Introduction 7

3 Executive summary 9

4 Exploring variations within the sample:

Zionism and secular/religious outlook 12

Zionists and non-Zionists 12

Secular/religious outlook 13

5 Relationships to Israel 15

5.1. Exile versus Diaspora 15

5.2. God-given land versus ancestral homeland 15

5.3. Israel and Jewish identity 165.4. Israel, Jews and responsibility 17

6 Attachments to Israel 18

6.1. Visiting Israel 18

6.2. Aliyah Emigrating to Israel 18

Should Jews live in Israel? 19

7 Perceptions of Israeli politics and society 20

7.1. Democracy versus corruption 20

7.2. Perceptions o Israels society 21

Infuence o Orthodox Judaism 21

Jewish and non-Jewish minorities in Israel 21

Israeli aid to non-Jews 22

8 Israel: policy, security and the peace process 23

8.1. Security issues 23

Control o the West Bank 23

The security ence/barrier 23


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2 JPR Report July 2010 Committed, concerned and conciliatory: the attitudes o Jews in Britain towards Israel

Is Israel an occupying power? 23The Gaza War 25

Freedom to act? 26

Is Iran an existential threat? 26

8.2. Policy issues 27

Give up territory? 27

Settlement expansion 28

A two-state solution? 28

Negotiate with Hamas? 28

8.3. Peace process 29

Responsibility or the ailure o the peace process 29

Do Palestinians want peace? 30

9 The impact of Israel on Jewish life in Britain 32

9.1. Comort and saety living in Britain 32

Relevance o Israel to lie in Britain 32

Feel comortable in Britain? 32

9.2. Discussing Israel with non-Jewish people 33

9.3. Speaking out 33

9.4. Israel as an issue when voting 35

9.5. Experiences o Israel-related antisemitism in Britain 35

10 Conclusion 36

11 Methodological Summary 38

11.1. Sampling strategy 38

11.2. Sample control and testing the credibility o

the data 38

11.3. Data calibration 38

11.4. Weighting implications o the results o the over/under-representation analysis 39

11.5. Methodological conclusion 40


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Foreword

The relationship o Diaspora Jews to Israelhas long preoccupied Jewish philosophical,theological and ideological debate. Since theearliest days o the Zionist movement, scholars,rabbis, politicians and journalists have discussedhow Jews in the Diaspora shouldrelate to Israel:what responsibilities they should have, whatcontributions they should make, what behavioursthey should exhibit. Opinions have diered, oten

depending upon the historical, geographical orreligious context in which they were developed,but the vibrancy and relevance o the debatecontinue to this day.

The related sociological question how Jews inthe Diaspora actually do relate to Israel has beenregularly investigated in the American Jewishcommunity, but ar less oten in a British Jewishcontext. Indeed, the only signicant data on theattitudes o British Jews to Israel were gathered bythe Institute or Jewish Policy Research (JPR) in

1995 and published in 1997.1 That study painted aportrait o a community that was closely attachedto Israel (81% elt either a strong or moderateattachment), that had, in large measure, visitedIsrael at least once (78%), and that comprisedmany individuals (69%) who had close amilyor riends living there. A clear relationship wasalso demonstrated between religious outlook andattachment to Israel: Jews who sel-identied asTraditional or Orthodox were considerablymore likely to be strongly attached to Israel thanthose who sel-identied as Progressive, Just

Jewish, or Secular. This distinction also playeditsel out on political issues: the Traditional andOrthodox were less likely to support the landor peace principle than the Progressive, Just

Jewish, and Secular. Nevertheless, at that time,69% o the sample as a whole agreed that Israelshould give up some territory in exchange orcredible guarantees o peace.

1 B. Kosmin, A. Lerman and J. Goldberg, The

attachment o British Jews to Israel(London:Institute or Jewish Policy Research, 1997). Thegeneral ndings rom the 1995 study were publishedin: S. H. Miller, M. Schmool and A. Lerman, Socialand political attitudes o British Jews: Some Keyndings o the JPR Survey (London: Institute orJewish Policy Research, 1996).

Possibly the most interesting part o that studywas a table included in the conclusion, whichattempted to capture the nature o the relationshipbetween British Jews and Israel in the past, andto predict, in the view o the authors, how thatrelationship might change in the uture:

Table 1: Predicted changes in the relationship between

British Jews and Israel, as recorded in 19972

In essence, the authors predicted that ... icurrent trends prevail, attachment to Zionismand the Jewish state could become the concerno only a minority with a mostly Traditional

or Orthodox religious outlook.3 O course,when that report was published, ew could havepredicted the turbulence in global and Israeliaairs over the subsequent thirteen years.Numerous events may have contributed to a shitin the outlook o Jews in Britain since those datawere collected. Globally, we have witnessed thepresidency o George W. Bush, 9/11, wars in Iraqand Aghanistan, and a worldwide recession.In Britain, we have lived through the period othe New Labour government under Tony Blairand then Gordon Brown, the inquiries into the

existence o weapons o mass destruction, theprotests against the war in Iraq, and, o course, the

2 Ibid., p.20.3 Ibid.

1

The Past The Future?

Appeals to all

denominations

Greater appeal to

Traditional and Orthodox

Jews

Attachment based onideology and emotion

Attachment based onexperience

The primary ocus o

communal undraising

Declining support or Israel

charities

Zionism most widely

held ideology

Zionism ideologically

irrelevant

A medium or the

expression o Jewish

ethnic identity

Jewish ethnic identity more

broadly based

A ocus or Jewish

communal consensusand strong uniying

actor

A source o communal

division

Central in Jewish li e Diminishing central ity
http://www.jpr.org.uk/http://www.jpr.org.uk/downloads/Attachment%20of%20Jews%20to%20Israel.pdfhttp://www.jpr.org.uk/downloads/Attachment%20of%20Jews%20to%20Israel.pdfhttp://www.jpr.org.uk/downloads/Social_Political_attitudes_Brit_Jews.pdfhttp://www.jpr.org.uk/downloads/Social_Political_attitudes_Brit_Jews.pdfhttp://www.jpr.org.uk/downloads/Social_Political_attitudes_Brit_Jews.pdfhttp://www.jpr.org.uk/downloads/Social_Political_attitudes_Brit_Jews.pdfhttp://www.jpr.org.uk/downloads/Social_Political_attitudes_Brit_Jews.pdfhttp://www.jpr.org.uk/downloads/Social_Political_attitudes_Brit_Jews.pdfhttp://www.jpr.org.uk/downloads/Attachment%20of%20Jews%20to%20Israel.pdfhttp://www.jpr.org.uk/downloads/Attachment%20of%20Jews%20to%20Israel.pdfhttp://www.jpr.org.uk/


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7/7 bombings. And in Israel itsel, we have seen theassassination o ormer Israeli Prime Minister andNobel Laureate Yitzchak Rabin,4 the collapse othe Oslo Accords and the second intifada, Israelsunilateral disengagement rom Gaza, the war withHezballah in Lebanon in 2006, rocket attackson Israeli civilians in Sderot and the surroundingarea, and Operation Cast Lead in 2008-09.

However, until now, there has been no way toassess whether, or indeed precisely how, the

attitudes o Jews in Britain have changed. Insome respects, the 1997 JPR report served as awake-up call to the community. Undoubtedly,immense eort and signicant sums o moneyhave been invested since then in providing youngpeople with opportunities to visit Israel onorganized educational programmes. Indeed, theIsrael Experience, Birthright and MASA havebecome cornerstones oUJIAs UK programme.It is conceivable that such initiatives will havestrengthened attachment levels and reversed thetide; certainly, that was part o their aim.

In terms o political opinions, there are severalhypotheses, but again, no reliable evidence.On the one hand, one can construct a case inavour o a likely shit in a hawkish direction.First, data gathered on an ongoing basis by theCommunity Security Trust, as well as thosecollected by the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiryinto Antisemitism (2006), clearly demonstrate anincrease in levels o antisemitism in Britain.5 Onenatural communal response to antisemitism isto turn inwards, circle the wagons and assume a

deensive posture. It is entirely conceivable thatthis reaction might, in turn, lead to Jews adoptinga more hawkish position on Israeli politics. Thelikelihood o this is strengthened by the data thatshow that one o the sources o contemporaryantisemitism is Islamic extremism, and that surgesin antisemitism are closely linked to the periodicoutbreaks o violence in the Israeli-Palestinian

4 The JPR data reerred to above were collected severalweeks prior to this event.

5 See:Antisemitic Incidents Report 2009 (London:Community Security Trust, 2009); and Report o theAll-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism(London: All-Party Parliamentary Group AgainstAntisemitism, 2006). The CST reported 924antisemitic incidents in 2009, the highest annual totalsince it began recording them in 1984.

confict.6 I Jews in Britain eel threatened anddraw clear parallels between the source o thethreat in Britain and the source o the threat inIsrael, some, at least, will be attracted towardsright-o-centre Israeli government policies.Second, and clearly related, the increasinglyrequent attempts by various British organizationsand institutions to boycott Israel may havesimilarly encouraged Jews in Britain to jump toIsraels deence more readily than in the past.The notion that Israel is singled out or unair

treatment is a common theme in Jewish communaldiscourse, and one would expect to see evidenceo that view in these new data. Furthermore,overarching apprehensions about the generalgrowth o Islamic extremism in Britain maysimilarly encourage Jews in Britain to back Israelin its ongoing eorts to ght delegitimization,hostility and attack.

Intriguingly however, in the recent past, therehave been some interesting indicators o a shit inDiaspora opinion or perhaps o a growing sense

o sel-condence in the opposite direction.The establishment oJStreet in the United Statesin April 2008 was partly based on a belie thatthe views o the majority o American Jews nolonger align with those o the American Jewishleadership, which was perceived, rightly orwrongly by the JStreet ounders, as decidedlyright-o-centre. Similarly,JCall, an initiativethat has garnered considerable support romseveral thousand Jews across Europe, includingprominent French intellectuals Bernard-HenriLvy and Alain Finkielkraut, issued a Call or

Reason earlier this year. JCall, while clearlyrecognising the existential threats aced by Israel,nevertheless argues that the systematic supporto Israeli government policy by Jews does notserve Israels best interests. This, in turn, inspireda similarly prominent group o American Jewsto publish a comparable statement under the titleFor the Sake o Zion, which holds that Diaspora

6 See: Report o the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiryinto Antisemitism, op. cit., pp.26-30. The CST hasalso noted in the aorementioned report that the

main reason or the record high gures in 2009 wasthe unprecedented number o antisemitic incidentsrecorded in January and February 2009, during andater the confict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza.It added: The number o incidents recorded did notreturn to relatively normal levels until April, somethree months ater the confict ended. (p.4).
http://www.ujia.org/http://www.thecst.org.uk/http://www.thepcaa.org/http://www.thepcaa.org/http://www.thecst.org.uk/docs/CST-incidents-report-09-for-web.pdfhttp://www.antisemitism.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/All-Party-Parliamentary-Inquiry-into-Antisemitism-REPORT.pdfhttp://www.antisemitism.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/All-Party-Parliamentary-Inquiry-into-Antisemitism-REPORT.pdfhttp://jstreet.org/http://www.jcall.eu/?lang=enhttp://salsa.wiredforchange.com/o/1285/p/dia/action/public/?action_KEY=1833http://salsa.wiredforchange.com/o/1285/p/dia/action/public/?action_KEY=1833http://www.jcall.eu/?lang=enhttp://jstreet.org/http://www.antisemitism.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/All-Party-Parliamentary-Inquiry-into-Antisemitism-REPORT.pdfhttp://www.antisemitism.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/All-Party-Parliamentary-Inquiry-into-Antisemitism-REPORT.pdfhttp://www.thecst.org.uk/docs/CST-incidents-report-09-for-web.pdfhttp://www.thepcaa.org/http://www.thepcaa.org/http://www.thecst.org.uk/http://www.ujia.org/


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Jews have a right to call attention to decisionsthe government o Israel takes which, in our view,endanger the State we hold so dear. Thus, thereappears to be a growing sense in some quartersthat Jews in the Diaspora should serve more ascritical riends, than die-hard supporters, o Israel.Evidence that this position is penetrating Britishshores is rather thin, but given what is happeningelsewhere, it would not be surprising i British

Jews attempted to establish similar initiatives here.All o this ought to be located in the context o

the broader debate about whether it is justiableor Jews to criticize Israel publicly at all, andcertainly, this report is published at a time whenthis question is eaturing prominently in Jewishcommunity discourse.7

There are, o course, extremes at both ends othe spectrum o opinion: hard-line criticismand unquestioning support. However, thereare also several positions that sit somewhere inbetween: support in certain instances combinedwith criticism in others; support on certain

undamentals combined with dissatisaction withspecic policies; or perhaps, a general sense oconusion about what to think. Embarking uponthis project, we were conscious that, without someempirical data, there was no reliable way to assesswhere Jews in Britain stand today, how they relateto Israel, in what directions they tend to lean, orhow we might construct an overarching pictureo the dierences o opinion that exist. That wasour goal: in short, to assess the attitudes andattachments o Jews in Britain to Israel.

In considering JPRs overall research agenda,it was clear to us that this issue was worthy oinvestigation. Much Jewish communal discourse istaken up with discussion o Israel. Events in Israelregularly dominate national media headlines.Whether the views expressed by the communitysleadership represent the thrust o grassrootsopinion in the Jewish community has been a mootquestion or some time. Without up-to-date dataabout those grassroots opinions, there has been noway o really knowing. As a result, any criticismlevelled at the communitys leadership or

7 See, or example, Mick Davis, Open debate is ourbest way o deending Israel in the diaspora, TheJewish Chronicle, 17 June 2010. The article alsoappears on the website o theJewish Chronicle underthe title Deending Israel in the diaspora.

adopting the communal stances it has taken, couldbe seen as rather groundless.

However, it is important to note that, inundertaking this research, JPRs primaryinterest has been simply to ull the role it holdsin the Jewish community: to provide reliableand objective data to help inorm constructivepolicy debate. We have not sought to support orundermine any particular communal perspectiveor any particular interest group. Furthermore, we

do not believe, or one moment, that sociologicaldata alone should inorm policy; just because amajority holds a certain position does not meanthat position is automatically correct. Thus, thissurvey was not designed to prove or disprove anypreviously-held hypothesis or position; indeed, wehave worked tirelessly to ensure that the data havebeen gathered, analysed and reported in as neutrala way as possible.

To ensure its credibility, we sought to involvesome o the leading specialists in Jewish social

research. One o the authors o the report is DrDavid Graham, JPRs Director o Social andDemographic Research, who is the oremostexpert in the demography o Jews in Britain. DrGraham has worked extensively with the dataon Jews rom the 2001 UK Census, which hasbeen particularly important in this project aswe have needed to careully cross-reerence oursample with baseline data rom the Census andother sources in order to assess accurately howrepresentative our ndings are.

In addition, the research has undergone extensivepeer review. First and oremost, we are deeplyindebted to Proessor Stephen H. Miller OBE,Emeritus Proessor o Social Research at CityUniversity in London and Chairman o JPRsPolicy Research Advisory Group, who has workedclosely with us, assessing our methodology,examining our ndings, interrogating the datasetitsel, and, in the nal analysis, ensuring that wehave done all in our power to present the datain a air and transparent ashion. We are equallygrateul to Proessor Steven M. Cohen, Research

Proessor o Jewish Social Policy at the HebrewUnion College-Jewish Institute o Religion inNew York and Director o the Berman JewishPolicy Archive @ NYU Wagner, who has broughtall o his knowledge, expertise and experience tothe dataset, and worked closely with us to ensure
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the robustness o our ndings. Finally, we mustalso express our gratitude to Proessor StanleyWaterman, Proessor Emeritus o Geographyat the University o Haia, and ormer Directoro Research at JPR, who has similarly assistedus and careully assessed our work. All o thesescholars have endorsed the accuracy and reliabilityo the data.

JPR was also ably assisted in the early stageso the project by the sta at Ipsos MORI,

the UKs oremost market research company,notably Pamela Bremner and Tom Frere-Smith,who worked closely with us to construct thequestionnaire in as unbiased and user-riendlyashion as possible. They also managed the onlinedata collection exercise with the highest degree oproessionalism and attention to detail, and we aregrateul to them or that. It is, however, importantto make clear that Ipsos MORI played no rolewhatsoever in data analysis or report-writing;

JPR was solely responsible or those elements othe project.

We are also most grateul to the Pears Foundationor unding and supporting this research. TrevorPears, together with the Foundations Director,Charles Keidan, and Deputy Director, AmyPhilip, worked with us to develop the researchbrie and suggest areas or investigation. Theirinterest throughout has been to understandmore about the role that Israel plays in thecomplex identity o Jews in Britain. However,

JPR remained strictly independent throughoutthe research process and all nal decisions about

methodology and question design were taken byJPR alone.

Our nal thanks are extended to JPRs layleadership and proessional sta. In particular,Harold Paisner, JPRs Chairman, who has beena constant source o encouragement and supportthroughout the project, and Judith Russell, TamaraOrmonde and Lena Stanley-Clamp, all o whomhave assisted with the project at various stageso its development, and helped us to complete

the report.

This is the most denitive study ever compiled onthis topic among Jews in Britain. JPR, togetherwith the Pears Foundation, hopes the data willbe used both or scholarly purposes, and toencourage debate within the Jewish communityin Britain about our individual and collectiverelationship with Israel. Certainly, Israel aceschallenges today that would test any nation state.The questions around how Jews in Britain shouldbest engage with Israel its people, civil society

and government are important considerationsor the uture o the Jewish state and or Jews inBritain. The data in this report cannot answerthose questions, but they should, at the veryleast, inorm the debate, and help to establishsome o the parameters within which uturepolicies may unold at all levels o the British

Jewish community.

Jonathan BoydExecutive Director
http://www.ipsos-mori.com/http://www.pearsfoundation.org.uk/http://www.pearsfoundation.org.uk/http://www.ipsos-mori.com/


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Introduction

In Jewish communal discourse, Israel is widelyregarded as being o vital importance to Jewishlie. It regularly dominates Jewish media headlines,it orms the basis o a considerable amount o

Jewish communal activity, and it is a major ocusor Jewish philanthropy. It can be both a source ocommunity cohesion and division; over the courseo its short history, events in Israel have not onlyprompted moments o tremendous communal

unity, but also instances o great anxiety, debateand tension. In the wider British national context,Israel requently eatures as a topic or discussion,and generates a tremendous amount o interestand concern. In short, Israel matters, both to Jewsand non-Jews.

This report investigates the attitudes andattachments to Israel o Jews living in Britain. Itis by ar the most denitive study yet conductedon this subject, and the rst to be undertaken orteen years in Britain. Given the changes in the

political landscape during that time, it would besurprising i opinions among Jews had not shitedor become more nuanced. However, until now,there has been no data to indicate precisely what

Jews in Britain think and eel about Israel today.

This survey shows that the vast majority orespondents exhibitstrong personal support or,and anity with, Israel: 95% have visited thecountry; 90% see it as the ancestral homelando the Jewish people, and 86% eel that Jewshave a special responsibility or its survival. On

the other hand, these strong levels o personalattachment to Israel do not prevent respondentsrom expressing criticism about Israels civilsociety: 74% think that Orthodox Judaism hastoo much infuence in Israel; 67% say there is toomuch corruption in Israels political system; and56% eel that non-Jewish minority groups suerrom discrimination in the country.

It urther paints a portrait o a community thatis highly-engaged with Israel, and that expressespredominantly dovish views on the key political

issues: 78% avour a two-state solution to theconfict with the Palestinians; 74% oppose theexpansion o existing settlements in the WestBank; and 67% avour exchanging land or peace.A majority (52% against 39%) avours negotiatingwith Hamas to achieve peace.

These, and the many other ndings contained inthis report, should contribute to ongoing debatesabout Israel within Britains Jewish community,as well as inorm discussions occurring outsidethe community: in the wider British media, other

Jewish communities around the world, and ocourse, within Israel itsel.

Do the ndings represent the views o

British Jews as a whole?Short o an ocial census which all members oa population are required to complete, no samplesurvey can provide a perect representation o thetarget population. That is particularly the casewhen sampling the Jewish community, becausemembers o the population cannot be identiedby a list, or accessed by any orm o randomprocess. Further, in a survey such as this, whichwas carried out on-line, and where respondents aresel-selected, there is additional potential or biasin the data.

Although it is not possible to devise a samplingmethodology or Jews that will guarantee inadvance that the sample will be representative,it is possible to get a good understanding owho ultimately responded to the survey. We canthereby assess retrospectively how representativethe achieved sample actually turned out to be andi necessary, weight it accordingly. This is done bycomparing the socio-demographic characteristicso the sample with those o the Jewish populationas a whole.

The details o this comparison are set out in themethodology section at the end o this report. Theanalysis shows that the Israel Survey (I.S.) samplehas a remarkably close t with the British Jewishpopulation generally in terms o age, geographicaldistribution, amily structure, employmentstatus, country o birth and Jewish religiouspractice. These close matches indicate that thissample provides a air refection o Jewish opinionin general.

However, on some variables, dierences betweenthe sample and the general Jewish population wereobserved. These dierences are generally minor,but the I.S. does, to some extent, over-representmen, Reorm, Liberal and Masorti synagoguemembers, and Jews with high levels o educational

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achievement. It under-represents central Orthodoxsynagogue members and strictly Orthodox Jews,as well as Jews who describe their outlook asSomewhat secular and Somewhat religious.8Tests show that the over-representation o menhas very little eect on the attitudinal data, andthus it has been ignored. But the higher prevalenceo Progressive/Masorti synagogue members,Secular and highly educated Jews does havean impact, since the data show that these groupstypically hold more dovish and critical views o

Israel. Thereore, i the biases were let unweightedthe results would over-represent such views.

By weighting the data it is possible to assessthe magnitude o this biasing eect and correctstatistically or the distortions in the make-upo the sample. The weighting process applies asimple adjustment to the over-sampled and under-sampled groups, so that their presence in

8 The outlook continuum allows respondents to identiyas Secular, Somewhat secular, Somewhat religious,and Religious.

the sample refects their presence in the Jewishpopulation generally. In accordance with standardsurvey methodology, all the ndings contained inthis report have been weighted to take account othese three data biasessynagogue membership,secular/religious outlook, and educationalachievement.

Further details o this are included within themethodology section at the end o this report.9However, in general terms, it is clear that the

2010 Israel Survey sample accurately refects thediverse character o the Jewish population onmost social, religious and demographic variables.Ater weighting, we have been able to corrector the infuence o known departures rom thepopulation prole. As a result, we are condentthat the picture presented here is unlikely to diermarkedly rom the general pattern o opinion heldby Britains Jewish population in regard to Israel.

9 An extended methodological analysis will be availableshortly on JPRs website (www.jpr.org.uk).


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Executive summary

This sample consists o 4,081 responses to the Israel Survey, which was conductedduring January and February 2010.

Deep ties and strong commitment

For82%ofrespondents,Israelplaysacentralorimportantbutnotcentralrole in their Jewish identities.

90% believe that Israel is the ancestral homeland o the Jewish people. 95% have visited Israel at some point in the past. In contrast, previous studies

reported comparable gures o 91% (2002) and 78% (1995). 72% categorize themselves as Zionists; 21% do not see themselves as Zionists,

and 7% are unsure. Generally speaking, the more religious respondents saythey are, the more likely they are to describe themselves as Zionist.

87% say that Jews in Britain are part o a global Jewish Diaspora; just 19%regard Jews outside Israel as living in exile.

Only 31% agree that the State o Israel has a responsibility or ensuring thesaety o Jews around the world. By contrast, 77% o respondents agree that

Jews have a special responsibility to support Israel.10

Anoverwhelmingmajority(87%)agreesthatJewsareresponsible or

ensuring the survival o Israel over hal (54%) the non-Zionist respondentsalso agree.

Dovish stance on key policy issues

Two-thirds (67%) avour giving up territoryor peace with the Palestinians;28% disagree. Religious respondents are less likely than secular respondents toagree. Nevertheless, almost hal (47%) o all Religious respondents agree thatIsrael should give up territory, as do 76% o the Secular. Similarly, 62% osel-described Zionists agree, compared to 70% o those who see themselves asnon-Zionists.

Almost three-quarters (74%) are opposed to the expansion o existingsettlements in the West Bank (Judea/Samaria). Even among those who denethemselves as Zionist, 70% are opposed.

A large majority (78%) avours a two-state solution to the confict with thePalestinians; 15% are opposed, and 8% are undecided.

Just over hal (52%) think that Israel should negotiate with Hamas, while39% do not.

Clear support on security issues but with somereservations

Hal the sample (50%) agrees that Israeli control o the West Bank (Judea/Samaria) is vital or Israels security, while a sizable minority (40%) disagrees.Religious respondents are more likely to agree than secular respondents.

10 This statement was designed to denote support or Israel in general, rather than the morenarrow meaning o support or the current policies o its government.

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There is still stronger support (72%) or the view that the security ence/separation barrier is vital or Israels security. Sel-dened Zionistrespondents are nearly three times as likely to agree as non-Zionists.

A clear majority (55% against 36%) consider Israel to be an occupying powerin the West Bank (Judea/Samaria); 9% are uncertain. 48% o sel-denedZionist respondents see Israel as an occupying power.

Most (72%) agree that the Gaza War was a legitimate act o sel-deence.Religious and Zionist respondents are considerably more likely to agree withthis than secular and non-Zionist respondents.

A slight majority (52% against 43%) agrees that the government o Israel haslittle or no choice in most o the military action it takes.

Fully 87% o respondents agree that Iran represents a threat to Israelsexistence. Just over two-thirds (68%) o non-Zionist respondents also agree.

Some mixed feelings about the state of Israeli society

A large majority (80%) eels that Democracyis alive and well in Israel. By contrast, 67% agree that there is too muchcorruption in Israels political

system. Only 13% disagree, while 20% are uncertain.

About three-quarters (74%) think that Orthodox Judaism has too muchinfuence in Israels society. Close to hal (45%) o Religious respondents also

agree with this assertion. 60% o respondents agree thatJewish minority groups in Israel, such as people

o Russian or Ethiopian origin, suer rom discrimination, and only 20%disagree. Similarly, 56% agree that non-Jewish minority groups suer romdiscrimination in Israel, while 27% disagree.

Some divergence of opinion on the will for peace

A majority (59%) eels that Israel holds lessresponsibility or the recentailure o the peace process than its neighbours; a third (34%) disagrees.Religious respondents are more sympathetic towards Israel in this respect thansecular respondents. Those with higher level qualications are more critical.

The majority o those with a view (47% compared with 38%) eels that MostPalestinians want peace with Israel; 15% are unsure. Secular and non-Zionistrespondents are the most likely to agree with the statement.

Israel is prominent in the daily lives of Jews in Britain

Over three-quarters (76%) o the sample eel that Israel is relevantto theirday-to-day lives in Britain. Even so, 67% do not eel any conict o loyaltyregarding Britain and Israel.

Just over a quarter (26%) say that they eel uncomortable living in Britainbecause o events in Israel. Respondents living in parts o the country withewer Jews are the most likely to eel uncomortable.

A majority (60%) says that Israel is either not an issue or only one o severalissues that infuences their voting behaviour. 36% say that Israel is either thecentral issue or a high priority issue but not central.


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Almost a quarter (23%) o the sample had witnessed some orm o antisemiticincident in the previous year. O these, over hal (56%) believe that the incidentwas probably or denitely related to the abuser/assailantsviews on Israel.

More than one in ten respondents (11%) said they had been subjected to averbal antisemitic insult or attack in the 12 months leading up to the survey.Over hal o the victims (56%) believe that the incident was probably ordenitely related to the abuser/assailants views on Israel.

Division of opinion on the right to speak out

Over a third (35%) think thatJewishpeople should always eel ree tocriticize Israel in the British media; a urther 38% say that there are some

circumstances when this would be justied. Only a quarter says this is neverjustied.

Just over hal (53%) agree that Jews in Britain have the right to judge Israeleven though they do not live there; a slightly smaller proportion (45%) thinkthat Jews do not have this right as they do not live there.

Religiosity and educational attainment

In general, the more religious respondents reported being, the more hawkishtheir stance on political and security issues; the more secular they were, themore dovish their stance.

Respondentswithhigherlevelsofeducationalattainmenttendedtoexhibitmore dovish stances on political and security issues compared with those withlower levels o educational attainment.


14/43


Exploring variations withinthe sample: Zionism and

secular/religious outlook

In examining attitudes to Israel, we have lookedboth at the views o the sample taken as a whole,and at the views o various sub-groups. Inparticular, we have ocused on variations betweenthose who sel-dene as Zionist and those whodo not, and also at variations based on the secular/

religious outlook continuum.

Zionists and non-ZionistsA key aim o the Israel Survey (I.S.) was to betterunderstand how the term Zionist is used by

Jews in Britain today. At its most undamentallevel, Zionism is a nationalist ideologyespousing the right o the Jewish people to sel-determination in their own sovereign state in theland o Israel. However, as the complexities o thepolitical situation have unolded over time, theterm has oten been used to mean a supporter o

Israel and its governments actions and policies.As a result, some o those opposing Israelsactions, or even its right to exist, have tended touse the term Zionist in derogatory and evenderisory ways. The I.S. investigated both the waysin which the term is being used by Jews in Britain,and the dierences o opinion that exist betweenthose who consider themselves Zionists andthose who do not.

We asked respondents, Although there aredierent opinions about what the term Zionism

means, in general, do you consider yoursel tobe a Zionist? As Figure 1 indicates, 72% orespondents say that they do consider themselvesto be Zionists, whereas 21% say that they do not.11

Further examination o the data revealed thatwhilst nearly all Zionists hold what mightgenerally be considered Zionist opinions, in thesense o proclaiming the right o Jews to a nationalhomeland, by no means all non-Zionists rejectthat right. Thus virtually all sel-dened Zionists(97%) believe that Israel is the ancestral homeland

o the Jewish people, and equally 97% o them seeJews as being responsible or ensuring the survivalo Israel. However, so too do the majority

11 It should be noted that the questionnaire did not oeran anti-Zionist response option.

o non-Zionists: 66% see Israel as the Jewishancestral homeland, and 54% see Jews as beingresponsible or Israels survival (see pages 1517).

What distinguishes non-Zionists romZionists is not so much their view on the status

o Israel as a Jewish national homeland, buttheir tendency to be ar more critical o certainpolicy decisions made by Israels government.For example, non-Zionists are roughly a thirdas likely as Zionists to see the Gaza War as alegitimate act o sel-deence by Israel. Similarly,they are ar less likely to see Israeli control othe West Bank as a vital security measure (27%versus 58%). Thus, it is apparent that many othose who dene themselves as non-Zionist areusing the term to mark their disagreement withcontemporary Israeli government policy, rather

than to signal a lack o support or the concept oIsrael as an expression o Jewish nationhood.

Meanwhile, those who describe themselves asZionist seem to be using the term in its moreundamental sense. However, that does not implythat they hold monolithic positions on Israeli

Dont

know if

'Zionist'

7%

Yes,

'Zionist'

72%

No, not

'Zionist'

21%

Figure 1: Although there are di erent opinions about

what the term Zionismmeans, in general, do you consider

yoursel to be a Zionist? N=3,986

4


15/43


government policy. Indeed, 62% avour givingup territory or peace, and 70% are opposedto expanding existing settlements in the WestBank (Judea/Samaria). Thus, those who denethemselves as Zionist are not always rmsupporters o Israeli government policy, and it isclear rom the analysis that one cannot assumethat all o those labelling themselves Zionists are,by denition, hawkish on political issues. Thismuddying o terminology as it has come to beused in practice by Jews in Britain is worthy o

urther examination.

Secular and religious outlookAnother key aim o this report was to explorethe relationship between Jewish identity andopinions about Israel. O the many indicators o

Jewish identity that could be used to do this (suchas measures o religious observance, synagoguemembership or eelings o Jewish identity),we have ocused on secular/religious outlook.Previous studies have shown that this measuredistinguishes well between dierent sections o

the Jewish population when it comes to Jewish

belies, practices and behaviours.12 Similarly, inthis survey, we ound large dierences betweenthe general Jewish behaviours o Secular andReligious respondents. For example, whilst 16%o Secular respondents Eat only kosher meatat home, 89% o the Religious do so. Even inareas unrelated to ritual observance, there areclear dierences: or example, 17% o Secularrespondents report that they have witnessed anantisemitic incident, whilst 33% o Religiousrespondents make the same claim.

Figure 2 shows that respondents who describethemselves as Secular are the least l ikely othe our outlook types to describe themselvesas Zionist (51%), compared with 70% o theSomewhat secular respondents and over 80%o the Somewhat religious and Religiousrespondents. The data also correlate well with

Jewish practice (or example, 83% o respondentswho Eat only kosher meat at home describethemselves as Zionist, compared to 34% o thosewho do none o the six Jewish practices presented

in the questionnaire).

12 D. J. Graham, Secular or Religious? The Outlook oLondons Jews (London: Institute or Jewish PolicyResearch, 2003); S. Waterman, The Jews o Leeds in2001: portrait o a community (London: Institute orJewish Policy Research, 2003).

51

70

8481

40

21

10 14

9 86 6

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Secular Somewhat

secular

Somewhat

religiousReligious

927 1,237 1,482 340

Dont

know

No not

Zionist

Yes

Zionist

Figure 2: Do you consider yoursel to be a Zionist? by secular/religious outlook


16/43


As was the case with the data on sel-denedZionists, outlook has strong associations withattitudes to Israel. For example, Secularrespondents are approximately twice as likelyas Religious respondents to avour negotiationswith Hamas, and are almost twice as likely tosee Israel as an occupying power in theWest Bank.

Note that respondents reporting a Religiousoutlook are about as likely as the Somewhatreligious to describe themselves as Zionist, ratherthan more likely as the overall trend implies. The

reason or this is that the Religious categoryincludes respondents who are attached to a widevariety o Orthodox synagogue movements.Those belonging to Mainstream Orthodoxsynagogues (including Independent Orthodox,Federation and the United Synagogue) areextremely likely to consider themselves to beZionist (83%), whereas those belonging to strictlyOrthodox synagogues (i.e. those aligned with

the Union o Orthodox Hebrew Congregations(UOHC) who would almost certainly identiy asReligious) are rather less likely to do so (66%)(see Figure 3).

* Due to rounding on this gure, as well as some o the other gures in this report, not all columns total 100.

46 46

56

66 6772

83

44 47

37 16

2520

10

10 7 7

18

8 8 6

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

LiberalJudaism

I do not

belong to asynagogue

Other Union of OrthodoxHebrew

Congregations

Movementfor ReformJudaism

Assemblyof Masorti

Synagogues

MainstreamOrthodox

205 586 186 146 423 142 2,296

Dont

know

No

Yes

Figure 3: Do you consider yoursel to be a Zionist? by synagogue membership*


17/43


Relationships to Israel

In seeking to explore the relationship Jewsin Britain have with Israel, it is important touncover the oundations upon which the bondsare based. We explored this in several ways. First,we looked at the extent to which respondentsregard themselves as living in exile rom home,as compared with simply living in the JewishDiaspora. The terms Diaspora and exile,whilst conceptually similar, have very dierent

meanings in common Jewish parlance: Diasporais a airly neutral term nowadays, typicallyunderstood as meaning outside o Israel,whereas exile is a much stronger term meaningaway rom home. Second, we examined whetherrespondents regard Israel as God-given ascompared with their ancestral homeland. Theormer clearly suggests a religious connection;the latter suggests more o an ethno-historiclink. Third, we explored the role o Israel inrespondents Jewish identities, and the extent towhich they locate it at the heart or the periphery

o their Jewishness. Last, we investigated thedegree to which respondents eel a sense oresponsibility towards Israel, as well as how muchthey eel Israel should be responsible or them andtheir wellbeing.

5.1. Exile versus DiasporaRespondents eel strongly that they are part o aglobal Jewish Diaspora, but eel equally stronglythat they are not living in exile rom Israel. Indeed,76% o respondents disagree or strongly disagreewith the statement, Jews who live outside Israelare living in exile. In complete contrast, 87%agree or strongly agree with the statement, Jewsin Britain are part o a global Jewish Diaspora

(see Figure 4).

5.2. God-given land versusancestral homelandRespondents relate much more strongly to theconcept that Israel is the ancestral homeland othe Jewish people, than they do to the notion thatIsrael was given to the Jewish people by God.Asked whether they agree or disagree with thestatement The Land o Israel was given to theJewish people by God, almost hal (48%) agree orstrongly agree. However, asked whether they agree

or disagree that Israel is the ancestral homelando the Jewish people, the vast majority (90%)agrees or strongly agrees. The latter statement alsoproved to be less challenging or respondentsonly 2% were unwilling to provide an opinion

5

Figure 5: Israel given by God versus ancestral homeland

28

61

20

29

2

12

4

23

4

10

8

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

The Land of Israel

was given to the

Jewish people

by God.

Israel is the

ancestral homeland

of the Jewish

people.

3,987 3,987

Dont know

No opinion

Strongly

disagree

Tend to

disagree

Tend to

agree

Strongly

agree

1

13

38

4 4

6

49

22

4

54

4

1 1

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Jews who live

outside Israel

are living in exile.

Jews in Britain

are part of a global

Jewish Diaspora.

3,988 3,987

Dont know

No opinion

Strongly

disagree

Tend to

disagree

Tend to

agree

Strongly

agree

Figure 4: Exile and Diaspora


18/43


compared with 18% or the ormer statement (seeFigure 5).

This strong sense o historical connection withIsrael correlates with outlook, but it is not justreligious respondents who agree that Israel isthe ancestral Jewish homeland; three-quarters(75%) o sel-described Secular respondentsagree or strongly agree as well. Further, almost all(97%) sel-described Zionist respondents agree orstrongly agree with this, compared with 66% o

non-Zionist respondents.

5.3. Israel and Jewish identityThe vast majority (82%) o respondentseel that Israel is either important but notcentral or central to their Jewish identity(Figure 6). Indeed, or 29% o the sample,Israel is central.

The more religious respondents report being, themore likely they are to say that Israel is centralto their Jewish identity. 64% o the Secular

respondents say Israel is either important butnot central or central, compared with 92% oReligious respondents (see Figure 7). Even

among non-Zionist respondents, 44% eel thatIsrael is important but not central or centralto their Jewish identities.

Israel iscentral to myewish identity

29%

Israel is

important but

not central to

my Jewish

identity

53%

Israel plays no rolein my Jewish identity

6%

Israel plays

a small part

in my Jewish

identity

13%

Figure 6: Which o the ollowing BEST describes the role

o Israel in terms o your Jewish identity? (N=3,924)

19

24

34

49

45

59

56

43

23

12

8 713

5 21

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Secular Somewhat

secular

Somewhat

religious

Religious

899 1,215 1,475 335

Israel plays no role

in my Jewishidentity

Israel plays a small

part in my Jewish

identity

Israel is important

but not central to

my Jewish identity

Israel is central to

my Jewish identity

Figure 7: Which o the ollowing BEST describes the role o Israel in terms o your Jewish identity? by secular/religious

outlook


19/43


5.4. Israel, Jews andresponsibilityRespondents were asked whether or not the Stateo Israel has responsibility or ensuring thesaety o Jews around the world (see Table 1).Less than a third (31%) eels this should be thecase. Indeed, although this is, in some ways, atraditional tenet o Zionism, only 35% o thosewho describe themselves as Zionists agree withthis notion. Nevertheless, it is important to notethat a quarter is undecided about this.13

13 i.e. they selected response box 3 (see Table 1).

Asked the converse o this statement, i.e. whetherJews had a special responsibility to support Israel,there is ar clearer agreement 77% eel this is thecase and only 12% disagree.14

Respondents were also asked whether theyconsider Jews to be responsible or ensuring thesurvival o Israel. Here, the strength o eeling iseven greater the majority o respondents (87%)agree that Jews are responsible or ensuring thesurvival o Israel. Indeed, over two-thirds (67%)

strongly agree, and over hal (54%) o the non-Zionist respondents also agree with this.

14 This statement was designed to denote support orIsrael in general, rather than the more narrow meaningo support or the current policies o its government.

(A) 1 2 3 4 5 (B)

It should be the responsibilityo the State o Israel or ensuring

the saety o Jews around the

world

11 20 24 20 26 It should not be the responsibilityo the State o Israel or ensuring the

saety o Jews around the world

Jews have a specialresponsibility to support Israel

54 23 11 4 8 Jews do not have a specialresponsibility to support Israel

Jews have a special

responsibility to ensure the

survival o Israel

67 20 6 3 4 Jews do not have a special

responsibility to ensure the survival

o Israel

Table 1: The responsibility o Israel towards Jews and o Jews towards Israel*

* Respondents were asked to read each pair o statements and decide which came closest to their own opinion. For example, i they agreed

much more with statement A than with statement B, then they were directed to select box 1. I they agreed equally with both or did not agree

with either, they were directed to select box 3 and so on. Figures represent percentage responses in each row.


20/43


6Attachments to IsraelTwo o the most obvious ways o measuringattachments to Israel are by examining how otenrespondents visit the country, and by assessingtheir appetite or aliyah (emigration to Israel). Itis important to note that whilst many Jews dosimply visit Israel on holiday, the concept o aneducational Israel experience has become one othe cornerstones o Diaspora Jewish education inthe past teen years. According to the underlying

philosophy, organized educational tours to Israelprovide an essential basis or the developmento Jewish identity; by connecting with Jewishhistory, people, culture and language, Jewsare more likely to nd substance and meaningin Judaism, Zionism and Jewish peoplehood.Emigration to Israel is usually understood to bethe ultimate measure o attachment as it servesas the mechanism by which the central goal oZionism the establishment and fourishing oa Jewish state in the land o Israel can best berealised. Thus, we also examined the extent to

which respondents regard aliyah as an imperative;i.e. not only whether individual respondentsintendto live in Israel, but also to what degreethey believe Jews in general shouldlive in Israel.

6.1. Visiting IsraelThe vast majority o the Israel Survey sample(95%) has visited Israel at some point in the past.This proportion sits well with that obtained by

JPR in 2002 or Jews living in London and theSouth-east, which showed that 91% o respondentshad visited Israel. The last (and only) time this

question was asked in a national British surveywas in JPRs 1995 study, which ound that 78% orespondents had previously visited Israel.

In our current survey, whilst 70% o respondentshave been to Israel as a visitor only, one in ve haspreviously lived there, and 7% currently have ahome there. Further, the vast majority (76%) osel-described non-Zionists have also previouslyvisited or lived in Israel.

6.2. Aliyah Emigrating to Israel

Respondents who have not previously lived inIsrael were asked How likely is it that you willlive in Israel in the uture? More than one inve (22%) considers it Very likely or Fairlylikely that they will live in Israel in the uture(Figure 8). The data also show that 42% o

Religious respondents are Very likely orFairly likely to do so, but only 14% o Secularrespondents are.

Dont

know9%

Very

likely10%

Fairly likely

12%

Not at all

likely

39%

Not very

likely

31%

Figure 8: How likely is it that you will live in Israel in theuture? N=2,980*

* Not including respondents who currently live or have ormerly

lived in Israel.

1511

7

18

15

8

28

32

32

29 34

45

10 9 8

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

18-39 40-59 60 and

above

483 930 1,552

Dont

know

Not at all

likely

Not very

likely

Fairly

likely

Very likely

Figure 9: How likely is it that you will live in Israel in the

uture? by age group*

* For all those that have not previously lived in, or currently have a

home in, Israel.


21/43


There is a close association between age andwhether or not respondents think it is likely theywill live in Israel in the uture (Figure 9). One-third (34%) o those aged under 40 say it is Verylikely or Fairly likely that they will live inIsrael, compared with 26% o people in their 40sand 50s, and 15% o those aged 60 and above.

Should Jews live in Israel?

Respondents were asked whether they agreeor disagree that Jews should live in Israel.Relatively ew respondents (28%) agree with thisstatement (Figure 10). Indeed, even respondentswho describe themselves as Zionist are morelikely to disagree than agree (50% compared with36% respectively).

8

20

30 30

0

3

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Stronglyagree

Tend toagree

Tend todisagree

Stronglydisagree

Noopinion

Dontknow

Figure 10: Jews should live in Israel % N=3,986


22/43


7Perceptions of Israelipolitics and societyOne important way o examining the attitudeso Jews in Britain to Israel is to investigate whererespondents stand on some o the major internalissues within contemporary Israeli society. First,we were interested to explore respondents viewson the current state o Israels democracy. Second,we wanted to look at respondents views on theinfuence o Jewish orthodox religious parties

which, together, have won approximately 20%o the total vote in each o the last our elections,and thus play a highly important role withinIsraels political system. Last, in the context o our

exploration o respondents perceptions o Israelisociety, we examined their views on the positiono minority groups in Israel: both Jewish ones (orexample, Jews o Russian or Ethiopian descent),and non-Jewish ones (which include Muslims,Christians and Druze). In each o these ways, wehoped to shed some light on how Jews in Britainsee the state o Israels political system and society.

7.1. Democracy versus corruptionRespondents were asked to what extent they agreeor disagree with the statement, Democracy inIsrael is alive and well. A majority (80%) agrees orstrongly agrees that Israels democracy is robust,in contrast to only 16% that does not (Figure 11).O those in disagreement, there is a noticeabletendency or them to be Secular. Indeed 41% orespondents who disagree (strongly or otherwise)were Secular as opposed to Somewhat secular,Somewhat religious or Religious.

Similarly, respondents who describe themselvesas non-Zionist are considerably more likely thanZionists to be sceptical about the state o Israelsdemocracy (40% compared with 8% respectively)(Figure 12).

Despite the act that a clear majority is condentthat Israel has a strong democracy (Figure 11),67% o respondents agree with the statement,There is too much corruption in Israels politicalsystem (Figure 13). The phrasing o the statement

is important: it does not indicate that two-thirdsbelieve that Israeli politics is inherently corrupt(indeed, the nding on the state o Israels

22

45

10

2

812

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

Strongly

agree

Tend to

agree

Tend to

disagree

Strongly

disagree

No

opinion

Dont

know

Figure 13: There is too much corruption in Israels political

system % (N=3,967)

37

43

11

51

3

0

5

10

1520

25

30

35

40

45

Strongly

agree

Tend to

agree

Tend to

disagree

Strongly

disagree

No

opinion

Dont

know

Figure 11: Democracy in Israel is alive and well %

(N=3,967)

Figure 12: Democracy in Israel is alive and well by Are

you a Zionist?

Dont know

No opinion

Strongly

disagree

Tend to

disagree

Tend to

agree

Strongly

agree

44

16

45

36

7

21

1

3

151

19

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Yes, Zionist No,

not Zionist

2,852 818


23/43


democracy partially demonstrates this), but ratherthat 67% believe the Israeli political system oughtto be less corrupt than it currently is. Furthermore,a relatively high proportion (one in ve) has Noopinion or does not know whether there is toomuch corruption in this regard.

7.2. Perceptions of Israels society

Infuence o Orthodox JudaismRespondents were asked to what extent theyagree or disagree with the statement, OrthodoxJudaism has too much infuence in Israels society.A large majority o the sample (74%) eels thatOrthodox Judaism does have too much infuencein Israels society (N=3,968).

Unsurprisingly, religious respondents are lesslikely to agree with the statement than secularrespondents (Figure 14). Nevertheless, just under

hal (45%) o even Religious respondents agreeor strongly agree that Orthodox Judaism doeshave too much infuence in Israel.

Jewish and non-Jewish minorities inIsraelRespondents were asked to what extent they agreeor disagree that, In Israel, Jewish minority groups,such as people o Russian or Ethiopian origin,suer rom discrimination. A majority (60%)o respondents agree that these Jewish groupsdo suer discrimination in Israelonly 19%

disagrees (Figure 15). However, a relatively largeproportion o the sample (20%) responded Noopinion or Dont know to this statement.

We also asked about other minority groups, andwhether In Israel, non-Jewish minority groupssuer rom discrimination? The biggest non-

Jewish minorities in Israel are Israeli Arabs, whoare made up o Muslims, Christians and Druze.Again, a majority o respondents (56%) agrees,and only 27% disagree that these non-Jewishgroups suer rom discrimination in Israel

(Figure 15). A relatively large proportion (17%)does not know, or did not provide an opinion onthe issue.

60

47

31

18

26

34

36

27

59

20

26

13

22

3 4 55

5 5 6 2

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Secular Somewhat

secular

Somewhat

religious

Religious

919 1,228 1,481 340

Dont know

No opinion

Strongly

disagree

Tend to

disagree

Tend to

agree

Strongly

agree

Figure 14: Orthodox Judaism has too much infuence in Israels society by secular/religious outlook


24/43


Figure 16 shows that responses to this statementabout discrimination against non-Jewish minoritiesalso correlate with educational achievement.Whereas 74% o respondents with postgraduatequalications agree that non-Jewish minoritiesare discriminated against in Israel, only 39% othose with no ormal qualications take the sameview. It is also noticeable that those with ewerqualications were less likely to provide a response.

These responses show that, notwithstanding their

great attachment to Israel, respondents are capableo holding critical views regarding Israeli politicsand society. British Jews may be nearly monolithicin their care and concern or Israel, but theyare ar rom uniorm in their views on speciccontroversial issues.

Israeli aid to non-JewsRespondents were asked whether they elt thatThe State o Israel has a moral responsibility tosend aid to non-Jews in need around the world.Almost two-thirds (64%) agreed or strongly

agreed with the statement, whilst 27% disagreedand 9% were unable to provide an opinion eitherway (N=3,967). Neither secular/religious outlook,nor whether or not the respondent sel-identiedas a Zionist made a dierence to the likelihood oagreeing or disagreeing with this statement.

Figure 15: Is there discrimination against Jewish and

non-Jewish minority groups in Israel? (N=3,966 or each

statement)

10

19

5037

1719

26

4

14 13

8

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

3,966 3,966

In Israel,

non-Jewish

minority groups

suffer from

discrimination.

In Israel, Jewish

minority groups,

such as people

of Russian or

Ethiopian origin,

suffer from

discrimination.

Dont know

No opinion

Strongly

disagree

Tend to

disagree

Tend to

agree

Strongly

agree

12 12

33

2734

41

4122

25

17

13

17

8

5

4

45

4

318 15

116

22

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

None Up to A level or

equivalent

Up to degree level

or equivalent

Postgraduate level

and above

426 926 765 1,103

Dont know

No opinion

Strongly

disagree

Tend to

disagree

Tend to

agree

Strongly

agree

Figure 16: In Israel, non-Jewish minority groups suer rom discrimination by highest educational qualication achieved


25/43


Israel: policy, security andthe peace process

The survey included a number o questionsconcerning the political, religious and territorialdisputes in Israel and the surrounding region. Wewere interested in the stance o Jews in Britain,particularly on issues related to the Israeli-Palestinian confict. In that context, rst weexplored respondents views on Israels securityneeds (or example, whether Israeli control o

the West Bank and the security ence/separationbarrier are seen as vital or Israels security,and whether respondents consider the GazaWarOperation Cast Leadin 2008-09 to havebeen a legitimate act o sel-deence on Israelspart). Second, we looked at their perspectiveson where responsibility lies or ailures in thepeace process: whether Jews in Britain believeIsrael is an occupying power, whether they eelsettlement expansion is right or wrong, andwhether they think Palestinians want to makepeace. Third, we examined their views on how

peace may best be achieved, including their viewson territorial compromise, the two-state solution,and whether the Israeli government should orshould not negotiate with Hamas. Finally, weasked about one broader contemporary issuethat is generating widespread concern: whetherrespondents believe that Iran represents a threatto Israels very existence. All o these issuesare regularly debated both within the Jewishcommunity in Britain and in countless otherBritish contexts; the data below indicate where,and in what measure, opinions coalesce and dier

among Jews living in Britain.

8.1. Security issues

Control o the West BankRespondents were asked whether they agree ordisagree that Israeli control o the West Bank(Judea/Samaria) is vital or Israels security (seeFigure 17). Although a majority o the sample(50%) agrees with this statement, 40% disagreesand 10% Dont know or have No opinion.

The responses on secular/religious outlookcorrelates with opinions on this matter. Forexample, 68% o Religious respondentsagree or strongly agree that the West Bankis vital or security, whereas only 39% oSecular respondents hold this view (Figure

18). Interestingly, 33% o sel-described Zionistrespondents reject the claim that the West Bank isvital or Israels security.

The security ence/barrierA majority o respondents (72%) agree or stronglyagree that The security ence/separation barrier isvital or Israels security, compared with a quarter

(24%) who disagree or strongly disagree (seeFigure 19).

Once again, responses closely correlate withsecular/religious outlook: the vast majority (87%)o Religious respondents agree or strongly agreethat the security ence is vital or Israels security,in contrast to 53% o Secular respondents.

Respondents who dene themselves as Zionists arenearly three times as likely as those who are notZionists to agree or strongly agree that the ence/

barrier is necessary or Israels security (86%compared with 30% respectively) (see Figure 20).

Opinions also correlate with educationalachievement. A large majority (80%) orespondents with up to A-level qualicationsonly agree or strongly agree that the securityence is vital or Israel; in contrast, only 59% othose with postgraduate qualications or aboveare in agreement.

Is Israel an occupying power?

Just over hal the sample (55%) agrees or stronglyagrees that Israel is an occupying power in theWest Bank (Judea/Samaria) (see Figure 21).

8

19

31

24

6

2

8

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Strongly

agree

Tend to

agree

Tend to

disagree

Strongly

disagree

No

opinion

Dont

know

Figure 17: Israeli control o the West Bank (Judea/

Samaria) is vital or Israels security % (N=3,937)


26/43


22

33

1916

4 5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Strongly

agree

Tend to

agree

Tend to

disagree

Strongly

disagree

No

opinion

Dont

know

Figure 21: Israel is an occupying power in the West Bank

(Judea/Samaria) % (N=3,937)

13 1621

36

2629

36

3223

28

24

163116

99

22

22

6 10 85

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Secular Somewhat

secular

Somewhat

religious

Religious

912 1,220 1,467 338

Dont know

No opinion

Strongly

disagree

Tend to

disagree

Tend to

agree

Strongly

agree

Figure 18: Israeli control o the West Bank (Judea/Samaria) is vital or Israels security by secular/religious outlook

Figure 20: The security ence/separation barrier is vital orIsraels security by whether or not Zionist (sel-described)

49

10

37

20

8

27

11

26

36

3

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Yes, Zionist No,

not Zionist

2,838 812

Dont know

No opinion

Strongly

disagree

Tend to

disagree

Tend to

agree

Strongly

agree

39

33

1311

14

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

Stronglyagree

Tend toagree

Tend todisagree

Stronglydisagree

Noopinion

Dontknow

Figure 19: The security ence/separation barrier is vital or

Israels security % (N=4,081)


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A large majority (72%) o Secular respondentsagree or strongly agree that Israel is an occupyingpower, almost twice the proportion o Religiousrespondents (38%) (Figure 22). In addition,non-Zionists are ar more likely than sel-described

Zionists to agree or strongly agree (77% comparedwith 48% respectively) (see Figure 23). Notethereore, that 38% o religious respondents and48% o sel-describing Zionist respondents believeIsrael is an occupying power in the West Bank.

The Gaza War

A majority o the sample (72%) agrees orstrongly agrees that The military action thatIsrael carried out in Gaza (December 2008to January 2009), known as Operation CastLead, was a legitimate act o sel-deence (seeFigure 24).

41

2114 14

32

35

3324

15

18

24

20

14 1936

3

4 54

38 5

2

7

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Secular Somewhat

secular

Somewhat

religious

Religious

913 1,220 1,467 338

Dont know

No opinion

Strongly

disagree

Tend to

disagree

Tend to

agree

Strongly

agree

Figure 22: Israel is an occupying power in the West Bank (Judea/Samaria) by secular/religious outlook

42

30

12 11

1 305

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

Strongly

agree

Tend to

agree

Tend to

disagree

Strongly

disagree

No

opinion

Dont

know

Figure 24: The military action that Israel carried out

in Gaza (December 2008 to January 2009), known as

Operation Cast Lead, was a legitimate act o sel deence

% (N=3,937)

Figure 23: Israel is an occupying power in the West

Bank (Judea/Samaria) by whether or not Zionist (sel-described)

14

48

34

2923

1020

64 44 3

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Yes, Zionist No,

not Zionist

2,838 811

Dont know

No opinion

Strongly

disagree

Tend todisagree

Tend to

agree

Strongly

agree


28/43


Religious respondents are considerably morelikely than Secular respondents to agree thatthe Gaza War was a legitimate act o sel-deence (88% compared with 53% respectively)(Figure 25). Similarly, sel-described Zionistrespondents are two-and-a-hal times as likelyto agree as non-Zionist respondents (85%compared with 33% respectively). Those withlower level qualications are more likely to agreewith the statement than those who have higherlevel qualications.

Freedom to act?Respondents were asked whether or not theyagree that The government o Israel has little orno choice in most o the military action it takes .Overall, a slight majority (52%) agrees, whilst43% disagree with the statement. However, onceagain, responses were closely related to outlook.Whilst two-thirds (67%) o Religious agreethe government has little or no choice, this wastrue o only 39% o the Secular respondents.Furthermore, 62% o sel-dened Zionists

respondents agree, compared with only a quartero non-Zionists.

Is Iran an existential threat?Respondents were asked to what extent theyagree or disagree that Iran represents a threat

to Israels existence. The vast majority (87%)o respondents agree or strongly agree with thestatement; indeed, more than three out o ve(62%) strongly agree (Figure 26).

Almost every sel-described Zionist respondentagrees or strongly agrees that Iran representsan existential threat to Israel. Indeed, over two-thirds (68%) o non-Zionist respondents alsoagree (Figure 27).

62

25

72 1

3

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Strongly

agree

Tend to

agree

Tend to

disagree

Strongly

disagree

No

opinion

Dont

know

Figure 26: Iran represents a threat to Israels existence

% (N=4,034)

3035

50

65

23

33

34

23

14

18

8 4

27

10

4 52 21 14 4 3

2

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Secular Somewhat

secular

Somewhat

religious

Religious

912 1,220 1,468 338

Dont know

No opinion

Strongly

disagree

Tend to

disagree

Tend to

agree

Strongly

agree

Figure 25: The military action that Israel carried out in Gaza was a legitimate act o sel deence by secular/religious outlook


29/43


8.2. Policy issues

Give up territory?Respondents were asked whether they agreeor disagree that Israel should give up territory

in exchange or guarantees o peace with thePalestinians. Overall the sample is strongly inavour o yielding land or peace: 67% agree orstrongly agree, compared with 28% who disagreeor strongly disagree (see Figure 28). Note that in

JPRs 1995 survey a very similar proportion (68%)o respondents supported the idea o exchangingland or peace.

The data correlate well with outlook. Religiousrespondents are less likely than Secularrespondents to be in avour o Israel cedingterritory (Figure 29). That said, almost hal(47%) o the Religious respondents agree withthe statement.

29

37

1513

23

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Strongly

agree

Tend to

agree

Tend to

disagree

Strongly

disagree

No

opinion

Dont

know

Figure 28: Israel should give up territory in exchange orguarantees o peace with the Palestinians % (N=3,987)

46

3021

18

30

41

40

29

1115

17

19

9 1016

27

2 2 2 23 2 4 4

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Secular Somewhat

secular

Somewhat

religious

Religious

882 1,188 1,400 318

Dont know

No opinion

Strongly

disagree

Tend to

disagree

Tend to

agree

Strongly

agree

Figure 29: Israel should give up territory in exchange or guarantees o peace with the Palestinians by secular/religious

outlook

Figure 27: Iran represents a threat to Israels existenceby whether or not Zionist (sel-described)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Yes, Zionist No,

not Zionist

Dont know

No opinion

Strongly

disagree

Tend to

disagree

Tend to

agree

Strongly

agree

1

36

22

32

17

7

1

1

173

1

2,838 811


30/43


Whilst a vast majority (83%) o non-Zionistrespondents agree or strongly agree that territoryshould be given up, 62% o sel-describedZionists also agree that Israel should giveup territory.

The data also correlates with educationalachievement. 56% o respondents with up toA-level qualications agree with the notion o landor peace, in contrast to 80% o respondents withpostgraduate qualications.

Settlement expansionWe asked respondents whether they agree ordisagree with the statement: It is right or thegovernment o Israel to expand existingsettlements in the West Bank (Judea/Samaria) i

it wishes to do so. Almost three-quarters (74%)o the sample disagree or strongly disagree thatsettlement expansion is justied (Figure 30). Justunder hal (48%) o Religious respondents, and70% o sel-described Zionist respondents,oppose Israeli expansion o settlements in theWest Bank.

A two-state solution?Respondents were asked whether they agree ordisagree that A two state solution is the only wayIsrael will achieve peace with its neighbours in the

Middle East (see Figure 31). The sample is verystrongly in avour o a two-state solution: overthree-quarters (78%) agree or strongly agree withthis statement.

Negotiate with Hamas?Just over hal (52%) o the sample agrees orstrongly agrees that The government o Israelshould negotiate with Hamas in its eorts toachieve peace. However, as Figure 32 shows, 39%disagree, and 9% have no opinion. Furthermore,o those who agree, only one-third Strongly

agrees which suggests that even among thosein avour o negotiations with Hamas, a certaindegree o caution is being expressed.

Secular respondents are more likely thanreligious respondents to agree that Israelshould negotiate with Hamas (see Figure 33).35% o Religious respondents agree with thestatement, whilst 67% o Secular respondentsagree, almost twice the proportion o the religiousgroup. Sel-described Zionist respondentsare ar less likely than non-Zionists to agree

that Israel should negotiate with Hamas (42%compared with 81% respectively) (Figure34). Further, respondents with higher levelqualications are more likely to agree (61%) thatIsrael should negotiate with Hamas than thosewith up to A-Level qualications (45%).

911

30

44

3 4

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

Strongly

agree

Tend to

agree

Tend to

disagree

Strongly

disagree

No

opinion

Dont

know

Figure 30: It is right or the government o Israel toexpand existing settlements in the West Bank (Judea/

Samaria) i it wishes to do so % (N=3,938)

39 38

87

16

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

Strongly

agree

Tend to

agree

Tend to

disagree

Strongly

disagree

No

opinion

Dont

know

Figure 31: A two state solution is the only way Israel will

achieve peace with its neighbours in the Middle East %(N=3,937)

Figure 32: The government o Israel should negotiate

with Hamas in its eorts to achieve peace % (N=3,936)

17

35

19 20

2

7

0

5

10

1520

25

30

35

40

Strongly

agree

Tend to

agree

Tend to

disagree

Strongly

disagree

No

opinion

Dont

know


31/43


8.3. Peace process

Responsibility or the ailure o thepeace processWe asked whether Israel holds less responsibilityor the recent ailure o the peace process thanits neighbours in the Middle East. Overall, amajority (59%) o respondents agree or strongly

agree that Israel holds less responsibility. However,a third (34%) disagrees (Figure 35).

Nevertheless, when responses are examined interms o secular/religious outlook, a clear patternemerges. Religious respondents are ar more

Figure 34: The government o Israel should negotiate with

Hamas in its eorts to achieve peace by whether or not

Zionist (sel-described)

8

4334

39

24

6

25

621

7 5

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Yes, Zionis t Not Zionist

2,839 811

Dont know

No opinion

Strongly

disagree

Tend to

disagree

Tend to

agree

Strongly

agree

25

21

13

26

33

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Stronglyagree

Tend toagree

Tend todisagree

Stronglydisagree

Noopinion

Dontknow

Figure 35: Israel holds less responsibility or the recent

ailure o the peace process than its neighbours in theMiddle East % (N=3,987)

31

179 9

36

40

3425

17

15

23

27

12

19

23 30

21

31

37 9 8

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Secular Somewhat

secular

Somewhat

religious

Religious

911 1,221 1,468 338

Dont know

No opinion

Strongly

disagree

Tend to

disagree

Tend to

agree

Strongly

agree

Figure 33: The government o Israel should negotiate with Hamas in its eor ts to achieve peace by secular/religious outlook


32/43


likely than Secular respondents to agree orstrongly agree that Israel holds less responsibilityor the ailure o the peace process (73% comparedwith 45% respectively) (Figure 36).

Further, Zionist respondents are more than twiceas likely as non-Zionists to agree that Israel holdsless responsibility or the ailure o the peaceprocess (69% compared with 31% respectively).

It is also evident that respondents with higherlevels o educational achievement are less likelyto agree with this statement than those with

no ormal qualications (56% compared with69% respectively).

Do Palestinians want peace?Respondents were asked whether they agree ordisagree that Most Palestinians want peace withIsrael. Almost hal the sample (47%) agrees orstrongly agrees that Palestinians do desire peacewith Israel, although a very small minority (9%)Strongly agrees (see Figure 37). Over a third o

respondents (38%) disagree with the statement.However, a relatively large proportion (15%) hasNo opinion or does not know, suggesting thatthere is some uncertainty about this question.

Again, the data correlate closely with secular/religious outlook (see Figure 38): 55% oSecular respondents in contrast to 36% oReligious respondents agree or strongly agreethat most Palestinians desire peace with Israel.And in terms o sel-described Zionists andnon-Zionists, Figure 39 shows that Zionists

are less likely than non-Zionists to agree thatPalestinians want peace (with 44% comparedwith 59% respectively).

1723

29

41

28

34

36

3221

25

18

1224

13 88

12

328

4 6 4

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Secular Somewhat

secular

Somewhat

religious

Religious

927 1,236 1,484 340

Dont know

No opinion

Strongly

disagree

Tend to

disagree

Tend to

agree

Strongly

agree

Figure 36: Israel holds less responsibility or the recent ailure o the peace process than its neighbours in the Middle Eastby secular/religious outlook

9

38

25

13

2

13

0

5

10

15

british jews and israel

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