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BRITISH JOURNAL FOR MILITARY HISTORY ADVISORY BOARDS

The Editorial Team gratefully acknowledges the support of the British Journal for Military Historys Editorial Advisory Board the membership of which is as follows: Major-General Mungo Melvin (President, BCMH) Professor Bill Philpott (Secretary-General, BCMH & Kings College London) Dr Tim Gale (Treasurer, BCMH) Andy Grainger (Member BCMH) Dr Andy Simpson (Member BCMH) Professor Charles Esdaile (University of Liverpool) Professor Richard Grayson (Goldsmiths, University of London) Professor Beatrice Heuser (University of Reading) Professor Matthew Hughes (Brunel University) Professor Andrew Roberts (Cornell University) Professor Gary Sheffield (University of Wolverhampton) Professor Sir Hew Strachan (University of Oxford) Dr Huw Bennett (University of Aberystwyth) Dr Huw Davies (JSCSC; Kings College London) Dr Declan OReilly (University of East Anglia) Jonathan Ferguson (Royal Armouries) Seb Cox (Air Historical Branch) Bob Evans (Army Historical Branch) Stephen Prince (Naval Historical Branch)

COVER IMAGE: COVER IMAGE: Soldier of the Mounted Infantry on his horse 1899 IWM (Q 72140)

THE BCMH LOGO: The BCMH logo is based on the combination of Mars & Clio, the Roman God of War and the Greek Muse of History, as a good summation of what we are about. It depicts Mars with his spear whilst Clio stands before him reading from a book or perhaps this journal the Secretary General of the BCMH having pointed out that since Mars cannot read someone will have to read it to him.

BRITISH JOURNAL FOR MILITARY HISTORY CONTACT US

Find us online at: www.bjmh.org.uk

Letters and communications to the Editors should be addressed: [email protected] Or Dr Matthew Ford Department of International Relations University of Sussex Brighton, BN1 9SJ

* Follow the British Commission for Military History and British Journal for Military History on: Facebook [www.facebook.com/bcmh] Twitter [@marsandclio] Online [www.bjmh.org.uk] British Journal for Military History ISSN: 2057-0422

BRITISH JOURNAL FOR MILITARY HISTORY *

Volume 1, Issue 1 October 2014

Editor-in-Chief: Dr Matthew Ford

Editors: Dr Nick Terry Dr Catherine Baker

Associate Editors: Jennifer Daley Aime Fox-Godden Dr Stuart Mitchell

Published by The British Commission for Military History

CONTENTS NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS EDITORIAL Articles A ONCE IN A CENTURY OPPORTUNITY? SOME PERSONAL REFLECTIONS ON THE CENTENARY OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR

by Gary Sheffield 1

THE ANNUAL CONFIDENTIAL REPORT AND PROMOTION IN THE LATE VICTORIAN ARMY

by Ian F. W. Beckett 12

SHOOTING POWER: A STUDY OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF BOER AND BRITISH RIFLE FIRE, 1899-1914

by Spencer Jones 29

IRELANDS NEW MEMORY OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR: FORGOTTEN ASPECTS OF THE BATTLE OF MESSINES, JUNE 1917 by Richard S. Grayson 48

THE LEGACY OF LIDDELL HART: THE CONTRASTING RESPONSES OF MICHAEL HOWARD AND ANDR BEAUFRE

by Brian Holden Reid 66

DIVIDED LOYALTIES: THE EFFECT THE BOER WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH HAD ON HOW IRISH NATIONALISTS INTERPRETERED THE IRISH SOLDIER SERVING IN THE BRITISH ARMY

by Alan Drumm 81

Reviews MAX HASTINGS , CATASTROPHE: EUROPE GOES TO WAR 1914

Reviewed by Jonathan Boff 97

THOMAS SCOTLAND & STEVEN HEYS (EDS.) , WARS, PESTILENCE AND THE SURGEONS BLADE: THE EVOLUTION OF BRITISH MILITARY MEDICINE AND SURGERY DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Reviewed by Jane Bowden-Dan 98

JAMES HOLLAND (ED.) , AN ENGLISHMAN AT WAR. THE WARTIME DIARIES OF STANLEY CHRISTOPHERSON, DSO, MC, TD, 1939-1945

Reviewed by Robin Brodhurst 100

ALAN TRITTON , WHEN THE TIGER FOUGHT THE THISTLE. THE TRAGEDY OF COLONEL WILLIAM BAILLIE OF THE MADRAS ARMY

Reviewed by Bruce Collins 103

ANNE APPLEBAUM , IRON CURTAIN: THE CRUSHING OF EASTERN EUROPE

Reviewed by Timothy C. Dowling 104

TIMOTHY S. WOLTERS , INFORMATION AT SEA: SHIPBOARD COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE U.S. NAVY FROM MOBILE BAY TO OKINAWA

Reviewed by Marcus Faulkner 106

THOMAS WALDMAN , WAR, CLAUSEWITZ AND THE TRINITY

Reviewed by Jan Willem Honig 107

PETER KENDALL , THE ROYAL ENGINEERS AT CHATHAM 1750-2012

TIMOTHY CRICK , RAMPARTS OF EMPIRE: THE FORTIFICATIONS OF SIR WILLIAM JERVOIS ROYAL ENGINEER, 1821-1897

Reviewed by Andrew Lambert 109

HALIK KOCHANSKI , THE EAGLE UNBOWED: POLAND AND POLES IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Reviewed by Simon Niziol 113

ANTHONY J. NOCELLA II , COLIN SALTER & JUDY K. C. BENTLEY (EDS.), ANIMALS AND WAR: CONFRONTING THE MILITARY-ANIMAL INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

Reviewed by Kimberly Brice ODonnell 115

JIM BEACH, HAIGS INTELLIGENCE: GHQ AND THE GERMAN ARMY, 1916-1918

Reviewed by Jack Sheldon 117

JOHN GRODZINSKI, DEFENDER OF CANADA: SIR GEORGE PREVOST AND THE WAR OF 1812

Reviewed by Ian Stafford 118

Submission Guidelines ARTICLE SUBMISSION GUIDELINES 121 STYLE GUIDE 122 BOOK REVIEW SUBMISSION GUIDELINES 123

Notes on contributors PROFESSOR GARY SHEFFIELD is Professor of War Studies at the University of Wolverhampton. He is President of the International Guild of Battlefield Guides and a Vice President of the Western Front Association. He has published widely on the First World War and regularly broadcasts on television and radio as well as contributing to numerous journals, magazines and newspapers. Previous books include the acclaimed Forgotten Victory and The Chief: Douglas Haig and the British Army, which was shortlisted for the prestigious Duke of Westminster's Medal. PROFESSOR IAN F. W. BECKETT is Professor of Military History at the University of Kent. A Fellow of the Royal Historical Society, he is also Chairman of the Council of the Army Records Society, and Secretary to the Buckinghamshire Military Museum Trust. Previously, he has held chairs in both the UK and the US. Currently, he is attached to BBC South for the AHRC- funded World War One at Home project and is coordinating Great War commemorative activities in Buckinghamshire. He is completing a book on the politics of command in the late Victorian army for the University of Oklahoma Press. DR SPENCER JONES is Senior Lecturer in Armed Forces and War Studies at the University of Wolverhampton. He currently serves at the Regimental Historian for the Royal Regiment of Artillery. His previous publications include From Boer War to World War: Tactical Reform of the British Army 1902-1914 and Stemming the Tide: Officers and Leadership in the British Expeditionary Force 1914. PROFESSOR RICHARD S. GRAYSON is Professor of Twentieth Century History at Goldsmiths, University of London. He is the author of Belfast Boys: How Unionists and Nationalists Fought and Died Together in the First World War (2009), and edited At War with the 16th Irish Division: The Staniforth Letters, 1914-18 (2012). He has engaged widely with community groups on First World War remembrance especially the 6th Connaught Rangers Research Project. An associate member of the First World War Centenary Committee in Northern Ireland, he contributed to BBC NIs Irelands Great War, co-edits www.irelandww1.org and chairs the Academic Advisory Group for the Digital Projects run by the Imperial War Museums. PROFESSOR BRIAN HOLDEN REID is Professor of American History and Military Institutions at Kings College London, and since 2010 an Academic Member of College Council. A former Head of the Department of War Studies (2001-7) in 2007 he was awarded the Fellowship of Kings College London (FKC), the highest honour the College can award its alumni and staff, and he is both. His books include J.F.C. Fuller: Military Thinker (1987, 1990), The Origins of the American Civil War (1996), Studies in British Military Thought (1998), Robert E. Lee: Icon for a Nation (2005, 2007) and Americas Civil War: The Operational Battlefield, 1861-1863 (2008).

British Journal for Military History, Volume 1, Issue 1, October 2014

ALAN DRUMM is a PhD student under the supervision of Dr Mike Cosgrave at University College Cork. His thesis examines the relationship between Irish Nationalism and the British Army between 1880 and 1914 and the impact it had on recruiting. Alan is the author of Kerry and The Royal Munster Fusiliers and has spoken at a number of conferences including the British Commission for Military Historys New Research in Military History Conference 2013, Trinity College Dublins Centre for War Studies Seminar Series 2010-11 and the Irish History Students Associations conference in both 2011 and 2012.

Editorial

The birth of the British Journal for Military History will be as welcome as it is long overdue. The past few decades have seen the appearance of a new generation of military historians. Some have been serving or retired members of the Armed Forces; some academics or aspiring academics; and some - most welcome of all amateurs who write for the sheer love of it. The continuing demand for their work is evidenced in every major bookshop, where Military History shelves often take up as much space as does mere History. Even those whose primary interest is not military history as such now realise that a knowledge of the subject is necessary if they are to understand the past, to say nothing of the present. Military history is now too important to be left to the military historians. For the past few years military historians have been able to communicate with each another at the annual meetings of the British Commission for Military History and through its publication Mars and Clio. Now the BJMH will make their work available to a far wider readership and should attract an increasing number of contributors. It will be not only British, and not only military historians who will wish it well."

Professor Sir Michael Howard We are very pleased to offer you the inaugural issue of the British Journal for Military History. This journal represents a unique vehicle for distributing high-quality military history to an audience beyond academia. The BJMH is open-access, applies peer review policies to all the articles we receive and is published three times a year. Our first issue showcases some of the journals ambitions. Articles consider a number of topics, ranging from the use and abuse of military history, to military promotion, shooting power, memory and war, the evolution of strategy and changing identities. In this edition we not only offer a platform for well-established historians but also for those new and upcoming authors with whom we wish to develop strong ties over the long term. Future issues will focus on counterinsurgency, offer a discussion of women working in military history and have Professors Andrew Roberts and Charles Esdaile debate whether Napoleon was great.


The BJMH has emerged out of the British Commission for Military History. Consequently, it is only right that the first article in this edition is based on a lecture given by Professor Gary Sheffield in memory of Professor Richard Holmes, a former President of the Commission. The Commission itself has been a great source of support to this initiative and the Editors are very pleased to offer their thanks to our fellow members, the General Committee and especially Professor Bill Philpott and Major General Mungo Melvin. If the Commission has provided the support then it is the Editorial Advisory Board that has helped us to develop the sorts of aspirations that frame the journals philosophy. The Board includes some of Britains leading military historians, academics and scholars. These busy people have generously offered guidance and counsel as the Editors have sought to bring the new journal together from inception to delivery. Their help has been crucial and we are greatly appreciative of their backing. Developing a new journal of course depends on having a great team of editors who are willing to do the work necessary to ensure the smooth production of each edition. In this respect all the Editors ought to be thanked for their endeavours over the past 18 months. The Associate Editors in particular have taken on serious roles and demonstrated their ability to rise to the occasion. Jennifer Daley has been instrumental in getting books reviewed, identifying reviewers and ensuring we have enough material to publish. Aime Fox-Godden has shaped the look and feel and the layout for the journal. Stuart Mitchell has worked extremely hard to check proofs, copy-edit and act as general fixer. I must also thank Nick Terry and Catherine Baker for stretching our networks and reach and providing an appropriate sounding board for ideas and strategy development. All of the Editors volunteer their time and I hope you will join me in offering our sincere thanks for all their efforts. Along the way a number of other people have helped in the evolution of this project. In particular I would like to thank Dr Philip W Blood, Dr Declan OReilly, Ross Mahoney and George Walkley for their early involvement in helping us think through the challenges associated with launching a new journal. Lastly, Dr Simon Coningham very kindly offered his time and the benefit of his experience of working in mainstream publishing. It is only a shame that he passed away earlier this year and was unable to see the final product.

The Editors would like to thank Professor Howard for his generous note of support. Not only do his words encapsulate the philosophy of the journal but we hope they will also inspire you to join us in broadening and shaping the future of our field of interest. Please enjoy this first issue of the BJMH. We welcome your comments and feedback.

DR MATTHEW FORD, EDITOR BJMH

ONCE IN A CENTURY OPPORTUNITY?

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A Once in a Century Opportunity? Some Personal Reflections on the Centenary of the First World War GARY SHEFFIELD University of Wolverhampton Email: [email protected]

ABSTRACT In this article Gary Sheffield sets out his opinions on the current commemoration plans and media responses to the centenary of the First World War. He argues that the British government and media are letting slip a golden opportunity to challenge popular perceptions of the conflict. This piece builds upon the authors speech delivered at the Richard Holmes Memorial Lecture, sponsored by the BCMH, Kings College London, and the National Army Museum, Chelsea. It was delivered at Kings College London on 13 March 2014.

This paper, and the lecture it is based on, is dedicated to the late Professor Richard Holmes. Richard was a very talented scholar who nonetheless wore his learning lightly. In print, in lectures and on battlefield tours, and on the television screen, time after time he proved himself to be an outstandingly good public historian. Richards death in 2011 deprived him of the opportunity to take a leading role in presenting the history of the First World War over the period of the Centenary to a mass audience. Before beginning my own reflections on the centenary, I would like to say something about Richards impact on my career. I arrived as a very junior lecturer at The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in 1985, to find that the then Dr Richard Holmes was Deputy Head of the War Studies Department. He was kindness personified, taking me under his wing, giving me some very sound advice about the direction of my career, and helping me steer through the politics of the organisation. We stayed in touch after he left Sandhurst and in 1999 we linked up again professionally when I moved to the Joint Services Command and Staff College, and we both taught on the memorable Higher Command and Staff


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Course staff rides. I learned a very great deal from Richard, not least the importance of public history. I have been very lucky in the senior colleagues who have helped guide my career. Richard was one of the most important influences in my professional life, and I was deeply honoured to be asked to give a lecture in his memory. The subject of my lecture and this paper, my reflections on the centenary of the First World War, is doubly appropriate. First, because Richard Holmes was a masterly communicator of history to a lay audience; he believed academics should speak to real people outside the academy. Second, although Richard wrote on a number of historical topics (his PhD was on the French army of the Second Empire, and he published on subjects as diverse as the English Civil War, the American War of Independence, and French counterinsurgency in the 1950s), he had a fascination for the First World War. He once admitted that he was 'haunted by the conflict.1 The stands on which Richard led during staff rides to the Somme and Verdun were even by his very high standards especially memorable. Although the two things are not the same, in 2014 media interest and, as far as I can judge, public interest in the First World War is at an all-time high. The centenary of the outbreak of the Great War does seem to have caught the public imagination. Undoubtedly, there is a once in a hundred years opportunity for education about 1914-18, and education is a primary objective of the governments First World War commemoration programme. What follows are a few thoughts on the way we in the UK are commemorating the war, and the state of knowledge and understanding of the First World War outside the academy one hundred years on. My perspective is that of an academic historian of the First World War who has a vocation for public history, and who has, through public lectures and talks to various bodies, appearances on television and radio, the use of social media (primarily Twitter), and high-level engagement with the government, civil service and armed forces, been closely involved with the Centenary commemorations. For a historian of the First World War like myself, the sudden national fixation on 1914 had been both dazzling and frustrating. It is dazzling, because of the sudden huge interest in my subject, and the opportunities that have opened up, not least in heading the University of Wolverhampton's programme of commemoration. Frustrating, because the response of the government and the media to the Centenary leave much to be desired. I have the sense of a golden opportunity for education about what George F. Kennan called the 'seminal catastrophe of the twentieth century', and Britain's role in it, slipping away.

1 Richard Holmes, Foreword to Gary Sheffield, Forgotten Victory: The First World War Myths and Realities (London, Headline, 2001) p.ix


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The last few years has made clear that, despite the efforts of revisionist historians over the last three decades, the 'futility/"lions led by donkeys"' narrative of Britains involvement in the conflict is very much with us. The ideas that there were no great issues at stake during the First World War, that a million men died for nothing and, in an accompanying myth, the lives of soldiers were routinely thrown away by criminally incompetent generals has been rebutted over and over again, but display remarkable longevity. One of the earliest and most influential statements came in the writings of David Lloyd George, Britain's prime minister in the second half of the war. His war memoirs, published in the 1930s, are a clear example of the literature of disillusionment, and Lloyd George was assisted in their writing by a disenchanted war veteran turned trenchant critic of the generals, Basil Liddell Hart. However this was a minority view in the 1930s. It began to become the dominant narrative after 1945, when the First World War started to be viewed through the lens of the 'good war', the struggle against Hitler. In the 1950s and 1960s a series of popular books, by the likes of Leon Wolff (In Flanders Fields, 1959 and Alan Clark (The Donkeys, 1961), as well as Joan Littlewood's musical play Oh! What a Lovely War (first produced in 1963, and turned into a film by Richard Attenborough in 1969) firmly established the futility/donkeys narrative in the public mind. Although for the most part worthless as history, they were extremely influential. Until the late 1970s a rather lonely revisionist furrow was being ploughed by John Terraine and his friend and collaborator, Correlli Barnett, and one or two others. From that point onwards new generations of academic historians provided timely reinforcements. In the 1980 and 1990s an informal school of revisionist historians of the British army in the Great War developed, based around the Imperial War Museum, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, the British Commission for Military History and a handful of university departments. The founding in 1980 of the Western Front Association, an organisation that brings together scholarly historians and interested lay-people, now with numerous branches and some 6,000 members, was also significant. The overall result has been a series of scholarly works which have moved on the debate significantly. (It is fair to say that some historians remain outside the broad consensus, and even within it there remains plenty of scope for disagreement and debate). However, the impact of such historical revisionism on the public and media has been limited. The 1989 television series Blackadder Goes Forth, a sort of Oh! What a Lovely War for the late twentieth century, was particularly influential in reinforcing stereotypes of stupid generals fighting a pointless war. It is significant that when in January 2014 the Conservative cabinet minister Michael Gove intervened in the debate over the teaching of the First World War, he cited


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Blackadder.2 The futility/donkeys view underpinned the British government's approach to commemorating the war. The government's advisory panel was light on professional historians but room was found for Sebastian Faulks, author of Birdsong, and Pat Barker, writer of the Regeneration trilogy. Both of these novelists adhere closely to the traditional narrative. When in October 2012 the Prime Minister, David Cameron, announced the programme of official commemorations it was noticeable that it concentrated on British defeats such Gallipoli and the First Day on the Somme but completely ignored the 'Hundred Days' campaign of 1918, when the forces of the British Empire, with their allies, won the greatest series of military victories in British history. The speech showed little knowledge or understanding of the Great War. For instance, Cameron stated that 200,000 were killed on one day of the Battle of the Somme. Assuming he meant 1 July 1916, the true figure was actually nearly 20,000, which is of course shocking enough, but for the UKs Prime Minister to have a made such a ludicrous mistake in the announcement of the governments plans for the centenary did not promote confidence that they would be underpinned by a rigorous understanding of the history involved. Similarly Cameron's statement that To us, today, it seems so inexplicable that countries which had many things binding them together could indulge in such a never-ending slaughter, but they did suggests that the Prime Minister and his speech writers had a deeply flawed understanding of the nature of the conflict.3 Camerons speech brought about a highly critical reaction from some historians, including me.4 Nonetheless, the government's programme proved too much for some, and initiated a renewed battle for the meaning of the First World War. In May 2013 a letter from a group of actors, musicians, poets and politicians was published in the Guardian, a liberal-left newspaper. It attacked the government's remembrance programme, declaring 'Far from being a "War to end all wars" or a "Victory for democracy" this was a military disaster and a human catastrophe'.5 This promptly became known in some circles as the "Luvvies' Letter".6 Historical research 2 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2532923/Michael-Gove-blasts-Blackadder-myths-First-World-War-spread-television-sit-coms-left-wing-academics.html, 2 January 2014 (accessed 9 October 2014) 3 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/speech-at-imperial-war-museum-on-first-world-war-centenary-plans, 11 October 2012 (accessed 22 November 2013) 4 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/history/britain-at-war/10037507/Historians-complain-Governments-WW1-commemoration-focuses-on-British-defeats.html, 5 May 2013, (accessed 22 November 2013) 5 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/21/remembering-war-to-promote-peace, 21 May 2013 (accessed 22 November 2013) 6 For cultural figures pronouncing on the history of the Great War, see Gary Sheffield. The Centenary of the First World War: An Unpopular View, in The Historian No.122 (Summer 20114) pp. 24-25


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and analysis are highly specialised activities. More than most historical events, the First World War prompts people to go public with views based on emotion, limited knowledge and flawed understanding. In case anyone thinks that opposition to such views as those laid out in the Luvvies' Letter is the preserve of male, middle-aged professors of military history, let me quote at length from the opinion of Dr Jessica Meyer, who is none of these things:

My main reason for annoyance lies, I think, in two aspects of the letter. The first is the apparent belief that those engaged professionally with and in the arts (as the majority of the signatories are) have a particular authority to speak about the horror of war I cannot help feeling that some, such as Michael Morpurgo, are using their status as creators of cultural expression which use the war as subject matter to give themselves authority to pronounce on the truth about the war, drawing on the tradition of the First World War canon... The second infuriating aspect of the letter is the dichotomy it sets up between national commemoration and the promotion of international peace and understanding through a focus on its futility and devastation. Such attempts to impose a contemporary political narrative on the commemorations feels like a betrayal of the men who fought There were certainly plenty of voices calling for international peace both at the start and in the wake of war. Equally there were many who saw the war as a fight for national survival against the threat of Prussian militarism. And there were many who, in fighting for King and Country, were simply fighting to preserve the sanctity of the small part of that nation that they called home. Far more men enlisted in the belief that they were defending democracy, however limited that democracy might seem from a 21st century perspective, than we tend to given them credit for. Many survived the war, just as many did not. Some were disillusioned by their experience; many incorporated it into their life stories and carried on, changed but not destroyed by war. To deny any this is to deny those who gave voice to these sentiments, as a huge number did, the validity of their beliefs and does their memory a huge disservice7

The government is very aware of the criticisms of the anti-war lobby, and is rather scared of it. In an extreme form it reflects the futility/donkeys narrative dominant in

7 Jessica Meyer, Possibly an angry post (blog, http://armsandthemedicalman.wordpress.com/2013/05/22/possibly-an-angry-post/ 22 May 2013, (accessed 22 November 2013). Dr Meyer is a cultural historian. I am grateful for her permission to reproduce part of her blog.


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British society, and politicians do not want to alienate voters. This helps to explain the choice of events that will receive full-scale formal commemoration, as announced by David Cameron in October 2012, discussed above. The historical illiteracy of omitting the Hundred Days is, as Professor Peter Simkins has trenchantly observed, akin to commemorating the Second World War by marking the Fall of Singapore but ignoring D-Day.8 To be fair, the government has changed its mind on this. Under pressure from various quarters, agreement has been reached in principle to commemorate the Battle of Amiens (8 August 1918), arguably the turning point on the Western Front. The government have also been wary about stating why the war was fought. The current debate over the origins of the war is a red herring. There has been widespread media approval of Christopher Clark's 'sleepwalkers' thesis, reinforced in some ways by Margaret MacMillans book, that the war was 'a tragedy, not a crime' and blame should not be allocated to individuals or states.9 However the mainstream historical position, based on 50 years of scholarship, is that on the contrary, Austria-Hungary and Germany bore the lion's share of the responsibility for the outbreak of war. Anyone solely reliant on the mass media for their information might not realise this. The third volume of John Rhls magisterial biography of Kaiser Wilhelm II, which does not hesitate to allocate blame to Germany, provides a powerful counter to the sleepwalkers idea.10 The notion of Europe drifting into war fits the current European zeitgeist of failing to face up to uncomfortable truths about the recent past. Not surprisingly, Clarks book has becomes a best-seller in Germany. However, in my view, the evidence demonstrates Austro-Hungarian and German culpability for the outbreak of the First World War.11 Of course, if no one was to blame for starting the war, the conflict can be seen as futile: except, no matter who was responsible, Germany took full advantage of the outbreak of hostilities. Berlin waged an aggressive war of conquest, carving out a huge empire, imposing brutal rule on occupied peoples and imperilling both the security of Britain and the Empire and the future of liberal democracy on continental Europe. For Britain the war was both a war of national survival and, in 1918, one of

8 www.westernfrontassociation.com/news/newsflash.html?start=65, 24 October 2013, (10 October 2014) 9 Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (London, Penguin, 2013 [2012]) p.561; Margaret MacMillan, The War That Ended Peace (London, Profile, 2012). For my detailed criticisms of this approach see Gary Sheffield, A Short History of the First World War (London, Oneworld, 2014), Chapter 1. 10 John Rhl, Wilhelm II: Into the Abyss of War and Exile, 1900-1941 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014) 11 For an excellent collection of documents in English translation, see Annika Mombauer, The Origins of the First World War: Diplomatic and Military Documents (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2013)


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liberation. To take another example of an actor expressing a view on the meaning of the First World War, in 2013 Caroline Quentin spoke about the new production of Oh! What a Lovely War being a heartbreaking piece about the futility of war.12 One wonders what a war would need to be fought about to qualify as not being futile in Ms Quentins book. The Luvvies' Letter and the like flourish in an environment in which the UK government, the successor of the ones that took Britain into the war in August 1914 and led the country through four and a half years of total war, refuses clearly to state that in 1914-18 the vast majority of the British people supported the war, seeing it as a war of national survival. In a democracy, a total war cannot be waged without the consent of the people. Neither will the government broadcast the fact that the weight of historical evidence and opinion points to the British people of a century ago being right in their views. The government makes the argument that it is not its place to place interpretations on historical events. This might have some validity but for the fact that this government (like all others) is very keen to put forward historical interpretations when it suits them. The legacy of Margaret Thatcher, another highly controversial historical issue which resurfaced after her death in 2013, is a case in point. Even more pertinent is the way the fiftieth anniversaries of D-Day and VE Day, which fell in 1994 and 1995, were commemorated. The government of the day had no hesitation in placing a particular interpretation (from the British point of view, a very positive one) on those events. Some individuals, such as Andrew Murrison MP, deserve credit for making public statements supportive of the view that the war was a struggle for national survival. There is a consensus that the centenary years should be about commemoration, not triumphalism. The outbreak of the war in 1914 is absolutely nothing to celebrate. The centenary of 1918 is, however, a different matter. In January 2014 Helen Grant, the Tory minister with responsibility for commemorating the centenary, sent out mixed messages, stating 1918 was an absolutely vital victory but we wont be celebrating that fact.13 The successes of the British armed forces and the British nation-in-arms should be celebrated, but not in a triumphalist fashion I agree with Ms Grant on that much. Celebration in the sense of public acknowledgment of a job well done, a great national achievement, would be wholly appropriate. The UK government thought it fitting to celebrate the victory of 1945. It is equally fitting to celebrate that of 1918. Overall, the government, by failing to provide clear and decisive leadership on this

12 Evening Standard, 22 October 2013; http://www.standard.co.uk/news/oh-what-a-lovely-voice-caroline-quentin-starts-training-for-musical-8896715.html, 22 October 2013 (accessed 14 October 2014) 13 http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/458507/ww1-victory-should-not-be-celebrated-with-dancing-in-the-street-MP-Helen-Grant-says 7 February 2014 (accessed 9 October 2014)


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issue, is missing a unique opportunity educate the population that the war was fought over major issues, that it was not meaningless, and a million men did not die for nothing. This is nothing short of an abdication of responsibility. To adapt Jessica Meyers point, allowing the imposition by default of a contemporary political narrative on the commemorations feels like a betrayal of the men who fought, died, survived, and were victorious. Turning to the media; newspapers, the BBC, and to a lesser extent other broadcasters, have embraced the First World War with a vengeance. It has certainly given various military historians a public platform and what are in historiographical terms old ideas have suddenly become current. Niall Fergusons views: that he considers it a catastrophe that Britain did not stay out of the war, and the world would have been better off by a Europe conquered by a benign German state, were first put forward in the mid-1990s, but they became front-page news in the Guardian in January 2014.14 Even more surprisingly, The Times gave me half a page to explain why I think his views are profoundly wrong. Views of various sorts have appeared across the press. The Guardian seems particularly keen on publishing pieces that depict the war as futile, although they published an article of mine that argued the opposite. As a life-long Guardian reader, it was an interesting experience being attacked in my daily newspaper of choice as a warmonger, and worse. The wider point is, however, that in spite of Michael Goves ill-informed attack in January on left wing historians for belittling Britains war effort for the most part the centenary commemorations have not been a party political football. Andrew Murrison, a Conservative, and Dan Jarvis, his Labour Shadow, co-operate closely and have both been at pains to avoid politicising the centenary. Neither can historians be neatly divided up by political allegiance. Sir Richard Evans, a leftist who has emerged as a forthright spokesmen for the futility view of the war, has found himself occupying common ground with Niall Ferguson and (posthumously) with Alan Clark, both very much of the right, while those who believe it was right for Britain to fight in the war include historians whose politics straddle the spectrum from left to right via apolitical. The response of the BBC to the centenary has been to go into overdrive, with 2,500 hours of programmes plus a major website. The comments that follow are quite critical, so let me preface them by saying that the BBC has produced a great deal of very good, high quality programming and internet material, and I have every reason to believe that there is a lot more to come. This in my view justifies paying the licence fee. But I have some major reservations. For a start, there is too much coverage of the First World War, and it started too early. There is a real possibility that people will simply become bored with the war by the end of 2014, let alone by

14 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/30/britain-first-world-war-biggest-error-niall-ferguson, 30 January 2014 (accessed 15 October 2014)


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2018. The flagship BBC TV series: Britains Great War, fronted by Jeremy Paxman, displayed a number of strengths, but also many weaknesses. Appearing at primetime on BBC1, the programme had enormous reach, and as one reviewer wrote that Paxmans inclusion as presenter says "serious" and it says "knowledgeable".15 This can be seen as the BBC marking a great national event and fulfilling its mandate to educate. An alternative view is that the series was rather lightweight. While it certainly did not pander to the futility view, and broadly reflects current scholarship, some of the analysis in the programmes was superficial. Overall, 'Britain's Great War' was marred by some poor editorial decisions on inclusion or exclusion of material. The omission of the Battle of Jutland, and the concentration on the first day of the Battle of the Somme to the exclusion of the rest of this four month campaign were perhaps the most egregious examples. Moreover Paxman, who may be looked on as authoritative by a mass audience, is a journalist not a historian, and in a well-publicised comment at a literary festival revealed that his knowledge of Britain in the First World War has some surprising and rudimentary gaps.16 The series would have had more credibility with a reputable historian presenting the series and how well Richard Holmes would have fulfilled that role or failing that, an actor reading a script. Using Paxman as front man is a facet of the BBCs obsession with celebrity, and this was compounded by the failure to feature a single scholarly historian on screen, although other people (such as another celebrity, the Downton Abbey scriptwriter Julian Fellowes) did appear. The rise of the 'drama-documentary' has been a feature of television over the last few years. This can take the form of dramatisation of events within the context of a conventional 'talking head and film clip' documentary, or a programme that consists solely of a dramatisation. Anyone who acted as a historical adviser to a conventional television documentary will know that the final script is the result of a series of compromises, and will have suffered the frustration of having their advice ignored because factual accuracy does not fit in with what the TV people want to do. Dr Adrian Gregory, of Pembroke College Oxford, has tweeted about his experience on Great Britain's Great War, and it is about par for the course.17 The trade-off between historical accuracy and the nature of television as a medium of entertainment is particularly acute in the case of 'pure' drama-docs. Bjorn Rose, an ex-Army officer now working as a history teacher, having brought a party of schoolboys to the set to act as extras, found himself very unexpectedly working as a

15 The Independent, 28 January 2014; http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/tv/reviews/britains-great-war-bbc1-tv-review-memories-from-the-home-front-humanise-paxmans-war-story-9088991.html, 28 January 2014, (accessed 10 October 2014) 16 Daily Mail, 9 October 2013, p.17 17 See @AdrianGregory20s Twitter timeline.


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historical adviser on the 'Mons' episode of Our World War This BBC series, broadcast in August 2014, sought to repeat the success of Our War, a 'fly-on-the-wall' series of documentaries on the British army in Afghanistan, in which Captain Rose's platoon had featured. He had some success in pointing out obvious errors - he persuaded the art department not to dress the set portraying Nimy bridge in 1914 with Brodie steel helmets, which were not introduced until a year later and only became general issue in 1916 - but otherwise was bemused by the lack of attention to historical detail and willingness to perpetuate blatant inaccuracies and anachronisms. In particular, Rose contested the statement at the end of the programme that the British army had been 'humiliated' at Mons. To put the best possible interpretation on this view, it is highly debatable. Some historians, myself included, would describe it as nonsense. Needless to say, Bjorn Rose lost the argument.18 That Professor David Reynolds' series The Long Shadow was screened is evidence that the BBC is prepared to take risks on giving a heavyweight historian a series which deals with a serious topic in a serious way, albeit on BBC2 rather than BBC1.The series looks at the legacy of the First World War across a range of issues, and is something of a model in conveying deep scholarship in an accessible fashion. It would have served the cause of education much better, and done something to repair the tattered reputation of the BBC as a broadcaster of serious documentaries on mainstream television, if The Long Shadow had been the flagship series for 2014 rather than Britain's Great War. Does any of it - the re-hashing of stale arguments by newspapers, dumbed-down and inaccurate television programmes, and the ambivalent and grudging response of the British government - really matter? I think it does. The Great War Centenary years offer a once-in-a-century opportunity for education, and to move serious debate beyond a narrow circle of historians. The interest and enthusiasm I have witnessed among local history groups, civic societies, in schools, colleges and universities, and the myriad of exhibitions and publications telling the story of the impact of the First World War on local communities has been truly inspiring.19 My hope is that at the end of the centenary period the people of Britain will have a more mature, reflective

18 Information given by Bjorn Rose, 6 October 2014. 19 At the risk of being invidious I have been particularly impressed by the First World War exhibition at the Manx Museum http://www.manxnationalheritage.im/news/new-exhibition-to-mark-100th-anniversary-of-the-first-world-war/ and the accompanying book: Matthew Richardson, This Terrible Ordeal: Manx Letters, Diaries and Memories of the Great War (Douglas, Manx National Heritage, 2013), and by Martin Hayes and Emma White (eds.), Great War Britain: West Sussex Remembering 1914-18 (Stroud, The History Press, 2014). I provided a foreword to the latter.


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and less strident view of the Great War; one less encumbered by myths, half-truths prejudice. We should not allow this opportunity to slip through our hands.


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The Annual Confidential Report and Promotion in the Late Victorian Army IAN F. W. BECKETT University of Kent Email: [email protected]

ABSTRACT The annual confidential report offers insights into both the manner of promotion in the late Victorian Army and the personalities of some of its key figures. This article looks in depth at the form, function and usage of the Annual Confidential Report, arguing that it was a flawed system which hampered the ability of Lord Roberts and Viscount Wolseley to promote the best officers to high command.

In October 1902 General Sir Evelyn Wood appeared before the Elgin Commission examining the conduct of the South African War. Wood had been Adjutant General in the War Office from 1897 to 1901. Understandably, one of the principal avenues of enquiry was the quality of military leadership in South Africa. Asked about officer training, Wood placed blame on the annual confidential reports upon which the Selection Board relied for information when considering promotions to higher ranks: The confidential reports up to recently have not been sufficiently drastic and straight; it is only in recent years that the man making the report has understood that his own character is also at stake for fairness and for telling the facts as they really are.1 To Wood, promotion up to the rank of Major appeared automatic. Thereafter, it was a matter of seniority tempered by rejection only in the very worst cases despite the fact that selection of higher commands by merit alone had been supposedly in force since 1891. Wood suggested that there were three distinct categories of officers that could be identified from confidential reports. There were those whose fitness for advancement was undoubted, and those with such a bad record that their unfitness was readily apparent. The great majority, however, were colourless men, who had been promoted simply because there is nothing known against them.

1 House of Commons Parliamentary Papers 1904 [Cd. 1790] Report of the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa, Minutes of Evidence, p. 176, c. 4166, Wood, 29 Oct. 1902.

THE ANNUAL CONFIDENTIAL REPORT

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The quotation was taken from Woods own memorandum on selection written in October 1900.2 The criticism of confidential reports was not new. In October 1888, Sir George Chesney, the Military Member of the Viceroys Council, had complained that there was a reluctance to report adversely on subordinates by those who in their desire to make things pleasant, do not put before A.H.Q. & Govt. their real opinions about officers. According to Chesney, district commanders in India would not commit to paper what they really thought of an individual so that no one wd. infer from them, what has been notorious for years to everyone in the army, except apparently the General O.C. the district, that he is a thoroughly useless officer. Referring to the case of Lieutenant Colonel Williams of the 16th Bombay Cavalry in March 1889, Chesney similarly claimed that inspecting officers will not do their duty but are too anxious to make things pleasant all round. The result was that the authorities were aware of an officers incompetence but there are no public vouchers to that effect, and they cannot establish a case merely on private opinion but must have something official and definite to go on.3 Equally, Lieutenant General Sir Donald Stewart, soon to become Commander-in-Chief in India, wrote in 1880,

The curse of our service is that people - I mean most people - wont say what they think about an officer till it is too late. Then the authorities that ought to know all about the Army then round and say there is nothing on record against so & so as if that were a sufficient recommendation in his favour.

Subsequently, Stewart told his successor, General Sir Frederick Roberts, in May 1887 that he did not consider J. F. Cadogan of the 33rd Bengal Infantry capable of commanding a regiment and yet I am not certain there is anything very strong on record against him.4 Amid the recriminations following the disaster at Maiwand in Afghanistan in July 1880, the Commander-in-Chief at the War Office, George, Duke of Cambridge, criticised the Commander-in-Chief in Bombay, Lieutenant General Henry Warre, for his selection of Lieutenant General James Primrose for the command at Kandahar. Warre tried to deflect criticism by suggesting that he should not have been expected to report on someone of equal rank. Cambridge retorted that a candid view should have been given: In high positions disagreeable things have

2 Ibid., p. 179, c. 4246; National Army Museum (hereafter NAM), Roberts Mss, 7101-23-207, Memorandum by Wood, 15 Oct. 1900; also in The National Archives (hereafter TNA), WO 32/8367. 3 NAM, Roberts Mss, 7101-232-14, Chesney to Roberts, 1 Oct. 1888, and 12 Mar. 1889. 4 National Library of Wales, Hills-Johnes of Dolaucothi Mss, L13655, Stewart to Hills, 16 May 1880; NAM, Roberts Mss, 7101-23-78, Stewart to Roberts, 5 May 1887.


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to be done at times for the good of the public service. Cambridge also suggested that he had advanced Primrose in rank previously in the belief that he was able, and could not have known otherwise unless properly informed through reports.5 Newly appointed Cambridges successor as Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Viscount Wolseley complained to Roberts, now also a field marshal and commanding in Ireland, in September 1895 that the Selection Board was necessarily guided by confidential reports but, in the case of officers of the Indian army, they were of little use: All their geese are swans.6 Wolseley was invariably prejudiced against the Indian army but there was generally perceived to be a problem. Indeed, when commanding in Ireland between 1890 and 1895, Wolseley had used the same phrase in noting of the confidential reports by his four district commanders,

[O]ne must take their opinion of officers in conjunction with what we think of those Generals & how we value or estimate the worth of their opinions. To some amiable men all geese are swans, & I must say this of all of them, that when they find fault & report that any officer is below par, he must be a real fool.7

Shortly before retiring, Wolseley agreed with Woods criticisms of reports, suggesting there was a system of promotion by seniority in all ranks, tempered by a somewhat rarely exercised rejection for well recognised incompetency. While Wolseley felt the Selection Board had been reasonably successful, not enough was known about Majors or seconds in command of battalions.8 Wolseley also once remarked of the Military Secretary, Lieutenant General Sir Edmund Whitmore, that I never knew anyone more anxious to do right, but he thinks one man is much the same as the other & hates passing any man over because you have a better man available for the vacancy. For all their differences on strategic and military matters, Roberts would have concurred heartily, having noted that as rule, I have observed that whether men behave well or ill, they are spoken of in the same terms, and get the same reward.9 Not surprisingly, Wolseley and Roberts had their own methods of determining military merit. As is well known, both operated their own rings of selected officers.

5 NAM, Warre Mss, 8112-54-673, 705, 707, Warre to Whitmore, 5 Dec. 1880, and Cambridge to Warre, 11 Nov. and 31 Dec. 1880. 6 Ibid., Roberts Mss, 7101-23-89, Wolseley to Roberts, 4 Sept. 1895. 7 National Library of Ireland (hereafter NLI), Kilmainham 1313, Note by Wolseley, 30 Dec, 1893. 8 TNA, WO 32/8367, Wolseley to PUS, 15 Oct. 1900. 9 Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Alison Mss, Box 1, Wolseley to Alison, 22 Mar. 1885; NAM, Roberts Mss, 7101-24-101, Roberts to Dillon, 4 Apl. 1880.


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For Wolseley the Asante campaign in 1873-74 had marked the real beginning of the Wolseley or Ashanti ring. As Wolseley wrote in his autobiography, he had long been in the habit of keeping a list of the best and ablest soldiers I knew, and was always on the look-out for those who could safely be entrusted with any special military piece of work. There is evidence for this list. On his way out to the Gold Coast, Wolseley gave Captain George Furse a paper bearing a long list of names, asking him at the same time to mark with a cross any name which he considered to be that of a good and efficient officer. In December 1884 Wolseley told his wife, after an old associate, Sir William Butler, had proved troublesome, he would drop him from my list.10 Wolseley always claimed that he picked solely on merit and even his critics acknowledged that he had the knack of selecting able men. He had a penchant for courage but also for intellectual reputation, particularly favouring Staff College graduates. There were obvious disadvantages, Wolseley becoming increasingly a prisoner of his early successes, feeling it desirable to keep employing the same individuals lest his rejection of them might reflect on his earlier choice. He also assumed that selected individuals would always be willing to fill specific roles in his military corrective when they themselves were growing in stature and seniority.11 Another drawback, as suggested by Cambridge, was that if the same officers are invariably employed, you have no area for selecting others, and give no others a chance of coming to the front.12 Roberts was equally careful. One of Wolseleys protgs, Lieutenant General Henry Brackenbury, was appointed Military Member of the Viceroys Council in 1891, throwing him into close proximity to Roberts, who was Commander-in-Chief in India from 1885 to 1893. In May 1894 Brackenbury specifically compared Robertss methods to those of Wolseley, suggesting that any officer placed in a great position of authority and responsibility will select as his tools for the work in hand the men whom he has tried, and found never to fail him, and will prefer them to those who he has not tried, or to those who he has tried and not found perfect. Brackenbury had asked Roberts about the Wolseley ring, to which Roberts had replied that Wolseley was perfectly right: No officer who has the responsibility laid upon him of carrying

10 Field Marshal Viscount Wolseley, The Story of a Soldiers Life 2 vols. (London: Archibald Constable & Co, 1903), II, p. 201; Sir George Douglas, The Life of Major General Wauchope (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1905), pp. 63-64, 74; Hove Reference Library, Wolseley Mss, W/P 10/38, Wolseley to Lady Wolseley, 23-29 Dec. 1884. 11 Adrian Preston (ed.), Sir Garnet Wolseleys South African Diaries (Natal), 1875 (Cape Town: A. A. Balkema, 1971), pp. 88-89; Ian F. W. Beckett (ed.), Wolseley and Ashanti: The Asante War Journal and Correspondence of Major General Sir Garnet Wolseley, 1873-74 (Stroud: History Press for Army Records Society, 2009), pp. 39-45; idem, Command in the Late Victorian Army, in Gary Sheffield (ed.), Leadership and Command: The Anglo-American Military Experience since 1861 (London: Brasseys, 1997), pp. 37-56. 12 A. R. Godwin-Austen, The Staff and the Staff College (London: Constable, 1927), p. 207.


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out a big job would ever be such a fool as to entrust the details of it to men he did not know he could rely on. 13 Roberts himself told Brigadier General Henry Wilkinson in February 1887 that he was guided in his choices by his own knowledge of officers, advice from the HQ staff and higher commanders, the opinion of the army generally, and confidential reports. Even this was not a foolproof method so far as confidential reports were concerned. Thus, in September 1887, having been informed by the Military Secretary that Major Howard Brunker of the Cameronians had been found wanting when in the presence of the enemy in South Africa, Roberts complained that he could hardly have known this. Brunker had been favourably reported on for the past two years in India, and any previous confidential reports had not been forwarded from the War Office.14 The officer corps of the British and Indian armies was relatively small, but this did not mean that everyone was well known to everyone else, as frequent comments in private correspondence make only too clear. Thus, the confidential report remained significant. General Sir William Lockhart, for example, noted in July 1898 that he considered Lieutenant General George Sanford the best candidate for the Bombay command. It was suggested that Sanford was eccentric. Lockhart commented, but then I have not seen his confidential report.15 Clearly, the issue of the annual confidential report is one worth considering in connection with promotion. One of the difficulties in assessing the impact and accuracy of reports is the lack of surviving papers relating to the work of the Military Secretary, responsible to the Commander-in-Chief for personnel issues. Just two general letter books have survived, covering the period from 1871 to 1893, and what is characterised as the Commander-in-Chiefs Selection Book, covering the period from 1882 onwards.16 The latter summarises the information utilised for promotions from Colonel to Major General, briefly indicating the general gist of confidential reports only to 1887, at which point the column for Confidential Reports on Colonel is used only to record whether a promotion is by selection or seniority. Personnel records as such have not survived with the exception of those of a small selection of leading soldiers, or whose careers were presumably thought of interest. For the Victorian period, there are relatively few but they do include those for Sir Redvers Buller; the Duke of Cambridge; Charles Gordon; Herbert Kitchener; Hector Macdonald; Lord Roberts; the Hon. Reginald Talbot, who commanded the Heavy

13 Royal Artillery Museum, Brackenbury Mss, MD 1085/3, Brackenbury to Buller, 9 May 1894. 14 NAM, Roberts Mss, 7101-23-199-4, Roberts to Wilkinson, 22 Feb. 1887; ibid, 7010-12-100-1, Roberts to Harman, 9 Sept., 1887. 15 British Library (hereafter BL), Asia, Pacific and Africa Collections (hereafter APAC), L/MIL/7/15520, Lockhart to Newmarch, 15 Jul. 1898. 16 NAM, 1998-06-194 and 195, Military Secretarys Private Letter Books; 1998-06-197, Commander-in-Chiefs Selection Book.


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Camel Regiment on the Gordon Relief Expedition; and James Henry Reynolds, who won the VC at Rorkes Drift.17 A few additional confidential reports have also been preserved for similarly distinguished soldiers including the Duke of Connaught; Lord Methuen; W. H. Mackinnon, who commanded the City Imperial Volunteers in the South African War; and Evelyn Wood.18 Few mention confidential reports in memoirs, the notable exception being Richard Meinertzhagen, who included extracts from his confidential reports from 1900 to 1924. Meinertzhagen suggested that, despite their invariably flattering nature, he had a wonderful aptitude for hiding my faults, and not allowing my little weaknesses to see daylight.19 Officers were reported on in a number of ways that added to their overall record. There are surviving reports on Indian army officers who attended the Staff College from 1882 onwards.20 Similarly, there are reports on engineering subalterns leaving the School of Military Engineering at Chatham between 1889 and 1892.21 Fortunately, too, all summaries of confidential reports (and a few full reports), primarily for infantry and cavalry officers, have survived for the Irish Command between 1871 and 1894.22 Summary confidential reports have also survived for officers at command and staff levels in the Indian army and the British army in India from 1888 onwards.23 Most leading figures such as Wolseley and Roberts expressed themselves freely on the quality or otherwise of fellow officers in their private correspondence but Roberts also kept copies of some confidential reports made on senior officers on the conclusion of his campaigns in the Afghanistan in 1879, and in South Africa in 1900.24 Consequently, there is sufficient material to make an informed assessment of confidential reports. The form of the annual report changed over time. In 1874 the first page of the report for infantry and cavalry officers required an assessment of the state of an officers health; whether fit for service, and with good eyesight; and whether a good horseman. The commanding officer was required to indicate his reasons for 17 TNA, WO 138. 18 Ibid., WO 27/489. 19 Richard Meinertzhagen, Army Diary, 1899-1926 (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1960), pp. 290-96. 20 BL, APAC, L/MIL/7/3424-27. 21 TNA, WO 25/3950. 22 NLI, Kilmainham 1307-1313. 23 BL, APAC, L/MIL/7/17038-50. 24 NAM, Roberts Mss, 7101-23-148, Reports for 1879, reproduced in part in Brian Robson (ed.), Roberts in India: The Military Papers of Field Marshal Lord Roberts, 1876-93 (Stroud: Alan Sutton for Army Records Society, 1993), pp. 68-69; ibid., 7101-23-188, Reports for 1900, reproduced in full in Andr Wessels (ed.), Lord Roberts and the War in South Africa, 1899-1902 (Stroud: Sutton Publishing for Army Records Society, 2000), pp.126-30. Additional Confidential Reports by Roberts are in TNA, WO 105/25 and 27].


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considering an officer fit for his current position and for advancement, or reasons for dissatisfaction. The back of the form carried details of date of birth; whether an officer had been a cadet at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst or had attended the Staff College; whether he had attended schools of instruction; whether he had passed for promotion; whether he had command of any languages; and whether he was married or single. The form also required details of whether an officer had been distinguished in the field, such as receiving a mention in despatches or orders and decorations; as well as full details of military service and appointments. The inspecting officer - usually the district commander - would then comment upon the report.25 By 1885, the first page of the report also required details of an officers general ability; general professional requirements; capacity for command; self-reliance; readiness and resource; judgement and tact; temper; his practical proficiency in application of drill, reconnaissance, outpost and patrol duties, and horsemanship. The back of the form had not essentially changed although it now also required whether an officer was qualified in signalling, and the name and address of next of kin.26 By 1891, it had changed again. The first page now sought detail on general ability; general professional acquirements; practical proficiency in drill and field movement; professional zeal; smartness in performance of duties; level of horsemanship; and an officers capacity for command in terms of judgement, tact, temper, self-reliance, and power of commanding respect. There also had to be an assessment as to whether an officer was equal to, or above, or below the average in his unit; and whether he could exercise proper influence for his rank over officers, NCOs and men. The back of the form now had additional separate sections for what level of promotion an officer had passed; whether he had attended schools of instruction for musketry, military engineering, signalling, cavalry, pioneers, mounted infantry, veterinary work, supply, transport, riding, and gymnastics; and whether he had acted as an adjutant.27 New guidance issued in 1893 required to know additionally where an officer had attended a school of instruction; whether he had been adjutant of a militia or volunteer battalion; and the level at which Persian or Hindustani had been passed.28 The surviving Irish Command report summaries have few for engineer or artillery officers. The front of the form was common to those of infantry and cavalry officers but the back required information on particular professional attainments. The artillery form in 1887 wanted information on an officers knowledge of the instructions laid down in the field artillery manual; and his power of applying the

25 NLI, Kilmainham 1307, Form for Captain William Abberley, 2/8th Foot, 2 Jul. 1874. 26 Ibid., Kilmainham 1310, Blank Form, 7 May 1885. 27 NLI, Kilmainham 1312, Report on Major Somerset Kevil-Davies, 2nd Gordon Highlanders, 29 Jul. 1891. 28 Ibid., Kilmainham 1313, Note by Childers, 20 May 1893.


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same in the field, by battery and in brigade, and in relation to other arms. For garrison artillery officers there had to be an assessment of an officers general knowledge of the instructions laid down in manuals for garrison and siege artillery; his degree of practical knowledge of the work of heavy garrison ordnance; his knowledge of hydraulics applied to artillery service; and his knowledge of steam and machinery, of electricity, and of drawing. In the case of engineering officers, the 1893 form required information on professional qualifications listed as attendance at the Staff College; and knowledge of field engineering, permanent fortification, construction and estimating, field telegraphy and signalling, electricity, submarine mining, surveying, railways, and ballooning. It also required the knowledge possessed of foreign languages, and of musketry. A solitary report form on a medical officer, also from 1893, was again common to that of others so far as the first page was concerned. On the back, it required to know whether an officer has passed in military law; if he had done so at a training school, in the medical staff corps, or at Aldershot; if he had passed a riding class; and whether he possessed other special acquirements and qualifications as a medical officer.29 In theory at least, the amount of detail required was considerable. Additional reports might be required, especially if an officer appealed against the judgements passed on him. Moreover, the more senior the officer, the more comments were applied up the chain of command. In those reports forwarded to the India Office for onward transmission to the War Office, for example, comments on senior officers in the Bombay and Madras presidencies were made by the governors of those presidencies as well as by the Commander-in-Chief in India. When Lieutenant Colonel the Hon. Paul Methuen was about to be appointed Assistant Adjutant General to the Irish Command in 1877, his predecessor, Charles Wynne-Finch, told him that dealing with the confidential reports for seven cavalry regiments, 21 infantry battalions and three companies of engineers, as well as for all the staff, was the devil in terms of work. The process began each August and continued until the following March.30 Perusal of the Irish reports suggests that Wood was essentially correct: those detailed comments recorded in summary returns tend to relate routinely to the commanding officer and second in command of units but, otherwise, only to those with obvious failings. In both October 1873 and October 1874, for example, all 31 captains and lieutenants of the 6th Dragoons were simply reported as satisfactory.31 To some extent, it depended upon the GOC. Upon assuming the Irish Command in October 1880, General Sir Thomas Steele directed that only unfavourable reports should be recorded. By contrast, when in Ireland, Wolseley insisted that the first

29 Ibid., Kilmainham 1310, Report on Lieutenant Colonel Edward Elliott, A Brigade, RHA, 2 Aug. 1887; ibid., 1313, Blank Engineer and Medical Forms, 1893.] 30 Wiltshire and Swindon History Centre, Methuen Mss, 1742/6335, Letters on Appointment to Dublin, Wynne-Finch to Methuen, 19 Mar. 1877. 31 NLI, Kilmainham 1307, Reports of 13 Oct. 1873, and 1 Oct. 1874.


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four officers in a unit should be reported on as to their fitness for promotion if it was a two-battalion regiment, or the first six officers in the case of a three-battalion regiment. Forms had to be filled in correctly and fully; periods of half pay should not be counted as employment; the place of birth must be accurately given; there must be a complete address for next of kin; and only the commanding officer and the inspecting officer were permitted to complete the boxes for additional comments.32 Yet, even in Wolseleys time, every subordinate officer in a regiment could be returned simply as satisfactory, as in the case of all 26 captains and lieutenants in the 1st Kings Own (Royal Lancaster Regiment) in October 1891, and all 24 captains and lieutenants in the 1st Royal Sussex Regiment in July 1893.33 There is also evidence of the reluctance to be specific in comments. In August 1884, Major General Lord Clarina, commanding the Dublin District, indicated that Lieutenant Colonel John Blaksley of the 1st Buffs (East Kent Regiment) was not a success although I am not prepared to give any specific reasons for expressing this opinion, but he is certainly not popular with his officers & is disliked socially according to common report. The Military Secretary responded by demanding a full report: It is necessary that reasons should be fully given for forming an adverse opinion regarding any officer, but Lord Clarina, although he has formed an unfavourable opinion of Lt. Col. Blaksley, states that he is not prepared to give any reasons for having formed it. Clarina replied with details of Blaksleys want of tact and judgement, defending his own original intention as being a desire

to avoid troubling the authorities with unnecessary correspondence, & in the exercise of his important command he has never shrunk from taking on himself as much responsibility as possible, therefore he (Lord C.) some months since settled a misunderstanding which had arisen between Lt. Col. Blaksley & his officers, with regard to a question relating to the Officers Mess; on which occasion he (Lord C.) could not fail to perceive that he certainly did not command their esteem, & that he had displayed great want of judgement.

Cambridge concluded from the evidence Clarina now presented that

unless this officer can so far alter his mode of carrying on his duties as to conduce to a more cordial feeling towards him on the part of his subordinates it will become a matter for consideration whether in the interests of the Service and the well being of the Battn. Lt. Col. Blaksley

32 Ibid., Kilmainham 1309, Note by Boyle, 2 Oct. 1880; ibid., 1313, Note by Childers, 20 May 1893. 33 Ibid., Kilmainham 1312, Report, 22 Oct. 1891; 1313, Report, 20-21 Jul. 1893.


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should not be called upon to retire from a position which he does not appear to be sufficiently qualified to fill in a very essential point.

Blaksley denied being on poor terms with his officers, and entered a heartfelt plea to be allowed to continue in the army, at which point Clarina indicated that he wished to say no more to damage Blaksleys prospects. He trusted that the episode would have taught Blaksley the need for requisite tact.34 In the following year, Clarina was again compelled to elucidate further his remarks on Lieutenant Colonel Edwin Oldfield, and Majors John Harkness and John Vincent of the 1st Northumberland Fusiliers. Not having previously seen Oldfield, Clarina had relied on the report of the battalions former commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Norman Macdonald, that Oldfield had completely lost his head on parade. Similarly, he had relied on Macdonalds view that Vincent lacked tact and judgement. Clarina excused this on the grounds that, with between 500 and 600 officers in Dublin District, he need scarcely observe that it is manifestly impossible for him to become personally acquainted with the qualifications of every individual officer, therefore he is obliged in a great measure, to rely on the information he obtains from Comg. Offs. In the case of Vincent, it transpired that Macdonald, in turn, had based his own view on what he had been told of Vincents performance as adjutant of the 3rd Northumberland Fusiliers. Meanwhile, Harkness had been promoted to command the 2nd Battalion on the basis of Clarinas satisfactory reports for 1883 and 1884 yet he now claimed Harkness had little ability. The Duke of Cambridge required to know how these reports could be reconciled, noting that he,

is obliged to rely on the reports received from Genl. Officers to assist him in deciding as to the fitness of an officer for promotion, and specially in the selection of a Lieut. Colonel for the responsible position of the command of a Battalion, and H.R.H. is placed in a very difficult position, when, after acting on such a report and appointing an officer to a command, he receives an unfavourable report from the same General Officer.

Clarina replied that he felt no difficulty in reconciling the apparent anomaly of his having in three separate reports rendered in three different years expressed opinions regarding an officer at variance with one another. He had seen Harkness only in the capacity of an acting magistrate in 1883 and 1884, and was not aware of his more general failings until the battalion was concentrated in Dublin in 1885. Rather giving the game away in precisely the way that general criticisms of the annual confidential reports have already been implied, however, Clarina also wrote, 34 Ibid., Kilmainham 1309, Steele to Whitmore, 27 Aug. 1884; Boyle to Clarina, 16 Sept, 1884; Clarina to Boyle, 23 Sept, 1884; Whitmore to Clarina, 26 Sept. 1884; Steele to Whitmore, 9 Oct. 1884; ibid., 1310, Note by Clarina, 28 Oct. 1884.


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No man can possibly more dislike having to make a disparaging remark as to the capacity of an officer than he (Lord C.) does, and he trusts H.R.H. will credit him with the desire to faithfully discharge the somewhat invidious duties which an Inspg. Gen. Officer is required to perform & that his explanation may be considered sufficient.35

Even Wolseley, who was usually more than willing to express his dissatisfaction with officers, could pull his punches on occasion. Thus, in October 1891, Wolseley described Colonel Montgomery Williams, commanding the Regimental District at Birr, as absolutely useless in any Military position and absolutely unqualified for further promotion. Yet, Wolseley indicated that he would find it difficult to put his exact reasons for these judgements into an official document. Since Williams was due to retire anyway, it would be better merely to say that, in line with previous reports, he had been found wanting in the districts essential recruiting work through lack of energy and want of go. Similarly, in August 1892 Wolseley chose not to disclose in full to the officer in question, Lieutenant Colonel William Roberts of the 2nd Duke of Cornwalls Light Infantry, adverse reports upon him. Wolseley commented that I dont think one can expect to obtain usefully guiding information from those in command relating to the men under their orders, if their reports are to be shown to those concerned. He went on,

In these days of selection, it is very easy to tell a Lieut. Colonel that he has not been selected for promotion, because there were others whom it was considered in the interests of the Army & of the State were more fitted for higher positions. One can do this without hurting an officers feelings, for you dont tell him he is useless, but that there are others better than he.36

In much the same way, while suggesting that adverse remarks should normally be communicated to officers, Roberts as Commander-in-Chief in Madras had declined to pass on his full report to Brigadier General George de Berry in January 1883. The latter would not be re-employed and was due to be retired in a matter of months: the full extent of the criticism would only pain an old soldier.37 De Berry, who had first seen action in the Sikh Wars but none since the Mutiny, was duly retired as a Major General in June 1883.

35 Ibid., Kilmainham 1310, Note by Clarina, 14 Oct. 1885; Macdonald to Turner, 13 Oct. 1885; Turner to Clarina, 5 Dec, 1885; Prince Edward of Saxe-Weimar to Harman, 12 Dec, 1885. 36 Ibid., Kilmainham 1312, Wolseley to Harman, 4 Oct. and 17 Oct. 1891; ibid, Wolseley to Harman, 27 Aug. 1892. 37 NAM, Roberts Mss, 7101-23-97, Roberts to Dillon, 31 Jan. 1883.


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On occasions, too, there was a desire to given an officer the benefit of the doubt. In January 1875, Cambridge proposed to remove Colonel Joyce from the 68th Sub District at Galway as a result of the report by General Lord Sandhurst. Sandhurst, however, indicated that it did not occur to me to suggest this officers removal. Although I may believe him to be unsuitable for an independent Command. Joyces correspondence had suggested to Sandhurst that he was of flighty intelligence and impudent in speech. Sandhurst recommended proceeding cautiously as he had not disclosed his views to Joyce but the latter had already been called upon to resign and was now demanding to know the cause. Lieutenant General Sir Edward Holdich, commanding the Dublin District, upheld Sandhursts view and Joyce was told bluntly he could sell his commission, go on half pay, or retire on full pay as he was over 60.38 In May 1885 there were adverse reports on Captain Charles Mayne of No. 1 Battery, 1st Brigade (Western Division) Royal Artillery at Carlisle Fort, Cork. Mayne had appeared to be drunk on a number of occasions, once while at the theatre in Cork, but was otherwise considered a good officer. Mayne was refused the interview he sought with the Duke of Cambridge and passed over for promotion. But, since the Duke wished to give Mayne the chance to redeem himself, he was given a years probation during which he would be reported on monthly.39 In August 1887 General H.S.H. Prince Edward of Saxe Weimar acknowledged that Colonel John Kinchant of the 11th Hussars was wanting in tact, as suggested by Major General the Hon. Charles Thesiger, who commanded the Cavalry Brigade at the Curragh, as well as acting as Inspector General of Cavalry in Ireland. Prince Edward felt Thesiger over ready to take offence. In the event, Kinchant retired in November 1887, being granted the honorary rank of Major General.40 Kinchants case raises the issue of where there was disagreement on the quality of an officer and adverse comment, of course, could have its roots in personalities. In terms of the former, for example, there was disagreement over a number of years of the merits of Colonel Thomas Crawley, a British officer serving as Assistant Adjutant General first at Lahore and then Allahabad. In 1891 Major General Sir Hugh Gough, an Indian army officer commanding at Lahore, considered Crawley thoroughly conversant with his duties but the Adjutant General in Bengal, Major General William Galbraith, a British officer, considered Crawley had a buoyant temperament and average ability. In 1892 the Commander-in-Chief, Roberts, concluded that Crawley was a satisfactory officer without any special qualifications. By 1893 Major General

38 NLI, Kilmainham 1307, Sandhurst to Horsford, 9 Jan. and 29 Jan. 1875; Fendall to Joyce, 6 Feb. 1875. 39 Ibid., Kilmainham 1310, Steele to Whitmore, 2 and 7 May 1885; Boyle to Young, 12 May 1885; Young to Boyle, 14 May 1885; Boyle to Young, 19 May 1885; Boyle to Young, 27 Jul. 1885. 40 Ibid., Thesiger to Beckett, 29 Aug. 1887; Beckett to Dormer, 18 Oct. 1887; Dormer to Beckett, 19 Oct. 1887; Prince Edward to Harman, 20 Oct. 1887.


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Viscount Frankfort de Montmorency, who had followed Gough in command at Lahore, reported that Crawley was on sick leave and that he would find it difficult to suggest any post or command for which Crawley was fitted. Brigadier General Gerald de Courcy Morton, who was acting Adjutant General in Galbraiths absence, concurred, describing Crawley as feeble although conceding this might be due to ill health. Roberts indicated, I do not think this officer is fitted for further employment on the Staff. Yet Crawley survived and, transferred to Allahabad, albeit a lesser post, was found excellent in all respects by Brigadier General Horace Evans of the Bengal Staff Corps, commanding there, after two months acquaintance in 1894. Back in post as Adjutant General, Galbraith still felt Crawley below average and that, inexperienced as he was in dealing with British officers, Evans was naturally impressed by Colonel Crawleys knowledge of them, but I cannot concur in his extremely higher estimate. The Commander-in-Chief in India, now General Sir George White, also felt Crawley had zeal and considerable experience, but not the gifts that go to make a high commander. Evans duly reported favourably on Crawley again in 1895 to the evident continuing surprise of Galbraith and White.41 Similarly, there was a clash in 1889 between Major General Henry Davies, commanding the Cork District, and Lieutenant Colonel Thomas St Clair of the 2nd Princess Charlotte of Waless (Royal Berkshire Regiment). St Clair had reported adversely on Major Justinian Ponsonby, after which Davies had suggested St Clair lacked tact and had a temper. St Clair claimed that Daviess hostility towards him originated from the time they had served together in Southern District previously, and that any reported discontent within the regiment was due to his arrival from the 1st Battalion with the intention to introduce reforms. A minor disagreement had led Ponsonby to complain directly to Davies but, as Ponsonby had apologised, St Clair had not entered an adverse report on him as when promotion by selection is so much the rule he feels the seriousness of an unfavourable report. Davies, in turn, took strong exception to any idea that he had been influenced by unsubstantiated reports from within the battalion. The Duke of Cambridge upheld Daviess report, St Clair having been reported upon for his temper as far back as 1878.42 Two years later, in July 1891, St Clair suggested that Ponsonby had many good qualities and, on the face of it, was qualified for promotion. Yet, at the same time, St Clair was

41 BL, APAC, L/MIL/7/17038, Bengal Reports, 15 Mar. 1891; ibid., Bengal Reports, 15 Mar. 1892; ibid., Bengal Reports, 15 Mar. 1893; L/MIL/7/17039, Bengal Reports, 15 Mar. 1894; ibid., Bengal Reports, 15 Mar. 1895. 42 NLI, Kilmainham 1311, Davies Report, 6 Aug. 1889; Note by Davies, 29 Sept. 1889; Prince Edward of Saxe Weimer to Whitmore, 4 Oct. 1889; Beckett to Davies, 19 Oct. 1889.


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compelled to say that he [Ponsonby] is of a hasty disposition, inclined to magnify personal matters and to be contentious. He is exceedingly selfish and vain, and sometimes narrow minded. He has little perseverance at work which entails discomfort and is too fond of leave and of society. He is not good at either drill or field work.

Ponsonbys eyesight was also poor, and St Clair felt that he should not succeed to command of the battalion. Davies did not agree, arguing that he had always found Ponsonby smart and efficient, and had no hesitation in recommending him for the command. For good measure, Ponsonby sent in a medical board report indicating his eyesight was good. Cambridge again found no reason to question Daviess assessment in the light of St Clairs own record, concluding that Ponsonby was fitted for promotion.43 As it happened, Davies himself had been admonished by Cambridge in January 1890 for two seemingly contrary reports on the Assistant Adjutant General at Cork, Colonel W. Lewis Ogilvy. The last confidential report in June 1889 had been entirely satisfactory yet Ogilvy was now reported as unfitted for his duties. Cambridge directed Ogilvy either to take more interest in his duties so as to avoid any further condemnation by Davies, or resign.44 A similar personality clash occurred in December 1891 when Lieutenant Colonel James Stewart Mackenzie of the 9th Lancers reported unfavourably on Major Bloomfield Gough following their disagreement over the treatment of a military prisoner in the regiment. Both had distinguished themselves in the Second Afghan War but it was known that they were not friends. Lieutenant General James Keith Fraser, the Inspector General of Cavalry, was unable to offer any view based on personal observation. He was inclined to believe Goughs side of the story on the basis of Goughs known gallantry. By contrast, Major General Somerset Wiseman Clarke, commanding the Belfast District, was more ready to back Mackenzie. Given that Fraser was non committal and Wiseman Clarkes view unfavourable, Gough was warned that he should have chosen his reported words to Mackenzie more carefully, and he must be made aware that further advancement depended on future satisfactory reports.45 One lasting dispute that was played out in the confidential reports was between Roberts and Hugh Goughs brother, Sir Charles Gough. In December 1879 when the

43 Ibid., Kilmainham 1312, St Clair report, 24 Jul. 1891 with comments by Davis; Harman to Childers, 20 Nov. 1891; Childers to Davis, 23 Jan. 1892. 44 NAM, 1998-06-195, Harman to Davies, 3 Jan. 1890, and Harman to Ogilvy, 3 Jan. 1890. 45 NLI, Kilmainham 1312, Report by Mackenzie, 18 Dec. 1891, with comments but Fraser and Wiseman Clarke; Gough to Childers, 19 Dec. 1891; Mackenzie to Childers, 21 Dec. 1891; Wolseley to Harman, 31 Dec. 1891; Childers to Wiseman Clarke, 1 Feb. 1892.


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then Major General (local Lieutenant General) Sir Frederick Roberts had forced his way into Kabul following the murder of the British envoy there, his force was besieged in the Sherpur cantonment. Commanding a brigade on the lines of communication, the then Brigadier General Charles Gough was ordered to advance from Jagdalak to reinforce Roberts at Sherpur, some 70 miles away and with snow thick on the ground, although the peremptory orders from Roberts actually contradicted those Gough received from his immediate superior, Major General Robert Bright. Roberts believed that Gough had been unnecessarily slow in taking 12 days to get through to him. In fact, there were fierce attacks on those detachments Gough had left to defend Jagdalak and other posts.46 Thereafter Roberts seemingly went out of his way to damage Goughs reputation despite the latter being praised by the then Commander-in-Chief, Sir Frederick Haines, and awarded the KCB. There were derogatory reflections in Robertss correspondence, with Roberts doing his best to ensure Gough would not get the Madras command in 1890, as well as what Gough took to be a damning slight in Robertss autobiography, Forty One Years in India, published in 1896. But confidential reports also served Robertss purpose. Thus, in 1888, when commanding the Oudh Division, Gough was characterised by Roberts as able and energetic but, Of his power to act with decision when a

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