bubbio - met a philosophical reflections on theism and atheism in the current debate

8/2/2019 Bubbio - Met a Philosophical Reflections on Theism and Atheism in the Current Debate

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12Metaphilosophical reflections on theism

and atheism in the current debatePaolo Diego Bubbio

I. New atheism and new theismIn the last few years, philosophy of religion has increasingly become a

subject of dispute. Two positions seem to be the most popular. On the

one hand, outspoken atheists reject religion in the name of reason and

science. On the other hand, we witness an increase of scholarship

sympathetic with evangelical movements, especially in the United

States. For the purpose of this paper, I will use the term new atheists

for referring to the former approach, and the term new theists for

referring to the latter approach.1

New atheists is a label that has become usual for identifying some

thinkers such as Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris and Quentin Smith.

1 A previous version of this paper has been presented as a response to Graham

Oppys paper New atheism and Christian evangelicalism, notes in progress at the

Philosophy of Religion Research Seminar (University of Sydney). I wish to thankGraham for having shared with me his comments on my response: in the current

version of the paper I try to answer some of his objections. An improved version

of the paper has been presented at the Australian Catholic University School of

Philosophy Seminar and I am grateful to the seminar participants for helpful

discussions. I wish also to thank Paul Crittenden, Paul Redding and Luca Moretti

for their close reading of this paper and for their insightful comments. Thanks are

also due to Philip Quadrio, who also commented on some of my ideas on phi-

losophy of religion, for his amicable assistance by joining in the proof-readings.


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Metaphilosophical reflections on theism and atheism 355

Atheism being a general term, a more detailed specification is neces-

sary. The distinguishing feature of the new atheism seems to be a

kind of scientific atheism. To borrow the philosopher ThomasDixons definition (2002: 33759), scientific atheism involves belief in

three central doctrines. The first is anti-theism. The second is scien-

tism, conceived as the belief that science, especially natural science, is

much the most valuable part of human learning because it is much

the most authoritative, or serious, or beneficial (Sorrell 1991: 1,

quoted in Dixon 2002: 342). Thirdly, scientific atheists recognise the

need to develop an alternative worldview to replace supernaturalism

and theism, in which to ground their interpretation of the results of

natural science, their understanding of the origins and meaning of

human life, and their ethical discourse (Dixon 2002: 342).2 Main-

stream scientific atheism is different from evolutionary humanism.

The term, coined by Julian Huxley, is used by Dixon to identify a sub-

species of scientific atheism, such as that of John C. Avise (1998),

which is characterised, in comparison with mainstream scientific

atheism, by its more sympathetic attitude to traditional religious be-lievers, religious language and theology (Dixon 2002: 349).

Providing a precise account of the new theism is much more diffi-

cult. If it is true that some scholars explicitly profess evangelicalism, or

at least some of its characteristics as identified by David Bebbington

(1989)including: conversionism, biblicism, activism, cruicentrism

and hence are often referred to as Evangelic Christians, the term is

only partly accurate, both because not all of them profess all thesebeliefs, and because the movement embraces a wider range of phi-

losophical expressions. Sometimes they are referred to as Christian

2 As Dixon stresses, This corresponds roughly to the fifth of Stenmarks five sorts

of scientism, which he calls redemptive scientism, that is, the view that science

alone is sufficient for dealing with our existential questions or for creating a world

view by which he could live cf. (Stenmark 1997: 31).


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356 Politics and religion in the new century

nationalists, but this label is even less accurate, because it implies an

emphasis on the political dimension of their philosophical activity

which, even assuming this as their ultimate goal, does not representthe philosophical justification of their reasoning. Rather, the distin-

guishing feature of what I call new theism seems to be a revived

natural philosophy that welcomes rational proofs for the existence of a

personal God and supernatural/religious explanations for scientific

phenomena. This philosophical attitude is exemplified by (but not

limited to) the theory of intelligent design. Intelligent design is the

claim that certain features of the universe and of living things are best

explained by an intelligent cause, not an undirected process such as

natural selection (Discovery Institute 2007: Top Questions section).

Thinkers such as William Lane Craig and Robert Koons seem to be

committed to this notion.3

II. Should they be considered as philosophies of religion?

The works of the new atheists and of the new theists are usually con-

sidered as belonging to (the discipline of) philosophy of religion for

they express a (positive or negative) relation between religion and

philosophy. However, from a normative point of view, this belonging

seems to me disputable. In other words, what I am wondering is

whether they should normatively be considered as philosophies of

religion.4

Moreover it has to be noted that a descriptive criterion implies a nor-

mative criterion, for it is thanks to a generally shared normative

3 The Center for Science and Culture 2007: Top Questions section (retrieved on

September 23, 2007). The website includes both William Lane Craig and Robert

Koons as Fellows.

4 Questioning the disciplinary belonging of various theses and publications could

seem just a problem of linguistic idiosyncrasy, but when we focus on philosophy

of religion it is not. I hope it will be made clear before the end of this paper.


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criterion that, for instance, we describe the book we are reading as a

book of philosophy of religion, of religious philosophy or of theol-

ogyor, simply, of literature. What is a normative criterion groundedon? Possible answers are: a) reason; b) a typical standard or model.

The latter answer is obviously weaker than the former, as it entails a

higher degree of arbitrariness. Let the former option be considered.

Unless a notion of objective reason is adopted (which is difficult when

focusing on normative criteria), the formulation of the former option

should be modified as follows: reasonat least byordinary standards

of reasonableness. In both cases,5 it is implied that a normative crite-

rion depends on a tradition, conceiving this term in the (general)

sense of a set of beliefs, customs or practices taught by one generation

to the next.

The thoughts, theories and publications of the new theists are descrip-

tively considered as belonging to (the discipline of) philosophy of

religion. So are the thoughts, theories and publications of the new

atheists, insofar as they are considered, as Quentin Smith critically

stresses, as a subfield of the philosophy of religion.6 If the descriptive

criterion according to which all these thoughts, theories and publica-

tions are considered as belonging to (the discipline of) philosophy of

religion implies a normative criterion, and if a normative criterion

always depends (partially at least) on a tradition, it follows that this

5 Most of the times these two options do not exclude each other, but they partially

overlapfor instance, a normative criterion often (but not always) is grounded on

a typical standard or model that has been adopted also because of a reasonat

least by ordinary standards of reasonableness.

6 As a subfield of the philosophy of religion, atheism is usually classified as a

body of counter-arguments against the cosmological, teleological and ontological

arguments, and counter-arguments against the arguments from religious experi-

ence and (alleged) miracles (Smith 2001: 195215).


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normative criterion has to be found in the broad philosophical tradi-

tion these thoughts, theories and publications belong to.

The emergence of a normative criterion within a specific traditionthus derives from both a degree of arbitrariness and a reasonat least

by ordinary standards of reasonableness (cf. Hobsbawm & Ranger

1992). It seems to me that the reason why the thoughts, theories and

publications of the new theists and of the new atheists are considered

as belonging to the (discipline of) philosophy of religion lies on the

following argument: any philosophical questions that arise in connec-

tion with religion properly belong to philosophy of religion. One ofthe philosophical questions thrown up by reflection on religion is the

question whether God exists. Therefore, arguments defining or deny-

ing religious explanations for scientific phenomena, and arguments

advancing or rejecting rational proofs for the existence of God belong

to the (discipline of) philosophy of religion.

This normative criterion (which I will refer to as the inclusive crite-

rion) seems to have a high degree of reasonableness. This view can be

challenged only by another normative criterion with a higher degree

of reasonableness. What I am going to do is to examine a different

normative criterion usually adopted in the so-called continental phi-

losophical tradition in order to question whether that criterion is

more reasonable than the inclusive criterion. The brief historical ac-

count I am going to present is thus motivated not by an attempt to

historically circumscribe what could be studied under the label phi-

losophy of religion, but by the aim of showing the motives for theadoption of this criterion, including both a degree of arbitrariness and

(what counts more for the purpose of this essay) a degree of reason-

ableness (at least by ordinary standards of reasonableness).


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III. Philosophy, theology and religious philosophy

Philosophy of religion, as a specific discipline, was born relatively late,

not before the 18th century, when modern philosophy stopped focus-

ing on the whole, and started focusing on the human being and on

her relationship to the world and to God. Only with the Enlighten-

ment is a philosophy of religion developed that is distinct from the

ways that medieval philosophy (and also early modern philosophy)

had dealt with religion. The universal questions about the being of

God are not set aside with this anthropocentric conversion. But the

question is not anymore to know the essence of God. Rather, the ques-tion is to know how the human being can relate herself to

transcendence.

A fundamental step in this process is Kants Copernican turn plac-

ing the human cognitive activities at the centre of philosophy. With

the transcendental move, rational arguments on religion become

objects of self-critical reason. Hence, Kant concludes that it is mis-

taken to take the ideas of the soul, the world, and God asconstitutivethey are not cognitive objects, but regulative principles

which serve to guide the understanding through reason in respect of

experience by using to their greatest perfection the rules of reason

(Kant 1998: A320/B376). Kants Religion within the boundaries of mere

reason pursues this goal by removing religious claims from the realm

of theoretical reason and referencing their significance to regulative

and symbolic meaning (Rossi & Wreen 1991).

The whole history of German Idealism from Kant onward can be read,

as Paul Redding has suggested, as the history of perspectivism (Red-

ding 2009). Perspectivism means first of all the renunciation of the

idea that the world can be examined by the subject objectively, that is,

from a Gods-eye point of view. When the subject knows an object,

she does not know the object in itself, but the object as far as it is


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known by the knower. It follows that in the process of knowledge the

subject knows her self by knowing the object.

It is true that the classic proofs of the existence of God sometimesreappear in different formfor instance, the new formulations of the

ontological proof by Schelling and Hegel. However, these proofs ap-

pear in a very different context. For example, when Hegel refuses

Kants confutation of the ontological proof as nave and barbarian, he

is perfectly aware that he is not presenting, properly speaking, an

argument. In fact, Hegel preliminarily assumes that an infinite, that is,

the Absolute, exists. According to Hegel, the ontological proof seemsto make sense only from a particular point of view, only, so to say, in a

particular hermeneutic horizonthe one opened by Kants transcen-

dental move. It is not the content of the religious claims that is

disputed, but its significance for the human being.

Using a different philosophical language, it could be said that there is

no epistemology of God. That is, claims about God (existence as well

as non-existence claims) are truth-apt: they can be true or false be-

cause they have a factual meaning. However, there is no evidence to

support one thesis or the otherthat is, claims on God are not episte-

mologically cognitive: their truth-values are unknowable to us, as there

is no way to increase the degree of rational belief in such claims.

Therefore, a clear distinction between philosophy and theology is

introduced by Kant. Theology bases itself on a revelation, which is

presupposed a priori and which theology develops argumentatively by

focusing on the content of that revelation. Conversely, philosophy

cannot presuppose any revelation. Even if philosophy of religion fo-

cused on a particular revelation, it is not its content that it is

questioned, but its significance for the human being.

Furthermore, philosophy of religion is different from religious phi-

losophy. Philosophy of religion assumes religion as an object of

investigation. In doing so, it remains philosophy and does not become


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religion. Its approach can be critical, analytical, hermeneutical or

whatever, but it cannot be abandonment to religion or a fusion with it.

The definition philosophy of religion expresses a relationship, thatbetween philosophy and religion. When there is a fusion between

philosophy and religion, this relationship is not possible anymore.

This is what happens in religious philosophy, a kind of knowledge in

which the philosophical element receives its validity and its funda-

mental meaning exclusively from its object, that is, the divine. The

paradigm of religious philosophy can be found in the neoplatonic

tradition. For instance, in Plotinus the content and the object of phi-

losophy have a clear sacral dimension. The doctrine of knowledge is a

doctrine of salvation, for the dialectical steps of the return of the soul

to the One, although presented in a rational form, constitute an up-

ward movement through the various phases of the emanationistic

process, up to the grasp of the supreme truth and to the fusion with it.

In philosophical approaches like this, philosophy loses its specificity:

there is no distinction between rational process and longing for God.7

According to this normative criterion (which I will refer to as the

post-Kantian criterion), philosophy of religion is that discipline

which focuses on possible relationships between philosophy and relig-

ion broadly conceived (not a specific revealed religion), in the same

way in which philosophy of law focuses on the relation between phi-

losophy and the notion of law (not the Australian law or the Italian

law), and philosophy of history focuses on the relation between phi-

losophy and the meaning of history (if any), not American history orFrench history. To emphasise the broadness of the term religion, the

discipline could also be defined as the relation between philosophy

and religious experience. That is, philosophy of religion should take

into consideration not only the meaning of actual and organised sys-

7 For an in-depth explanation of the distinction between philosophy of religion,

theology and religious philosophy see (Ravera 1995).


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tems of beliefs and doctrines, but also all those (practical or intellec-

tual) experiences of transcendence coming from outside organised

systems. Moreover, the term religious experience stresses once againthat religion is not primarily considered by philosophy as a proposi-

tional knowledge.

The analytic-anglophone tradition has adopted the normative crite-

rion according to which any philosophical questions that arise in

connection with religion properly belong to philosophy of religion

(inclusive criterion). The continental tradition has instead adopted the

normative criterion according to which only the questions that arisein connection with the regulative and symbolic meaning of religion

properly belong to philosophy of religion, whereas questions that arise

in connection with the theoretical contentof religion do not belong to

it ( post-Kantian criterion).8 The main reason why, I think, the ana-

lytic-anglophone tradition has not assumed the criterion adopted by

the continental tradition is because it has rejected Kantian and post-

Kantian perspectivism.

Therefore Koons and Craigs arguments for the existence of God9 and

reasoning about the nature of divine attributes, together with

Dawkins and Smiths arguments against the existence of God, can be

considered philosophies of religion according to the inclusive crite-

8

Of course I am generalising. Doubtless it is possible to find some philosophieswhich belong (geographically and/or methodologically) to the analytic-

anglophone tradition which adopt the post-Kantian criterion, as well as it is

possible to find some philosophies which belong (geographically and/or method-

ologically) to the continental tradition which adopt the inclusive criterion.

However, these can be considered exceptions within a general trend that usually

shares the same criterion.

9 On Craigs Kalam cosmological argument, see Oppy (2006: 13754); on Koons

contingency-based cosmological argument, see Oppy (2006: 12530).


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rion;10 but cannot be considered philosophies of religion according to

the post-Kantian criterion. In fact, the new theists take for granted a

form of theism based on Christian revelation, on which they develop arevived natural philosophy. The new atheists often refuse to engage

with the theist philosophers arguments because they take for granted

that religion itself is nothing more than superstition.

As a consequence of this general picture, if one takes a superficial look

at the current debate, one could get the feeling that it is necessary to

side with either one group or the other. It could even seem that a

philosopher should not deal with religion and should stigmatise it as achildish form of superstition or, in case she wants to deal with relig-

ion, she should commit herself to the demonstration of the existence

of God, to the definition of the divine attributes or, as the new theists

do, to the clarification of the scientific validity of the theory of intelli-

gent design. Of course there are other possibilities between these

extremes in philosophy of religion (and there are many positions that

are actually occupied). There are, for example, many importantly

different varieties of atheism as well as many importantly different

varieties of theism. However, if one looks at the current debate in the

English-speaking world, it still seems that philosophy of religion has

to be approached from a theistic or from an atheistic standpoint.11

10

This is the reason why books on arguments about the existence of God areclassified in the philosophy of religion section of the catalogues of the major

anglophone scholarly publishers (Cambridge University Press, Oxford University

Press, Routledge, Blackwell, etc.). The cataloguers are not making a linguistic or

conceptual mistake in so classifying these books. They are simply applying a

normative criterion commonly adopted within the tradition they belong to.

11 To be more precise, the agnostic standpoint should be added. In fact, those who

hold an agnostic standpoint are by definition less predisposed to engage a debate

on religion. I will elaborate on this point later on.


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IV. Theist and atheist metaphilosophy of naturalism

The mirror-like positions of the new theists and of new atheists could

remind one of the enemy twins referred to by the cultural theorist

Ren Girard (1986: 125ff). The enemy twins fight each other vigor-

ously, but they need each other, as both of them build their identity in

opposition to their adversary.

Despite the frontal opposition that could lead one to think that these

two positions have nothing in common, the standpoint of new theists

and the standpoint of the new atheists mirror each other. Theyhave

something in common. They both assume that religion is a theory.

They assume that philosophy can and/or should consider religion as a

system of theoretical propositionsso that it is possible, for instance,

to increase the rationality of a specific claim regarding the existence of

God.

The assumption that religion is a theory seems to be based on a kind

of meta-naturalism.12 Atheist philosophers profess a methodological

naturalismwhich, according to the new theists, entails metaphysicalnaturalism (cf. Forrest 2000: 729)13conceived as that approach

which considers supernatural phenomena as nonexistent or not in-

herently different from natural hypothesis. On the other hand, the

new theists profess a natural philosophy that welcomes supernatural

12 The adoption of a naturalistic perspective also explains the rejection of the post

Kantian tradition, as Sebastian Gardner recently pointed out: the kinds of phi-losophical positions most intensively worked on and argued about in non-

historical, systematic analytic philosophy are predominantly naturalisticand

thus, on the face of it, not in any immediate and obvious sense receptive to the

central ideas of German idealism (Gardner 2007: 19).

13 Forrest examines the question of whether methodological naturalism entails

philosophical (ontological or metaphysical) naturalism. She concludes that the

relationship between methodological and philosophical naturalism, while not one

of logical entailment, is the only reasonable metaphysical conclusion.


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explanations of natural phenomena. In both cases, religion is consid-

ered as a theory, whose propositional content is then rejected (for it

expresses something which does not exist, or which can be explainednaturally) or assumed (for it is taken as the ground of natural phe-

nomena).

A good (although inevitably partial) account of this approach to relig-

ion can be found in Quentin Smiths paper The metaphilosophy of

naturalism (2001). Smith complains about the consideration of athe-

ism as a subfield of the philosophy of religion: atheism is usually

classified as a body of counter-arguments against the cosmological,teleological and ontological arguments, and counter-arguments

against the arguments from religious experience. Conversely, Smith

argues, Atheism should be considered as a defence of naturalism

against skeptical attacks, and thereby to play a foundational role in

justifying the presuppositions of positive naturalist philosophy. On

this account theism should be considered as a subfield of naturalism,

namely, as a skepticism about the basic principles of naturalism. As

the final consequence of this reclassification move, [Philosophy of

religion] disappears, to be replaced by a new subfield of naturalism,

namely, [skepticism about naturalism], with skeptical arguments

being put forth and argued against, with the aim in mind of further

developing the argumentative foundations of the naturalist world-

view.

The position of the new theists could be expressed by the same words,

by just inverting the term atheism and theism: theism should beconsidered as a defence of natural philosophy (expressing supernatu-

ral explanations of natural phenomena) against skeptical attacks. Even

in this case, philosophy of religion ultimately disappears, to be re-


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placed by a subfield of theology, namely, apologetics (defence of theis-

tic positions against atheist attacks), (cf. Cottingham 2005).14

In the post-Kantian view, religion cannot be considered as a theory.The arguments that can be offered in support of claims to know that

there is a God or of claims to know that there is no God are not ade-

quate to justify the commitment required by the extreme positions

(new theism and new atheism).15

The rational arguments supporting religion are not adequate to justify

the required commitment. The lack of rational or empirical proofs is

compensated by the believers with faith, a non-rational componentthat provides the believer with the required degree of commitment.

Faith is thus considered by religion as a merit, or a gift, or both (ac-

cording to the different theological conceptions). The attempts of the

new theists to compensate this lack with new rational or empirical

proofs paradoxically aim to dismiss faith. If one day our microscopes

discovered the words made by God in every cell (provided that they

have not been genetically engineered by a race of super-intelligent

aliens), the existence of God would become a mere fact, and not a

merit or a gift anymore.

Once it is accepted that no rational or empirical evidence is sufficient

to claim the existence or the non-existence of God, and that this lack

of rational and empirical proofs is compensated by the believers with

faith in order to reach the required degree of commitment, the ques-

14 In this recent and interesting book, Cottingham rejects the view of religion as atheory. A religious outlook he writes, is never, or at any rate not typically,

adopted on the basis of an inference to the best explanation (22). Later on, he

stresses that theistic commitments are not derived as a conclusion from the

preponderance of philosophical arguments, or put forward as a scientific hy-

pothesis providing the best explanation for certain empirical data (131).

15 This objection does not apply to a belief in God (or non-belief) marked by a

degree of caution.


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tion arises: what is compensating the same lack for the atheists, so that

they can reach the required degree of commitment?

In order to answer this question, it is useful to consider the work ofsome philosophers of the post-Kantian tradition: Gabriel Marcel and

Paul Ricoeur. This exposition will also try to make clear what philoso-

phy of religion should be according to the post-Kantian criterion.

V. Post-Kantian meta-philosophy of religion

In the late 1920s, Gabriel Marcel was one of the protagonists, and

maybe the main character, of a heated debate with some atheist phi-

losophers of that time, like Jean-Paul Sartre, Georges Bataille and

Albert Camus. The historical context and the philosophical approach

of these atheist philosophers were, of course, very different from the

current context and the philosophical prospective of the new atheist

philosophers. Instead of the scientific atheism (shared by Dawkins,

Harris and Smith), Sartre, Bataille and Camus shared a nihilistic athe-

ism based on Nietzsches notion of the death of God. There is noGod, there are no metaphysical values of any kind: according to them,

human beings have to accept this existential situation.

According to Marcel,16 the point is that these nihilist philosophers

present atheism as something evident or more rational than faith in

God. Despite the difference of historical context and philosophical

approach, the general assumption of these nihilist philosophers is the

same assumption that can be reached in the statements of the newatheists. The judgment God does not exist is, they say, more evident

and/or more rational than the judgement God exists. One of the

most exemplary expositions of this argument is that expressed by

Norwood Russell Hanson (1972) in What I do not believe: while there

16 Marcels arguments are taken from Homo viator: introduction to a metaphysic of

hope (1951).


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are good reasons for believing that God does not exist, there are no

good reasons for believing that God does exist.

According to Marcel, atheism is neither evident nor more rational.The non-existence of God cannot be proved, in the same way that the

existence of God cannot be proved. It is not the task of philosophy of

religion to demonstrate the existence of God or the immortality of the

soul. Following in Pascals footsteps, Marcel claims that the belief in

the existence of God, as well as the belief in the non-existence of God,

is the result of a wager. It is just as much an act of faith as the opposite

choice. In other words, at the root of every philosophy (or, better, atthe root of every human existence) there is always a wager. In this

way, Marcel provides an answer to the question what is compensat-

ing the lack of rational and empirical proofs for the atheists, so that

they can reach the required degree of commitment? According to

Marcel, the answer is faitha non-rational component that pro-

vides the unbeliever with the required degree of commitment in the

non-existence of God. It has to be noted that the wager argument, as it

is reproposed by Marcel, does not claim to be a convincing argument

for taking steps to become a believer in a specific revealed religion

(such as Christianity for Pascal). As Diderot (1875: 167)17 pointed out,

an imam could just as well reason the same way: Pascals argument

cannot decide among different religions. Insofar as faith is a non-

rational component, its content is not rationally determined.18 The

conversion to a specific faith requires a higher degree of commitment

than that required by the (simple) assertion of the existence of God

17 See Hacking (1994: 24) and Jordan (1994: 10113). I am grateful to Paul Crit-

tenden for having called my attention on this point.

18 Claiming that the content of faith does not need to be rationally determined

does not imply the claim that reasonableness does not play any role in the choice

of ones own faith. One could consider her own religion as more reasonable, but

the judgement is, of course, culturally determined and highly subjective.


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(regardless of the fact that it is then identified with a personal God,

with a superior being pantheistically conceived or with anything else).

Marcel does not try to defend this argument, not even by claiming itat least gets us to theism (the so-called generic theism answer).19

Insofar as Marcel belongs to the philosophical tradition opened by

Kants transcendental move, he is not interested in the content of the

religious claim here. His approach here is phenomenological20he is

phenomenologically describing how believers and unbelievers com-

pensate the lack of rational and empirical proofs. Marcel goes further.

He wonders: what does determine our decision to bet on the existence

or on the non-existence of God? Behind a wager, Marcel argues, there

is a desire, if not even a will. Marcel writes: There is, then, an emo-

tional element lurking beneath the apparently objective and rational

assertion or claim made by the unbeliever; and what is more, deeper

thought on the matter will show us that it could not be otherwise

(Marcel 1949: 208).

From this point of view, the whole nihilistic thought appears like a

form of dogmatism generated by a will: I want reality to be of such

sort that it gives me no grounds for expecting any salvation or cher-

ishing any hope (Marcel 1951: 199). This is Nietzsches greatest

lesson: once metaphysics has been definitely abandoned, we have to

face the fact that at the roots of every taking of sides, both existentially

and theoretically speaking, there is a will.

When one commits herself to theism or atheism (or all the more so to

a specific kind of theism or atheism), she is not primarily choosingaccording to the prior probabilities she assigns to the theoretical

19 See Jordan (1994: 10113) and Armour-Garb (1999: 11938). The generic

theism answer runs into the Professors God objection: God could reward

those who humbly remain sceptical in the absence of evidence, and not those who

adopt theism. Cf. (Martin 1990: 22938; Mackie 1982: 20003).

20 On Marcel and phenomenology, see Bubbio (2005: 5570).


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propositions constituting the standpoint she is taking. Although cul-

ture, social influences, existential experiences and the like can and do

play a relevant role in the decision-making process, the decisive de-terminant is somehow a reflection of how one wants the world to be.21

Besides deciding to bet on the existence or on the non-existence of

God, there is a third option. One could say that the matter is too un-

clear or uncertain to make a definite decision, and then she would

chose not to bet (agnosticism). However, even this is a decision and,

qua talis, it is moved importantly by desire and will (as well as the

cultural, social and existential determinants mentioned above). Thisposition is different from (scientific or nihilistic) atheism, and from

rational theism because it seems less exposed to the risk of turning

into a form of dogmatism. At a meta-philosophical level (the matter

of religion is too unclear or uncertain to rationally make a definite

decision), it can be considered as the standpoint of a post-Kantian

philosophy of religion. Nevertheless, it can become dogmatic if the

agnostic position is considered not meta-philosophically, but philoso-

phically or existentially, that is, if the content of the agnostic

proposition is considered more rational than that of the atheist or

theist propositions (the matter of religion is too unclear or uncertain,

so that the only rational decision is not to decide). The content of the

agnostic proposition is not more rational, as it is equally moved by

desire and will.

21 This outcome is similar to the weak faith proposed by the Italian philosopher

Gianni Vattimo in Belief(1999), whose original title is Credere di credere (which

literally means I believe that I believe). Although this conception can be consid-

ered as a relativisation of faith, it is not so far from some theological

interpretations of the Augustine doctrine ofprevenient grace, insofar as it allows

persons to engage their free will to choose the salvation offered by God (or to

reject it).


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There are no successful arguments for the conclusion that God exists

or does not exist. Therefore, if the post-Kantian normative criterion is

applied, hypothesis and theories that insist in presenting argumentsfor the existence or for the non-existence of God do not belong to (the

discipline of) philosophy of religion.

It has been previously said that according to the post-Kantian crite-

rion, philosophy of religion is that discipline which focuses on

possible relations between philosophy and religion broadly conceived.

It has also been said that philosophy of religion should not focus on

the content of religious claims, but on their significance for the humanbeing. Therefore, what does a philosophy of religion conceived in this

way look like? One of the most representative philosophies of this

tradition is the hermeneutics developed by Paul Ricoeur.22

According to Ricoeur, the passage from metaphysics to hermeneutics,

that is, from a dogmatic thought that wants to reach absolute and

objective truths to a thought which recognises that truth is not an

object and can be partially reached only through interpretations, is not

painless. A hermeneutics of the sacred must pass through the so-called

school of suspicion: Marx, Nietzsche and Freud provide philosophy

with the tools necessary for demystification. Only by learning not to

confuse religion with the ideological superstructures of a particular

form of society or with the psychological projections of consciousness,

is it possible to establish a real dialogue between philosophy and

religion.23

22 Paul Ricoeurs main mentor was, not by chance, Gabriel Marcel. See Blundell

(2003: 89102).

23 Cottingham not only supports a bare compatibility between philosophy,

psychoanalysis and religion, that is, the mere possibility of co-existence between

our three domains of thought. He also suggests that these three areas of human

reflection can be seen as intimately intertwined (Cottingham 2005: 73).


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Ricoeur argues that an authentic philosophy of religion necessarily is

a hermeneutics of symbols. According to Ricoeur, the symbol is a sign

able to transmit a meaning. Ricoeur says that the main feature of asymbol is opacity: an opacity that can be penetratedbut never solved

in perfect transparency. The rationalisation of the sacred and of the

question of evil, which is always indissolubly bounded to religion,

ended up dissolving the symbolic and regulative meaning of religious

experience itself. Hence, Ricoeurs conclusion: that it is necessary to

undo the concept, to pass through the defeat of knowledge to find

that meaning in the symbols of religious experience.

The meta-philosophical standpoint of a position such as that held by

Ricoeur implies that religious experience is taken as an important part

of the human experience (at least in the great majority of human cul-

tures). Insofar as every person faces the problem, whether defining

herself an agnostic, an atheist or a theist (and, more specifically, a

Christian, a Muslim, a scientific or nihilistic atheist and so on), she

somehow goes through a religious experience. This experience thus

deserves to be considered by a philosopher qua philosopher (and not

qua believer, unbeliever or agnostic).24 A philosophy of religion con-

24 To consider religion only as a social and psychological phenomenon, so that it

should be studied only by human sciences such as anthropology, sociology and

psychology, is quite reductive, as much so as ascribing the so-called religious

conflicts and the phenomenon of terrorism exclusively or primarily to the reli-

gious element. Sam Harris (2004) writes: There are days when almost everyheadline in the morning papers attests to the social costs of religious faith, and the

nightly news seems miraculously broadcast from the fourteenth century (236). I

would ask of Harris whether the headlines in the morning papers really attest

to the social costs of religious faith or they rather attest to the religious costof the

socialand economic conflicts. It is a serious mistake to merely identify terrorism

and religious fundamentalism. But if it is true that terrorism easily develops

within religious fundamentalism, it is also true that the latter is often just an

expression of deeper economic and social conflicts.


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ceived as a hermeneutics of religious experience does not demand a

demonstration of the truth, but is meant to be a dialogue between

philosophy and religion, while recognising both of them as expres-sions of the human being.

Ricoeurs philosophy is a good example of this hermeneutics of reli-

gious experience. However, it could be said that Ricoeurs approach

has its limits. The irreducibility of symbols to non-symbolic concepts

represents a serious problem for a philosophy of religion that aims to

play a role in the establishment of a dialogue among different religious

experiences. Our times, characterised by a loss of shared values and bythe confrontation (if not conflict) between different cultures, seem to

issue to philosophy the challenge of expressing itself on the possibility

of a thought usable and able to be shared. A symbol is richer than a

concept because of its opacity, which makes it inexhaustible. And its

opacity can be penetrated because a symbol refers to a complex system

of signs, references and other symbols as well. This system is what we

name culture. Hence, a symbol is completely meaningful only

within a particular culture. When our main demand becomes the goal

to find a common cultural language that may be accepted and shared

among different cultures, a symbol unfortunately loses the greater part

of its richness and sometimes even its utility.

Therefore, the great challenge for philosophy of religion today seems

to be to maintain its own speculative vocation and delineate suitable

limits for a space of possible sharing, while at the same time establish-

ing a dialogue among different religious traditions. The point is thatreligion is, as Kant argued, the realm of regulative and symbolic

meanings. However, the pursuance of that aim implies the use of

concepts. In fact, concepts can (potentially) establish a relation with

all the symbolic contexts. Of course this process of translation of a

symbol into concept does not happen without a degree of impover-

ishment of the symbol.


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A hint for dealing with this problem can be found in Kant. It has been

said that Kant removed religious claims from the realm of theoretical

reason and related their significance to regulative and symbolic mean-ing. Ricoeur (and most of the hermeneutic tradition together with

him) emphasised the symbolic aspect of this move. Hegel emphasised

the regulative aspect of it.

In the light of recent revisionist readings (such as those of Robert B.

Pippin, Terry Pinkard and Paul Redding), Hegels notion of God can

be philosophically considered in a Kantian way, that is, as an idea

playing a regulative role (rather than as a super-entity). Conceived inthis way, Hegels account of God appears to be formed by symbolically

expressed ideas. Philosophy does not dismiss religion, but preserves it

(Pinkard 2000: 578). Concepts only partially succeed in translating

symbolic content into rational content. Concepts fail because they do

not exhaust the symbolbut, in so doing, they maintain the symbolic

inexhaustibility. This failure is not philosophically useless. This kind

of approach does not claim to exhaust the meaning of a religious sym-

bol (rational dogmatism) and does not limit itself to expressing what a

religious symbol is not (negative theology). It allows one to mark the

border between what can be expressed theoretically and what is sig-

nificant regulatively and symbolically, thus continuing the

philosophical project started by Kant with Religion within the bounda-

ries of mere reason. Further, it shows how religious symbols play a

regulative role in the interaction among individuals and constitute

their identities (cf. Redding 2007: 17599).25

Thus, religion can beviewed as something clearly personal but not exclusivelysubjective.26

25 See also Bielefeldt (2003).

26 This point can be fruitfully expanded through further developments.


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VI. Conclusion

In conclusion, it is time to come back to the question which has been

proposed for investigation, namely, whether the inclusive criterion

(any philosophical questions that arise in connection with religion

properly belong to philosophy of religion) can be challenged by an-

other normative criterion with a higher degree of reasonableness. The

alternative that has been examined is the post-Kantian criterion,

which can be formulated as follows: any philosophical questions that

arise in connection with the symbolic or regulative meaning of relig-

ion, and not with its propositional content, properly belong tophilosophy of religion. Questioning the disciplinary belonging of

some theses and publications (such as those of the new atheists and

the new theists) is not just a problem of linguistic idiosyncrasy, as the

answer to this question potentially sets the agenda for philosophy of

religion itself.

If the inclusive criterion is applied, philosophy of religion seems des-

tined to remain trapped in a pros/cons discussion between theism andatheism. Theist philosophers will keep defending arguments for the

existence of God (and will try to find new ones). Atheist philosophers

will keep attacking arguments for the existence of God (and will try to

find new arguments for the non-existence of God). Others will simply

not engage the debate and/or will dismiss religion as superstition. In

the long run, philosophy of religion is destined to disappear. It will be

absorbed by two subfields: a subfield of atheist naturalism and a sub-

field of a theistic natural philosophy. Of course there are other

possibilities between these extremes, and maybe a philosophy of relig-

ion not conceived only as a skeptical subfield is possible for both

(reasonable) religious believers and non-believers. However, this is the

point: the meta-philosophy of religion supporting the inclusive crite-

rion conceives philosophy of religion as a set of theoretical

propositions regarding the content of religion. Hence, one can: a) try


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to demonstrate that these propositions are true, b) try to demonstrate

that these propositions are false, or c) stand aside, or show that none

of these arguments are powerful enough to be convincing.27

The difference between the extremes of the new atheists and the new

theists, on the one hand, and more moderate thinkers, on the other,

concerns the degree of commitment to the factual contents of reli-

gious propositionsit does not concern the accepted meta-

philosophical standpoint, which is basically the same. In both cases,

religious propositions are thought of as provided with factual content,

and the differences concern the degree of probability or plausibilityascribed to these propositions. In a few words, the new atheists and

the new theists are more dogmatic than the more moderate philoso-

phers. Yet both of them consider religion to be a theory. If this is

philosophy of religion, then it does not seem to meet the contempo-

rary need for dialogue between different religious traditions. Insofar

as a theory is an explanation or a model of given phenomena, it can

only be right or wrong (or improvable). I will not accept a dialogue

with those who support a different theory, if I think their theory has

been proved wrong. Thus the new theists will not accept a dialogue

with believers of other faiths, likewise the new atheists will not accept

a dialogue with any kind of religious believers, as they are both dog-

matic. The more moderate philosophers are not exposed to the risk of

dogmatism, so they will stand aside: a position that can promote toler-

ance among different faiths, but not a real dialogue.

If the post-Kantian criterion is applied, then different consequencesfollow. To consider the religious fact as an important part of the hu-

man experience (not only as a psychological or social fact, but as a

symbolic and regulative dimension of the human being) is not to

claim a particular religion (or religious experience) as true or more

27 It seems to me that the latter is the position expressed by Graham Oppy (2006).


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authentic than others. The support of a specific religion (or of a spe-

cific atheist faith) cannot be considered as the outcome of a

philosophy. A philosopher who does not (personally) believe in theexistence of God is notautomatically an atheist philosopher, insofar as

she recognises the symbolic and regulative value of religion. In the

same way, a philosopher who does (personally) believe in God is not

necessarily a Christian, a theist or a religious philosopher, insofar as

she recognises the non-rational component of her personal commit-

ment and does not consider her faith as the premise or the outcome of

her philosophy.28 The boundary between an analysis of regulative

value and symbolic significance on the one hand, and a religious claim

(like the affirmation of the existence of God) on the other, cannot be

exceeded. For instance, Leslie Stevenson, commenting on John

Cottinghams statement (2005: 80) that One is able to affirm that

God exists as one apprehends depths of value and significance in the

world asks: Is anyone who finds value and significance in the world

thereby affirming the existence of God? (Stevenson 2006: 47476). If

the post-Kantian criterion is adopted, the philosophical answer to thisquestion is no. Of course it can be questioned whether the idea of a

personal God is more consistent with the presence of value and sig-

nificance in the world precisely because it is personalbut in doing

so, we are exceeding the boundaries of philosophy (of religion) and we

are trespassing in religious philosophy or in theology.

It seems to me that there are several reasons why the post-Kantian

criterion can be considered to be more reasonable than the inclusivecriterion (at least by ordinary standards of reasonableness). First, it

defines more accurately the boundaries that distinguish philosophy of

religion, religious philosophy and theology. Second, it better defines

the object of the discipline, namely, the possible relations between

28 From this point of view, there could be, so to say, a Christian who is a philoso-

pher, but not a philosopher who is Christian.


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philosophy and religion broadly conceived (not a specific revealed

religion), so that the discipline can be considered on a par with other

philosophical disciplines (such as philosophy of language or philoso-phy of law). Third, by conceiving the notion of religion as the set of

all possible religious experiences, it includes in the field all those

(practical or intellectual) experiences of transcendence which do not

belong to a specific system of religious belief and which are devoid of

a corresponding propositional knowledge (such as mysticism).

Fourth, by accepting Nietzsches lesson that at the root of every side-

taking there is a will, it acknowledges the importance of emotional

and voluntary components of religious beliefs. Fifth, the post-Kantian

criterion thus firmly refuses any kind of dogmatism. Sixth, and most

important, it allows philosophers to open a real dialogue between

different religious traditions.

Within a real dialogue between philosophy and religion, the religious

element cannot be reduced to psychological intimacy or arbitrary

subjectivity, insofar as a personal belief does not conflict with an ac-

ceptance of the function of philosophy as the norm or criterion of

every judgment. Paraphrasing the Italian hermeneutic philosopher

Luigi Pareyson, it could be said that when one commits a common

work to demands of reason, she admits that everybody else do the

same. If someone should demonstrate to me, on rational grounds, that

I am wrong, I will withdraw as readily as I would speak in the name of

reason, in case I discover someone in error and demonstrate to her the

precise source of her error. And let it be noted that I do not permitmyself to be convinced by the other as that particular person who

holds a particular belief, but as one who induces me to listen to the

voice of that reason I was unable to hear, and which now we both

exercise, she in convincing me of my error and I in permitting myself

to be convinced, (cf. Pareyson 1/1952: 8396; 1995: 6579).


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Philosophy of religion can really play a role in the contemporary

world in so far as it remains philosophy. Put differently, philosophy of

religion can speak every religious language in so far as it speaks aphilosophical language, and not a religious one. Philosophy of religion

is neither Christian or Islamic, atheist nor theist. This does not

mean that it must necessarily be neutral, but that its outcome should

be the result of a philosophical analysis that takes its object seriously;

and not just the development of a thesis or a belief taken for granted

or assumed a priori.

In conclusion, I think that philosophy of religion can play a funda-mental role in the contemporary society insofar as it is able to go

beyond the meta-philosophical naturalistic view of religion as a the-

ory. In this case, it will significantly contribute to the overcoming of

all possible dogmatisms (either religious or atheist) and to building

bridges between different religious traditions.

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