bulk carrier safety by design, not by accident

Bulk carrier safety by design, not by accident27 January 2021 • 09:00-09:45 GMT

#bulkcarriers

Bulk CarriersWebinar Week

Part of

26-29 January 2021

Presentation documents:Page 2: Firoze Mirza, Bernhard Schulte (Hong Kong)Page 9: John Noble, Constellation Marine Services8: Jay K Pillai, INTERCARGO

Bulk carrier safety by design, not by accidentPresenter : Capt Firoze Mirza, Managing Director

Bernhard Schulte Shipmanagement (Hong Kong) Limited Partnership

Date : 27th January 2021

Large Bulker Design Issues

25/01/2021 Bulk carrier safety by design, not by accident 2

Large hatch covers( 150~200 mt)- HOG DUE TO THE SUNLIGHT AND CANNOT CLOSE UNTIL HOSED DOWN WITH WATER????



INCREASED STRUCTURAL STRESSES

STRESS CRACK ON A HATCH COVER STRESS CRACK IN A BALLAST TANK



High stresses in the E.R/ Accommodation area( flares) due to the design

RE INFORCEMENT REQD IN FPK VOID RE INFORCEMENT OF E.R FWD BULKHEAD



HATCH COVER UNABLE TO BATTEN DOWN

Challenge in closing hatch cover due flexing

All Bulkers Design Issues


➢Ballast Systems / Stripping Capacity

➢BWTS Design and Compatibility Issues

➢Mooring Line Leads

➢Access Arrangements / Gangways

➢M.E. Power when loaded in low UKC

➢Fixed Loader berths

➢Conduits from holds, Improperly sealed

Thank you

very much!

Bernhard Schulte Shipmanagement

(Hong Kong) Limited Partnership

2602, K. Wah Centre

191 Java Road

North Point

Hong Kong

Bulk carrier safety by design,not by accident

BY John Noble

Director Constellation Marine Services, Dubai and UK

a) 1990s Losses at sea presumed Structural

b) High Tensile steel/reduced section modulus

c) Dissimilar metals : For example weld materialand plating – necking

d) Cargo issues – liquefaction cargo properties

e) Incorrect loading procedures – hulloverstressing

Some early common factors

STRUCTURAL FAILURE

CARGO ISSUES

NAVIGATIONAL

CREW TRAINING

SOME CAUSES OF SAFETY FAILURE

Weight distribution

STRUCTUAL FAILURE

Hh

Machinery Failure

Pasha Bulker aground

a) Stress induced hull failure

b) Properties of the cargo

c) Maintenance can be “difficult”

SOME KEY CONCLUSIONS

Final Solution

Jay K Pillai – INTERCARGO : Bulk Carrier Safety

Bulk Carrier Safety by Design – Not by accident

Jay K Pillai

Special Advisor to the Management Committee of INTERCARGO

Former Vice Chairman of INTERCARGO from 2015~2020

Former Director, Fleet (Head of Ship Management & New Buildings), Pacific Basin Shipping from 2010~2020

www.jaykpillai.com

Riviera Maritime - 27 January 2021

1) People Centered Approach

• Design, build, equip ships with focus on trade and people. Design for operational efficiency for 20~25 years

• Design the Ports and Terminals for the crew to trade the ships safely and call without undue stress

2) Industry stake holders need to support the crew and treat them with dignity, respect and

compassion

• End piracy, corruption, harassment and de-motivation of crew with fines, unreasonable PSC defects &

detention

• Engage, empower and collaborate with crew to perform their tasks with passion and focus on what matters

• Empathize with crew, who endure the challenges of sea, the boredom and monotony of sea life

3) Make seafaring attractive for crew and youngsters to sustain shipping and safety at sea. Happy

crew will run safe ships

1


Enhancing Operational Efficiency by Design

Design cargo holds for trading diverse range of cargoes and main deck for project cargoes

▪ Fixed Fire Extinguishing (CO2) in holds, A60 bulkhead between engine room and hold

▪ Strengthened tanktop to load 2 tiers of Steel Coils of 25 mt. Sufficient deck/hatch cover strength and lashing lugs for project cargoes,

Facilitate crew safety while turning around cargo holds from dirty to clean trade with

▪ high pressure washing system or robots to clean the inaccessible upper areas of holds safely, dedicated slop tanks for wash

water, permanent safe means of access to reach and clean cargo residues from under cross deck areas

Enhance crew well being by reviewing the minimum class and statutory criteria during design

▪ Accommodation - fire detection systems, attached wash rooms for increased gender equality, aesthetic design of crew

accommodation to enhance wellness at sea, crew recreation equipment for health, safety and comforts

▪ Fittings on deck for safety of crew - safe access for hatch covers (in closed position), platforms on hatch coamings for monitoring

cargo operations, cross over platforms on deck, mooring deck, cranes, etc.

▪ Better lighting and include waterproof cameras and CCTV in shipyard standard fittings for crew to monitor essential areas during

voyage and in ports (such as forward and poop decks, forecastle store) and mooring and cargo operations. Install CCTV in machinery

spaces on ships designed for UMS operation

Avoid over optimised designs with least minimum standards and inadequate design

▪ Minimum scantling - structural damages even with the lightest touch during manoeuvring with under rated tugs for handling

▪ Mooring and anchoring equipment, machineries, deck and engine pipelines, cargo gear

▪ Cargo gear where jibs, sheaves, wire drums get wasted and wires jump off the wire drums and sheaves with huge risk

Design high capacity de-ballasting system and stripping arrangements.

Avoid Ballast Holds as far as possible on Handy and Ultramax vessels.

2


Terminals, Port States, Flag States Can Help

Ensure Harbours and Terminals are “Fit For Purpose” for safe trading

▪ Dredge and maintain the declared depth for vessels to manouever and remain safely afloat always at berth, without touching bottom

and maintain a safe under keel clearance at all times except at NAABSA ports

▪ Maintain professional pilots with good communication skills & avoiding pilots who refuse to communicate with crew

▪ Maintain adequate tugs with sufficient bollard pull and modern fendering on pier for the modern vessels, which are designed with high

tensile steel with optimised scantling size to maximise cargo carrying capacity and fuel efficiency at least draft, to berth safely without

structural damage to vessel and the pier

Enhance governance of Ports, Port States and transparency

▪ Start treating crew as “key workers” and facilitate crew change. Do not let any ship sail with seafarers on board for >11 months

▪ Treat crew who sail the ships and endure the challenges of sea with compassion, dignity and respect

▪ Maintain an anti corruption policy and relieve crew from enormous stress of dealing with corrupt port officials with the threat of huge

fines for errors in declarations and documents

▪ Regulate PSCOs, who are insecure to inspect a ship with zero defects, but greedy and egoistic and abuse their authority by de-

motivating crew with long list of bookish defects with no value addition to the industry, detaining ship with unreasonable defects

▪ Implement ISPS Code at port facilities and tackle robbery, stowaways, piracy and kidnapping crew for ransom

▪ Maintain hydrographic charts for the ports and do not force crew to be over reliant on Pilots, while Master remains responsible for

berth to berth voyage planning and execution

▪ Seek continual improvement of port services and facilities from crew and Managers of ships calling the port

Enhance governance of Flag States and transparency

▪ Support crew on unreasonable port state defects and detentions

▪ Investigate incidents and publish lessons learned from casualty investigations promptly as per IMO’s guidelines3


Risk of commercial pressures for safe operation

Commercial pressure and demands from Charterers and Operators to

▪ arrive at lightest draft in contravention of the thumb-rule of maintaining minimum F/A drafts to 2/3 % of LOA and propeller immersion for

safe manoeuvring and safe navigation in the channel

▪ maintain unrealistic ETA resulting in crew taking unsafe shortcuts (speeding through heavy weather, unsafe voyage planning to

minimise voyage distance without maintaining safe distance off hazards

▪ leave within tidal window without completion of planned routine maintenance of machinery, trimming/securing cargoes etc

▪ leave ports and arrive ports without hold ballast in unsafe draft/propeller immersion with manoeuvring difficulties to expedite operations

▪ take shortcuts in cargo stowage, securing of project and steel cargoes to expedite vessel turn around and optimise stowage and

securing costs

▪ rough handling of cargo gear by stevedores and stressful repairs on cranes by crew

Charterers and Operators with lack of empathy and compassion to crew

▪ over loading crew with tasks which can be completed on shore - stow plans, charterers questionnaires, numerous check lists etc….

▪ demanding new preventive actions on obvious errors arising from non-compliance of existing procedures to safeguard their

compliance team, resulting in complex management systems with no buy-in from crew and shore-based Managers

▪ too many paper-based systems and checklists and lack of ship~shore~ship engagement with no motivation for implementation

▪ introducing new standards and systems over and above ISM Code, ISO 9001, ISO 14001, ISO 45001, rather than focusing on few and

implementation of existing systems

▪ ease of communications is becoming the curse of the seafarer with never ending guidelines, procedures, check lists by e mail and

telephone calls with little or no time for doing the real job

▪ lack of respect and concern for crew and restricting crew change during charter period to avoid delay on voyage and delivery of cargo.

Not honoring the Key Workers Status set by UN & IMO. ALL Governments and ALL Charterers shall are not supporting Ship

Owners on the urgent matter of Crew Change

4


Not learning from accidents and increase of claims

Crew Complacency

▪ Experienced seafarers becoming complacent, overconfident and negligent

▪ Reluctance to comply with procedures and systems and assess risks for each operation

▪ Neglecting personal safety and basic seamanship to get the job done in haste resulting in accidents

with fatal injuries

Significant Accidents & Claims

▪ Bulk Carriers sinking with loss of lives from liquefaction - not a crew issue, but a shore-based

management issue

▪ Is industry learning from past mistakes and accidents?

▪ Is industry learning from Other Peoples Mistakes (OPM)?

▪ Complacency and negligence of navigation

▪ 10 October 2006 - MOL-operated iron ore carrier Giant Step grounded and broke up off Kashima with 10 lives lost

▪ 5 October 2011 - Container ship Rena grounded off Tauranga, NZ resulting in pollution and sinking

▪ 13 January 2012 - Italian cruise ship Costa Cordia capsized, after it struck rocks off Giglio Island, Italy resulting from unsafe

navigation. 32 lives were lost, while >4,200 were rescued

▪ 25 July 2020 - Panamanian Capesize Bulker Wakashio ran aground 0.9 nm off the coast of Mauritius, on coral reef of Pointe

d'Esny. About 1,000 tonnes of oil was spilled and ship broke apart in mid August. Nothing learned from Costa Concordia, as

the Master and Officers navigated the ship 2 nm close to the shore within range of mobile communications coverage

https://www.mol.co.jp/en/pr/2020/20090.html

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https://www.mol.co.jp/en/pr/2020/20090.html

bulk carrier safety by design, not by accident

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