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Bulletin TASCAS Bulletin

1 / 2010

Message du Secrétaire Général du TAS / Message from the CAS Secretary General1 MessageduSecrétaireGénéralduTAS

2 MessagefromtheCASSecretaryGeneral

Articles et commentaires / Articles and commentaries3 ChallengesforCASdecisionsfollowingtheadoptionofthenewWADACode2009 JensAdolphsen

13 TheCourtofArbitrationforSport:asubtleformofinternationaldelegation AbbasRavjani

30 LeNouveauCodedel’arbitrageenmatièredesport MatthieuReeb

32 ThenewCodeofSports-relatedArbitration MatthieuReeb

34 Thesanctionsimposedontheplayersforbreachorunilateralterminationofcontract Jean-PhillipeDubey

41 LifetimeineligibilityaccordingtotheWADACode DespinaMavromati

51 Standingtobesued,aproceduralissuebeforetheCourtofArbitrationforSport(CAS) EstelledeLaRochefoucauld

Jurisprudence majeure / Leading cases57 Arbitration CAS 2007/A/1370 Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) v. Superior

Tribunal de Justiça Desportiva do Futebol (STJD) & Confederação Brasileira de Futebol (CBF) &MrRicardoLucasDodô

& Arbitration CAS 2007/A/1376World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v. Superior Tribunal de Justiça

DesportivadoFutebol(STJD)&ConfederaçãoBrasileiradeFutebol(CBF)&MrRicardoLucasDodô 11September2008

68 Arbitration CAS 2008/A/1458 Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) v. Alexander Vinokourov &KazakhstanCyclingFederation(KCF)

23July2009

72 ArbitrationCAS2008/A/1485FCMidtjyllandA/Sv.FédérationInternationaledeFootballAssociation(FIFA)

6March2009

76 ArbitrationCAS2008/A/1575FédérationInternationaledeFootballAssociation(FIFA)v.MaltaFootballAssociation(MFA)&M.

& ArbitrationCAS2008/A/1627WorldAntiDopingAgency(WADA)v.MFA&M. 9February2009

83 ArbitrationCAS2008/A/1639RCDMallorcav.TheFootballAssociation(FA)&NewcastleUnited 24April2009

Table des matières / Table of contents

89 ArbitrageTAS2008/O/1643VladimirGusevc.Olympussarl 15juin2009

96 ArbitrationCAS2008/A/1658SCFotbalClubTimisoaraS.A.v.FédérationInternationaledeFootballAssociation(FIFA)&RomanianFootballFederation(RFF)

13July2009

104 ArbitrationCAS2008/A/1691WislaKrakówv.FédérationInternationaledeFootballAssociation(FIFA)&EmpoliFCS.p.A&K.

3July2009

108 ArbitrationCAS2008/A/1705NeueGrasshopperFussballAGZurichv.ClubAlianzadeLima 18June2009

113 ArbitrationCAS2009/A/1781FKSiadMostv.ClubeEsportivoBentoGonçalves 12October2009

117 ArbitrationCAS2009/A/1782FilippoVolandriv.InternationalTennisFederation(ITF) 12May2009

125 ArbitrationCAS2009/A/1788Ekaterinburgv.FIBAEuropee.V 29October2009

Jurisprudence de la Chambre ad hoc du TAS à Vancouver / Jurisprudence of the CAS ad hoc Division in Vancouver130 ArbitrationCASadhocdivision (OGVancouver)2010/001AustralianOlympicCommittee (AOC)v.

FédérationInternationaledeBobsleighetdeTobogganing(FIBT) 9February2010

134 ArbitrationCAS adhocdivision (OGVancouver) 2010/002ConfederaçaoBrasiliera deDesporto noGelo(CBDG)v.FédérationInternationaledeBobsleighetdeTobogganing(FIBT)

12February2010

139 ArbitrationCASadhocdivision(OGVancouver)2010/003VirginIslandsOlympicCommittee(VIOC)v.InternationalOlympicCommittee(IOC)

12February2010

142 ArbitrationCASadhocdivision(OGVancouver)2010/004ClaudiaPechsteinv.DeutscherOlympischerSportbund(DOSB)&InternationalOlympicCommittee(IOC)

18February2010

Jugements du Tribunal Fédéral / Judgments of the Federal Tribunal145 4A_460/2008Judgmentof9January2009,1stCivilDivision

149 4A_424/2008Judgmentof22January2009,1stCivilDivision

153 4A_600/2008Arrêtdu20février2009,IreCourdedroitcivil

159 4A_368/2009Arrêtdu13octobre2009,IreCourdedroitcivil

162 4A_358/2009Judgementof6November2009,1stCivilDivision

168 4A_490/2009Judgementof13April2010,1stCivilLawCourt

173 ObservationsrelatedtothejudgmentoftheSwissFederalTribunal4A_490/2009

Informations diverses / Miscellaneous175 PublicationsrécentesrelativesauTAS/RecentpublicationsrelatedtoCAS

1

Message du Secrétaire Général du TAS

Après avoir été diffusé à une échelle restreinte, leBulletind’informationduTribunalArbitralduSport,appelé dorénavant “Bulletin TAS”, renaît sous unenouvelle forme. Ce Bulletin nouvelle formule estdésormais publié sur le site internet du TribunalArbitralduSport(www.tas-cas.org)etestainsiaccessibleàunlargepublic.CeBulletinparaîtradeuxfoisparannée,enmarsetenseptembre.

LaplusgrandepartiedeceBulletinestconsacréeàlajurisprudenceduTAS.Comptetenudunombreélevéde sentences arbitrales rendues par le TAS chaqueannée, une sélection des sentences ayant un intérêtparticulier et/ou un impact sur la jurisprudenceduTAS a été effectuée.Dans un autre chapitre, lajurisprudence du Tribunal Fédéral concernant desaffairesduTASestégalementexaminée.Onrelèveraà ce titre que le nombre de recours contre dessentences duTAS a connuune forte augmentationdepuisl’année2005(11recoursdéposésentre1984et2004contre64depuis2005).

Le Bulletin TAS contient aussi quelques articlessur des sujets ayant un intérêt scientifique pourl’activité du TAS en général. Les articles qui noussontproposés,quece soitde l’intérieurduTASoude l’extérieur, sont soumis au comité de rédactiondu Bulletin qui sélectionne les textes pouvant êtrepubliés. Enfin, le Bulletin TAS fournit quelquesinformations générales sur les activités du ConseilInternational de l’Arbitrage en matière de Sport(CIAS)etduTAS.

Aprèsavoirfêtéses25ansd’existence, leTASaeuune année 2010 passablement chargée avec l’entréeenvigueurduCodedel’arbitrageenmatièredusportrévisé et la création de trois nouvelles Chambresad hoc à l’occasion des JeuxOlympiques d’hiver àVancouver, de la Coupe duMonde de la FIFA enAfriqueduSudetdesJeuxduCommonwealthàNewDelhi. A cela s’ajoute le traitement des procéduresd’arbitrage et demédiation (environ 300 nouveauxcaschaqueannée)quiconcernentdeplusenplusdedisciplinessportivesetdenations.LeTAScontinue

ainsisondéveloppementtoutenveillantàdéfendreunejusticesportiveindépendanteetautonome.

Comptetenudesonimplicationdanslemondeentier,l’internet constitue un moyen de communicationidéalpourleTAS.LenouveauBulletinTAScomplèteainsi l’information spécialiséedestinée auxathlètes,fédérations sportives, clubs, avocats, managers,étudiants,etc…disponiblesurwww.tas-cas.org.

Nous souhaitons que cette publication contribue àaugmenter l’intérêt du monde du sport et de celuidudroitpourunmécanismederésolutiondeslitigessportifs qui amaintenant fait ses preuvesmais quiresteenconstanteévolution.

Matthieu REEBSecrétaireGénéralduTAS

-Message du Secrétaire Général du TAS / Message from the CAS Secretary General

2

Message of the CAS Secretary General

Having formerly been distributed on a restrictedbasis, theCASNewsletter, fromnowonknownasthe“CASBulletin”,isre-borninanewformat.Thisnew format bulletin is published on thewebsite ofthe Court of Arbitration for Sport (www.tas-cas.org)and therefore accessible to a broad audience. Thebulletinwillbepublishedbi-annually,inMarchandSeptember.

The majority of the bulletin is devoted to thejurisprudenceof theCAS. Giventhehighnumberof arbitral awards rendered by the CAS each year,awards of particular interest and/orwhich have animpactonthejurisprudenceoftheCASwereselected.Inanothersection,thejurisprudenceoftheFederalTribunalconcerningCAScasesisexamined.InthisregarditistobenotedthattheCAShasexperiencedasignificantincreaseinthenumberofappealsmadeagainst CAS awards since 2005 (11 appeals filedbetween1984and2004,and64filedsince2005).

The CASBulletin also contains several articles onsubjects of technical interest about CAS activitiesin general. The articles we are offered, whetherinternally or externally to theCAS, are referred totheEditorialBoardwhichselectsthetextsthatcanbe published. Finally, the CAS Bulletin providessome general information about the activities ofthe International Council of Arbitration for Sport(ICAS)andtheCAS.

Havingcelebrated25yearsofexistence,in2010theCAShashadafairlybusyyearwiththecomingintoforceoftherevisedCodeofSports-relatedArbitrationand the creation of three new adhocdivisions fortheWinterOlympicGamesinVancouver,theFIFAWorldCupinSouthAfrica,andtheCommonwealthGamesinNewDelhi.Tothisisaddedthehandlingof arbitration and mediation procedures (around300new cases each year)which concernmore andmoresportingdisciplinesandnations.Withthis,theCAS continues its development whilst assuring itsindependent and autonomous resolution of sports-relateddisputes.

Given its world-wide coverage, the internetconstitutesanidealmeansofcommunicationfortheCAS. The new CAS Bulletin provides specialisedinformationdestinedtoathletes,sportsfederations,clubs, lawyers, managers, students, etc… and isavailableonwww.tas-cas.org.

Wehope that thispublicationhelps to increase theinterestof those in theworldsofsportand lawforameans of resolving sports-related disputes whichhas a proven track record but remains in constantevolution.

Matthieu REEBCASSecretaryGeneral

-Message du Secrétaire Général du TAS / Message from the CAS Secretary General

3-Articles et commentaires / Articles and commentaries

I.IntroductionI. Introduction

Thisarticlefocusesontherequirementsthatfuturedecisions of the CAS will have to meet due tochangesoftheWADACode2009.Themainchange- compared thefirst and the2009versionsWADACode-isthattheinitialharmonizationisnowbeingrelaxed through elements of more flexibility. Thisarticle will be centred on this change.However, itfirst deals with a few rather technical questions,whichtheCASwillhavetoaskitselfafteranyreleaseofanewversionoftheWADACode.

II.NodirectapplicationofthenewWADACode

The Code constitutes a set of rules of a privatefoundation(Stiftung)underSwisslaw.Asasetofrulesfalling under private law, it cannot therefore claimanydirectapplicability1.Inotherwords:TheWADA

1. Jens Adolphsen, Umsetzung des Welt Anti-Doping Code inDeutschland,in:Vieweg(ed.),PerspektivendesSportrechts2005,p.81;

Codedoesnotsimplyapply,itisagreed.NeithertheoriginaldeclarationofthefirstversionattheWorldConference on Doping in Sport in March 2003in Copenhagen2 nor the acclamation at the 2007ConferenceinMadrid3canchangethisfact.

The parallel signature and ratification of theUNESCOConvention againstDoping in Sport on19 October 20054, giving effect to the Code, alsodoes not alter the fact that theWADACode lacksdirect effect.Athletes are boundby the statutes of

seealsoCommentto introductionofpartoneof theCode(amendedversion):“Bytheirparticipationinsport,Athletesareboundbythecompetitiverulesof their sport.In thesamemanner,AthletesandAthleteSupportPersonnelshouldbeboundbyanti-dopingrulesbasedonArticle2oftheCodebyvirtueoftheiragreementsformembership,accreditation,orparticipationinsportsorganizationsorsportseventssubjecttotheCode.EachSignatory,however,shalltakethenecessarystepstoensurethatallAthletesandAthleteSupportPersonnelwithinitsauthorityareboundbytherelevantAnti-DopingOrganization’santi-dopingrules”.2. http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/code_v3.pdf (lastviewedon13.08.09).3 .ht tp://www.wada-ama.org/r tecontent/document/WADA_Code_2007_3.0.pdf(lastviewedon13.08.08).4.http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=31037&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (last viewed on13.08.09).

* The original version in German of this article is published in: Bernasconi/Rigozzi (editors), Sport Governance, Football Disputes, Doping and CAS Arbitration: CAS & FSA/SAV Conference, Lausanne 2008, Editions Weblaw, Bern 2009.

I. Introduction.................................................................................................................................................................................3II. No direct application of the new WADA Code..............................................................................................................3III. Transitional provisions.........................................................................................................................................................5 A)Tempusregitactum...............................................................................................................................................................5 B)Adjustmentof sanctionswhichhavebeenimposed........................................................................................................5 C)Lexmitior................................................................................................................................................................................6IV. The impact of mandatory law.............................................................................................................................................6 A)Themandatoryapplicationof europeancartellawbytheCAS....................................................................................7 B)Theapplicationof nationalcartellawbytheCAS...........................................................................................................7

1.Effectsdoctrine.................................................................................................................................................................82.Obligationof theCAStoapplymandatorylaw..........................................................................................................8

C)Thepossibilityof theCAStoapplymandatorylaw........................................................................................................8V. More flexibility regarding the penalty.................................................................................................................................9 A)Possibilitiesof reductioninthecaseof specifiedsubstances .......................................................................................10 B)Reductioninthecaseof non-specifiedsubstances..........................................................................................................11 C)Possibilityof reductioninthecaseof specifiedsubstancespursuanttoArt.10.5.....................................................12VI. Summary....................................................................................................................................................................................12

Challenges for CAS decisions following the adoption of the new WADA Code 2009*

Prof.DrJensAdolphsen


theirfederation,whethertheybethestatutesoftheinternational or the national federation, but neverdirectlybytheWADACodeitself.Evenso,therulesof the international federations and those of theWADACodecan,ofcourse,be identicallyworded.However, this does not change the fact that thesubstantivebindingnatureinfactensuessolelyfromtherules.

The CAS has resolutely stood firm on this in itsdecisions in recent years. It has always only takenthe relevant rules into account and in only rarecases has it referred to the WADA Code to helpwith its interpretationbecause the relevant rulesoftheinternationalassociationcontainedtheterm“nosignificant fault” without defining this any further5.Using theWADACode tohelpwith interpretationiftheanalogouslydraftedinternationalrulesdonotgovern certain issues doesnot breach theprinciplethattheWADACodeitselfisnotdirectlyapplicable.In such cases the Code only serves to help withinterpretingtherulesoftheassociationandsodoesnotacquiredirecteffect.

The classification of theWADACode as “non self-executing”hasfurtherconsequencesalsoinconnectionwiththeintroductionofthenewWADACode2009.

1. Althoughmentioned inArt. 25 of theWADACode, there isnoso-called“EffectiveDate”.Thedate of 1 January 2009 was initially a requestmadeofthesignatoriestobringtheirrulesandregulationsinlinewiththenewWADACodebythatdate.

At the same time the term “Effective Date”probablyindicatesthatthesignatoriesshouldnotbringrulesandregulationsamendedbeforehandintoforceuntilthen.

However,ifindividualsignatoriesfailtocomplywith their obligation to bring their rules andregulationsinlinewiththeWADACodebythestipulated date, the CAS remains mandatorilyobliged tocontinue toapply theoutdated rulesand regulations,whichdonotcomplywith theWADACode,after1January2009.Asanarbitrationcourt,theCASisboundbythecontractual terms agreed between the parties.The fact that one party has failed to meet anexternalobligation, cannotcause thenewrulesandregulationstobeanticipated.However,thepartiesareatlibertytoagreethatdifferent contractual terms apply to a certain

5.CAS2007/A/1364.

event or in connection with a dispute beforetheCAS; thus they can also agree to apply theWADACodeoritsessentialtermsasabasis.

It would therefore have been possible to agreethenewWADACodeasbindingfortheOlympicGamesinPekingbecauseasregardsthistheIOCisinapositiontoorganisethelegalrelationshipaccordingly on the basis of the registrationform. The German IOC Vice-President madea comment to this effect in Madrid in 20076.TheadhocdivisionofCAScouldthushavebeenforcedtoadjudicateonthisbasis.Itwasagooddecision that the IOC restrained.TheOlympicGamestakeplaceonthebasisoftherulesoftheinternationalsportsassociations,whohaveeachimplemented theWADACodeverydifferently.Somehaveadoptedseparaterules,whichlargelycorrespond to the WADA Code7. Others,however, have integrated the Code into theirexistingrules.Notmuchimaginationisrequiredto picture the confusion in the event that theregulationsoftheIOCconflictwiththoseoftheinternationalsportsassociations.

2. Due to the absence of direct applicability, theprovisionsonthenewcrownwitnessrulesalsodid not apply before they had been effectivelyadoptedbytheassociation’srules.Correspondingapplicationsforthesanctiontobereducedupto1/3hadthereforebedismissedasunfounded.

3. In thepast, the fact that theWADACodehasnotapplieddirectlyhas,quiterightly,meantthattheCAShasrefusedtoactuponanyappealbyWADA if the rules of the associations do notprovideforsuchanappeal.

BoththeoldandthenewWADACodeprovidein Art. 13.2.3 that WADA has the right toappealtoCAS.Inthefinalanalysis,thisrighttoappeal is a proceduralway of safeguarding theharmonizationthathastakenplace.Thepurposeof the right to appeal is to ensure that thefederationsandassociationsenforcetheWADACode uniformly. Art. R47 of the ProceduralRulesoftheCASprovide:

“Anappea l a ga ins t th e d e c i s i on o fa f ed e ra t i on , a sso c i a t i on o r s po r t s -relatedbodymaybefiledwiththeCASinsofaras the statutes or regulations of the said body

6.http://www.dosb.de/de/leistungssport/anti-doping/news/detail/news/neuer_wada_code_verabschiedet_bach_die_neue_flexibilitaet_erlaubt_haerter_zu_bestrafen/608/nb/4/cHash/b0ba072a1a (lastviewedon14.08.08).7.See the rulesof theFEIunderwww.horsesport.org.orof theISUunderwww.isu.org.


so provide or as the parties have concluded aspecific arbitration agreement and insofar astheAppellanthas exhausted the legal remediesavailabletohimpriortotheappeal,inaccordancewiththestatuesorregulationsofthesaidsports-relatedbody”.

TheCAShastherefore,quiterightly,dismissedan appeal by WADA in a case where aninternational federation had failed to meet itsobligationtoincorporatearulecorrespondingtoArt.13.2.3WADACodeinitsrules8.Althoughthepanelexpresslyregrettedthisdecision,itdidtherebystrictlyabidebythefactthattheWADACodecannothaveanydirecteffectandthattherulesmustthereforebeaccordinglyamendedinthisregard.

4. The new WADA Code provides in numerousArticles thatpersonnel surrounding the athlete(AthleteSupportPersonnel)arealsotobeboundbyanti-dopingrules (Art.20.3.3;20.3.5;20.3.9;20.4.5; 20.5.6; 20.6.4; 20.6.5; 21.2). A questionwhich the CAS will have to answer first andforemost is whether an arbitration agreementgiving rise to the jurisdictionof theCAS evenexistswithsuchpersonnel(Art.R27CASCode).However, this question will often be lumpedtogether with the question of being boundby the rules. The statutes of the internationalfederationsusuallycontainanarbitrationclause,whichprovidesthattheCAShasjurisdictionasanappealinstance.

Ifaninternationalfederationimposesasanctionon the Support Personnel and one of thesepersonsisoftheopinionthathe/sheisnotboundbytherulesandthereisnoarbitrationagreement,thatpersoncanfileasuitwiththestatecourts.However,itwillprobablyalsobeheldadmissiblefor that person to turn to theCAS so that anexpostarbitrationagreementcanestablishandassertthatthepersonisnotboundbytherulesof the international federation for lack of anycontractual relationship with the internationalfederation.

Disputesonthejurisdictiontodecidejurisdictionarethereforealsoconceivable.

TheCASwillinfuturehavetoexamineindepthwhethertherulesofthefederationsreallycoverSupport Personnel. The WADA Code itselfcannotdothis; itonlyestablishesanobligationto extend corresponding rules on the SupportPersonnel.

8.CAS2006/A/1190.

III.Transitionalprovisions

A. Tempus regit actum

Already in its advisory opinion of 26 April 20059the CAS made it clear that there is a problem inidentifyingtherelevantsubstantivelegalrulebecausethe anti-doping rules were amended in relativelyquicksuccession.Inthisadvisoryopinionthepanelinitiallyconfirmedtheprincipleof tempus regitactum(“principleofnoretroactivity”)andpointedoutthat, inordertodetermineananti-dopingruleviolation,itisnecessarytoascertainthelegalsituationatthetimeoftheallegedviolation.

TherevisedWADACode includes thisprinciple inArt.25.2,whichreads:

“Non-Retroactive Unless Principle of Lex MitiorApplies With respect to any anti-doping rule violationcasewhichispendingasoftheEffectiveDateandany anti-doping rule violation case brought afterthe Effective Date based on an anti-doping ruleviolationwhichoccurredpriortotheEffectiveDate,the case shall be governed by the substantive anti-doping rules in effect at the time the alleged anti-doping rule violation occurred unless the tribunalhearing the case determines the principle of lexmitiorappropriatelyappliesunderthecircumstancesofthecase”.

Atthesametime,connectedwiththisisthestatementthatevenifaninternationalfederationhasnotmeetitsobligation toamend its rulesby1January2009,thenofcoursetheoldrulesremaininforceandtheCASisitselfthereforeboundbysaidoldrulesasthebasisbetweenthepartiesuponwhichitistomakeitsdecision.Theresultisthatanti-dopingruleviolations,whichoccurafter1January2009,canthereforestillbetreatedaccordingtotheoldlaw.Thefactthatthedecisionby theCASwasnot rendereduntil after1January2009wasinprincipleirrelevantinthecaseofananti-dopingruleviolationthathadoccuredbefore1January2009.Heretoo,theoldlawapplied.

B. Adjustment of sanctions which have been imposed

Art. 25.3 provides for a retroactive application intheeventthatananti-dopingruleviolationhasbeendecided according to the old law, the decisionwasrenderedpriortotheEffectiveDateandtheathleteis still serving the period of ineligibility after theEffectiveDate.Inthatcasetheathleteoranyotherpersoncouldapplytotheanti-dopingruleorganization

9.CAS2005/C/841CONI.


which had results management responsibility for areductioninthesanctionaccordingtothecriteriaofthenewWADACode.Suchanapplicationwasonlypossibleincaseswheretheperiodofineligibilityhadnotyetexpired.

Strangely, such a possibility of reduction withrecourse to the new WADA Code was providedonly in the case that both the anti-doping ruleviolation and the federation’s decision were beforetheEffectiveDateof1January2009.However,thisruleisprobablybasedonamisinterpretationoftheterm“EffectiveDate”,soitistoconsideritexpedientto also allow such a possibility of reduction if thedecisionwas renderedaccording to theprincipleoftempusregitactumonthebasisoftheoldlawbutafter1January2009.Ultimately,whatisdecisiveisthatthereis a period of ineligibility after theEffectiveDate,whichmaybesubjecttoreductiononthebasisoftheanticipatorilyapplicablenewCode.

C. Lex mitior

The CAS has at least considered applying theprincipleoflexmitiorinvariousawards.

However, WADA’s drafting group deliberatelydecided not to expressly regulate the principle oflex mitior. It is merely mentioned in Art. 25.2 as apossibilityofmakinganexceptiontotheprincipleoftempusregitactum.

The possibilities of applying this principle inarbitration cases appear to be extremely limited:First,thisisaprincipleofcriminallaw,whichinthepresentcaseisnotonlyaformaldistinction.

Unlike private rules for doping-related disputes,criminal law always applies directly in the relevantstate territory. However, as explained above, theWADACode does not have direct effect. There isthereforeinfactno“lessseverelawthatalreadyapplies”.Recoursetoanapplicablelessseverelawcan,undernocircumstances,leadtoadirectapplicationoftheWADACode.Thiscontradictsitslegalnature.

It was of course possible that the internationalfederation had already amended its own rules tobringtheminlinewiththenewWADACodeafteran anti-doping rule violation had been committed.Duetothetempusregitactumruletheoldlawinitiallyremainedthebasisforthelegalrelationshipwiththeathlete. This could therefore be a case for havingrecoursetoanapplicablelessseverelaw.If,however,assuggested,oneappliesArt.25.3here,recoursetothelexmitiorprincipleisnotnecessary.

In an arbitral award made in 200510 the panelconsidered applying the lex mitior principle becausetheapplicablerulesdidnotprovideforanypossibilityofmitigatingastandardsanctionof2years.Thepanelconsidered applying the possibilities of mitigationprovided under Art. 10.5.2 (no significant fault ornegligence). Better the principle of proportionalityshouldhavebeen appliedhere; the rules containedalacuna,whichhadtobefilledbyinterpretationonthebasisofastandardthatisparticulartosport’slaw.However,thisisnottheapplicationofthe lexmitiorprinciple.

Asanarbitrationcourt,theCASwillusuallybeboundbythecontractualtermsagreedbetweentheparties,whichexcludesrecoursetootherrules.However,thepartiesarefreetomutuallydeclaretheiragreementtotheapplicationoflesssevererulesasabasisforthearbitrationdecision.

IV.Theimpactofmandatorylaw

The changes made under the new WADA Codehad encountered a dynamic judicial environment.TherearetobementionedthedecisionbytheECJin the caseMeca/Medina and Majcen and theCanasjudgmentbytheSwissFederalTribunal(SchweizerischesBundesgericht). Both judgments and the substantivechanges to the newWADACode ought to have aconsiderable impact on the future decisions of theCAS.

IntheMeca-MedinaandMajcencasetheECJ11decided,contrary to the court of first instance12, that thedoping rules of federations had to be measuredagainstthestandardofEuropeancartellaw.Atfirst,thatmay seem to be a logical continuation ofECJcase-law. For German lawyers, the application ofcartel lawtoreviewthesanctionsofa federation isnotanythingunusualbecauseundernationallawtooclaimsareoftenbasedoncartellaw13.Thecasemaybedifferent for Switzerlandbecause in Switzerlandtherightofpersonalityisgivenutmostimportance14.Finally,onecouldalsothinkthatitisnotsomuchthenatureofthebasisoftheclaimthatisimportant,solongascourtsapplyareasonablyappropriatestandardforreview.Internationally,however, theapplicationcarries a completely different potential for conflict,whichtheECJdidnotevenbegintorecognize.

10.CAS2004/A/787=SpuRt2005,205,207.11.ECJ;judgmentof18.7.2006-C-519/04P.12. ECJ, judgment of 30.9.2004 – case T-313/02. Meja-Medina andMajcen/Commission=SpuRt2005,20(Schroeder23);Orth,causasport2004,195.13. Jens Adolphsen “InternationaleDopingstrafen”[InternationalDopingSanctions],pp.156etseq.14. For a comparison of laws see Jens Adolphsen, “InternationaleDopingstrafen”[InternationalDopingSanctions],pp.124etseq.


In his case before the Swiss Federal Tribunal(Schweizerisches Bundesgericht)Guillermo Canas objectedtothefailuretoconsidereitherUS-DelawarelawortheUS-American ShermanAct andEC cartel law.In the end, theSwissFederalTribunal allowed theactionforannulmentsolelybecauseofthefailuretoapply US-Delaware law. By failing to consider thelawofDelawareitconsideredthattherighttoafairhearinghadbeendenied(Art.190(2)(d)Switzerland’sFederalCodeonPrivateInternationalLaw(IPRG)).

Fromthepointofviewoftheconflictoflawsitwassimple to substantiate theneed to apply the lawofthestateofDelawareinthepresentcasebecausethepartieshadagreedthislawasthebasisforthelegalrelationship.

ThequestionoftheextenttowhichtheCASwillinfuturebeobligedtoalsoreviewthenon-compatibilityof certain sanctions with cartel law as mandatoryinternational law (so-called Eingriffsnormen, loi depolice,mandatorylaw,definitioninArticle9(1)RomeI-Regulation15)isamuchmorecomplexquestion.

It isprobablybynomeanscompletely fanciful thatathletes will in future object that, for example, anincrease in the sanction forafirstviolation to fouryears(Art.10.6),thecontinuinglackofflexibilityinArt.10.5.2andpossiblyalsothestatusduringaperiodof ineligibility (Art. 10.10), are disproportionateand incompatible with cartel law. The standard istherefore not only Swiss law, whether that be theSwissCivilCode(ZGB)ortheConstitutionoreventhe European Convention on Human Rights, butalsocartellaw.

Inordertoassessthefuturesignificanceofmandatorylaw in arbitration proceedings before the CAS, adistinction must be made between European andnationalcartellaw.Inadditiononemustdistinguishbetweentheextenttowhichthereisadutytoapplymandatorylawandtheextenttowhichthereisadutyonlytoconsiderallegedlyapplicablemandatorylaw.

A. The mandatory application of European cartel law by the CAS

When analysing this one must take into accountthe fact that the CAS has its seat in SwitzerlandandnotinamemberstateoftheEU.Itisthereforeirrelevantthatin1999theEuropeanCourtofJusticeemphasized the duty of the member states’ statecourts, withwhom an application is filed to annulanarbitralaward,toallowtheactionforannulment

15. Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament andthe Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable on contractualobligations,OJL1774/07/2008,p.6-16.

if they consider that the arbitral award conflictswith EC cartel law (Art. 81 Treaty EstablishingtheEuropeanCommunity)16. An obligation on thepart of international arbitration courts,which havetheirplaceofarbitrationinanEUmemberstate,toapplytherulesofECcartellawwasrightlyinferredfrom this judgment. However, this only applies toarbitration courts in an EU member state, not toarbitrationcourtsinSwitzerland.

However,Articles81and82oftheTreatyEstablishingtheEuropeanCommunity (after theLisbonTreatyArticle101and102TreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropean Union) have extraterritorial effect. TheSwiss Federal Tribunal (Schweizerisches Bundesgericht)therefore held in 1992 already that an arbitrationcourt, which had its seat in Switzerland, had anobligation to review EC competition law. In thespecificcasethepartieshadagreedthatBelgianlawwastogoverntheirlegalrelationship17.

The basis for binding the arbitration court byEuropeancartellawwasultimatelytheagreementtothesubstantive lawofanEUmemberstate (TreatyEstablishing the European Community as a partieintegrante(integralpart)ofBelgianlaw).Theprevailingopinion in Switzerland is that the remission underthe conflict of law rules to the substantive law ofamember state of theEU includes themandatorylaw of said law. The background to this is the“Schuldstatutstheorie” (Theory whereby the governing lawbasicallyalsoincludesthemandatorylawsoftheforeignlaw)and Art. 13 Switzerland’s Federal Code on PrivateInternationalLaw(IPRG)18.

Ifthereforeinternationalfederationsandathleteshaveagreedthe lawofamemberstateor ifanobjectiveconnecting factor, especially due to the federationhavingitsseatinamemberstate,meansthatthelawofamemberstateapplies,theCASwouldalsohavetoapplyEuropeancartellaw.

B. The application of national cartel law by the CAS

ThecommentsmadesofarhaveonlyconcernedtheapplicationofEuropeancartel lawwhenthe lawofanEUmemberstateapplies.

The Canas case, in which an objection was raisedabout the failure to take into account the UnitedStatesAntitrustShermanActs,i.e.theapplicationof

16.EuGHE[judgmentsoftheECJ]1999I-3079,3094(marginno.41).17.BGE[DecisionsoftheSwissFederalTribunal]118II193.18. Anton schnyder, Anwendung ausländischer Eingriffsnormen durchSchiedsgerichte [The Application of Foreign Mandatory Laws byArbitrationCourts]RabelsZ59(1995),293,299.


nationalcartellaw,isaclearillustrationofthefutureproblem.

1.Effectsdoctrine

Numerous states would like their national cartellaw to apply whenever the domestic market isnoticeably affected. This doctrine known as the«effectsdoctrine»originatedintheUSA19.Numerouscountrieshavefollowedthisexample:Thus,GermanlawcontainsacorrespondingprovisioninParagraph130(2)GermanActagainstRestraintsofCompetition(GWB), Swiss cartel law contains a correspondingprovision in Art. 2(2) Swiss Cartel Act (KG). TheAustrianCartelAct(Kartellgesetz )likewiseprovidesinParagraph6(1)thatitmustalsobeappliedtoforeignfactsiftheyhaveaneffectonthedomesticmarket.

This domestic effect is the decisive factor fortriggeringtheclaimthatnationalcartel lawapplies.Suspensions imposed by international sportsfederationshaveanoticeableeffectonthedomesticmarket if an athlete can no longer appear on themarketasaproviderofsportingperformancesinthesportsmarketduetothesuspension.

Theunusualaspectabouttheapplicationofnationalcartellawisthatitappliesirrespectiveofanychoiceof lawby theparties, so itoverrides the lawthat isotherwiseapplicable.

2.ObligationoftheCAStoapplymandatorylaw

ThechangetotheWADACodecouldtherefore infuture quite possibly lead to athletes increasinglyobjecting to a breach of European or their ownnationalcartellawbecausethecorrespondingmarketisaffectedifsaidathletesareexcludedfrompractisingtheirsportduetosuspensions.

However,fortheCASitdoesnotnecessarilyfollowfrom the interest in applying national cartel lawextraterritoriallythatthislawwillalsobeappliedinthearbitrationcasecontrarytoanychoiceoflaw.

As has been seen, there is an obligation to applysupranational EU competition law only if thepartieshavechosenthelawofanEUmemberstate.Otherwise, there is a risk that the Swiss FederalTribunal (Bundesgericht) will quash the arbitralaward. This probably ensues from Art. 190(2) (b)Switzerland’sFederalCodeonPrivateInternationalLaw (IPRG)20.On the other hand, the application

19.US vs.AluminiumCo. ofAmerica (Alco), 148 F.2d.416, 443 (2dCIR.1945).20.BGE[DecisionsoftheSwissFederalTribunal]118II193,commentson this by Anton schnyder, “Pflicht schweizerischer Schiedsgerichtezur Prüfung der Anwendbarkeit von Eingriffsnormen, insbesondere des EG-

ofArt. 190(2) (e) is probably excluded because theSwiss Federal Tribunal (Bundesgericht) later decidedthattheprovisionsofnoteverysetofrulesgoverningcompetition belong to essential, largely recognizedsystemofvalues,whichaccordingtotheprevailingopinion in Switzerland, should form the basis ofeverylegalsystem21.

An agreement on the law of an EUmember stateis, however, less common than EU cartel law notapplying because themajority of sports federationshave their seat in Switzerland and so there is acorrespondingagreementofSwisslaw.

There is likewise an obligation to apply nationalcartellawifthepartieshavechosenthelawofanEUmemberstate.

In addition, for civil tortious claims (omission,removal, damages, satisfaction and accountingfor profits), Art. 137 Switzerland’s Federal Codeon Private International Law (IPRG) creates theobligation to apply the law of the state, on whosemarket the injured party has beendirectly affectedby the obstruction to competition due to thesuspension.However,itisdisputedwhetherArt.137Switzerland’sFederalCodeonPrivateInternationalLaw(IPRG)alsoappliestoarbitrationcourts(andtheextenttowhichitoverridestheotherwiseapplicablelaw.22IfoneassumesthatCAShastoapplythislawevencontrarytoachoiceoflawthenforeignathletescould assert claims for damages before the CASbasedonnationalcartellaw.

C. The possibility of the CAS to apply

mandatory law

Apartfromtheseobligationstoapplyextraterritoriallyapplicable cartel law, there is another possibilityunderSwisslawofapplyingsaidlaw.

Wettbewerbsrechts”[ObligationofSwissArbitrationCourtstoReviewtheApplicationofMandatoryProvisions,particularlyofECCompetitionLaw], IPRax 1994, 465; Jens Adolphsen, “Internationale Dopingstrafen”[InternationalDopingSanctions],p.289,655.21. BGE [Decisions of the Swiss Federal Tribunal] 132 III 389; forcomments on the different scope of review of the provisions forquashing an award see Jens Adolphsen, “Internationale Dopingstrafen”[InternationalDopingSanctions],p.289,655.22. FrAnk Vischer,ZürcherKommntar,Art.137IPRGmarginno.14;agreeingwithhimdAsser/drolshAmmer,BaslerKommentar,Art.137IPRGmarginno.23,whichrefertothefactthatacomparableschismexistsinECcompetitionlaw.TheretheunlawfulnessfollowsfromECcompetition law,whereas the liability arising therefromderives fromnationallaw.Asregardsthelatterschismseealsodenis esseiVA,“DieAnwendungdesEG-KartellrechtsdurchdenschweizerischenRichteraufgrunddesArtikels137IPRG”[TheApplicationofECCartelLawbySwissJudgesduetoArticle137Switzerland’sFederalCodeonPrivateInternationalLaw (IPRG)]. ZVglRWiss 94 (1995), 80, 103 et seq..On this questionsee Adolphsen, “Internationale Dopingstrafen” [International DopingSanctions],p.292.


Art. 19 Switzerland’s Federal Code on PrivateInternationalLaw(IPRG)23opensupapossibilityofapplyingforeignnationalcartellaw.

Under Art. 19(1) Switzerland’s Federal Code onPrivate International Law (IPRG) a mandatoryprovision of a law other than that otherwisedesignatedbySwitzerland’sFederalCodeonPrivateInternationalLaw(IPRG)maybetakenintoaccountinstead of the law that is otherwise designated bySwitzerland’sFederalCodeonPrivateInternationalLaw(IPRG)if,pursuanttoSwisslegalconcepts,thelegitimateandmanifestlypreponderantinterestsofapartysorequireandifthecircumstancesofthecasearecloselyconnectedwiththatlaw.

Indecidingwhethersuchaprovisionistobetakenintoaccount,itspurposeistobeconsideredaswellaswhetheritsapplicationwouldresultinanadequatedecision under Swiss concepts of law (Art. 19(2)Switzerland’sFederalCodeonPrivateInternationalLaw(IPRG).

These are evidently extremely complex conflict oflawquestionswhichstatuteresolvesonlyinpartandonly inavagueandrudimentarymanner.TheECJobviouslydidnot take thesequestions intoaccountwhen it elevated cartel law to be the standard ininternationaldoping-relatedlitigation.

It is therefore extremely difficult to say whether aparticularcartellawhastobeappliedmandatorilyinproceedingsbeforetheCAS;thispartlyalsodependsontheassessmentoftherespectivepanel.

AneasierdecisionisthedecisionthatcorrespondingpleadingsinproceedingsbeforetheCASshouldbeconsidered.OnthebasisofthedecisiondeliveredbytheSwissFederalTribunal(Bundesgericht)intheCanascase,ifthepartysopleadstheCASwillinanyeventhavetoconsidertheunderlyingarguments.

InthisregarditwillbesimpletodraftinfutureakindoftemplatecoveringthequestionoftheapplicabilityofECcartellawtobeinsertedintothedecision.

However, this is probably more difficult for theconsideration of national cartel law. In this regardthe arbitration court must at least be required todeal with these questions. “Hesitant indications”, asgiven by the Swiss Federal Tribunal (Bundesgericht)regarding itsconsiderationofUSDelaware law,arenot sufficient.Furthermore, it is also sensible, evenif not mandatory according to the decision by theSwissFederalTribunal(Bundesgericht),togenerallydo

23. See Jens Adolphsen, “Internationale Dopingstrafen” [InternationalDopingSanctions],p.292;Vischer,RabelsZ53(1989),438,447etseq.

this in thereasonsfor thearbitralaward.Althoughit iscorrect thatas regards thisa superficial reviewwouldbesufficient,thisshouldbynomeanssatisfytheCAS’sexpectationthatitscaselawbeofahigh-qualityintermsofcontent.

TheCASmaywellthereforeinfuturebefacedwithrather demanding questions concerning conflict oflawrulesandtheapplicationofnationalcartellaw.

V.Moreflexibilityregardingthepenalty

Amain focus of the changesmade to theWADACode is on more flexibility in the penalty. In thepast this was achieved by partly departing fromthe harmonization trend in the first version of theWADACode.

Thediscussionabout theneed tomake thepenaltymore flexible must be seen in the light of theapplication of the doctrine of proportionality inthe athlete’s legal relations to the federation and inarbitrationproceedingsbeforetheCAS.

Thepossibilitiesofreduction,whichalreadyexistedunder the old WADA Code, and which are alsocontained inthenewWADACode,areonewayofexpressingthedoctrineofproportionality.

However, in the past it was often problematicwhether - in certain caseswhere theWADACodedid not provide for a further reduction - contraryto the wording of the WADA Code and thecorresponding rulesof the international federation,afurtherreductionofthepenaltyshouldbepossiblebyapplyingthedoctrineofproportionalityenshrinedinthenationallaw.

In order to solve this problemone first has to askwhat taskanarbitrationcourt like theCAShas.Atfirst, i.e. in the 1990s, the CAS usually considereditselfboundbytheprovisionsofthefederation;thelegalvalidityoftheprovisionswasnotreviewed24.

Fortunately, the CAS has, in recent years, found acourse that it has the right and duty to review thelawfulnessoftheagreedfederationrules.Thismustbe agreed with. The applicable national law takesprecedenceoverthetermsoftheagreement;itformsthe standard for reviewing the legal validity of thefederation’s rules. An arbitration court is obligedto review whether the agreed rules are compatiblewithanational law.Thestandardfor this review isthelawthatappliestothelegalrelationshipbetweenthepartiesduetotheparties’choiceoflaw.Inmany

24.Authorities Jens Adolphsen, “Internationale Dopingstrafen”[InternationalDopingSanctions],p.618.


casesthisisSwisslaw,theapplicationofwhichisalsointheendoftenhelpedbytheCASCode25.

In various decisions the CAS has made clear itsreservations about the system of theWADACodethathasexistedtodate.

Only inonecase, thePuerta case26did theCASfixapenalty contrary to theWADACode.As regardsthis, after extensive considerations regarding theproportionality,thepanelfoundthateverysanctionmust be proportionate. If the sanction that wouldreallyhave tobe imposedaccording to theWADACodeisdisproportionate,thequestionariseswhetheritislawfulundertheregimeoftheWADACodetoimposealessseverepenalty.Since,accordingtotheoldCodeaperiodofineligibilityofeightyearswastobeimposedinthecaseofarepeateddopingoffencedespite the athlete having twice been at fault onlyveryslightly(asregardsthechange intheamendedCode,seeArt.10.7),theCASreducedthepenaltytotwoyearscontrary to theprovisionsof theWADACode.

ThepanelsimilarlyhadtodealwiththedoctrineofproportionalityintheSquizzatocase27.

An Italian swimmerwhowas aminor (17 years ofage) used an ointment containing anabolic steroidstotreataskindiseaseonher little toe.Hermotherhadobtainedit,unawareofitscomposition,andtheathleteappliedit.

HeretootheCASconsideredthattheathlete’sfaultwasnot significant andaskedwhether theminimalpenalty of one year, which was to be imposed inthis case, was compatible with the doctrine ofproportionality. The panel applied Swiss law. TheCASheld that theminor athletewas at fault, so itwasnotpossibletocompletelyeliminateaperiodofineligibility(Art.10.5.1.WADACode2004).InthecontextofArt.10.5.2WADACode2004thepanelwonderedwhether, if therehasbeenno significantfault, the period of ineligibility may in actual factbe reduced to only one-half in every conceivablecase.However, the panel left open the question ofwhether the wording of the WADA Code reallyprohibitsfurtherreducingthesanctionandimposeda suspension of one year. However, this was doneexpresslywith a feeling of “unease” and “not withouthesitation”.25.Art.R58CASCode:“LawApplicable:ThePanelshalldecidethedisputeaccordingtotheapplicableregulationsandtherulesoflawchosenbythepartiesor,intheabsenceofsuchachoice,accordingtothelawofthecountryinwhichthefederation,associationorsports-relatedbodywhichhasissuedthechallengeddecisionisdomiciledoraccordingtotherulesoflaw,theapplicationofwhichthePaneldeemsappropriate.Inthelattercase,thePanelshallgivereasonsforitsdecision.”26.CAS2006/A/1025MarianoPuertav.ITF,Causasport2006,365.27.CAS/A/830G.Squizzatov.FINA,SpuRt2006,30.

The commentsmade in this award about the legalnatureoftheWADACodeareimportantandsucceed.The fact that the rules of a federation are derivedfromtheWADACodedoesnotalterthelegalnatureof said rules; they are still federation rules, whichcannot a priori replace either directly or indirectlyfundamentallegalprinciplessuchasthedoctrineofproportionalityforeveryconceivablecase.

In the end it was these openly stated reservations,which -despite the legalopinions to thecontrary -calledformoreflexibility.

The new WADA Code therefore now containsthe category of specified substances in Art. 4.2.2,althoughitwasalreadyknownundertheoldCode.

“SpecifiedSubstances AllProhibitedSubstances,exceptsubstances intheclasses of anabolic agents and hormones and thosestimulantssoidentifiedontheProhibitedList,shallbe“SpecifiedSubstances”forpurposesoftheapplicationofArticle10(SanctionsonIndividuals).ProhibitedMethodsshallnotbeSpecifiedSubstances”.

The category of specified substances is necessarysolelyasthebasisforapplyingArt.10.Accordingtothe comment toArt. 10.4, the distinction betweenspecified and non-specified substances is madeaccordingtowhetherthereisagreaterlikelihoodthatthe presence of said substances has nothing to dowithdopingpurposes28.Specifiedandnon-specifiedsubstancesareexpresslynotdistinguishedaccordingto whether they are better or worse suited for thepurposesofdoping.Fornon-specifiedsubstances,i.e.theanabolic agents,hormones setout inArt.4.2.2andthosestimulantssoidentifiedontheList,theoneandonlypossibilityofreductionthatremainsisthepossibilityunderArt.10.5ofthenewWADACode.

A. Possibilities of reduction in the case of specified substances

In the case of specified substances there is now thepossibilityofreductionunderArt.10.4.Accordingtothis,thepenaltytobeimposedforafirstviolationisataminimum,areprimandandaperiodofineligibilityofbetweennilandtwoyears.AsinthecaseoftherulethatstillexistsunderArt.10.5.1,areductiontonilis,inthatcase,thereforecertainlyconceivable.

28.CommenttoArticle10.4:“SpecifiedSubstancesasnowdefinedinArticle10.4 are not necessarily less serious agents for purposes of sports doping thanotherProhibitedSubstances( forexample,astimulantthatis listedasaSpecifiedSubstancecouldbeveryeffectivetoanAthleteincompetition); forthatreason,anAthletewhodoesnotmeetthecriteriaunderthisArticlewouldreceiveatwo-yearperiodofIneligibilityandcouldreceiveuptoafour-yearperiodofIneligibilityunderArticle10.6.However, there is a greater likelihood thatSpecifiedSubstances, asopposedtootherProhibitedSubstances,couldbesusceptibletoacredible,non-dopingexplanation.”


For this the athlete must first establish how thesubstanceenteredhisorherbodyorcameintohisorherpossession,thestandardofproofherebeing“onabalanceofprobability”.

In addition the athlete must establish to thecomfortable satisfaction of the hearing body thatin taking said substance he or she did not intendto enhance his or her performance. The provisionthereforecoversthenegligentorintentionaltakingofasubstance,butundernocircumstancesthetakingofasubstancefordopingpurposes.

Theappropriateperiodof ineligibility is thentobefixeddependingon thedegreeof fault. Inorder toprovethattherewasnointentiontoenhancehisorher performance, the athlete must plead objectivecircumstancesthatmightleadthepaneltobesatisfiedthereof.Asregardsthis,thecommentmentionsthenatureofthesubstance,thetimingof its ingestion,the open, not concealed, use of the substance andamedicalprescription,whichsubstantiates that thesubstance was not prescribed for any sport-relatedreason29. Ultimately, the point is to prove - byobjective circumstances - the absenceof any intenttoenhancetheathlete’sperformance.Thecommentassumesthatthegreaterthepotentialofthesubstancefor enhancingperformance, thehigher thisburdenofproofis.

B. Reduction in the case of non- specified substances

As regards this, it is initially clear that in the caseof non-specified substances both possibilities ofreduction under Art. 10.5 are possibilities, but notArt. 10.4.The athlete can therefore still claim thatheorshebears“nofault”or“nonegligence”(Art.10.5.1)withtheconsequencethatheretooareductiontonilispossible.

If,ontheotherhand,theathleteclaims“nosignificantfaultornegligence”thenalltheproblems,whichtheoldversionoftheWADACodeposedfornon-specifiedsubstances,continuetoexist.Thesuspensioncanatmostbereducedtooneyear.

Incertainisolatedcasesthedoctrineofproportional-itycanstillnottakefulleffect,soitisnotpossibletoimposeasanctionthatisproportionatetothedegreeoffault.

29.CommenttoArticle10.4:“Examplesofthetypeofobjectivecircumstanceswhich in combination might lead a hearing panel to be comfortably satisfiedof no performance-enhancing intent would include: the fact that the nature ofthe Substance or the timing of its ingestionwould not have been beneficial to theAthlete; theAthlete’s openUse or disclosure of his or herUse of the Substance;and a contemporaneous medical records file substantiating the non-sport-related prescription for the Substance. Generally, the greater the potentialperformance-enhancingbenefit,thehighertheburdenontheAthletetoprovelackofanintenttoenhancesportperformance.”

A mere reference that the substances concernedhere are non-specified substances, i.e. anabolicagents,hormonesandstimulants,isnotappropriatefor disregarding the doctrine of proportionality inthesecases.AsstatedinthecommentstotheCodethemselves, specified and non-specified substancesare not in principle distinguished according towhether they are appropriate for doping purposes.The only criterion that is decisive for classifyingsubstances as specified substances is that there is agreaterlikelihoodthatthepresenceofsaidsubstancescanbecrediblyexplainedbytheargumentthattheywerenotusedinordertoenhanceperformance30.

Intheendtherefore,theonlycriterionthatdecideswhetherthepenaltytobeimposeddependsonfaultor,inextremecases,isirrespectiveoffaultiswhetherthesubstanceisclassifiedasaspecifiedorasanonspecified substance. This is not convincable. Onetherefore wonders why the drafting group did notrealise theoriginal plans and include all prohibitedsubstances as so-called “specified substances”, or whythecategoryof“specifiedsubstances”wasnotdispensedwithaltogetherandwhyaprovisionallowinggreaterflexibilityanalogoustoArt.10.4wasnotincludedforallsubstances.

Maybeinthecaseoftoday’snonspecifiedsubstancesthe proof that there was no intention to enhanceperformance would then fail. However, there isat least a possibility that the athlete doesmeet theburdenofproofandthatthereforethesanctioncanbe reduced to a period approaching nil. In futuretherefore itwillagainbecomenecessary inextremecasestoapplythedoctrineofproportionalitydirectly.Thereasonsthatwerestatedformaintaining10.5.2.andtheoneyearlowerlimit,werefirstandforemostreasons of general prevention that follow from theentiresystem.However,sincethereisnowapossibilityofareductiontonilforspecifiedsubstances,whethertaken intentionally or negligently, this argumentno longercuts ice. Inotherwords, the insertionofArt.10.4forspecifiedsubstanceswillinfuturemeanevenmorethatareductionunder10.5.2willalsobeconsidered fornon-specifiedsubstancescontrary tothewordingoftheWADACode.

AstheCASpanelstatedintheDaniloHondocase,31itistheCAS’sdutytoinanyeventfindanapplication,whetherasanctionnotcompliesonlywiththerulesadoptedbythesportsorganizationbutalsowiththefundamental principles of the legal system, in thiscaseSwisslaw.

30.However, there is a greater likelihood that Specified Substances,asopposed tootherProhibitedSubstances, couldbe susceptible to acredible,non-dopingexplanation.31.SpuRt2006,71.


Theprincipleoftheproportionalityofthesanctionsispartofthesefundamentalprinciplesand it is thearbitration court’s duty to observe these takinginto account the special circumstances of the caseconcerned.

C. Possibility of reduction in the case of specified substances pursuant

to Art. 10.5

According to the comment, if specified substanceshavebeenproventhepossibilityofreductionunderArt. 10.5.2 should not be applied in cases whereArt. 10.4 already applies becauseArt. 10.4. alreadytakes into consideration the degree of fault for thepurposes of establishing the applicable period ofineligibility32.

Thiscommentcanprobablybeunderstoodtomeanthat Art. 10.5.2 is only not applied in cases wherethe period of ineligibility has been reduced underArt.10.4dependingonthedegreeoffault.

If, on the other hand, a specified substance hasbeen established and the athlete does not succeedinsatisfyingapanelthatheorshedidnotintendtoenhancehisorherperformancebecause,forexample,the athlete fails to meet the standard of proof of“comfortablesatisfaction”,Art.10.5canbeapplied.

VI.Summary

ThereformoftheWADACodeandtheinsertionofflexibilityattheexpenseofharmonizationhavebeencarriedoutonlyhalf-heartedly.Whetherthecategoryof“specifiedsubstances”isnecessaryatall isextremelydoubtful.ItisnotreallyapparentwhyonedoesnotapplyArt.10.4forallsubstancesandultimatelytakesthenatureofthesubstanceintoconsiderationintheevidentiaryproceedingsinsteadofexcludingcertainsubstances from theoutset from the applicationoftheflexibilityrule.

Here WADA was obviously worried that thefederations might abuse the flexibility allowed.However, in order to prevent this the proceduralsafeguard,thatisleavetoappealtotheCASagainstdecisions by the federations, would alone havesufficed. An additional substantive safeguard doesnotappearnecessary.

Ultimately, all of the questions posed in the pastremain; the scope of their application is of coursereduced, but they are not resolved. It is therefore

32.“Article10.5.2shouldnotbeappliedincaseswhereArticles10.3.3or10.4apply,asthoseArticlesalreadytakeintoconsiderationtheAthleteorotherPerson’sdegreeoffaultforpurposesofestablishingtheapplicableperiodofIneligibility.”

probablyonlyamatteroftimeuntiltheCASagainhas todealwith a case inwhich the athlete claimsthatheorshebears“nosignificantfaultornegligence”andtheCASconsidersthatitispreventedfromimposingafault-basedpenaltyonthebasisofthenewWADACodeduetothethresholdofoneyear.

It is therefore necessary to help the state doctrineof proportionality to override and, contrary to thewording of theWADA Code, to impose penaltiesthatfallbelowthelowerlimitofArt.10.5.2.


* JD 2009, Yale Law School. The author may be reached at [email protected]. The full article was first published in the Winter 2009 edition of the Journal of International Media and Entertainment Law.

I.Introduction

I. Introduction.................................................................................................................................................................................13II. International delegation and the Court of Arbitration for Sport...............................................................................15A)Internationaldelegationdefined.........................................................................................................................................16B)Benefitsandcostsof internationaldelegation..................................................................................................................17

III. Why states delegate to the Court of Arbitration for Sport.........................................................................................18A)StatesdelegatecontroltotheCAS–indirectlyanddirectly: Theimportanceof lowvisibilitydelegationtotheCAS................................................................................................181.LowvisibilitydelegationtotheCASthroughtheNewYorkConvention..............................................................182.LowvisibilitydelegationtotheCASthroughtheWorldAnti-DopingCode.........................................................203.DomesticdelegationwithinstatestriggersCASjurisdiction.....................................................................................22

B)DelegationtotheCourtof ArbitrationforSportisefficientandeffective................................................................241.Theevolutionof theCASthroughlitigationinstatecourtsincreased theefficiencyandeffectivenessof theinstitution.......................................................................................................242.Featuresof theCASthatdemonstrateefficiencyandeffectiveness.........................................................................253.Perceivedeffectivenesspromotesdelegation:twoexamples.....................................................................................26

IV. The impact and future of the Court of Arbitration for Sport....................................................................................27 A)Theeffectof delegationtotheCAS..................................................................................................................................27 B)Theimportanceof lowervisibilitydelegation..................................................................................................................28 C)UnitedStatesCASinvolvement:willitincrease?..............................................................................................................29V. Conclusion...................................................................................................................................................................................29

The Court of Arbitration for Sport: A subtle form of international delegationMr.AbbasRavjani*

American cyclist Floyd Landis received his day incourt – sort of. Landis has been stripped of hisTour de France championship because of dopingviolations,chargeshecontendedwerefalse1.Inordertoclearhisname,Landis couldnotgo toa typicalcourt; he was subject to an arbitration agreemententeredintobyallcyclistscompetingintheTourdeFrance.2Afterexhaustingallremedieswithincyclingchannels, hisonlyhope for recoursewas the little-knownCourtofArbitrationforSport(CAS)whichultimatelyruledagainsthim3.

1.BrendanGallagher,FloydLandisCouldCompeteinTourdeFranceAgainstLanceArmstrongNextYear,telegrAph (London),Sep.25,2008,http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/othersports/cycl ing/2797108/Floyd-Landis-could-compete-in-Tour-de-France-against-Lance-Armstrong-next-year---Cycling.html.2.UCICyclingRegulations,Part14Anti-DopingRulesoftheUCI46-47(2004);seealsoCourtofArbitrationforSport,CodeofSports-RelatedArbitration,R27ApplicationoftheRules.3. Court of Arbitration for Sport, CAS 2007/A/1394 Floyd Landisv/USADA 50, available at http://www.tas-cas.org/d2wfiles/document/1418/5048/0/Award%20Final%20Landis%20(2008.06.30).pdf.

LandisisoneofthemanyathletesthathavehadtheirfatedecidedbytheCAS.TheCASisanarbitralbodythathandlescasesarisingoutofinternationalsportscompetitionsandhasappellatejurisdictiongiventoit by certain international federations, such as theInternational Cycling Union (UCI) under whoseauspicestheTourdeFranceisconducted.Allmattersbefore theCAS have the consent of the parties tothe proceeding. Agreement to arbitration by theCASisoftenaprerequisiteforanathletetocompetein an international sports competition such as theOlympics. Though not a “court” in the traditionalsense,theCAShascourt-liketendenciesandhasovertheyearsdevelopeditsownbodyofjurisprudence4.WhileCASdecisionsdonotofficiallycreatebindingprecedentfortheCourttofollowinfuturematters,manyobserversoftheCASarguethatatypeof lex

4.KenFoster,LexSportivaandLexLudica:TheCourtofArbitrationforSport’sJurisprudence,inthe court oF ArbitrAtion For sport 1984-2004420,437(IanS.Blackshaw,RobertC.R.Siekmann,JanwillemSoekeds.2006)(acknowledgingthattheCASisnotacourtbutdescribingthosecharacteristicsthatmakeitfunctionlikeacourt,includingjurisdictionovermostinternationalsportsdisputesandtheuseofprecedent).


sportiva is emerging and continues to grow as theCourt matures5. In the past four years, the CAScaseloadhadincreaseddramatically.SixtypercentofthetotalcasesoverthelifeoftheCAS(1984-present)werebroughttotheCourtbetween2004and20076.

Given these developments in international sportslawand the trend towardsa lex sportiva, the lackofattentiongiventotheCAS’sbroadpowertointerpretinternational sports law is puzzling. Internationalsports law has been viewed “as much a matter ofinternational law as sports law”7 and is an importantaspectoftransnationallawthathasdevelopeditsowndistinctivebodyofrulesovertime8.MostcountriesandinternationalsportsfederationshaveaccededtothejurisdictionoftheCAS, despitesomecountries,including theUnitedStates,beingconcernedaboutthethreatoftheirnationalsbeingtriedbyforeignersinforumssuchastheInternationalCriminalCourt(ICC)9.Oneauthorarguesthatinternationalsportslaw is respected as opinio juris10. This acceptance ofthe CAS is especially curious given the generalhostilityandskepticismoftheUnitedStatestowardsinternationaladjudication.WiththeCAS,aforeignbodydeterminesthefateofanAmericanathlete,asintheLandiscase.ThistypeofinternationaldelegationwouldappeartohavesomesovereigntycoststhathavenotbeenattheheartofthediscussionsurroundingtheCAS.Itwouldseemimportantforagovernmenttohavesomecontroloverhowitscitizensaretreated,especiallyinafieldwithsuchmassappealassports.While most individuals may not be conversant ontheintricaciesofinternationalhumanrightslaw,theaverage citizen easily understands –and probablyhasanopinionon–asportingevent.Sportshaveaprofoundinfluenceonpeopleworldwideandsports

5. James A.R. Nafziger, Lex Sportiva and CAS, in the court oF ArbitrAtion For sport 1984-2004 409 (Ian S.Blackshaw, et al. eds.2006).6. CAS Statistics available at http://www.tas-cas.org/statistics (925 ofthe1501totalcaseseverfiledwiththeCASwerefiledbetween2004and2007).7.JamesA.R.Nafziger,GlobalizingSportsLaw,9mArq. sports l.J.225,237(1999).8. Anthony T. Polvino,Arbitration as Preventative Medicine for OlympicAilments:TheInternationalOlympicCommittee’sCourtofArbitrationforSportand theFuture for the Settlement of International SportingDisputes,8 emory int’l l. reV. 347, 349-350 (1994).9.TheUnitedStatespassedtheAmericanService-Members’ProtectionAct (also known as the Hague Invasion Act) into law in 2002. TheAmericanService-Members’ProtectionAct,Pub.L.No.107-206,116Stat.899(2002)(providingthat“TheUnitedStateswillnotrecognizethejurisdictionoftheInternationalCriminalCourtoverUnitedStatesnationals”);TheUnitedStatesalsowithdrewitssignaturefromtheICCin2002.PressStatement,U.S.Dep’tofState, InternationalCriminalCourt: Letter to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (May 6, 2002)(providingthetextofaletterfromJohnR.Bolton,UnderSecretaryofState forArmsControl and International Security, toU.N.SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm.SeealsoJohnYoo&EricPosner,InternationalCourtofHubris,WAll street JournAl, April7,2004(criticizingtheICJ);JackL.Goldsmith&StephenD.Krasner,TheLimitsofIdealism,132dAedAlus47(2003),reprintedinFoundAtions oF internAtionAl lAW And politics 350(OonaA.Hathaway&HaroldHongjuKoh,eds.2005).10.JamesA.R.Nafziger,internAtionAl sports lAW12(2ded.2004).

activityhasbeendescribedas“thelargestsocialforceofourtime”11.Thestakesappeartoohightoletaforeignbodydeterminethefateofanation’sathlete.

This article will offer some explanations as towhy adjudication by the CAS has been relativelyuncontroversial.Although theCourtofArbitrationfor Sport possesses similarities to arbitral bodies(which also tend not to be controversial), it alsosharesseveralattributeswiththeinternationalcourtstowhichcommentatorshavesostrenuouslyobjected.There is reason to expect, then, that countries –especially theUnitedStates–wouldbe reluctant toallowtherightsoftheirathletestobedecidedbytheCAS. I argue that theCAShas avoided the typicalcriticisms lodged against international adjudication,including the erosion of sovereignty, for twomainreasons.

First, states are more willing to delegate to aninternational tribunal when the delegation isperceived to be benign and has low visibility.Delegationthatdirectlyimplicatesthestateeitherasapartytoadisputeorthroughanofficialgovernmentrepresentative, such as a military official, appearsmorefaciallythreateningthananindirectdelegationthat implicates a state’s citizens in an individualcapacity. Athletes representing a nation typicallyappearbeforetheCAS,notthenationitself.Bybeingonestepremovedfromtheproceedings,astatehaslowered the visibility of the delegation. However,lowvisibilitydelegation,whetherdirector indirect,canstillhavealargeimpactuponinternationallaw.Bysigning theConventionon theRecognitionandEnforcementofForeignArbitralAwards,knownastheNewYorkConvention,countrieshaveimplicitlydelegatedauthoritytoallarbitraltribunalsthatmeetthe standard of a fair arbitral tribunal –a standardIarguethat theCAShasmet.Asaresult, this lowvisibility international delegation to the CAS hasnot conjured-up the typical arguments againstinternationaldelegation.Similarly,thelackofahigh-profiledisputeimplicatingaspecificcountry’ssportsteamhaskeptissuesofnationalpridefromeruptingwhen the CAS hands down an adverse decision.Individual athletes are predominantly the litigantsbeforetheCAS,ratherthananentirenationalteam,shielding the CAS from scrutiny –at least for thetimebeing12.

11.Id.at9(citing olympic reV., March1984at156).SeealsoJanPaulsson,ArbitrationofInternationalSportsDisputes, inthe court oF ArbitrAtion For sport 1984-2004 40(IanS.Blackshawetal.eds.2006)(describingthepassionandbusinessbehindsports).12. Scantmedia attention has beenbrought to theCASproceedingsin March 2008 involving the case of well-known American cyclistFloydLandis.WhileIconcedethatawell-knownnationalicon,suchasMichaelJordan,couldevokestrongemotionsandoutcry,itismorelikelythatanationalteambeingtakeninfrontoftheCASwouldcreatesuchemotions.


Second,theCASprovidesefficiencyandeffectivenesstointernationalsportsdisputes.Theuseofarbitrationincontractualdisputeshasincreasedovertheyears,with parties to contracts often preferring arbitralproceedings for a variety of reasons. While manyof the arguments in support of arbitration are notunique to theCASand canbe seen inother typesof international arbitrations, the complex rules ofinternational sports competitions coupled with theneedforswiftdecisions inherent insportingeventslendcredencetothepositionthattheCASprovidesthe optimal level of efficiency and effectiveness inresolving sporting disputes, thereby avoiding thesovereigntydebates.Statesrecognizedtheefficiencyof delegation to the CAS for adjudicating dopingdisputes when they supported the World Anti-DopingCode,givingappellateauthoritytotheCAS.

Part I of this article discusses the concept ofinternational delegation and examines howdelegation to the CAS fits within the broaderinternationaldelegationliterature.PartIIaddressesthequestionofwhystatesdelegatetotheCASintwosections. First, the delegation to theCAShas lowvisibility and is indirect. In particular, this sectionexaminestheimpactofthelowvisibilitydelegationby international sports bodies and through theNewYorkConvention.Second,theCASisefficientand effective and these characteristics increase theacceptabilityofdelegationtothatbody.Thissectionalso demonstrates how the CAS is best-suited tohandle international sports disputes andwhy therehas not been a large sovereignty outcry despitethis foreign institution determining the fate of aparticular country’s citizens. Part III examines theimpactofthisdelegationandthenlookstothefutureof theCAS and the implications forboth thefieldof international sports law and thebroader area ofinternationaladjudicationanddelegation.

II.InternationaldelegationandtheCourtofArbitrationforSport

International delegation is a contentious topic ininternationallawascountriesaresometimeshesitanttogiveuptheirsovereigncontroloveradjudicatingdisputesthatimplicatetheircitizens.Alargesubsetofinternationaldelegationhasconcernedeconomicandcommercialmatters, such aswith theWorldTradeOrganization, as countries have seen a compellinginterest in pursing relationships with one anotherthatproducemutualeconomicgain.Otherareasofinternational law, suchashuman rightsor criminaladjudication,haveseenlesssuccessasnationsattempttoprotecttheircitizensfromtheperceivedbiasesofforeigncourts13.Thefieldofinternationalsportslawis

13.See,e.g.,JackL.Goldsmith&StephenD.Krasner,TheLimitsofIdealism,

uniqueasnon-stateactorsaretheprimaryagentsthatparticipate in the international arena. Internationalsports law ismostly private in nature, albeit underthe colorof some state authority. While corporateentitiesincommercialarbitrationalsosharethenon-state actor characteristic, the distinguishing aspectofsports is thatathletesparticipate in internationalcompetitionundertheflagofaspecificstate,ratherthan as a solely private entity, and are perceivedby society as ambassadors of a particular country,especiallywhen theyaredrapedwith theirnationalflag at a victory celebration. Each country hasmechanismsthatareputinplacetoselectathletesto“represent”themduringinternationalcompetition14.Therefore, despite a lack of direct governmentallink to a particular athlete or team, the overridingperceptionbyspectatorsof sports is thatacountryisbeingrepresentedduringaparticularinternationalsports competition. This informal association addsadditional importance to international competitionforindividualstates,astheirreputationsareatstake.

Thisauraofstateinvolvementininternationalsportscompetitionwouldappeartofavorsomegovernmentinvolvementinsafeguardingitsnameandreputationduring these highly visible events. Nationalgovernments,asinotherareasoflaw,wouldwanttoretaincontroloverhowitscitizensweretreatedwhenaccusedofwrongdoing.However,countrieshavenotdemandedsuchdirectcontrol.Thecurrentscholarlyliterature on international delegation attempts todefinetheconceptofinternationaldelegationandalsoaddressestheperceivedcostsandbenefitsofastate’sdecisiontodelegateauthority.However,theliteraturelacksacomprehensivediscussionoftwokeyelementsthatareessentialtotheexaminationofinternationaldelegation:1)thevisibilityandexplicitnatureofthedelegation and 2) the efficiency and effectivenessof the bodies to which authority is delegated. AdiscussionoftheCAShighlightstheseareasthatthetraditional literaturehasunderdevelopedandshowswhenandhowtheseissuesmatterinthediscussiononinternationaldelegation.

Countries have decided to delegate authority overinternationalsportslawtoprivatebodies,whichhavesubsequently delegated additional authority to theCAS. First, I explore the literatureon theconceptof international delegation, placing the subject ofinternationalsportslawwithinthatdiscussion.Then,Iexaminethebenefitsandcostsofsuchinternationaldelegation.

132dAedAlus 47 (2003), reprinted inFoundAtions oF internAtionAl lAW And politics 350,356(OonaA.Hathaway&HaroldHongjuKoh,eds.2005).14.Seeinfra,PartII(A)(3).


A) International delegation defined

As the international community adapts to theglobalizing world around it, an increasing numberof international problems need to be dealtwith collectively. Getting multiple countries tocooperatively make decisions in a timely fashioneachtimeaninternationalproblemarises,nomatterhowsmalltheissue,wouldbeadifficulttask.Asaresult,countriesdelegateauthorityovercertainissuesto other institutions. On its most basic, intuitivelevel,internationaldelegationistheideathatanationdecidesitwillallowsomeotherpersonorinstitutiontomakedecisionsonitsbehalf.Despitethissimplisticnotionofinternationaldelegation,thereisagrowingliteratureanddebateontheissue.

CurtisBradleyandJudithKelleydefineinternationaldelegationas“agrantofauthoritybytwoormorestatestoan international body tomake decisions or take actions”15.A key aspect of their definition of internationaldelegation is the exantegrantofauthority. BradleyandKelley attempt to distinguish delegations frommerecommitments,withtheformerhavingagrantof authority and the latter simply being a promiseto act in a certain capacity16. Bradley and Kelleycontendthatgrantsofauthoritydonotonlyhavetoallowaninternationalbodytotakeactionsthatbinda state under international law; in fact, they arguethat international delegation can exist even whenthe international body can issue only non-bindingstatements17.Asaresult, theyarguethedegreeanddepthofaninternationaldelegationcanbeaffectedbythe limitsplacedonthebodytowhichpower isdelegated18.

Asecondaspectof theirdefinitionworthnoting isthe breadth of what they consider an internationalbody. Traditionally, scholars would point to state-run institutions, such as the United NationsSecurity Council, the European Union (EU), ortheWorldTradeOrganization(WTO),asexamplesof international bodies to which power has beendelegated. While these traditional bodies are thesubject of much scholarship, Bradley and Kelleyalso briefly discuss private bodies being grantedauthority by states. They identify the InternationalAccountingStandardsBoard(IASB),abodythatsetsfinancial reporting standards that all EU countriesmust follow,asanexampleofaprivatebodybeingdelegated authority19. They argue that in situations

15. Curtis A. Bradley & Judith G. Kelley, The Concept of InternationalDelegation,71 lAW And contemporAry problems 1, 3 (2008). 16.Id.17.Id.at4.18.Id.19.Id.at8.

inwhichprivatebodiesreceiveauthorityfromstatesor groups of states, an international delegation hasoccurred20.Inthiscase,theEuropeanCommissiondelegatedtotheIASB.Inthenextsection,Idescribehow theCAS is a similar to the IASB as it is alsoaprivatebody thathasbeendelegatedauthoritybystates to adjudicate international sports disputes,bothimplicitlyandexplicitly.

Other authors have also offered their perspectivesondefining internationaldelegation.Thedefinitionoffered by Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake,DanielL.Nielson,andMichaelJ.TierneyissimilartotheBradley-Kelleydefinition,butframestheissueasaprincipal-agentrelationshipandexplicitlydefinesthegrantofauthorityas“conditional”21.“Delegationisaconditionalgrantofauthorityfromaprincipaltoanagentthatempowersthelattertoactonbehalfoftheformer”22.TheHawkinsgroupfocusesontheabilityoftheprincipaltorescindauthorityfromtheagentasanimportantaspectofthedelegationrelationship,whichBradleyandKelleywouldviewindicativeofthedepthofthedelegation.

AndrewGuzman and Jennifer Landsidle provide acritique of the Bradley-Kelley approach, claimingthat their definition is overbroad23. Guzmanand Landsidle emphasize the legal dimensionsof delegation as providing a better guidepost forexamining international delegation and look to thework of KennethW. Abbott, RobertO.Keohane,Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, andDuncanSnidalwhodescribedelegationintermsofgrantsofauthorityto“implement,interpret,andapplytherules;toresolvedisputes;and(possibly)tomakefurtherrules”24.EdwardsT.Swainehasasimilaremphasisonrulesinhisdiscussionofinternationaldelegation25.Allofthese different methods of analyzing internationaldelegations underscore the complexity of the issueand the importanceof the concept to internationallaw.

Despite this debate over what constitutes aninternational delegation, even Guzman andLandsidle concede that granting authority toan international tribunal –as opposed to simplyinternational entities– to make decisions affecting

20.Id.at8-9.21.DarrenHawkinsetal.,DelegationUnderAnarchy:States, InternationalOrganizations,andPrincipal-AgentTheory,indelegAtion And Agency in internAtionAl orgAnizAtions3,7(DarrenHawkinsetal.eds.,2006).22.Id.23.AndrewT.Guzman&JenniferLandsidle,TheMythof InternationalDelegation, at 6, available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=andrew_guzman.24.KennethW.Abbottetal.,TheConceptofLegalization,54int’l org.401,401(2000).25.EdwardT.Swaine,TheConstitutionalityofInternationalDelegations,104colum. l. reV.1492,1507-12(2004).


internationallawistheultimateformofinternationaldelegation26. The development of the CAS as abodytowhichstatesdelegateauthoritytoadjudicatesports-related disputes will fit under many of thepreviously stated conceptions of internationaldelegation,butcaneasilyfitunderthecategoryofaninternational delegation to a tribunal despite beingprivate in nature like the InternationalAccountingStandardsBoard.Regardlessofhowtheconceptofinternational delegation is specifically defined, theCAShasreceivedauthorityfromstates,bothdirectlyandindirectly,toadjudicatedisputesthatarisefrominternationalsportscompetition;asaresult,aformofinternationaldelegationhasoccurred.However,thereasonswhystateshavebeenwillingtodelegateneedtobeconsidered,bothastothevariousargumentsonwhystatesdelegateinthebroadsense,andthenhowtheCASfitsintothisframework.

B) Benefits and costs of international delegation

International delegation is done for a reason. Theincrease in acts of delegation confirms that statesbelieve thatdelegationproducesgains. Evensomeskepticsofinternationaldelegationseecertainbenefitsin the use of international tribunals27. The mostdiscussedperceived costof internationaldelegationisthelossofstatesovereignty.Inherentintheactofdelegatingtoanotheristhetransferofauthorityfromonepartytoanother.Whilealegitimateconcerninsome areas, Oona Hathaway directly disputes theconventional wisdom surrounding the sovereigntycostsofinternationaldelegationbyarguingthatonemust not only look at the loss of authority in thedelegationbutmustalsolookatthefactthatastateactorisconsentingtothatdelegation28.Hathawayviewsthedelegationasanactof“sovereignconsent”thatdemonstrates a state’s sovereign ability to delegateauthority –a quintessential act of exercising statesovereignty29.

BradleyandKelleyalsodiscusssomeoftherelativecostsofdelegation.Inparticular,theynotethatthescopeandrangeofissueareasinvolvedcanhaveanimpactonthedelegationcosts30.Whenthe issueatstake is relatively uncontroversial, cooperation canbringaboutsignificantsocialbenefits31.Thecostsof

26.Guzman&Landsidle,supranote23,at15-16.

27.SeeEricA.Posner&JohnC.Yoo,JudicialIndependenceinInternationalTribunals, 93cAl. l. reV. 1, 6-7, 14 (2005) (describing some limitedcircumstancesthatdelegationtotribunalsmaybeeffective).

28.OonaA.Hathaway,InternationalDelegationandStateSovereignty,71lAW And contemporAry problems115,121-22(2008).

29. Id. at 122. For more development on the idea of consent ininternationaldelegation,seeid.at123-140.

30.Bradley&Kelley,supranote15,at30.

31.Id.at27.

thedelegationsmaybelow,butthenetbenefitsareoftenquitelarge32.

While the major cost associated with internationaldelegation comes from the perceived loss of statesovereignty, therearemanybenefits thathavebeenhighlighted by scholars discussing internationaldelegation.Hathawayexplainssomeofthebenefitsof delegation that help explain generally whyinternational delegation can be in a state’s interesteven though there may be some sovereignty costsassociatedwiththatdelegation33.Thefirstoftheseis the ability of a state to project its own values,such as human rights norms, through internationalagreements34.

Two additional benefits that Hathaway articulateshave more salience in the discussion of the CAS.Statesoftendelegatebothasawaytocoordinatetheiractivity and as a means to overcome a collective-actiondilemma35.Inessence,delegationonspecificissuesprovides for efficientoutcomes thatmaynotbeachievableindependently.Forinstance,statesarewilling to coordinate their activity by establishinguniform overflight rules36. Additionally, states canjointly agree to economic actions, such as lowertariffs, that could not be achieved through state-to-state action: reciprocity is needed through aninternational body37.These efficiency arguments astheyrelatetotheCASarediscussedinfrainPartII(B).

Oneofthemostimportantbenefitsofinternationaldelegation–especiallyinrelationtotheCAS–isthegainachievedfromspecialization. AsexplainedbytheHawkinsgroup,statesunderstandthatsometimesaspecializedbodyisinabetterpositiontoactonaparticular international issueand thatallowing thatbodytoactonitsbehalfwillproducemoreefficientoutcomesthaniftheytriedtoactalone38.Specializedbodies often have greater expertise in a particularsubject matter and can more effectively resolvedisputes because of this core competence39. Stateshaverecognized thevalueof theCAS inprovidingthisexpertiseoninternationalsportsdisputes40.

32.Id.

33.Hathaway,supranote28,at141.

34.Id.at143.

35.Id.at143-44.

36.Id.

37.Id.at144.

38.Hawkinsetal.,supranote21,at13.

39.SeeId.at13-15;seealsoBradley&Kelley,supranote15,at25-6.

40.SeeinfraPartII(B).


III.WhystatesdelegatetotheCourtofArbitrationforSport

The scholarly literature provides insight into thegeneralstructureandbenefitsofactsofinternationaldelegation; however, it lacks a comprehensivediscussion on the importance of certain moreparticularized aspects of the delegation process:the visibility of the delegation and the perceivedefficiency and effectiveness of the bodies towhichauthority is delegated. Understanding these twoaspectsofdelegation is important, especiallyas theskeptics of delegation become increasingly vocal intheiropposition.

Idefinethevisibilityofadelegationtobeindicatedby the degree of direct state involvement in theaction. Signing theRomeStatute to accede to thejurisdiction of the International Criminal Courtwould be an instance of high visibility delegation;on theotherhand,anaction thatoccursunder theauraofstateinvolvement,butisinsteadcarriedoutbynon-governmentalorotheractorswouldbeclassifiedas low visibility. I argue that the low visibilitydelegationshavethechancetobedeeperandmorewidespread than the typical high visibility statedelegations since they appearmore benign and donothavehugepoliticalramifications.Thus,thelowvisibility delegations provide an important windowinto how states might try to increase delegationwithoutbeingperceivedtosacrificesovereignty.

Additionally, the efficiency and effectiveness of aparticulararbitralbodyisimportantingarneringexanteapprovalbystatesforspecificactsofdelegation.Thisaspectofdelegationprovidesinsightsintostatebehavior and how to go about gaining support forfutureinstitutions.

Theroleofvisibility inthesuccessofdelegationtotheCASisbestexaminedthroughtheprismofthreeparticular examples: 1) theNew York Convention;2) the World Anti-Doping Code; and 3) domesticdelegationthatleadstoCASjurisdiction.Similarly,the efficiency and effectiveness of the CAS inhandling international sports disputes is illustratedby three specific areas: 1) domestic court litigationthat has helped shape the CAS; 2) features of theCAS that enhance efficiency and effectiveness; and3)theperceptionsofstates.

A) States delegate control to the CAS – indirectly and directly: the importance of low visibility delegation to the CAS

Statesaremoreapttodelegatewhenthedelegationdoesnotappearfaciallytoimplicatestatesovereignty.

Statesdonotseeeffectivearbitrationasa threat tostatesovereignty;infact,statesarewillingtodelegateauthority to arbitral institutions that can betteradjudicate disputes on specific subject-matter41.However, one should not confuse less visible withlesseffective; infactthese lowvisibilitydelegationscanhaveaprofoundimpactonareasofinternationallaw.Thelowervisibilitycanallowforgreaterdepthofdelegation,ascountriesarelessconcernedwithahugepublicbacklashagainstallowingdecisionsregardingtheir citizens to be subject to a foreign tribunal.Additionally,anactofinternationaldelegationdoesnot have to be explicit. As demonstrated by theNew York Convention, state actions can implicitlydelegateauthorityandstillretainfeaturespresentinthetraditionalnotionofaninternationaldelegation.

In the context of sports, two major acts ofinternationaldelegationdemonstratetheacceptanceoftheCASasthevenueofchoicefor internationalsportsdisputes.First,astatesigningtheConventionon the Recognition and Enforcement of ForeignArbitralAwards,knownastheNewYorkConvention,implicitlydelegatesauthoritytoanyarbitralbodythatcan prove itself as a legitimate tribunal –includingtheCAS.TheNewYorkConventionnotonlysetsupasystemthatpresumptivelyapprovesofarbitration,but the signing of the document is also an actof delegation that allows for the growth of moredelegation –since any subsequent arbitral tribunalcreated is presumptively legitimate until domesticcourts rule otherwise. Second, states convened in2003attheWorldConferenceonDopinginSportandadopted theWorldAnti-DopingCode,adocumentthat specifically delegatedfinal judicial authority tothe CAS in disputes arising from alleged dopingviolations. These examples will help fill in someof the gaps in the existing international delegationliteraturebydemonstratingtheimpactofthevisibilityofdelegation.Sincebothofthesedelegationactsdonotformally implicatethestate inanyproceedings,theywouldbeconsideredlowvisibilitydelegations.

1)LowvisibilitydelegationtotheCASthroughtheNewYorkConvention

International arbitration has been the disputeresolutionmechanismofchoiceformany,especiallyin the commercial arena. While arbitral awardsshould be facially binding upon the parties to theproceeding, sometimes an additionalmechanism isneeded to enforce an award upon a specific party.To accommodate for this enforcement need, statescame together in 1958 and adopted theNewYork

41.SeeProjectonInternationalCourtsandTribunals,TheInternationalJudiciary in Context (Chart), available at http://www.pict-pcti.org/publications/synoptic_chart.html(showingachartwiththewide-rangeofarbitraltribunalsinexistencetoday).


Convention. To date, 143 parties have signed theNewYork Convention42 and it remains one of thefoundationaldocumentsinthefieldofinternationalarbitration. The Convention has been labeled the“singlemost important pillar on which the edificeofinternationalarbitrationrests”43.Icontendthatastate’s adoptionof theNewYorkConvention is animplicit delegationof authority to any arbitral body–includingtheCAS–subjecttocertainprovisionsoftheConventionbywhichstatecourtscanvacatetheawardsofarbitraltribunals.Inessence,theNewYorkConventionallowsforeffectivearbitrationtooccurbyanyarbitralbodythatcanmeetcertainstandardsof fairness and legitimacy. The Convention grantsexanteauthoritytoallarbitraltribunalstoadjudicatematters,but limits thatgrantofauthority to expostscrutinyonasmallsubsetofissues.Additionally,theimplicit, lessvisibledelegationofauthority throughthe New York Convention is an act of delegationthat allows for thegrowthofdelegationover time.Thissingleactofdelegation–thesigningoftheNewYorkConvention–hasallowedfortheproliferationof arbitral tribunals, such as the CAS, to occurunnoticedbymanyandhassignificantpotentialformore indirect delegationsof authorityover awide-rangeofissues.

The adoption of the New York Convention doesmore than simply set forth the internationallyaccepted rules of arbitration. The distinctionbetween this Convention, and for instance, theVienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, is thedegreeofcontrolstatesnowhavesince thesigningofthetreaty.WhiletheViennaConventionsetsforththe rulesof the road, inorder for that treaty tobeofvalue, stateshave toenactother treaties thatwillbenefit from theViennaConvention’s guidance ontheappropriateprocedures.ThisisdifferentfromtheimplicitdelegationthatoccurswiththesigningoftheNewYorkConvention.Aftersigning,astatedoesnothave to take any affirmative actionwith respect tothecreationofotherarbitraltribunals.PrivateactorscreatethearbitraltribunalswhoseawardsstateshavealreadyagreedtoimplementundertheConvention,aslongastheymeetcertainstandards.Thisimplicitdelegation is similar to the model used by theInternational Centre for Settlement of InvestmentDisputes(ICSID);themajordifferenceisthatstatesonlydelegatedtoICSIDinitsfoundingdocument44,

42.ConventionontheRecognitionandEnforcementofForeignArbitralAwards available at http://treaties.un.org/pages/participationstatus.aspx (select “CHAPTER XXII”; then select “Convention on theRecognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards”) (listingpartiesratifyingtheConvention).43.J.GillisWetter,ThePresentStatusoftheInternationalCourtofArbitrationoftheICC:AnAppraisal,1Am. reV. int’l Arb.91,93(1990).44.SeeInternationalCentrefortheSettlementofInvestmentDisputes,ConventionontheSettlementofInvestmentDisputesBetweenStatesandNationalsofOtherStates,availableathttp://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc_en-archive/9.htm.

whilestatesdelegatedtoall futurearbitral tribunalsthroughtheNewYorkConvention.

In order to have an effective arbitral system, abalance must be struck between independence ofthearbitralbodyandsomesortofnational judicialreview45. Toomuch autonomy could lead to abuseof power, but too much national power to nullifyawards would cripple the arbitration scheme46.TheNewYorkConventionattemptstobalancetheindependenceandjudicialreviewinterests.ArticlesIthroughIVoftheNewYorkConventionsetforththeparametersbywhicha foreignarbitral award isenforceablebystatecourts.Thesearticlesprovidetheprocedural rules statesmust follow in giving effecttoarbitralawards.Includedinthesearticlesaretheprovisionsforthearbitralagreementtobeinwritingand the procedures a party must take in order tosubmitanawardforenforcementbyastate47.

However,ArticleVprovidestheexpostmechanismfor judicial reviewofanaward,butonlyoncertaingrounds.These limitedgrounds for review include:incapacity, lack of notice for arbitration, agreementnotbeinginaccordancewiththelawofthecountryinwhichthearbitrationtookplace,ortheawardhasalreadybeensetasideunderthe lawofthecountryin which the arbitration took place48. Additionally,theawardmaybesetasideifthesubjectmatterwasnot capableof settlementby arbitrationunder lawsof that countryor if the enforcementof the awardwould be in violation of the public policy of thatcountry49. These limited grounds of prohibitingenforcementmeanthatnational“[c]ontrolundertheNewYorkConventionessentiallyinvolvespolicingprocedureandnotsubstance”50. United States federal courts have alsoagreedwith this sentiment51.Since statesonlyhavethese very limited grounds for vacating an arbitralaward52,Icontendthatstateshave exante implicitly

45. W. Michael Reisman, systems oF control in internAtionAl AdJudicAtion And ArbitrAtion: breAkdoWn And repAir113(1992).46.Id.47. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of ForeignArbitralAwardsart.I-IV,June10,1958,availableathttp://www.uncitral.org/pdf/1958NYConvention.pdf.48. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of ForeignArbitralAwardsart.V(1)(a-e).49. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of ForeignArbitralAwardsart.V(2)(a-b).50.Reisman,supranote45,at115.51. See Int’l Standard Electric Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad AnonimaPetrolera,IndustrialyComercial,745F.Supp.172,178(S.D.N.Y.1990)(holdingthat“‘thecompetentauthorityofthecountryunderthelawofwhich,[the]awardwasmade’refersexclusivelytoproceduralandnotsubstantivelaw,andmoreprecisely,totheregimenorschemeofarbitralprocedurallawunderwhichthearbitrationwasconducted,andnotthesubstantivelawofcontractwhichwasappliedinthecase.”).52.Oneofthemosttellingcasesofcourtdeferencetoarbitralawardsunder the New York Convention is demonstrated by National OilCorporation v. Libyan SunOil,733 F.Supp. 800 (D.Del 1990). In thecase, a U.S. court demonstrated the strong power of the New YorkConvention inenforcinganarbitral awardagainstaU.S.company infavorofastatedesignatedbytheU.S.asastate-sponsorofterrorism.


delegated authority on a whole range of issues toarbitralinstitutions—includingtheCAS.TheimpactofthisbroaddelegationofauthoritywillbeexploredfurtherinPartIII.

Manyof the awards renderedby theCASneednooutside actor for enforcement, since the sportscompetitioncansimplychangeitsresultordisqualifyan athlete53.However, a contractual dispute or thepaymentoflitigationcostscouldrequiretheoutsideenforcementoftheaward.Inthatcase,astatecourtcouldconductanexpostreviewandrefuseenforcementoftheawardunderoneoftheenumeratedgroundsoftheNewYorkConventiondiscussedabove, thoughthestandardforrefusingtoenforceishigh.

Conversely,challengestotheCASawarditselfmustbemade to the Swiss Federal Tribunal—the courtof the nation where the arbitration took place54.TheCAShasbeenfoundtobealegitimatearbitraltribunal,meaningitsawardscanbeenforcedthroughthe New York Convention55. In particular, whenlitigantschallengedwhethertheCASwasafairandimpartialarbitraltribunal,theSwissFederalTribunalupheldthelegitimacyoftheCASinboththeGundelandLazutina/DanilovadecisionsdiscussedinfrainPartII(B)56. The findings by the Swiss court on thesechallengestotheallegedflaws inadecisionupholdthe use of the New York Convention to enforceCASawardswhenneeded57.ThisdoesnotmeanthatCAS awardswill be recognized by the Swiss courtineverycase,butchallengestotheindependenceorimpartialityoftheCASwilllikelyfail58.

Other nations have also adopted the view that theCAS is a legitimate arbitral tribunal that operatesundertheparametersoftheNewYorkConvention.In light of theUnited States adoption of theNewYorkConvention,U.S. courts have deferred to thejudgmentofarbitraltribunalsintheareaofsports59.

The decision further highlights the narrowpublic policy grounds bywhichanarbitralawardcanbevacated.53.Thismethodof enforcement canbe termed a “speech act” sincestatingadecisionhasthedesiredeffectdespiteanypotentialresistancebyaparty.Forinstance,takingawayamedalfromsomeonedoesnotrequirephysicallyrecoveringthemedal;byannouncinganewwinner,thesportsbodyalreadyinflictsthedesiredpenaltyevenifthetangiblematerial(themedal)isnotrecovered.DanielH.Yi,TurningMedalsintoMetal:EvaluatingtheCourtofArbitrationforSportasanInternationalTribunal,6 Asper reV. int’l bus. & trAde l.289,322-324(2006).54.MatthieuReeb,TheRoleandFunctionsoftheCourtofArbitrationforSport(CAS),inthe court oF ArbitrAtion For sport 1984-2004 31,38(IanS.Blackshawetal.eds.2006).55.Id.56.Seedigest oF cAs AWArds 1986-1998,at543-44 (MatthieuReebed.1998).57.Id.58.StephenA.Kaufman,IssuesinInternationalSportsArbitration,13b.u. int’l l.J.527,542-43(1995).59.See, e.g.,Slaneyv. Int’lAmateurAthleticFed’n,244F.3d580,601(7thCir.2001)(rejectinganappealfromanarbitraltribunalundertheenforcementfeatureoftheNewYorkConvention).

The Justin Gatlin case demonstrates the unwillin-gnessofUnitedStatescourtstopolicethesubstanceofCASrulingsunlesstheyreachthepointofviolationofpublicpolicy60.DespitesympathizingwithGatlinand calling the actions of the CAS arbitrary andcapricious,theNorthernDistrictofFloridaheldthatGatlin’sonlyremedyforreliefwastheSwissFederalTribunalsincechallengestotheawardhadtobemadein the seat of the arbitration under theNew YorkConvention61.Additionally,anAustraliancourthadtheopportunitytoexamineadecisionbytheCASandsimilarlyheldthattheawardshouldstandbecauseitdidnothave jurisdiction tohear the case since thematterwasforeignnotdomestic62.TheAustraliancourtrefusedtointerferewithaCASdecisionhandeddownbytheAdHocDivisioninAustraliaonbehalfofanAustralianathletesinceLausanne,Switzerlandistheseat forCAS63. Thisdecision implicitlyupheld thelegitimacyoftheCASassetforthbySwisslawintheGundeldecision anddemonstrates thepowerof theNewYorkConvention64.TheNewYorkConventionimplicitlydelegatesanincredibleamountofauthoritytoarbitraltribunalsandtheCAShasbenefitedfromthisdelegation.

2)LowvisibilitydelegationtotheCASthroughtheWorldAnti-DopingCode

Thefightagainstdopinginsportrequiredcollectiveactionfromavarietyofstakeholders.Harmonizingthe various doping standards into a unified set ofprincipleswasamajorgoaloftheWorldAnti-DopingAgency (WADA)andtheireffortscametofruitionatthesecondWorldConferenceonDopinginSportheld in Copenhagen,Denmark inMarch 2003. Atthisconference,some1200delegatesrepresenting80governments,theIOC,allInternationalFederationsfor Olympic Sports, athletes, and others cametogether and unanimously agreed to adopt theWorldAnti-DopingCode(Code)asthebasisforthefight against doping in sport65. Participants at theConference demonstrated support for the Code byadopting theCopenhagenDeclaration, thepoliticaldocumentsignedbygovernmentsattheConferencethatexplicitly statedeachactor’s role in supportingand implementing the Code 66. The Code, which

60.Gatlinv.U.S.Anti-DopingAgency,Inc.Order,June24,2008.CaseNo.3:08-cv-241/LAC/EMT.61.Id.62. Nafziger, supra note 10, at 45-46 (citingRaguz v. Sullivan [2000]N.S.W.Ct.App.240(unpublishedopinion),reprinteding. kAuFmAnn-kohler, ArbitrAtion At the olympics51(2001)).63.Id.at46.64.Id.65. World Anti-Doping Agency, What is the Code? Introduction,available at http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=364.66. World Conference on Doping in Sport Resolution, Adopted bytheWorldConferenceonDopinginSport,Copenhagen,Denmark,5March2003.


entered into force on January 1, 200467, grantsjurisdiction for appeals involving international-level athletes exclusively to theCAS68. I argue thattheadoptionof theWorldAnti-DopingCode isanexplicit act of international delegation by states tothe CAS, albeit indirect since states never directlyinteractwiththeCAS.

The Code attempts to provide the framework toharmonize the standards different InternationalFederationsused in adjudicatingdopingmattersbysetting forth guidelines for doping regulations69.Before the adoption of the Code, the CAS heardappeals on some doping disputes; however, themanner in which it did so was sporadic andunpredictable. While IFs still eachhave theirownregulationsforadjudicatingdopingdisputes,certainaspects of the Code are supposed to be adoptedverbatim and the other principles of the Codeadoptedwiththesamesubstantiveintent70. Oneofthe mandatory items is making the CAS the finalappellate authority for disputes in cases involvinginternational-level athletes71. Designating the CASasthefinalappellateauthorityisonewaytheadoptionoftheCodeservedasactofinternationaldelegationtotheCAS.

As a resultof theCode’s adoptionand thepassageof the Copenhagen Declaration, states committedto implement these principles at the national level.For instance, the U.S. created the United StatesAnti-Doping Agency (USADA) which functionsindependently as the drug testing arm for theUSOCandanyUnitedStatesNGB72.TheUSADAimplementstheCodeonbehalfoftheUnitedStatesand has the authority to transmit drug testinginformationtorelevantInternationalFederationsandWADA73.PartiestoadisputeinvolvingtheUSADAcan ask for a hearing in front of the American

67. “The current Code, which went into formal effect on 1 January2004, underwent a thorough review and consultation with WADAstakeholders for its practical improvement. This 18-month, 3-phaseprocess culminated at the Third World Conference on Doping inSport in November 2007, at which time the WADA FoundationBoard approved the newly RevisedCode and identified the requiredimplementation date for all stakeholders as being January 1, 2009.”World Anti-Doping Agency, 2009 Code Implementation, available athttp://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=735.

68.WorldAnti-DopingCodeart.13.2.1.

69.World Anti-Doping Agency, What is the Code? Introduction,available at http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=364.

70.WorldAnti-DopingCode,Introduction.

71.WorldAnti-DopingCodeart.13.2.1.It isnoteworthythatArticle13.2.2pertainingtonational-levelathletesdoesnotrequireappealstobeheardbytheCAS;othertribunalsdeemedtomeetcertainstandards,likeAAAintheUnitedStates,areacceptable.

72.UnitedStatesAnti-DopingAgency,ProtocolforOlympicMovementTesting,at1.

73.Id.

Arbitration Association (AAA) and if not satisfiedwiththeresult,canappealtotheCAS74.

TheUSADA sets forth the forgoingprocedures inits Protocol for Olympic Movement Testing, butit also directly incorporates the Code into AnnexA of the Protocol entitled: “Articles from the WorldAnti-Doping Code that are Incorporated Verbatim intothe USOC Anti-Doping Policies and the USADAProtocol for OlympicMovement Testing”75.United StatesparticipationattheWorldConferenceanditssupportfor theCode at the governmental level indicated awillingnesstodelegatefinaljudicialauthoritytotheCAS, and this implicit delegation was codified onbehalf of the United States by the USADA in theProtocol.

WADA, as a non-governmental organization,recognized that the Code it drafted may not beconsideredlegallybindingbystates76.Consequently,a few differentmethods of rectifying this problemwereputinplace.First,theCopenhagenDeclarationmentioned above was designed to be a politicaldocument that demonstrated commitment to theCodebystates;thoughagain,thiscanbeseenmerelyasindicatinginterestintheCode,ratherthanbeinga legally binding mechanism. Second, the biggerpoliticalmechanismforadoptionoftheCodecamefrom the United Nations Educational, Scientific,andCulturalOrganization(UNESCO)-ledefforttocreateanInternationalConventionAgainstDopingin Sport77.Governments unanimously adopted thisdocumentatthe33rdUNESCOGeneralConferenceinParisinOctober200578.Atthetimeofpublication,105stateshaveratifiedoraccededtotheConvention79includingtheUnitedStateswhichrecentlyratifieditduringAugust200880andmanymorestatesindicatingtheir intent todososoon. Thefirstsessionof theConference of States Parties to the InternationalConvention againstDoping inSportwas convenedon5-7February 2007 andbrought together the 41states that had ratified the Convention by the endof200681.“Thefightagainstdopingwasthusinscribedfor

74.UnitedStatesAnti-DopingAgency,ProtocolforOlympicMovementTesting,at10.75.UnitedStatesAnti-DopingAgency,ProtocolforOlympicMovementTesting,AnnexA.76.WorldAnti-DopingAgency,Q&AontheCodeavailableathttp://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=367.77.Id.78.Id.79. International Convention Against Doping In Sport: Paris, 19October2005. Listofpartiesavailableathttp://portal.unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO=31037&language=E&order=alpha.80.WhiteHousePressRelease,PresidentGeorgeW.Bush,MessagetotheSenateof theUnitedStates, (February7,2008);UNESCONewsService,UnitedStatesratifiesInternationalConventionagainstDopingin Sport, available at : http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=43227&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.81. Media Advisory, International Convention Against Doping in


the first time in international law, and governments, sportsfederationsandcivilsociety–aswellastheOlympicmovement–wereprovidedwithabindinglegalinstrument”82.Finally,theIOChastakenadditionalstepstoensuretheCodeisadoptedbyallmembersof theOlympicMovementbyamendingtheOlympicChartertomakeadoptionoftheCodemandatory83.AllNOCs,IFs,andothersthatareapartoftheOlympicMovement84willhavetobeboundbytheCode.

These three mechanisms binding states and otherinternationalsportsactorstotheCodeareimportantacts of international delegation to the CAS.States have directly signed documents supportingdelegation to the CAS; have indirectly had theirNOCsandotheragencies,suchasUSADA,submitto jurisdiction; and continue to have their athletescompete in competitions that make jurisdiction tothe CAS mandatory. In doing so, states explicitlygrantedtheirapprovalfortheabilityoftheCAStobeafairandneutralarbiterofsportsdisputes.

Afinal issue iswhydelegation to theCASthroughtheWorldAnti-DopingCodecanbeconsideredanactoflowvisibilitydelegation.AscontrastedwiththeNewYorkConventionexample,stateshavedirectlyendorsedtheCASthroughtheCode.Itmightappearthat this act of delegation could be considered astraightforwardactofdelegationbystates;however,inmany countries, including theUnitedStates, thespecificdelegationdidnotoccuratthegovernmentallevel–thedelegationoccurredwhentheUSOC,anon-governmentalbody,createdtheindependentUSADAwhichadoptedtheCodeintoitsprocedures85.StatesneverformallydirectlydelegatedanyauthoritytotheCAS;theyonlyindirectlydidsothroughtheirinternalregulatory bodies. They did however indicate theirsupportfortheCodeintheCopenhagenDeclarationandthroughtheUNESCOdocumentandasaresulthave implicitlycededauthoritytotheCAS.Thus,Iconsider the delegation to be low visibility since itdoesnotfaciallyimplicatethestateinanyfashionbutisdoneundertheauthorityofthegrantofdelegatedpowerbythestate.

Sport: 41 States will take part in First Conference of States Parties,( Jan. 9, 2007) available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=36578&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.82.Id.83. International Olympic Committee, Olympic Charter, art. 44:World Anti-Doping Code (2007); see World Anti-Doping Agency,Q&AontheCodeavailableathttp://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=367.84. International Olympic Committee, Olympic Charter, art. 1:Composition and General Organisation of the Olympic Movement(2007).85.UnitedStatesAnti-DopingAgency,ProtocolforOlympicMovementTesting,AnnexA.

3)DomesticdelegationwithinstatestriggersCASjurisdiction

Statesalso interactwiththeCASthroughdomesticdelegations that have international implications –namelywhere states have chosen to delegate issuesofinternationalsportsdisputestodomesticagencieswhichthen,inturn,submittothejurisdictionoftheCASonbehalfofthestate.Inessence,theadoptionof theNewYorkConvention and theWorldAnti-DopingCodebyindividualstatesareactionsonthemacro level thatprovide theauthorityunderwhichstate-createddomesticagenciescaninteractwiththeCASonthemicro level.This implicitdelegationofauthorityhasgoneunnoticedanddemonstrates theabilityof lessvisibledelegation tohave aprofoundimpactoninternationallaw.

Unlike the typical instances of internationaldelegation discussed earlier,86 an act of domesticdelegation indirectly leads to the internationaldelegation to the CAS. Individual countries arerepresented at international sports competitionsby national bodies. In theOlympics, each countrymustsetupaNationalOlympicCommittee(NOC)that is a particular country’s representative at theGames87. While there is no explicit requirementfor theNOCs tobecompletely independentof thegovernment, the language of the Olympic Charterleans in thatdirection88.Additionally,atothernon-Olympic international competitions, each countrythat participates usually has a National GoverningBody (NGB) that organizes and is responsible foradministeringaparticularsport.Forinstance,“USABasketball” is responsible for putting together theU.S.teamthatcompetesinallinternationalbasketballcompetitions89.

The state, as a sovereign entity, is usually notrepresentedatthesecompetitions,unlike,forexample,theUnitedNationswhereapermanentrepresentativeisanagentofthestate.Certaincountrieshavegoneastepfurtherandhaveevencompletelyremovedthegovernment from the process of making decisionsconcerning international sports competitions. Asa result, they have delegated this authority overinternational law to their respective NOCs andNGBs. For instance, in theUnitedStates, theTedStevensOlympicandAmateurSportsAct,90createstheUnitedStatesOlympicCommittee(USOC)and

86.SeesupraPartI.87.InternationalOlympicCommittee,OlympicCharterart.28:MissionandRoleoftheNOCs(2007).88.Id.89. InsideUSABasketball available athttp://www.usabasketball.com/inside.php?page=inside.90.TedStevensOlympicandAmateurSportsAct,36U.S.C.§§220501etseq.(1998).


lays out the rules for creation and governance ofNationalGoverningBodies.TheStevensActcreatesanindependent,federallycharteredcorporation(theUSOC)thatwillrepresenttheinterestsoftheUnitedStatesininternationalsportscompetitions91.Throughthis domestic delegation, the U.S. has essentiallycededitssovereignauthoritytoprivate,independentactors (the USOC and the NGBs for each sport)thatwill pursue the broad goals highlighted in theActonbehalfoftheUnitedStateswiththeoreticallyno government control92. As a result, the UnitedStates has also delegated its authority on issues ofinternational sports law, as the types of activitiesthesedomestically-createdbodieswillparticipate inareinherentlyinternationalinnature.

This indirect international delegation through theStevens Act leads to the jurisdiction of the CAS.The International Federations for each sport setthe parameters for participation in their respectivecompetitions.WhetherinthecontextoftheOlympicGamesortheFIFAWorldCup,eachinstitutionhascreatedamechanismfortheadjudicationofdisputesthat arise from international sports competitions.Increasingly, these bodies have acceded to thejurisdictionof theCAS93. Inorder toget access totheseinternationalcompetitions,countries,typicallythrough their representatives (the NOCs), mustbe willing to play by the rules set forth by thesebodies –including the jurisdiction of the CAS.Since the country is getting a tangible benefit bygetting the ability to have its athletes compete inthese competitions, few have questioned the defacto mandatory nature of the delegation or thesovereignty costs associated and have consented toCAS jurisdiction94. By competing in theOlympics,the USOC and its athletes are subject to CASjurisdiction95.

Delegation todomestic regulatoryagencies isnotanewphenomenon.Governmentofficials,particularlyelectedofficials,oftendelegate toagencies inorderto benefit from the gains of specialization. MarkThatcher specifically addresses this phenomenonofdelegation todomestic regulatoryagencies96.Hisanalysisonwhygovernmentofficialswoulddelegate

91.36U.S.C.§220502.92. Formally, there is no government involvement. But as will bediscussed infra the government often has some influence on thepositionsthesebodiestake,suchasinaboycottoftheOlympicGames.93. 36 U.S.C. §220503; International Olympic Committee, OlympicCharter art. 59: Disputes - Arbitration (2007) (Participation in theOlympicsrequiresanIForNOCtosubmittoCASjurisdiction.).94.Seediscussionon“consent”supraPartII.95.MaidieE.Oliveau,Navigating theLabyrinthof ‘Amateur’SportsADRProcedures,13 no. 3 disp. resol. mAg. 6,7(2007).96.MarkThatcher,DelegationtoIndependentRegulatoryAgencies:Pressures,FunctionsandContextualMediation, inthe politics oF delegAtion 125 (MarkThatcherandAlecStoneSweet,eds.2003).

authorityoncertaindomesticmatters to regulatoryagenciessetsthebackdropformyargumentonwhycountrieswouldsimilarlydelegatetodomesticactorsthathavetheabilitytoactinternationallyinthefieldofsports.

Increased information requirements provide anobstacle for elected officials to gain any politicalbenefitfromcertainactions,andasaresult,politiciansprefertodelegatethoseactionstoregulatorybodies97.In essence, the benefits of certain programs andpolicies are too difficult to explain in the shortattentionspanoftheaveragevoterthatthoseissuesbecome too costly for politicians to devote timetowards. For instance, regulatory bodies have beencreatedtoaddresspublicpolicyproblems,suchasfoodsafetyor theenvironment, since thesepolicy issuesrequire more specialist involvement98. In additiontothelackofelectoralbenefitconferredbysomeofthese very technical policy areas, officials can shifttheblameforunpopulardecisionstotheseregulatorybodies99.Andtosomeextent,policymakersrecognizetheneedforspecialistsdealingwithtechnicalmatterstofurtherefficiency.

These bodies provide a win-win solution for thepolitician:theyfocusonpoliticallyimportantissuesand allow the politician to blame others whenthingsgowrong in areas thathavebeendelegated.However,thesamesubstantivepolicyconcerndoesnotnecessarilygetdelegatedineverycountry.Thereis “no automatic link between functional advantages ofdelegationand the creationof IRAs[independent regulatoryagencies]”100. In the sports context, it would seemcounterintuitiveforpoliticianstogiveuptheabilitytomakedecisionsover internationalsports,anareaof lawthata largesectionof thevotingpopulationdeeply cares about and has some knowledge of101.Sports arouse such high emotions from thosewhofollow athletic competitions that it would seempoliticians would want to benefit from being abletoclaim theywere involved in theprocessat somelevel102. However, despite the emotions that sports

97.Id.at 132.98.Id.at128.99.Id.at131.100.Id.at136.101. I do concede that U.S. domestic sports—the NBA, NFL, orMLB—tendtobemorepopularintheUnitedStatesthaninternationalsports such as soccer; however, this fact does not take away frommy argument since the CAS only deals with international sportingcompetitions. Large international sports competitions, such as theOlympics, evoke a tremendous amount national pride and affectperhapsevenawideraudiencethatthehardcoresportsfanattunedtoU.S.leagues.Additionally,formostoftherestoftheworld,sportingcompetitions that are conducted each year aremore international orregionalinscopethatsportsintheU.S.102. There are instances when elected officials do get involved insports, but those are generallyonlywhen tangiblepolitical gains canbe achieved or are done at a high level of generality. For instance,the baseball steroids scandal caught the attention of Congress oncethe scandal caught the headlines of major media outlets. See Dave


elicit, the technical aspects of international dopingregulations and other sports-related rules makesports a prime area in which a country wouldconsider delegating to a regulatory body. It wouldbe difficult for politicians to try to explain theintricacies of doping standards in internationalsports competitions, and indirectly allowing forthedelegationof the jobtoaspecializedbody, liketheCAS,doesprovide thepoliticiansomepoliticalcoverandabilitytocastblameiftheCASreachesanadversedecision.

However, this analysis does not provide all of theunderlying reasons why politicians would let thedomestic regulatory body independently sign thenation’s name to arbitration agreements underthe CAS or participate in competitions that havemandatoryarbitrationclauseswithjurisdictionundertheCAS.TheefficiencyandeffectivenessoftheCASprovidestheotherhalfofthestory.

B) Delegation to the Court of Arbitration for Sport is efficient and effective

The second reason I contend that the CAS hasavoided the major criticisms of internationaladjudication is that the CAS has proven to be anefficient and effective arbitral tribunal. The courtthatbeganoperations in1984isstrikinglydifferentfromthecourtthatoperatestoday.Thiswillingnessto evolvehas kept its critics relatively silent.BynomeansistheCASperfect,anditstillhasitsfairshareofcritics;however, stateshaveshownawillingnessto legitimate thecourtas isshownby theadoptionof theWorldAnti-Doping Code, which designatestheCASasthefinalappellateauthorityforalldopingdisputesarisingfrominternationalcompetition.Thisrecognition and explicit delegation by states, notedintheLazutina/DanilovaandGundeldecisionsbytheSwiss Federal Tribunal, underscores the efficiencyandeffectivenessoftheCASasatrueinternationalsports arbitral body. I argue that states are morewillingtocedeauthorityovertheirnation’scitizens,evenindirectly,whentheybelievethebodytowhichauthority is given is efficient and effective. ThisSectionhighlightsthoseattributesthathaveledstatestorecognizetheabilityoftheCAStobeanefficientandeffectivetribunal.First, itexaminesthe impactdomestic court litigation has had on the evolutionof the CAS. Next, it explores the features thatembody the efficient and effective institution.Andfinally, it analyzes theperceptionsofefficiencyand

Sheinin,BaseballHasADay ofReckoning InCongress,the WAshington post,March18,2005,atA01.Additionally,thePresidentofteninviteswinning athletes and teams for photo-opportunities at the WhiteHouse.SeeWhiteHousePressRelease,PresidentWelcomesUniversityofTexasLonghorns,2005NCAAFootballChampions, to theWhiteHouse (February 14, 2006) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/02/20060214.html.

effectiveness and how perceptions correlate with acountry’spositiontowardstheinternationaltribunal.

1)The evolution of the CAS through litigationin state courts increased the efficiency andeffectivenessoftheinstitution

In addition to consent, the CAS needed to beperceived as an impartial judicial body that wasindependent from the International OlympicCommittee (IOC) in order for the CAS to retainlegitimacyoverthelong-term.FromthefoundingoftheCAS,theIOChadamajorrole–itwastheIOCthatsawaneedforsuchacourtandthenspentthetime andmoney to create the institution. For thefirsttenyearsoftheCAS,theCourtretainedaheavyinfluencefromtheIOC,especiallysincethemajorityoftheCAS’sbudgetcamefromtheIOC103.TheIOCalsohadagreatdealofcontrolovertheappointmentofarbitratorsandoftherulesunderwhichtheCASoperated104.Thestrong linksbetweentheIOCandtheCASwouldbetroublesomeforthecourt’simageas a neutral, independent body capable of fairlyadjudicatinginternationalsportsdisputes.

The relationshipbetween the IOCandCASbeganto change as a result of a public law appeal of aCAS decision to the Swiss Federal Tribunal105 in acase involving Elmar Gundel, a horse rider whohad appealed his suspension by the InternationalEquestrianFederation(FEI)totheCAS(hereinafter“Gundel”)106.Gundel claimed that theCASwasnotsufficiently independent of the IOC and FEI, andas a result, the CAS ruling against him should beabandoned.InitsjudgmentinMarch1993,theSwisscourtupheldthejudgmentoftheCAS,recognizingits role as “a true arbitration court”107. However, thecourt, indicta,made itclear thatcertainaspectsoftheCAS’srelationshipwiththeIOCweretroubling,especiallythefundingandmembershiplinksbetweentheCASandIOC108.Inresponsetothisjudgment,the CAS underwent a restructuring process inlate 1993 that focused onmaking the Court moreindependentoftheIOC.Thesereforms,adoptedin1994,havesettheCASonamoreautonomouspath,solidifyingitslegitimacyasatruecourtofarbitration.

103.Reeb,supranote54,at33.104.Id.105.SwissCourtshad jurisdictionoverchallenges to theCAS in theGundelcasesincetheCAS’sheadquartersareinSwitzerland.106.Extractof the judgmentofMarch15,1993,deliveredby the1stCivil Division of the Swiss Federal Tribunal in the case G. versusFédérationEquestreInternationaleandCourtofArbitrationforSport(CAS)(publiclawappeal)(translation),CAS92/63G.v/FEIindigest oF cAs AWArds 1986-1998,at561(MatthieuReebed.1998)[hereinaftercited“Gundel”].107.Id.at543.108.Id.at570.


The1994reformsoftheCASrespondingtothedictain theGundeldecisionseemed toplace theCASonmore independent footing.However, the CASwassubsequently challenged in 2003 when the SwissFederal Tribunal once again examined whether ornot the CAS was a sufficiently independent bodyabletoresolvesportsdisputes–thistimespecificallyinthebackdropofthecourt’srelationshipwiththeIOC. The Swiss Tribunal’s decision on thismatterarising from the 2002 Winter Olympics affirmedthatthe1994CASreformsadequatelyaddressedtheindependence concerns, leavingnodoubt as to thecredibilityof the institution tohandle internationalsportsdisputes.

The 2003 case involved twoRussian cross-countryskiers,LarissaLazutinaandOlgaDanilova,whowerechallengingthedecisionheardonappealbytheCASthatupheldtheirbanfromthe2002OlympicWinterGames based on violations of doping (hereinafter“Lazutina/Danilova”)109IntheGundelcase,the“FederalSupremeCourthasacceptedthattheCASmaybeconsidereda truearbitral tribunal for cases inwhich the IOC isnotaparty,”110butinthis2003case,thecourtwouldhavetheopportunitytodecidewhethertheCAScouldbeconsidered a true arbitral tribunal even if the IOCwasapartytothisdispute–anissuetheGundelcourtaddressedonlyindicta.TheLazutina/Danilovacasedemonstrated that the 1994 reforms created trueindependencefromtheIOCandwouldhavealastingimpactonthefutureoftheCAS.

Not only did the Swiss court grant a stamp oflegitimacytothenewCASstructure,italsofurtheredthe contention that theCAS is a “true ‘supreme courtof world sport ’”111. The Swiss Tribunal held: “[I]t isclear that the CAS is sufficiently independent vis-à-vis theIOC, aswell as all other parties that call upon its services,for its decisions in cases involving the IOC to be consideredtrue awards, equivalent to the judgments of State courts”112.Goingonestepfurther,theSwissTribunaldiscussedthe adoption of the 2003CopenhagenDeclarationonAnti-Doping in Sport at theWorldConferenceonDopinginSport,inwhichmanyStates,includingChina,Russia,andtheUnitedStates,committedtoadopting“theWorldAnti-DopingCodeasthebasisfortheworldwidefightagainstdopinginsport”113.UndertheCode,theCASistheappellatebodyforalldoping-relateddisputes (suchas theFloydLandiscase).TheSwiss

109. Excerpt of the judgment of 27 May 2003, delivered by the1st CivilDivision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal in the caseA.&B.versusInternationalOlympicCommittee(IOC)andInternationalSkiFederation(FIS)(4P.267,268,269&270/2002/translation)indigest oF cAs AWArds iii2001-2003,at674,675(MatthieuReeb&EstelledeLaRochefoucauldeds.2004).110.Id.at679.111.Id.at688.112.Id.at689.113.Id.at688.

courtviewedthisdelegationofauthoritybyStatesasa“tangiblesignthatStatesandallpartiesconcernedbythefightagainstdopinghaveconfidenceintheCAS.ItishardtoimaginethattheywouldhavefeltabletoendorsethejudicialpowersoftheCASsoresoundinglyiftheyhadthoughtitwascontrolledby the IOC”114. This does not mean, however, thatCASawardswillberecognizedineveryinstance;butachallengetotheindependenceandimpartialityofthetribunalwilllikelyfail115.

AstheCAScontinuestodevelopandbecomesabodythatsportingfederationsturntomorefrequently,theimportanceoftheinstitutioninshapinginternationalsports law will grow. Already the Court hasmadeitsmark in developing a body of jurisprudence oninternationalsportsissues,andthelikelyexpansionofitsrolewilldependonthislegitimacyreceivedfromstates.ThesetwochallengestotheindependenceoftheCAShelpedthecourtsolidifyitselfasanefficientandeffectivetribunal.

2)FeaturesoftheCASthatdemonstrateefficiencyandeffectiveness

The CAS is perceived to be efficient and effectiveby states since it is identified as providing timelyjudgments, independentexperts familiarwith sportissues,andcost-effective litigation116.Manyofthesefeaturesarealsoattributedtocommercialarbitration;however the CAS goes beyond these attributesand performs an essential function as a body thatcentralizesdisputeresolutioninsport.

First, CAS arbitrations are quick and efficient.The most telling example of the CAS’s efficiencyis the AdHocDivision that is formed during theOlympicGamesandotherlargeinternationalsportscompetitions,suchastheWorldCup117.TheAdHocDivision addressed the need for quick turnaroundoncertaincompetition-relateditems(usuallywithin24hours)118.TheAdHocDivisionalsoremovedtheorganizerof thecompetition from the roleoffinalarbiteronmatters inwhichtheorganizer likelyhassome stake in the outcome. Additionally, the CAS“appealsarbitrationprocedureprovidesforafour-monthtimelimitfromthefilingoftherequestforarbitrationtoissueafinalaward”119.Suchself-imposedconstraintsonoperationprovide the CAS with a comparative advantage

114.Id.115.SeeStephenA.Kaufman,Note,IssuesinInternationalSportsArbitration.116. Hilary A. Findlay,Rules of a Sport-Specific Arbitration Process as anInstrumentofPolicyMaking,16mArq. sports l. reV.73,74(2005).117. The AdHocDivision grew out of a need to quickly adjudicatedisputes arising during a competition that could not wait until thecompetitionwasover.Fifty-sixcaseshavebeensubmittedbeforeAdHocDivisionsof theCAS. SeeCASStatisticsavailable athttp://www.tas-cas.org/statistics.118.Reeb,supranote54,at38.119.Id.at39.


andfurther thebelief that thebody isefficientandeffectiveinhandlingsportsdisputes.

Second, CAS arbitrators are specialists in sportsdisputes. This characteristic is common to mostarbitral bodies and is especially important in thecontext of sports, since the stakes for athletescompetinginsportareveryhigh120.

A final general reason for the preference ofarbitrationisthatthecostsofadjudicatingadisputeare usually lower than in domestic court. Litigantsdon’t have to be fearful of high court costs whenbringing their disputes to the CAS and they avoidthecostsofextensivediscoveryaswell.ThelowcostisevenfurtheramplifiedsincetheCASbearsmostofthecostsofthearbitrationwhilethelitigantsareresponsibleonlyforafewfees121.

WhiletheCASretainsmanyofthepositiveattributesof conventional arbitral tribunals, it also addsvalue in other areas since it is in a better positionthan domestic courts to handle issues unique tosports. In particular, the CAS centralizes judicialinterpretationofrulesandregulations,allowingforincreased predictability and fairness in outcomes.The lex sportiva that has emerged serves as a guideforfuturelitigants.Internationalsportscompetitionsareconductedallaroundtheworldwith205NationalOlympicCommitteescurrentlyapartoftheOlympicMovement122.Weresportsdisputestobeadjudicatedindomesticcourts,athletesandorganizationssuchastheIOCwouldbesubjecttoavarietyofconflictinglawsinmultiplejurisdictions,asituationthatwouldbedifficult forallparties.TheCAScentralizes thedisputeresolutionprocess,reducingtransactioncostsfor all parties. Additionally, any potential “homefieldadvantage”athletesmightgetlitigatingintheirhomecountrycouldbeoffsetbythetimeandcostoflitigationcoupledwiththechancethataninstitutionsuch as the IOC might not recognize a perceivedtaintedcourtdecision123.

Second, allowing individual InternationalFederations to have a purely internal hearingstructure is not appropriate for adjudicating sportsdisputes124. Allowing an International Federationor even the IOC to be the sole party bringing anaction against an athlete and also be the judge in

120.SeeJessicaK.Foschi,Note,AConstantBattle:TheEvolvingChallengesintheInternationalFightAgainstDopinginSport,16duke J. comp & int’l l.457,468(2006).121.Reeb,supranote54,at39.122.InternationalOlympicCommittee,NationalOlympicCommitteesavailableathttp://www.olympic.org/uk/organisation/noc/index_uk.asp.123.Yi,supranote53,at301,302.124.Id.304-09.

such a case is unfair to the athlete.TheCAS addsa layer of scrutiny to internal hearings, creating afairer,moretransparentprocess.Theaccountabilitymechanism the CAS provides was underscored intheGundeldecision.Inthatcase,theSwissTribunalindicatedaneedfortheIOCtobeindependentfromtheCASsothattheIOCwouldnotbeapartytoadisputethatitwouldhaveaninfluenceindeciding125.TheCASisessentialtoprovidingjudicialreviewtointernalIFhearings,especiallyforpotentialdopingviolationsthatcanseverelyimpactanathlete’scareer.Similarly,IFs,theIOC,andothersprefertheCAStobeviewedasaneutralarbiterpresidingovertheirsportorcompetition.ForIFsandtheIOC,beingperceivedascredibleinstitutionsintheeyesoftheirparticipantsiscrucialtotheirgrowthandsuccess.Theseactorsgetto ‘passtheball’ totheCAStomakedecisions,providing themselves “public relations insurance” bypotentiallydistancingthemselvesfromcriticismoverpotentiallycontroversialdecisions126.

Finally,theCASissetupinamannerthatprovidesaneasymechanismforitsdecisionstobeenforced.InadditiontotheenforcementthroughtheNewYorkConvention,manyofthedisputesadjudicatedbytheCAScanbeenforcedbyspeechalone.Forinstance,ifanathlete isdisqualifiedandrefusestogivebackpossession of a gold medal, the consequences ofthat holdout are negligible. The CAS ruling that aparticularathleteisorisnotthegoldmedalwinnerismoreimportantthanbeingthegoldmedalholder.Thevalueofthemedal inpossessionofthedisqualifiedathletebecomesmeaninglessiftherestoftheworlddoesnot recognize the achievement127.As a result,the CAS rulings can have immediate teeth whenimplemented by all the International Federationsand sporting competitions that have acceded tojurisdictionoftheCAS.

3)Perceivedeffectivenesspromotesdelegation:twoexamples

Thedecisionbyastatetodelegateauthorityentailsanassessmentofthecostsandbenefitsassociatedwiththataction.Attheheartofthiscalculusisthenotionthatastatedelegatesinordertofurtheritsinterestsand refuses to delegate when it is safeguardingsomething it believes it cannot place in the handsofothers.However, an institution that isperceivedtobeeffectiveismorelikelytogaintheacceptanceofholdoutcountriesorparticipants–evenwhentheissue is of high importance.While there aremanyissuesandcountriestoexplore,Ilookparticularlyat

125.Gundel,supranote106,at569.126.Yi,supranote53,at309-12.127.Id.at322-25.


theUnitedStatesandtheFédérationInternationalede Football Association (FIFA). Examining theseentities’ responses to the CAS will help furtherthe argument that the perceived efficiency andeffectivenessoftheCASaidedtheactofinternationaldelegation.

As one of the more vocal critics of internationaldelegation,theUnitedStateshasimplicitlyendorsedthe CAS without any major problems. One ofthe biggest critiques leveled against internationaldelegation is the perceived loss of sovereignty bylettingAmericancitizensbetriedinvenuessuchastheInternationalCriminalCourt.FortheUnitedStates,militarymattersareofparamountimportance.Withtherobustmilitarypresenceof theU.S.worldwide,it believes that its troops would be vulnerable toprosecutions at the ICC under false pretext. Inessence, this is an argument based, in part, on theperceivedineffectivenessoftheICCasaneutraltribunalthat would only try those who commit true warcrimes rather thanengage inpoliticalprosecutions.ThisisoneofthereasonstheU.S.hasnotgivenitssupporttothisperceivedineffectiveinstitution.

Conversely,theUnitedStates,throughtheauthoritygiven to a private, non-governmental entity (theUSOC),hasdeemed theCAS to satisfy thecriteriaof an effective institution that can adequatelyadjudicate matters concerning U.S. citizens. TheexplicitadoptionoftheCopenhagenDeclarationondopingcoupledwiththeratificationoftheUNESCOConventionsignifiestheacceptanceoftheCASasaneffectiveinstitutiononthegovernmentallevel.

Ontheonehand,theICCdealswithissuesofhighimportance to the state (military matters) but isperceived to have low effectiveness by the UnitedStates; while the CAS adjudicates issues of lowto medium importance to the state (sports) but isperceivedtobehighlyeffective.Iarguethatperceivedeffectivenessofaninstitutionisanimportantfacetofacountry’spositiononinternationaladjudication,asisevidencedbythepositionoftheUnitedStatesoneachinstitution;howevertheremaybeotherfactorsat issue, especially relating to sovereignty loss andissuesofnationalsecuritywiththeICC.Theextentto which perceived effectiveness of the institutiondeterminesacountry’spositionisunclearandshouldbeasubjectforfurtherstudy.

Similarly, one can look to soccer’s governingbody,FIFA,andseehowtheevolutionoftheCASledtothat organization ceding authority over disputes tothisinternationaltribunal.ThemainstakeholdersinFIFAarecountriesthathaveaverystrongattachmentto soccer, particularly in Europe. Onemight even

joke that decisions over soccer trump sovereignty,especiallygivenEuropeanacceptanceoftheICC, 128butinitialhesitanceofFIFAwithrespecttotheCAS.However, over time, as the CAS began to proveitself a credible institution,FIFAand the countriesinvolved,werewillingtoturnoversomecontrolovertheirbelovedsporttothisinternationaltribunal129.

IV.TheimpactandfutureoftheCourtofArbitrationforSport

The Court of Arbitration for Sport provides aninterestinglookatatypeofinternationaldelegationthat has been underemphasized in the traditionalliterature.Stateshavedemonstratedtheirwillingnessto adjudicate international sports disputes throughtheCAS;however,theimplicationsofthatdecisionare unclear. This Part will examine the impactthe CAS has had in the arena of internationaldelegation.ThefirsttwosectionsexaminetheeffectandimportanceofdelegationtotheCAS.ThelastsectionlooksatthefutureoftheCourt,specificallywithrespecttoU.S.involvement.

A) The effect of delegation to the CAS

Despite the initial inclination that delegation ofauthoritybystatesoverinternationalsportsdisputeswouldreducetheamountofcontrolastatehadoverthefateofitsowncitizens,theactofdelegationtotheCASisactuallyasovereigntyenhancingdevicethatadequatelysafeguardsanathlete’srightswithouttheextraburdenforthestatetogetinvolvedinallmattersrelatingtointernationalsportslaw.Asaresultofthisdelegation to the CAS, I contend that individualstatesretaintheappropriateamountofcontroloverpotentialdisputesthataffecttheircitizenswhilealsoallowingthestatetoexertitssovereigncontrolintheinternationalcommunity.

First,when states put in place themechanisms fordelegationtotheCAS,theactofdelegationcanbeseen as the type of sovereignty enhancing actionthat Hathaway discusses130. Under the New YorkConvention, state courts are the ex postmechanismby which individual states can ensure that arbitralawards are legitimate; but in addition to ensuringthecredibilityofanawardinaparticularcase,statecourts,bymaintaining the ability to reviewcertainaspectsofarbitralproceedings,actuallyenhanceanarbitrationbody’scredibility.Infact,havingthestatecourt provide an enforcement mechanism when a

128.SeeInternationalCriminalCourt,TheStatesPartiestotheRomeStatute available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/statesparties.html (showing108countriesthatareapartytotheRomeStatute).129.Foschi,supranote120,at463-64.130.Hathaway,supranote28,at148-49.


partyrefusestocomplywiththeresultsofanarbitralbody actually enhances the strength of the arbitralsystem, preventing bad actors from frustrating anarbitrationproceeding131.Stateslegitimatethearbitralprocess through their sovereign legal authorityon a macro level when they adopt the New YorkConvention; but they also subsequently allow thearbitral bodies to self-regulate132. Consequently,onecanview this actof internationaldelegationassovereigntyenhancing,withgreatbenefitstostates.Arbitralbodiesneedstaterecognitionincasecertainactorsdonotimplementtheresultsofaproceeding;thecoercivepowerof thestatehelpsadda levelofcredibilitythataddsvalueforallactorsintheprocess.

In legitimating the arbitral process, states areallowing arbitral tribunals to self-regulate andoperate autonomously, but I contend that they domaintainanappropriateamountofcontroloverthedecisionsofarbitralbodies,includingtheCAS.Theuseof theNewYorkConvention’s limitedgroundsforrefusingtoenforceanarbitralawardprovidesforadequate state judicial ex post involvement withoutoverburdening the state judicial system everytime there is a dispute. Additionally, the ability tochallenge aCASaward inSwiss courts, the seatofthearbitration,allowsforexpostreview.Infact,theCASisthemostappropriatejudicialorgantohandleinternational sportsdisputes, as isdemonstratedbythefactthatmoststateshaveindicatedtheirsupportfor the body when they adopted the World Anti-DopingCode.

B) The importance of lower visibility delegation

Delegation that is less visible provides statesmorelatitude in pursuing their international interests.Statesfeellessthreatenedwhenanactofdelegationdoesnotfaciallyimplicatetheirsovereignty;however,evenaseeminglybenignactofdelegationcanhaveprofound implications for international law. Theimportanceofsuchdelegationcannotbeemphasizedenough,as itprovidesameans for specialist issues,suchassport,toberesolvedquicklyandefficiently.I argue that the manner in which delegation isconductedmatters;ifastatedirectlytriedtoaccedetothejurisdictionofatribunalliketheCAS,itmightencountermoreoppositionbecauseoftheperceivedsacrifice of state sovereignty. By contrast, the lessvisible delegation allows for better and increasedcooperation,butstilladequatelysafeguardstherightsofastate’scitizens.

131.Reisman,supranote45,at107.132.TomCarbonneau,TheRemakingofArbitration:DesignandDestiny,inlex mercAtoriA And ArbitrAtion23,28(ThomasE.Carbonneaued.,rev.ed.1998).

TheNewYorkConvention is theultimateexampleof an instrument that has allowed for less visibledelegationtogrowovertime.Thecreationofasystemwhereby arbitral tribunals can emerge as neededand already retain delegated enforcement authorityfromstates throughthisConventionallowsarbitralbodiesthatwouldpotentiallytakeyearstoformandgarner affirmative consent from states to emergeinaquickandefficientfashion. Somemightclaimthis is circumventing the democratic process sincethegovernmentdoesnotgettoexaminethemeritsof each created body; instead I argue that it is theappropriateamountof scrutinyby thegovernment.Thesearbitral institutionsmustmeet theminimumexpost safeguardsof theConvention133;hence, statecourtsgettheopportunitytoensurethatthebodyisadjudicatingdisputesproperly.

Itmakes sense from an efficiencypoint of view toallowexpostversusexantescrutinyofthesedevelopingtribunals. Often, there is an initial resistance tochange in adjudication; allowing for only ex postreview gives an arbitral institution the opportunityto develop on its own and prove itself as opposedtobeingdeniedeventhechancetofunctionbecauseof an ex ante fear of change. If the skeptics tointernational adjudication were right and the bodyhad some serious flaw, those deficiencies wouldemergeintheexpostreview.TheCASwentthroughsuch changes, as it has undergone transformationsin response to court decisions that reviewed itsindependence.Allowingthearbitralbodytobelessvisible from the outset is the best approach. Suchlowvisibilityhelped statesunanimously approveoftheCASas thefinal appellate authority fordopingdisputeswhentheyadoptedtheWorldAnti-DopingCode. The low visibility of delegating to the CASaidedthisimpressiveactofdelegation.AstheCASbecomes an increasingly important and knowncommodityby thepublic, the fact that ithadmorethan twenty years todevelopbefore it gets throwninto the spotlight will ensure fairness for thelitigants and will instill confidence in the publicthat it canhandle international sports lawdisputes.Thevisibilityof theCAS in thefuturemaysubjectittomorescrutinygivenitsincreasingcaseloadanduse;however,sincetheCourthasalreadyproventobe willing to adapt and change, those questioningthe erosion of sovereignty will likely be quietedwithoutmucheffort.Othertribunalscouldalsousethis strategyof loweringvisibility inorder toavoidsomeofthetypicalcriticismslodgedatinternationaladjudication.

133.SeesupraPartII(A).


C) United states CAS involvement: will it increase?

DespitetheU.S.adherencetotheCASininternationalsportscompetitionsandclaimsarisingfromdoping,suchastheFloydLandiscase,theUnitedStateshaschosennottousetheCASastheappellateauthoritytoresolveothernationalsportingdisputesthatarisebetweentheUSOC,NGBs,andathletes.UndertheStevensAct,disputesarisingwith thosebodiescanbe taken to the American Arbitration Association(AAA)forfinalresolution134.Whileothercountrieshave designated the CAS to handle such domesticsports disputes and others have advocated for theU.S.tofollowsuit 135,therearelikelyreasonswhytheU.S.hasnotacceptedCASjurisdictiontodate.

First,theStevensActwaspassedin1978,roughly6years before theCAS came into existence in 1984.TheU.S. systemunder theAAAhasmaturedoverthe years and it does not seem that Congress hascometorecognizeaneedfor theuseofadifferentbody, especially since Congress could have alteredtheActwhenitmaderevisionstotheAct’samateurrequirementin1998.TheUnitedStatesissubjecttothejurisdictionoftheCAS,bothindopingcasesonappealandalldisputesthatcomeoutofinternationalcompetitions that have adopted the CAS appellatejurisdiction (virtually all of them); however, it isunclearwhether thismomentumwill lead theU.S.toabandonuseoftheAAAinfavoroftheCAS.Ifthe United States were to modify the Stevens ActtoplacetheCASasthefinalappellateauthorityfordomesticdisputes,thiswouldbeanevenbiggeractofinternationaldelegation,sincearbitrationauthoritywouldbeexplicitlytakenawayfromasolelyAmericanentity and placed in the hands of an internationalinstitution.

V.Conclusion

TheCASoffersashiningexampleoftheeffectandbenefitsof lessvisible internationaldelegation.TheCourthasgainedtheacceptanceoftheinternationalcommunity without much fanfare. The CAS mayreceive more attention because of its many recenthigh-profile cases, such as the Landis case, thecase involvingOscarPistorius(arunnerwhowearsprosthetic racing blades who is challenging hiseligibility for the Olympics)136, and the appeal byMarion Jones’ teammates challenging the decision134.TedStevensOlympicandAmateurSportsAct,36U.S.C.§220529(1998).135.SeeEdwardE.HollisIII,Note,TheUnitedStatesOlympicCommitteeand the Suspension of Athletes: Reforming Grievance Procedures Under theAmateurSportsActof1978,71ind. l. J. 183,200(1995).136. Oscar Pistorius Receives His Day In Court, Reuters, April 1, 2008,available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUS157079+01-Apr-2008+PRN20080401.

of the IOC stripping them of the medals won ona team with Jones, who is serving a prison termstemming from her use of performance-enhancingsubstances137.However,giventherecordoftheCASthus far and its dramatically increased caseload inthelastfewyears,itseemsthatthecourthaskeptitsdetractorsrelativelysilent.

Additionally, it seems that the proponents anddrivers of theCAS see the development of a bodyof precedent –a lex sportiva. If theCAS begins totake onmore of the attributes of a court by usingprecedentmorefrequently,onemightseeanincreaseindebateovertheinstitution.

By maintaining its low visibility and proving itsefficiencyandeffectiveness,theCAShasdevelopedintoaninstitutionthatprovidesfordeepdelegationwhilesafeguardingtherightsofindividual litigants.Countries have shown their willingness to supportthe CAS both directly and indirectly. Futuretribunals can learn from the successesof theCAS,inparticularfocusingoncreatinginstitutionsthatdonotdirectlyimplicatesovereigntyandareperceivedtobeefficientandeffective.Gainingexantecredibilitywhilemaintaining some level of ex post review is awinningformulaforstates;itgivesstatestheproperincentive to commit to delegation without a hugethreattostatesovereignty.

137.IOCvotestostripJones’teammatesofmedalsfrom2000Games,AssociatedPress, April 10, 2008, available at http://sports.espn.go.com/oly/trackandfield/news/story?id=3339267.


Le Nouveau Code de l’arbitrage en matière de sport MeMatthieuReeb,SecrétaireGénéralduTAS

Par décision du 29 septembre 2009, le ConseilInternational de l’Arbitrage en matière de Sport(CIAS) a adopté plusieurs modifications du Codede l’arbitrage en matière de sport (Code). Lesmodifications principales sont décrites ci-dessous,accompagnées de quelques commentaires. Il s’agitde la troisième révisionduCodedepuis son entréeen vigueur le 22 novembre 1994. LeCodemodifiéestentréenvigueurle1erjanvier2010.Toutefois,lesprocéduresencoursau1er janvier2010sontrestéessoumisesauRèglementenvigueuravant2010,saufsi les deux parties ont demandé l’application dunouveauCode.

Article S18Les arbitres et médiateurs du TAS ne peuventdésormais plus agir comme conseil d’une partiedevantleTAS.SiunarbitreduTASagitnéanmoinscommeconseildevant leTAS,saqualitédeconseilnepourrapasêtreremiseencausedansl’arbitrageenquestion.Enrevanche, leCIASpourraprendredesmesuresparticulièresà l’encontredecettepersonneencequiconcernesafonctiond’arbitre/médiateur.Ilestàreleverquecetterestrictionnes’appliquequ’auxmembresduTASpersonnellement.Unassociédelamême étude d’avocats qu’unmembre duTAS peutdoncthéoriquementreprésenterunepartiedevantleTAS sansmettre son collègue arbitreoumédiateurduTASendifficulté.

Article S20Sous certaines conditions, il sera possible pour leTAS de transférer une procédure d’arbitrage de laChambreordinaireàlaChambred’appeletviceversa.Jusqu’àfin2009,cetransfertn’étaitpaspossible.Cechangement doit permettre d’adapter la procédureapplicableenfonctiondel’évolutiond’unarbitrage.

Article R31Ledépôtetlacommunicationdepiècesjointesàdesmémoires déposés par les parties pourront se faireparcourrierélectronique.LeGreffeduTASpourraainsicommuniquercesmêmespiècesparlesmêmesmoyens. Cette nouvelle règle ne s’applique pas audépôtdesmémoires.

Article R32Une nouvelle disposition permet à la Formationarbitralede suspendreuneprocédured’arbitrageencours pour une durée limitée. Cette nouvelle règle

combleunelacune.

Article R34La compétence de trancher les demandes derécusationestattribuéeauBureauduCIASquipeutensuitelibrementrenvoyeruncasauCIAS(plenum).L’ancienrèglementprévoyaitlasituationinverse.Pourdes raisons d’efficacité, leCIAS a choisi d’attribuercettecompétenceenprioritéàsonBureau.

Article R37Danslecadred’uneprocédureenmatièredemesuresprovisoires,lePrésidentdeChambre,silaFormationarbitrale n’est pas encore constituée, peut mettrefin à une procédure d’arbitrage s’il constate que leTASn’estmanifestementpascompétentpour jugerl’affaireenquestion.

Articles R39 et R55Le défendeur/intimé peut demander que le délaipourledépôtdelaréponsesoitfixéaprèslepaiementpar le demandeur/appelant de l’avance de frais.Cettemesure vise à éviter que le défendeur/intiméengagedesfraispoursadéfenseavantdesavoirsiledemandeur/appelantapayésapartd’avancedefrais.

Articles R40.3 et R54La fonction de greffier ad hoc de la FormationarbitraleestofficialiséedansleCode.

Article R41.3Le délai pour permettre à un tiers de déposer unedemanded’interventionestprolongé:anciennement,ilcoïncidaitavecledélaipourledépôtdelaréponse;dorénavant une demande d’intervention peutêtre déposée dans un délai de dix jours suivant lemomentoùletiersintervenantapprendl’existencedel’arbitragemaisavantl’audienceouavantlaclôturedelaprocédureécritesiaucuneaudiencen’alieu.

Article R41.4La Formation arbitrale dispose d’une plus grandelibertépourdéterminer le statutdes éventuels tiersintéressésetpourdéfinirleursdroitsdanslaprocédured’arbitrage.Enoutre,uneFormationarbitralepourraautoriserledépôtdemémoiresamicuscuriae.

Articles R44.1 et R51Dans leurs écritures, les parties doivent indiquernonseulement lesnomsde leurséventuels témoinsetexpertsmaisenplusindiquerunbrefrésumédes


témoignagesprésumés,àdéfautdetémoignagesécritsdétailléset,pourlesexperts,mentionnerledomained’expertisepourchacund’entreeux.

Articles R46 et R59LeCIAS a décidé d’officialiser la pratique duTASvisantànepasreconnaîtrelesopinionsdissidentesetànepaslescommuniquer.

Article R51Une déclaration d’appel ne pourra être considéréecommeunmémoired’appelquesil’appelantenfaitlademandeparécrit.Enl’absenced’unetelledemande,et si aucun mémoire d’appel n’est déposé dans ledélai prescrit, leTASmet un terme à la procédured’arbitrage.

Article R52LeCIASofficialiseunepratiqueconstanteduTASen confirmant qu’il peut envoyer une copie de ladéclaration d’appel et du mémoire d’appel, pourinformation, à l’autorité qui a rendu la décisionattaquée. En outre, le Président de Chambre oule Président de la Formation, s’il est déjà nommé,dispose de pouvoirs plus étendus en matière dejonctiondecauses.

Article R55La possibilité de déposer des demandesreconventionnelles en procédure d’appel estsupprimée. Les personnes et entités qui souhaitentcontesterunedécisiondoiventdoncimpérativementlefaireavantl’expirationdudélaid’appelapplicable,quitte à retirer l’appel ultérieurement. Il n’est pluspossible d’attendre que la partie adverse dépose unappel pour décider ensuite de déposer un contre-appel.

Article R56Avec l’accord des parties ou décision spécifique duPrésident de la Formation, les parties peuvent nonseulementproduire de nouvelles pièces et formulerdenouvellesoffresdepreuveaprèslasoumissiondelamotivationd’appeletde laréponsemaispeuventencore modifier leurs conclusions. En outre, unenouvelle disposition a été insérée pour permettre àuneFormationarbitraledetenteruneconciliationenprocédured’appel.

Article R59Enprocédured’appel,ledélaipourlacommunicationdelasentencefinaleparleTASétaitprécédemmentfixéàquatremoisàcompterdudépôtdeladéclarationd’appel.EnraisondesdélaiscauséspardesquestionspréliminairesliéesàlaconstitutiondelaFormation,auchoixdelalangueetaussiaupaiementdesavancesdefrais, leCIASadécidédefixerundélaipouvant

êtremieuxmaîtriséparlesFormationsarbitrales.Lenouveaudélai pour rendre les sentences enmatièred’appelestdésormaisfixéàtroismoisàcompterdelatransmissiondudossierdelaprocédureauxarbitresconcernés.

Article R65.1Après un examen attentif de la question des fraisd’arbitrageetaprèsconsultationavec lesentitésquicontribuentaufinancementduTAS,leCIASadécidédemaintenirleprincipedelagratuitédesprocéduresd’appel pour les affaires à caractère disciplinaire.Toutefois,lagratuiténes’appliqueplusquepourlesappels dirigés contre des décisions rendues par desfédérationsouorganisationssportivesinternationalesou par des fédérations ou organisations sportivesnationales agissant par délégationdepouvoir d’unefédération ou organisation sportive internationale.Alorsqu’autrefoisilsuffisaitqu’unepartienesoitpasdomiciliéedanslemêmepaysquelesautresouquel’athlèteconcernésoitde“niveauinternational”pourquelagratuités’applique,leCIASachoisideretenirun critère objectif plus précis, correspondant à sonrôledetribunalinternationaldedernièreinstanceettenantdavantagecomptedespossibilitésfinancièresduTAS.Lesdécisionsrenduespardesfédérationsouorganisations sportives nationales peuvent toujoursêtre soumises en appel au TAS mais les partiesdoiventcontribuerauxfraisdelaprocédure.LeCIASveillera cependant à ce que l’obstacle financier nesoitpas insurmontablepour lesathlètesetadopteraprochainement de nouvelles directives concernantl’octroidel’assistancejudiciaire.

Article R68Nouvelle disposition prévoyant une exclusion deresponsabilitépourlesarbitresetmédiateursduTAS,lesmembresduCIASainsiquelesemployésduTAS.

Enfin,unnouveaubarèmedesfraisaétéadoptéparleCIASprenantdavantageenconsidérationlavaleurlitigieuse.


The new Code of Sports-related Arbitration MrMatthieuReeb,CASSecretaryGeneral

Bydecisionof29September2009,theInternationalCouncil of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS) adoptedseveral amendments to the Code of Sports-relatedArbitration (Code). The main amendments aredescribed here below, accompanied by a fewcomments. It is the third time that the Code isamendedsinceits implementationon22November1994. The amended Code entered into force on 1January2010.However, theprocedureswhichwerepending on 1 January 2010 remained submitted tothe rules in force before 2010, unless both partiesrequestedtheapplicationofthenewCode.

Article S18CAS arbitrators andmediators can no longer havethepossibilityofactingasCounselforapartybeforethe CAS. If a CAS arbitrator nevertheless acts asCounselbeforetheCAS,his/herfunctionasCounselwillnotbecalledintoquestioninthearbitrationatstake.However,theICASwillhavethepowertotakeparticularmeasurestowardshim/herwithrespecttohis/her function as arbitrator/mediator. It shall beemphasized that this restriction appliesonly to theCASmemberspersonally.Apartnerofthesamelawfirm as aCASmembermay therefore theoreticallyrepresentapartybeforetheCASwithoutcreatinganydifficultytohis/hercolleaguearbitrator/mediatoroftheCAS.

Article S20Undercertainconditions, itwillbepossiblefor theCAS to transfer an arbitration procedure from theOrdinary Division to the Appeals Division andvice-versa.Uptotheendof2009,suchtransferwasnotpossible.Thischangeshouldallowtoadapttheapplicableproceduredependingontheevolutionofanarbitration.

Article R31Thefilingandthecommunicationofexhibitsattachedtowrittensubmissionsfiledbypartiesmaybemadebyelectronicmail.TheCASCourtOfficecanthentransferthesameexhibitsbythesamemeans.Thisnewruledoesnotapplytothefilingofsubmissions.Article R32A new provision allows the Arbitral Panel, or theDivision President, to stay an ongoing arbitrationprocedureforalimitedperiodoftime.Thisnewrulefillsagap.

Article R34The power to settle petitions for challenge to anarbitrator is given to the ICAS Board, which maydecide at its discretion to refer a case to the ICAS(plenum). The old regulations provided for thereverse order. For reasons of efficiency, the ICAShaschosen toassign thiscompetence inpriority toitsBoard.

Article R37Inrelationtoanapplicationforprovisionalmeasures,the Division President, if the Panel has not beenconstituted yet, may terminate the arbitrationprocedureifherulesthattheCAShasmanifestlynojurisdictiontodecidethecaseatstake.

Articles R39 and R55TheRespondentmayrequestthatthetimelimitforthefilingof the answerbefixed after thepaymentby theClaimant/Appellantof theadvanceofcosts.ThismeasureaimsatavoidingthattheRespondentinvestsmoneyforhis/herdefensebeforeknowingiftheClaimant/Appellanthaspaidhis/hershareoftheadvanceofcosts.

Articles R 40.3 and R54ThefunctionoftheadhocclerktothearbitralPanelisnowofficialintheCode.

Article R41.3Thetimelimitforathirdpartytofilearequestforintervention is amended: beforehand, it was thesame as the deadline for the filing of the answer;now a request for interventionmaybefiledwithin10 days after the arbitration has become known tothe intervenorbutbefore thehearingorbefore theclosingoftheevidentiaryproceedings,ifnohearingisheld.

Article R41.4TheArbitral Panel hasmore latitude to determinethestatusofpotentialthirdpartiesandtodeterminetheirrightsinthearbitrationprocedure.Furthermore,aPanelmayallowthefilingofamicuscuriaebriefs.

Articles R44.1 and R51 Inthewrittensubmissions,thepartiesshall listnotonly the names of potential witnesses and expertsbut also indicate a short summary of the expectedtestimony, intheabsenceofwitnessstatements; forexperts,theirareaofexpertiseshallbestated.


Articles R46 and R59TheICAShasdecidedtoconfirmtheCASpracticethatdissentingopinionsarenotrecognizedandarenotnotified.

Article R51Astatementofappealcanbeconsideredasanappealbriefonly if theAppellantrequests it inwriting.Inthe absenceof such request, and if no appeal briefis filedwithin the appropriate time limit, theCASterminatesthearbitrationprocedure.

Article R52TheICASconfirmedtheCASpracticeanddecidedthattheCASCourtOfficeshallsendacopyofthestatementofappealandappealbrief,forinformation,to the authority which has issued the challengeddecision.Furthermore,theDivisionPresidentorthePresident of thePanel, if already appointed, enjoysa largerpowerwith respect to the consolidationofcases.

Article R55Itwillnolongerbepossibletofilecounterclaimsinappeal procedures. The persons and entitieswhichwant tochallengeadecisionmustdosobefore theexpiryoftheapplicabletimelimitforappeal,evenifitmeanswithdrawingtheappeallater.Itisnolongerpossible to wait that the opposing party files anappealtodecidethentofileacounter-appeal.

Article R56With the agreement of the parties or by a specificdecision of the President of the Panel, the partieshave the possibility not only to supplement theirarguments and produce new exhibits after thesubmissionsoftheappealbriefandoftheanswerbutalsotoamendtheirrequestsforrelief.Furthermore,anewprovisionhasbeenincludedinordertoallowPanelstoattemptconciliationinappealprocedures.

Article R59 In appeal procedures, the time limit for thecommunicationof thefinal awardby theCASwaspreviously fixed at four months from the filing ofthe statement of appeal. Due to the delays causedbypreliminary issuesconnected to theconstitutionof the Panel, the choice of the language and alsothepaymentof theadvanceofcosts, theICAShasdecidedtofixatimelimitwhichwillbemoreunderthecontroloftheArbitralPanel.Thenewtimelimittorenderawardsinappealsisnowthreemonthsfromthecommunicationofthecasefiletothearbitratorsconcerned.

Article R65.1After careful examination of the question of

arbitration costs and after consultation with theentitiescontributingtothefundingoftheCAS,theICASdecidedtomaintainthe“freeofchargerule”for appeal procedures related to disciplinary cases.However, this “free of charge rule” applies nowonly to appeals directed against decisions renderedby an International Federation or Sports body orby aNational Federation or Sports body acting bydelegationofpowerofanInternationalFederationorSportsbody.Whileitwaspreviouslysufficientforapartynottobedomiciledinthesamecountryastheothersorforanathletetobeof“internationallevel”inorderforthe“freeofchargerule”toapply,theICASdecided to retainamoreaccurateobjectivecriteria,which fits in with the CAS status of last instanceinternational tribunal and which takes more intoaccount thefinancialmeansof theCAS.Decisionsrendered byNational Federations or Sports bodiesmaystillbesubmittedtotheCASAppealsprocedurebut the parties have to contribute to the costs ofsuchprocedure.TheICASwillhowevermakesurethatthefinancialconstraintswillnotbetooonerousfor athletes and will shortly adopt new guidelinesregardinglegalaid.

Article R68This is a new rule providing for an exclusion ofliability for CAS arbitrators and mediators, ICASmembersandCASemployees.

Finally,anewscheduleofcostshasbeenalsoadoptedbytheICAS,whichtakesmorethevalueindisputeintoaccount.


Article17oftheFIFARegulationsontheStatusandTransfer ofPlayers (RSTP) is the central provisionof Chapter IV of the Regulations dealing withthe maintenance of contractual stability betweenprofessionals and clubs. Following the well-knownBosmandecisionoftheEuropeanCourtofJustice1,theFIFAintroducedtheconceptofcontractualstabilityamongthemainprinciplesthatwouldfromthenonregulatetheinternationaltransfers.Accordingly,thenewregulationssoughttoensurethat,intheeventaclubandaplayerchosetoenterintoacontract,thislatterwouldbehonouredbybothparties,thereforeimplementingtheprinciplepactasuntservanda.

Asaconsequence, acontractbetweenaclubandaplayer, if not expiring, may only be terminated bymutualagreement(Art.13RSTP),byeitherpartyifa just cause exists (Art. 14RSTP) or by the playerif he can invoke a specifically designed sportingjustcause (Art.15RSTP).Anybreachorunilateraltermination of contract without just cause, whilenot forbidden2, will lead to financial sanctions inanycase(Art.17paras.1and2RSTP)aswellastodisciplinarymeasuresinsome(Art.17paras.3to5

1. Case C-415/93,Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football AssociationASLBv.Jean-MarcBosman,[1995]ECRI-4921.2.Unilateral termination ishowevernotpermittedduring thecourseofaseason(Art.16RSTP),saveforjustcause(butnotforsportingjustcause!).

RSTP). In other words, Article 17 RSTP does notprovidea legalbasis for aparty to freelybreachorunilaterally terminate an existing contract withoutjustcauseatnopriceoratagivenfixprice.Rather,the provision clarifies that a compensation will bedueatall timesandthatdisciplinarysanctionsmayalsobepronouncedifsomeconditionsaremet.

Although Article 17 also sets up sanctions for theclubsorforanypersonsubjecttotheFIFAregulations“whoactsinamannerdesignedtoinduceabreachofcontractbetweenaprofessional[player]andaclub”,thepurposeofthispresentation is to give a shortoverviewof theCAScaselawonlyregardingthesanctionsthatmaybeimposedontheplayerinadditiontotheobligationtopaycompensationwhentheplayerisinbreachofhisemploymentcontract.

I.Thelegalnatureofthesanction

Article17para.3RSTPimproperlystatesthat“sportingsanctions”shallbeimposedonanyplayerfoundtobein breach of contract. The true legal nature of thesanctionishowevernotsporting,butdisciplinary.

Indeed,adistinctionisusuallymadebetweenthetwocategoriesofmeasures:ontheonehand,theobjectiveofasportingsanctionistoensureequalopportunity

I. The legal nature of the sanction..........................................................................................................................................34II. The disciplinary sanctions imposed on the players.......................................................................................................35A)Thedutytoimposeanineligibilitysanctionduringtheprotectedperiod....................................................................35B)Theaggravatingcircumstances............................................................................................................................................36C)Thepossibilitytoimposeanineligibilitysanctionaftertheprotectedperiod.............................................................37D)Thenotionof “officialmatches”.......................................................................................................................................37E)Thestartingdateof thesanction........................................................................................................................................37F)Theaddresseeof theappealagainstthesanction.............................................................................................................38

III. Can other measures be taken against the player?.........................................................................................................38IV. Standing of the clubs regarding the sanction imposed on the player.....................................................................39 A)Standingof thenewclubtoappealagainstasanctionimposedontheplayer...........................................................39 B)Standingof theformerclubtorequirethatasanctionbeimposedontheplayer.....................................................40

The sanctions imposed on the players for breach or unilateral termination of contract ThejurisprudenceoftheCASregardingArticle17para.3oftheFIFAregulationsonthestatusandtransferofplayersDrJean-PhillipeDubey,CounseltotheCAS


between the competitors by penalising the breachofanyruleaimingatavoidingforanathletetogainundueadvantageovertheothers.Sincethegoalistorestorethefairnessofthecompetition,thesanctionisautomaticanddoesnotdependon thedegreeoftheplayer’sfault(strictliability)3.Ontheotherhand,theobjectiveofadisciplinarysanctionismorelikelytobepunitiveand/orpreventive,asthesanctionisaformofpenaltyfortheviolationofarule4.

Whensportingassociationssetuprulesthatprohibitparticipation to a competition as a penalty for theprevious wrongful behaviour of an athlete, theyin fact establish disciplinary sanctions rather thansportingsanctions5.Therefore,whenFIFAsetsuparulethatimposesafour-monthrestrictiononplayinginofficialmatches(prohibitionofparticipationtoacompetition)toanyplayerfoundtobeinbreachofcontract (wrongful behaviour of the player), it setsupadisciplinarysanction.ThisisacknowledgednotonlybytheCAS6,butalsobyFIFAitself7.

II.Thedisciplinarysanctionsimposedontheplayers

ThedisciplinarysanctionsimposedontheplayersareprovidedforinArticle17para.3RSTP.Thisprovisionmakes a clear distinction between a breach or aunilateral termination of contract occurring duringthe so-called “protected period”8 and one occurringafterthisperiod.Inthefirstcase,asanctionwillbeimposedconsistinginarestrictionoffourmonthsonplayinginofficialmatchesor,ifthereareaggravatingcircumstances,ofsixmonths.Inthesecondcase,nosanctionwillbeimposedexceptiftheplayerfailstogiveduenoticeofterminationwithin15daysofthelastmatchoftheseason.

A. The duty to impose an ineligibility sanction

during the protected period

According to Article 17 para. 3 RSTP, “sportingsanctionsshall(…)beimposed”ontheplayersfoundto

3.TAS2007/O/1381,paras.59-63.4.Idem,para.67.5.Idem,paras.77-79.6.ForinstanceinCAS2004/A/780,orderonprovisionalmeasuresof 6January2005,para.5.9:referenceismadetothe“disciplinaryDecision[that]wasimposedpursuanttoart.23(a)of RSTP”(thelatterbeingtheformerver-sionof Art.17para.3RSTP).7.Inthesameorder,FIFAarguedthat“thedisciplinarymeasuresprovidedforbythe(…)Regulationsserveasadeterrentagainstunjustifiedbreachof contractandthatsuspendingtheeffectof suchasanctionwouldrepresentaninappropriateexampletowardsall the footballplayers”;cf.CAS2004/A/780,orderonprovisionalmeasuresof 6January2005,para.5.6i.f.8.AccordingtotheDefinitionscontainedintheRegulations,the“protect-edperiod”is“aperiodof threeentireseasonsorthreeyears,whichevercomesfirst,followingtheentryintoforceof acontract,wheresuchcontractisconcludedpriortothe28thbirthdayof theprofessional,ortwoentireseasonsortwoyears,whichevercomesfirst,followingtheentryintoforceof acontract,wheresuchcontractisconcludedafterthe28thbirthdayof theprofessional”(no7).Theprotectedperiodstartsagainincasethedurationof theinitialcontractisextended(Art.17para.3i.f.).

be in breachof contract.A literal interpretationoftheprovisionshouldleadtotheconclusionthatthecompetent bodyhas therefore a duty to impose anineligibility sanction on the player when the latterbreaches the contract during the protected period.This is the conclusion to which the panels havecometoinmanycasesbroughtbeforetheCAS.Forinstance,inacaseinvolvingaSenegaleseplayerwhohadsignedacontractwithaFrenchclubwhilestillunder contract with a Norwegian club9, the PanelcametotheconclusionthatitfollowedfromaliteralinterpretationofArticle17para.3RSTP“thatitisadutyof the competentbody to imposesportingsanctionsonaplayerwhohasbreachedhiscontractduringtheprotectedperiod:«shall» isobviouslydifferent from«may»;consequently, if theintentionoftheFIFARegulationswastogivethecompetentbody the power to impose a sporting sanction, itwould haveemployed theword«may»andnot«shall»”10.Inthesameway, inacaseofaLibyanplayerwhohadbreachedhis employmentcontractwithaSaudi clubwithoutjust cause, thePanel concluded that“[w]hether or nottheDRCwasobliged to imposeasanctionon thePlayer forbreachof contract, it is thePanel’s view thatonce thebreachwasconfirmedbytheDRCtheonlyremedyavailablewastheimpositionofasanction”11.

However, although the FIFA Dispute ResolutionChamber (DRC) usually applies the four monthssanctionruleontheplayer,therearecasesinwhichit considered that the principle of proportionalityrequiredthatthelengthofthesanctioncorrespondedto the seriousness of the conduct leading to thesanction. In this respect, the DRC referred to thepossibility of taking into consideration exceptionalcircumstances on the basis of which the sanctioncould be extended or, to the contrary, shortenedor even lifted12. Therefore, some panels have beenreluctant to automatically apply the four monthssuspensionruleandhaveconsideredmoreadequatetorelyontherealintentionoftherulemaker:“(…)rulesandregulationshavetobeinterpretedinaccordancewiththeirrealmeaning.Thisistruealsoinrelationwiththestatutesandtheregulationsofanassociation.Ofcourse,ifthewordingofaprovisionisclear,oneneedsclearandstrongargumentstodeviatefromit.(…)Itisstable,consistentpracticeofFIFA,

9.CAS2008/A/1429&1442.Addressing afirst issue, thePanelhadcometotheconclusionthattheplayerhadconcludedavalidemploymentcontractwithIKStart(whichtheplayercontested)andthat,asaresult,thefactthatthesameplayerhadsubsequentlyconcludedanemploymentcontractwithASSt-EtiennethereforeimpliedthattheexistingcontractwithIKStarthadbeenunilaterallybrokenwithoutavalidreasonduringtheprotectedperiod(para.6.14).10.CAS2008/A/1429&1442,para.6.23.SeealsoCAS2008/A/1568,para.6.57.11.CAS2008/A/1674,para.8.2.12. de WegerF.,The Jurisprudenceof theFIFADisputeResolutionChamber, The Hague 2008, p. 113 ff. The FIFA Commentary ofthe RSTP provides that a player breaching his contract during theprotectedperiod“risks”arestrictiononhiseligibilitytoplay;cf.FIFACommentaryontheRegulationsfortheStatusandTransferofPlayers,No2para.2adArt.17.


and of theDRC in particular, to decide on a case by casebasiswhether to sanction a player or not.Even though it isfairtosaythatthecircumstancesbehindthedecisionsfiledbyFIFA to demonstrate such practice differ from case to case,there is a well accepted and consistent practice of theDRCnottoapplyautomaticallyasanctionasperArt.17para.3.SuchinterpretationoftherationaleofArt.17para.3maybeconsidered contrary to the literal interpretation, but appearstobe consolidatedpracticeandrepresents therealmeaningoftheprovisionasitisinterpreted,executedandfollowedwithinFIFA”13.

Inthemostrecentawardsrelatedtothesubject,theCASpanelshavecometoasolutionthatreconcilesboth trends, as is summarised in the case CAS2008/A/1568: “FIFA and CAS jurisprudence on thisparticular article 17 para. 3 may be considered not fullyconsistent,mainly since the decisions are often rendered on acase by case basis.The consistent line however is that if thewording of a provision is clear, one needs clear and strongargumentstodeviatefromit,thatistojustifynotimposingthesanctionsaslaiddowninarticle17para.3”14.Theprincipleis therefore that the fourmonths sanctionmustbeimposed except when exceptional circumstancescommand to apply the principle of proportionalityin order to adapt the lengthof the sanction to theseriousness of the infringement. This is also inline with the 2001 version of the RSTP, of whichArticle23clearlyspecifiedthatsuchsanctionwastobeapplied“otherthaninexceptionalcircumstances”15.

B. The aggravating circumstances

Article 17 para. 3 RSTP provides that in case ofaggravating circumstances, the restriction on theeligibilityoftheplayerwillbeofsixmonths.However,no definition of these “aggravating circumstances”is given in the Regulations or in the Commentaryof the Regulations. It will therefore be up to thejurisprudence of both the DRC and the CAS tooutlinethenotioninsofarasthenumberofcaseswillallowit,as,toourknowledge,onlyoneCASaward

13.CAS2007/A/1358,paras.120-121.14.SeeCAS2008/A/1568,paras.6.58-6.59;seealsoCAS2007/A/1429B.v.FIFAandIKStart&CAS2007/A/1442,para.6.24.15. Circular No 769 of 24 August 2001 that informed the NationalAssociations of the amendments to the regulations regardinginternationaltransfersprovidedthattheDRChadtotakeintoaccount“all relevant circumstances, be they factual or legal, in fixing the duration of thesanction,inaccordancewithgeneralprinciplesoflaw”(p.11).IntheMexèscase,thePanelupheldthefindingsoftheDRCwithregardtotheexceptionalcircumstances that justified imposinga sanctionofonly sixweeksofineligibilitytoplaytotheplayer.TheDRChadfoundthattheverylongcontractualrelationshipbetweentheplayerandAJAuxerre(7years)aswellasthepersistentlackofcollaborationoftheclubtowardstheplayerwere mitigating circumstances (TAS 2004/A/708 Mexès c. FIFA &TAS2004/A/709ASRomac.FIFA&TAS2004/A/713AJAuxerrec.ASRomaetMexès,sentencedu11mars2005,para.81).Inanothercasehowever,thePanelfoundthatthefactthataplayerwasnotqualifiedtoplayforhisnewclubduring twomonthsdue to theoppositionofanother club was not an exceptional circumstance that justified toreduce the fourmonths suspensionof theplayer (TAS2006/A/1082RealValladolidc.B.&ClubCerroPorteño&TAS2006/A/1104B.c.RealValladolid,sentencedu19janvier2007,para.101).

hasdealtwithitforthetimebeing.

Inthisparticularcase,anEgyptianplayerhadsignedin January 2005 an employment contract with theGreekclubofPAOKwhilestillundercontractwiththe Egyptian club Zamalek16. TheDRC found theplayer to be in breach of the contract without justcause and declared him ineligible to play for fourmonths.Afterhis suspension, theplayerplayed forPAOKforoneyearand then lefton14April2006fora10-dayholidayinhiscountryoforigin,wherehewascalled to serve themilitary service andwastherefore obliged to stay for the next three years.WhileinEgypt,theplayersignedanewemploymentcontract with Zamalek in November 2006. Again,the DRC found that the player had breached hiscontractual obligations with PAOK without justcauseandimposedarestrictionofsixmonthsonhiseligibilitytoplayinofficialmatches,whichtheplayercontestedbeforetheCAS17.

As regards the “impossibility of performance”, thePanelexplainedthatitcouldqualifyasareasontovoida contract or to terminate it without consequencesforanyofthecontractingpartiesiftwocriteriaweremet:a)theimpossibilitywasunforeseen,andb)thedebtorwasnotresponsiblefortheimpossibility.ThePanelfoundthatneitherofthetwocriteriawasmetin thecaseathand since theplayer couldnothavebeenunawarewhenhehadsignedthecontractwithPAOK that the military service was mandatory inhiscountryand thatbyvisiting it inApril2006hehadactedatleastnegligently,inthathehadacceptedtheriskofbeingretainedfornothavingservedhismilitary obligations18. The player was therefore tobe considered liable for the breach of the contractwithall thefinancialanddisciplinaryconsequencesattachedtothisbreach.

Asregardsthedisciplinarysanctions,thePanelnotedthat theplayerhadbreachedemployment contractstwicewithina timeperiodof18months, thereforeshowing “remarkable disrespect towards one of the mainprinciples of professional football: contractual stability”.Contrarytotheplayer’ssubmissionthatthenotionof“aggravatingcircumstances”hadtobedifferentiatedfrom a repeated offence, the Panel found that arepeatedoffencewastoberegardedasanaggravatingcircumstancelikelytoentailthemoreseveresanctionofsixmonths19.

16.CAS2008/A/1448.ThecontractwithZamalekindicatedaperiodofvalidityuntilthe2005-2006season.17. The player submitted that he had a just cause to terminate theemployment contract on the basis of “impossibility of performance”duetoforcemajeure,sincehehadbeenarresteduponhisarrivalinEgyptandobligedtojointhearmyforcesforaperiodofthreeyearswithoutbeingabletotravelabroad.18.CAS2008/A/1448,para7.3.19.CAS2008/A/1448,para.7.4.7.


C. The possibility to impose an ineligibility sanction after the protected period

AccordingtoArticle17para.3infineRSTP,ifaplayerbreacheshisemploymentcontractwithoutjustcauseafter the protected period, no ineligibility sanctionwillbeimposedexceptiftheplayerfailstogiveduenoticeofterminationwithin15daysofthelastmatchoftheseason.

Even in this latter case, such sanction is notmandatory:theRegulationsprovidethat“[d]isciplinarymeasuresmay(…)beimposed”.Inanycase,thesanctionwillneedtobeindirectrelationtothemomentwhenthe termination of the employment contract wasnotified. The four-month restriction on eligibilityis not applicable in such situations, as it would beexcessive20.

D. The notion of “official matches”

The ineligibility sanction applies to the “officialmatches” of the player. The Regulations definethe “official matches” as the “matches played withinthe framework of organised football, such as national leaguechampionships,nationalcupsandinternationalchampionshipsfor clubs,butnot including friendlyand trialmatches”21. IntheabovementionedS.&ZamalekSCcase,theplayerhadsubmittedthatamatchofhisnationalteamdidnotfallunderthedefinitionof“officialmatches”intheRegulations.

Recallingtheaforementioneddefinitionaswellasthedefinitionof“organisedfootball”22,thePanelfoundthatthelistoftheofficialmatcheswasratherindicativeandnotlimitedsinceitstartedwiththewords“suchas”.Furthermore,neitherofthetwodefinitionsdidexclude matches between representative teams ofassociations, organised under the auspices ofFIFA(e.g.theFIFAWorldCup)oraconfederation(e.g.theAfricaCupofNations)23.Whendeclaredineligibleforplayinginofficialmatches,aplayerwasthereforealsopreventedtotakepartinagamewithhisnationalorrepresentativeteam.

E. The starting date of the sanction

According toArticle17para.3RSTP, thesanctionshall takeeffect“fromthe startof the following seasonatthe new club”.TheCommentaryof theRSTPpointsout that the aim of the provision is to ensure that

20.FIFACommentaryontheRegulationsfortheStatusandTransferofPlayers,No2para.5adArt.17,note86.21.Definitionno5RSTP.22.AccordingtoDefinitionno6RSTP,“organisedfootball” isthe“as-sociation football organisedunder theauspices of FIFA, the confederationsand theassociations,orauthorisedbythem”.23.CAS2008/A/1448,para.7.4.10.

thesanction iseffective for theplayerand thenewclub,sinceasanctionthatwouldbeimposedduringthe period between two seasons would have nodeterrenteffect.However, if theplayer isprima facieresponsible for the breach of contract without justcausewhenithappens,registrationforthenewclubwillonlybegrantedafterthedecisiononthemeritsofthematter.Duringtheperiodbetweenthebreachandthedecisiononthemerits,theplayerwillremainregisteredwithhisformerclubandthesanctionwillonlytakeeffectasfromtheregistrationwiththenewclub24.

Itexiststhereforeariskthatthesanctionwillinfactlast longer than fourmonths since it seems hardlyconceivablethataplayerwhobreachedhiscontractorunilaterallyterminateditwillkeepplayingwithhisformerclubuntiladecisiononthesubstanceofthecasewillbe takenby theDRC.Forexample, if thedecisionistakenattheendofOctober,aplayerwhoterminatedhiscontractwithoutjustcauseinJune,atthe endof theprevious season,will notbe able toplaywithhisnewclubfromthebeginningofthenewseason,say,beginningofSeptember,untiltheendofOctober,andthenwillbesuspendedforfourmonthsifheisfoundresponsibleforthebreach.Moreover,ifanappealisfiledwiththeCASagainstthedecisionoftheDRC,thefactualsuspensioncouldevenbelongersincethefinaldecisiononthemeritswouldonlybetakenattheendoftheproceedingsbeforetheCAS.

Theriskishowevermoretheoreticalthanrealsince,following respective jurisprudence of the CASaccording to which a player cannot be compelledto remainwith or return to his former club25, it isnowadays commonpractice for theSingle JudgeoftheFIFAPlayers’StatusCommitteetoprovisionallygrant registration for thenewclubafter thebreachor theunilateral terminationhasoccurred,withoutwaiting for and pending the decision on thesubstanceofthecase.Besides, if itdoesnotappearprima facie that theplayerhasno reasonable chanceofsuccess,thestayoftheexecutionofthedecisionappealed againstwill usually be granted before theCAS,basedontheassertionsthat1)theplayerwouldsufferirreparableharmifhewasdeemedineligibletoplayforacertainperiodoftimebutthataPanelwereeventuallytofindthatthesuspensionshouldbesetaside,and2)asregardsthebalancebetween,ononeside,theinterestoftheplayernottosufferirreparableharm and, on the other side, the interest of FIFAtomaintain contractual stability, the interestof theplayerwillprevailsincethestayoftheexecutionofthedecisionwillonlyhavetheeffectofpostponing

24.FIFACommentaryontheRegulationsfortheStatusandTransferofPlayers,No2para.2adArt.17,note82.25.Seeinfra.


thepotentialsanction,butnottocancelit,thereforenot undermining its deterrent effect26. As for theperiod of suspension possibly served between thenotification of theDRC decision and the grantingof the stay of the decision by the CAS, it will bediscountedfromthefourmonthssuspension,incasethelatterisconfirmed27.

In more recent cases, the panels have opted for aliteralinterpretationoftheprovisioninordertotackletheproblemoftheusualdelaybetweenthedecisionof theDRCandthenotificationofsaiddecisiontotheplayer28.Theyfoundthattheliteralinterpretationofthewords“followingseason” referredtotheseasonaftertheeventthathadgivenrisetotheterminationofthecontractandthat,therefore,thesanctionhadtostartfromthecommencementofthenextseasonwherevertheplayermightfindhimself29.Inanothercase30,theSoleArbitratordecidedthatthesanctionhadtotakeeffect“asfromthefirstdayoftheregistrationof the playerwith a new club”31, therefore leavingopenthequestionas towhether itmeant theactualnewclub(thisbeingthelogicalconclusionensuingfromaliteralinterpretationof“thefollowingseasonatthenewclub”32containedinArticle17para.3RSTPandfromateleologicalinterpretationoftheprovision,sincetheobjectiveofFIFAwasthatthesanctionwouldalsohaveadeterrenteffectontheclubhiringtheplayerinbreach33)oranynewclubthattheplayerwouldjoinaftercompletionofhisactualemploymentcontract(theuseoftheword“registration”appearingtofavourthis interpretation). As regards the length of thesuspension,thePanelintheAl-HilalcasedecidedthattheperiodthathadlapsedasbetweenthenotificationoftheDRCdecisiontothestayofexecutionofthedecisionhad tobediscounted34, thereforeadoptingthesamesolutionthanintheoldercases.

As regards the question ofwhether the suspensionshould start on the day of the notification of theCASdecisionoronthefirstdayofthenewseasonfollowingthecompletionoftheactualone,thePanel

26. See e.g. CAS 2008/A/1674, order on request for provisional andconservatory measures of 14 November 2008, paras. 7.11 ff.; CAS2004/A/780,orderonprovisionalmeasuresof6January2005,paras.5.10ff.27.CAS2004/A/780,para.114.28.Although theusualdelay isof twoor threemonths, itoccasionallyhappensthatitismuchlonger;forinstance,inthecaseCAS2008/A/1674AlHilalAl-SaudiClubv.FIFA,thedecisionof theDRCwasdated30No-vember2007buthadonlybeennotifiedtothepartieson29September2008.29.For instanceCAS2008/A/1674, para. 8.3.2;CAS2008/A/1429&1442,para.5of theoperativepart.30.CAS2007/A/1369.31.Ouremphasis.32.Ouremphasis.Theuseof thearticle“the”indeedsupposesthattheclubinquestionisalreadyidentified.33. See the FIFA Commentary on the Regulations for the Status andTransferof Players,No2para.2adArt.17,note82.34.CAS2008/A/1674,para.8.3.3.

intheMexèscasestatedthat,asthenewseasonhadalreadystarted,itwasimpossibletofollowtheletteroftheprovisionandthat,therefore,thesanctionhadtotakeeffectonthedayofthenotificationoftheCASdecision35.ThissolutionhadalreadybeenadoptedintheOrtegacase36;itwasalsoinlinewiththepositionoftheDRCwhichistoconsiderthewordingoftheprovisionasamereguideline,notstrictlybindingbutgivingalsothepossibilitytodecideonanotherstartingpointfortheplayer’ssanction37.IntheAl-Hilalcasehowever,thePaneldecidedthat,accordingtoaclear,unambiguousandliteralinterpretationofArticle17para.3RSTP, thesanctionwas tocommencefromthecommencementofthenextseasonwhereverthePlayermayfindhimself38.

F. The addressee of the appeal against the sanction

If a player wants to appeal against the sanctionimposed upon him, he must summon the correctrespondent.Inacaseinwhichhehadbroughtbeforethe CAS the decision by theDRC that had foundhim tobe inbreachofhis employment contract, aplayer only named his former club as respondent,butnotFIFA.ThePanel foundthatwhile theclubhadstandingtobesuedwithrespecttothefinancialsanctionimposedupontheplayer,itwasclearlynotthecaseasregardedthedisciplinarysanctionsince,byseeking theannulationsof it, theplayerwasnotclaiminganythingagainsttheclub,butagainstFIFA.Itwas thereforeonlyFIFAthathadstanding tobesuedwith regard to thedisciplinary sanction; sincethe player had only directed his appeal against hisformerclubandnotagainstFIFA,hecouldnotseekreliefforthedisciplinarysanction39.

III.Canothermeasuresbetakenagainsttheplayer?

Ifaplayer isfoundtohavebreachedorunilaterallyterminated his employment contract, can othermeasures (be they disciplinary or injunctions) betakenagainsthim?AlthoughArticle17para.3RSTPdoesnotprovideforanyothersanction,clubsoftenask,interalia,thattheplayerbecompelledtoremainwithorreturntohisformerclub.

In a case where the player had terminated hisemploymentcontract,theformerclubhadrequested

35.TAS2004/A/708&TAS2004/A/713,para.83.36.CAS2003/O/482,para.13.3.37.Cf.CAS2008/A/1674,orderonrequestforprovisionalandconserva-torymeasuresof 14November2008,para.7.15.38.CAS2008/A/1674,para.8.3.2.Forthisreason,FIFAisnowconsid-eringamendingArticle17para.3RSTPinorderforittoprovidealegalgroundformoreflexibility.39.CAS2008/A/1677,paras.92-96.


FIFA that the player be ordered to return to itimmediately. In its decision, theDRC had deemedthe contract to still be valid and had ordered thattheplayerimmediatelyresumedutywithhisformerclub.TheplayerappealedofthisdecisionbeforetheCAS; in its award, the Panel found that althoughthe player had no valid reasons to terminate hisemploymentcontractearly,thedecisionoftheDRCregardingtheobligationtoresumeserviceswiththeformer employer could not be upheld. The PanelrecalledthepositionofSwisslawaswellasofCASjurisprudence,whichisthatifaplayeristerminatinghis employment contract without valid reasons, heis – notwithstanding the possibility of disciplinarysanctions – obliged to compensate for damages, ifany,butnotobligedtoremainwiththeemployerortorenderhisservicesthereagainsthiswill40.

In other cases, the panels had the occasion ofpursuing the same reasoning with regard to othernationallaws,alwayscomingtothesameresult.Forinstance, in a case involving aBrazilian player andaGreek club, thePanel stated that itwas not onlythepositionunderSwiss law,butalsounderGreekandcommonlawthataperson“shouldnotbecompelledto remain in the employment of a particular employer. Anemployeewhobreachesanemploymentcontractbywrong fulandprematurewithdrawalfromitmaybeliableindamages,butnottoaninjunction”41.InacaseinvolvingaDutchclub,thePanelrepeatedthatitwasthepositionunderSwisslawandunder theCASjurisprudencethatanemployeewho breaches an employment contractmay not beliabletoaninjunctiontoremainwithhisemployer.ItaddedthattheDutchclubhadnotdemonstratedthat Dutch law or any other law applicable to theemploymentcontractwouldprohibittheplayertobetransferredfromtheDutchclubtoanotherone42.

In the latest cases, the panels have confirmed thislongstandingCASjurisprudence.InacaseinvolvingaPolishplayerwhohadunilaterally terminatedhisemployment contractwith a clubof his country tojoinanItalianclub, theSoleArbitratorrecalledthefindingsofoneof the formercasesandstated thathedidnotseeanyreasontodepartfromthepositionexpressedinit43.

IV.Standingoftheclubsregardingthe

sanctionimposedontheplayer

Although the player is the first one to be affectedbythesanctionofineligibilitytoplay,thenewclub

40.CAS2006/A/1100,para.8.3withreferences.41.CAS2004/A/678,para.8.3.42.CAS2005/A/835&942,para.117withreferences.43.CAS2008/A/1691,para.59with reference toCAS2006/A/1100,para.8.3.

may also be affected by the suspension since itmomentarily looses the services of an element onwhich itwasobviously counting.Can therefore thenew club substitute itself for theplayer in order toappealagainstthesanction?

Also, theformerclubmayhavean interest thattheplayerwhobreachedanemploymentcontractthathehadwithitbesuspendedsotoserveasanexampletowardsotherplayersof its rooster thatmight alsobe tempted to leave. Itmay also be simply willingto prevent the player in breach to play, at least fora while. However, are those interests sufficient torequirethatasanctionbeimposedontheplayerorthatthesanctionbeaggravated?

A. Standing of the new club to appeal against a sanction imposed on the player

As regards the first question, a panel was onceconfrontedwithaclubappealingagainstthedecisionof the DRC to impose an eligibility restriction offourmonthstooneofitsplayers.AstheRespondent,theFIFAhadsubmittedthattheclubwas“thewrongplaintiff and [had] no active legal standing to appeal thesporting sanction in question”, as it was “affected by thesanctionforthebreachofcontractonlyindirectly”44.

For the Panel, the issuewas to determinewhethertheclubhada“sufficient interest” inthematterbeingappealed. It first stated that “sufficient interest” was“a broad, flexible concept free from undesirable rigidity,which includes whether the club can demonstrate a sportingandfinancial interest”.It thenreferredtoformerCASjurisprudence,emphasisingthattherequirementwassatisfied if it could be stated “that the appellant (i) issufficiently affected by the appealed decision and (ii) has atangible interest, of financial or sporting nature, at stake”.Finally,itconsideredthatintheindividualcase,theclubwasdirectlyaffectedbyadecisionoftheDRCsince,asa resultof thedecision, itwasdeprivedofaplayer’sservicesthroughouthissuspension,whichhad a direct impact on the club’s team. The factthat the club had paid a substantial sum to retainthe player and continued to pay the player’s salary,despitetheplayer’ssuspension,wasalsoanargument.Furthermore, as the club was found jointly andseverally liable to pay the compensation awardedbytheDRC,ithadafinancialinteresttoappealthesanction45.

44.CAS2008/A/1674,orderonrequestforprovisionalandconservatorymeasuresof14November2008,para.3.11.45.CAS2008/A/1674,orderonrequestforprovisionalandconservatorymeasuresof14November2008,paras.7.2-7.6withreferencetoCAS2005/A/895,para.67.


B. Standing of the former club to require that a sanction be imposed on the player

As far as the second question is concerned, thePanel in theMexès case found that the duration ofasuspensionregardingaplayerwhoisnotanymorepartofitsroosterhadnoeffectonthisplayer’sformerclub. Therefore, the latter had no legally protectedinteresttorequirethatasanctionbeimposedontheplayerorthatthesanctionbeaggravated46.

TheCASconfirmed thisorientation in a later caseinwhichthePanelstatedthatnoruleoflaw,eitherintheFIFARegulationsorelsewhere,wasallowingtheclubvictimofthebreachofcontracttorequestthatasanctionbepronounced.Indeed,thesystemofsanctions laiddownrulesthatappliedtotheFIFA,ontheoneside,andtotheplayerortotheclubthathiredtheplayer,ontheotherside.Athirdpartyhadnolegallyprotectedinterestinthismatter47.

46.TAS2004/A/708,para.78.47.TAS2006/A/1082&1104,para.103.


A. Life ban as regulated in the 2009 WADC

The2009WorldAnti-DopingCode(2009WADC)foresees the sanction of ineligibility for life1 invariousprovisionsand forvariousviolationsof theanti-doping rules. Inmostcases, a lifeban isnotaso-called “standard” sanction, but the adjudicatinginstanceenjoysacertaindegreeofflexibility.Inthisrespect,accordingtoArticle10.3.2,fortraffickingorattempted trafficking, administration or attemptedadministrationofprohibitedsubstanceorprohibitedmethod, the period of ineligibility is a minimumof four years up to lifetime ineligibility, unless theconditions for establishing a reduced sanction aremet. Moreover, a violation of an anti-doping ruleinvolvingminors is considered to be a particularlyserious violation. It results in lifetime Ineligibilityif committed by the medical or other personnel

1.Forthepurposesofthispaper,“lifetimeineligibility”,“lifeban”and“ineligibilityforlife”areconsideredashavinganidenticalmeaning.

of the athlete2 for violations including prohibitedsubstances which are not included in the list ofspecifiedsubstances.

The flexibility of the adjudicating instance whenimposingthedisciplinarysanctionisalsoreflectedincasesinwhichanathleteorotherpersonsuccessfullyestablishes in an individual case that he bears nosignificant fault or negligence (see, for instance,Article10.5.2ofthe2009WADC):theadjudicatinginstancehastheprerogativetoreducetheotherwiseapplicableperiodofineligibility,andincasealifebanwas to be imposed on the athlete, the adjudicatinginstance has the power to reduce the otherwiseapplicablesanction,butnolessthaneight(8)years.

Inversely,therearecircumstanceswhichmayjustifythe imposition of a period of ineligibility greaterthanthestandardsanction(seecommenttoArticle10.6 of the WADC), such as the athlete or otherperson committing the antidoping ruleviolation as

2.Forthepurposesofthispaper,“he”isalsousedtorefertofemalepersons.

I.The2009WADACode(2009WADC):provisionsonlifetimeban

I. The 2009 WADA Code (2009 WADC): provisions on lifetime ban..............................................................................41 A)Lifebanasregulatedinthe2009WADC..........................................................................................................................41 B)Secondanti-dopingruleviolationandlifebanaccordingtotheWADC..................................................................... 42II. CAS case law on lifetime ban................................................................................................................................................42A)FixedsanctionsimposinglifeineligibilityandCASpowertomodifyfixedsanctions............................................... 42B)Proportionalityof alifebanaccordingtotheCASPanels.............................................................................................431.Firstdopingviolationandlifetimeineligibility.............................................................................................................432.Proportionalityof alife-banfortheseconddopingoffence.....................................................................................443.Otherargumentsinfavourof thelifetimeineligibility................................................................................................444.Professionalathletesaspersonswhoseworkisregulated...........................................................................................445.Expulsionforlifefordisciplinarycasesunrelatedtodopingoffences..................................................................... 45

C)Differencebetweenrecidivismand“seconddopingoffence”.................................................................................................45D)Secondviolationandthe“exceptionalcircumstances”defence............................................................................................45E)Secondanti-dopingruleviolationthroughthenotificationof thefirstviolation....................................................... 46F)Lexmitiorandlifeban..........................................................................................................................................................48G)Lifebananddeparturefrominternationalstandardfortesting....................................................................................49H)Lifebanandreformatioinpejus........................................................................................................................................50

Lifetime ineligibility according to the WADA CodeIssuesrelatedtolifetimeineligibilityindopingcasesinthelightofthejurisprudenceoftheCourtofArbitrationforSport(CAS)Dr DespinaMavromati,CounseltotheCAS


partofadopingplanorscheme,eitherindividuallyor involving a conspiracy or common enterprisetocommitanti-doping ruleviolations;or theuse/possession of prohibited substances- or methodson multiple occasions. The list enumerated in thecomment toArticle 10.6 is not exclusive andotheraggravating factorsmay also justify the impositionof a longer period of ineligibility. It is noted that“Violations under Articles 2.7 (Trafficking or AttemptedTrafficking) and 2.8 (Administration or AttemptedAdministration)arenotincludedintheapplicationofArticle10.6becausethesanctionsfortheseviolations( fromfouryearsto time Ineligibility) already build in sufficient discretion toallowconsiderationofanyaggravatingcircumstance”.

Finally, according to Article 10.7.3, a third anti-doping rule violation always results in a lifetimeperiod of ineligibility, except if the third violationfulfils the condition for elimination or reductionof the period of ineligibility under Article 10.4 orinvolvesaviolationofArticle2.4(filingfailuresand/or andmissed tests). In these particular cases, theadjudicating instancehas theflexibility to imposeasuspension fromeight (8) yearsup toa lifebanontheathlete.

B. Second anti-doping rule violation and life ban according to the WADC

Under the terms of the 2009 WADC, the secondanti-doping rule violation does not automaticallyor does not always lead to lifetime ineligibility.Article 10.7.1 includes a table indicating the casesof a second anti-doping rule violation which maylead to lifetime ineligibility. In this respect, the2009 WADC differentiates between the different“categories”ofanti-dopingruleviolationsandreferstostandardsanctions;reducedsanctionsforspecifiedsubstances under Article 10.4; refusal to submit tosamplecollection;nosignificant faultornegligenceunderArticle10.5.2;aggravatedcircumstanceswhichmayincreasetheperiodofthesanction;and,finally,traffickingwhich is alone a very seriousoffenceoftheanti-dopingrules.

Incaseofafirstdopingoffenceincludingtrafficking,thesecondviolationwillalmostalwaysleadtoalifesuspension unless the second violation consists ofa reduced sanction including a specified substanceunderArticle10.4ofthe2009WADC.Inthosecases,thesanctiontobeimposedwillvarybetween8yearsandalifeban.Inallothercases,asecondviolationinvolvingtraffickingwillleadtolifeineligibility.

AsregardsaggravatingsanctionsforeseeninArticle10.6of the 2009WADC, secondviolations lead toa ten-year suspension up to a life ban for cases of

missedtestsorrefusaltosubmittosamplecollectionand cases where no significant fault or negligencecouldbeestablished.Forasecondviolationinvolvingastandardsanction,acaseoftraffickingora(second)aggravating sanction, the applicable sanction is the(standard)lifeban.

The applicable sanction in case of a first standardsanctionandasecondviolationincludingtraffickingor aggravating circumstances will be the life ban,whereas in case of two standard violations thesanctionwillvaryfromeight-yearsuptoalifeban.

Incaseofafirstdopingoffencewithnosignificantfault or negligenceor formissed tests or failure tosubmit to sample collection, a second anti-dopingrule violation can only result in a life ban if it isassociated with an aggravating sanction of Article10.6(10yearsuptolifeban)ortrafficking(standardlifeineligibility).

Finally,ifthefirstanti-dopingruleviolationconcernsa reduced sanction for specified substances underArticle10.4,asecondanti-dopingruleviolationmayleadtoa lifebanonlyincaseoftrafficking.Inthiscase, the adjudicating instance has the margin toimposefromtenyearsuptoalifeban.

II.CAScaselawonlifetimeban

A. Fixed sanctions imposing life ineligibility and CAS power to modify fixed sanctions

In 2002,WADA had not yet adopted theWADC.CAS Panels had however imposed the life ban insomeinstances3.PriortotheadoptionoftheWADC,internationalfederationsusedtoregulatethesanctionof a life ban (or rather the reasons leading to suchsanction)individuallyandinasomehowfragmentedway. While some rules provided for a flexiblesanction, in case of a second offence, which couldleadtoalifeineligibility(seeforinstanceArticle130oftheUCIAntiDopingExaminationRegulations),other Anti-Doping rules were stricter, in that theyprovidedforafixedlifeban(incaseofasecondanti-dopingrulesviolation,seeforexampleRule60.2(a)(ii) of the IAAFAnti-Doping Rules). As stated inCAS 2002/A/3834, fixed sanctions do not requireanyproof that thepenaltybeingapplied is justandequitable, but only that the doping violation hasoccurred5.

3.SeeCAS2002/A/383,para.193;seeRichardMCLAREN,DopingSanctions:WhatPenalty?, International SportsLawReview, 2002, p.23,27.4.See2002/A/383,para.193.5.SeealsoMCLAREN,op.cit.fn.3,p.25.


More precisely, and as established through thepreviousCAScaselaw6,thefixedsanctionprovidedforbytheanti-dopingregulationsofaninternationalfederationandtheimpositionofsuchafixedsanctionon theathletes should inprinciplebeautomaticallyappliedby theCASPanels,unless their applicationisarbitraryor thesanctionsareexcessiveorunfair.InCAS96/157thePanelemphasizedthat“(...)itcaninterveneinthesanctionimposedonlyiftherulesadoptedbytheFINABureauarecontrarytothegeneralprinciplesoflaw,iftheirapplicationisarbitraryorifthesanctionsprovidedbytherulescanbedeemedexcessiveorunfairontheirface”.

In 2002/A/383 (para. 195), under the applicationof theso-calledfixedsanction (i.e. lifeban) for thesecondviolationof theanti-dopingrules, thePanelimposedalife-banontheathlete(inaccordancewithIAAFRule60.2a).ThePanel,althoughrecognizingthata life-banwasaveryharshpenalty, foundthatthelifebansanctionimposedbytheIAAFaccordingtoitsregulationswasreasonableandappropriate(seebelow under “proportionality” ). The reasonwas that incaseofafixedsanctionforeseenbytheregulationsofthefederation(incasutheIAAF),theCASPanelhadnojurisdictiontoconsiderexceptionalcircumstancesinfixingthesanctionsincethiswasnotprovidedbytherules7.

B. Proportionality of a life ban according to CAS Panels

Apart from the specific case of fixed sanction thathas been presented above (whereCASPanels havelittle–oralmostnoflexibility), severalCASpanelshaveobservedthat“[w]hateverthenatureoftheoffencemaybe,[…]thespecial circumstancesofeachcasemustbetakeninto accountwhen determining the level of the sanction”8. Itbearsmentionthat,whereasthecase2000/A/218didnotrelatetoalife-ban,thePanelreferredtotheneedtotakeintoconsiderationthespecificcircumstancesofeachcase.

1.Firstdopingviolationandlifetimeineligibility

In general, “arguments for the life-time ban for first timeADR violations sit uncomfortably with the legal concept ofproportionality,sinceitissimplynotproportionatetopreventaprofessionalpersonfrompursuinghischosenprofessionafteroneisolatedproventransgressionoftherules;moreover,aninstantlifetimebanleavesnoroomfortheconceptsofgenuinecontrition,insightandrehabilitation;thesearenotjustidealisticnotionsaschambershimselfhasdemonstrated”(seealsoNorrisJ.,

6.However,fornondoping-relatedcases,seeCAS96/157,Awardof23April1997,Matthieu reeb(ed.),CASDigestI,p.351,358-359,para22andCAS2002/A/360,para.59.7.SeeCAS2002/A/383,para.199.8.CAS2000/A/218,para.79,Matthieureeb (ed.),CASDigest IIp.411,417,para.17.

DrugsAlife-timebanforfirsttimecheats?,inInsideTrack,May2009,p.2).

However,inCAS2001/A/330,thePanelfoundthatthe lifetime ineligibility imposedon the athlete forhis first doping violationwas proportionate (paras.46-47) because, according to the Panel, someinternational federations were willing to imposehigherminimumsanctionsasa“demonstrationof theirdeterminationandcommitmenttotheeradicationofdopingintheirsport”9.

Anothercriterion justifyingthe lifetimeineligibilitywould be the particularly serious character of theoffence. For example, the anti-doping rules of theInternational Ski Federation (FIS) consider a caseto be particularly serious if the anti-doping ruleviolationiscommittedonaminor10.

In CAS 2008/A/1513, the Panel established someadditionalcriteriaregardingtheproportionalityofthelifeban.Thecaseconcernedacoachofthenationalcross-countryskiingteamwhowassanctionedforlifefollowingamultipledopingoffence(possessionofaprohibitedmethodandintentionalassistancetoviolatetheanti-dopingrulesofaninternationalfederation).The Panel stressed the importance of taking theprincipleofproportionalityintoaccount,particularlyin cases where the applicable rules regarding theextentofthesanctiongrantCASanamplescope.ThePanelwentontonotethatthesanctionimposedmustbeproportionateandinlinewiththeseriousnessofthe offence. While the previous instance (i.e. theFISDopingPanel) considered the anti-doping ruleviolationsastwoseparateinfractions,theCASPanelconsidered them as one anti-doping rule violationanddeterminedtheapplicablesanctiononthebasisof Article 2.8 FIS anti-doping rules, which carriesthe most severe sanction. In this respect, the FISDopingPanelimposedthehighestpossiblesanction(according toArt.10.4.2FISanti-doping rules, theperiodofineligibilityimposedisaminimumoffouryearsuptolifetimeineligibility,inthelightofthefactthatviolationsofArt.2.8FISanti-dopingrulesareconsideredparticularlyseriousundertheWADC11).

On its side, the CAS Panel also found that theoffence committed by the coach was a seriousoffence, since the coach provided substantial helpfor multiple third-party anti-doping rule violationsandhewasinvolvedin,sotospeak,alargerdopingconspiracyand therebydemonstratedahighdegreeof criminal energy. Furthermore, such doping

9.CAS2001/A/330,paras.46-47.10.See2008/A/1513,para.30.11.SeeCAS2008/A/1513,para.29.


practiceswereparticularlydangerousfortheathletesconcerned.However,theCASPanelfoundthattheoffence had not reached a level of seriousness thatwould justify the highest possible sanction, i.e. thecoach’s life ineligibility from participating directlyorindirectlyinanyFISsanctionedeventfortherestofhis life.According to thePanel, sucha sanctionwouldbeappropriateifthecoachwastheprincipalor the leaderof thedopingconspiracysurroundingtheAustrian cross-country ski team, and thePanelhadsubstantialdoubtsaboutthis(i.e.thePanelcouldnot exclude that other, higher-ranking officials,wereatthetopofthedopingconspiracy).ThePanelconcluded that the coach had a decisive leadershipresponsibilityinthedopingscandal,butnotthesoleor supreme leadership responsibility and thereforeitwas not appropriate to penalise the coach as thehead;itthusdecidedtoimposeonlyalimitedperiodofineligibilitytobeproportional12.

By calculating the sanction to be imposed on thecoach, the Panel considered the age of the coach,togetherwiththedateofhisretirementandimposedasanctioncorrespondingtothe2/3ofhisremainingcareeruptohisretirement(i.e.15years)ratherthanalifeban(seeCAS2008/A/1513,para.32).

2.Proportionalityofa life-banforaseconddopingoffence

In CAS 2002/A/383 (para. 198), the Panel foundthatthe lifetimesuspension imposedontheathletefor his second doping offence was “severe but notdisproportionate”.ThePanel’sfindingswerebasedonseveral factors: in particular, the Panel took intoconsiderationthefactthattheathletewasnotafirsttimeoffender(andthesameargumentwasusedinanAmericanArbitrationAssociation(AAA)arbitration,even though the applicable rule in question (i.e.,Article 130 UCI anti-doping rules) provided thepanelwithsomediscretioninfixingthesanction)13.Therefore, at the time the awardCAS2002/A/383wasrendered,thebasiccriterioninordertodeemalife-ban proportionatewas the fact that the athletecommitted the same infraction twice, and thiswasequallyinfavourofthelegaldoctrine14.

3.Otherargumentsinfavouroflifetimeineligibility

Other factors that are generally taken into accountarethelevelsoftheprohibitedsubstancefoundintotheathlete’surinesample (thisapplies, inprinciple,to the so-called “threshold substances”). In CAS

12.SeeCAS2008/A/1513para.31.13.seeAAAN°30-190-00505-02,USADAcTammyThomas,Awardof6September2002,p.19,availableathttp://www.usantidoping.org.14.MCLAREN,op.cit.fn.3,p.32.

2002/A/383, the Panel compared the level of theprohibited substance found in the athlete’s urinesample to other IAAF affiliated athletes15. In CAS2002/A/383(para.195),thecourtsfoundthatalifebanwasproportionate(i.e.,asareasonablerestraintoftrade)inordertoprotecttheathlete’sownhealth,todiscourageyoungpeoplefromdoingthesameandtoprotectotherathletes’righttoafaircompetition(i.ereasonsofpublicinterest).

InCAS2008/A/1572,1632&1659(para.4.81) thePanelcalculatedtheapplicablesanctionandimposedalifebanontheathleteonthebasisofthefactthattheseconddopingoffenceoftheathlete(tamperingwithadopingcontrol)wascommittedunderaggravatingcircumstancesandthereforeanaggravatedsanctionwas warranted. According to the CAS Panel,“tamperingisaparticularlyseriousoffencebecausetamperingrevealsthattheAthleteknewaboutthepresenceoftestosteronewhichshetriedtohidebythemanipulation.Itisnotonlytheintakeoftestosteronebutalsotheadditionalefforttomanipulatethedopingcontrol(...)”16.

In2008/A/1585&1586,theCASPanelfoundthatthedopingoffencesweresoseriousthatjustifiedthemaximumsanction(i.elifeban),eveniftheapplicableregulations provided for a sanction between eightyearsuptolifetimeineligibility.

4.Professional athletes as persons whose work isregulated

In 2006/A/1149 & 121117 the athlete (a footballplayer) was tested positive twice, and the seconddoping offence occurred during the period ofsuspension.ThePanelrejectedtheathlete’sargumentthat the second test was conducted while he wasservinghissuspensionandthereforetheprohibitedsubstance detected had remained in his body fromthetimeoftheinitialtest.Moreover,thePanelnotedthat,accordingtoArt.66oftheFIFADisciplinaryCode,athleteswereobligedtoundergodopingtestswhileservingsuspension.

Theathletearguedthatalifebanwoulddeprivehimofthepossibilitytopursuehispreferredprofession.However, the Panel noted that those who seek tomake their livelihood in professional sports shouldnot violate the anti-doping rules. Those rules existnot only in the interest of an athlete’s own health,butalsointhepublicinterestofdiscouragingdopingamongyoungerathletes,aswellasofensuringthat

15.Slaneyv.Int’lAmateurAth.Fedn,244F.3d580,7thCir.Ind.Mar.27,2001andJohnsonv.AthleticsCanada,[1997]O.J.No.3201,DRS98-01748CourtFileNo.A4947/97.16.SeeCAS2008/A/1572,1632&1659,para.4.82.17.SeeCAS/A/1149&1211,paras.47ff.


all professionals competewith an equalityof arms,and that those forwhomsportshave an importantmeaningarenotdisaffectedby thedegenerationofethicalstandards.Interestingly, thePanelassociatedprofessionalathletestophysiciansorpublicservantsoraccountants(i.e.personswhoseworkisregulated)and noted that those persons face disqualificationif they violate the rules to which they are held.AccordingtothePanel,anti-dopingrulesaredesignedandintendedtoprotectathleteswhocompetefairly,and topunish thosewhodonot.The latter shouldthusbepreparedtofacetheconsequenceswhentheytransgresstherules.

5.Expulsionforlifefordisciplinarycasesunrelatedtodopingoffences

TheCASalsohadtodealwiththecaseofalife-banforanotherdisciplinarymatter–thistimeadoping-unrelated case. In CAS 2007/A/1291, a licensedswimmingcoachenteredintoafightwithhisdaughterduring the preparations for a competition and thefight was captured by a remote video camera andlatercirculatedintothemedia.FINAfoundthatthecoachhadviolateditscodeofconductbydamagingtheimageoftheFINAactivitiesandbringingtheminto disrepute. The CAS Panel found18 the coach’sconduct aggressive and violent “to such a degree thatit constitutes an act of misbehaviour within the meaning ofArticle 2 (b) of theFINACode ofConduct”.However,thePanelclarified that thecoachdidnotbring thesportintodisreputebuthisconducthadthepotentialofbringingthesportintodisrepute.ThePanelfoundthat the initial sanction imposedbyFINA,namelyanexpulsionforlife“fromactivitiesunderthejurisdictionofFINAandMemberFederations”wasaharsh,severeanddisproportionate sanction in the circumstancesof theparticular case, especially in the light of thefact that itwasnotsuccessfullyestablishedthat theconductofthecoachbroughtthesportofswimminginto disrepute. Finally, the Panel found that theappropriate sanction was that of suspension ratherthanexpulsion,and,after taking intoconsiderationthespecialnatureandunusualcircumstancesoftheconduct of the coach, imposed a suspension for aperiodof8monthsasan“appropriateandproportionatesanction”forhisconduct19.

Onecouldmoregenerally infer that inthiskindofdisciplinarycases,theCASPanelsaremorereticenttoimposealifetimesuspensionastheyareinpurelydoping-relatedmatters.

18.SeeCAS2007/A/1291,paras12ff.19.SeeCAS2007/A/1291,para.28.

C. Difference between recidivism and “second doping offence”

According to theCAScase law, the seconddopingoffence does not presuppose two identical dopingviolations, but those may be different in nature:in CAS 2006/A/1159, the athlete’s first violationconsistedofthepossessionofprohibitedsubstances;lessthanfourmonthsafterhisreturntocompetition,the athlete committed his second doping offence.ThePanel took intoconsideration the fact that theathlete committed his second infraction in such ashorttimeframeandrejectedtheathlete’sargumentthatthesecondoffencewasacaseof“recidivism”andnotasecondviolationassuch,onthegroundsthattheoffensescommitted(possessionofdopingsubstancesontheonesideanduseofdopingsubstancesontheother)werenotof the samenature20.According tothe application of the IAAF anti-doping rules, thedopingoffencesareconsideredlatosensu,anddonotpresupposethesameformofoffence.

D. Second violation and the “exceptional circumstances” defence

In CAS 2006/A/1159, the Panel tried to examinewhether the lifetime ineligibility following theestablishment of the second violation of the anti-dopingrulesbytheathletecouldbeavoidedthroughthe existence of “exceptional circumstances”. However,itrejectedtheargumentthatthesubstancedetectedin the athlete’s urine sample (methadone) wasconsidered as “atypical” and would not enhancethe athlete’s performance on the grounds that thelist of prohibited substances was established everyyear byWADA for all athletes: thePanelwas thusnotobligedtoexaminethespecificcharacteroftheprohibitedsubstanceortheeffectthesubstancecouldhaveonthespecificsport.ThePanelequallyrejectedthe athlete’s argument that he was not consciousof taking the prohibited substance, and repeatedthe athlete’s personal responsibility of what entershis body, but also the duty of care of professionalathletes,especiallyafterthefirstdopingoffence(alsoinlinewiththewell-establishedCAScaselawonthesubject)21.

InCAS2008/A/1585&1586(para.114ff.)thePaneldealt with an athlete who had committedmultipledoping offences. However, the Panel, because oftheseriousnessofhaving todecideupona lifeban(andinordertoclearlyestablishthatmultipledopingoffenceswere committed), required the productionof further documents relating to the first anti-

20.SeeCAS2006/A/1159,para.47.21.SeeinteraliaTAS2004/A/690,TAS2005/A/847,TAS2003/A/484,TAS2005/A/990andCAS2006/A/1067.


doping rule violation the athlete was accused of.Thedocumentsestablishwithcertaintythatthefirstviolation,whichwasnotifiedtotheathletein2004,concerned charges for a violation of IAAF anti-doping rule32.2 (c) (refusalor failure to submit todopingcontrol)andofrule32.2(e)(tamperingwithdopingcontrol),andthattheathleteacceptedthetwo-year ineligibility decided by the IAAF disciplinarycommittee and renounced appealing to the CAS.Consequently,thePanelfoundthattheexistenceofafirstanti-dopingruleviolationbytheathleteanditspropernotificationtotheathletehavebeenproven.

Concerning the athlete’s second anti-doping ruleviolation, committed in 2007 and relating to thepresenceofaprohibitedsubstance(IAAFRule32.2(a)),thePanelstressedthatneithertheresultsoftheAandBsamplesnor anyaspectof the testinghadbeenchallenged.Consequently,theexistenceoftheanti-doping violation could be established and thequestion that remained was whether (according toIAAFRule40.2)“… thereare exceptional circumstancesinthecasesuchthattheathleteorotherpersonbearsnofaultor negligence for the violation” enabling the ineligibilitysanctiontobeeliminated22.

In accordance with IAAF Rule 40.2, in order tobenefitfromafindingofexceptionalcircumstances,“… the athlete must establish how the prohibited substanceenteredhissystem…”.ThePanelconsideredtheathlete’sexplications(i.ethattheprohibitedsubstanceenteredherbodyduetotheingestionofcontaminatedmeator food supplements) as unconvincing accordingto the balance of probabilities test23 since theathleteadducednoconcreteevidenceastohowtheprohibitedsubstanceenteredherbody24.Itthereforefound that theathletehadcommitted twoseparateviolationsand,duetotheseriousnessofthedopingoffences, imposed the lifetime ineligibility on theathlete.

E. Second anti-doping rule violation through the notification of the first violation

In CAS 2008/A/1572, 1632 & 1659, the athlete, aBrazilian swimmer, faced a life ban for multipledopingoffences.TheCASPanelconsideredthattheathlete committed three anti-doping rule violations(on 25 and 26May 2006, on 13 July 2007, and on12 July 2007 respectively), each of which would

22.SeeCAS2008/A/1585&1586,para.118.23.AccordingtoCASjurisprudence,thebalanceofprobabilitystandardmeans that the athlete bears the burden of persuading the judgingbody that the occurrence of the circumstances onwhich he relies ismoreprobablethantheirnon-occurrenceormoreprobablethanotherpossibleexplanationsofthedopingoffence(seeCAS2004/A/602;CAS2007/A/1370&1376;TAS2007/A/1411).24.SeeCAS2008/A/1585&1586,para.119f.

have the consequenceof a separate sanction25.Thefirsttwoanti-dopingruleviolationsconsistedofthepresence of testosterone (committed on 25-26May2006andon13July2007,respectively)andaccordingto the FINA Rules (DC 10.2) each one entailedthe impositionof a two yearperiodof ineligibility.AccordingtotheapplicableFINARules(DC10.4.1in conjunction with DC 10.2), the same period ofineligibilitywouldhavetobeimposedontheathleteforthethirdanti-dopingruleviolationcommittedintheformoftamperingwithadopingcontrol(on12July2007).

Furthermore, according to the Panel’s findings, inthe situationof three separatedopingoffences, thesanctiontobeimposedontheathletehadtofollowthe rules on multiple anti-doping rule violations(see CAS 2008/A/1572, 1632 & 1659, para. 4.50).For a second anti-doping rule violation DC 10.2providesforasanctionoflifetimeineligibility.AsaconditionforthedeterminationofasecondviolationunderDC10.2,accordingtoDC10.6.1,thesecondantidopingruleviolationmusthavebeencommitted“afterthecompetitor...receivednotice...ofthefirstanti-dopingrule violation”.Theproblemthataroserelated to themannerthatthesanctionhadtobecalculatedforthemultipleanti-dopingruleviolationsandfromwhichpoint in time a second (or third) anti-doping ruleviolationcouldbeconsideredasasecond(orthird)violationforpurposesofimposingsanctions.

InthedecisionrenderedbytheFINADopingPanel,itwasheldthat(para.41ofthedecisionrenderedbythe FINADoping Panel of 3.09.2008) “for purposesof imposing sanctions under FINA Rules DC 10.2 and10.4.1asecondruleviolationmaybeconsideredonlyifFINAcan establish that theCompetitor committed the secondanti-doping rule violation after theCompetitor received notice, orafterFINAmadeareasonableattempt togivenoticeof thefirst anti-doping rule violation (FINA Rule DC 10.6.1).Inthisregard“notification”doesnotmeannotificationofthedecision confirming the violation. It means the notificationof the factual circumstances, i.e. the identified presence of aprohibited substance in theASample of aCompetitor”. Inother words, the FINA Doping Panel consideredthat for the establishment of the second violation(for the calculationof the sanction andnot for theestablishment of the violation as such) there is noneed towait for the decision on the first violationtobecomefinal,butsufficestohavethenotificationofthefactualcircumstancesthatprovethepresenceof theprohibitedsubstance in theASampleof theAthlete.

In2008/A/1572,1632&1659,theCASPanelrepeatedthe position held by the FINA Panel and stressed

25.SeeCAS2008/A/1572,1632&1659,para.4.47.


that for the purpose of imposing sanctions formultipleviolationsalifetimesanctionisconditionaluponthereceiptofnoticeofthefirstviolationpriortothesecondone26.TheCASPanelnoted,however,thattheathletedidnotreceiveaformalnotificationof thefirst anti-doping rule violationdue todelaysofthenationalfederationoftheathlete,asprovidedforinthecourseoftheresultsmanagementprocessaccording toDC 7.1.3, or that FINAwas not in apositiontoadduceevidencetothiseffect.

The CAS Panel proceeded then to the evaluationof themeaning of the term “notice ...of the first anti-dopingruleviolation”inaccordancewiththeestablishedmethodsof legal interpretation; thewordingof thetermsintheircontextandinthelightoftheobjectiveandpurposeofthenorm27.Itnotedthatthetermnoticeis not restricted to a formal act of notification butratherreferredtothemereknowledgeofafact.Intheparticularcase,theathletehadreceivednoticewhensheobtained“theknowledgeofananti-dopingruleviolation”.Tothispoint,theCASPanelinterpretedthemeaningof the “anti-doping rule violation”within themeaningof the rulesofFINA(DC10.6.1).Accordingly, theCASPanelfoundthattheinterpretationoftheFINARulesequatedanti-dopingruleviolationwiththeadverseanalytical finding28, whereas the definitions attachedtotheDCprovidethatadverseanalyticalfinding is the“reportfromalaboratory...thatidentifiesinaspecimenthepresenceofaprohibitedsubstance”.ThePanelalsoreferredtoFINADC2,whichdefinesanti-dopingruleviolationas “The presence of a prohibited substance ...” and notedthatthisisawidedefinitiongivingroomforfurtherinterpretation.Tothisend,theCASPanelemployedtheanalogousprovisionsoftheWADACodeasaninterpretation tool of the corresponding rules ofFINA.Article 10.6.1 of the 2003WADC 2003, asinforceatthetimeofthedopingcontrolsatstaketowhichDC10.6.1corresponds,providedthat“receivednotice ... of the first anti-doping rule violation”,while theCommentto10.6.1referredto“noticeofthefirstpositivetest”, that isthenotificationofanadverseanalyticalfinding based on the A sample in the course ofthe results management process according to DC7.1.3 andArticle7.2 of the 2003WADC (seeCAS2008/A/1572,1632&1659,para.4.59).

The CAS Panel concluded that, in the normalcourseofthehandlingofanallegedanti-dopingruleviolation,thenotificationintheresultsmanagementprocessisasufficientconditionforasecondviolation.Thenotification in theresultsmanagementprocessismore than theknowledgeof themere laboratoryreportofanadverseanalyticalfinding.Theadditional

26.SeeCAS2008/A/1572,1632&1659para.4.52.27.SeeCAS2008/A/1572,1632&1659para.4.54.28.CAS2008/A/1572,1632&1659,para.4.57.

conditionsforsuchnotificationarethatnotificationisonlyissuedupontheinitialreviewconductedbytheresponsible anti-doping organization according toDC7.1.2,whichleadstotheresultthatnotherapeuticuse exemption has been granted and no apparentproceduraldepartureunderminesthevalidityoftheanalyticalfinding.TheCASPanelfurthernotedthat,allfurtherstepsavailabletotheathletes,suchastherequestfortheanalysisoftheBsample,requestforahearing,appealofdecisionsetc.,arelegalremedieswhichdonotaffectthevalidityofthesuspensionassuch. The rationale for this conclusion was that adifferent interpretation would facilitate athletes tocommit further doping offences after notificationwithouttheriskoflifetimeineligibilityforasecondviolation29.

Within the particular frame of the Case CAS2008/A/1572, 1632 & 1659, the Panel found thatthe handling of the first anti-doping rule violationby the athlete’s national federation was “unusual”.While the national federation was the responsibleanti-dopingauthorityforthetestsconductedduringthe national championships, the Panel found thatno proper results management process took placeuponreportof theadverseanalyticalfindingbasedontheAsamples30.AfterFINAwasinformedoftheadverseanalyticalfindingby theendof June2006,FINA kept the case under observation. However,thenationalfederationadoptedthepositionthattheanalysis results were not sufficient to establish ananti-dopingruleviolationandtosuspendtheathleteandlaterFINArequestedthenationalfederationtoproceedwiththeresultsmanagementprocessandtoholdahearing.Almostoneyearafterthefirstdopingviolation took place, a hearing took place in order“todiscusstheadverseanalyticalfinding”withtheathleteattending.DespitetheadverseanalyticalfindingandFINA sopinionthePaneldecidednottosuspendtheAthlete.After the analysis of theB sampleswhichconfirmed the exogenous origin of testosterone,FINA again requested the national federation toorganize a hearing and to reach a final decision;howeverthenationalfederationtookoverthematterandreferredthecasetoitsDopingPanel31.

ThecriterionthattheCASPanelemployedinorderto seewhether a substantial notification tookplacewasthat“theAthletewasdeeplyinvolvedinhercaseaftertheadverseanalyticalfindingwasreportedon29June2006.Atthehearingheldon11May2007,atthelatest,theAthletewasinapositionsimilartothatifshehadreceivedthenotificationin the results management process. She was informed aboutthe adverse analytical finding, about her right to request the

29.SeeCAS2008/A/1572,1632&1659para.4.60.30.SeeCAS2008/A/1572,1632&1659,para.4.66.31.SeeCAS2008/A/1572,1632&1659,para.4.66.


Bsampleanalysisandtohaveahearing.InthecasebeforeitthePanelconsidersthestateofinformationtheAthletereceivedaboutherdopingcaseatorbefore11May2007tobeatleastequivalenttothenotificationintheresultsmanagementprocessaccording toDC 7.1.3. In the normal course of anti-dopingproceedings the notification and suspension would have beenmadewithintheperiodoftimemuchshorterthanoneyear”32.

Inthesamecase,theCASPanelfurtherinterpretedthe purpose and the object of FINA DC 10.6.133:beforeanathlete is sanctionedfor life foraseconddopingoffence,hemusthavebeenawareof afirstviolationand,hencebeenwarnedthatheorshehasbeen “caught”, and in the caseCAS 2008/A/1572,1632&1659thisconditionwasfulfilledbecausetheathletehadbeeninformedaboutthefactualbasisofthe doping offence and that proceedings had beeninitiated.

In another case34 concerning a Brazilian bobsleighrider (dos Santos), the ad hoc panel differentiatedadverseanalyticalfindingfromanti-dopingruleviolationandcametotheconclusion:“Onlyafterthatprocess[resultsmanagement, B sample analysis, hearing to contesttheadverseanalyticalfinding,addedbythisPanel]hasbeencompletedandtheadverseanalyticalfindingisconfirmedisananti-dopingruleviolationfound.”AlthoughthismightseemcontradictorytothePanel’sfindingsintheCAS2008/A/1572,1632&1659, it isnotbecausetheadhocpanelfoundthatananti-dopingruleviolationis“found”ifanappealabledecisionthatananti-dopingrule violation was committed has been renderedby any authority35. What actually happened in thecaseof dos Santos andwasnot considered sufficientbytheadhocpanelwasthattheBrazilianOlympicCommittee, in disregard of the prohibition of anypublic disclosure, publicly announced the adverseanalytical finding. Furthermore, the ad hoc paneldid not decide on a possible second anti-dopingrule violation and,hence, its constructiondoesnotconstituteprecedence for theunderstandingofDC10.6.2orsimilarrules.Instead,theadhocpanelhadtodecidewhetherornotdosSantosactuallycommittedan anti-doping rule violation at a givendatewhichwould have justified his exclusion from theWinterGames.Atthetimetheadhocpanelhadtodecideonly the positive laboratory report was providedandillegallypublished–roughlyfiveweeksafterthesample collection.The resultsmanagementprocesshadnotevenstartedoratleastwasnotfinished.Noprovisionalsuspensionwasimposed.

32.SeeCAS2008/A/1572,1632&1659,para.4.68.33.AnalogoustoArticle10.6.1ofthe2003WADCandArticle10.7.4ofthe2009WADC.34.CASadhocDivisionO.G.Torino2006/010.35.SeealsoCAS2008/A/1572,1632&1659para.4.62.

Finally, in another case36, the Panel found thatdue to the fact that the athlete committedherfirstanti-doping rule violation in 2004 and the secondoccurredin2007,thesecondviolationwascommitteda substantial period of time after the athlete hadreceivednoticeofthefirstviolationintheyear2004,and considered that the conditions for admitting amultiple violation under IAAF Rule 40.637 werefulfilled.

F. Lex mitior and life ban

Asageneralrule,theprincipleoflexmitiorappliesto doping cases and aims to protect athletes bypermittingtheretroactiveapplicationofaprovisionifthisismorefavourabletotheathlete.Article25.2of the 2009 WADC provides that “With respect toanyanti-dopingruleviolationcasewhichispendingasoftheeffective date and any antidoping rule violation case broughtafter theeffectivedatebasedonananti-dopingruleviolationwhich occurred prior to the effective date, the case shall begoverned by the substantive anti-doping rules in effect at thetime the alleged anti-doping rule violation occurred unlessthe panel hearing the case determines the principle of “lexmitior” appropriately applies under the circumstances of thecase.”TheprincipleisofparticularimportancewhenthePanelisconfrontedwithathletesfacinglifetimeineligibility: there can be significant differencesbetweenthedifferentapplicableregulationsgrantingthePanelagreaterflexibilityastothedeterminationofthesanction.

InorderforaPaneltoapplythelexmitiorprinciple,it previously has to determine which substantiveprovisionsarereallymorefavourabletotheathlete.However,thisisnotalwayseasytocompare–inlegaland factual terms –the older and the most recentversion of the anti-doping rules to be applied inordertoestablishwhichversionconstituteslexmitiorand could be more favourable to the athlete. ThePanel left thisquestionopen inCAS2008/A/1572,1632&1659because it reached theconclusion thatthe lifetime ineligibility would have to be appliedunder the application of both rules38. After a firstappreciation and comparison of the two texts, thePanelcouldnottellwhetherthe2009FINADopingControl Rules (2009 DC), which is analogous tothe 2009WADC, constitutes a lexmitior comparedto the 2003 rules: in the particular case, while the2009rulesforeseeasanctionfromeightyearsuptolifetime ineligibility, the older (2003) rules foresawa fixed standard lifetime ineligibility sanction. Ontheotherside,thePanelalsotookotherparametersinto consideration, and noted that the new rules,

36.SeeCAS2008/A/1585&1586,para.120.37.IAAFRule40.6isanalogoustoArticle10.7.4ofthe2009WADC.38.CAS2008/A/1572,1632&1659,paras4.74ff.


albeit more lenient at first sight, provide (in DC10.9)foraggravatingcircumstanceswhichjustifytheimpositionofaperiodofineligibilitygreaterthanthestandardsanctionandthoseprovisionshavealsotobetakenintoaccountwhendeterminingthelexmitior.

In CAS 2008/A/1572, 1632 & 1659 the Panelcalculatedtheapplicablesanctiononthebasisofthe2009rules,inanefforttoseewhetheritcouldimposealowersanctionthanthelifetimeineligibilitywhichit would have to impose should it apply the 2003rules39.Itthenconsideredtheseconddopingoffenceof the athlete (tamperingwith adoping control) ascommitted under aggravating circumstances andthereforeimposedanaggravatedsanction.Accordingto the CAS Panel, “tampering is a particularly seriousoffence because tampering reveals that the Athlete knewaboutthepresenceoftestosteronewhichshetriedtohidebythemanipulation.Itisnotonlytheintakeoftestosteronebutalsotheadditionalefforttomanipulatethedopingcontrol(...)”40.

In another case, theCASPanel concluded that theprinciplelexmitiorwasofnoassistancetotheathletein the particular case, since the application of the2009IAAFRuleswouldnotleadtoalowersanctionthan the one determined on the basis of the 2007IAAFRules,whichwouldhavetobeappliedundertheprincipletempusregitactum41.ThePanelfirstappliedRule48.1-2ofthe2009IAAFCompetitionRules42,accordingtowhichthe2009Rulescameintoeffecton1 January2009andwerenon-retroactiveunlesstheprincipleof“lexmitior”applied.ThePanelhadthus to examine whether a lower sanction wouldapplytotheathleteunderthenewsystemofsanctionintroducedinRule40.7ofthe2009IAAFRuleswithrespecttomultipleviolations43.

LikeinthecaseCAS2008/A/1572,1632&1659,thePanel then found that, at the very least the athletehad committed two standard sanctions, whichunder the rule required an ineligibility sanction ofbetween8yearsandalifeban.Moreover,basedontheevidenceonrecordtherewasnodoubtthatbothviolationsshouldbedeemedveryserious innature,andthePanelcouldnotfindsubstantialevidenceinordertoconsiderthattheathletedidnotintentionallycommitbothviolations.ThePanelfoundthatalifebanshouldbeimposedontheathlete,evenunderthe2009IAAFRulesanddidnotanswertothequestionwhether the violations would formally qualify asbeing committed in aggravating circumstances as

39.CAS2008/A/1572,1632&1659,para.4.81.40.SeeCAS2008/A/1572,1632&1659,para.4.82.41.SeeCAS2008/A/1585&1586,para.127.42.Rule48.1-2ofthe2009IAAFCompetitionRules isanalogoustoArticle25.2ofthe2009WADC.43.See2008/A/1585&1586,para.123.

definedunderthe2009IAAFRules44.

G. Life ban and departure from international standard for testing

InCAS2008/A/1607,thePaneldealtwithabiathlonathlete who committed her second doping offenceand was sanctioned by the international federationwithlifetimeineligibilityfromparticipationinsport.The athlete challenged the decision to the CAS,arguing that the decision should be annulled (andtherefore the ban should be lifted) because of theathlete’sinabilitytohavearepresentativepresentfortheopeningandtestingofthe“B”sample.Althoughnotdirectlydealingwiththeissueofproportionalityofalifeban,thePanelstatedthat,especiallyincaseswheretheathleteisfacingalifetimebanastheresultofanallegedanti-dopingruleviolationandbecauseofthesignificanceoftheconsequencesofsuchbanfor the athlete, it is important that procedures arefollowedcorrectlyand that informationconcerningtherightsandremediesofanathleteiscommunicatedclearly.

Initsdecision,theCASPanelrepeatedthat,becausetheconsequencesofanti-dopingruleviolationscanbesosignificantforanathlete,theWorldAnti-DopingCodeanditsassociatedstandardsandrulesnecessarilyincludeanumberofchecksandbalancestoensureafairoutcome.Inthisrespect,thePanelstressedtheimportanceofhavingarepresentativepresentfortheopening and testing of a “B” Sample according totheWADC,eventhoughsomeexpertssaythatsuchpresenceisnotreallynecessary.

In the particular case, the Panel noted that theinternational federation –although it was obligedto do so– did not attempt to canvass alternativedates with the laboratory, following the athlete’srequest for a different testing date. Instead of this,theinternationalfederationobtainedanindependentwitness to attend in place of the unavailablewitness designated by the athlete, a gesture whichthe appellant and her representative rejected. ThePanelnotedthat,becauseof thesignificanceof theconsequencesforanathletefacingalifetimebanasthe result of an alleged anti-doping rule violation,procedures should be followed correctly and thatinformation concerning the rights and remedies ofanathleteshouldbecommunicatedclearly.

According to the Panel in 2008/A/1607, althoughArticle 3.2.2 of the 2003 WADC provided that“DeparturesfromtheInternationalStandardforTestingwhichdid not cause anAdverseAnalyticalFinding or other anti-

44.Article40.6ofthe2009IAAFRules.


doping rule violation shall not invalidate such results (…)”,intheparticularcase, theerrorwasseriousenoughto invalidate the“B”sample result (and referred toCAS2002/A/385“Asamatterofprinciple,thePanelisoftheopinionthat,evenifaproceduralerrorisunlikelytoaffecttheresultofaB-sampleanalysis,sucherrorcanbesoseriousas to lead to the invalidity of the entire testingprocedure.”45.ThePanel,however,didnot try toseewhether theinternationalfederationcouldprovethatthepresenceof theAppellant’s representative would havemadeany difference to the outcome. Instead of this, thePanel focussed on whether the federation’s failureto follow the applicable rules by failing to makereasonableattemptstoaccommodatetheappellant’srequest for a different testing date invalidated the“B”sampleresult.

The Panel concluded that by failing to make anyefforts to reasonably accommodate the appellant’srequest to have her “B” sample opened and testedin the presence of her technical representative, thefederationhadfailedtoadheretoboththeIBUAnti-DopingRulesandtotheInternationalStandardinforceatthetimeoftheallegedanti-dopingruleviolationandapplicabletotheopeningandtestingoftheathlete’s“B”Sampleand,asaresult,thattheoutcomeofthe“B”Sampletestingcouldnotbeacceptedaspartofthe evidenceof theAppellant’s alleged anti-dopingruleviolation46.

Interestingly, the Panel stressed that the athlete’srighttobegivenareasonableopportunitytoobservethe opening and testing of a “B” sample was ofsufficient importance that it needed tobe enforcedeven in situations where all of the other evidenceavailableindicatedthattheAppellantcommittedananti-dopingruleviolation47.Asaresult,itupheldtheathlete’s appeal and annulled the decision renderedbytheinternationalfederationimposingalifebanontheathlete.

H. Life ban and reformatio in pejus

Evenincasesdealingwithathletesfacingthelifetimeineligibilitysanction,CASPanelshavestatedthattheprinciple reformatio inpejusdoesnotapplyas longastheCAShas, according toArticleR57of theCASCodetherighttoruledenovoandaslongasthemoreseveresanctionhasbeendulyrequestedbyaparty.

A.Rigozziarguesthat“endépitdupleinpouvoird’examendont il dispose, le TAS s’est montré généralement hésitantà procéder à une reformatio in pejus”48. Logically the

45 SeeCAS2002/A/385paras.22ff.46 SeeCAS2008/A/1607,para.29.47 SeeCAS2008/A/1607para.32.48 SeeRIGOZZI,op.cit.,47n.1369.

arbitrators could not just increase the ineligibilityperiodintheabsenceofaparty’ssubmissiontothisend49. This means that in cases where the sportsfederation limits itself by asking theCAS Panel toconfirm the decision it undertook in the previousinstance,theCASPanelcansimplynotgoultrapetitaandimposeagreatersanction,eveniftheapplicableregulationsallowforsuchanincreasedpenalty.

InCAS2008/A/1585&1586,theathletewasarguingthat theappealeddecisionwrongly imposedonhera four-year ban,whereas IAAF in its counterclaimsubmittedthattheathletecommittedasecondanti-dopingruleviolationandshouldthereforebedeclaredineligibleforlifeundertheIAAFRules.Theathletesupportedthatalifebancouldnotbeappliedbecausethere had been no repeated antidoping violationandthat,inanyevent,asanctionbeyondfouryearscouldnotapplyduetotheprohibitionof“reformatioinpejus”50.

ThePanelfoundthatunderArticleR57oftheCASCode, the Panel had the authority to evaluate anddecidethecasedenovoandhadthereforethepowertovary a sanction in eitherdirectionprovided thatsuch variation had been duly requested by a party.Provided that the sports federation had lodged acounterclaim requesting the CAS to impose a lifeban on the athlete, the Panel determined that theexistenceoftwoviolationshadbeenestablished(thefirstin2004andthesecondin2007)andthatsuchviolationsshouldbequalifiedasmultipleviolationsinthemeaningoftheIAAFRules.Inotherwords,thecombinationofCAS’fullpowerofreview(providedinArt. R57 of theCASCode) and a counterclaimof thesports federation lead to thenon-applicationof theprinciplenonreformatio inpejus fordopingcases.

It has to be noted, however, that according to thelatestversionof theCASCode(whichentered intoforce on 1.1.2010), counterclaims are no longerpermitted at an appeal level and thus the partiesshouldlodgeaseparateappeal(aslongasthedeadlinehasnotyetbeensurpassed).Thispracticallymeansthattheprinciplenoreformatioinpejuswillbedefactorespectedwithintheframeworkoftheappeallodged(bytheathlete),unlessaseparateanddistinctappealhasbeen lodgedat thesametime(i.e. inrespectoftheapplicabledeadlinesforlodginganappeal)bythesportsfederationaskingforagreaterpenalty.

49.SeeCAS2008/A/1585&1586,para.111.50.SeeCAS2002/A/360andCAS2008/A/1585&1586para.111.


Until recently the jurisprudence of the CAS wasnotquiteclearastowhethertheprerequisiteofthestanding to be sued was to be treated as an issueof the admissibility of an appeal1 or ofmerits2. InCAS2008/A/1639, thePanel considered that in anappealthatisdirectedagainsta“wrong”Respondentbecause the latter has no right to dispose of thematter in dispute, the claim filed by theAppellantisadmissiblebutwithoutmerit.TheCASPanelsawitselfcomfortedinitsreasoningbythejurisprudenceoftheSwissFederalTribunalaccordingtowhichtheprerequisiteofthestandingtobesuedistobetreatedas an issue ofmerits andnot as a question for theadmissibility of an appeal3. This jurisprudence hasbeenrecentlyconfirmedinTAS2009/A/1869,awardof3July2009.

1.CAS 2006/A/1189, para. 61 et seq., CAS 2007/A/1329-1330, paras.30-32.2.CAS2008/A/1517,para.135.3.Cf.ATF128II50,55:“Surleplandesprincipes,ilsieddefaireclairementladistinctionentrelanotiondelégitimationactiveoupassive(appeléeaussiqualitépour agir ou pour défendre;Aktiv- oderPassivlegitimation ), d’une part, et cellede capacité d’êtrepartie (Parteifähigkeit), d’autrepart.La légitimationactive oupassivedansunprocèscivilrelèvedufondementmatérieldel’action;elleappartientausujet(actifoupassif)dudroitinvoquéenjusticeetsonabsenceentraîne,nonpasl’irrecevabilitédelademande,maissonrejet”andATF126III59c.1a;ATF123III60c.3a.

II.NoSpecificrulesastothestandingtobesued

CASPanelshaveconsistentlynotedthatneithertheCAS Code nor the FIFA Regulations contain anyspecificruleregardingthestandingtobesuedissue4.

In particular, inCAS 2008/A/1639, thePanel heldthat according toArt. 23 of theFIFARegulationson the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP), adecisionreachedbytheSingleJudgemaybeappealedbeforetheCASaslongasallinternalremedieshavebeen exhausted. The provision does not specify,however,againstwhomtheappealmustbedirected.Contrary to thedecision inCAS2007/A/14035 thePanelconsideredthatthesameistruefortheFIFAStatutes. InparticularthePanelheldthatitdoesnotfollowfromthewordinginArt.62etseq.oftheFIFAStatutes6 that FIFA allows for cases to be resolved

4. CAS 2008/A/1468, para. 82; CAS 2008/A/1517, para. 133; CAS2008/A/1518,para119.5. In CAS 2007/A/1403, the Panel held that FIFA has ensured therecognitionandenforcementofCASawardsbyincludinginitsbodyofrulesanappealprovisiontoCAS.ThePanelconsideredthatfromthatperspectiveandwheneverthereisanappealabledecision,inaccordancewithFIFAStatutes,FIFAshallhavepassivelegalstanding(paras.49ff ).6.Art.62:CourtofArbitrationforSport(CAS)1. FIFA recognises the independent Court of Arbitration for Sport(CAS)withheadquartersinLausanne(Switzerland)toresolvedisputesbetween FIFA, Members, Confederations, Leagues, clubs, Players,Officialsandlicensedmatchagentsandplayers’agents.2. The provisions of the CAS Code of Sports-Related Arbitrationshall apply to theproceedings.CASshallprimarilyapply thevarious

I.Issueofmeritsoradmissibility?

I. Issue of merits or admissibility.............................................................................................................................................51II. No Specific rules as to the standing to be sued..............................................................................................................51III. Standing to be sued according to Swiss law...................................................................................................................52IV. Standing to be sued according to the jurisprudence of the CAS..............................................................................53 A)Principle..................................................................................................................................................................................53 B)CAS’spowerof reviewwithregardthestandingtobesuedissue................................................................................54 C)Contractualmatters...............................................................................................................................................................55 D)Disciplinarymatters..............................................................................................................................................................56 E)Standingtobesuedwithregardsportingsanction..........................................................................................................56

Standing to be sued, a procedural issue before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) AshortanalysisofthestandingtobesuedissueinlightofthejurisprudenceoftheCASMsEstelledeLaRochefoucauld,CounseltotheCAS


by the CAS irrespective of the parties standing tosueortobesued.Therefore,thePanelcametotheconclusionthatthere isnospecificprovision intheFIFA regulations and that thequestionofwhetherornottheRespondentshavethestandingtobesuedmust be derived from the subsidiarily applicableSwisslaw.

III.StandingtobesuedaccordingtoSwisslaw

Under Swiss law, a decision by an association likeFIFAmaybechallengedpursuanttoArt.75oftheSwissCivilCode(CC).Undertheheading“protectionofmember’srights”,theprovisionreadsasfollows:

“Any member who has not consented to aresolutionwhichinfringesthelaworthearticlesofassociationisentitledbylawtochallengesuchresolutionincourtwithinonemonthfromthedayonwhichhebecamecognizantofsuchresolution”.

Art.75CChasconsistentlybeeninterpretedbySwisslegaldoctrineandjurisprudencetomeanthatitistheassociationwhichhasthecapacitytobesued7.

Nevertheless,according toCAS2008/A/1517,CAS2008/A/1518, Art. 75 of the Swiss CC does notapplyindiscriminatelytoeverydecisionmadebyanassociation but one has to determine whether theappealagainstacertaindecisionbyanassociationfallsunderArt.75SwissCConacase-by-casebasis.If,forexample,thereisadisputebetweentwoassociationmembers(e.g.regardingthepaymentforthetransferofafootballplayer)andtheassociationdecidesthataclub(member)hastopaytheotheracertainsum,this is not a decision which can be subject to anappealwithinthemeaningofArt.75SwissCC.Thesportsassociationtakingadecisionisnotdoingsoinamatterof itsown, i.e. inamatterwhichconcernsits relationship to one of its members, rather it isactingasakindoffirstdecision-makinginstance,asdesiredandacceptedbytheparties.Inthisrespect,inCAS2009/A/1828andinCAS/A/1829thePanelwas called to settle a dispute between a nationalfootballclubandafootballnationalassociationfromanother country in connection with the issuanceof a provisional registration for two players withthe national association and to the granting of anInternational Transfer Certificate (ITC). The Panel

regulationsofFIFAand,additionally,Swisslaw.Art.63:JurisdictionofCAS1. Appeals against final decisions passed by FIFA’s legal bodies andagainstdecisionspassedbyConfederations,MembersorLeaguesshallbe lodgedwithCASwithin21daysofnotificationof thedecision inquestion.2. RecoursemayonlybemadetoCASafterallotherinternalchannelshavebeenexhausted(…).7. heini/scherrer,“BaslerKommentar”,2nd edition, 2002,note20onArt.75SwissCivilCode;riemer h.m, op.cit.,note60etseq.onArt.75SwissCivilCode;cf.BGE122III283.

consideredthatFIFAwasactingintheproceedingsas the authority deciding to grant or to refuse theauthorizationtoprovisionallyregisterplayers(SingleJudgedecision).Inthiscontext,thePanelconsideredthatFIFAsimplyauthorizedanationalassociationtoregisteraplayerwithoutundertakinganythingitselfintheproceedings.ThePanelheldthereforethat itdidnotseempossibleforFIFAtobeconsideredasapartytotheproceedings(marg.no.69-72).

Hence, one part of the doctrine tries to limit thescope of application of Art. 75 CC by restrictingthe protected membership related sphere. In theirviewArt.75CC“doesnotapply indiscriminately to everydecision made by an association … Instead, one has todetermine in every casewhether the appeal against a certaindecision falls underArt. 75 Swiss Civil Code, i.e. whethertheprerequisitesofArt.75of theSwissCivilCodearemetinaspecificindividualcase”8.InCAS2008/A/1639,thePanelunderlinesthatthisideatolimitthenotionofmembership relateddispute coveredbyArt. 75CChasbeentakenupbyseveralCASPanels.ThePanelinthecaseCAS2006/A/1192forexamplewascalledtosettleadisputebetweenaplayerandhisclubforan alleged breach of the contract by the club. Thedispute was decided at a first level by an organ ofFIFA.When analyzing the applicability of Art. 75CCtosaiddecisionbyFIFA,thePanelstatedthat“atanyrate,thepresentmatterisclearlynotamembershiprelateddecision,whichmightbe subject toArt.75CCbuta strictcontractualdispute.Accordingly,thePanelholdsthatMr.M.doeshavestandingtobesued”(marg.no.41-48)9.

Pursuant to the interpretation according to whichonly the association has the capacity to be sued,theappeal cannotbedirectedprimarilyagainst themembers of the respective organ that has passedthedecisionorthemembersoftheassociation10.Inprinciplehowever,anassociationhasacertainmarginof discretionwhendesigning the conditions for anappeal against its internal decisions/resolutions. InCAS2008/A/1639,thePanelstatedthatinprinciplehowever, the rights and obligations resulting frommembership in an association point in severaldirections, i.e. towards the association as such butalsotowardstheotherindividualmembers.Disputesbetweenmembers of an association can, therefore,notbeexcludedattheoutsetfromthemembershiprelated sphere.This is all themore true in viewofthe fact that an association which settles disputes

8. bernAsconi/huber, Appeals against a Decision of a (Sport)Association: TheQuestion of theValidity of Time Limits stipulatedin theStatutesofanAssociation,published inGerman in thereviewSpuRt,2004,Nr.6,p.268etseq.9.seealsoCAS2005/A/835&942,marg.no.85etseq.10. Handkommentar zum Schweizer Recht/niggli, 2007, Art. 75ZGBmarg.no.5;BaslerKommentarZGB/heini/scherrer,3rded.2006,Art.75marg.no.21;BernerKommentarzumschweizerischenPrivatrecht/riemer,1990,Art.75marg.no.60.


betweenitsmembersinapplicationofitsownrulesandregulationsisofcourse(also)pursuinggoalsofitsownand,hence, is alsoacting inamatterof itsown.Thus,inCAS2008/A/1639thePanelexpresseddoubtswhether–intheabsenceofanyspecificrulesin the statutes and regulations of a federation– itsubscribes to the narrow interpretation given bybernAsconi/huber to the notion “membershiprelateddispute”11.

InCAS2008/A/1639,thePanelunderlinedthatthepurpose ofArt. 75CC is to protect the individualinitsmembershiprelatedspherefromanyunlawfulinfringements by the association12. In view ofthis legislative purpose Art. 75 CC is construedand interpreted in a broad sense13. In particularthe term “resolution” inArt. 75CCdoes not onlyrefer to resolutions passed by the assembly of anassociation but, instead, encompasses any other(final and binding) decision of any other organ ofthe association, irrespective of the nature of suchdecision (disciplinary, administrative, etc.) and thecompositionofsaidorgan(oneorseveralpersons).

Hence,contrarytothereasoninginCAS2009/A/1828and 1829 (cf. supra), in CAS 2008/A/1639, thePanel considered that the issuance of a provisionalregistration for a player with a national federationtouchesupontherelationshipbetweenFIFAanditsmembers.Itdoesnotinterferewiththerelationshipamongclubs.TheproceedingsputinplacetograntorrefuseanInternationalTransferCertificate(ITC),inthePanel’sview,aremeanttoprotectanessentialinterestofFIFA.This is evidencedby thewordinginArt. 9of theRSTPandArt. 2of theAnnex totheRSTP.Accordingtotheserules,onlythenationalfederationsareinvolvedintheprocessoftheissuanceoftheITC.Furthermore,thenewfederationoftheplayer has no claim of its own against the formerfederation to grant the ITC. Instead, if the formerfederation does not deliver the ITC the issuanceof the ITC lies in the sole competence of FIFA.Furthermore, inexercisingitsexclusivecompetenceFIFA does not act like a court of first instancein a dispute between its members. Instead, whenassumingthecompetencesconferredonitaccordingto the RSTP FIFA is exercising an administrativefunction and, thus, having an impact on the rightsanddutiesofitsindividualmembersinthesenseof

11. netzle s.SchiedsVZ2009,93etseq.12.ATF108II15,18.13.ATF 118 II 12, 17 seq.; 108 II 15, 18 seq;Handkommentar zumSchweizerRecht/niggli,2007,Art.75ZGBmarg.no.6seq;heini/portmAnn, Das Schweizer Vereinsrecht, Schweizerisches PrivatrechtII/5,2005,marg.no278;BaslerKommentarZGB/heini/scherrer,3rd ed. 2006, Art. 75 marg. no. 3 et seq; Berner Kommentar zumschweizerischenPrivatrecht/riemer,1990,Art.75marg.no.7etseq.,17etseq.;Fenners h.,DerAusschlussderstaatlichenGerichtsbarkeitimorganisiertenSport,2006,marg.no.208.

Art.75CC.Themerefactthatseveral(andnotjustone) member is affected by FIFA’s administrativeact does not change the nature of the “appealeddecision”.IfoneappliestheprincipleslaiddowninArt.75CCtothecaseathandthenthedisputemustbe considered to be a membership related disputewiththeconsequencethatitmust(also)bedirectedagainstFIFA.

Moreover,inCAS2008/A/1639thePanelstatedthatArt.75CCmustbeappliedmutatismutandistoArt.62et seq.of theFIFAStatutes,becausethepurposeofArt.62etseq.oftheFIFAStatutesistoconfertoCASthe competence to decide the dispute in lieu of theotherwisecompetent(Swiss)Courts.Since,however,the CAS assumes comparable functions as statecourtsitishardlyconceivablewhythequestionastowhichpartyhasstandingtobesuedshould–absentanyspecificrulesintheStatutestothecontrary–beanswereddifferentlyforstatecourtproceedingsandforarbitralproceedings.

IV. StandingtobesuedaccordingtothejurisprudenceoftheCAS

A. Principle

AccordingtotheCASjurisprudenceandSwisslaw,applicablepursuanttotheFIFAStatutesandtoArt.R58 of the CASCode, a party has standing to besued(légitimationpassive)andmaythusbesummonedbeforetheCASonlyifithassomestakeinthedisputebecausesomethingissoughtagainstit14.

Inotherwords,thedefendingpartyhasstandingtobe sued if it is personally obliged by the “disputedright”atstake15.

In CAS 2006/A/1206, the Panel considered thatalthough disciplinary proceedings may be initiatedby FIFA to sanction a person for not complyingwith thedecisionsof itsbodies andofCASfinallysettlingadisputebetweenthispersonandanationalfederation,thelatterisnotapartytothedisciplinaryproceedings. Therefore, the national federationcannot be considered as the “passive subject” oftheclaimbroughtbeforetheCASbywayofappealagainst theDisciplinaryCommittee (DC) decision,as its rights are not concerned by theDCdecisionand as it has no powerwhatsoever to sanction theperson’s failure to comply with FIFA bodies’ andCAS decisions. It is hence clear that the nationalfederation does not have any standing to be sued

14.CAS2006/A/1189,paras.6.4-6.5,CAS2006/A/1192,paras.41-46;CAS2007/A/1329&CAS2007/A/1330,para.27;CAS2007/A/1367,para37;opcitCAS2008/A/1517;opcit.CAS2008/A/1518.15.CAS2006/A/1206,paras.26-30;CAS2008/A/1468,paras.82-87;CAS2008/A/1517;CAS2008/A/1518.


(légitimationpassive)andcannot,assuch,beidentifiedasarespondentinthearbitration.

Furthermore, in CAS 2008/A/1517 and CAS2008/A/1518,thePanelhasstatedthataRespondentto a CAS procedure has standing to be sued if infilingaclaimtoFIFAwhentheremighthavebeena possibility that another national tribunal wascompetent to hear the case pursuant to the FIFARegulations, the Respondent could have breachedhis contractual duties. Accordingly, the AppellantisentitledtodirectitsappealbeforetheCASattheRespondent in order to require him to refuse theFIFA’s jurisdiction to rule on the issue of sanctionandcompensation.

B. CAS’s power of review with regard to the standing to be sued issue

1.ApplicationofArt.R47oftheCodeofSports-relatedArbitration(theCode)

In CAS 2008/A/1517 and CAS 2008/A/1518, thePanel held that pursuant to FIFA’s recognition ofthe jurisdiction of the CAS in the FIFA Statutes,thepartiestoacontractualdisputebeforetheDRCandFIFAagreetotheapplicationofArt.R57oftheCASCode,whichgivesCASfullpowertoreviewthematterindispute.

2. CASscopeofreviewwithregardArt.R48oftheCode

Art.R48oftheCodeismeanttohelptheappellantswhen they fail to provide some of the elements oftheir statement of appeal but it is not meant tocure a major procedural mistake such as that ofthe Appellant’s. Indeed, if an appellant forgets tospecifyarespondent,theCASCourtOfficewillaskthe appellant to provide such namewithin a shortdeadline,inordertobeabletonotifythestatementofappeal to thenamedrespondent.However,oncean appellant does name a respondent, even if it’sthewrong respondent, theCASCourtOfficemustregister such respondent’s name into the CAS roleand summon it into the proceedings. This meansthatthearbitrationprocedurehasbeensetinmotionandthatthesummonedpartyhastheopportunitytoappearbeforetheCAS,inparticulartoclaimitslackofstandingtobesuedandaskforlegalcosts,orelseitmayriskthatthePaneldoesnotrecognizeitsrightnottobeinvolvedinthearbitration.

Inotherwords, theCASCourtOfficehasnodutyand no power to check whether an appellant hasnamed the right respondent and, hence, Art. R48cannotbeinvokedbytheappellantinsuchasituation.

However,itisuptotheappointedPaneltoexaminethe file and determine whether the summonedrespondentlacksstandingtobesued16.

Moreover, in the CAS system for a statement ofappealagainstagivenrespondenttobeadmissibleitisnecessarynotonlythat itnamesthatrespondent,butalsothat itcontainsanactualclaimagainst thesubjectindicatedasrespondent.Thesimpleindicationoftherespondentdoesnotmeanpersethatarbitrationcanproceedagainstthatrespondent,unlessaspecificclaimisbroughtagainstit17.

In CAS 2007/A/1329, CAS 2007/A/1330 & CAS2007/A/1367,theCASjurisprudencehasconsideredthattheattempttoshiftthearbitrationproceedingsfromaninitialrespondent(acluboraplayer)toanewrespondent (FIFA)mustbeconstrued, froma legalstandpoint,asthefilingofanewappealaltogether.Therefore, the request contained in the appealbriefanddirectedagainstthenewrespondentmustin fact be considered as a new statement of appealleadingtoanewanddifferentarbitrationprocedure.Inthisrespect,thesummoningofFIFAasthenewrespondentcanbeadmissibleonlyifithasbeenmadewithin the21-day time limitprovidedby theFIFAStatute.

InCAS2007/A/1367,thePanelhasalsoestablishedthat a person or body who gets involved in anarbitration is entitled to know, at an appropriatepointintime,whetheritisformallyconsideredtobeapartysinceasaformalpartytotheproceedings,ithasadifferentpositiontothatofanonparty–e.g.byparticipatingdirectlyinthecompositionofthePanelpursuanttoArt.R50andR53oftheCAS.

3.Burdenofproof

Considering the proof of the Respondent’s status,in CAS 2007/O/1398, the Panel has stated that a“proof of payment” can be taken as an indicationthat amatch agent is the debtor of the claim, andalso a party to theAgreement.Moreover, amatchagentthatfromthecorrespondenceisconsideredasa party to an agreement gives the clear impressionthat he considers himself as theClaimants’ debtor.Therefore, a match agent becomes a party to theAgreementevenifheisnotclearlyindicatedassuchtherein,solongasthecommonwillofthepartieswasthat thematchagentwas tobecomeaparty to theAgreementandhencerespondentintheproceedings.

16. CAS 2007/A/1329 & CAS 2007/A/1330, paras. 37-40; CAS2008/A/1620,paras.4.9-4.16.17.CAS2005/A/835&942,paras.85-88.


C. Contractual matters

1. Player’s standing tobesued in thecontextofacontractsubjecttotherulesofFIFA

In CAS 2006/A/1192, the Panel stated that anemploymentcontractwhichisacontractbetweenamemberclubofanationalassociation,whichinturnis amember of FIFA, and a professional player, issubjecttotherulesofFIFA,whichareapplicabletoanydisputearisingoutofthebreachofthatcontractbyoneoftheparties.Itfollows,therefore,thatifFIFAprovidesfora2-stagejurisdictionsystemincaseofadisputearisingoutof the terminationofacontractthedisputewillbedecidedbythatsystem,includingthatpartwhichprovidesfortheexclusivecompetencetodecideontheamountofcompensationtorestwiththeDRC.Theplayerhastoabidebythatrule,asheandtheclubhavetoabidebyalloftheprovisionsofthecontract.Therefore,inraisingadefenseoflackofjurisdictionbeforeFIFA, theplayermaybreachhiscontractualduties.Accordingly,theclubisentitledtodirectitsappealattheplayerinordertorequirehimtoaccept theFIFAjurisdictiontoruleonthe issueof sanctionandofcompensation. Atany rate, suchmatter isclearlynotamembershiprelateddecision,whichmight be subject to Art. 75 CC but a strictcontractualdispute18.

Ontheotherhand,inCAS2007/A/1248,thePanelconsideredthatinaloanagreementcase(non-returnof the Player) where the appellant Club- does notnamethePlayer,butonlytheotherClubwithwhomthePlayerhasregisteredasRespondent,theCASisnotinapositiontoconsiderthebehaviorand/orthepossiblebreachoftheallegedcontractbythePlayer,normayitruleastowhethertherespondentClubcanbeheldliable,astheliabilityoftheClub,accordingtotherelevantprovisionsoftheFIFARegulations(Art.17RSTP)wouldbesubsidiarytothatofthePlayer.Failure to include thePlayerasaparty to theCASproceedings precludes the CAS from entertaininganyclaimand/orallegationsrelatingtothePlayer19.

2. FIFA invited by the CAS to participate in theproceedings

InCAS2007/A/1388&CAS2007/A/1389,thePanelconsideredthatifthepartiestotheproceedingshavenotappliedforFIFAtobe joinedasaparty in theappeal (which involvesadecisionby theCASas tothegrantingorrejectionofaproceduralapplication),opportunity is nevertheless given to FIFA toparticipate in the proceedings, on a voluntary

18.CAS2008/A/1192,paras.45-47. 19.CAS2007/A/1248,para.30(b).

basis, in its capacity as the body appealed against.This invitation,which can be accepted or declinedbyFIFA, ismadebytheCASonitsowninitiative.If FIFA declines to participate, any claim againstFIFA is struck out on the grounds that the bodyagainstwhomthesaidorderissoughtisnotapartytotheproceedings20.

3. FIFA’srighttointervene

In contractual matters, FIFA offers a disputeresolution system, where FIFA is not a party buta neutral entity that is called on to settle a strictcontractualdisputebetweenitsmembersinamatterthatdoesnotconcernFIFA’s relationshipwithoneofitsmembers.ThisneutralpositionisnotchangedbythefactthattheAppellanthasthechancetogetthe case reviewed by the CAS pursuant to FIFA’srecognition of the jurisdiction of the CAS in theFIFAStatutes.Nevertheless,theappealfiledbeforeCASchallenging thedecisionof theFIFADisputeResolution Chamber (DRC) could concern FIFA.Therefore,FIFAcouldhave intervened in theCASarbitrationproceedingsbymakinguseofArt.R41.3of the Code. However, when FIFA was given theopportunity to participate in these proceedingsunderArt. 41.3 (intervention) of theCASCode, itdeclinedtodoso21.

InCAS2007/A/1287,thePanelhasestablishedthatwhenmerelyactingasthecompetentdecidingbodyof first instance in a dispute between twoor moreparties regarding transfer or contractual matters,FIFAcannot,inprinciple,benamedasarespondentin the appeal procedure. Indeed, FIFA cannot beconsidered as the “passive subject” of the claimbroughtbeforetheCASbywayofappealagainstitsdecision,asitsrightsarenotconcernedbythereliefsoughtbytheappellant(s).ItishenceclearthatFIFAdoes not have any standing to be sued (légitimationpassive).However,whendeciding toproceedon themeritsofthecasebyformallyrequestingfromCASthat it rejects the appeal and confirms its decision,FIFA thus acts as a party intervening in the case.In the particular case, the CAS Panel thereforeconsidered FIFA as one of the respondents in theproceedings only as a result of an intervention inthe proceedings, which became effectivewhen theAppellant reiterated its will to address the appealagainstFIFAandFIFAformallyrequestedfromCASin itsanswerthat itrejectstheappealandconfirmstheDecision.Bydoingso,FIFA,indeed,decidedtoproceedonthemeritsofthecaseandthusactedasapartyinterveningintheprocedure22.

20.CAS2007/A/1388&CAS2007/A/1389,para.99.21.CAS2008/A/1517;CAS2008/A/1518.22.CAS2007/A/1287,paras.42-45.


D. Disciplinary matters

1.Principle

The FIFA disciplinary proceedings are primarilymeant to protect an essential interest of FIFA, i.e.full compliance with the decisions rendered by itsbodies. Indeed, the appeals against the decisionsof thedisciplinarybodies regardonly theexistenceof a disciplinary infringement under FIFA rules,the power of FIFA to impose sanctions and theappropriateness and proportionality of such FIFAsanctions23.

2. Determinationof theperson(s)orassociation(s)havingstandingtobesued

If the appellant(s) is/are seeking something onlyagainstFIFA and the relief requested affectsFIFAonly, only FIFA has standing to be sued in suchappealsbroughtbeforeCAS24.

Inthisrespect,ifaplayerwantstoappealagainstthesanction imposed upon him, hemust summon thecorrectrespondent.InCAS2008/A/1677,theplayerhadbroughtbeforetheCASthedecisionbytheDRCthathadfoundhimtobeinbreachofhisemploymentcontract. The player only named his former clubasrespondent,butnotFIFA.ThePanel foundthatwhiletheclubhadstandingtobesuedwithrespecttothefinancialsanctionimposedupontheplayer,itwasclearlynotthecaseasregardedthedisciplinarysanctionsince,byseekingtheannulationsof it, theplayerwasnotclaiminganythingagainsttheclub,butagainst FIFA. Itwas therefore only FIFA that hadstanding tobe suedwith regard to thedisciplinarysanction;sincetheplayerhadonlydirectedhisappealagainst his former club and not against FIFA, hecouldnot seek relief for thedisciplinary sanction25.

In CAS 2006/A/1206, the Panel stated that if theFIFADisciplinary CommitteeDecision challengedbeforetheCASisonlyandsolelymeanttosanctiona coach for not complyingwith the Players’ StatusCommittee (PSC)decision,whereby the coachwasordered to pay the national football associationthat used to employhim an amountofmoney, thenational football association, however de factointerestedintheoutcomeoftheappeal,isnotapartyto theFIFAproceedingsandcannotbeconsideredasthe“passivesubject”oftheclaimbroughtbeforetheCASbywayofappealagainsttheDCdecision.

23.CAS 2006/A/1206, para. 29; CAS 2007/A/1329 & CAS2007/A/1330,para.30,CAS2008/A/1620,paras.4-6.24. CAS 2007/A/1329 & CAS 2007/A/1330, para. 31; CAS2008/A/1620,para.4.7.25.CAS2008/A/1677,paras.92-96.

Indeed, its rights are not concerned by the DCdecisionandthenationalfootballassociationhasnopower whatsoever to sanction the person’s failuretocomplywithFIFAbodies’andCASdecisions.Itishenceclearthatthenationalassociationdoesnothaveanystandingtobesued(légitimationpassive)andcannot,assuch,beidentifiedasarespondentinthearbitration.

Moreover, in CAS 2007/A/1358 and in CAS2007/A/1359, the Panel considered that whendeciding to take part in the proceedings beforeCASbyfiling an answer asking thePanel to rejecttheappealandtoconfirmthedecisionofoneofitsbodiesinamatterthatis,atleasttosomeextent,ofadisciplinarynature,FIFAactsasapartyinterveninginthecaseandmustthereforebeconsideredtohavethestandingtobesued26.

E. Standing to be sued with regard to sporting sanctions

InCAS2008/A/1677,whereasthePanelemphasisedthatunderSwisslaw,thedefendingpartyhasstandingtobesuedifitispersonallyobligedbythe“disputedright”atstakeandmaythusbesummonedbeforetheCASonlyifithassomestakeinthedisputebecausesomethingissoughtagainstit,italsoestablishedthatwhileaclubhasstandingtobesuedwithrespecttothefinancialaspectofacase,itisnotthecasewithrespect to the sporting sanctions imposed to theplayer, as nothing is claimed against the club norsoughtfromit27.

Furthermore, in CAS 2007/A/1369, the SoleArbitratoragreesthatanappealagainstanysportingsanctions imposed by the competent FIFA bodiesmustalsobefiledagainstFIFA,inaccordancewiththeCAScase-law28.

26.CAS2007/A/1358&CAS2007/A/1359,para.74.27.CAS2008/A/1677,paras.93-96.28.CAS2007/A/1369,paras.231-232.

57Jurisprudence majeure / Leading cases -

Arbitration CAS 2007/A/1370 Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) v. Superior Tribunal de Justiça Desportiva do Futebol (STJD) & Confederação Brasileira de Futebol (CBF) & Mr Ricardo Lucas Dodô &Arbitration CAS 2007/A/1376 World Anti Doping Agency (WADA) v. Superior Tribunal de Justiça Desportiva do Futebol (STJD) & Confederação Brasileira de Futebol (CBF) & Mr Ricardo Lucas Dodô11September2008

The Player had already undergone in-competitiondopingtestson6and16May2007,andwastestedagainon30June2007,alwayswithnegativeresults.

AfterthePlayerwasnotifiedthathis“A”Sampleof14 June 2007 had tested positive, he requested theanalysisofthe“B”Sample.ThetestontheBSampleconfirmedtheadverseanalyticalfinding.

On 9 July 2007, the Superior Tribunal de JustiçaDesportiva do Futebol (STJD), the highest sportscourt inBrazilian football, provisionally suspendedthePlayerfor30days.

On 11 July 2007, on the advice of Dr AlexandrePagnani (President of the Brazilian Association ofStudies and Fight on Doping, ABECD), BotafogosentseveralnutritionalsupplementsregularlyusedbytheteamtotheUniversityofSãoPauloLaboratoryforToxicologicalAnalyses(the“USPLaboratory”)tobetestedinordertoascertainthepossiblepresenceofFenproporex.

TheUSPLaboratory’sreport,dated13July2007andconsistingofasinglepagesignedby the laboratorydirectorandbythepersoninchargeoftheanalysis,stated that the analysis had found the presence ofFenproporex in some caffeine capsules producedby “Farmácia de Manipulação Pharmacy”. Theanalysedcapsulesweretakenfromthreecontainers,two sealed (lots no. 348877 and 348873) and oneunsealedandpartiallyused(lotno.3419560),whichhadbeen sent to theUSPLaboratorybyBotafogo.TheUSPLaboratory’sreportdidnotspecifywhich,nor howmany, caffeine capsuleswere found to becontaminated,butdidstatethattheUSPLaboratory“doesnotassumeliabilityfortheoriginofthematerialdeliveredforanalysis”.

In the disciplinary proceedings brought by theBrazilianSportsProsecutoragainstthePlayerbeforethe2ndDisciplinaryCommission(the“Disciplinary

Mr Ricardo Lucas, better known as Dodô (the“Player” or “MrLucas” or “Dodô”), is aBrazilianfootball player born on 2 May 1974 in São Paulo.Hehasbeenregisteredinthelastcoupleofseasonswith theConfederaçãoBrasileiradeFutebol (CBF),having played in 2007 for the club Botafogo deFuteboleRegatas(“Botafogo”orthe“Club”)andin2008fortheclubFluminense.

On 14 June 2007, Dodô was selected for an in-competitionanti-dopingcontrolon theoccasionoftheBrazilianchampionshipmatchbetweenBotafogoandVascodaGama.ThetestwasperformedbytheWADA-accredited LADETEC laboratory of RiodeJaneiro.TheurinesampleprovidedbythePlayerrevealedthepresenceof“Fenproporex”,aprohibitedsubstance appearing on the 2007 Prohibited Listunder category S6, stimulants. Fenproporex is astrongstimulant,precursortoamphetamine.

Panel: Prof. Massimo Coccia (Italy), PresidentMr. Peter Leaver QC (United Kingdom) Mr. José Juan Pintó (Spain)

Football; doping (fenproporex); CASjurisdiction; applicable law; no fault ornegligence;no significant faultornegli-gence;burdenof proof;dutyof careof the athlete; commencementof the sus-pensionperiod

Relevantfacts


Commission”), the Player relied on the USPLaboratory’s report to argue that the prohibitedstimulanthadenteredhisbodywithouthisknowledgeandwillthroughthecontaminatedcaffeinecapsulesmanufactured by the local producer Pharmacy 65Manipulação Ltda. (“Pharmacy 65 Manipulação”)that the Botafogo medical staff had given him toingest before the match. The Player has declaredthroughouttheBrazilianandCASproceedingsthathe trusted the team doctors and essentially tookwhateverwasgiventohim,ashehadnoreasontomakeparticularinquiriesortohavedoubtsaboutthevariousproductsthatwereregularlyadministeredtohim.

On 24 July 2007, the Disciplinary Commissionimposed a 120 day suspension to the Player,statingthattheexplanationgivenbythePlayerwasimplausible, especially in light of the fact that nootherBotafogoplayerhadtestedpositive inthatorinothermatches.

ThePlayer lodged an appealwith the STJD.On2August2007,theSTJDdecidedbymajorityvotetosetasidetheDiscplinaryCommission’sdecisionandtoacquitthePlayer(the“AppealedDecision”).TheSTJD accepted the Player’s argument that he hadbeenan innocentvictimofcontaminationandthathehadnotbeennegligent.

The CBF notified theAppealedDecision to FIFAon 20 August 2007. WADA was informed of theAppealedDecisionon22August2007.

On6and11September2007,respectively,FIFAandWADAfiledstatementsofappealagainstthedecisionoftheSTJDwiththeCAS.

On 10December 2007, the Panel issued anOrderon Application for Provisional Measures whichdismissed a request for provisional measures filedby FIFA. The Panel held that it was not satisfiedthat FIFA had discharged the burden on it ofdemonstrating that a provisional suspension of thePlayerwasnecessarytoprotectitspositionorthattheharmor inconvenience that itwould have sufferedfromtherefusaloftheprovisionalsuspensionwouldhave been greater than the harm or inconveniencethatthePlayerwouldhavesufferedifsuchmeasurehadbeenordered.

By letterdated26March2008, thePlayerobjectedto the request of WADA to hear as witness arepresentativeofPharmacy65Manipulaçãosince(i)Dodôhadfiledaclaimagainst suchcompanywithaBraziliancourtand(ii)thisevidentiaryrequestofWADAwasnotmentionedinitsappealbrief.On31

March 2008, the President of the Panel decided toaccepttherequest.On29April2008,WADAsenttotheCASthewrittenwitnessstatementofMrMiltonLuis Santana Soares, owner and chief executiveofficerofPharmacy65Manipulação.

AhearingtookplaceinLausanneon19and20May2008.

Extractsfromthelegalfindings

1. CAS jurisdiction over the CBF and the STJD

First of all, the Panel observes that the CBF is amember of FIFA and, as such, is contractuallyboundtorespecttheStatutesofFIFAtowhichithasvoluntarilyadhered.

Article61oftheapplicable2007versionoftheFIFAStatutesprovidesthat,onceallinternalremedieshavebeenexhausted,FIFAandWADAarebothentitledtoappealtotheCASagainstdoping-relateddecisionsadoptedbyFIFAmemberssuchastheCBF.Hence,theCBFislegallyboundtoyieldtoanappealtotheCASbroughtbyFIFAand/orWADAagainstoneofitsfinaldoping-relateddecision.

However,theCBFarguesthatArticle61oftheFIFAStatutesisofnorelevanceherebecausetheAppealedDecisionwasnotadoptedbytheCBFbutratherbytheSTJD,thatisawhollyindependentjudicialbody.

Nevertheless, having reviewed Brazilian law andBrazilian sports rules, aswell as thedocumentsonfile, the Panel has formed the view that the STJDisa justicebodywhich,althoughindependent in itsadjudicatingactivity,mustbeconsideredpartoftheorganisationalstructureoftheCBF.

With regard to Brazilian law, first of all the Panelobserves that Article 217, paras. 1 and 2, of theConstitution of the Federal Republic of Brazilmentions “sports justice bodies” (“justiça desportiva”) forthe purposes of providing that Brazilian ordinarycourts have jurisdiction over sportingmatters onlywhen sports proceedings have been exhaustedand that sports justice bodies must exhaust suchproceedingswithinsixtydays.Itisworthmentioningthat,contrarytowhatthePlayeralleges,Article217of theBrazilianConstitution does not specify howsportsjusticebodiesmustbestructuredandwhethertheyaretobeindependentandsetupinsideoroutsidethe organisational structure of sports federations.Article217 leaves the regulationof thosedetails toordinarylaws.


Then, the Panel notes that pursuant to Article 23,para. I, ofLeiPelé, the statutesofBrazilian sportsfederationsmustprovidefortheinstitutionofsportsjustice bodies in accordancewith the requirementsofLeiPelé.

In compliance with Lei Pelé, the STJD and theDisciplinary Commissions have been instituted asindependent and autonomous sports justice bodiesby Articles 69-71 of the CBF Statutes and havebeen given authority to judge whether disciplinaryviolations have been committed by anyone –associations,clubs,players,coaches,etc.–directlyorindirectlyaffiliatedtoorregisteredwiththeCBF.Inotherwords,theCBFhaswhollyentrusteditsvesteddisciplinarypowertotheSTJDandtheDisciplinaryCommissions.

InindependentlyexercisingsuchdisciplinarypoweronbehalfoftheCBF,theSTJDisobliged“tocomplywiththeStatutes,regulations,circularsanddecisionsandCodeofEthicsofFIFA”,aswellas“torespecttheprinciplesandrulesoftheFIFADisciplinaryCode,ofuniversalapplication,andtheBrazilianCodeofSportsJustice(CBJD),ofnationalapplication”(Article70,para.3,oftheCBFStatutes).

The Panel also notes that under Article 50, para.4, of Lei Pelé, sports federationsmust finance thefunctioningofthesportsjusticebodiesthatoperatewiththem.

Then,thePanelnotesthatArticle70,para.1,oftheCBFStatutesconfersonthePresidentoftheCBFtheformalpowertoappointtheninejudgesoftheSTJD.PursuanttoArticle55ofLeiPelé,suchappointmentis done upon indication by the CBF (two judges),by the clubs participating in the top professionalchampionship (two judges), by the Brazilian Bar(two judges),by the referees (one judge)andby theplayers (two judges).Therefore, seven judgesoutofnine are designated by theCBF itself or by bodiesor individuals operating within the CBF, beingaffiliated thereto (the clubs) or registered therewith(therefereesandtheplayers).

Moreover, according toArticle 41, para.XXIII, ofthe CBF Statutes, the President of the CBF mustenforcetherulingsofthesportsjusticebodies.

ThePanelalsonotesthatArticle22,para.3-VII,oftheCBFStatutesprovidesthattheGeneralAssemblyof the CBF has the power to decide on appealsagainstthefinalrulingsofthesportsjusticebodiesconcerning the loss of affiliation or exclusion ofaffiliatedentities(suchasclubs).So,thereisatleastonetopicinwhichtheSTJD’sjudgmentyieldstothatofthemainbodyoftheCBF.

Inaddition,thePanelnotesthattheSTJD’sPresident,in a letter dated 13 September 2007 to the CBF’sSecretaryGeneral,hasclearlystatedthat“theSuperiorTribunalde JustiçaDeportivadoFutebol, thus,hasnoownlegal personality. It is just one of the bodies of theCBF, aswellastheBoardofDirectors(withexecutivepowers)andtheGeneralMeeting(withinternallegislativepowers).AsoneofthebodiesofCBF,theSTJDdoesnotconstituteagovernmentalbody.Despitethat,Article52ofLaw9615of1998attributesorganizational autonomy and decision-making independencefromCBFtoSTJD”.[Emphasisadded]

In the light of the foregoing, the Panel is of theopinion that the STJD is a justice body which isan integral part of the organisational structure oftheCBF,withno legal personality of its own.Thefact that in Lei Pelé, in the CBF Statutes and intheBrazilianCodeofSports Justice thereare rulesprotecting the autonomy and independence of theSTJDvis-à-vis the executive and legislativepowersoftheCBFdoesnotalterthefactthattheSTJDhasbeeninstitutedby(andthusowesitslegalbirthandexistenceto)theCBFStatutesandisfinanciallyandadministrativelydependentontheCBF(“dependênciafísico-financeira”ascharacterizedbyDrPauloMarcosschmitt in his article Organização e competência dajustiçadesportiva,publishedinCódigoBrasileirodeJustiçaDesportiva – Comentários e Legislação: Ministério doEsporte,ass.ComunicaçãoSocial,Brasília/DF,2004,pp.23-44).

In thePanel’s view, it is a commendable featureofthe Brazilian sports system that sports federationsare organised in accordance with the principle ofseparationofpowers.ThismeansthatthePresidency,theSecretariatandtheBoard, theexecutivebranchof the CBF –of Directors– is not permitted toencroach on the domain of the judicial branch–the STJD, theDisciplinaryCommissions and theArbitration Court– and vice-versa. This happensalso in other football associations. However, thepraiseworthy independence and autonomy of theSTJDinadjudicatingthedisputesbroughtbefore itdoesnotentailthattheSTJDisabodywhichcouldlegallystandaloneiftheCBFdidnotexist.

Indeed, in the Panel’s opinion, the “stand-alone test”is thedecisive test to revealwhetheragivensportsjustice body pertains in someway to the structureofagivensportsorganizationornot.IftheCBFdidnotexist, theSTJDwouldnotexist andwouldnotperformanyfunction.Inthisrespect,thesimilaritythattheSTJDsuggestedbetweenitselfandtheCAS–“JustastheCASisindependentoftheIOCandtheothersports institutions that finance the CAS or nominate itsmembers,theSTJDisindependentoftheCBF”–iswhollymisplaced.ApartfromthefactthatCASarbitrators


are appointed by a private Swiss foundation, theInternational Council of Arbitration for Sport,which is also responsible for the financing of theCAS, the CASwould legally stand alone and existasanarbitration institutioneven if the IOCoranyoftheinternationalfederationssuddenlydisappeared(or simply withdrew their choice of the CAS asarbitrationforum).Incontrast,theSTJDwouldnotlegallystandaloneiftheCBFdidnotexist.

Accordingly, thePanel is of the view that (at least)forinternationalpurposesthedecisionsoftheSTJD,althoughindependentlyreached,mustbeconsideredtobethedecisionsoftheCBF.Inotherwords,theCBF is tobeconsidered responsiblevis-à-visFIFA(orotherinternationalsportsbodies)forthedecisionsadoptedbytheSTJD.Thisisexactlythesamelegalsituationaswehaveinpublicinternationallaw,whereStatesareinternationallyliableforjudgmentsrenderedbytheircourts,evenifundertheirconstitutionallawthejudiciary iswholly independentoftheexecutivebranch.

In conclusion, the Panel finds that the STJD hasno autonomous legal personality and may not beconsidered as a Respondent on its own in a CASappeal arbitration concerning one of its rulings;consequently, the procedural position of the STJDbefore the CASmust be encompassed within thatof the CBF. Therefore, the Panel holds that theAppealedDecisionmustbeconsideredasadoping-relateddecisionadoptedbyanationalfederationandthus,pursuanttoArticle61oftheFIFAStatutes,theCAS has jurisdiction to hear WADA’s and FIFA’sappealsagainsttheCBF.

2. CAS jurisdiction over the player

The Panel notes that the Player is registered as aprofessional athlete with the CBF and that, by hisdeliberate act of registering, he has contractuallyagreedtoabidebythestatutesandregulationsoftheCBF.

ThePanelalsonotesthat in thethirdclauseof theemployment contract which the Player signedwithBotafogoon16January2007,thePlayerhasexplicitlydeclaredtobecognisantofandtopledgetorespect,besideshiscontract,therulesoftheCBF.

Article1,para.2,oftheCBFStatutesprovidesinteralia that all athletesmust complywith the rules ofFIFA.Article61oftheFIFAStatutesentitlesFIFAandWADA to appeal to the CAS against doping-relateddecisionsadoptedbynationalfederations.InthePanel’sview,while thePlayer’s argumentbasedonthefactthatArticle136oftheBrazilianCodeof

SportsJusticeprovidesthattheSTJD’sdecisionsarenotsubjecttoappealmayberelevantatnationallevel,it is irrelevant for international purposes, becauseArticle 61, para. 7, of the FIFA Statutes specifiesthatappealstotheCASareinfactdirectedagainst“internallyfinalandbindingdoping-relateddecision”.

InconnectionwiththeprovisionoftheCBFStatutesrequiringallCBFplayerstocomplywithFIFArules,thePanelremarksthat it is theBrazilian legislationitself which strengthens the status of internationalsports rules within the Brazilian sports system.Indeed,Article1,para.1,ofLeiPeléexpresslystatesthatofficialsportspractice inBrazil isgovernedbynationalandinternationalrulesandbysportingpracticerulesofeachtypeofsport,acceptedbytherespectivenational federations. The Panel also observes thatArticle3,para. III,ofLeiPeléspecifically imposesonathletespractisingprofessionalsportthedutytoabideby international sports rules,besidesLeiPeléandnationalsportsrules.

The Panel finds these provisions of Lei Peléparticularlywise,insofarasinternationaldisciplinaryrules are concerned. Indeed, strengthening by lawtheapplicationofinternationalrulestendstoremove“the temptation to assist national competitors by over-indulgence.Theobjectiveistosubjectallathletestoaregimeofequaltreatment,whichmeansthatnationalfederationsmustbeoverrulediftheylooktheotherwaywhentheirathletesbreachinternationalrules”(CAS2006/A/1149&2007/A/1211,para.27).

InthePanel’sview,asaresultof theabovequotedexpress legislative provisions, international sportsrules are directly applicable to Brazilian sport;accordingly, any athlete registered with a Brazilianfederationisdirectlyboundbytheinternationalrulesacceptedbythatfederation,includinganyprovisionthereingivingjurisdictiontotheCAS,asisthecasehere with doping-related decisions under Article61 of theFIFA Statutes. In this respect, the Panelobserves thataplayerwhohasbeenexposed toaninternationalexperience,havingplayedinternationalmatcheswithbothhisclubsandhisnational team,must be particularly aware of the existence ofinternationalrulesdirectlyapplicabletohim.

Accordingly,thePaneldoesnomorethantoobservethatthePlayerhasacceptedtobeboundbytherulesoftheCBFandbytherulesofFIFA.

Inlightoftheforegoing,inaccordancewithArticleR47 of the Code of Sports-related Arbitration(the “CAS Code”), the CAS has jurisdiction tohear WADA’s and FIFA’s appeals against the twoRespondentsCBFandMrRicardoLucasDodô.


ThePanelwishes topoint out, by analogy towhatanotherCASPanelstatedintheabovequotedCAS2006/A/1149&2007/A/1211case, that itwouldbeamistaketoconsiderthisconclusiontobecontrarytoBrazilianinterests.First, theprosecutionofanti-doping violations is in the interest of all Brazilianclubsandplayerswhorespecttheanti-dopingrules.Secondly,allBrazilianfederations,clubsandplayersobviously benefit from the coherent and effectiveanti-doping regime which FIFA has sought toestablish whenever Brazilian clubs or selectionsare engaged –as often happens, due to the world-renowned excellence of Brazilian football– ininternationalmatchesandtournaments.

3. Applicable law

The Panel has noted above that Brazilian lawexplicitly imposes on Brazilian federations andathletestheobservanceofinternationalsportsrules.It is worth adding that, with specific reference todopingandanti-dopingcontrols,theBrazilianCodeofSportsJusticeconfirmsandreinforcesthestatusofinternational anti-doping ruleswithin theBraziliansportssystem,providingfortheobligationtocomplyalso with international rules (Article 101). In linewithsuchprovisionsoftheBrazilianCodeofSportsJustice, Article 65 of the CBF Statutes providesthattheprevention,fight,repressionandcontrolofdopinginBrazilianfootballmustbedonecomplyingalsowithinternationalrules.

The Panel has already noted that the CBF itselfdictates its own compliance, as well as that of itsclubs, athletes etc., with FIFA rules (see Articles1, para. 2, and 5, para. V, of the CBF Statutes).Moreover, the CBF imposes the application of the“principles and rules of the FIFA Disciplinary Code” inany disciplinary proceedings concerning its clubs,athletes,etc.,considering thoseprinciplesandrules“of universal application” and the Brazilian Code ofSports Justice“ofnational application” (seeArticle70,para.3,oftheCBFStatutes).InthePanel’sview,thisCBF statutory provision, acknowledging the legalprimacy of FIFA disciplinary principles and rules,although drafted as a rule concerning the law thatmust be applied by the STJD, implies the obviousconsequenceof its applicability in any internationalproceedingsreviewingadecisionissuedbytheSTJD.

ThePanelhasalsoalreadyobservedthatthePlayer,inadditiontothedutyimposedonhimbyLeiPelétorespect international sports rules, has contractuallyagreed, by his deliberate act of registering as aprofessional athlete with the CBF, to comply withCBFrulesand,thus,withFIFArulestoo.

ThePanelalsoremarksthatArticle60,para.2,oftheFIFA Statutes –contractually accepted by theCBFandthePlayer,asalreadyexplained–providesthatinCASproceedings“CASshallprimarilyapplythevariousregulationsofFIFAand,additionally,Swisslaw”.

Inlightoftheforegoing,thePanelisoftheopinionthatthe“applicableregulations”underArticleR58oftheCASCodeareprimarilytherulesofFIFA–acceptedbyallparties–and,subsidiarily,therulesoftheCBF.In other words, in case of inconsistency betweena CBF provision and a FIFA provision, the FIFAprovisionmustprevail.Otherwise, thedeferencetointernational sports rules proclaimed in BrazilianlegislationandtheobligationassumedbyCBFinitsownStatutes(andacceptedbyitsclubs,players,etc.)tocomplywithFIFAruleswouldbecomemere lipservice. The compliance with and enforcement ofFIFArulesisevenindicatedinArticle5,para.V,oftheCBFStatutesasoneoftheCBF’sbasicpurposes.

In particular, considering that this is a disciplinarycase involving an athlete of international status,thePanel isof theviewthat theFIFADisciplinaryCode–incorporatingbyexpressreference(atArticle63,para.1)theFIFADopingControlRegulations–mustprevail, incaseofconflictingprovisions,overthe Brazilian Code of Sports Justice and the CBFDoping Control Regulation because, as expresslyacknowledged by the CBF Statutes, the FIFAdisciplinaryrulesareof“universalapplication”whereasthecorrespondingCBFrulesaremerelyof“nationalapplication”(Article70,para.3,oftheCBFStatutes).

In addition, the right of appeal to CAS againstnational decisions – granted to FIFA and WADAunderArticle61,paras.5and6,oftheFIFAStatutes–confirmsthatnationalfootballassociations(which,asmembersofFIFA,have thecollective legislativepower to enact and modify the FIFA Statutes)have expressed the clear wish to pursue uniforminterpretation and application of anti-doping rulesand sanctions vis-à-vis athletes of internationalstatusthroughoutthefootballworld.Suchuniforminterpretation and application would be imperilledorimpedediftheCAS–absentanymandatoryruleorpublicpolicyprincipleimposingsuchlegalcourse–hadtoaccordprecedencetodomesticanti-dopingrulesover aFIFAdisciplinary systemcontractuallyaccepted, on a basis of reciprocity, by all nationalfootball associations and their affiliated clubs andregisteredindividuals.

Furthermore, the Panel notes that the Player, inhis appeal to the STJD (lodged on 26 July 2007)against the Disciplinary Commission’s decision,expresslyinvokedinhisfavour(inadditiontosome


nationalrules)theapplicationoftheWADACode,inparticularofArticle10.5(“EliminationorReductionofPeriodofIneligibilityBasedonExceptionalCircumstances” ),motioning for his acquittal “or eventualiter for theapplication of a sanction in accordance with the provisionsof the WADA Code” (“ou eventualmente lhe aplicar apena em consonância com os artigos do Código MundialAntidoping”). DuringtheCASproceedings,thePlayerhas slightly modified his position, arguing at thehearingthat theWADACode isapplicableonlyonasubsidiarybasis.Inanyevent,itseemstothePanelthat,byexplicitly invoking the rulesof theWADACode,thePlayerhasacceptedtheapplicationofthoserulesinhisfavouraswellastohisdetriment.

The applicability of theWADACode is confirmedby the fact that the STJD did apply the WADACode (in addition to Brazilian rules, FIFA rulesand general principles of law) in performing itsdisciplinaryfunctiononbehalfoftheCBF.Indeed,as the President of the STJD himself explained inhis lettertotheCASdated24September2007,theSTJD’s decision to acquit the Player “was based ongeneralprinciplesoflaw,theprovisionsoftheCBJDandtherulesofinternationalsportslaw,particularlyarticles2.1and10.5.1 of theWorldAnti-DopingCode [...],which inspiredarticle65oftheFIFADisciplinaryCode(FDC)”.

Therefore, considering that (i) FIFA and WADAhave also invoked during these proceedings theapplicationoftheWADACode;(ii)variousBrazilianrules impose deference to normas internacionais, i.e.internationalrules(seeArticles1,para.1,and3,para.III,ofLeiPelé,Articles101and248oftheBrazilianCode of Sports Justice and Article 65 of the CBFStatutes);and(iii)theWADACodeinspiredtheanti-dopingrulesofFIFA,thePanelfindsthattherulesoftheWADACodecanalsobecomplementarilyappliedin this arbitration as regulations whose applicationhasbeeninvoked,andthusaccepted,byallparties.

InthePanel’sview,Brazilianlawmaybeappliedonasubsidiarybasisasthelawofthecountryinwhichthebodywhichhasissuedthechallengeddecisionisdomiciled.TakingintoaccountArticle60,para.2,oftheFIFAStatutes,Swisslawmayalsobeadditionallyapplied,particularlyinreferencetotheinterpretationandapplicationofFIFArules,whicharerulesissuedbyaprivateassociationincorporatedinSwitzerland.

Inconclusion,thePanelholdsthatthepresentcasemustbeadjudicatedonitsmeritsapplyingprimarilyFIFArules,complementarilytheWADACodeand,subsidiarily,CBFrulesandBrazilianlaw.Additionally,Swiss lawmightalsobeapplied inconnectionwiththeinterpretationandapplicationofFIFArules.

The Panel deems also worth clarifying that, as totheapplicablerulessettingoutthelistofprohibitedsubstancesandmethods(the“ProhibitedList”),the2007ProhibitedListofCBFandFIFA isperfectlyconsistent with that of WADA. Indeed, the CBFDoping Control Regulation provides that anymodification to the list determined byWADA andaccepted by FIFA prevails over the CBF list, andthe FIFA Doping Control Regulations expresslystate that theFIFA2007 list is“taken from the2007[WADA]ProhibitedList,InternationalStandard”and“isadaptedaccording to the revisedversions in theWorldAnti-DopingCode”.

4. Sanction

It is undisputed that the analysis of both urinesamplesAandBdeliveredbythePlayeron14June2007,ontheoccasionofthematchbetweenBotafogoandVascodaGama,showedevidenceofanadverseanalyticalfindingofFenproporex,thatisastimulantincludedinsectionS6ofthe2007ProhibitedList.Asaresult,thePanelfindsthattheobjectivepresenceofFenproporexinthePlayer’surinesamples,regardlessof the athlete’s subjective attitude (i.e. his possibleintent, knowledge, fault or negligence), constitutesan anti-doping rule violation proven to the Panel’scomfortable satisfaction, bearing in mind theseriousnessoftheallegation.

UnderArticle65,para.1(a),oftheFIFADisciplinaryCode, the sanction for a first offence is a two-yearsuspension. In lightof the abovediscussionon thelaw applicable in this appeal arbitration, the Panelcannot take intoaccount the lessersanctionsetoutbyArticle244oftheBrazilianCodeofSportsJustice(between120and360daysofsuspension)because(i)thissanctionismerelyofnationalapplicationwhereasthe FIFA sanction is of universal application, asacknowledgedbytheCBFStatutes;and( ii)thetwo-year sanction is among the FIFA mandatory rulesthatmustbe incorporatedwithoutexception in thenational disciplinary regulations (Article 152of theFIFADisciplinaryCode).

ThePanelremarksthat,undertheFIFADisciplinaryCode, the two-year sanctionmay be eliminated orreducedifthePlayerdischargestheburdenofprovingthat“hebearsnofaultornegligence”(Article65,para.3)or,atleast,that“hebearsnosignificantfaultornegligence”(Article65,para.2).AccordingtoCASjurisprudence,thepossibleapplicationofsuchtwofoldexception“istobeassessedonthebasisoftheparticularitiesoftheindividualcaseathand”(CAS2004/A/690).

Article106,para.2,oftheFIFADisciplinaryCodeprovides that in“case of adoping offence, it is incumbent


upon the suspect to produce the proof necessary to reduce orcancelasanction.Forsanctionstobereduced,thesuspectmustalsoprovehowtheprohibitedsubstanceenteredhisbody”.

Accordingly, relying on a long line of CAS cases(see e.g. CAS 2006/A/1067, para. 6.8) and on theWADACodeprinciplesrelatedtotheathletes’faultornegligence,thePanelobservesthatthePlayer,inorder to establish that he bears no fault or negligence,mustprove: (a) how theprohibited substance cameto be present in his body and, thus, in his urinesamples,and(b)thathedidnotknoworsuspect,andcouldnotreasonablyhaveknownorsuspectedevenwiththeexerciseofutmostcaution,thathehadusedorbeenadministeredtheprohibitedsubstance.Theproofofboth(a)and(b)wouldeliminatethePlayer’stwo-yearsanction.

Inorder to establish thathebearsno significant faultornegligence,inadditiontotheproofof(a)above,thePlayer must prove: (c) that his fault or negligence,whenviewedinthetotalityofthecircumstancesandtakingintoaccounttherequirementof(b)above,wasnotsignificantinrelationshiptotheanti-dopingruleviolation.Theproofofboth(a)and(c)wouldreducethe Player’s sanction to a penalty ranging betweenone year and two years (Article 65, para. 2, of theFIFADisciplinaryCode:“the sanctionmay be reduced,butonlybyuptohalfofthesanction”).

The Panel observes that, in light of the CASjurisprudence, the burden of proving the above isa very high hurdle for an athlete to overcome (cf.e.g. CAS 2005/A/830; TAS 2007/A/1252). Indeed,theWADACode’sofficialcommenttoArticle10.5unequivocallystatesthatthemitigationofmandatorysanctionsispossible“onlyincaseswherethecircumstancesaretrulyexceptionalandnotinthevastmajorityofcases”.

Withregardtothestandardofproofrequiredfromthe indicted athlete, the Panel observes that, inaccordance with established CAS case-law and theWADACode,thePlayermustestablishthefactsthatheallegestohaveoccurredbya“balanceofprobability”.According to CAS jurisprudence, the balance ofprobabilitystandardmeansthattheindictedathletebears the burden of persuading the judging bodythat theoccurrenceof the circumstancesonwhichhereliesismoreprobablethantheirnon-occurrenceormoreprobablethanotherpossibleexplanationsofthedopingoffence(seeCAS2004/A/602,para.5.15;TAS2007/A/1411,para.59).

a)EvidenceofhowtheprohibitedsubstanceenteredthePlayer’sbody

In these proceedings, exactly as in the STJD

proceedings,thePlayerhasarguedthattheprohibitedstimulantcametobepresent inhissystembecausethe caffeine capsules that were administered tohim before thematch againstVasco daGama hadbeen contaminated with Fenproporex during theproductionprocessat thepremisesofPharmacy65Manipulação.

As evidence of such alleged contamination, thePlayer relies essentially on the report dated 13 July2007issuedbytheUSPLaboratory.However,inlightofthebalanceofprobabilitystandard,thePanelfindsthe evidence provided by such USP Laboratory’sreporttobe inadequatetodischargetheburdenonthePlayer.

ThePanelacceptstheevidencegivenbyDrPagnanithattheUSPLaboratoryisareliablelaboratoryanddoes not wish to speculate as to why the caffeinecapsuleswere sent tobe analysed all theway fromRio de Janeiro to São Paulo (rather than to thelocal WADA-accredited laboratory). Nor the Panelwishes to cast any doubt on the correctness of theanalyses performedby theUSPLaboratory andontheaccuracyofitsreport.However,thePanelcannotreadintheUSPLaboratory’sreportmorethanwhatisexpresslystatedtherein.

Having carefully scrutinized the USP Laboratory’sreport, the Panel has noted the following specificmatters:

- In comparison to many detailed laboratoryreportsthatthesearbitratorshaveseeninotherdopingcases,theUSPLaboratory’sreportisveryshortandsketchyandgivesscantdetailsoftheanalysis.

- Thedisclaimeratthebottomofthereport(theUSP Laboratory “does not assume liability for theorigin of the material delivered for analysis” ) warnsabout the absence of any custodial proceduresprior to thedeliveryof thecaffeinecapsules tothe USP Laboratory and, thus, raises seriousdoubtsastowhatwastrulygiventobeanalysed.ThePlayerhasargued,relyingonthetestimonyofDrPagnani,thatthisisastandardannotationthat bears no relevance. However, the Panelobservesthattheannotationhasbeentypedandsignedby theUSPLaboratoryDirector andbythepersonresponsiblefortheanalysis;giventhedescribedreliabilityoftheUSPLaboratory,itisanannotationthatcanbynomeansbeignored.

- Thereport,indescribingthecontainersinwhichthe caffeine capsules were contained, does notindicatethepresenceofanyplayer’snameonthe


labelsalthough,accordingtotheevidenceheardat thehearing,eachcontainerwaspersonalisedwith theplayer’snamewrittenon itdue to thedifferentweightoftheplayersandtheconsequentdifferent quantityof caffeineneeded (2mg foreachkgofweight).

- The USP Laboratory received three containersof caffeine capsules, two of them sealed andone open and partially used. According to theevidenceprovidedbyDrVilhena,thetwosealedcontainers had been delivered by Pharmacy 65ManipulaçãotoBotafogo(fortheplayersDodôand L.) on 27 June 2007, whereas the opencontainerhadbeendeliveredtoBotafogoon20April 2007 andusedbyDodôduringMay andJune2007.So,giventhatDodô’spositivetestingwason14June2007, theonly relevantanalysisto provide evidenceof howFenproporex cametobeinthePlayer’sbodyisthatofthecapsulescontainedinthecontainerdeliveredon20April2007;however,theUSPLaboratory’sreporthasnot indicated how many capsules were in thatcontainernorhowmanyofthemwerefoundtocontainFenproporex.

- Indeed,inthereportitisonlygenericallystatedthattherewasapositiveresultofthepresenceofFenproporex.ThePanelhasheardtheevidenceofDrPagnanitestifyingthattheUSPLaboratoryfound that all capsules in all three containerstested positive for Fenproporex. The Paneldoes not consider it necessary to express anyconclusionastowhetheritacceptsDrPagnani’sevidenceinthisregard,becausethePanelfindsitquiteextraordinarythattheUSPLaboratory’sreportdoesnotspecifywhichcapsulesandfromwhich containers, nor how many, were foundtobepositive forFenproporex, norhowmuchFenproporexwasfound,norwhetherthepositiveresultcamefromcontaminatedcaffeinecapsulesorwhether it came fromFenproporex capsulesfoundinthecontainersgivenfortheanalysis.

Inadditiontotheaboveunusualelements,thePanelobserves that, strangely, nobody from the USPLaboratory was called by the Player to give directevidence on the analysis performed. Such evidencecould have possibly clarified some of the doubtsraisedby thedisappointingly inadequate contentoftheUSPLaboratory’sreport.

The Panel finds also noteworthy that the Player’surinesamplesdeliveredattheanti-dopingcontrolsof6May,16Mayand30June2007showednopresenceofFenproporex.Indeed,onthebasisoftheevidenceprovided by Dr Vilhena, in that period the Player

ingestedbeforematches–exceptfornightmatchesstartingat21:45– thecaffeinecapsules takenfromthecontainerdeliveredbyPharmacy65ManipulaçãotoBotafogoon20April2007,andlatersenttotheUSPLaboratoryforanalysis.Accordingly,thePanelisaskedtoconcludethatinsidethecontainerdeliveredinAprilonlythecapsulesingestedbythePlayeron14June2007andthoseanalysedbytheUSPLaboratoryon13July2007werecontaminated,whiletheothercapsules contained pure caffeine. The Panel findsthispossibilityquiteimplausible.

Withregardtotheimplausibilityofthecontaminationexplanation, it is to be noted that Pharmacy 65Manipulação,astestifiedbyitsownerandCEO,MrMiltonLuísSantanaSoares,providedtoBotafogoatotalof808caffeinecapsulesin2006and2007withnotasinglecaseofadverseanalyticalfinding,exceptfor Dodô’s case. It is also interesting to note thatFenproporexisaverycostlysubstance–muchmoreexpensivethancaffeine–subjectedtostrictcontrolsby public authorities, in particular by theBrazilianagencyofhealthvigilance,ANVISA.MrSoaresalsotestifiedthatinhiscompany’spremises,asrequiredby the law, theproductionofcaffeinecapsulesandFenproporexcapsulesisdoneatdifferenttimesandindifferentplaces.Inaddition,thePanelfindsquiteremarkabletheevidenceprovidedbyMrSoaresthatthecaffeinecapsulescanbeeasilyopenedandclosedagainandthecontainerscanbeunsealedandsealedagain,renderingadeliberatecontaminationpossibleatanytimeaftertheendoftheproductionprocess.

ThePanelalsonotesthatontheoccasionoftheanti-doping controls related to the matches of 1 April2007(Botafogo-VascodaGama)and29April2007(Flamengo-Botafogo), the Botafogo’s team doctordid declare on bothmedications list forms that allplayers had been administered caffeine, while thetested players A., T. (twice) andM. did declare ontheirrespectivedopingcontrol formsthat theyhadtaken caffeine. However, as already mentioned,on the occasion of the doping control that yieldedDodô’s adverse analytical finding neither the teamdoctornorDodôdeclaredtheuseofcaffeineonthesameforms.Therefore,theproofthatthePlayerdidingest a caffeine capsule on the day of his positivetesting is left to thePlayer’sownwords, given thattheClub’snutritionist,DrVilhena,acknowledgedatthehearing that shedidnotpersonallywitness thePlayer’singestionofcaffeine.

In the light of all the above elements, the Panel isnotwilling toshare theSTJD’sconclusion that theexplanationofferedbythePlayerisacceptable.InthePanel’sview,theevidencesubmittedbythePlayerastoboththeingestionofacaffeinecapsulepriortothe


matchandthecontaminationofthatcaffeinecapsuleisunsatisfactory.

Inparticular,thePanelwouldhaveexpectedamuchmoredetailedandunambiguous reportby theUSPLaboratory, thoroughly illustrating its analyticalfindings.ThePanelfindsalsoquitedifficulttobelieve,considering the high cost of Fenproporex and thepublic controls towhich is subject, that aproducermightinadvertentlymixFenproporexwiththemuchcheaper and unrestricted caffeine. Besides, if theproductionprocessofPharmacy65Manipulaçãowasso unreliable as to lend itself to such an accidentalcontamination,itwouldbeaquiteunlikelyeventthatonly a fewcaffeine capsulesoutofmanyhundredsendedupbeing contaminated.Given theBotafogoplayers’intensiveingestionofthosecaffeinecapsulesbeforematches,onewouldexpectsomemoreadverseanalyticalfindingsinthemanyanti-dopingcontrolswhichtheyunderwent,particularly intheperiodofMayandJune2007.

Given the stringent requirement for the Player toofferpersuasiveevidenceofhowthepositivefindingof Fenproporex occurred, the Panel finds thatthe Player’s explanation would have needed morepersuasiveevidencetopassthebalanceofprobabilitytest. In other terms, the Panel is not persuadedthat the occurrence of the alleged ingestion ofFenproporex through a contaminated caffeinecapsule is more probable than its non-occurrence.ThePanelhasnoreasontothinkthatthePlayerisacheat.However,inviewof(i)thefactthatBotafogo’sstaffwas accustomed todispensing to theirplayersbeforeorduringmatchesnolessthanfivenutritionalsupplements(declarationbyDrVilhena)includingastimulantsuchascaffeine–forbiddenuntil2004andpermittednowadays,butstillsubjecttotheWADAmonitoring program – and (ii) the circumstancethatthePlayer,asheexplicitlyadmitted,essentiallyingested whatever the Club’s staff gave him, thePanel finds the occurrence of contamination lesslikely thanthepossibledeliberateadministrationofaFenproporexcapsuletothePlayer.

Accordingly,thePanelholdsthat,onthebalanceofprobability,thePlayerhasfailedtoestablishhowtheprohibitedsubstanceenteredhissystem.

b)Player’scautionanddegreeoffaultornegligence

With regard to the duty of caution required underthe applicable rules, thePanel shares the followingopinionexpressedbyanotherCASPanel:“Nofault”meansthattheathletehasfullycompliedwiththedutyofcare.[…]“Nosignificantfault”meansthattheathletehasnotfullycompliedwithhisorherdutiesofcare.Thesanctioning

bodyhastodeterminethereasonswhichpreventedtheathleteinaparticularsituationfromcomplyingwithhisorherdutyofcare.Forthispurpose,thesanctioningbodyhastoevaluatethespecificandindividualcircumstances.However,onlyifthecircumstances indicate that the departure of the athlete fromthe required conduct under the duty of utmost carewasnotsignificant, the sanctioningbodymay […]depart from thestandardsanction”(CAS2005/C/976&986).

In the light of such definition of the athlete’s dutyof care, even if the Player’s explanation of howFenproporexhadcomeintohisbodywassupportedby plausible evidence (quod non), it seems to thePanel that the Player’s behaviour was significantlynegligent under the circumstances. His departurefromtherequireddutyofutmostcautionwasclearlysignificant. Indeed, the Player did not exercise theslightestcaution.

Questionedatthehearingonthecautionthathetookbeforeingestingthecaffeinecapsulesandtheothernutritional supplements that the Botafogo’s staffregularly gave him, the Player candidly answeredthat he simply trusted his employer and the teamdoctorsandneverknewexactlyhowandwheretheproducts were manufactured nor who producedthem.Apartfromthe justificationthathereliedontheClub’sdoctors,thePlayerhasnotevenattemptedtodemonstratethatheexertedsomeparticularcarebefore ingesting those products. Questioned abouthisexperiencewithhiscurrentclub(Fluminense),thePlayer testified thathewas still being administeredseveralproductsbeforematches,butwasnotabletomentiontheirnamesorwhattheywere.

ThePanelfindsextraordinarythisPlayer’sadmissionthat, despite having already had a positive test,he is still passively ingesting a variety of productsadministered to him by his current club withoutaskinganyinformationordoinganyresearchonhisown.

Asseenabove,thePlayerhastheburdentoestablishthat he did not know or suspect, and could notreasonablyhaveknownor suspected evenwith theexerciseofutmostcaution,thathehadusedorbeenadministered a prohibited substance. Although thePanelissatisfiedthatthePlayerdidnot“knoworsuspect”that the caffeine capsule couldbe contaminatedbyaprohibitedsubstance,thePanelcannotacceptthatthePlayer“couldnotreasonablyhaveknownorsuspected”thatthiswasso.

The Panel notes in particular the clear and publicwarning issued by the CBF to Brazilian footballplayers (and their doctors) as to the risk ofcontaminated nutritional supplements. Article


8 of the CBF 2007 Doping Control Regulationreads as follows: “COMMON MISTAKES BYTHEATHLETEOR PHYSICIAN THATCANBRING ABOUT A POSITIVE TEST. […] DONOT use medications, nutritional supplements or vitaminsof dubious origin.DONOT trust the composition declaredon leafletsand labels ofmedications,nutritional supplementsandpharmaceuticalandhomeopathicproductions.Verify thereliability of the supplier, as there aremany cases of omittedmentioninlabelsofstimulantsandanabolicagents”.

The Panel also notes that the WADA Code –publishedeveninaPortugueseversionintheWADAinternetsite–providesatarticle2.1.1 that it“is eachAthlete’spersonaldutytoensurethatnoProhibitedSubstanceenters his or her body”. Thismeans that the Player ispersonally responsible for the conduct of peoplearound him from whom he receives food, drinks,supplementsormedications, and cannot simply saythathetruststhemandfollowstheirinstructions.

Then,theWADACode’sofficialcommenttoArticle10.5 (provision whose application was expresslyinvoked by the Player) reads as follows: “a sanctioncould not be completely eliminated on the basis ofNoFaultor Negligence in the following circumstances: (a) a positivetest resulting from a mislabeled or contaminated vitamin ornutritional supplement (Athletes are responsible for whatthey ingest (Article2.1.1)andhavebeenwarnedagainst thepossibilityofsupplementcontamination);(b)theadministrationof a prohibited substance by theAthlete’s personal physicianor trainer without disclosure to the Athlete (Athletes areresponsiblefortheirchoiceofmedicalpersonnelandforadvisingmedical personnel that they cannot be given any prohibitedsubstance);and(c)sabotageof theAthlete’s foodordrinkbya spouse, coach or other personwithin theAthlete’s circle ofassociates(Athletesareresponsibleforwhattheyingestandfortheconductofthosepersonstowhomtheyentrustaccesstotheirfoodanddrink)”.

The circumstances of the present case are quitetypicalandfallsquarelyinthewarningssetoutinthequotedArticle 8of theCBF2007DopingControlRegulation as well in theWADACode’s commentto Article 10.5. Indeed, there have been so manyanti-doping cases where the athlete has attemptedto justify himself on the basis of a contaminatedsupplement that practically every sports or anti-dopingorganizationintheworldhasissuedwarningsagainsttheuseofnutritionalsupplements.

In addition, the Panel notes that, according to theconcurrentevidenceputforwardbyDrPagnaniandDrVilhena,therehavebeeninBrazilvariouspubliclyknowncasesofcontaminatednutritionalsupplementthat yielded positive anti-doping tests. Such cases,showingthehighriskofcontaminationofnutritional

supplements in Brazil, should have rendered thePlayeracutelyawareoftheriskandinducedhimtorefuse the caffeine capsules given to him. All themoreso,asthePlayerhasdeclaredthatheneverfeltthatcaffeinecontributedanyparticularbenefittohissportingperformance.

Notwithstandingtheextensiveinformationavailablethatshouldhavealertedhimtotheriskofadopingoffence, the Player chose to do nothing, simplyand without question ingesting every productadministered tohim.Even accepting that theClubhas a serious responsibility towards the Player,the Panel finds that the Player’s conduct in thecircumstances amounted to a significant disregardof his positive duty of caution. Indeed, nothingprevented the Player from complying with suchduty and refusing the products given to himor, atleast,checkingpersonallyhow,whereandbywhomthe products were manufactured. The Panel findsthatnowadaysanathleteofDodô’sstature,ageandexperiencecannotmerelyrelyonhis team’sstaff inusing supplements and vitamins. As another CASPanel has vividly put it, this Player’s attitude is“tantamount to a type ofwilful blindness forwhichhemustbeheldresponsible.This“seenoevil,hearnoevil, speaknoevil” attitude in the face of what rightly has been called thescourgeofdopinginsport–thisfailuretoexercisetheslightestcaution in the circumstances – is not only unacceptable andtobecondemned,itisafarcryfromtheattitudeandconductexpectedofanathleteseekingthemitigationofhissanctionforadopingviolation”(CAS2003/A/484).

Therefore, the Panel finds that the Player’s degreeof “fault or negligence”, viewed in the totality of thecircumstances,isclearly“significant”inrelationtotheanti-dopingruleviolation.

Notwithstanding the fact that the Panel is findingagainst the Player, the account given by the Club’snutritionistpromptsthePaneltomakeclearthattheClub’shabitofhandingoutnumerouscapsulesandsupplementstoitsplayersaswellastheClub’ssystemofobtaining,keeping,guardinganddispensingthosecapsules and supplements seem, to say the least,imprudent. Indeed, what this case has highlightedis that it is the players who end up bearing anyconsequences of such a club’s attitude, in terms ofbothhealthandsanctions.Inthisrespect,thePanelwishestorecalltheWADACodewarningclausetobefoundattheverybeginningoftheProhibitedListandwhichanyathleteorclub’sstaffordoctorshouldalwaysbearinmind:“Theuseofanydrugshouldbelimitedtomedicallyjustifiedindications”.


In conclusion, the CAS has jurisdiction rationemateriaeandrationepersonaetoentertaintheappealsoftheFIFAandtheWADAinrespectoftheCBFandMrRicardoLucasDodô,whileithasnojurisdictionrationepersonaeinrespectoftheSTJD.

TheappealsofFIFAandWADAagainstthedecisiondated2August2007oftheSTJDareupheld.


Relevantfacts

Arbitration CAS 2008/A/1458Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) v. Alexander Vinokourov & Kazakhstan Cycling Federation (KCF) 23July2009

The Union Cycliste International (UCI), theAppellant, is the international federationgoverningthe sport of cyclingworldwide. It is an associationwhich comprises the national federations whichgovern the sport of cycling in their respectivecountriesasmembersandhasitsregisteredofficeinAigle,Switzerland.

Mr. Alexander Vinokourov, the First Respondent(“theathlete”or“Mr.Vinokourov”)isaninternationalprofessionalcyclistofKazakhnationality,underthejurisdiction of the Kazakhstan Cycling Federation.HeholdsalicenceissuedbytheKazakhstanCyclingFederation.Hehasparticipatedinandrankedhighlyin numerous international top-level competitions,such as the Tour de France in 2003where hewasplacedthird.

The Kazakhstan Cycling Federation, the SecondRespondent (KCF) is the national federationresponsible for the sport of cycling inKazakhstanand,assuch,memberofUCI.

Mr.Vinokourov,asamemberoftheUCIProTeam“Astana”, participated in the 2007Tour deFrance,whichwasheldfrom7Julyto29July2007.Hewassubmitted to an in-competition blood doping test,according to the UCI Anti-Doping Regulations

(ADR)whichrevealedthepresenceofa“mixedredbloodcellpopulation indicatinghomologousbloodtransfusion”. Mr. Vinokourov was notified that hewas testedpositiveon24 July2007.The sameday,hewassuspendedbyhis teamand left theTourdeFrance. Mr. Vinokourov has not competed sincethen.

Uponreceiptoftheanalysisresults,theUCI,byletterof30July2007,askedtheKCFtoinitiatedisciplinaryproceedingsagainstMr.Vinokourov.Afterahearingheld on 5December 2007 before theKCF sAnti-Doping Commission in Almaty, Kazakhstan, thisCommission,whichhaddoubtsaboutthereliabilityof the tests, mainly decided on the same day todisqualifyMr.Vinokourovforaperiodofoneyear.

After the communication of the Anti-DopingCommission sdecision,inapressconferenceheldon7December2007,Mr.Vinokourovdeclaredpubliclythathewouldendhiscareer.

In the course of the proceedings the contentiousmatters of the dispute have changed considerably.Originally, by 17 January 2008, UCI lodged anappeal against the decision of KCF s Anti-DopingCommission to impose on Mr. Vinokourov asanctionofoneyearonly.InitsStatementofAppealand Statement of case, in particular in the prayersfor relief,UCI requested thePanel to state that ananti-dopingruleviolationtookplaceanddeclareMr.Vinokourovineligiblefortwoyears.TheextensionoftheperiodofineligibilityrequiredbyUCIpursuanttoArticle277ADR2004wasonlymentionedinthereasoningofthe“Statementofcase”of18December2008.

As Mr. Vinokourov, in his answer of 27 January2009, admitted to have committed an anti-dopingruleviolationandacceptedatwoyearssanctiontheoriginal issues of the dispute were settled and thecontinuing dispute focussed on the matter of thedateofthereinstatement.Mr.Vinokourovsubmittedarguments against the application of Article 277ADR2004inhiscase.TheissueofArticle277ADR2004 gave rise to the exchange of further writtensubmissions.Thedateofthecommencementoftheperiodofineligibility,however,wasnotdisputed:24July2007.

Cycling; doping/use of a prohibitedmethod; interpretation of the wordingof a Commitment signed by the rider;paymentof acontributionasaconditionfortheRider’sreinstatement

Panel: Prof. Christoph Vedder (Germany), President Mr. Beat Hodler (Switzerland)Mr. Michele Bernasconi (Switzerland)


InitsAdditionalsubmissionof26March2009,UCIabandonedtheapplicationofArticle277ADR2004because Mr. Vinokourov was not removed fromUCI sregisteredtestingpool.Thereforetheissueofan extensionof theperiodof ineligibility basedonArticle277ADRwasnolongeramatterofdispute.

Atthisstage,allmattersraisedbyUCIinitsappealanddealtwithintheparties submissionsareresolved.

However, UCI, in its Additional Submission,introducedthepaymentofthecontributionallegedlydueunderthe“Rider scommitment”asaconditionfor Mr. Vinokourov s reinstatement. Against thisargument Mr. Vinokourov submitted variouscounter-arguments including that the submission isinadmissiblebecause,accordingtoR51andR56CASCode,itwassubmittedoutoftime.Mr.VinokourovalsosubmittedthattheCommitmentisnullandvoidandthatitisunenforceablebecauseMr.VinokourovwasnotfreetosignornottosigntheCommitment.ByreferencetotheCanasdecisionoftheSwissFederalTribunal an undertaking signed by an athlete as apreconditiontoparticipateinaneventisunenforceableunderSwisslaw.AccordingtodeclarationsmadebyUCI s officials and by representatives of the Tourorganizer the signature of the Commitment was aconditiosinequanontoparticipateintheTourdeFrancewhich is the most important event in the cyclingcalendar.Mr. Vinokourov further submits that theCommitment constitutes an excessive obligationwithinthemeaningofArt.27SwissCivilCodeandisnotjustifiedbyaparamountpublicinterestofthefightagainstdopingunderArt.28SwissCivilCode.Atwoyearssuspensionplusthepaymentofanannualsalarywouldbedisproportionate.

But, on the other hand,Mr. Vinokourov explicitlydeclaredhisconsenttothePanel spowertodecideonthematterofthevalidityoftheCommitmentandsubmittedprayersforrelief,accordingly.

WhereasUCIintroducedthe“Commitment”mainlyas a condition forMr.Vinokourov s reinstatement,Mr.VinokourovgoesbeyondandrequeststhePaneltodecideon the existenceofhis allegedobligationtopaythecontributionincludingthevalidityoftheCommitmentasanindependentmatterseparatefromtheissueofthedateofhisreinstatement.

Both the UCI and Mr. Vinokourov claim thereimbursement of their legal fees and other costsincurred.

AsitisofparamountimportanceforMr.Vinokourovtoknowwithcertainty thedateofhis eligibility tocompete as soon as possible, he proposes a Partial

Awardonalltheparties prayersforreliefexceptUCI sprayersrelatingtothepaymentofthecontributionasaconditionforthereinstatement.


1. Anti-doping rule violation and consequences

Mr. Vinokourov committed an anti-doping ruleviolationaccording toArticle15par.2ADR2004.The analysis of both the A and the B samplesconducted by the WADA accredited laboratory inChatenay-Malabry, France, revealed the presenceof a mixed red blood cell population indicatinghomologousbloodtransfusionwhichconstitutestheuse of a prohibitedmethod in the sense ofArticle15par.2ADR2004inconnectionwithM1oftheWADA2007ProhibitedList(blooddoping).

Mr.Vinokourovwasnotabletochallengethevalidityofthelaboratoryfindingsandexplicitlyadmittedtohavecommittedananti-dopingruleviolation.

UCI sADR,initsArticle261,forananti-dopingruleviolationaccordingtoArticle15par.2ADRprovidesfor a sanction of two years. By explicitly acceptingthetwoyearsperiodofineligibilityMr.Vinokourovwaived the opportunity to claim the existence ofexceptional circumstances which, according toArticles 264 et seq. ADR 2004, could reduce theperiodofineligibility.

According to Article 275 as read together withArticles 217 et seq. and Article 268 ADR 2004 theperiodofMr.Vinokourov sineligibilitycommencedon24July2007,thedayonwhichhewassuspendedbyhisteamandlefttheTourdeFrance.ThisdateisnotdisputedbyeitherpartynorisdisputedthefactthatMr.Vinokourovdidnotparticipateinanyracesincethen.

The results obtained by Mr. Vinokourov duringtheTourdeFrance2007areautomaticallyannulledaccordingtoArticles256and257ADR2004.Resultsobtained later, if any, are disqualified, according toArticle274ADR2004.

2. The date of the reinstatement according to UCI s ADR 2004

Based on the foregoing considerations and, inparticular,according toArticles261par.1and275ADR 2004 the sanction of two years’ ineligibilityextendsto23July2009.

As UCI is no longer of the opinion that Art. 277ADRappliestoMr.Vinokourov scaseandthePanel


does not see the elements of that provisionmet inthis particular case, an extension of the period ofineligibility,asinitiallysubmittedbyUCI,cannotbejustifiedonthebasisofArticle277ADR2004.

3. The payment of the contribution according to the rider s commitment as a condition

for reinstatement

AccordingtoR51andR56CASCode,thePanelwouldhave to reject UCI s submission in relation to theCommitmentasdelayed.NeitherdidtheUCIandMr.VinokourovagreeinadvancenordidthePanelorderthat further submissions may be made concerningthe Commitment. No exceptional circumstancescouldhave justifiedsuchkindofa late submission.ThePanelallowedfurthersubmissionsexclusivelyinrelationtoArticle277ADR2004.However,asMr.Vinokourov inhis response expressly agrees to theextensionoftheclaimmadebyUCI,thePanelwilldealwith the issueof theRider s commitmentasapotentialconditionforreinstatement.

The “Rider s commitment”, signed by Mr.Vinokourovon29 June2007, i.e.8daysbefore theTour de France 2007 started, does not establishthe payment of the contribution as a condition forthe reinstatement. Pursuant to the Commitmentthe payment of the contribution is an obligation“in addition to the standard sanctions”. The standardsanctionaccordingtotheanti-dopingregulations,i.e.ineligibilityfortwoyears,remainsunaffected.TheCommitment, in itsoriginalFrenchversion,speaksof“sanctionréglementaire”whichclearlyshowsthattheCommitment isanadditionalanddistinctmeasure.The payment of the contribution is “in addition” tothesanctionand,hence,separateandindependentoftheregularsanction.Furthermore,theCommitmentaims at the payment of a “contribution to the fightagainstdoping”whichissupposedtobepayabletotheCouncilfortheFightAgainstDoping.Thiswordingdiffers considerably from terms such as “fine”, asusedinthelaterArticle326ADR2009whichwouldhaveclearly indicated themeaningofa sanctionoreven a contractual penalty. Mr. Vinokourov, whenheacceptedandsignedtheCommitment,reasonablycould have been of the understanding that theCommitment had nothing to do with a possibledoping sanction, in particular the duration of asuspension.

ThePanelnotesthatUCI,initslettertothePresidentof the KCF, dated 6 October 2008, did not linkthepaymentof thecontribution to thedateofMr.Vinokourov s reinstatement. In the letter to Mr.Vinokourovof9October2008UCIonlymentionedtheallegedextensionaccordingtoArticle277ADR

2004 and, hence, fixed the date of re-eligibility for7April2010.Thepaymentof thecontributionwasonly indirectlymentionedby reference to the lettertotheKCF.

This understanding of the wording of theCommitment is supported by the context of theCommitment. It isanadhoc-measure takenby theUCI in order to counteract the rumours nourishedbytheso-calledPuertoaffairshortlybeforetheTourdeFrance.TheCommitmentitself,asthebeginningof its first paragraph shows, was a mere symbolicaction which mainly addresses to the public, thelegalvalidityofwhichwasdoubtedevenbytheUCIPresident and high officials. For that purposeUCIcreatedthepaymentofanannualsalaryasasevereadditional sanction. In this situation, if UCI hadwished tomake the fulfilmentof theCommitmenta condition for the reinstatement, this would havehadtobephrasedunequivocallyintheCommitmentitself. A clear wording of the Commitment wouldhavebeennecessary alsobecause the relevant anti-dopingregulations,atthattime,didnotcontainsuchaconditionforreinstatement.

In the absence of a contractual condition for Mr.Vinokourov s reinstatement an extension of thesanction could be based exclusively on the set ofrules which specifically govern anti-doping ruleviolations and their consequences.However,UCI sADR2004,whichapplytothecasedonotmentionapaymentwhatsoeverasasanctionorapreconditionfor the reinstatementof an athletewhohad servedaperiodofineligibility.AsthePanelalreadystated,Mr.Vinokourovwillbeeligibletocompeteasfrom24July2009accordingtotheapplicableADR2004.

In compliance with Article 10.12 of the WADACode2009UCIintroducedintoitsADR2009anewArticle 326 which provides for the imposition offines“inadditiontothesanctions”providedforgenerally.According toArticle326par.1 lit.aADR2009 inasituationwhereasanctionoftwoyearsormoreisimposed,a“fine”equaltothenetannualincomeshallbe inflicted. However, neither Article 326 nor anyother ruleof theADR2009nor theWADACode2009makethereinstatementdependentonthepriorpaymentofthefine.

Only by virtue of a footnote attached to Articles324 and 325 ADR 2009 which deal with theconditions for the reinstatement such as testingand the consequences of retirement - the previousArt. 277 ADR 2004 - the payment of the fine ismade conditional for the reinstatement, indirectly.The footnote refers to anArticle12.1.034which isfound under “Amendments to other regulations”


whichreads:

“Thepersonsuspendedshallnot,uponexpiryofthe period of suspension, be returned his licenceorgivenanewlicenceandshallnotbeeligibletoparticipateincyclingeventsinwhatevercapacityifhehasnotfulfilledallhisobligationsunderthepresentregulationsorunderanydecisiontakeninaccordancetherewith”.

However,accordingtothetransitionalruleofArticle373ADR2009 theprovisionsof thenewADRdonot apply to an anti-doping rule violation whichoccurredpriorto1January2009,unlessoneofthenew rules is a lexmitior.Article 326ADR2009, asreadwithArticle12.1.034,doesnotconstitutearulemore favourable toMr.Vinokourov than the rulesoftheADR2004.Therefore,Article326ADR2009doesnotapplytoMr.Vinokourov sreinstatement.

In accordance with and on the basis of Article10.12WADACode2009UCI,initsADR2009,hasintroducedtheimpositionofafineasanadditionalsanctionwhichisnewintheanti-dopinglaw.Article326ADR2009providesanewcategoryofananti-doping sanction and is not a mere clarification orcodificationofthelegalsituationthatalreadyexistedunder the previous rules. Therefore, Article 326ADR2009,asamendedbyArticle12.1.034,cannotbetakenintoconsiderationfortheinterpretationoftheADR 2004 in the sense that the payment of afineisaconditionforreinstatementalreadyundertheADR2004.

Inthesituationwherethepaymentofthecontributionis not conditional forMr.Vinokourov s re-eligibilitythePanel leaves open the issuewhether or not theCommitmentislegallyvalidandtheallegedobligationarisingfromitisenforceable.

4. Merits of the dispute in relation to the obligation to pay the contribution under

the “Rider’s commitment”

UCI andMr. Vinokourov are in dispute about thevalidity and enforceability of the Commitment.WhereasUCIisoftheopinionthatthecommitmentislegallyvalidand,inparticular,thatMr.Vinokourovwasfreetosign,thelatterchallengesthecommitmentmainly because he was not free to sign or rejectthe commitment which was a precondition for hisparticipationintheTourdeFrance.

The Panel was requested byUCI, in its 5th prayerfor relief in the “Additional Submission” of 26March2009,todecide,first,onthepaymentofthecontributionasanindependentmatterand,second,on

thepaymenttobeconditionalforthereinstatement.Mr.Vinokourov,inhis“Response”of9April2009agreedtothisnewsubject-matterofthedisputeandrequestedthePaneltodecide.However,thePanelisof theopinion that this issue, given the amountofmoneyat stakeand thegeneral importanceof suchanextra-regulatorycontractualsanction,needsmoreconsiderationwithrespecttothefactsandthelaw.

Therefore, because the issue of the date of Mr.Vinokourov seligibilitytocompetedoesnottoleratefurtherdelay,thePaneldecided,accordingtoArticle188 Swiss Statute on Private International Law,to issue a Partial Award regarding the date ofMr.Vinokourov sreinstatementonly.

5. Summary

BasedontheforegoingconsiderationsthePanelcomestotheconclusionthatMr.Vinokourovcommittedananti-dopingruleviolationintheformofblooddopingand,therefore,istobedeclaredineligibletocompetefortwoyearscommencingon24July2007.Hence,thedecisionofKCF sAnti-DopingCommissionof5December2007mustbereversed.AsArticle277ADR2004does not apply and the payment of the“contribution” under the “Rider s commitment” isnotconditional forMr.Vinokourov s reinstatementthe two years period of ineligibility will elapse on23July2009andMr.Vinokourovwillbeeligibletocompeteinternationallyasfrom24July2009.

Thedispute about thepaymentof the contributionasamatterindependentofthedisputeonthedateofMr.Vinokourov s reinstatement isnotyetreadyforadecision.Hence, thePanel issues itsdecisionas aPartialAward,accordingtoArt.188SwissStatuteonPrivateInternationalLaw.


Relevantfacts

FC Midtjylland A/S (“the Appellant” or“Midtjylland”) is a football clubwith its registeredofficeinHerning,Denmark.MidtjyllandisaDanishPremierLeagueClub.IthasestablishedcooperationwithFCEbedei,aNigerianClub.Theofficialwebsiteof Midtjylland contains the following informationon this cooperation: “FC Midtjylland has establishedcooperationwith theNigerian clubFCEbedei, which playsin the second tier ofNigerian football. (…)The cooperationwithFCEbedeimeansthatFCMidtjyllandhasthepurchaseoption on the club’s biggest talents.OluwafemiAjilore, whodebutedwithFCMidtjyllandin2004asa19yearsold, isthefirst talent tocome fromFCEbedei toFCMidtjylland.The cooperationalso includesplayersbelow theageof18,asFCMidtjyllandhasthepossibilityofenrollingyoungNigeriantalentsintheClub’sFootballAcademy”.

On6June2006,MidtjyllandregisteredthreeminorNigerian players (“the Players”), all born in 1989andpreviouslyregisteredwiththeNigerianclubFCEbedei.

On1February 2007Midtjylland applied for playerpermitsforthreeplayers(“theYoungerPlayers”),allbornin1990andalsopreviouslyregisteredwiththeNigerianclubFCEbedei.

The Danish Football Association issued thenecessary licences in favour of the Players and

registeredthemasamateurs inaccordancewiththeDanishFootballAssociation’sdefinitionofamateurplayers. According to this definition, a player mayreceive a maximum total amount of DKK 24,000(EUR 3,219) per calendar year without losing hisamateur status. The Danish Football Associationdeclined to issue amateur player permits to theYounger Players pending resolution of an ongoingcasebeforethePlayersStatusCommitteeconcerningpotentialviolationofArt.19ofFIFA’sRegulationsfortheStatusandTransferofPlayers(“theRSTP”).

Both the Players and the Younger Players havebeen granted a residence permit by the DanishImmigrationService, allowing a short-term stay, asstudents.ThepermitsgrantedtothePlayersandtheYoungerPlayersdonotincludetherighttowork.

The Players have been given an upper secondaryschool education, in a public school in Denmark.The Younger Players have likewise participated in10thgradeschoolingatIkastYouthCenterandhaveattendedschoolfor13,3hoursperweek(10lessonsof1hourand20minutes),whichcomprise lessonsin ordinary Danish classes, English classes, sportsclasses,Danishcultureclasses,artandhumanrightsclasses.

TheAppellantexplainedthattheNigerianstudentsunder the age of 18 who play football with theAppellant receive contributions towards board andlodgingandalittlepocketmoney.AccordingtotheAppellant,thetotalamountofthesecontributionsdonotexceedDKK24,000perstudent,onanannualbasis, inorderforthesestudentstoberegisteredasamateurplayers according to the regulationsof theDanishFootballAssociation(DBU).

In February 2007, the FIFPro contacted FIFAalleging that Midtjylland was systematicallytransferring minor Nigerian players, in violationofArt.19para.1RSTP.On25October2007, thePlayers’ Status Committee (PSC) issued a decisionagainst Midtjylland and the Danish FootballAssociation, stating as follows in relevant parts(“TheDecision”):“(…)7.(…)Art.19oftheRegulationsrelating to the protection of minors is applicable to bothamateurandprofessionalplayers.(…)13.(…)Theprotectionofminors,infact,constitutesoneoftheprinciplesincludedinthe agreement that was concluded between FIFA, UEFA

Panel: Mr. Stuart McInnnes (United Kingdom), President Mr. Lars Halgreen (Denmark) Prof. Luigi Fumagalli (Italy)

Football; international transfer ofminor players; scope of application ofArt. 19 RSTP; application of EC Lawin general; application of the CotonouAgreement; application of the CharterofFundamentalRightsoftheEU

Arbitration CAS 2008/A/1485FC Midtjylland A/S v. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA)6March2009


andtheEuropeanCommissioninMarch2001andisoneofthepillars of theRegulations. In this respect, theCommitteerecalled that the inclusion of this provision was the result ofanalarmingsituationthathadoccurredrelatingtoabuseandmaltreatmentofmanyyoungplayers,mostlystillchildren.TheCommittee emphasized that solely an interdiction allowingonlyverylimitedexceptionsunderspecificcircumstancescouldbringahalttosuchasituationandprotectminorplayersfromtheirrightsbeinginfringedupon.Furthermore,theCommitteeagreedthatsuchaimcanonlybereachedbyastrict,consistentandsystematic implementationofArt.19oftheRegulationspointing out that no means allowing a more lenient modusoperandi appear to exist. Moreover, the members of theCommittee underlined that the consistent implementation ofArt.19oftheRegulationsoffersclubsandplayerslegalsecurityandcomplieswiththeprincipleofgoodfaith.14.OnaccountoftheaboveconsiderationsandinstrictapplicationofArt.19oftheRegulations,theCommitteehastorejecttheargumentsputforwardbyboththeDBUandFCMidtjylland.(…)”.

For theabovementioned reasons, thePSCdecidedthefollowing:“1.TheDanishFootballAssociation(DBU)hasbeenissuedwithastrongwarningfortheinfringementofArt.19para.1oftheFIFARegulationsfortheStatusandTransferofPlayers.2.FCMidtjylandhasbeenissuedwithastrongwarningfortheinfringementofArt.19para.1oftheFIFARegulationsfortheStatusandTransferofPlayers.3.(…)”.

On14February2008,MidtjyllandfiledastatementofappealwiththeCourtofArbitrationofSport(CAS)directedagainsttheDecision.


1. Is Art. 19 RSTP applicable to professional and amateur minor players?

The Appellant’s submissions are based on theassumption that Art. 19 would have to be appliedonly to professional players especially because Art.19para.2(b)ii)mentionsthecasewheretheminorshould “cease playing professional football”. The Panelhowever considers that Art. 19 applies equally toamateurandprofessionalminorplayers.

Firstly,aliteralconstructionoftheprovisiondoesnotindicate that theapplicationof theprovisionwouldbe limited to professional players. The title of thechapterVoftheRSTP,underwhichArt.19hasbeenset, refers to “International Transfers involvingMinors”.The term“Transfer” is tobe linkedwith thenotionof“Registration”,whichapplies tobothamateurandprofessionalplayers(Art.5para.1).Furthermore,Art.19isentitled“ProtectionofMinors”andArt.19para.1refersto“Players”withoutanyspecificationastothestatusoftheseplayers.ItisthuscleartothePanelthat

Art.19hasbeendraftedtoapplytominorplayersingeneral,irrespectiveofwhethertheyareprofessionalor amateur according to the Regulations. Anyotherconstructionwouldbecontrary to theclearlyintendedobjectiveandspiritof the regulation.ThePanelacceptsthattoapplyArt.19RSTPrestrictivelytoprofessionalplayersonlycouldresultinobviatingprotectionofyoungamateurplayersfromtheriskofabuseandilltreatmentwhichwasclearlynotwithintheanticipationofthescopeoftheregulation.

Inviewof thefinding that theprotectionprovidedby Art. 19 RSTP applies equally to amateur andprofessionalminor players there is noneed for thePanelinthepresentdisputetodeterminewhetherthePlayersregisteredwiththeDBUaretobeconsideredasamateurorprofessionalaccordingtoArt.2RSTP.On this issue, despite registration of thePlayers asamateursbytheDBU,thePanelnotesthatCAScaselawhastakenabroadapproachintheinterpretationofthenotionofprofessionalstatus,intheapplicationoftheRSTP2001(seeCAS2006/A/1177,especiallypara.8.4).

Finally,thePanelnotesthatthestatusof“Professional”or “Amateur” as defined by the RSTP is not to beconfusedwithanyotherstatus,whichisnotspecificto the RSTP or to the activity of playing football,suchasthestatusof“Worker”or“Student”.

2. Does the application of Art. 19 RSTP to the present case contradict any mandatory provision of public policy or any other

provision of EC Law?

The Appellant submits that a strict application ofArt.19RSTPwouldcontravenetheECLegislation.

The Appellant’s submissions are based on theassumption that EC Law would be binding upontheCAS, as regardsdisputes connectedwithFIFARegulations.Thisassumptionisnotcorrect.Art.R58oftheCodeprovidesthatthePanelshalldecidethedispute according to the applicable regulations andtherulesoflawchosenbytheparties.Inthepresentcase,itisnotdisputedthatthepartieshaveacceptedArt.60para.2oftheFIFAStatutes,whichprovidesfor the application of the various regulations ofFIFAand,additionally,Swisslaw.Itisrecognizedbythe relevant Swiss authors, as well as by CAS caselaw,thatArt.187oftheSwissPrivateInternationalLaw (SPIL) allows an Arbitral Tribunal to decidethedispute inapplicationofprivaterulesof law,assportingregulationsorrulesissuedbyaninternationalfederation(seeamongstothersRigozziA.,L’arbitrageinternationalenmatièredesport,Bâle2005,N.1178;see also TAS/2005/A/983-984, especially para. 62


ff.). In consequence, the direct application of ECLaw provisions or principles has been excludedby the parties and the Appellant cannot claim theapplicationofnonmandatoryprovisionsofEClaw.

Even if the parties have chosen to submit theirdispute toprivate rulesof lawand toSwiss law,anArbitralTribunalhavingitsseat inSwitzerlandhas,to a certain extent, to take into consideration theapplicationofmandatoryforeign lawswhere this isjustifiedbyasufficientinterest(seePoudret/Besson,ComparativeLawof InternationalArbitration, 2nded.,London2007,N.707c,p.615).InordertoclaimthataspecificprovisionofECLawistobeappliedincases involvingFIFARegulationsandsubmittedtoArt.60para.2of theFIFAStatutes,onehas toestablish that the relevant EC provisions are of amandatory nature according to Swiss law,which isthelawoftheseatofthearbitration.

Before decidingwhetherArt. 19RSTP contradictsaprovisionorprincipleofECLawthatwouldhaveto be considered as mandatory by the Panel, it isto be examinedwhetherArt. 19RSTP contradictsany provision of EC Law at all. The Panel willin consequence address the submissions madein connection with the Cotonou Agreement, thecase law of the European Court of Justice on theprohibition of discrimination of workers and thefreedomofassemblyandofassociation.

The Appellant refers to Art. 13 para. 3 of theCotonou Agreement, which reads as follows: “ThetreatmentaccordedbyeachMemberStatetoworkersofACPcountries legally employed in its territory, shall be free fromany discrimination based on nationality, as regardsworkingconditions, remuneration and dismissal, related to its ownnationals.Furtherinthisregard,eachACPStateshallaccordcomparable non discriminatory treatment to workers whoare national of aMember State”. It seems to thePanelthatthisprovisioncouldhaveadirecteffectonthesignatoryStates.

ThePanel isof theopinion thatArt. 13para. 3ofthe Cotonou Agreement confers the right to nondiscrimination of ACP nationals only as regardsemploymenttermsandconditions,butnotasregardsaccesstoemployment.ThetextofArt.13para.3oftheCotonouAgreementrefersexpresslyto“WorkersofACPcountrieslegallyemployedinitsterritory”.ThePanelhasconcludedthatthePlayersarenottobeconsideredas legally employed in Denmark. The Appellantsubmits that they have no employment contractand are not employed in Denmark. Furthermore,accordingtotheDanishimmigrationlegislation,theyaretobeconsiderednotas“workers”,butas“students”.TheResidencepermitsofthePlayers,producedwith

theAppealBrief,mentionexpresslythattheresidingauthorisationdoesnotincludetherighttowork.

It is accordingly to be considered that the Playersare outside of the scope of application of Art. 13para.3oftheCotonouAgreement,becausetheyarenot workers. In consequence, this provision is notrelevantasregardstheregistrationofthePlayerswiththeAppellant.

The Appellant furthermore submits that the caselawoftheEuropeanCourtofJustice,especiallytheSimutenkovcase,wouldsupportthepointofviewthatthePlayershavealegalclaimtobetreatedequallytocitizensoftheEuropeanUnionoroftheEuropeanEconomicArea, that is to say, to benefit from theexceptionofArt.19para.2b)RSTP.

TheAppellant refers to the judgmentof theCourtofJusticedated12April2005,inthecaseC-265/03.Inthiscase,theCourtruledthatArt.23para.1ofthePartnershipAgreementbetweentheECandtheRussian Federation must be construed to precludeapplication to a professional sportsman of Russiannationality, who is lawfully employed by a clubestablishedinamemberState,ofanyruledrawnupbyasports federationof thatState,whichprovidesthat clubs may field, in competitions organized atnationallevel,onlyalimitednumberofplayersfromcountrieswhich are not EuropeanEconomicAreanationals.

In the Panel’s view, this decision concerns onlycitizens who are lawfully employed, that is to sayplayerswhichhavetobeconsideredas“workers”.ThePanelhasdeterminedthatthePlayersdonotholdthestatusofworkersbutarestudents.

Furthermore, it is clear to the Panel that theEuropeanCourtofJusticeinterpretedArt.23oftheAgreement between the EC Community and theRussianFederationasbeingrelevantonlywithregardto working conditions, remuneration or dismissal,and not as regards the rules concerning accessto employment (see Simutenkov case, C-265/03,para. 37). The Agreements concluded between theEC Community and third countries, prohibitingdiscrimination as regardsworking conditions, havea scope of application which is clearly limited toforeigners legally employed in the member States.They do not apply to foreigners who are not yetlegallyemployedandwanttoentertheemploymentmarket.Anyotherconstructionoftheseagreementswouldbeintotalcontradictionwiththeimmigrationlimitations of each member state and allow anynationalofthestateswithwhichtheECCommunityhasanagreementtoentertheterritoryoftheMember


State,withoutanyrestriction.

Inthelightoftheabovementioned,thePanelisoftheopinionthattherulesprovidedbyArt.19RSTPdonotcontradictanyprovision,principleorruleofECLaw,ofmandatorynatureornot.

The Appellant also claims that Art. 19 RSTPcontradictsArt. 12 of theCharter of FundamentalRights of theEuropeanUnion, on the freedomofassemblyandofassociation.AssubmittedbyFIFA,the Charter of Fundamental Rights is not a legaldocument having binding effect. In consequence,onecannotrelyuponArt.12 inordertoassertanylegallyenforceableright.

Furthermore,thePanelconsidersthattheregistrationwithafootballclub isnotprotectedbytherighttofreedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom ofassociation provided by Art. 12 of the Charter. Inthat respect, it is clear thatArt. 19RSTPdoesnotprevent the Players from playing football or fromjoiningotherpeopleinordertoplayfootball.

Finally, thePanel also notes that certain rulesmayconstitutearestrictiontofundamentalrights,whensuch rules pursue a legitimate objective and areproportionatetotheobjectivesought.Intheinstantcase,thePanelfullyendorsestheopinionexpressedin the Arbitral Award CAS 2005/A/955 and CAS2005/A/956, especially in para. 7.2, and considersthatFIFAruleslimitingtheinternationaltransferofminorplayersdonotviolateanymandatoryprincipleofpublicpolicyanddonotconstituteanyrestrictionto the fundamental rights that would have to beconsideredasnotadmissible.

Inconclusion, thePanel isof theopinion thatArt.19RSTP,asappliedbythePlayersStatusCommitteein the challengeddecision, doesnot contradict anyprovision of public policy or any provision of ECLaw.

Inconclusion,thePanelfindsthattheAppellanthasbreachedArt. 19RSTP and that itwas justified toimposeasanctionfortheregistrationofthePlayers.Furthermore, the Panel is of the opinion that thenature and the level of sanction imposed on theAppellantistotallyappropriate.Midtjylland’sAppealisthereforedismissed.


Relevantfacts

Arbitration CAS 2008/A/1575 Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) v. Malta Football Association (MFA) & M. &Arbitration CAS 2008/A/1627 World Anti Doping Agency (WADA) v. Malta Football Association (MFA) & M.9February2009

by the Player, after the match of his team againstTarxienRainbowsFC, thePlayer testedpositive tometabolitesofcocaine.

The sample was analyzed by the AntidopingLaboratory of Dresden, which is accredited byWADA.

OnFebruary11,2008,theMFAExecutiveCommitteedecided to temporarily suspend the Player fromFebruary19,2008.

Atameetingbefore theMedicalCommitteeof theMFAheldonFebruary15,2008,thePlayeradmittedhavingtakentheforbiddensubstancesduringaNewYear’sparty.

InadecisiondatedMarch25,2008,theMFAControlandDisciplinaryBoardimposedtothePlayeraoneyear periodof ineligibility starting onFebruary 19,2008forhisviolationoftheanti-dopingrules.

Thedecisionof theMFAControl andDisciplinaryBoard,whichisdocumentedintheverybrieffaxsenttoFIFA,canbesummarizedinessenceasfollows:

“(...)ThecasewasreferredtotheMedicalCommittee,whichheard theevidenceof theplayerandconcludedthat the player had taken the banned substanceswillinglyandknowinglybuthealsogavetheimpressionthathewassorryforhavingbeencaughtnotforwhathehaddoneandinallprobabilityhehadnointentiontoenhancehisperformance.TheMedicalCommitteerecommended that the seasonal circumstances thatprobably led the player to abuse of these substancesshouldbeconsideredasamitigatingfactor.

(…) The Control and Disciplinary Board, afterhearingtheevidenceoftheplayerandtheClubdelegateconcerned, and taking into account the reportmadeby the Medical Committee of the Malta FootballAssociation,suspendedM. forone(1)year, startingfrom 19th February 2008 when he was suspendedtemporarilybytheExecutiveCommittee”.

The Fédération Internationale de FootballAssociation (FIFA) is the International Federationof Football with its registered office in Zurich,Switzerland.

The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) is theinternational independent organisation created in1999 topromote, coordinate andmonitor thefightagainstdopinginsportinallitsforms.Itcoordinatesthe development and implementation of theWorldAnti-Doping Code (WADC). It is a Swiss privatelaw Foundation with corporate seat in Lausanne,SwitzerlandanditsheadquartersinMontréal,Canada.

The Malta Football Association (MFA) is thenational football federation in Malta and affiliatedwithFIFAsince1960.

The footballplayerM. (“thePlayer”) isplaying fortheMaltesefootballclub“MostaFC”,whichteamisaffiliatedwiththeMFA.

Ontheoccasionofanin-competitiontestperformedon January 2, 2008 on a bodily sample provided

Panel: Mr. Lars Hilliger (Denmark), PresidentMr. Goetz Eilers (Germany) Mr. Stephan Netzle (Switzerland)

Footba l l ; doping/coca i ne ; scopeof application of FIFA anti-dopingregulations & of national anti-dopingregulations; applicable law: applicationof FIFA antidoping regulations byreference?;sanction


OnJune10,2008FIFAfiledwithCASastatementofappealagainstthedecisiontakenbytheMFAControland Disciplinary Board and completed it with anappealbriefsentonJuly10,2008submittingtosetaside thedecisionpassedon25March2008by theControlandDisciplinaryBoardoftheMFAandpassa new decision imposing a two-year suspension ontheplayerM.

OnAugust5,2008,WADAfiledaswell anappealagainstthedecisiontakenbytheMFAControlandDisciplinary Board and confirmed its statement ofappealwiththefilingofanappealbriefonOctober30,2008.WADAsubmittedtoCAStosetasidethedecision passed by the Control and DisciplinaryBoardoftheMFAinthematterofM.andtosanctionthelatterwithatwoyearsperiodofsuspension.

TheMFArepliedtoFIFA’ssubmissionsinananswerdatedJuly28,2008andsubmittedtoCASthatFIFA’sappealbriefabovereferredtoberejected.


1. Jurisdiction and admissibility

ThejurisdictionofCASisnotdisputedandallpartiessignedtheorderofprocedurebutthePlayerallegedthathe is “non-suited” sinceArt. 61para. 5of the2007FIFAStatuteswouldprovideFIFAwitharightofappealonlyagainstitsmembers.AccordingtothePlayer,FIFAwouldthereforehavearightofactionagainsttheMFAbutnotagainsthim.

Atthemomentoftheanti-dopingtest,thePlayerwasregisteredwiththeMFA,whichisamemberofFIFA.

Pursuanttoarticle13par.1lit.(a)and(d)ofthe2007FIFA Statutes in force as fromAugust 1, 2007, allnationalfederationsmembersofFIFAmustcomply“fullywiththeStatutes,regulations,directivesanddecisionsofFIFAbodiesatany time”andhaveto“ensure that theirownmemberscomplywiththeStatutes,regulations,directivesanddecisions ofFIFAbodies”.Pursuant toarticle2oftheFIFADopingControlRegulations,“allassociationsshall (…) undertake to comply with these FIFA DopingControlRegulations”.

The2002editionoftheMFAStatutesprovidesunderclause3par.(i)thattheMFA’sdutyisto“observe,therules,bye-laws,regulations,directivesanddecisionsoftheFederationInternationaledeFootballAssociation(FIFA)”.TheMFAStatutesfurtherprovideunderclause3par.(ii)that“(…) in so far as the affiliation toFIFA is concerned, theAssociationrecognizestheCourtofArbitrationinLausanne,Switzerland(CAS),asthesupremejurisdictionalauthoritytowhich theAssociation, itsMembersandmembers thereof, its

registeredplayersanditslicensedcoaches,licensedrefereesandlicensedplayers’agentsmayhaverecoursetoinfootballmattersasprovidedintheFIFAStatutesandregulations”.AstothespecificquestionoftherulesapplicabletothePlayer,notably thearbitrationclauses, thePanelnotes thattheMFAStatutesprovideunderclause78that“Playersare only allowed to take part in football matches under thejurisdictionoftheAssociationand/orFIFAand/orUEFAoncondition that theyobserve therules,bye-laws, regulationsanddecisionsof theAssociation,FIFAandUEFA(…)”.TheMFAStatutes further provide under clause 79par. (iv)that“theregistrationofapersonasaplayerwiththeMFAshallimplythatsuchpersonshallbesubjecttothejurisdictionandtoall therulesandregulationsof theMFAandofthosenationalandinternationalorganizationsofwhichtheMFAmay be a member”. According to clause 80par. (i)of theMFAStatutes, the registration to theMFAispreconditionaltotheregistrationwithaClubbelongingtotheMFA.

The Panel comes thus to the conclusion that thearbitration clause provided in favor of CAS underarticle61of the2007FIFAStatuteswhichwere inforcewhenthedecisionoftheMFAAppealsBoardwas issued,applieswithoutanydoubttoallparties,includingthePlayer,andthatCAShas jurisdiction.ThePanelpointsoutthat thisconclusion is limitedto the issue of the applicability of FIFA andMFAarbitrationclausesinrelationwithCASjurisdiction.The issue of the applicability of FIFA materialantidopingrulesandoftheFIFAmaterialregulationsas provided under the Disciplinary Code will beaddressedunderthepoint“Applicablelaw”.

As to the admissibility of the appeals, the decisionappealedagainstbyFIFAandWADA is adecisionissuedbytheMFAControlandDisciplinaryBoard,whichis,accordingtoclause61par.1subpar.oftheMFAStatutes“competenttodealwithandtakeallnecessarydisciplinaryactionforanyviolationofanyoftherules,by-lawsorregulationsoftheAssociationortheLawsoftheGame(…)”.ThePanelnotedthatunderclause66par.1subpar.(i) of its Statutes the MFA establishes an appealauthority,theMFAAppealsBoardwhichis“competenttotakecognisanceofanddecideuponappealsagainstdecisionsoftheCouncilandotherbodiesoftheAssociation(…)”andthat under clause 67 of its Statutes, it establishes afurtherappealauthoritywhichiscompetenttoreviewdecisions of the Appeals Board, namely the MFAIndependentArbitrationTribunal.Asnorequestwasfiledby thePlayerbefore theMFAAppealsBoard,the Panel, based on the MFA Statutes, notes thatdecisionoftheControlandDisciplinaryBoardisaninternal final and binding doping-related decision,whichisundisputed.


Basedon article61par. 5 and6of the2007FIFAStatutes,FIFAandWADAhavethereforearighttoappealbeforeCASagainstthisdecision.

AstothetimelimittolodgeanappealbeforeCAS,article61par.1andpar.7ofthe2007FIFAStatutesprovidethattheappealmustbelodged“within21daysofnotificationofthedecisioninquestion”andthat“thetimeallowedforFIFAandWADAtolodgeanappealbeginsuponreceipt by FIFA orWADA, respectively, of the internallyfinal and binding decision in an official FIFA language”.ThedecisionwasnotifiedtoFIFAbymeansofafaxdatedJune6,2008andFIFA’sappealwaslodgedonJune 25, 2008, therefore within the statutory timelimit set forthby the2007FIFAStatutes,which isundisputed.AstoWADA,thedecisionwasnotifiedto it by an email of FIFA dated July 21, 2008 andWADAlodgeditsappealonAugust5,2008,whichwasaswellwithinthestatutorytimelimitsetforthbythe2007FIFAStatutesandwhichisalsoundisputed.

Itfollowsthattheappealsareadmissible.

2. Applicable law: scope of application of FIFA and national antidoping regulations

ThemainquestionthatthePanelhastodealwithistheoneoftheapplicableregulationstothepresentcase.FIFA claims that theFIFA antidoping regulations,namely the FIFADoping control regulations 2008together with the FIFADisciplinary Code enteredintoforceonSeptember1st,2007,areapplicabletotheexclusionoftheMFARegulations.WADAholdsaslightlydifferentposition.WADAclaimsindeedthatthe FIFA antidoping regulations are applicable butarguesthatthoseFIFAregulationsdonotcontradictthe MFA regulations which, according toWADA,areclearlycompatiblewiththeFIFAones.AstotheMFA,thenationalassociationclearlyexpressesthatFIFA antidoping regulations are not applicable atthenationallevelandthatonlytheMFAantidopingregulationscanapplytothepresentcase.

ThePanelnotedthatitwasnotthefirstcasewhereCAS had to decide on the question of the scopeof application of FIFA and national antidopingregulationsandonthequestionofpotentialconflictsbetween those regulations. In CAS 2007/A/1446,4.5 et seq, CAS concluded that FIFA antidopingregulationswereapplicablebecausethelastversionoftheQatariFootballAssociation(QFA)StatutesandQFA Regulations referred to the FIFA antidopingregulations but not to any specific and extensiveQFAantidopingrules.Theregulationsof theQFAnamed“CompetitionDomesticfor1stand2ndDivisionClub”providedunderarticle96that“itwasprohibitedtouseillegal drugs for activation according to FIFA regulations

(…) which contain a list of illegal materials andmethods”.Inthesamecase,CASdecidedthat“BasedontheveryclearwordingoftheFIFAStatutesandoftheFIFADopingControlRegulationsand,onthefactthatnothingintheQFAStatutesorRegulationsprovidesforanycontraryinterpretationand on the numerous references to theFIFA regulations bytheQFAofficialbodiesduringtheprocedurebeforetheQFAdisciplinary committee, the Panel concludes that the FIFAStatutes, Regulations and Directives are directly applicableto the present case” (CAS 2007/A/1446, 4.8). In thatcontext, CAS pointed out that “the suspension for aspecifiedperiod is oneof the sanctionsprovidedunderarticle60,whichisinlinewiththeFIFADisciplinaryCode”.

ThePanelnotes that theuseof the terms“directlyapplicable” by CAS did not mean in the specificcasethatCASconsideredthattheFIFAantidopingregulations were applicable per se but that thenumerous references to the FIFA antidopingregulations in the QFA regulations lead to theapplicationincasuoftheFIFAantidopingregulationswhichoperatedascomplementaryregulationsoftheQFA.AstheQFAhadnotedictedspecificantidopingrules,theFIFAantidopingrulescouldbeappliedbyCASwithoutany restriction.This interpretationbyCAScontradictsFIFA’sopinionbut is somehow inlinewithWADA’s positionwhenWADA seems torecognize that in order to apply FIFA antidopingregulations, such application should not contradictMFAregulations.

InanothercasequotedbyFIFAandWADA(CAS2007/A/1370 & 1376), CAS admitted that theFIFAantidopingruleswereapplicabletotheplayerbecause,ontheonehand,BrazilianlawimposedonBrazilianfederationsandathletestheobservanceofinternationalsportsrulesand,ontheotherhand,article65oftheStatutesoftheBrazilianfootballfederationprovidedthat“theprevention,fight,repressionandcontrolofdopinginBrazilianfootballmustbedonecomplyingalsowithinternational rules”. The Brazilian football federationapparently considers FIFA Disciplinary code “ofuniversal application”.EventuallyCASpointed outthat the compliance with and the enforcement ofFIFA rules is even indicated inArticle 5, par.V oftheBrazilianfootballfederationstatutesasoneofthebasicpurposesofthisFederation.Inthatcase,CASthusdrewtheconclusionthattheBraziliannationalregulationsacknowledgedthelegalprimacyofFIFAdisciplinaryprinciplesandthattheFIFAruleswereapplicable (CAS 2007/A/1370 & 1376, 101 et seq.).The Panel sees here again that in order to applyFIFAantidopingregulations,thenationalfederationregulationsmustbetakenintoconsideration.

In the present case, FIFA seems to draw theconclusionfromarticlearticle60par.2ofthe2007


FIFAStatutes,whichprovidesthat“CASshallprimarilyapply the various regulations of FIFA and, additionally,Swiss law” that FIFA Regulations are directlyapplicable to the Player and that no transcriptionin the national federation regulations would benecessary. FIFA andWADA seem to consider thatprevious CAS case law, notably the ones quotedaboveconfirmthisinterpretationofarticle60para.2.

The Panel notes on one hand that FIFA is anassociationofnationalfederationsandinternationalconfederations. As such FIFA issued variousregulations on the basis of the competenceswhichweregrantedtoitbyitsmembers.SuchcompetencesarenotablygrantedtoFIFAinitsStatutes.

On the other hand it is undisputable that FIFA’smembers, in particular the national footballfederations,areissuingtheirownnationalregulationsandthusretain,inaccordancewiththeFIFAStatutes,their own regulatory competences, notably withregard to national competitions. In principle FIFAregulationsthusapplytointernationalgamesonly.

However the Panel points out that FIFA and itsmembersare awareof theneed to set internationalstandardswhichshouldbeapplicableinanytypeoffootballcompetitionsbeitatnationalorinternationallevel,beitprofessionaloramateurcompetitions.Inordertopursuethisobjective,FIFAanditsmemberscan decide that FIFA issues regulations which aredirectlyapplicableatnationallevelorthatFIFAissuesinternational regulationswhichneed tobe adoptedby eachFIFAmember in order to be applicable atnationallevel.

In antidoping matters, the Panel stresses first thatFIFA and many other international federationsinsistedonthefactthattheWorldAnti-DopingCode(WADC)wasnotdirectlyapplicabletothembutthatitwasnecessarythatitbeadoptedbyfederationsinorder tobe applicable to their individualmembers.In this respect FIFA andWADA are thus correctwhentheyrelyon theFIFADisciplinaryCodeandFIFAantidopingregulationsandnotontheWADCin their statements of appeal. However, the Panelnotes further thatFIFAnotonly issuedantidopingregulations at FIFA level but requested from itsmemberstoissuesimilarregulations.Thiswholesetofnational regulationsonantidopingmatters tendsto prove that FIFA antidoping regulations are notdirectlyapplicableatnational level,otherwisethosenational regulations would be useless at best orconflictwithFIFAregulationsatworst.

ThePanel checkedfirstwhetherFIFARegulationsprovidedfortheirdirectapplicabilityatnationallevel

or not. Should no clear answer be found in FIFARegulations as to their scope of application, thePanel decided that it would then address the issueof the potential conflict between FIFA rules andnationalrules,bearinginmindthatthevariousCASprecedentsexpresslyreferredtonationalregulationsor national civil law before concluding that FIFAregulationswereapplicableperreference.

According to article 2 “Scope of application: substantivelaw”oftheFIFADisciplinaryCode(FDC)theFDC“appliestoeverymatchandcompetitionorganizedbyFIFA.Beyondthisscope,italsoappliesifamatchofficialisharmedand,moregenerally,ifthestatutoryobjectivesofFIFAarebreached,especiallywithregardtoforgery,corruptionanddoping.(…)”.ThepresentdisciplinarycaseisnotrelatedtoamatchoracompetitionorganizedbyFIFA,so itdoesnotfallwithin thescopeof theFDCas faras thefirstsentenceofarticle2FDCisconcerned.Howeverthisis adopingcaseandas such thePanelfinds that itfallswithinthescopeofthesecondsentenceofarticle2FDC,aspartofthestatutoryobjectivesofFIFA.In other words should the Player have perpetratedadopingoffenceduringthegameorganizedbytheMFA,hewouldbesubjecttotheFDC,onthebasisofarticle2FDC,2ndsentence.

ThePanel needs to understandwhether a sanctionimposed on the basis of the FDC applies tointernationalmatchesandcompetitionsortonationalmatches and competitions as well. In this respectarticle2FDCremainsunclear.ShouldthesanctionsprovidedbytheFDCapplytonationalcompetitions,national bodies should then apply the FDC andnottheirnationalregulations.ThiswouldthereforemeanthattheFDCisdirectlyapplicableandthatalldopingcaseswouldbe subject to the same rules inanynationalfederation.

HoweverthePanelisoftheopinionthatarticle152FDC is clearly excluding the direct applicability oftheFDCatnationallevel,notablytheprovisionsondopingoffences,forthefollowingreasons:

(1) Article 152 FDC par. 1 clearly specifiesthat national associations must adapt theirprovisions inorder to complywith theFDCfor the purpose of harmonizing disciplinarymeasures. If the provisions of the FDC ondoping offenceswere directly applicable, thewordingofarticle152FDCwouldbe totallydifferent,asnoadaptationwouldbenecessaryand no harmonization would be needed,the direct applicability of those FIFA rulesensuring that the samedisciplinarymeasuresaretakenworldwide.


(2) Article 152 FDC par. 2 provides that theassociations will incorporate inter aliaantidoping regulations into their ownregulations in accordancewith their internalassociationstructure.Thisshowsthataprocessof transposition of the relevant regulationsof the FDC is necessary in order for thoseregulations to be applicable at national level.Thisprocessisinparticularduetotheinternalstructureofeachassociation.

(3) Article 152 FDC par. 5 specifies varioussanctions against the association whichinfringes this article. The Panel sees in thisseriesofsanctionsaclearproofthattheFDCregulationsondopingoffencesarenotdirectlyapplicableandthatFIFAneedsto“threaten”the associations with sanctions in order toensure that national antidoping regulationsareharmonizedwiththeFDC.

(4) Eventually thePanelobserves thataccordingto FIFA circular number 1059 which ispublicly accessible and was consulted by thepanel ex officio FIFA provided the nationalfederationswithadeadlinetoproceedwiththeamendments to their antidoping regulations.In case of the national associations passingthedeadline,FIFAthreatensthemwithfines,whereas no reference is made to a potentialdirectapplicabilityoftherelevantregulationsoftheFDC.

During the hearing, FIFA admitted that accordingtoarticle2FDC,thiscodeappliesinprincipleonlytoFIFAcompetitionsbutitclaimedthatitappliedaswell todopingmatters inothercompetitionsbasedon article 2 FDC, second sentence. As mentionedabove, the Panel is of the opinion that dopingoffencescommittedduringmatchesorcompetitionsnotorganizedbyFIFAmayindeedfallinthescopeofapplicationoftheFDC.This isnotcontradictedbythePanel’sopinionthattheantidopingregulationsof the FDC are not directly applicable at nationallevel but means that FIFA can sanction a player,whocommittedadopingoffenceduringanationalcompetition,withregardtomatchesandcompetitionsorganisedbyFIFA.Thisisconfirmedbyanindepthanalysis of the meaning of article 2 FDC, secondsentence.

Underchapter1“organization”,section1“Jurisdictionof FIFA, associations, confederations and otherorganizations”, article 77 “General rule”, the FDCprovidesthat“withregardtomatchesandcompetitionsnotorganizedbyFIFA(cf.art.2),associations(…)areresponsibleforenforcingsanctionsimposedagainstinfringementscommitted

intheirareaofjurisdiction.Ifrequested,thesanctionspassedmay be extended to haveworldwide effect (cf. art. 143 ff.)[para.1]. Article 77 FDC provides further that “thejudicial bodies ofFIFAreserve the right to sanction seriousinfringements of the statutory objectives of FIFA (cf. finalpartof art. 2) if associations (…) fail to prosecute seriousinfringements or fail to prosecute in compliance with thefundamentalprinciplesoflaw”[para.2].Article77FDCthenforeseesthat“associations(…)shallnotifythejudicialbodiesofFIFAofanyserious infringementsof the statutoryobjectivesofFIFA”(cf.finalpartofart.2).

Far fromconsideringarticles77,143and144FDCasmerejurisdictionalclauses,thePanelcametotheconclusion that the system put in place under theFDCshowsthatFIFAhasexclusivecompetencesatinternationallevelwhereasnationalfederationshaveexclusive competences at national level. However,in order to avoid that doping offences remainunsanctionedatinternationallevel,theFDCobligesthe national federations to disclose them to FIFAjudicialbodies.Shouldthenationalassociationsfailtomeet their disclosure obligations, then theFDCauthorizesFIFA judicial bodies to sanctiononly atinternationalleveldopingoffencescommittedduringnationalmatchesorcompetitions.

ThePanelnotedaswellwithinterestthataccordingto article 144 lit d)FDC a request for extension isapproved by FIFA’s judicial bodies if “the decisioncomplies with the regulations of FIFA”. This provisioncombinedwith article 77 para.2 FDC ensures thatFIFA judicialbodies imposeorextendsanctionsatinternationallevelonalldopingoffencescommittedworldwide during matches or competitions notorganized byFIFA.ThePanel finds that theFDCapplies to every match and competition organizedby FIFA if its statutory objectives on doping arebreachedinanytypeofmatchorcompetition,beitorganizedbyFIFAornot.

ThePanelconcludesthatthiscorrespondstoaliteralandsystematicinterpretationofarticle2FDC.Itthusappears that the Panel’s decision not to recognizethe direct application of the FDC when it comesto sanctions imposed against players on nationalmatches and competitions is not only in line withCASprecedentsbutaboveallwithFDC’sscopeofapplicationasdefinedunderarticle2FDC.

As tonationaldecisionsondopingoffencesandasmentionedbefore,thedisciplinarymeasuresprovidedunder article 152FDCensure that the associationsimplementthenecessaryantidopingregulations.Ontopof that article 61 paragraphs 5 and 6 grants toFIFAandWADAarightofappealinordertoensurethat national judicial bodies apply correctly their


nationalantidopingregulations.

The Panel concludes that in order to ensure theharmonizationofdopingsanctionsatnational levelFIFAcannotclaimthedirectapplicabilityoftheFDCantidoping regulationsbutmust use its disciplinaryprerogativesprovidedunderarticle152FDCinorderto have national antidoping regulations amendedaccordingly.Oncethenationalantidopingregulationshavebeenharmonized,itisthenFIFA’sandWADA’sduty to ensure that those national regulations arecorrectlyappliedbythenationaljudicialbodies,usingtheirrightofappealifnecessary.

Having excluded FIFA’s submissions on the directapplicabilityoftheFDCatnational level,thePanelthen considered WADA’s position which sees theFDC antidoping regulations as being part of thenational antidoping regulations per reference, asexpressed during the hearing, or as prevailing onthenational antidoping regulations should therebea conflict between those rules. In this respect, thePanel admitted that the CAS jurisprudence quotedbyWADAandsummarizedaboveclearlyrecognizedthat theFDCantidopingregulationscouldapplyatnationallevelperreference,beitforinstancethroughnationalcivillaw,asintheBraziliancasementionedabove or through the Statutes and antidopingregulations of the relevant national association inthe samecaseor in theQatari cases.On theotherside, CAS quoted jurisprudence is very reluctantto recognize that the FDC antidoping regulationsprevail as a general rule on national antidopingregulations. This would in practice mean that theFDCisdirectlyapplicableatnationallevel,whichthePanelalreadyexcluded.

However,as rightlyclaimedby theMFA, theMFAStatutes and MFA antidoping regulations do notleaveanyroomforsuchaninterpretation.TheMFAStatutesdoindeedrefertotheFIFAregulationsbuttogetherwiththeUEFAandMFAregulations.TheclearwordingoftheMFAStatutesshowsthatthereisnointentionontheMFAsidetoextendthescopeofapplicationoftheFIFAorUEFAregulationsperreference.Inotherwords,eachsetofregulations isapplicablewithinitsproperscope.CASiscompetentasthehighestexternaljurisdictionoftheMFAwithrespecttodisputesrelatedtoMFARegulations.CAScompetence cannot be interpreted as an admissionoftheapplicabilityofFIFARegulationstonationalcases,aswronglyclaimedbyFIFAontheerroneousbasisofarticle60par.2oftheFIFAStatutes.

As to the MFA antidoping regulations andprocedures, contrary for instance to the Qatariantidoping regulations and procedures, very few

references are made to FIFA regulations. As tospecificreferencestoFIFAintheMFACharter,thefactthatasanintroductiontotheCharter,theMFAexpressesthat“theMaltesegovernmentisasignatoryoftheanti-doping convention of the council of Europe” and thattheCharteris“inaccordancewiththepoliciesofFIFAandUEFAandinaccordancewiththerecommendationslaiddownbytheWorldAnti-DopingAgency(WADA)”cannotleadto theconclusion thatanyprovisionof theCharterwhichmightbecontrarytotheFDCortheWADCisautomatically supersededby the relevantFDCorWADCprovision.

The Panel came to the conclusion that theMFA antidoping regulations should be appliedindependently and without any reference to theFDCantidopingregulationswhicharethereforenotapplicable in the present case, considering that thedecisionappealedagainstandtheParties’submissionsdealwiththesanctionofaplayeratnationallevel.

Consideringnowthequestionoftheapplicablerulesoflaworoftheapplicablelaw,thePanelnotesthatthePartiesdonotspecificallyagreeonanyapplicablerules of law to the present arbitration. As to theapplicable law, the Panel considers that one couldconsider,onthebasisofArt.R58oftheCode,thatMalteselawisapplicableasthechallengeddecisionwasissuedby theMFAControlandDisciplinaryBoardwhomustapplytheLawsoftheRepublicofMalta,which govern the MFA Statutes and consequentlyall the subordinatedMFA Regulation, as providedunderparagraph158oftheMFAStatutes.However,as mentioned above, theMFA Statutes specificallyrefertotheFIFAStatuteswhichprovide,inthe2007edition,underarticle60par.2,thatCASwillapplySwiss law “additionally” to the FIFA Regulations.Farfromseeinginthisaconflictofgoverninglaws,thePanelconsidersthat,inthisspecificcase,whereFIFARegulationsarepartlyapplicableasmentionedabove,Swiss lawshouldapplyadditionally, ifthis isneeded.ThePanel notes however that none of thepartiesdrawargumentsfromtherespectivenationallawsandthatitdidnotneedeventuallytorefertoorconsultexofficioSwissorMalteselaw.ThisquestionisthushereactuallynotrelevantandthePaneldoesnotneedtofurtherdevelopthereasonsforhisdecisionontheapplicablelaw.

3. Merits

a)dopingoffence

Cocaine, MDMA and MDA being class S6,Stimulants,accordingtothe2007and2008WADAList classifications and to theMFA Charter, thosesubstances are thus prohibited at all times, in and


outofcompetition.ThepresenceofMDA,MDMAandCocaineinthePlayer’sbodilysampleconstitutestherefore an anti-doping rule violationor a dopingoffenceaccordingtosection4oftheMFACharter.

b)Mitigatingcircumstancesandsanction

Accordingtosection6art.1.2oftheMFADopingCharter a one year sanction may be scaled downor extended in particular circumstances. As thePlayer did not file an internal appeal against theMFAControlandDisciplinaryBoard’sdecisionandthus logically did not request CAS to scale downthe sanction imposedonhim, thePanel, accordingto the prohibition to decide ultra petita, may notreview whether mitigating circumstances exist andshould only consider whether the MFA Controland Disciplinary Board should have extended thestandard period of suspension. In this respect, thePanel alike FIFA,WADA and theMFA, considersthe case of the Player as a very standard one. Inothertermsnopartyreferstoanyparticularfactualcircumstanceswhich should justify an extensionofthe one-year period of suspension provided undersection6art.1.1oftheMFADopingCharter.

As to the applicable regulations, the Panel alreadyexcludedthedirectapplicationoftheFIFADCandthusofthe2yearperiodofsuspensionprovidedbyit.ThePaneldoesfurthernotagreewithWADAwhenitclaimsthatbasedonsection6art.1.2oftheMFADopingCharter,itcouldextendthesanctionuptotwoyearsandthusreachtheminimalsanctionprovidedbytheFIFADisciplinaryCode.WADA’sreasoningwould indeed lead to constantly extend the periodof suspension independently from the particularcircumstances of the case which is clearly not theobjective of section 6 art. 1.2 of theMFADopingCharter.Asthereisnoparticularcircumstanceinthepresentcase,whichcouldleadthePaneltodecidetoextendtheperiodofsuspension,thedecisionoftheMFAControlandDisciplinaryBoardisconfirmed.


Relevantfacts

Real Club Deportivo Mallorca, SAD (“RCDMallorca” or “the Appellant”) is a professionalfootball club with its seat inMallorca, Spain. It isaffiliated to the Royal Spanish Football Federation(“theRFEF”or“theSpanishFA”), a federation inturn affiliated to the Fédération Internationale deFootballAssociation, theworld governing body offootball(FIFA).

Newcastle United FC (“Newcastle” or the “FirstRespondent”)isaprofessionalfootballclubwithitsseatinNewcastleuponTyne,England.ItisaffiliatedtotheFootballAssociation.

The Football Association (FA or the “SecondRespondent”) was founded in 1863 and is theassociationresponsiblefororganisingandsupervisingfootball in England. The FA is a member of theUnion des Associations Européennes de Football(UEFA)andofFIFA.

On 9 August 2005, the Appellant concluded anemploymentcontractwiththeArgentinianfootballerG.(“thePlayer”),whosedateofbirthis5July1983.The validity of this contract was set to expire on30June2010.

BymeansofaletteraddressedtotheAppellantanddated 30May 2008, the Player announced that he

wished to render his services to another club thanRCDMallorca.On1July2008,theFirstRespondentsignedanemploymentcontractwiththePlayervalidfromthedateofsignatureuntil30June2013.Onthissamedate,theAppellantpresentedaclaimbeforeanordinarySpanishcourtagainst thePlayerregardingtheterminationofthecontractualrelationship.TheAppellant extended this claim to include the FirstRespondenton4July2008.

Also on 1 July 2008, the FA sought to obtain theInternational Transfer Certificate (ITC) for thePlayer from theRFEF.As the SecondRespondentdid not receive a reply from the RFEF, it turneduponNewcastle’srequest toFIFAon10July2008,requestingtheinternationalclearanceforthePlayer.

On 14 July 2008, FIFA invited the RFEF to issuethe ITC for the Player or, alternatively, to providean explanation for its refusal. After expiry of thedeadline setbyFIFA,whichhad remainedwithoutaresponsebytheRFEF,FIFAsetasecondandfinaldeadline on 22 July 2008, ordering the RFEF tocomplywith the contents of its previous letter andsettingtheprospectforadecisionbytheSingleJudgeoftheFIFAPlayers’StatusCommittee(“theSingleJudge”)basedsolelyonthedocumentscontainedinthefile.

In reply to this correspondence, the AppellantcontactedFIFAon23July2008,outliningthatthePlayer was still legally bound to its club bymeansof an employment contract valid from 8 August2005until30June2010.Inaddition,theAppellantannouncedthatithadcommencedlegalproceedingsagainst thePlayer and theFirstRespondent beforetheordinarycourtsinSpain.

On 13 August 2008, the Single Judge passed adecision regarding the international clearance forthePlayer, so as to enablehim to registerwith theFirstRespondent.Thedecisionreads–interalia–asfollows:

“…onthebasisofart.23par.3andAnnexe3oftheRegulationsontheStatusandTransferof Players (hereinafter: the Regulations), as ageneral rule, [the Single Judge] was compententtodealwiththepresentrequestforauthoristationto provisionally register the player in question.

Panel: Prof. Ulrich Haas (Germany), President Mr. José Juan Pintó (Spain) Mr. Mark Hovell (United Kingdom)

Football; transfer; lis pendens in theproceedingsbefore theCAS;powerofthe CAS Panels to take amicus briefsinto account without the consent ofthe parties; standing to be sued as anissue of merits and not as an issue ofadmissibility;purposeofArt.75CCandstandingtobesued

Arbitration CAS 2008/A/1639RCD Mallorca v. The Football Association (FA) & Newcastle United 24April2009


Furthermore, the Single Judge stated thatpursuant to art. 22 of the Regulations, theSpanishclubwasatlibertytoreferthecontractualemployment-relateddispute toa civil court.Yet,the ordinarySpanish court is competent to dealwith the contractual dispute arisen between thepartiesinvolvedastothesubstance.But,itisonlytheSingleJudgeofthePlayers’StatusCommitteewhoiscompetenttoheardisputespertainingtotheissuanceofanITC.Infact,suchmatterscannotbereferredtoordinarycourts(cf.art.64par.2oftheFIFAStatutes)”.

WithrespecttothependingcasebeforetheordinarySpanishcourt,theSingleJudge:

“… was eager to emphasise that the presentdecision does not prejudice any decision ofa competent body as to the substance of thecontractualdispute”.

TheSingleJudgedecidedtoauthorisetheprovisionalregistrationofthePlayerwiththeFirstRespondent,withimmediateeffect.

By letterdated26August2008, theAppellantfileditsStatementofAppealwiththeCourtofArbitrationforSport(CAS)againstthedecisionrenderedbytheFIFA Single Judge. The appeal is directed againstNewcastleandtheFA.

On 14 October 2008, FIFA communicated that itrenouncestoitsrighttointerveneinthearbitrationproceedings.With the same correspondence, FIFAfiled-however–asubmissionentitled“amicuscuriaebrief”,whichexpandeditspositiononthedispute.

TheCASCourtOfficeforwardedthecorrespondencereceived fromFIFA to the parties, askingwhethertheywouldacceptthe“amicus curiaebrief”presentedbyFIFAtobepartofthefile.

Whilst the First Respondent did not object to the“amicuscuriaebrief”tobetakenonfile,theAppellantunderlinedthatFIFAhasnopart inthearbitrationand is, thus, not entitled to file submissions in thepresent proceedings. However, the AppellantinsistedthatitwouldnothaveanyobjectionsifFIFAintervenedintheproceedingsasarespondentparty.

On15January2009,theCASCourtOfficeinformedtheParties that thePaneldecidednot toadmit the“amicuscuriaebrief”submittedbyFIFAon14October2008aspartofthefile,thusconsideringFIFAanon-partyintheproceedings.


1. Lis pendens

The question of lis pendens in the case at hand isgovernedbytheSwissPrivateInternationalLawAct(PIL),sincetheCAShasitsseatinSwitzerlandandatleastoneofthepartiesatthetimeoftheconclusionofthearbitrationagreementdidnothaveitsdomicileorhabitualresidenceinSwitzerland(Art176(1)PIL,and,with respect to lis pendensArt. 186 of thePILprovidesinArt186(1bis):“Thearbitraltribunalrulesonitsjurisdiction.(1bis)Itrulesonitsjurisdictionirrespectiveofaclaimbasedonthesamesubjectmatterbetweenthesamepartiespendingbeforeanotherstatecourtorarbitraltribunal,unlessseriousreasonsdemandfortheproceedingstobesuspended”.

The proceedings before the Spanish courts andbefore this arbitral tribunal do not have the samesubjectmatter.Whilethestatecourtproceedingsdealwiththe(contractual)consequencesofabreachofalabourcontractconcludedbetweentheAppellantandthePlayer,thecasepresentedbytheAppellantbeforethis arbitral tribunal deals - in essence – with thequestionwhetherornotFIFAiscompetenttoissuea (provisional) ITC in relation to the Player. Sincethesubjectmattersbefore thisarbitral tribunalandbeforetheSpanishstatecourtsdiffer,thePanelhasnogroundstofurtherinvestigatetheprerequisitesofArt186(1bis)PIL,sincethereis–fromtheoutset–noissueoflispendenshere.EvenifthePanelwouldhavefoundthatproceedingsconcerningthesamesubjectmatterwerependingbeforetheSpanishcourtsandCAS, thePanel is of theopinion that there are no“considerablereasons”withinthemeaningofArt186(1bis)PILtosuspendthepresentproceedings.

2. The status of FIFA in the present proceedings

With its letter dated 14 October 2008, FIFApresentedthePanelwithastatementonthisdispute,whichitspecifiedas“amicuscuriae”brief.ContrarytothecaseCAS2008/A/1517,thepartiestothepresentproceedings have not unanimously accepted the“amicusintervention”byFIFA.

Having considered the positions of both partieson the admissibility of the “amicus curiae” brief aswell as FIFA’s arguments, thePanel decidedon 15January2009nottoadmititaspartofthefileforthefollowingreasons:

Literallytranslated“amicuscuriae”means“friendofthecourt”.Thetermamicuscuriaeoramicusbriefdescribesaninstrumentallowingsomeonewhoisnotapartyto a case to voluntarily offer special perspectives,


argumentsor expertiseon adispute, usually in theform of awritten amicus curiae brief or submission,inordertoassistthecourtinthematterbeforeit.Itisexactlythis(andonlythis)rolethatFIFAseekstoplayintheseproceedings.

Amicus participation has a tradition in commonlaw countries, yet is less known in the civil lawtradition (cfstumpe F. SchiedsVZ2008, 125, 127).Onan internationalscale,amicusbriefsareknowinproceedingsbefore theEuropeanCourtofHumanRights (ECHR) (Art 36(2) ECHR. The provision,however,doesnotallowforunsolicitedamicuscuriaebriefs) and in European Competition Law, wherethe cooperation between national courts and theEuropeanCommissionisconstruedonanamicusbasis(Cf. Art 15 EC-Regulation 1/2003). In arbitrationamicus curiae briefs have gained a certain degreeof acceptance in disputes relating to internationalinvestments.InparticulartwodecisionsbyNAFTAtribunalshavereceivedahighdegreeofattentioninthat respect (Methanex andUPS, cfFriedland, Theamicusroleininternationalarbitration,inmistelis/leW (Ed), Pervasive Problems in internationalarbitration,2006,p.321etseq).Reasonsputforwardinfavourofamicusparticipationare–interalia–thatproceedings affecting the pubic interest are notconcludedcollusively,unrepresentedpersonsandthepublic interest are protected by amicus participationandthatthetransparencythatgoesalongwithamicusparticipation strengthens the confidence in theoutcome of the arbitration process (cf shelton 88AJIL[1994]p.611,612).

Inabsenceofanexpressconsentbythepartiesthereare two sets of requisites for submissions of amicusbriefs. The first is intrinsic of the arbitral process.According to it, arbitrators must find themselvesempoweredtoacceptamicussubmissions.Thesecondisextrinsictothearbitralprocess,i.e.theremustbeamiciwithavitalinterestinthesubjectmatter.

On thefirst requirement –arbitral power to acceptamicus submissions– the starting point must bethe Code. Unlike for example ICSID-ArbitrationRules (Art 37(2), cf kreindler/schäFer/WolFF,Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, 2006, marg. no 380) theCASCodeissilentontheissue,whetherornotthePanelmaytakeamicusbriefsintoaccountwithouttheconsentoftheparties.InparticularnopowerofthePanel to accept amicus briefsmay be inferred fromArt57(1)3rd sentenceof theCode, since theamicusbriefisnotapartofthe“fileofthefederation”.Thequestion,therefore,iswhetherthePanelmayderivethe respective power from Art 182(2) PIL. Thisprovision states: “If the parties have not determined theprocedure,thearbitraltribunalshalldetermineittotheextent

necessary,eitherdirectlyorbyreferencetoastatuteortorulesofarbitration”.

Art182(2)PILisonlyapplicable,if“thepartieshavenotdeterminedtheprocedure”.InthecaseathandthepartieshavereferredthedisputetotheCASand,thus,havemade a choice as to the applicable procedure, i.e.theCASCode.The latterdoesnotcontaina lacunain respectofamicus submissionswhichwouldmakeitnecessary tofallbackonArt182(2)PIL.Onthecontrary, thePanel is of theview that–absent anyexpress agreement of the parties to the contrary–the Code enumerates in an exhaustive manner allpossiblewaysofparticipationinaproceedingbeforetheCAS,i.e.asanappellant,arespondent,joinderorintervenor. In summary, therefore, the Panel holdsthattheCodeasitstandsnowdoesnotconfertothePanelthepowertoacceptamicusbriefs(submittedbynon-parties).

Subsidiarily the Panel wants to point out that Art182(2) PIL –even if it were applicable– does notobligethePaneltoacceptnon-solicitedsubmissionsbynon-parties.Theprovisiongrantswidediscretionto thePanel in determining the applicable rules ofprocedure. This discretion is not confined in thecaseathandbya standingpractice in internationalarbitration to accept unsolicited amicus briefs. Onthe contrary, the Panel is of the view that there isnogeneralprinciplepermittingwrittensubmissionsby non-parties in private international arbitration.Even in state arbitration proceedings unsolicitedamicusbriefsarenotadmittedasageneralruleintheabsenceofexplicitrulesallowingforit.

In addition, the Panel holds that amicus briefs tend–as in the case at hand– to support one party tothe detriment of the other. Thus, amicus briefsinterfere with the concept of two-party arbitrationandmaycauseanimbalancebetweenoranunequaltreatment of the parties (cf stumpe F., SchiedsVZ2008,125,129).ThePanelholds,therefore,thatthediscretion conferred on it by Art 182(2) PILmustbeexercisedwithcaution.Amicusbriefsshouldonlybe accepted where their disadvantages are offsetby their positive effects. This may be the case inproceedings demanding for greater transparencybecause of the public interest at stake. In theUPScase,forexamplethetribunalacceptedamicusbriefsas thematter indisputedealtwithaclaimbyaUScompanycontendingthataCanadianstatemonopolyunfairlylimiteditsabilitytocompeteintheCanadianexpress courier business. In this proceeding theamicusbriefwasfiledbytheCanadianPostalWorkersUnionandtheCouncilofCanadiansonthegroundsthat the UPS claim would harm the employmentstatus ofCanadian postalworkers and the services


providedtothosewhodependeduponCanadaPost.Inthe“Methanexcase”,inwhichtheamicusbriefwasequallyacceptedbythetribunal,thematterindisputeconcerned an investor’s claim for compensationbecauseof anenvironmental regulationadoptedbythe stateofCaliforniaprohibiting theuseof a fueladditive,whichtheclaimantproduced.Theamici inthis case were environmental groups, who arguedthattheinvestor’sclaimwouldhavechillingeffectsonthewillingnessofstateandfederalgovernmentsto implement environmental legislation. Thecharacterof the arbitrationproceedingswhichmaybe suited for amicus briefs is best described by theMethanex tribunal (Methanex v. US, Decision ofthe Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons toInterveneas“AmicusCuriae”dated15.01.2001,para.49).Thearbitraltribunalheld:“Thereisanundoubtedlypublicinterestinthisarbitration.Thesubstantiveissuesextendfarbeyondthoseraisedbytheusualtransnationalarbitrationbetweencommercialparties”.

Appropriatecases that allow foramicus submissionstobetakenintoaccountwithouttheconsentoftheparties are, thus, disputes that are likely to affectpersons beyond those involved as parties. Only ifthereisapublicdimensiontothematteratstakethedisadvantages incurred with amicus briefs may becompensatedbyitsadvantages.Itdoesnotcomeasasurprise,therefore,thatamicusbriefssofarhaveonlybeenan issue inproceedings that affect thepublic,chiefly dealing with financial, environmental andhumanrightsconsideration.IntheviewofthePanelthecaseindisputedoesnotreachthisthresholdand,therefore,evenifArt182(2)PILwouldallowfortheacceptance of amicus briefs, there is no obligationtodo so.Thepresent casedoesnot affect apublicinterestotherthantheonethatthisformationshallforthesakeofgoodadministrationof justiceapplytherulesandregulationscorrectly.

In light of the above considerations the Panel,therefore,rejectsFIFA’srequestforconsiderationofitsamicuscuriaebrief.

3. The relief sought by the Appellant

TheAppellantseeksasaprimaryreliefadeclaratoryjudgmentbyCASthat“FIFAisnotcompetent inordertoauthorizetotheplayer…toberegisteredbyotherNationalassociation…”.ThepurposeofthisrequestisnotquitecleartothePaneland,thus,hastobeinterpretedbyit.AdeclaratoryjudgmentthatFIFAisnotcompetenttoauthorizetheregistrationofthePlayerwithanewfederationisofnolegal interesttotheAppellantaslongastheITCissuedbyFIFAremainsinplace.TheAppellant’s prayer for relief, therefore, only makessenseifitisdirectedagainstthedecisionoftheSingle

Judge. The Panel, thus, interprets the Appellant’sprimary prayer for relief as seeking a judgment bythe CAS that the decision by the Single Judge isunlawful and, hence, has to be set aside. It resultsfromthisinterpretationthattheAppellant’sprimaryandsubsidiarilysoughtreliefspursuethesamegoalbutfor thefact thatwiththe latter theAppellant–inaddition–requestsCAStoimposealsosanctionsupontheFirstRespondent.

4. Standing to be sued

The First Respondent asks for the present appealtobedismissedasitdeemsthatit isdirectedatthewrong parties. It maintains that the Appellant didnotdesignateFIFAasarespondenttothisprocedureand that, therefore, the Panel cannot consider theAppellant’srequestsforrelief.InsummarytheFirstRespondent claims that neither it nor the SecondRespondenthavethestandingtobesuedwithrespectto the jurisdictional challenge and the challenge totheauthorisationgrantedbytheSingleJudge.

a)Issueofmeritsoradmissibility?

UponexaminingthejurisprudenceoftheCASitisnotquiteclearwhethertheprerequisiteofthestandingtobesuedistobetreatedasanissueofmerit(egCAS2008/A/1517,marg.no.135)oroftheadmissibilityofanappeal(egCAS2006/A/1189,marg.no.61etseq.;CAS 2007A/1329-1330,marg. no. 32). In this casethePanelholdsthatanappealthatisdirectedagainsta“wrong”Respondentbecausethelatterhasnorighttodisposeofthematterindispute,theclaimfiledbytheAppellant is admissiblebutwithoutmerit.ThistribunalseesitselfcomfortedinitsreasoningbythejurisprudenceoftheSwissFederalTribunal(cfATF128 II 50, 55: “Sur le plan des principes, il sied de faireclairementladistinctionentrelanotiondelégitimationactiveoupassive (appelée aussiqualité pouragir oupourdéfendre;Aktiv-oderPassivlegitimation),d’unepart,etcelledecapacitéd’être partie (Parteifähigkeit), d’autre part. La légitimationactive ou passive dans un procès civil relève du fondementmatériel de l’action; elle appartient au sujet (actif ou passif)du droit invoqué en justice et son absence entraîne, non pasl’irrecevabilitédelademande,maissonrejet”.)

b)NospecificrulesastothestandingtobesuedintheFIFAregulations

AccordingtoArt23oftheRSTP,adecisionreachedbytheSingleJudgemaybeappealedbeforetheCAS.The provision does not specify, however againstwhomtheappealmustbedirected.ContrarytothedecisionCAS2007/A/1403marg.no.49ff)thisPanelholdsthatthesameistruefortheFIFAStatutes.Inparticular it does not follow from the wording in


Art62 et seqoftheFIFAStatutesthatFIFAallowsforcases tobe resolvedbyCAS irrespectiveof theparties’ standing to sue or to be sued. Therefore,thePanel comes to the conclusion that there is nospecificprovision in theFIFA regulations and thatthe questionwhether or not theRespondents havethe standing to be suedmust be derived from thesubsidiarilyapplicableSwisslaw.

c)StandingtobesuedaccordingtoSwisslaw

Under Swiss law, a decision by an association likeFIFAmaybechallengedpursuant toArt75of theSwissCivilCode(CC).Undertheheading“protectionofmember’srights”,theprovisionreadsasfollows:

“Any member who has not consented to aresolutionwhich infringes the lawor thearticlesofassociationisentitledbylawtochallengesuchresolutionincourtwithinonemonthfromthedayonwhichhebecamecognizantofsuchresolution”.

The purpose of this provision is to protect theindividualinitsmembershiprelatedspherefromanyunlawful infringements by the association (cfATF108 II 15, 18). In view of this legislative purposeArt 75CC is construed and interpreted in a broadsense (cfATF 118 II 12, 17 seq.; 108 II 15, 18 seq;HandkommentarzumSchweizerRecht/Niggli,2007,Art75ZGBmarg.no.6seq;heini/portmAnn,DasSchweizerVereinsrecht,SchweizerischesPrivatrechtII/5,2005,marg.no278;BaslerKommentarZGB/heini/scherrer, 3rd ed. 2006,Art 75marg. no. 3et seq.; Berner Kommentar zum schweizerischenPrivatrecht/riemer,1990,Art75marg.no.7etseq.,17etseq.;FennersH.,DerAusschlussderstaatlichenGerichtsbarkeit imorganisiertenSport,2006,marg.no.208).Inparticulartheterm“resolution”inArt75CCdoesnotonlyrefertoresolutionspassedbytheassemblyofanassociationbut,instead,encompassesanyother (final andbinding) decisionof anyotherorganoftheassociationirrespectiveofthenatureofsuchdecision (disciplinary, administrative, etc.) andthecompositionofsaidorgan(oneorseveralpersons).In lightof the foregoing thedecisionby theSingleJudgedated13August2008mustbeinterpretedasa“resolution”byFIFAinthetermsofArt75CC.

The party having standing to be sued in matterscovered by Art 75 CC is –according to the Swisslegal doctrine– “only” the association.Pursuant tothistheappealcannotbedirectedprimarilyagainstthemembersoftherespectiveorganthathaspassedthe decision or themembers of the association (cfHandkommentar zum Schweizer Recht/niggli,2007,Art 75ZGBmarg. no. 5;BaslerKommentarZGB/heini/scherrer, 3rd ed. 2006,Art 75marg.

no. 21; Berner Kommentar zum schweizerischenPrivatrecht/riemer,1990,Art75marg.no.60).Thequestion is,however, if thereareexceptions to thisrule.

bernAsconi/huber try to limit the scope ofapplicationofArt75CCbyrestrictingtheprotectedmembershiprelatedsphere.IntheirviewArt75CC“doesnotapplyindiscriminatelytoeverydecisionmadebyanassociation… Instead, one has to determine in every casewhethertheappealagainstacertaindecisionfallsunderArt75SwissCivilCode,i.e.whethertheprerequisitesofArt75oftheSwissCivilCodearemetinaspecificindividualcase.If,forexample,thereisadisputebetweentwoassociationmembers(e.g.regardingthepaymentforthetransferofafootballplayer)andtheassociationdecidesthataclub(member)hastopaytheotheracertainsum,thisisnotadecisionwhichcanbesubjecttoanappealwithinthemeaningofArt75SwissCivilCode.[…]Adisputebetweentwofootballclubs,i.e.twoassociationmembers, therefore, is not a dispute which can be appealedagainstunderArt75SwissCivilCode.Thesportsassociationtakingadecisionisnotdoingsoinamatterofitsown,i.e.inamatterwhichconcernsitsrelationshiptooneofitsmembers,ratheritisactingasakindoffirstdecisionmakinginstance,as desired and accepted by the parties”. (bernAsconi/huber, Appeals against a Decision of a (Sport)Association: TheQuestion of theValidity ofTimeLimits stipulated in the Statutes of anAssociation,published in German in the review SpuRt, 2004,Nr.6,p.268etseq).Thisideatolimitthenotionofmembership related dispute covered by Art 75 CChasbeen takenupbyseveralCASformations.ThePanelinthecaseCAS2006/A/1192forexamplewascalledtosettleadisputebetweenaplayeranditsclubforanallegedbreachofthecontractbytheclub.Thedispute was decided at a first level by an organ ofFIFA.Whenanalyzingtheapplicabilityofarticle75CC to said decisionbyFIFA, thePanel stated that“at any rate, the presentmatter is clearly not amembershiprelateddecision,whichmightbesubjecttoArticle75CCbutastrictcontractualdispute.Accordingly,thePanelholdsthatMr.Mutudoeshavestandingtobesued”(marg.no.41-48;seealsoCAS2005/A/835&942,marg.no.85et.seq.).

ThePanel holds that an association–in principle–has a certainmargin of discretion when designingthe conditions for an appeal against its internaldecisions/resolutions. The Panel has, however,doubts whether –in the absence of any specificrulesinthestatutesandregulationsofafederation–it subscribes to the narrow interpretation givenby bernAsconi/huber to the notion “membershiprelated dispute” (cf alsonetzle S. SchiedsVZ 2009,93 et seq.). A membership relation is not just one-dimensional. Instead, the rights and obligationsresulting frommembership in an association pointin several directions, i.e. towards the association as


suchbutalsotowardstheotherindividualmembers.Disputes between members of an association can,therefore,notbeexcludedfromtheoutsetfromthemembershiprelatedsphere.Thisisallthemoretrueinviewofthefactthatanassociationwhichsettlesdisputes between its members in application of itsownrulesandregulationsisofcourse(also)pursuinggoalsofitsownand,hence,isalsoactinginamatterof its own.Ultimately, the question if and towhatextent the opinion of bernAsconi/huber shouldbe followed canbe left unansweredhere, since theappealfiledbytheAppellantdoesneitherfulfilltheprerequisitesoftheprincipleslaiddowninArt75CCnortheconditionsofthe(supposed)exceptiontothisrule.

The issuance of a provisional registration for aplayer with a national federation touches upon therelationshipbetweenFIFAanditsmembers.Itdoesnotinterferewiththerelationshipamongclubs.TheproceedingsputinplacetoaccordorrefuseanITC,inthePanel’sview,aremeanttoprotectanessentialinterestofFIFA.This is evidencedby thewordinginArt9oftheRSTPandArt2oftheAnnextotheRSTP. According to these rules, only the nationalfederationsareinvolvedintheprocessoftheissuanceoftheITC.Furthermore,thenewfederationoftheplayer has no claim of its own against the formerfederation to grant the ITC. Instead, if the formerfederationdoesnotdeliver the ITCthe issuanceoftheITCliesinthesolecompetenceofFIFA.

Furthermore, inexercising itsexclusivecompetenceFIFA does not act like a court of first instancein a dispute between its members. Instead, whenassumingthecompetencesconferredonitaccordingto the RSTP FIFA is exercising an administrativefunction and, thus, having an impact on the rightsanddutiesofitsindividualmembersinthesenseofArt75CC.Themerefactthatseveral (andnot justone) member is affected by FIFA’s administrativeact does not change the nature of the “appealeddecision”.Ifoneappliestheprinciples laiddowninArt75CCtothecaseathandthenthedisputemustbe considered to be a membership related disputewiththeconsequencethatitmust(also)bedirectedagainstFIFA.

d)ApplicationofArt75CCtoArt62etseq.oftheFIFAStatutes

ThelastquestionthatremainstobesolvediswhethertheprinciplesenshrinedinArt75CCmustbeappliedmutatismutandistoArt62etseq.oftheFIFAStatutes.ThePanelholdsthatthisisthecase.ThepurposeofArt62etseq.oftheFIFAStatutesistoconfertoCASthe competence to decide the dispute in lieu of the

otherwisecompetent(Swiss)Courts.Since,however,the CAS assumes comparable functions as statecourtsitishardlyconceivablewhythequestionastowhichpartyhasstandingtobesuedshould–absentanyspecificrulesintheStatutestothecontrary-beanswereddifferentlyforstatecourtproceedingsandforarbitralproceedings.

e)Summary

SummoningupthePanelholdsthatneithertheFirstnor the Second Respondent have standing to besued in respect of the primary request filed by theAppellant and that, therefore, the appeal must bedismissedinsofar.Thesameistrueforthesecondaryrelief sought by theAppellant.Also themotion toamendortosupplementan(administrative)decisionby an organof a federationmust –like the requestto set aside such decision– be directed against the“proper”party,i.e.FIFA.SincetheAppellantfailedtocomplywith this, also themotion for secondaryreliefmustbedismissed.

Since it is the responsibility of the Appellant tofulfil the prerequisites of an appeal the Panel seesnodutyon thepartofFIFAtocure theomissionsbytheAppellantbysteppingintothisprocedureasanintervenor.ThePanel,therefore,seesnoissueofvenirecontrafactumpropriumonFIFA’ssideinthecaseathand.


Faitspertinents

M.VladimirGusev(“ledemandeur”ou“lecycliste”)estuncoureurcyclisteprofessionnelrusse.

Olympus sarl (“la défenderesse” ou “l’équipe”)est une société ayant son siège auLuxembourg.Ladéfenderesseestlaresponsablefinancièredel’équipeprofessionnelle de cyclisme Astana et exploite lalicenceprofessionnelleUCIProTourpour l’équipejusqu’en2010.

Endatedu15novembre2007, lespartiesontsignéun contrat intitulé “Professional Rider TeamAgreementForASelf-EmployedRider”.

Cecontratétaitconclupouruneduréededeuxanset prévoyait pour le demandeur une rémunérationde EUR 275’000.-- pour l’année 2008 et de EUR340’000.--pourl’année2009.

Ce contrat contient notamment, sur le thèmede larésiliationducontrat,lesclausessuivantes:

“PREAMBULE,E.Conditionssuivantes:LeCyclisteacceptedemettreàladispositiondel’Equipeson dossiermédical et son anamnèse clinique.Cesinformations doivent être jugées satisfaisantes parl’équipemédicaledelaSociétéavecdélivranced’uneapprobation formelle avant l’entrée en vigueur duprésentAccord.Si,àl’entréeenvigueurduprésent

Accord, cette condition n’est pas intégralement etinconditionnellement remplie, la Société aura ledroit de refuser l’Accord.Si les analysesmédicalesannuellesprogramméesensuiteparOlympusrelèventuneanomaliedenaturebiologique,physiologique(ouautre)qui,del’avisdel’équipemédicaled’Olympus,seraitincompatibleaveclecyclismeprofessionnel,laSociétéauraledroitderefuserleprésentAccord”;

“1. Prestations du Cycliste, (b) (iv): Le Cyclisterespectera les statuts et le règlements de l’UCI,des Fédérations nationales applicables, toute loinationale antidopage des pays qui accueillentles courses cyclistes professionnelles auxquelles ilparticipeetleCodedeConduitepubliéparl’AgenceMondialeAntidopage, de même que les règles oule Code de Conduite de l’Equipe et la politiqueantidopagedel’Equipe.LaSociétécommuniqueraau Cycliste et lui remettra les documents écritscontenant les règles et/ou le code de conduite del’Equipe. Le non-respect inconditionnel de cetteobligationseraconsidérécommeuneviolationgravedelapartduCycliste”;

“5. Etat de santé du Cycliste et tests antidopageet médicaux, (c): Dans certains cas, la Société etl’Equipe peuvent demander au Cycliste de sesoumettreàdestestsantidopageet/ouéthyliques.SilaSociétéetl’EquipeontuneraisondesuspecterqueleCyclistefaitusagededrogues,substancestoxiques,alcools,narcotiquesouautresubstancesouscontrôleoudopante,leCyclistepeutêtreenvoyéauprèsd’unlaboratoired’analysecertifiépouryêtresoumisauxexamensnécessaires.Detempsentemps,l’UCIetd’autresOrganesgouvernementauxpeuventexécuterdestestsantidopagedecontrôlepourdécelerunusageéventueldesubstancesinterditesousouscontrôle.LeCyclistesemontreratoutàfaitprêtàsesoumettreà ces analyses. Si le Cycliste refuse, sans raisonvalable,desesoumettreàcestestsous’ilometl’undecestestspourquelqueraisonquecesoit,laSociétépourramettrefinauprésentAccordconformémentauxconditionsderésiliationdecetAccordoubiensuspendre leCycliste conformémentauxrèglementsde l’UCI ou à ceux des Fédérations affiliées, enfaisantparvenirunenotificationécriteauCycliste”;

“12. Résiliation par la Société, (a): La Sociétépeut résilier le présent Contrat sans préavis niresponsabilitédepréjudiceencasdenégligencegrave

Formation: Me José Juan Pinto (Espagne), Président M. Guido De Croock (Belgique)Me Michele Bernasconi (Suisse)

Cyclisme; résiliationunilatéraleducontratpassé entre un cycliste et son équipe;qualification juridiqueducontrat; absencede justesmotifs; conséquencesfinancièresd’une résiliation unilatérale sans justesmotifs; demande d’une indemnitéadditionnelleenréparationdutortmoral

Arbitrage TAS 2008/O/1643Vladimir Gusev c. Olympus sarl15juin2009


delapartduCyclisteoudesuspensiondecedernierconformément aux dispositions des règlementsUCI pendant la durée résiduelle de l’Accord.Par négligence grave il faut également entendre laviolation des normes antidopage nationales despaysoùleCyclisteprendpartàdesévénementsdecyclisme professionnel, la violation des règlementsUCI ou de ceux des Fédérations nationales, duCode de Conduite publié par l’Agence MondialeAntidopage,duCodedeConduiteoudelapolitiqueantidopage de l’Equipe, la collaboration, directeou indirecte, avecunautre entraîneur,médecin ouprofessionnel de santé sans l’assentiment préalableécrit de laSociété, le refus de disputer des coursescyclistesmalgrélesinvitationsréitéréesencesensdelapartdel’Equipe.S’ilyalieu,leCyclistedevraprouverqu’iln’estpasenmesuredeparticiperàuneépreuve”.(Traductionlibre)

Par courrier du 23 juillet 2008 à l’attention deM.Vladimir Gusev, Olympus sarl a résilié avec effetimmédiat le contrat conclu aumotif que le rapportmédicalducoureurindiquaitdesanomaliesdanslesvaleursd’urineetdesangrendantlecoureursuspectd’avoirutiliséunesubstanceinterditeparl’AMA.

Il était également précisé dans ce courrier qu’àcompter du 23 juillet 2008,M.VladimirGusevnefaisaitpluspartiedel’équipeAstana.

Larésiliationducontratapar lasuiteétéannoncéeparOlympus sarl par voie de presse.Olympus sarlaégalementindiquéquellesétaientlesraisonsayantprésidé à la résiliation de ce contrat, à savoir unesuspiciondedopage.

Par courrier du 29 juillet 2008, l’Union CyclisteInternationale (UCI) informait la Fédérationrusse de cyclisme, soit pour elle son Président M.AlexanderGusyatnikov, que les analyses sanguinesdeM.VladimirGusevn’excèdentpasleslimitesquiauraient dû impliquer une déclaration d’incapacité,conformémentauxrèglespertinentesdel’UCI.

L’UCI indiquait égalementqueM.VladimirGusevétaitdès lorsautoriséàparticiperàdesévénementscyclistesréglementésparl’UCI.

Paractedu1erseptembre2008,M.VladimirGuseva saisi leTASd’une requêted’arbitrage auxfinsdevoir condamner Olympus sarl en raison des faitsprécédemmentexpliqués.

Parmémoire réponsedu8octobre 2008,Olympussarl s’est opposée aux prétentions du demandeuret annonçait une demande reconventionnelle d’unmontantdeEUR1million,fixéexaequoetbono.

M.VladimirGusevaadressésonmémoireauTASendatedu27novembre2008.Ilconclutaupaiementdesmontantssuivants:

- EUR 500’416.67 à titre de salaire, cela enapplication de l’art. 337c al. 1 du Code desObligations (CO), plus intérêts à partir du 27novembre2008;

- EUR154’750.--autitredel’indemnitéprévueparl’art. 337c al. 3CO, plus intérêts à partir du 27novembre2008;

- EUR 5’000’000.-- à titre du dommage subi enrelationaveclaviolationdelapersonnalité,plusintérêtsàpartirdu1erseptembre2008;

- EUR 30’000.-- à titre de tort moral, cela enapplicationdesart.49cum328CO,plusintérêtsàpartirdu27novembre2008.

Dans son mémoire réponse du 12 janvier 2009,Olympussarl conclutau rejetde lademandedeM.VladimirGusevetàlacondamnationdecelui-ciaupaiementd’unmontantàtitrededommagemoralfixéexaequoetbonoàEUR1million,avecsuited’intérêts.

Extraitsdesconsidérants

1. Qualification juridique de la convention signée

La Formation considère qu’il se justifie, dans unpremier temps, d’analyser en détails quelle est lanature juridique de la convention conclue entre lespartiesle15novembre2007.

Le demandeur soutient qu’il s’agit d’un contrat detravail.Ladéfenderessesoutientquantàellequ’ilnes’agit aucunement d’un contrat de travailmais bienaucontraired’uneconventiondecollaborationàtitreindépendant,sansréelrapportdesubordination.

L’undesprincipesessentielsdudroitsuisseestceluidelalibertécontractuelle(art.19al.1CO).Endroitsuisse,uneconventionestvalable,saufsielleapourobjetunechose impossible, illiciteoucontraireauxmœurs(art.20al.1CO).

Selonl’article319al.1CO,“parlecontratindividueldetravail, le travailleur s’engage, pour une durée déterminée ouindéterminée,à travaillerau servicede l’employeur et celui-cià payer un salaire fixé d’après le temps ou le travail fourni(salaireauxpiècesouàlatâche)”.

De cette définition légale, l’on peut tirer quatreéléments caractéristiques du contrat de travail:


premièrement,letravailleurs’engageàtravailler,soitdéployer une activité; deuxièmement, le travailleurdéploiecetteactivitédansladurée;troisièmement,letravailleuragitauservicedel’employeur,c’est-à-diredansunrapportdesubordination;enfin,letravailleurperçoitunsalaire(AubertG.,CommentaireRomandduCodedesObligations,Bâle2003,adart.319CO,n.1).

Ladistinctionentrelecontratdetravailetlesautrescontrats,notammentlemandat,revêtuneimportanceconsidérable.“Eneffet,àladifférencedesrèglesgouvernantces autres contrats, celles qui touchent le contrat de travailrestreignenttrèsfortementl’autonomiedesparties(cf.CO361et362).(…)”(AubertG.,op.cit.,adart.319CO,n.22).

Ladoctrineunanimesouligneque“lerégimeducontratde travail comportant de nombreuses règles impératives, l’onnesauraitpermettreauxpartiesdes’ysoustraireendécidantd’exclure l’application du droit du travail à leurs relations,quandbienmêmecesdernièresrépondraientàladéfinitionducontratdetravailselonCO319I.C’estdirequelaqualification,opérée à la lumière des critères objectifs contenus dans cettedéfinition,revêtuncaractèreimpératif:laqualificationvouluepar lesparties constitue, toutauplus,un indicenondécisif”(AubertG.,op.cit.,n.23).

Auvudecequiprécède,ducontenudelaconventionconclueetdesargumentsdéveloppésparlespartiesdans leurs écritures ainsi que lors de l’audiencequis’esttenue,laFormationconsidèrequ’ilnefaitaucundoutequelecontratconcluestuncontratdetravailausensdesarticles319etsuivantsCO.

Eneffet,ilrésulteducontenudelaconventionprécitéeun clair rapport de subordination entre Olympussarl et le cycliste, en l’espèce M. Vladimir Gusev.Sur ce sujet, la Formation retient en effet commedéterminantslesargumentsavancésparM.VladimirGusev,notammentl’obligationdeneparticiperqu’àdes courses pour l’équipe, l’interdiction d’effectuercertainssportssansleconsentementdel’équipeetlasoumissionàlatactiquedecourse.LaFormationnoteégalement,surcesujet,l’obligationdetenirinforméel’équipe de son programme d’entraînement, celui-ci devant être conforme aux standards minimumsdéfinispar l’équipe, l’interdictiondecollaboreravecunautreentraîneur,médecinouprofessionneldesantésans le consentement d’Olympus sarl, l’interdictiondetravaillerpouruneautreéquipeetl’interdictiondefairede lapublicitépourdessponsorsdifférentsdeceuxdel’équipe.

La Formation est d’avis que les obligationssusmentionnées illustrent l’existence d’un lien desubordinationetd’unerelationdetravail.Lefaitquelespartiesaientstipulédansquelquesclausesdeleur

contrat qu’elles n’étaient pas liées par une relationcontractuelle de travail au sens des articles 319 etsuivantsduCOnesauraitmodifierceconstat.Eneffet,laFormationconsidèrequ’auvudel’analyseglobaleducontratetdesdispositions juridiques, lespartiesontconcluuncontrattravailetceindépendammentdelaqualificationqu’ellesontretenue.

Les arguments soulevés par Olympus sarl nepermettentpasd’inverserceconstat.

Auvudecequiprécède,laFormationconsidèrequelesarticles319etsuivantsCOsontapplicablesetquec’estàlalumièredecesdispositionsquelarésiliationdelaconventionconcluedevraêtreexaminée.

2. Résiliation de la convention conclue

Selonl’article357al.2CO,“entantqu’ilsdérogentàdesclausesimpératives,lesaccordsentreemployeursettravailleursliés par la convention sont nuls et remplacés par ces clauses;toutefois,lesdérogationsstipuléesenfaveurdestravailleurssontvalables”.

Le droit du travail est un domaine du droit danslequel le législateur a prévu un certain nombre dedispositions absolument impératives, auxquelles ilnepeutêtredérogéniaudétrimentdusalarié,niaudétriment de l’employeur (article 361 CO) (AubertG.,op.cit.,adart.361-362CO,n.1).

L’article 361 CO liste les dispositions absolumentimpératives.

L’article337al.1et2COquitraitentdelarésiliationimmédiate pour juste motifs sont des dispositionsabsolumentimpératives(article361CO).

Selon la doctrine, “il ne suffit pas que les rapports deconfianceentrelespartiessoientsubjectivementdétruits.Encorefaut-ilque,objectivement,selonlesrèglesdelabonnefoi,l’onne puisse plus attendre de la partie qui a donné le congé lacontinuation des rapports de travail jusqu’à l’échéance ducontrat.Encela,lecontratdetravailsedistingueducontratdemandat,auquel,enprincipe, chacunedespartiespeutmettrefin librement avec effet immédiat, pour des raisons purementsubjectives (CO404).Le juge apprécie librement l’existencedejustesmotifs,enappliquantlesrèglesdudroitetdel’équité(CC4), compte tenu de tous les éléments du cas particulier,notamment la position et la responsabilité du travailleur, legenred’emploietladuréedesrapportscontractuels,ainsiquedelanatureetdel’importancedesmanquements”(AubertG.,op.cit.,adart.337CO,n.2-3).

Seul un manquement particulièrement grave dutravailleur justifie son licenciement immédiat. Si lemanquementestdegravitémoyenneoulégère,ilne


peutentraînerunerésiliationimmédiateques’ilaétérépétémalgréunouplusieursavertissements(AubertG.,op.cit.,adart.337CO,n.4).

La doctrine a également précisé qu’est injustifié lelicenciement prononcé sur la base de soupçons quise révèlentpar la suitemal fondés.Le licenciementimmédiatestparcontrejustifiésil’employeurparvientà établir les manquements soupçonnés et que cesderniersconstituentdejustesmotifsconformémentàl’article337CO(AubertG.,op.cit.,adart.337CO,n.4;WylerR.,DroitduTravail,2èmeéd.,Berne2008,p.494-495).

Enl’espèce,comptetenudelaqualificationjuridiqueretenue de la convention signée, la Formationconsidère que le courrier adressé parOlympus sarlàM.VladimirGusevle23juillet2008constitueunerésiliationimmédiateducontratdetravailausensdel’article337al.1CO.

Il reste dès lors à examiner si ladite résiliationdoitêtreconsidéréecommejustifiéeoupas,cequirevientàexaminerl’existencede“justesmotifs”derésiliationausensdel’article337al.1CO.

Atitrepréalable,laFormationnotequelarésiliationdu23juillet2008estmotivéecommesuit:

“nous avons reçu un rapport médical du Dr.Damsgaard qui indique des anomalies dans lesvaleursdevotreurineetdevotresang.Voustrouverezci-joint une copie de ce rapport”. (Traductionlibre)

Parailleurs,laFormationretientcommedéterminant,pourl’examendeséventuelsjustesmotifs,ceci:

- LesconclusionsduDr.RasmusDamsgaardtellesqu’ellesrésultentdesoncourrieldu20juillet2008sont libellées comme suit:: “Le test urinaire pourl’EPOhautementsuspectcombinéauxvariationsdansleprofilsanguin individuelsontdesolides indicateursd’unestimulationdelamoellecauséepardel’EPOexogèneouparunesubstanceaveceffetsimilairecommeparexempleCERA. Sur la base de ces deux faits, le coureur estconsidéré comme suspect d’avoir utilisé une substanceinterdite par l’AMA” ); (Soulignement ajouté)(Traductionlibre)

- Olympus sarl n’allègue pas, ni ne démontre àsatisfactiondedroit,quelesrésultatsdesanalysesmédicalesdeM.VladimirGusevconstituentuneviolationdesrèglesfixéesparl’AMAoul’UCI;

- Le communiqué de presse d’Olympus sarl estlibellécommesuit:“Bienquesesrésultatsn’indiquent

pas l’utilisation d’une substance interdite, les valeurs deVladimirontexcédélesparamètresnormauxétablisparleDr.Damsgaardetn’étaientpasconformesavecl’accordstrict signé par tous les trente cyclistes” ; (Traductionlibre)

- M.VladimirGusevapuparticiperàdifférentescompétitionssuiteàsonlicenciement,l’UCIayantd’ailleurs confirmé à la Fédération cycliste deRussie,parcourrierdu29juillet2008,quecelui-là était autorisé à participer à des compétitionsréglementéesparl’UCI;

- Interpellée par la Formation lors de l’audience,le Conseil d’Olympus sarl a confirmé que M.Vladimir Gusev a été licencié pour un profilsuspect.

Auvudeceséléments,laFormationretientqu’iln’yavait pas de justes motifs de résiliation avec effetimmédiatducontratdetravaildeM.VladimirGusev.Lesimplefait,del’aveumêmed’Olympussarl,quelesanalyses,notammentd’urine,ducoureurGusevaientétésuspectesn’autorisaitenaucuncasOlympussarlàrésilieraveceffetimmédiatlecontratconclu.

Olympussarln’étaitdèslorspasendroitdemettrefinunilatéralementetimmédiatementaucontratconclu,quecesoitsurlabaseduparagrapheEduPréambule,del’article5,del’article12oud’unautrearticledelaconventiondu15novembre2007.

Parsurabondancedemoyens,laFormationretientqueladispositionducontratde travaildu15novembre2007qui semble régirprécisément la situationdanslaquelleOlympus sarl s’est trouvée suite au courrielduDr.RasmusDamsgaarddu20juillet2008estrégieparl’article5lettrecduditaccord.

Cettedispositionprévoitnotammentquesi l’équipea une raison de suspecter qu’un coureur fait usagededroguesoudesubstancesdopantes,leditcoureurpeut être envoyé auprès d’un laboratoire d’analysecertifiépouryêtresoumisauxexamensnécessaires.Le cycliste doit se montrer disposé à se soumettreà ces analyses; à défaut, l’équipe peut notammentmettrefinaucontrat.

Or en l’espèce, suite au courriel susmentionné duDr.RasmusDamsgaard,Olympusn’apasdemandéàM.VladimirGusevdesesoumettreàdesanalysesauprèsd’un laboratoire accrédité.Bien au contraire,Olympus sarl a immédiatement résilié le contrat detravailconclu.

LaFormationademandéauxparties,enfind’audience,decommentercettedispositiondelaconventiondu


15novembre2007.LeConseildeM.VladimirGuseva indiqué qu’il considérait que cette dispositioncontractuelle n’avait pas été respectéeparOlympussarl.LeConseild’Olympussarlaaucontrairepréciséqu’ilappartenaitaucoureurdesolliciterdenouvellesanalyses,cequi,de l’avisde laFormation,n’estpascompatibleavecletexteclairdel’article5lettrecducontratdetravail,lequelprévoitcequisuit:

“5. Etat de santé du Cycliste et tests antidopageet médicaux, (c): Dans certains cas, la Société etl’Equipe peuvent demander au Cycliste de sesoumettreàdestestsantidopageet/ouéthyliques.SilaSociétéetl’EquipeontuneraisondesuspecterqueleCyclistefaitusagededrogues,substancestoxiques,alcools,narcotiquesouautresubstancesouscontrôleoudopante,leCyclistepeutêtreenvoyéauprèsd’unlaboratoired’analysecertifiépouryêtresoumisauxexamensnécessaires.Detempsentemps,l’UCIetd’autresOrganesgouvernementauxpeuventexécuterdestestsantidopagedecontrôlepourdécelerunusageéventueldesubstancesinterditesousouscontrôle.LeCyclistesemontreratoutàfaitprêtàsesoumettreà ces analyses. Si le Cycliste refuse, sans raisonvalable,desesoumettreàcestestsous’ilometl’undecestestspourquelqueraisonquecesoit,laSociétépourramettrefinauprésentAccordconformémentauxconditionsderésiliationdecetAccordoubiensuspendre leCycliste conformémentauxrèglementsde l’UCI ou à ceux des Fédérations affiliées, enfaisantparvenirunenotificationécriteauCycliste”.(Traductionlibre)

Sur ce sujet, la Formation note également quel’“Institut für Dopinganalytik und SportbiochemieDresden”précisedanssonrapportdu17juillet2008ceci:“Forthisreasonfurthertargettestingisrecommended”.Orcelan’apasétéfaitparOlympussarl.

LaFormationtientàsoulignerqu’ilestévidemmentlouablequedeséquipescyclistesmettentenplaceunsystèmeinterneperformantdelutteanti-dopage.Untelsystèmedecontrôlenesauraitcependantpermettreà une équipe, notamment cycliste, de résilier aveceffet immédiat un contrat de travail sur la base desimplessoupçonsdedopage.

Il appartient par ailleurs à l’équipe qui souhaitemettreenplaceun tel systèmed’assureraucoureurdesgarantiesprocéduralesadéquatesconformesauxstandardsdel’UCIetdel’AMA.

Ilesteneffetessentiel,mêmesilalutteanti-dopageestassurémentunepriorité,depermettreaucoureurdefairevaloirsesargumentsdemanièreefficace.

Sans vouloir entrer dans les détails du système

de contrôle mis en place par l’équipe Astana, laFormationselimiteànoterqu’iln’apasétédémontréquelecodedeconduitedel’équipeet/oulesnormesdel’équipe,mentionnéesnotammentàl’article1lettrebchiffre4ducontratdetravaildu15novembre2007,ontétéremisàM.VladimirGusev.Olympussarln’ad’ailleurs pas produit à la procédure un exemplairedu code de conduite de l’équipe et des normes del’équipe. La Formation note également que le Dr.RasmusDamsgaardaadmislorsdesonauditionparlaFormation,contrairementàcequiestprécisédanssoncourrieldu20juillet2008àl’attentiondeM.JohanBruyneel(traductionlibre:“L’échantillonaétéenvoyéàunautre laboratoire accréditépar l’AMApour confirmation” ),que l’échantillonanalysén’a jamaisétéadresséàunautrelaboratoireaccréditéparl’AMA,maisquecenesontquelesrésultatsdel’analysequiontétéadressésàunautrelaboratoirepourconfirmation.

Au vu de ce qui précède, comme déjà indiqué, laFormationretientqu’Olympussarln’étaitpasendroitde résilier avec effet immédiat le contrat de travailconclupourjustesmotifs.

Ilyadèslorslieud’examineràprésentlesconséquencesdecetterésiliation,àlalumièrenotammentdel’article337cCO.

3. Conséquences financières de la résiliation immédiate injustifiée du contrat de travail

L’article 362 CO prévoit que l’alinéa 1 de l’article337c CO est de nature relativement impérative.“L’ al. 2 doit également être considéré comme relativementimpératif, caruneextensiondes circonstancespermettantuneimputationsurlemontantàverserparl’employeurreviendraiten réalité à permettre une diminution de la créance de l’art.337cal.1CO,cequiestmanifestementcontraireaucaractèrerelativementimpératifdecepremieralinéa.L’art.337cal.3CO est également de nature relativement impérative. Il n’estpasmentionnéàl’art.362CO,carils’adresseaujugeetnonauxparties, étant rappeléque l’énumérationdesart.361 et362COn’estpasexhaustive”(WylerR.,op.cit.,p.520).

L’article337cal.1COprévoitque“lorsquel’employeurrésilie le contrat sans justesmotifs, le travailleuradroità cequ’ilauraitgagnésilesrapportsdetravailavaientprisfinàl’échéancedudélaidecongéouàlacassationducontratconclupouruneduréedéterminée”.

Bien qu’il s’agisse d’une créance en dommages-intérêts,ellen’estpasréductiblepourcausedefauteconcomitante éventuelle du travailleur (AubertG.,op.cit.,adart.337cCO,n.2;ATF120II243,c.3).

Cettecréanceestimmédiatementexigible(article339al.1CO).


Selonl’alinéa3decettemêmedisposition,“lejugepeutcondamner l’employeur à verser au travailleur une indemnitédont il fixera librement le montant, compte tenu de toutesles circonstances; elle ne peut toutefois dépasser le montantcorrespondantàsixmoisdesalairedutravailleur”.

Il s’agitd’une indemnité spécialedont lebut estdedissuader l’employeur de prononcer à la légère unerésiliationaveceffetimmédiat.“CetteindemnitéviseaussiàréparerlepréjudicedécoulantducongéabruptetdépassantlemontantdusalairedûselonCO337cI,enparticulierletortmoral.Dece fait, ellene laisseguèredeplaceà l’applicationcumulativedeCO49”(AubertG.,op.cit.,adart.337cCO,n.12).

“Parmi les circonstances dont le juge doit tenir compte pourfixerlemontantdelapénalitéfigurentnotammentlasituationsocialeetéconomiquedesdeuxparties,lagravitédel’atteinteàlapersonnalitédelapartiecongédiéeetdeseffetséconomiquesdu congé, l’intensité et la durée des relations de travail, lamanière dont celui-ci a été donné, l’âge du travailleur, safaute concomitante; aucun de ces facteurs n’est décisif en lui-même”(AubertG.,op.cit.,adart.337cCO,n.13;cf.égalementWylerR.,op.cit.,p.517).

“LeTribunalfédéralainterprétéCO337cIIIencesensque,saufcirconstancesparticulières,l’indemnitéestduedanstouslescasdelicenciementimmédiatinjustifié”(AubertG.,op.cit.,adart.337cCO,n.15;cf.égalementATF116II300,JdT1991I317etWylerR.,op.cit.,p.517).

En l’espèce, le contrat de travail conclu l’était pouruneduréededeuxans,c’est-à-dire jusqu’à lafindel’année2009.

Orilaprisfinendatedu23juillet2008.

M.VladimirGusevestdèslorsendroitdeprétendre,enapplicationdel’article337cal.1CO,auversementdecequ’ilauraitgagnésisoncontratdetravailn’avaitpasétérésiliéaveceffetimmédiat.

CelareprésentelasommedeEUR500’416.67(EUR160’416.67pourl’année2008etEUR340’000.--pourl’année2009).

Untelmontantnepeutpasêtredéduitdessommesfixéesenapplicationdel’article337cal.2COétantdonné qu’il n’est pas établi qu’une fois son contratavecOlympus sarl résilié, le coureur ait perçu unequelconque rémunération de la part d’un autreemployeur. En fait, l’affirmation de l’Olympus sarlselon laquelle le coureur était sous contrat avecl’équipe Kathusa s’est avéré erronée, cette dernièreayantcertifiéavoirrefusétouterelationcontractuelleaveclecoureur.

LaFormation a par ailleurs décidé d’accorder àM.Vladimir Gusev une indemnité supplémentaireéquivalenteàsixmoisdesalaire,celaenapplicationdel’article337cal.3CO,soitl’indemnitémaximale.

LaFormationretienteneffetcommedéterminants,pour accorder l’indemnité maximale prévue par laloi,enplusdel’absencedejustesmotifsaumomentdelarésiliationducontrat, lalégèretéaveclaquelleOlympus sarl a estimé que M. Vladimir Gusevavait enfreint le contrat du 15 novembre 2007,alors que Olympus n’avait elle-même pas respectéles procédures internes en matière de contrôleantidopage, la manière dont le licenciement a étécommuniquéàM.VladimirGusev,lesconséquencesdecetterésiliationsurlespossibilitésactuellesdeM.VladimirGusevderejoindreunenouvelleéquipeetl’annonce faiteparOlympus à lapressedes raisonsdelarésiliationducontratdetravaildu15novembre2007alorsmêmequeM.VladimirGusevnefaisaitl’objetqued’unesuspiciondedopage.

CelareprésentelasommedeEUR153’750.--(EUR275’000.--+EUR340’000.--/2=EUR307’500.--/2=EUR153’750.--).

OlympussarlseradèslorscondamnéeàpayeràM.VladimirGusevlasommedeEUR654’166.67,avecintérêtsà5%dèsle27novembre2008,conformémentauxconclusionsprisesparM.VladimirGusevdanssonmémoired’arbitragedu27novembre2008.

Eneffet,selon l’article104CO,“ledébiteurqui est endemeurepour lepaiementd’une sommed’argentdoit l’intérêtmoratoireà5pourcentl’an,mêmesiuntauxinférieuravaitétéfixépourl’intérêtconventionnel”.

A toutes fins utiles, la Formation rappellera quecesmontantsnesauraientêtrediminués, comme lesoutientOlympussarl, enapplicationde l’article12lettre a de la convention signée. En effet, commeindiquésupra,lesarticles337cal.1et3COsontdesnormesrelativementimpératives.

4. Autres prétentions de M. Vladimir Gusev

M.VladimirGusevréclameégalementleversementd’unesommedeEUR5millionsàtitrede“dommageenmanqueàgagnerprovoquéparlaviolationdelapersonnalité”ainsi qu’une sommedeEUR30’000.-- comme tortmoral,celaenapplicationdesarticles49et328CO.

Ces prétentions seront rejetées pour les motifssuivants.


EncequiconcerneleversementréclamédeEUR5millionsàtitrede“dommageenmanqueàgagnerprovoquépar la violationde lapersonnalité”, laFormationretientque le demandeur a échoué dans l’obligation quiétaitlasiennedeprouverconcrètementl’existencedece dommage, cela conformément aux exigences del’article8duCodecivil.

La Formation retient bien au contraire qu’il estraisonnable de prévoir que M. Vladimir Gusevpourratrouverunnouvelemployeuràbrèveéchéancecomptetenudesesqualitésdecycliste,tellesqu’ellesont notamment été expliquées par son agent, M.RaimondoScimone,àl’audience.

Par ailleurs, il est à noter que la Formation a déjàaccordé à M. Vladimir Gusev le versement d’uneindemnité équivalente à six mois de salaire, celaen application de l’article 337c al. 3 CO. Laditeindemnisationestdéjàdenatureàprendreencomptelepréjudiceimportantsubiparledemandeurdufaitdelarésiliationimmédiateinjustifiéedesoncontratdetravail.

RiennepermetcependantdepenserqueM.VladimirGusev ne sera pas engagé par une nouvelle équipedanslesdixprochainesannéesdufaitdelarésiliationimmédiate injustifiée du contrat de travail de M.VladimirGusevetdelacommunicationquis’enestsuivie.

Ilyaparailleurslieudeconsidérerquelamotivationde la présente décision sera également de nature àrétablirM.VladimirGusevdanssonhonneurdansla mesure notamment où la Formation y constateclairement qu’Olympus sarl a résilié le contrat detravail qui la liait àM.VladimirGusev sur la based’un simple soupçon de dopage, dopage qui n’aaucunementétédémontré.

Encequiconcernelademandederéparationdutortmoralliéàl’annonceparcommuniquédepressedesraisonsdelarésiliationducontratdudemandeur,laFormationretientquecetélémentadéjàétéprisencompte dans la fixation de l’indemnité prévue parl’article337cal.3CO.

AccorderàM.VladimirGusevuneindemnitéfondéesur les articles 49 et 328CO reviendrait à prendredeuxfoisencomptel’atteinteàlapersonnalitécauséepar lamédiatisation desmotifs de la résiliation ducontratquiliaitOlympussarlàM.VladimirGusev,cequineseraitpasadmissible.

LaFormationretientégalementqueleTribunalfédéralaeul’occasiondepréciser,s’agissantdel’article336aal.2CO,quel’indemnitéprévueparcettedisposition

nelaisseguèredeplaceàl’applicationcumulativedel’article49CO,carelleembrassetouteslesatteintesà la personnalité du travailleur qui découlent de larésiliation abusive du contrat. “Seule demeure réservéel’hypothèsedanslaquellel’atteinteseraitàcepointgravequ’unmontant correspondant à six mois de salaire du travailleurne suffirait pas à la réparer. Sous cette réserve, l’applicationparallèledel’art.49COnesauraitentrerenlignedecompteque dans des circonstances exceptionnelles” (Wyler R.,op. cit., p. 552; cf. égalementTF16 juin2005, arrêt4C.84/2005).

Cesconsidérationspeuvent,del’avisdelaFormation,s’appliquerparanalogieàl’article337cal.3CO.

De plus, le Tribunal fédéral a également précisé,s’agissantde l’article337cal.3CO,que l’indemnitéprévueparcetarticlecouvreletortmoralsubiparletravailleur (TF22février1994,SJ1995802=JAR1995198).

En l’espèce, la Formation considère que le tortmoralsubiadéjàétéprisencomptedanslafixationde l’indemnité prévue par l’article 337c al. 3 COet qu’il n’y a dès lors pas lieu à une indemnisationsupplémentaireenapplicationdel’article49CO.L’onnesauraiteneffetconsidérerquelescirconstancesducasd’espècesontàcepointexceptionnellesqu’ellesdoivententraîner,ensus,l’applicationdel’article49CO.Cela est d’autant plus vrai que la Formation adécidéd’accorder àM.VladimirGusev l’indemnitémaximaleprévueparl’article337cal.3CO.


FIFA is the International Federation of Football(Fédération Internationale de FootballAssociation)withitsregisteredofficeinZurich,Switzerland.

The Romanian Football Federation (RFF) is thenationalfootballfederationinRomaniaandaffiliatedwithFIFAsince1923.

S.C.FotbalClubTimisoaraS.A.(“theAppellant”)isa football clubaffiliated to theRFFandplaying intheRomanianLiga1.

On December 5, 2006, CAS issued an award inthe proceedings CAS 2006/A/1109 between theAppellant, acting under its previous name CSFCUPolitehnicaTimisoara and SCFCPolitehnicaTimisoara SA. The object of the proceedings wastheclaimmadebySCFCPolitehnicaTimisoaraSAthat the Appellant’s club name, colours and logocreatedariskofconfusionbetweenthetwoclubsandconsequentlyviolatedthepersonalityrightsofSCFCPolitehnica Timisoara SA. The CAS Panel mainlyordered FCU Politehnica Timisoara to continueto use its earlier name CS FC Politehnica AEKTimişoaraortoadoptanothername,approvedbytheRomanianFootballFederation,thatdoesnotincludetheriskofconfusionwiththenameofSCFCandtopayacompensationtoSCFCPolitehnicaTimisoara

SAforeachofficialmatchplayedfrom5December2006,untiliteffectsanamechange.Inaddition,FCUPolitehnicaTimisoarawasinterdictedtoimitatethecolours,orusethetrackrecord,historyandlogoofSCFCPolitehnicaTimisoaraSAandwasorderedtopayacompensationforviolationwithregardtotheuse of thename, colours, track record, history andlogoofSCSFCPolitehnicaTimisoaraSAbetween13June2006and4December2006inclusive.

SincetheAppellantdidnotcomplywiththisawardSCFC Politehnica Timişoara SA initiated proceedingsbeforeFIFAagainsttheAppellant.FIFA,however,“closed thecase” ina letterdated26July2007.SCFCPolitehnicaTimişoara SA appealed against thisdecisiontotheCAS.OnApril25,2008,CASissuedanotherawardintheproceedingsCAS2007/A/1355betweenFCPolitehnicaTimisoaraSA,ononeside,andFIFA,theRFFandtheAppellantontheotherside.

In this second award theCAS ruled in applicationof Art. 71 paragraph 1 of the FIFA DisciplinaryCode(FDC)notablythatSCPolitehnica1921StiintaTimisoara Invest SA shall no later than 30 June2008 change its name to a name which does notinclude the riskof confusionwith thenameofFCPolitehnicaTimisoaraSAandchangeitsclubcolourssothattheynolongerincludeviolet.IfSCPolitehnica1921StiintaTimisoaraInvestSAfailstocomplytheaboverequirementsby30June20086pointswillbededucted.

OnJune25,2008,theAppellant,nowactingunderthe name of Fotbal Club Timisoara SA, informedthecompanySSDSportSystemDevelopmentS.R.L.(“SSD”) in Bucharest, of its obligations accordingtotheCASawardCAS2007/A/1355andrequestedfrom SSD the delivery of newT-shirts, shorts andsocks (“kit”) with the new colours of the Club,namelyMauve –White – Black. This informationwasmadeinwritingbytheAppellantonaletterheadstillreferringto“Polithenica1921StiintaTimisoara”.

Still on 25 June 2008, theAppellant informed thecompany De Reinhart, which is in charge of themanagementofitsofficialwebsite,thatCASorderedtheAppellanttochangethenameandthecoloursoftheClubandinstructedthiscompanytouseonlythe

Relevantfacts

Panel: Mr. Lars Hilliger (Denmark), President Mr. Rui Botica Santos (Portugal) Prof. Ulrich Haas (Germany)

Football; definition of the term“decision”; CAS Jurisdiction regardingthe appeal against a FIFA decision;standing to appeal; validity of a FIFAdecision imposingasanctiononaclubthroughtheclub’snationalfederation

Arbitration CAS 2008/A/1658SC Fotbal Club Timisoara S.A. v. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) & Romanian Football Federation (RFF) 13July2009


newcolours,namelymauve,whiteandblackandthenewfirmname,namelyFotbalClubTimisoaraS.A.De Reinhart took note of the changes on 27 June2008 and confirmed the change of the dominantcolourontheAppellant’sofficialwebsiteinlinewiththenewcolourcodeadoptedbytheAppellant.

AnextraordinarygeneralmeetingoftheAppellant’sshareholderstookplaceon30June2008.Accordingtotheminutesofsuchgeneralmeeting,thechangeofnameofthetradecompanyfrom“Politehnica1921Stiinta Timisoara & Invest S.A”. to “Fotbal ClubTimisoara SA” and the change of coulours whichshallbemauve,whiteandblackwasdecided.

On5July2008,theRFFexecutivecommitteetookadecisionwhereitconfirmedthatithadtakengoodnoteofthechangeofthenameandofcoloursofSCPolitehnica1921StiintaTimisoara&InvestSAinSCFotbalClubTimisoara.

On 10 July 2008, FIFA, acting through its deputysecretarytotheDisciplinaryCommittee,Mr.VolkerHesse, sent a letter to theAppellant and explainedthat it had been informed by FC PolitehnicaTimisoaraSA that theAppellanthadnot compliedwith the CAS ruling and granted the Appellant adeadlineuntil15July2008inordertoproduce“anykindofproofthatPolitehnicaStintia1921TimisoaraInvestSA[read:theAppellant]respectedtheCAS-award(CAS2007/A/1355)”.FIFAfurtherremindedtheAppellantthat“incaseofnon-compliance6pointswillbedeductedfromPolitehnicaStintia1921TimisoaraInvestSA”.

Byfax letterdated11July2008,Mr.Pruneaof theRFF providedCAS, FIFA andUEFAwith a copyof theRFF executive committee’s decisiondated 5July2008andconfirmedonthecover letter tothisdecision that the Appellant had changed its nametoSCFotbalClubTimisoaraandhadadoptednewcolours.

On18 July 2008, theAppellant sent a fax letter toFIFA,totheattentionofMr.VolkerHesse.Thisfaxletterwasdated15July2008andwasprintedontheAppellant’snew letterhead.However, this fax letterbore the Appellant’s old stamp with “Politehnica1921 Stiinta” on it and the Appellant’s old faxheaderindicating“from:Poli1921Stiinta”.Inthisfaxletter, theAppellantconfirmed toFIFAthat ithadcompliedwiththeCASaward2007/A/1355dated25April2008.

FIFA,stillactingthroughitsdeputysecretarytotheDisciplinaryCommittee,Mr.VolkerHesse,issuedaletterdated3September2008totheattentionofRFFwhichrecognize–interalia–thattheClubhadchange

hisnameon5July2008incompliancewithpoint1ofthementionedCASaward.Asthechangeofthenamehasbeeneffectuatedon5July2008,acompensationofEUR5,000shallbepaidbyFCTimisoaraforeachofficialmatch played from 5December 2006 until5July2008,asprovidedfor in thementionedCASawardandintheawardCAS20061A/1109.Howeverpoint3oftheCASaward(CAS2007/A/1355),thatisthecolorsoftheuniformsusedbyFCTimisoaraintheseason2008/2009andtheofficialhomepageof FC Timisoara has not been respected by FCTimisoara.Thedominantcolourof theclub is stillviolet.Therefore,theRomanianFootballFederationwasaskedto immediately implementpoint3of theCASaward(CAS2007/A/1355)andconsequentlytodeduct6sixpointsfromFCTimisoara’sfirstteam.

AsaconsequenceofFIFA’sletter,theRFFexecutivecommittee issued a new decision, namely decisionnr 9 of 4 September 2008, which implemented, asrequestedbyFIFA,thesixpointsdeductionfromtheAppellant’sfirstteam.

On10September2008,theAppellantsentafaxlettertoFIFA’sAppealCommittee on its new letterheadandthistimewithitsnewstampbutstillwithafaxheaderindicating“From:Poli1921Stiinta”wherebyit informed the latter of its firm and unequivocalintentiontoappealthedecisionrenderedbyDeputySecretarytotheDisciplinaryCommittee,Mr.VolkerHesse on September 3rd 2008, ref. no. 070076,compelling the Romanian Football Federationto impose sanctions upon SC FC Timisoara SA.consisting of a deduction of 6 points from SC FCTimisoaraSA’sfirstteam.

On 23 September 2008, the RFF sent to FIFA aletter from the Appellant which indicated that theAppellant had changed its kit colours. The RFFsentsamplesoftheAppellant’snewkitstoFIFAbyseparatepost.

TheFIFAappealcommitteepassedadecisionon9February2009rejectingthatappealasitconsideredthatithadbeenfiledoutsidethetimelimitprovidedbytheFIFAdisciplinarycode(FDC)andasitnotedthattheappealfee,whichwasduenotablyaccordingtoArt.123par.1and2FDChadnotbeenpaidbytheAppellant.

TheAppellantsentalettertoCASon10September2008 where it declared its intention to lodge astatement of appeal against [the] decision passedby [the] Deputy Secretary to the DisciplinaryCommittee,Mr.VolkerHesseonSeptember3rd2008,FIFA re. no. 070076 and against the decision no.9/04.09.2008renderedbytheExecutiveCommittee


oftheRomanianFootballFederation.

Furthertoitsappealbrief,theAppellantfiledon17October2008,anapplicationtostaytheexecutionofthechallengeddecisions.

On 29 October 2008, FIFA informed CAS thattheAppellanthad lodgedanappealwith theFIFAAppealCommitteeandthattheproceedingsbeforetheFIFAAppealCommitteewerestillpendingandthattherefore“theformalprerequisiteofthe“finality”ofthe“decision”isnotfulfilled,astheproceedingsinstigatedbyS.C.F.C.TimisoaraS.A.withtheFIFAAppealCommitteearestillpending.ThereforetheappealfiledbyS.C.F.C.TimisoaraS.A.withtheCourtofArbitrationforSportisprematureandtheCAShasnojurisdictiontohearthepresentappealandtheattachedapplicationforthestayoftheexecution.Withaviewto the efficiencyof theproceedings,werequest that thisPaneltakean“interimdecision”onthequestionofjurisdiction”.


1. CAS jurisdiction regarding the appeal against the FIFA Decision

The Appellant filed its appeal before CAS againsttwo decisions. The first appealed decision is the“decisionrenderedbytheDeputySecretarytotheDisciplinaryCommittee,Mr.VolkerHesseonSeptember3rd,2008”asquoted from the Appellant’s statement of Appeal,(“theFIFADecision”).Thesecondappealeddecisionisthe“decisionn°9/04.09.2008renderedbytheExecutiveCommitteeoftheRomanianFootballFederation”(“theRFFDecision”). CAS jurisdiction regarding the appealmustbeexaminedforeachdecisionseparately.

CAS jurisdiction relating to the appeal against theFIFADecision is disputed by FIFA and the RFF.The parties did not conclude a specific arbitrationagreement.AstheAppealwasfiledagainstadecisionofaFIFAbody,thePanel,inaccordancewitharticleR47oftheCode,mustthusrefertoFIFAStatutesorregulationsinordertodecideonCASjurisdiction.

Article63oftheFIFAStatutesprovidesthat“appealsagainstfinaldecisionspassedbyFIFA’slegalbodiesandagainstdecisionspassedbyConfederations,MembersorLeaguesshallbe lodged with CAS within 21 days of notification of thedecisioninquestion”(par.1).“RecoursemayonlybemadetoCASafterallother internal channelshavebeenexhausted”(par.2).“CAS,however,doesnotdealwithappealsarisingfrom:(a)violationsoftheLawsoftheGame;(b)suspensionsofuptofourmatchesoruptothreemonths(withtheexceptionof doping decisions); (c) decisions againstwhichanappeal toan independent and duly constituted arbitration tribunalrecognisedundertherulesofanAssociationorConfederationmaybemade”.(par.3).

None of the exceptions provided under article63 paragraph 3 are applicable in the present case.Therefore, CAS has jurisdiction if the letter byFIFAdated3September2008meets the followingrequirements:

a) Qualificationof theFIFADecision as a formaldecision

The first question to be addressed by the Panel iswhetherFIFAindeedissuedadecisionaccordingtoarticleR47of theCodeandarticle63of theFIFAStatutes.

In light of CAS 2005/A/899 (published in Digestof CAS awards 1986-1998, p. 539), the Panel isof the view that the purpose of the letter by Mr.VolkerHessewhichis“toresolvea legal situation inanobligatory and constraining manner” must be qualifiedas a decision since the letter contains a ruling andaffectstheparties’ legalpositions.TheletterofMr.VolkerHesse did not only contain a ruling on thequestionwhetherornottheAppellantcompliedwiththeoperativepartoftheawardinCAS2007/A/1355but also established that the “FIFA DisciplinaryCommittee will pronounce an appropriate sanction againsttheRomanianFootballFederation” ifRFFwouldfailtoactaccordingtothecontentsoftheletter.AsstatedintheabovementionedCASprecedent,theformofthe communication has no relevance to determinewhetherthedocumentisadecisionornot.ThePanelrefersfurthertoCAS2007/A/1251aswellastoCAS2007/A/1355, whose enforcement led to the FIFADecision, where CAS considered that letters fromFIFAwere tobe considered as formal decisions astheycontainedarulingandaffectedtheparties’legalpositions.

b)DecisionofaFIFABody

Ononeside, thePanelnoted thatFIFAconfirmedthat therewerenominutesof themeetingheldbytheDisciplinaryCommittee inBeijingand that thecommunicationmadebyMr.VolkerHessedidnotevenrefertoameetingoftheDisciplinaryCommitteeandtothedecisiontakenbyit.ThecommunicationaddressedtotheRFFishowevermadeunderFIFAletterheadandissignedbyFIFAasMr.VolkerHessesigned thedocumentonbehalfofFIFAand inhiscapacity as Deputy Secretary to the DisciplinaryCommittee,asprovidedunderarticle123paragraph2FDC(versionofSeptember2007).Eventually,theRFF seemed tohavehadnodoubton thebindingnatureofthecommunicationandissueditsdecisionaccordingly.TheFIFADecisionwas thus takenbyaFIFAbodyinthesenseofarticle63oftheFIFAStatutes.


c)Finaldecision

Accordingtoarticle86FDC,“theAppealCommitteeisresponsiblefordecidingappealsagainstanyoftheDisciplinaryCommittee’s decisions thatFIFA regulations do not declareasfinalorreferabletoanotherbody”.Basedonarticle71FDCpara.5whichprovidesthat“anyappealagainstadecisionpassedinaccordancewiththisarticleshallimmediatelybe lodged with CAS” and on article 125 FDCwhichprovides that “an appeal may be lodged to the AppealCommittee against any decision passed by the DisciplinaryCommittee, unless the sanction pronounced is (…) decisionspassed in compliancewith art. 71 of this code”, thePanelconsidersthatanydecisionoftheFIFADisciplinaryCommittee takenon thebasisofarticle71FDC isindeedfinalwithinFIFAandcanbedirectlyappealedbeforeCAS.

FIFAsubmitshoweverthatCAShasnojurisdictionas the Appellant had previously lodged an appealbefore its Appeal Committee on 10 September2008,which leadsFIFAtoconclude that,bydoingso, theAppellant admitted that theFIFADecisioncould be appealed before its Appeal Committee.ThePanelhowevernotesthat,inprinciple,ifapartyfilesanappealbeforethewrongjurisdictionalbody,this cannot create a valid appeal procedure beforethisbody.Astatementofappealmustofcoursebesupportedbyavalidproceduralrule.

TheRFFdidnot raise during theproceedings anyobjectiononCASjurisdictionorontheadmissibilityoftheAppealagainstitsdecision.Althoughtheorderofproceduresignedbythepartiesprovidesthat“thejurisdiction of CAS in the present case is disputed”, thePanelconcludesfromthelegalargumentsbroughtbyallpartiesandfromtheFIFAandRFFregulationsathand,thatCASjurisdictionontheappealdirectedagainst the RFF Decision, is not disputed and isgiven.

2. Admissibility

TheRFFclaimsinitsanswerthattheappeallodgedbytheAppellanttoCASagainsttheFIFAdecisionwas late for the reason that article 71 paragraph5 FDC provides that “any appeal against a decisionpassedinaccordancewiththisarticleshall immediately(red.)be lodged with CAS”. The Panel notes that the term“immediately”hasclearlynotthemeaningwhichtheRFFwants togive to it. In theGermanversionofthisarticle,thetermusedis“sofort”whichcanmeanwithout delay but also “directly”. What is meantis therefore that any decision taken under article71 FDC can be lodged before CAS “directly” or“immediately”initsliteralmeaning,whichis“withoutmeansofinternalrecourse”.

ThePanelthusdecidesthatthestandardtimelimitof21daysprovidedunderarticle63paragraph1oftheFIFAStatutesisapplicable.TheAppellantheardof theFIFADecision on 4 September 2008 at theearliest and the Appellant lodged its statement ofappealon17September2008,whichisnotdisputed.Theappealwasthereforelodgedwithinthestatutorytimelimitsetforthbythe2008FIFAStatutes.

ThePanelnotesfurtherthattheAppealagainsttheRFF Decision was filed within 21 days after thenotification of the RFF Decision. The Panel thusconcludesthattheAppealagainsttheRFFDecisionisfiledintime,whichisaswellnotdisputed.

3. Standing to appeal

The RFF Decision was notified to the Appellant,whichisdirectlyaffectedbyit,asaresultofa6pointsdeduction being imposed on its first team throughthisDecision.ThePanelfindsthatthereisnodoubtthat theAppellant has a standing to file an appealwithCASagainsttheRFFDecision.Thisisactuallyundisputed.

Although the issue was not raised by the parties,thePanelmustnowconsiderwhethertheAppellantalso has a standing to file an appeal with CASagainsttheFIFADecision.TheAppellantisindeednot theaddresseeof theFIFADecisionwhichwasonlynotified to theRFFandnot to theAppellant.However, it follows from the contentsof the letterthat theAppellant ismateriallyaffected incase theaddressee of the FIFA letter, i.e. the RFF wouldexecutetheFIFAorder.

TheFIFArulesdonotprovideaspecificprovisionastowhoisentitledtolodgeanappealagainstdecisionsbyFIFAtotheCAS.However,there isaprovisionregulatingwho is entitled tofile an internal appealwithin the instances of FIFA. Article 126 FDCprovides in this respect that “anyone who is affectedand has an interest justifying amendment or cancellation ofthe decision may submit it to the Appeal Committee”. Inprinciple, there is a presumption that the questionof the standing to appeal is regulated in auniformmannerthroughoutallinternalandexternalchannelsof review. Since theAppellant is at least indirectlyaffected by the decision of FIFA thiswould speakin favour of accepting a standing to appeal to thebenefitoftheAppellant.

TheforegoingisallthemoretrueasnoindependentevaluationandassessmentofthefactsismadeattheRFFlevel.InthisrespectthePanelreferstoarticle3paragraph4oftheRFFenforcementprocedureofaCASaward,whichprovidesthat“thedecisiononthe


enforcementofanawardpassedbytheCourtofArbitrationforSportshallbeconsideredasautomaticallyadoptedbyconsensusofthemembersoftheExecutiveCommittee,votingnonlongerbeing required”. In lightof the foregoing itwouldbeoverly formalistic to accept that only the RFF isaffectedbytheFIFAdecisionand,thus,isaccordedstandingtoappeal.

Basedontheforegoing,thePanelstressesthatthefateoftheRFFDecisionislinkedtotheFIFADecision.InrequestingfromtheRFFthatitdeducts6pointsfromtheAppellant’sfirstteam,theFIFADisciplinaryCommittee did not only dispose in its decision ofthe RFF rights with regard to the classificationof a Romanian club, namely the Appellant, in theRomanianLiga1butobviouslyalsoofthoseoftheAppellant,whichsawsixpointsdeductedbytheRFFfrom its first team. The Appellant is thus directlyaffected with the consequence that the AppellantmusthavearightofappealagainsttheFIFADecision.Inthisrespect,thePanelfindsthatarticle126FDCisapplicableperanalogytoappealsbeforeCAS.FIFAdidobviouslynotintendtohavetwodifferentgroupsofpersonswithstandingtoappeal,onelargerwhenitcomestoappeals lodgedbeforetheFIFAAppealCommittee,onesmallerwhenappealscanbedirectlylodged before CAS. Moreover, the Panel refers toCAS jurisprudence and to the jurisprudenceof theSwissFederalCourtonthestandingtoappealagainstdecisionspassedbyanorganofanassociationoronresolutions(seethedevelopmentsonthissubject inCAS2008/A/1583ad9.1etseq.).

ThePanelthereforefindsthattheAppellanthasthestanding to file an appeal before CAS against theFIFADecision.

4. Validity of the FIFA decision asking the national federation to implement

the sanction

The FIFA decision is to be set aside if it eitherviolates the formal or thematerial prerequisites ofthe applicable FIFA rules. In order to know whattheserequirementsarethePanelhastodetermineinafirststepthelegalbasisfortheFIFAdecision.TheSecondRespondentclaims in that respect thatArt.71FDCformsthelegalbasisofitsdecisiontoasktheRFFtodeduct6pointsfromtheAppellant.

Article 71 provides for a two-stage procedure toenforce decisions by FIFA or CAS. In a first stepaccordingtoarticle71paragraph1FDCastandardfine in the amount of CHF 5,000 is imposed onthe party that failed to complywith the respectivedecision. In addition the debtor is granted a finaldeadline to complywith thedecision.Furthermore

the party is threatened with a specific sanction(deduction of point, demotion to a lower divisionortransferban)incaseofnon-compliancewiththedeadline.Ifthedeadlinehaselapsedandthepartyhasfailedtocomplywiththedecisiontobeenforcedtheenforcement procedure arrives at the second stage.In such case article 71 paragraph 2 FDC providesthat the relevant associationwill be “requested” toimplement the sanctionswhichwere threatenedonthebasisofarticle71paragraph1FDC.

InthecaseathandFIFAadvisedtheRFFinitsletterdated3September2008todeduct6pointsfromtheAppellant.Hence,theappealeddecisionbyFIFAisobviously based upon article 71 paragraph 2 FDCand, therefore, relates to the second enforcementstep.

a)DidthecompetentbodydecideaccordingtoArt.71paragraph2FDC?

Article71paragraph2FDCdoesnotstatewhichFIFAorganiscompetenttoaskthenationalfederationtoimplement the sanction.Article 83 FDC, however,provides that the FIFA Disciplinary Committee isauthorizedtosanctionanybreachofFIFAregulationswhich does not come under the jurisdiction ofanotherbody.Even though– literally speaking– adecision according to article 71 paragraph 2 is notaboutissuingasanction(butratherrequestssomeoneelsetoimplementasanction)thematterissocloselyrelatedtoarticle83FDCthatthisprovisionshouldapplyalso in these instances.Furthermore,noneofthepartiesclaimedthatanotherbodythantheFIFADisciplinaryCommitteehadthecompetencetotakethe FIFA Decision, which is based on article 71paragraph2FDC.TheAppellant itself admits that“itistheexclusiveprerogativeoftheDisciplinaryCommitteetorenderdecisionsonthematterofimposinganysanctionsuponaparty”.Article125FDCconfirmsindirectlythattheFIFADisciplinaryCommittee iscompetent topassdecisions in compliance with article 71 FDC, as itexpresslyprovidesthatforsuchdecisionstheAppealCommittee cannot decide on an appeal lodged“againstanydecisionpassedbytheDisciplinaryCommittee”.

Based on all the above, the Panel decides that theFIFADisciplinaryCommittee had the competencetopasstheFIFADecision.

b)Did the decision comply with the formalrequirements?

TheFIFADecisionconsistedinasimplelettersignedby the deputy secretary of the FIFA DisciplinaryCommittee.However,decisionsby theDisciplinaryCommitteethatareissuedonthebasisoftheFDC


must complywith certain formal requirements thatareenumeratedinArt.123.Someoftheprerequisitesaremetinthecaseathand.Forexample,accordingto article 123 paragraph 2 FDC the decision hasto be signed by the committee Secretary of theDisciplinary Committee. Other conditions of saidprovision, however, have not beenmet. Accordingto article 123 paragraph 1 FDC, a decision of theDisciplinary Committee must contain informationonthecompositionofthecommitteeandthenoticeofthechannelsofappeal.BothoftheseconditionsweremissingfromtheFIFAdecisioninthecaseathand.However,thelettercontainedallthematerialgrounds of the decision. As to the exercise of itsrighttobeheard,theAppellanthadtheopportunityto provide FIFA with the necessary informationduringthe investigationprocedurewhichstarted inJuly 2008. Proceedings before FIFA are in generalconducted inwriting, asprovidedunder article119paragraph1FDC,and,inanycase,theAppellantdidnotaskforahearing,althougharticle119paragraph2FDCgrantedtheAppellanttherighttorequestforit.

BasedonCASjurisprudenceandonthejurisprudenceof the Swiss Federal Supreme Court (ATF 106 Ib,p. 179), the above mentioned formal mistakes arenotofsuchnaturetorendertheFIFAdecisionnullandvoid.Whether the formalmistakesareof suchweight torender thedecisionofFIFAannullable isirrelevant, because, even if this were the case, themissionofthisPanelaccordingtoarticleR57oftheCodeandinviewoftherequestsandsubmissionsbythepartieswouldbebroadenoughtoissueadecisiononthebasisoftheapplicablerulesinlieuofFIFA.

c)Isthereanenforceabledecision?

Article71paragraph1FDCstipulatesthatdecisionsby“abody,a committeeoran instanceofFIFAorCAS”are enforceable under the provision. In the case athandFIFA sought to enforce theCAS awardCAS2006/A/1109.IntheoperativepartoftheawardCAS2006/A/1109, the association CS FCU PolitehnicaTimisoara which is identical to the Appellant was– inter alia– ordered to change name and not toimitate the colours, track record and logo of SCFC Politehnica Timisoara SA. Hence, looking atthe language of article 71 paragraph 1 FDC theprerequisite that there must be an enforceabledecisionisfulfilled.

The Appellant claims, however, that article 71paragraph 1 FDC has to be construed narrowly.Theprovisiondoes– according to theAppellant–not grant FIFA any competence to enforce otherCASawards than theoneswhichwere issued afterproceedings involving FIFA jurisdictional bodies.

FIFA and the RFF answer that article 71 FDCmakes no distinction between CAS awards passedafter an appeal was lodged against decisions ofFIFAbodies or after an appealwas lodged againstdecisionsofnationalbodies.Thequestionthereforeariseswhetherornot theAppellant isprecluded inraisinghisobjectionatthisstageoftheenforcementprocedure.ThePanelanswersthisintheaffirmative.All the parties to the present procedure have beena party to the CAS procedure CAS 2007/A/1355.This Panel is, therefore, bound by this previousCAS decision according to which the award CAS2006/A/1109 constitutes an enforceable decisionunderarticle71FDC.

Subsidiarily, the Panelwould like to point out that–asrightlymentionedbyFIFAandtheRFF–article71FDCdoesnotinitswordingmakeanydistinctionbetween CAS awards delivered in relation with adecisionissuedbyFIFAorwithadecisionpassedbyanationalfederation.Itiswellknownthatthepurposeof the jurisdiction of CAS provided in the FIFAStatutesistoensureacoherentjurisprudenceinthematteroffootballbothatnationalandinternationallevel.Article62oftheFIFAStatutesthusprovidesforawidejurisdictionclauseinfavourofCASinorder“toresolvedisputesbetweenFIFA,Members,Confederations,Leagues,clubs,Players,Officials,andlicensedmatchagentsandplayersagents”.Astoarticle63oftheFIFAStatutes,theAppellantomitstoquoteinitsappealbrief,thepartwhichprovides thatnotonlyfinaldecisionspassedbyFIFAbutaswell“decisionspassedbyConfederations,MembersorLeaguesshallbelodgedwithCAS”.ThePaneldoesnotseehowtheAppellantcandeductfromthereferenceunderarticle63paragraph2of theFIFAStatutes to “all other internal channels” that CAS canonly examine a previous decision of a FIFA body.Withreferencetoarticle63paragraph1oftheFIFAStatutesitisindeedclearthatarticle63paragraph2oftheFIFAStatutesrefersaswellto“internalchannels”ofConfederations,nationalfederationsorleagues.

Article64paragraph1oftheFIFAStatutesprovidesfurther that “the Confederations, Members and Leaguesshall agree to recognise CAS as an independent judicialauthorityandtoensurethattheirmembers,affiliatedPlayersandOfficials complywith thedecisionspassedbyCAS”. ItisthePanel’sviewthatthisrecognitionbyFIFAofCAScompetence to resolvedisputesat all levelsofthe familyof football and theobligation tocomplywithCASdecisionsisnotonlyanchoredintheFIFAStatutes but also in article 71 FDC. Through thisarticle,FIFArecognisesthatallCASawardsissuedinfavouroragainstmembersofthefamilyoffootballshouldbeenforcedandthatFIFAwillmakeuseofits competences as the international association forfootball to reach this objective.Therefore not only


a literal constructionof article 71FDCbut aswellasystematicconstructionofthisarticleleadstotheconclusionthatFIFAhasindeedageneralcompetencetoenforceCASawardswithinthefamilyoffootball.ThePanelconsequentlydoesnotseeanyambiguitywith this construction, which is coherent with theFIFAdisciplinary systemanddoes thusnotviolatetheprincipleofgoodfaithand loyaltyapplicabletotheFIFAregulations.

TheAppellantiswrongwhenitdrawstheconclusionfrom the FIFA Circular n° 1080 dated February13,2007and therelated jurisprudenceof theSwissFederal Court that FIFA and the Swiss supremecourtacknowledgetheauthorityofFIFAtoimposesanctionsbasedonarticle71FDConlywhentherehasbeenpreviouslytotheCASawardadecisionofaFIFAbody.Tosupportitsopinion,theAppellantindeed uses precedents where FIFA and the SwissFederal Court dealt with enforcement of CASawardsrelatedtoFIFAdecisions.TheSwissFederalCourtdidnothave todecideonFIFAcompetencetoenforceaCASawardwhichwasnotrelatedtoaFIFAdecision.ThestatementsoftheSwissFederalCourtarethuslimitedbythenatureofthecaseithadto dealwith.TheAppellant cannot have the SwissFederalCourt decideon something that itwasnotasked to decide on.As correctlymentioned by theAppellantatpage16ofitsappealbrief,“inthepresentdispute,thesituationiscompletelydifferent”.

Based on the foregoing, the Panel decides that inthe present case there is an enforceable decisionaccordingtoarticle71FDC.

d)WastheAppellantthreatenedwiththedeductionof6points?

Beforerequestingthenationalfederationtoimplementasanctionaccordingtoarticle71paragraph2FDCthe respective party must be threatened with saidsanctionincaseitdoesnotcomplywithitsobligationswithin a certain deadline according to article 71paragraph1FDC.InthecaseathandtheAppellantwasthreatenedintheCASawardCAS2007/A/1355that “[i] f SC Politehnica 1921 Stiinta Timisoara InvestSA (this is the former nameof theAppellant) failstocomplywiththeparagraphs1to3aboveoranyofthemby30June20086pointswillbededucted”.Hence,alsothisrequirementiscompliedwith.

e) Did the Appellant comply with its obligationintime?

According to the letterofFIFAdated3September2008 the Appellant has failed to comply with itsobligation to “change its club colours so that they no

longer include violet” since –according to the SecondRespondent– the dominant colours of the club ontheuniformsoftheAppellantandontheAppellant’shomepagewerestillvioletafterthedeadline.

InordertodeterminewhetherornottheAppellantcomplied with his obligation the exact contents ofthe latter has to be determined. The Panel notesin this respect that there is a certain discrepancybetweentheobligationoftheAppellantstipulatedintheenforceabledecision (CASaward2006/A/1109)and in the CAS award 2007/A/1355 implementingthefirststepoftheenforcementprocedureaccordingtoarticle71paragraph1FDC.WhiletheCASawardCAS 2006/A/1109 interdicts “to imitate the coloursof SC FC Politehnica Timisoara SA” the CAS award2007/A/1355obligestheAppellant“to change its clubcoloursso that theyno longer includeviolet”.ThemajorityofthePanelholdsthatinviewoftheseverityofthesanctioninquestionandinviewofthenecessityoflegal certainty the Appellant can only be expectedto comply with the obligation stipulated in CAS2007/A/1355andthattheobligationcontainedthereincannotbeinterpretedinthelightofthedecisiontobeenforced.Hence, inorder todeterminewhetherornottheAppellantcompliedwithitsobligationsitisnotdecisivewhethertheAppellant“imitated”thecolourviolet,butwhetherhechangedthecolour“sothatitnolongerincludesviolet”.ThePanelholdsthatthechangeofcoloursappliestosuchobjectsthatservetoidentifytheclubinthepublic.

Theuniformsusedbyaclubduringmatchesisaveryimportantmeansofidentificationforaclub.Hence,thereisnodoubtthattheobligationinno.3oftheoperativepartoftheCASawardCAS2007/A/1355“change its club colours so that theyno longer includeviolet”appliestotheuniformsusedbytheAppellant.

ThePanelnotesthattheAppellantorderednewkitstothecompanySSDon26June2008andobviouslyneverplayedsincetheninviolet.Until4August2008whenthenewkitwasdeliveredtotheAppellantandfiled with the RFF and the UEFA, the Appellantplayedfriendlygamesinblackandyellow.TheFirstRespondentsubmitted,however, that theAppellantstill playedwith a violet kit in othermatches priorto4August2008.However,thePanelcomestotheconclusion that the Second Respondent failed toprove, that theAppellant played in violet after theexpirationofthedeadlineon30June2008.

As to the change of colours on the Appellant’swebsites,thePanelnotesthattheAppellantaddresseda letteron25June252008tothewebsitemanagerinforming him of the change of the club’s coloursandoftheneedtoadaptthewebsiteimmediatelydue


tothesanctionsthreatenedbyCAS.ItappearsthatthewebsitescolourswerestillinvioletinSeptemberwhen FIFA passed its decision but that they havesincebeenchanged.Inthisrespect,thePanelagreeswithFIFAandtheRFFthatthewebsitecoloursmustbe changed andnot containviolet.Apparently thiswas theofficialwebsiteof the club and its internetaddress is even indicated on the Appellant’s letterhead.Furthermore,thereisnodoubtthatthenameandthecoloursoftheclubbelongtotheAppellant,whichshouldbeinapositiontoimposethechangeof its colours on its official website. However, itremains that the Appellant did ask for the changeofthewebsitecoloursbeforeendofJune,2008andit had received a positive answer from the websitemanager within the deadline set by CAS. As theofficialwebsitewaseventuallymodifiedandadaptedto thenewcoloursof theclub, thePanel seeshereagainthatadeductionof6pointscannotbedecidedonly for the reason that the colours of thewebsitewereeffectively changedby thewebsitemanager, athird party to the Appellant, only shortly after 30June2008.

There is no question that the colours “violet” and“mauve” are close. The question, therefore, ariseswhethertheAppellantbreachesitsdutyof“changingits colours so that they no longer include violet”by changing his colours from “violet to “mauve”.Technicallythecolour“mauve”isadifferentcolourfrom “violet”, as confirmed in a report from theDeanoftheFacultyofArtsandDesignofthewestUniversityofTimisoara.FurthermorethischangeoftheAppellant’s colourswas recognisedby theRFFon5 July 2008 and theRFFExecutiveCommitteerequested twoof its legal representatives to informFIFAthattheAppellanthadcompliedwiththeCASaward2007/A/1355.Tosumup,therefore,thePanelcomestotheconclusionthatalsointhisrespecttherewasnobreachbytheAppellant.

To sum up, therefore, the Panel comes to theconclusion that the Appellant did not breach itsobligation“nottoincludevioletinitsclubcolours”andthatthereforethedecisionofFIFAiserroneous.

f) Can the decision of FIFA be upheld on othergrounds?

It is true that the threatening todeduct6points intheCASaward2007/A/1355doesnotonlyrefertotheobligationtochangethecoloursbutalsototheobligationtochangeitsname.

ThePaneldeemsthattheAppellant’schangeofnamewasmadewithinthedeadlinefixedbytheCASaward2007/A/1355.ThisisnotonlyconfirmedbytheRFF

decisionpassedon5July2008wheretheRFFclearlyindicates that the Appellant’s change of name wasvalidly done, but also by theFIFADecisionwheretheFIFADisciplinaryCommitteedecidedthat“point1 [red: the point related to the change of name] ofthementionedCASaward has been respected”.TheRFFDecisiondoesthuslogicallynotrefertothequestionoftheAppellant’schangeofnamebutonlysanctionstheAppellantonthebasisofitsallegedlatechangeofcolours.

The question ariseswhether the lack of adaptationtothenewnameinthecorrespondenceinthedaysfollowing the Appellant’s change of name on itsletterheadand stampsconstitutes aviolationof theAppellant’sobligationsaccordingtotheCASawardCAS2007/A/1355.ThelatterobligestheAppellantto “change its name”. It is not without hesitationthat the Panel comes to the conclusion that theobligation in the CAS award CAS 2997/A/1355has to be construed and interpreted narrowly. Theoccasional or sporadic use of the Appellant’s oldnameorlogoshortlyaftertheformalchangeofnamedoes,therefore,notconstitutea–atleastsubstantial–breach of the duties embedded in the CAS awardCAS2007/A/1355.Tosumup, therefore, thePanelcomes to the conclusion that the FIFA Decisioncannotbeupheldonothergroundsand,hence,mustbesetaside.

5. Validity of the RFF Decision implementing the FIFA decision

SincetheFIFAdecisionhastobesetasidethisalsoinfects theRFFdecisionwhich is designed to givetheFIFAdecision effect inRomania and thereforehastobesetasideaswell.

6. Summary

Based on all the above the Panel decides that theappealmustbeupheldinsofarasitisdirectedagainstthe validity of the FIFA Decision and the RFFDecision.However,allotherprayersforreliefoftheAppellantarerejected.


WislaKrakówisafootballclubwithitsregisteredofficeinKraków,Poland(the“Appellant”).ItisamemberofthePolishFootballAssociation(“PZPN”),whichhas been affiliated to theFédération InternationaledeFootballAssociation(FIFA)theworldgoverningbodyofFootballsince1923.

EmpoliFootballClubS.p.A.isafootballclubwithitsregisteredofficeinEmpoli,Italy.ItisamemberoftheItalian National Football Association (FederazioneItalianaGiuoco Calcio – FIGC), itself affiliated totheFIFAsince1905.

K.(the“Player”)isaprofessionalfootballplayer.HeisofPolishnationality.Hecurrentlyplayswith theclubEmpoliFootballClubS.p.A.on thebasisofaprofessionalcontract.

On27July2005,aprofessionalcontractwasenteredintobetweentheAppellantandthePlayer.Itwasafixed-termagreementforfiveyears,effectivefrom1July2005until30June2010.

On22May2008, thePlayernotified inwritingtheAppellant,theFIFAandthePZPNofthefactthathewasunilaterallyterminatingwithimmediateeffecthis contractual relationshipwith thePolish club inaccordancewitharticle17of theFIFARegulationsfor the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP) Inparticular, he indicated that the notification was

servedwithin15daysfollowingthelastgameoftheseasonofthePolishleagueandattheendoftheso-calledprotectedperiod.

On15June2008,MrMarekWilczek,chairmanofthemanagementboardoftheAppellant,acknowledgedreceiptof thePlayer’s letterbut contested thevalidtermination of the contract dated 27 July 2005.He drew the Player’s attention to the fact that hiscontractual obligations had not expired and thathewas still amember of theAppellant’s team.Assuch,hewasexpectedtoattendthetrainingsessionsorganisedonbehalfoftheclub.

On10July2008,MrMarekWilczeksenttothePlayeraletterconfirmingthatthecontractsignedon27July2005wasstillinforce.HewarnedthePlayerthathisfailuretoappearduringteampractiseorhiseventualinvolvementwithanotherclubwasinbreachofhiscontractualobligations.

On4August2008,theAppellantcalledthePlayertoappearatadisciplinaryhearingtobeheldbeforeitsmanagementboardon19August2008.

Ina letterdated23September2008andaddressedto the PZPN, the Appellant confirmed that thedisciplinaryproceedingwasstillpending.

At the hearing held on 12 May 2009 before theCourtofArbitrationforSport(CAS),theAppellantconfirmed that it had not yet initiated proceedingsbefore the FIFA or another tribunal to obtain arulingwithrespecttotheconsequencesoftheallegedbreach/termination of the contract dated 27 July2005bythePlayer.Likewise,onthesameoccasion,the Respondents told the Sole Arbitrator that theywerenot awareof any claim lodgedwith regard tothesaidcontract.

On30 July2008, thePlayer signedanemploymentagreementwiththeclubEmpoliFootballClubS.p.A.validfrom1August2008until30June2013.

On5September2008,theFIGCformallyrequiredfrom the FIFA to be authorized to provisionallyregister the Player with its affiliated club EmpoliFootballClubS.p.A.Thisrequestwasgrantedwithimmediateeffectbydecisionpassedon10October

Relevantfacts

Panel: Mr. Lars Hilliger (Denmark), Sole arbitrator

Football; contract of employmentbetweenaplayerandaclub;terminationof contract by the player; CASJurisdiction; standing to file a petitionwith FIFA to provisionally registera player with a national footballassociation; validity of the provisionalmeasuresorderedbyFIFA;conditionofadmissibilityofacounterclaim

Arbitration CAS 2008/A/1691Wisla Kraków v. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) & Empoli FC S.p.A & K. 3July2009


2008bytheFIFASingleJudgeofthePlayers’StatusCommittee. The latter reached this conclusionprincipallybecausehefoundthattheAppellant“doesnotappeartobegenuinelyinterestedintheservicesoftheplayeranymore,butratherinfinancialcompensation”andthat“bymeansofanoticeofterminationdated22May2008addressedtothePolishclub,thePZPNandFIFA,theplayerhadclearlyexpressedhiswishtorenderhisservicestoanotherclubthanWislaKraków”.

On4November2008,theAppellantfiledastatementof appeal and an appeal brief with the Court ofArbitrationforSport(CAS)challengingthedecisionof the FIFA Single Judge of the Players’ StatusCommittee.

InhisappealbeforetheCAS,theAppellantchosetonameonlytheFIFAasRespondent.On27November2008, the latter requested Empoli Football ClubS.p.A. and the Player to participate to the presentarbitrationproceedings.

On 1December 2008 and pursuant to article R54andR41.2oftheCodeofSports-relatedArbitration(“Code”),theCASCourtofficeinvitedtheAppellantaswellastheItalianclubandthePlayertoexpresstheirpositionontherequestof theFIFA.WhereastheAppellanthasnotfiledanysubmissionwiththisregard,EmpoliFootballClubS.p.A.andthePlayerconfirmed in a timely manner that they agreed toparticipateinandjointheprocedureathand.

On16March2009,theCASCourtOfficeinformedthe parties that, “taking into account the Respondent’srequestforthejoinderofEmpoliFCSpAandK.,theagreementofthetwothirdpartiestheretoandtheabsenceofanycommentsfrom theAppellant within the time limit granted, pursuanttoArticle R41.4 of the Code of Sports-relatedArbitration(the“Code”),thepartiesareadvisedthattheSoleArbitratorhasdecided that the two thirdpartiesmaybe joined to theseproceedings”.


1. CAS jurisdiction

ThejurisdictionofCASderivesinthecaseathandfromarticles62ff.oftheFIFAStatutesandarticleR47of theCode, the latterwhich reads as follows:“Anappealagainstthedecisionofafederation,associationorsports-relatedbodymaybefiledwiththeCASinsofarasthestatutesorregulationsofthesaidbodysoprovideorasthepartieshaveconcludedaspecificarbitrationagreementandinsofarastheAppellanthasexhaustedthelegalremediesavailabletohimpriortotheappeal,inaccordancewiththestatutesorregulationsofthesaidsports-relatedbody.AnappealmaybefiledwiththeCASagainstanawardrenderedbytheCASactingasafirst

instancetribunalifsuchappealhasbeenexpresslyprovidedbytherulesapplicabletotheprocedureoffirstinstance”.

In thepresentproceedings,FIFA isof theopinionthat all internal procedures and remedies have notbeen exhausted and that the decision of the SingleJudgeofitsPlayers’StatusCommitteeisnotfinal.

Having evaluated FIFA’s arguments, the SoleArbitratorhasconsideredthathehasjurisdictiontodecide over the present dispute, and thus over theappeal against the provisionalmeasures because (i)theappealeddecisionwasrenderedbytheFIFASingleJudgeofthePlayers’StatusCommittee,andarticle23par.3infineoftheFIFARegulationsforStatusandTransferofPlayersprovidesthat“(...)Decisionsreachedby the single judge or thePlayers’StatusCommitteemay beappealedbeforetheCourtofArbitrationforSport(CAS)”and(ii)moreover,theSoleArbitratorconsidersthatthedecisionfromtheSingleJudgeofthePlayers’StatusCommitteeisindeedafinaldecision,accordingtothemeaningofarticleR47oftheCode.Theprovisionalnatureoftheobjectofthedecision(i.e.theissuanceof theprovisional ITC)doesnotaffect, and inanycase cannot affect, the nature of the decision itselfwhichisfinalanddefinitiveregardingthesaidobject.Inotherwords,eventhoughtherequestedITChasaprovisionalnature,thedecisionwhichgrantsitsissueisafinaldecision.

ItfollowsthattherequirementsofarticleR47oftheCode aremet and that theCAShas jurisdiction todecideonthepresentdispute.

2. Standing to file a petition with FIFA to provisionally register a player with

a national football association

TheAppellantsubmittedthat,basedonarticle2par.6ofannex3totheFIFARegulations,theFIGCwasnotentitledtorequestfromFIFAanauthorizationtoprovisionally register thePlayerwith itsaffiliate. Inlightofthesaidprovision,theAppellantclaimedthatsuchapetitioncouldhavebeenfiledexclusivelybythePlayerorbyhisnewclub.

Article2par.6ofannex3totheFIFARegulationsreadsasfollows:“TheformerassociationshallnotissueanITC if a contractual dispute has arisen between the formerclubandtheprofessional.Insuchacase,theprofessional,theformercluband/orthenewclubareentitledto lodgeaclaimwithFIFAinaccordancewitharticle22.FIFAshall thendecideontheissueoftheITCandonsportingsanctionswithin60days.Inanycase,thedecisiononsportingsanctionsshallbetakenbeforetheissueoftheITC.TheissueoftheITCshallbewithoutprejudicetocompensationforbreachofcontract.FIFAmaytakeprovisionalmeasuresinexceptionalcircumstances”.


TheSolearbitratornotedthattheprovisiondoesnotspecifywhoisentitledtoaskforprovisionalmeasuresorwhattriggersFIFA’sintervention.

InviewoftheircrucialrolewithregardtotheITC,itwouldbeillogicaltoexcludetheassociationsfromtheprocessof applying forprovisional registration.As a matter of fact, a player must be registeredwith an association to play for a club as either aprofessionaloranamateur(seearticle5par.1oftheFIFA Regulations). A precondition for registeringaplayeristhathisITChasbeenvalidlytransferredfromtheassociationofhisoldclubtotheassociationofhisnewclub(seearticle9oftheFIFARegulationsandarticle1par.1oftheirannex3).Allapplicationsto register aprofessionalmustbe submittedby thenew club to thenew associationduringoneof theregistration periods established by that association(article 2 par. 1 annex 3 to theFIFARegulations).Uponreceiptoftheapplication,thenewassociationshall immediately request the former association toissue an ITC for the professional (article 2 par. 2annex 3 of theFIFARegulations).As a result, theparticipation of associations in the registration ofplayers is inevitable a) as they are the competentbodiesforthemanagementoftheITCandb)astheywillnotfilearequestforprovisionalmeasuresbytheFIFA ifnot required todosoby theplayerand/orby its affiliate.Thenewassociationhas therefore alegitimate interest to intervene when its opinion isdivergingfromtheviewsoftheformerassociation.One might actually expect the new association tosupportby allmeans the correct applicationof theregulations,especiallywhenitsaffiliates’rightsareatstake.

Thefactthatonlyassociationsarecompetenttofilea petition to provisionally register a playerwith itsaffiliateisalsoconsistentwiththepositionexpressedbytheFIFAtoK.Withthisregard,theprincipleofgoodfaithprotectstheinterestedpersoninthetrusthe/sheplacedintheassuranceshe/shereceivedfromthecompetentauthority(ATF131II636;ATF129I170;128II125;126II387).On3September2008,the Player asked for the assistance of the FIFA inreceivingtheITCfromthePZPN.Thefollowingday,FIFAexplained that“should our intervention be needed,you are kindly invited to inform the Federazione ItalianaGiuocoCalcio to contactour services inorder toask forourassistancewiththerequestfortheissuanceoftherelevantITCby the PolishFootballAssociation”.At thehearing, theFIFAconfirmedtotheSoleArbitratorthatthiswasinlinewithitsconstantpractice.Asalreadyexposedhereabove,article2par.6ofannex3of theFIFARegulationsdoesnot specifywho is entitled to askforprovisionalmeasures.Hence,intheabsenceofaclearwrittenruletothecontrary,theSoleArbitrator

doesnotseeasuperiorinterestthatcouldjustifythebreach of the assurance given by the FIFA to thePlayeron4September2008.

Inviewoftheforegoingdetermination,theFIGChadstandingtofileapetitionwithFIFAtoprovisionallyregisterthePlayer.

3. Validity of the provisional measures ordered by the FIFA Single Judge of the Players’

Status Committee

TheAppellantallegesthat,inthepresentproceedings,there are no exceptional circumstances that couldjustify theprovisionalmeasures takenby theFIFASingle Judge of the Players’ Status Committee.Fundamentally,theAppellantclaimsthataslongasithasnotagreedtotheterminationofthecontract,thePlayer remains committed to it until 30 June 2010.Thisallegationmustbedisregarded.

If the Appellant’s position was to be followed, itwouldindisputablycreateaninequalityofbargainingpower between the player and the club and placethe latter in the favorable position of deciding thetermsandtheconditionsunderwhichitwouldgiveits consent to the “mutually agreed termination of thecontract”.Had the player not signed a new contractwithanewemployer, the formerclubcouldsimplyprevent him fromworking by decidingnot to givehimitsacceptationtotheterminationofthecontractduringthetransferwindow.

All the above considerations establish that thepositionoftheAppellantisinconsistentwiththeFIFARegulations,whicharedesignedtofindareasonablebalance between the needs of contractual stability,on the one hand, and the needs of freemovementof players, on the other hand, i.e. tofind solutionsthat foster the goodof football by reconciling in afairmannerthevariousandsometimescontradictoryinterests of clubs and players (CAS 2007/A/1298,1299,1300,CAS2008/A/1519, 1520).

In the view of the above, the SoleArbitrator doesnot see any reason to depart from the positionexpressedintheconstantjurisprudenceoftheCAS(CAS2006/A/1100):“(…)thePanelisoftheopinionthataplayer cannotbe compelled toremain in the employmentofaparticular employer. Ifaplayer terminateshis employmentcontractwithoutvalidreason,thenthelatterisnotwithstandingthepossibilityofsportingsanctions-obligedtocompensatefordamages,ifany,butisnotobligedtoremainwiththeemployerortorenderhisservicesthereagainsthiswill”.

ThefactthatthePlayernotifiedtheAppellantthatheunilaterallyterminatedtheircontractualrelationship


withimmediateeffectis,perse,notexceptional.

The Sole arbitrator considers that the provisionalmeasures ordered by the FIFA Single Judge of thePlayers’ Status Committee were the only meansavailabletoprotectthePlayerandhisrighttoworkfromanirreparableharmifbetweenthemomenttheterminationofthecontractwasnotifiedbythePlayerand themoment theFIFAwas requested to acceptthe provisional registration of the Player, severalmonths passed by and that during this period, thePlayer’sformerClub(theAppellant)hadnotinitiatedproceedings to examine the consequences of thesaid terminationand/or todeny itsvalidity.Onlyadisciplinary investigation was allegedly undertakenat thePolish club levelwhichwas still pending on23September2008.Withthisregard,theAppellanthasnottriedtoexplaintotheSoleArbitratoriftheinternalprocedurehadbeencarriedout completelyandwhetherasanctionhadbeenimposeduponthePlayer.Thosecircumstancesmakethesituationtrulyexceptionalandjustifytheprovisionalmeasures.

4. Condition of admissibility of a counterclaim

Empoli Football Club S.p.A. requested the SoleArbitrator toorder thepayment in its favourof anindemnityamountingtoEuro39,435.30.Itisoftheopinion that the proceedings initiated because oftherefusalofthePZPNtoissuetheITCpreventedEmpoli Football Club S.p.A. to field the Player orbenefitfromhisservicesformorethantwomonths.

The Sole arbitrator observes that in the particularcontext, the purpose of a counterclaim which isrelated to compensation for damages derives fromthecontractualdisputebetweenthepartieswhereasthepurposeoftheappealisrelatedtothevalidityoftheprovisionalmeasuresorderedbytheFIFASingleJudge from the Players’ Status Committee. Suchcontractualdisputecould/shouldbe theobjectofadistinctprocedure.Itisobviousthatthecounterclaimis entangled with the Appellant’s own eventualclaim for compensation for the alleged premature,unjustified termination of the professional contractbythePlayer.

Inanyevent,theSoleArbitratornotesthat,asregardstheburdenofproof,itisthedutyofEmpoliFootballClubS.p.A.toobjectivelydemonstratetheexistenceofitsrights(Article8oftheSwissCivilCode,ATF123III60consid.3a)ATF130III417consid.3.1.).It is not sufficient for it to simply assert themereexistenceofaviolationofitsinterestsforatribunaltoconsiderthematterwithoutfurthersubstantiatingits claim (CAS 2005/A/896). In the case at hand,Empoli Football Club S.p.A. has not proven nor

madeplausible theexistenceof the allegeddamageit suffered. In particular it has not established thatit paid the Player, that the latter has not providedany services nor trained at all with its team duntil14October2008andthat it istheAppellantwhichissolelyresponsiblefortheallegeddamageandnotthePZPN.

For all those reasons,EmpoliFootballClubS.p.A.cannotasapartofthiscasebeawardedtherequestedcompensation.


Relevantfacts

Neue Grasshopper Fussball AG Zurich (“Grass-hopper”or“theAppellant”)isaprofessionalfootballclub with its seat in Niederhasli, Switzerland. It isaffiliatedtotheSwissFootballAssociation(SFVor“theSwissFA”),afederationinturnaffiliatedtotheFédération Internationale de Football Association,theworldgoverningbodyoffootball(FIFA).

Club Alianza de Lima (“Alianza” or “theRespondent”)isaprofessionalfootballclubwithitsseat inLima,Peru.It isaffiliatedtotheFederaciónPeruanadeFútbol (FPFor the“PeruvianFA”), anassociationinturnaffiliatedtoFIFA.

ThePeruvianplayerD.(“thePlayer”)wasregisteredwiththeRespondenton25July2000.On1November2002, the Respondent and the Player signed anemploymentcontractvaliduntil31December2006.The Player was born on 21 September 1984. Thesalary agreeduponby thepartieswasofUSD250permonth.

The Player regularly performed with the youthnational team of Peru and was called up for thenational“A”teaminAugust2003.

ThecontractualrelationshipbetweentheRespondentand the Player came to an end upon the expiry ofthe employment contract, which was not renewed.

InJanuary2007,i.e.beforehis23rdbirthday,thePlayersignedanemploymentcontractasaprofessionalwiththeAppellantandwasregisteredbyit.

On 31 July 2008, the FIFA Dispute ResolutionChamber(DRC)renderedadecisionontheamountoftrainingcompensationpayablebytheAppellanttotheRespondent.ThedecisionoutlinedthefindingsoftheDRConly,butdoesnotcontainanyreasons.Itwasnotifiedtothepartieson17October2008.

By letter dated 7 November 2008, the Appellant,without having filed with FIFA a request for thegroundsofthedecision,fileditsStatementofAppealwiththeCourtofArbitrationforSport(CAS)againstthe decision rendered by the DRC, whereas on 17November2008,theAppellantfileditsAppealBriefwiththeCAS.


1. Decision by a federation

CAS Panels tend to interpret the term “decision”withinthemeaningofArt.R47oftheCodebroadly(cfCAS2008/A/1583&1584,no.5.2.1).

AlthoughFIFA’slettersenttothepartieson31July2008 does not address the grounds on which thedecisionwaspassed, itclearly showsall formalandmaterialcharacteristicsofa“decision”inthesenseofArt.R47oftheCode.Onamateriallevelitstatestheoutcomeof thedeliberations regarding the issueofthetrainingcompensationowedforthePlayer.Thecontent of this letter thus represents a “unilateralact”whichaimsataffectingthelegalsituationoftheaddressees–oratleast,inthepresentcaseandunderthe concrete circumstances of this case, could beinterpretedasaimingatdoingso.Onaformallevelthelettercarriestheheading“decision”,waspassedbyanorganofFIFA(theDRC)andwassignedbythe FIFA General Secretary, who is awarded thiscompetenceinArt.68(3)lit.hoftheFIFAStatutes.Furthermore,FIFA’sletterof31July2008containslegal instructions onhow to appeal against it, thusbearingalltheelementsascribedtoa“decision”.Thefactthatthedecision isnotmotivatedcan,assuch,notaffectitbeinga“decision”(cf.CAS2004/A/748,no.91).

Panel: Prof. Ulrich Haas (Germany), President Mr. Michele Bernasconi (Switzerland) Mr. Pedro Tomás Marqués (Spain)

Football; compensation for training;nonmotivateddecisionas a“decision”subjecttoappealtotheCAS;referraltoSwisslawintheFIFAStatutes;Art.15of theDRCRules; hierarchy of normsintheprovisionsofaSportsfederation;deadline to appeal a decision; purposeofArticle75oftheSwissCivilCode

Arbitration CAS 2008/A/1705 Neue Grasshopper Fussball AG Zurich v. Club Alianza de Lima 18June2009


2. Timeliness of the appeal

According toArt. R49 of theCode the appeal hastobe lodgedwithinacertain time limit.Accordingtothedeadlineprovided inArt.63(1)oftheFIFAStatutes the appeal has to be filed with the CASwithin21days.AnotherdeadlineiscontainedinArt.15oftheDRCProceduralRules.Thisprovisionreadsasfollows:

“1.ThePlayers’StatusCommittee, theDRC, thesingle judge and theDRC judgemaydecidenot tocommunicate the grounds of a decision and insteadcommunicateonlythefindingsofthedecision.Atthesame time, the parties shall be informed that theyhave tendays fromthereceiptof thefindingsof thedecision to request, in writing, the grounds of thedecision,andthat failure todosowillresult in thedecisioncomingintoforce.

2.Ifapartyrequeststhegroundsofadecision,themotivateddecisionwillbecommunicatedtothepartiesin full, written form. The time limit to lodge anappealbeginsuponreceiptofthismotivateddecision.

3. It the parties do not request the grounds of adecision.ashortexplanationofthedecisionshallberecordedinthecasefiles…”.

a)ThedeadlineinArt.15oftheDRCRules

ItisundisputedbetweenthepartiesthattheAppellanthas not requested the grounds for the decision bytheDRC. Art. 15(1) of theDRC Procedural Rulesprovides that in such a case thedecision is comingintoforce.

aa)Thenatureofthedeadline

If the parties agree on deadlines for submitting adispute to arbitration these deadlines may servedifferentpurposes(cfkAuFmAnn-kohler/rigozzi,Arbitrageinternational,2006,marg.no.275;schWAb/WAlter,Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit,7thed,2005,Chap.6marg.no.6).Thepartiesmayhaveintendedtolimitthemissionof the arbitral tribunal as to time.Thetimelimitunderthosecircumstancesisdirectedtothepowersofthearbitraltribunal.Oncethetimelimithaselapsedthearbitraltribunalisnolongercompetenttodecidethematterindispute.Thearbitraltribunalhasnojurisdictionwiththeconsequencethattheappealis (no longer) admissible. The time limit may alsoserve,however,anotherpurpose.Itcouldbedirectedastothemeritsofthecase,i.e.attheclaimitself.Ifinsuchacasethetimelimitelapsesthearbitraltribunalremainscompetent todecide thedispute.However,theappellanthaslostthepossibilitytoavailhimself

of his specific rightwith the consequence that theclaim has to be dismissed. Whether a time limitservesoneortheotherpurposemaybedifficulttoanswerinaspecificcase.Thedecisivecriterionis–asPaulssonhaspointedout–whethertheobjectingparty is taking aim at the tribunal or at the claim(PaulssonJ.,inLiberamicorumRobertBriner,2005,p.616).

ThereislittleCASjurisprudenceonthenatureofthedeadlinetofileanappeal.Thereisacertaintendency,however, to qualify the deadline as a proceduralissue. An example for this may be found in CAS2004/A/674,no.47:

“Thejurisdictionofanarbitraltribunalisanevidentproceduralprerequisiteoftheadmissibilityofaclaim…Itisalsowidelyrecognizedthatanagreementtoarbitratemay, like other agreements, be limited intime:i.e.thepartiesmayagreeinadvancetoacertaintimeperiod,theelapseofwhichleadstothelapsingoftheagreementtoarbitrate…ThePanelisoftheviewthatafterthelapseofthetimeperiodprovidedforinArt.60oftheFIFAStatutes,andacceptedherebyandagreed by the parties, therewould beno validagreement to arbitrate between the parties and theappealwouldnotbeadmissible,respectively.Insuchacase,theCASwouldhavetodecline jurisdictiontoruleonthemeritsofthiscaseandtodeclaretheappealnotadmissible”.

Whetherornotthetimelimit tofileanappeal isaprocedural issue or an issue of the merits followsfromtheinterpretationoftheprovisioninquestion.In particular consideration must be given to theintentoftheparties.ThepurposeofArt.15oftheDRC Procedural Rules is fostering legal stabilityandcertainty.Aftertheelapseofthetimelimitthedecisionbythefederationshouldnolongerbeputinquestionbyanyoneentitledtoappeal.Thispurpose,however, is poorly served when interpreting thetimelimitasaproceduralissue.Thedecisionofthefederationcouldnotbechallengedbefore theCASbut it could possibly be challenged before anotherforum, e.g. a state court (cfrigozziA.,L’arbitrageinternational en matière de sport, 2005, marg. no.1039).Ifhowever,thetimelimitaimsattheclaimitselfthe actionwould have to be dismissed irrespectiveof theforumchosenbytheappellant todecidethematter in dispute. Thus, the intent of the partiesclearlyspeaksinfavourofconstruingthetimelimitasanissueofmerits.ThePanelfeelsitselfcomfortedinitsviewbylookingonArt.75CCwhichrulesonthepossibilityforamemberofa(Swiss)associationto appeal against a decision of that association.Theprovisionreads:


“Anymemberwhohasnotconsentedtoaresolutionwhichinfringesthelaworthearticlesofassociationisentitledbylawtochallengesuchresolutionincourtwithinonemonthfromthedayonwhichhebecamecognizantofsuchresolution”.

The purpose of Art. 75 CC is to safeguard theindividual’s membership rights from unlawfulinfringementsbytheassociation(cf.ATF108II15,18).Withthislegislativepurposeinmind,Art.75CCisinterpretedinabroadsense(cfATF118II12,17seq.;108II15,18seq.;HandkommentarzumSchweizerRecht/niggli, 2007,Art. 75ZGBmarg. no. 6 seq.;heini/portmAnn, Das Schweizer Vereinsrecht,SchweizerischesPrivatrechtII/5,2005,marg.no.278;Basler Kommentar ZGB/heini/scherrer, 3rd ed.2006,Art.75marg.no.3etseq.;BernerKommentarzumschweizerischenPrivatrecht/riemer,1990,Art.75 marg. no. 7 et seq., 17 et seq.). In particular, theterm“decision”inArt.75CCencompassesnotonlyresolutionspassedbytheassemblyofanassociationbut,also,any(finalandbinding)decisionofanyotherorgan of the association, irrespective of the natureof such decision (disciplinary, administrative, etc.)and the composition of said organ (one or severalpersons).

TheobjectiveofArt.75CCliesinenablingallpartiesconcerned (the association itself, themembers andthird interested parties) to obtain clarity about thebinding effect of an association’s decision with areasonabledeadline.Theshortappealdeadlinethusservestheinterestsoflegalcertaintyandsecurity.InviewofthisobjectiveitisunanimouslyheldthatthetimelimitinArt.75CCisamatterofmerits,i.e.thattheappellantoncethetimelimithaselapsedforfeitshis (member) right to challenge thedecisionof theassociation with the consequence that the appealis admissible but unfounded on themerits (BernerKommentar zum schweizerischen Privatrecht/riemer, 1990, Art. 75 marg. no. 62; Fenners H.,Der Ausschluss der staatlichen Gerichtsbarkeit imorganisiertenSport,2006,marg.no.353;ATF85II525,536).

bb)CompatibilitywithArt.75CC

The wording of Art. 75 CC leaves no doubt as tothemandatorycharacterofthisprovision.Theterm“entitledbylaw”signifiesthatthisprovisioncannotbeamendedbythestatutesofanassociation(cfBernerKommentar zum schweizerischen Privatrecht/riemer, 1990, Art 63 marg. no. 13; Nater H.SpuRt 2006, 139; Fenners H.,DerAusschluss derstaatlichen Gerichtsbarkeit im organisierten Sport,2006, marg. no. 98, 248; zen-ruFFinen P., CausaSport2007,67,71). Itgoesbeyondquestion thatat

firstsightthedeadlinecontainedinArt.15(1)oftheDRCProceduralRules,i.e.tosolicitthegroundsofthedecisionwith adeadlineof 10days inorder topreserveonesrightofappealdeviates fromArt.75CC.However, itdoesnotfollowfromthis that theprovisioncontainedintheDRCProceduralRulesarenullandvoid.

IthasbeenstatedbeforethatSwissLawonlyappliessubsidiarilytothemeritsofthiscase,i.e.iftherulesandregulationofFIFAcontainlacunae.If,however,acertainissueisdealtwithbytherulesandregulationsofFIFAthenSwiss lawdoesnotapply.This is–asstatedabove–even true if theotherwiseapplicableprovisionof Swiss law ismandatory.Hence, in thecase athand it is irrelevantwhetherornot there isacontradictionbetweenthetimelimitsintherulesand regulations of FIFA andArt. 75CC since thelatter provision is –in the context of arbitrationsconductedaccordingtotheCode–supersededbytherelevantprovisionsinthestatutesandregulationsofFIFA(cf.alsobernAsconi/huber,SpuRt204,268,270;NaterH.,SpuRt2006,139,143 f;rigozzi A.,L’arbitrage international enmatière de sport, 2005,marg.no.1041).

FIFA’s autonomy to deviate from (mandatory)provisions of Swiss substantive law is limited,however, by the (transnational) ordre public. Thequestiontoberaised,therefore,iswhetherornottheprovisions inArt.15of theDRCProceduralRulesis inbreachwith fundamental legal principles.ThePanel is of the view that this is not the case. Thedutytosolicitareasoneddecisionwithin10daysofitsnotificationinordertobeabletoappealitbeforeCASmaybeseenasaffectingtheAppellant’saccesstothecourtsandlegalprotection.ThePanelholds,however,thatthislimitationisnotdisproportionate.It is true that the time limit of ten days is short.However,littleisrequiredfromanappellantwithinthis timeframe.Hedoesn’tneed tofilea fullbriefthat outlines his legal position. He is not evenrequiredtofilespecificmotionsorrequests.Theonlythinghehas todo inorder topreservehisrightofappealistosolicit(inwriting)areasoneddecision.Inaddition,theprovisionappliestoallappellantsand,thus,guaranteesequaltreatmentamongall(indirect)membersofFIFA.Additionally,the10days-deadlineofArt.15(1)oftheDRCProceduralRulesdoesnotshorten the deadline which is applicable for filingan appeal, once the grounds of the decision areserved to theparties. Indeed, the relevant 21days-deadline remains untouched by Art. 15(1) of theDRCProceduralRules.Furthermore, theprovisionserves a legitimate purpose, i.e. to cope with theheavycaseloadofFIFAandcontributestothegoalof an efficient administration of justice. Even the


European Court of Human Rights has all alongallowedtherightofaccesstothecourtstobelimited“in the interests of the good administration of justice” (cf.brinerR.,vonSchlabrendorff, in:Liberamicorumböckstiegel,2001,p.89,91).Itdoesnotcomeasasurprise,therefore,thatsimilarrestrictionastheonein theDRCProceduralRules canbe found also inrelationtotheaccesstostatecourts.Anexampleofthisissec.158ofthelawgoverningtheorganisationof the judiciary of the canton of Zurich, aroundwhichArt. 15(1) of theDRCProceduralRules hasevidentlybeencrafted.Sec.158ofthelawgoverningthe organisation of the judiciary of the canton ofZurichreads:

“Indecisionsoffirstinstancerelatingtocivilmattersand the enforcement of monetary judgements thecourts may renounce to provide the reasons for thedecision and communicate the operative part onlyto theparties.Insteadofadvising thepartiesof theappropriate recourse against the decision the courtinformsthepartiesthattheymayaskforthereasonsofthedecisionwithin10daysofthenotification,failingwhich the decision becomes final and binding […]Doesapartyrequestthereasonsofthedecision,thefulldecisionisservedwiththereasonstothepartiesinwriting.Thedeadlinesforfilinganyappealoranyactiontonegatetheclaimshallstarttorunwithsuchnotificationofthefulldecisionwiththereasons”.

Tosumup,therefore,thePanelconcludesthatArt.15oftheDRCProceduralRulesisneitherincompatiblewith Art. 75 CC nor with the fundamental legalprinciplesbelongingtotheordrepublic.

cc)Compatibilitywiththehierarchynorms

In principle, sports federations can freely establishtheir own provisions (cf zen-ruFFinen, Droit duSport,2002,marg.no.161).However,therearelimitsto this autonomy. In particular the relevant organswhencreatingnewrulesand regulationsareboundby the limits imposed on them by higher rankingnorms, in particular the association’s statutes. Thisfollows from the principle of legality (“Le principede la légalité implique l’exigencede laconformitéauxstatutsdes texts réglementaires inférieurs et des decisions des organssociaux”, cf. bAddeley M., L’association sportiveface au droit, Les limites de son autonomie, 1994,p.208).Accordingtothisprincipleregulationsofalower levelmay complement and concretize higherrankingprovision,butnotamendnorcontradictorchangethem.ThisprincipleisalsowellestablishedinCASjurisprudence(cfCAS2006/A/1181,no.8.2.2;CAS 2006/A/1125, no. 6.18;CAS 2004/A/794, no.10.4.15).

InthecaseathandtheRSTPfindtheirlegalbasisinArt.5oftheFIFAStatutes.Thelatterprovidesthat:

“TheExecutiveCommitteeshallregulatethestatusof Players and the provisions for their transfer inspecialregulations”.

Oneaspectarisinginthecontextofthetransfersofplayersisthequestionoftrainingcompensation(Art.20 RSTP). Hence, the RSTP contains provisionsregarding training compensation and regulatesquestionsannexedtoit,i.e.whichorganwithinFIFAiscompetent todealwiththe issue incasedisputesbetweenclubsshouldarise(Art.22lit.d,24RSTP).InArt. 25(7)RSTP reference ismade to theDRCProceduralRules.Theprovisionreadsthat:

“ThedetailedprocedurefortheresolutionofdisputesarisingfromtheapplicationoftheseregulationsshallbefurtheroutlinedintheFIFAProceduralRules”.

Formally,theDRCProceduralRulesfindasufficientlegal basis in the statutes of FIFA. It is debatable,however, whether Art 15 of the DRC ProceduralRules exceeds the autonomy granted to the FIFAExecutiveCommitteeaccordingtoArt5oftheFIFAStatutes.Atthispoint,itisnecessarytoaddresstheargumentputforwardbytheRespondentfollowingwhich the 10 days-deadline is merely a formalityanddoesnotaffectthepartiesrighttoappeal,giventhatthe21–days-deadlineofArt.63(1)oftheFIFAStatutes remains inplace.De facto, anyparty failingtorequestthegroundsofadecisionwithin10dayslosesitsrighttoappealtoCASand,assuch,issimplyfacedwithareducedappealdeadline.However,onemaynotealsothatanypartyaskingthegroundsofthe decision is granted, de facto, a longer period oftime todecidewhetherornot toaccept the resultsof the FIFA procedure and the DRC decision.Consequently, the 10 days deadline must be seenandscrutinized in thecontextof the time limit forappeals to theCAS.ThePanelhasdoubtswhetherArt.15of theDRCProceduralRules iscoveredbythelegalbasisinArt.5oftheFIFAStatutesbecausethequestionoftimelimitsrelatingtoappealstotheCASaredealtwith–exhaustively– inchapterVIIIoftheFIFAStatutes.InparticularthetimelimitforappealstoCASisregulatedinArt.62(1)oftheFIFAStatutes.Theprovisionreads:

“AppealsagainstfinaldecisionspassedbyFIFA’slegal bodies and against decisions passed byConfederations,MembersorLeaguesshallbelodgedwith CAS within 21 days of notification of thedecisioninquestion”.


No reference ismade in chapterVIII of theFIFAStatutestolowerlevelprovisions.NopowerisgrantedtospecificorganswithinFIFAtofurtheroutlineorcomplement Art 62(1) of the FIFA Statutes. Fromthis it follows, that changes from the provisionsdealingwithtimelimitsforappealstotheCASareinthesolecompetenceoftheFIFACongress(Art26(1)oftheFIFAStatutes).ItisquestionableinthecaseathandwhetherArt.15oftheDRCProceduralRulesmateriallychangesArt.63(1)oftheFIFAStatutes.Ifthatwerethecasethiswouldamounttoafailuretoupholdtheprincipleoflegalitythatcallsforinferiorrules and regulations to be in conformitywith thestatutes.ThiswouldresultinArt.15(1)oftheDRCRulesbeinginapplicable.

However,whetherornotArt15oftheDRCProceduralRulescomplieswith thehierarchyofnormscanbeleft undecided in the case athand.Because even ifthe latter is answered in the affirmative becauseoftheparticularitiesof thecaseathandtheprovisioncannotbeheldagainsttheAppellant.Inthepresentmatter,thenoticerelatingtothepossibilitytoappealtheDRC decision to the CAS is confusing.Whileno.6oftheDRCdecisionexplicitlystatesthat“thisdecision may be appealed against before the… CAS”, itfollows fromno. 7of theDRCdecision thatno. 6apparentlyisonlyintendedtoapplyifthepartyhasrequestedthegroundsofthedecisionwithinacertaindeadline. Inviewof the fact that this constitutes aconsiderable change from the previous proceduralsituation and in viewof the fact that it is constantCASjurisprudencethatadecisiondoesnotneedtocontain grounds inorder tobe appealable toCAS,one would have expected from FIFA a notice ofinformationonappealsthatismuchmoretransparentandconsistent.Tosumup,therefore,thePanelholdsthatunderthepresentcircumstances,Art.15oftheDRC Procedural Rules cannot be held against theAppellant. Furthermore, FIFA may consider (i) tointegrateArt.15(1)oftheDRCRulessomehowintotheFIFAStatutesinordertopreventanypossibleorallegedconflictswiththehierarchyofnormsand(ii)toissuenoticestothepartiesinsuchaclearwaythatnodoubtcanexistonwhatactionapartyisrequestedandentitledtodouponhavingbeeninformedontheresultsofaDRCprocedure.

b)ThedeadlineinArt.63(1)oftheFIFAStatutes

The final obstacle to the timeliness of the presentappeal lies in the argument presented by theRespondentwherebytheAppellantfailedtomeetthe21daysdeadlineofArt.63(1)of theFIFAStatuteswhenfilingtheappeal.

Thefindingsof thedecisionpassedby theDisputeResolutionChamberon31July2008wereservedontheAppellant on 17October 2008. TheAppellantfileditsappealon7November2008.

AccordingtoCASjurisprudence(CAS2006/A/1176,no. 7.2; CAS 2008/A/1583 & 1584, no. 7; CAS2007/A/1364,no6.1etseq.;CAS2006/A/1153,no.41),Art.R32oftheCodeisindeedageneralprovisionwhich,asperArt.R27oftheCode,appliestoboththeordinaryandtheappealarbitrationproceedings.As such, Art. R32 serves to provide clarity tothe respective provisions of both proceedings.Consequently, and in accordance with Art. R32 oftheCode,thedeadlineforappealcommencesonthedayfollowingthenotificationofadecision.

ThesamecanbesaidaboutthedeadlinecontainedintheFIFAStatutes.Art.63oftheFIFAStatutesdoesnot contain a provision as to how to compute thetime limit.However,Art.62(2)provides thatSwisslawshall apply“additionally”.ThePanelnotes thatunderSwisslaw,deadlinesfixedperdaysstarttorunfromthedayfollowingthereceiptofadecision,withthedayof receiptnot included (CAS2007/A/1364,no6.1etseq.;CAS2006/A/1153,no.41).Inadditionthe interpretationgivenbythePanel is in linewiththecomputationofothertimelimitsprovidedforintheFIFAregulations.Indeed,Art.16(7)oftheDRCProceduralRulesstipulatesthat:“...Thedayonwhichatimelimitissetandthedayonwhichthepaymentinitiatingthetimelimitismadeshallnotbecountedwhencalculatingthetimelimit”.

In the case at hand, the decision of theDRCwasnotifiedtotheAppellanton17October2008.Hence,the deadline of 21 days expired on 7 November2008at24:00o’clockwiththeconsequencethattheAppellant,withitsletterof7November2008,fileditsappealintime.Tosummarisetherefore,thePanelacceptsthattheAppellantfiledtheappealinatimelymannerbecause theadditional restrictions imposedbyArt.15oftheDRCRulescannotbeheldagainsthim.


Relevantfacts

FKSiadMost(“SiadMost”or“theAppellant”)isaprofessionalfootballclubwithitsseatinMost,CzechRepublic.It isaffiliatedtotheFootballAssociationof the Czech Republic (CFA), a federation in turnaffiliatedtotheFédérationInternationaledeFootballAssociation, the world governing body of football(FIFA).

Club Esportivo Bento Gonçalves (“Gonçalves” or“the Respondent”) is a professional football clubwith its seat in Bento Gonçalves/RS, Brazil. It isaffiliated to theConfederaçãoBrasileiradeFutebol(CBF),whichinturnisaffiliatedtoFIFA.

TheBrazilianplayerC.(“thePlayer”)wasregisteredasaplayerwiththeRespondentfrom23March2004to28April2006.AccordingtothePlayer’sPassportissued by the CBF on June 2007, the Player wasregisteredwiththeCBFasanamateurplayerwhilehewasplayingwiththeRespondent.

On 28 April 2006, the Player moved from BentoGonçalvestoanotherBrazilianclub,BrusqueFutebolClube(“Brusque”).WhileplayingatBrusque,C.wasstillregisteredwiththeCBFasanamateur.

C.signedanagreementwithBrusquecalled“PrivateAgreement for the granting of financial aid to afootball player” (the “Private Agreement”). ThePrivate Agreement granted C. a monthly paymentdescribedinthePrivateAgreement(accordingtothe

English translationprovidedby theRespondent)asa monthly apprenticeship allowance worth R$620(Reais)for“hislivingcostsandasanincentivetothepracticeoffootball”.

AccordingtothetermsofthePrivateAgreement,inadditiontotheaforementionedpayment,C.wasalsoentitledtomedical,dentalandpsychologicalassistance,as well as to the costs related to transportation,food, housing/lodging, school, nutritionist andphysicaltherapy.Furthermore,BrusquearrangedlifeinsuranceforC.Forhispart,C.had toattendandparticipateingamesandtrainingsessionsscheduledbyBrusqueandinallotheractivitiesconnectedwiththedutiesofafootballplayer.

On22August2006,C.wastransferredfromBrusquetotheCzechclubFKSiadMostandforthefirsttimeofficially registered as aprofessional football playerwithinafootballassociation.

On 29 November 2007, the Respondent lodged acomplaintwiththeFIFAPlayers’StatusCommitteeregardingthenon-paymentoftrainingcompensation.

The DRC rendered a decision on 9 January 2009acceptingtheclaimoftheRespondentandgrantingit training compensation payable by the Appellant.ThedecisionsetsoutthefindingsoftheDRConly,butdoesnotcontainanyreasons.Itwasnotifiedtothepartieson23January2009.

By letter dated 2 February 2009, the Appellant,withouthavingpreviouslyfiledarequestwithFIFAasking for the grounds of the decision, filed itsStatement ofAppealwith theCourt ofArbitrationforSport(CAS)againstthedecisionrenderedbytheDRC,insofarasthedecisionsentencedtheAppellanttopayEUR62,500plus5%p.a.interestastrainingcompensationtotheRespondent.IntheStatementofAppeal, theAppellantnamedboth theRespondentandFIFAasrespondentparties.

In itsAppealBrief dated 23February 2009 and initsfurthersubmissions,theAppellantrequestedtheCAS – inter alia – to annul the appealed decisionof theDRCand todismiss thepayment requestofBentoGonçalves.

Panel: Mr. Efraim Barak (Israel), Sole arbitrator

Football; training compensation;appealable decision before the CAS;decisionwithoutgroundsasa“decision”in the meaning of Article R47 of theCASCode; request for the grounds ofthedecisionandexhaustionof internalremedies; violation of the principle ofdueprocessandCASpowerofreview;criteria for qualifying a player as“professional”

Arbitration CAS 2009/A/1781 FK Siad Most v. Clube Esportivo Bento Gonçalves 12October2009


In its Answer to the Appeal and in its furthersubmissions, theRespondent requested theCAS toterminatethearbitrationprocedureduetomanifestlackof competenceof theCAS and todismiss theAppealandconfirmtheappealableDecisionof theDRC.


1. Decision by a federation within the meaning of Article R47 of the CAS Code

CAS Panels have interpreted the term “decision”within the meaning of Article R47 of the Codebroadly(cfCAS2008/A/1583&1584,no.5.2.1).

The Sole Arbitrator is satisfied that, although theDecisionoftheDRCissuedon9January2009andnotifiedtothepartieson23January2009doesnotaddressthegroundsonwhichthedecisionwaspassed,itclearlyshowsallformalandmaterialcharacteristicsof a “decision” in the sense of Article R47 of theCode.Onamaterial level, it shows theoutcomeofthedeliberationsregardingthe issueofthetrainingcompensation owed for the Player. Therefore, thecontentofthistextrepresentsa“unilateralact”whichaimsataffectingthelegalsituationoftheaddressee.On a formal level, the letter carries the heading“decision”, was passed by an organ of FIFA (theDRC)andwassignedbytheFIFADeputyGeneralSecretary.Thefactthatthedecisionisnotmotivatedcan,assuch,notaffect itbeinga“decision”(cf.CAS2008/A/1705,para.5.2.2;cfalsoCAS2004/A/748,no.91).

Furthermore, the fact that the Decision waserroneously issued by FIFA without grounds (byapplying the 2008Rules instead of the 2005Rulesthat should have been applied) and without legalinstructions on how to challenge it, cannot beconstrued as depriving the Appellant from hisfundamental right to appeal the decision based onArticle63oftheFIFAStatutes.

2. Exhaustion of legal remedies

According to Article R47 of the Code, a decisionmaybeappealed toCAS“insofar as theAppellant hasexhaustedthelegalremediesavailabletohiminaccordancewiththe statutes and regulations of the said sports-related body”.DecisionsoftheDRCcannotbeappealedbeforeanyotherinternallegalbodyofFIFA.Whatismore,evenunderthe2008Rulestherightgrantedtoapartytoaskforthereasonsofthedecisioncannotbequalifiedas an “internal remedy”within FIFA in the sense ofArticleR47oftheCode(cfCAS2008/A/1705,para.5.2.4). It is even more so in this case, where the

decisionwas grantedwithout reasons based on theerroneous application of the new rules that shouldnothavebeenappliedinthiscase.Consequently,asthereisnootherinternallegalremedy,theconditionslaiddowninArticleR47oftheCodearemetandtheCAShasjurisdictiontoruleonthepresentcase.

3. While registered with the Club Brusque under the regime of the “Private Agreement”,

was the player an amateur or a professional under the 2005 RSTP?

According to Article 20 of RSTP 2005 “trainingcompensation shall be paid to a player’s training club(s): (1)whenaplayersignshisfirstcontractasaprofessional(…)”.

According to Article 2 para. 1 of the RSTP2005 “Training compensation is due when: i) aplayer is registered for the first time as a professional;orii)aprofessionalistransferredbetweenclubsoftwodifferentassociations(whetherduringorattheendofhiscontract(…)”.

Article 2 para. 2 of the 2005 RSTP defines themeanings of “Professional” and “Amateur” for thepurposesof theapplicationof thesameregulationsonagivendisputeandcircumstances:“AProfessionalis a player who has a written contract with a club and ispaidmorethantheexpensesheeffectivelyincursinreturnforhis footballing activity. All other players are considered asAmateurs”.

It becomes obvious that FIFA identifies only twocategoriesofplayers,i.e.ProfessionalsandAmateurs.There is no space within the regime of the FIFAregulations for a third category. Thus, there isno space within the FIFA regulations for a thirdcategorytowhichmightbelongplayersundertakingtrainingdedicatedtothepracticeoffootball,butwhoare at the same time still studentswith thegoalofbecomingprofessionalfootballplayers,evenifsuchplayerswouldnotordinarilybecalledeitheramateursorprofessionals(cf.CAS2006/A/1177,no7.4.3).

Furthermore,theSoleArbitratorisoftheopinionthatthereisnoplacefortheapplicationofBrazilianlaworBraziliannationaldefinitionsandcriteriaindecidingthestatusofthePlayerinthecaseathand.NationalBrazilianlaw,aswellasthewaytheCBFdefinesthestatusofaplayerinBrazil,arenodoubtrelevantandgoverninternaltransferswithinBrazil.Article1(2)ofRSTP2005clearlyrecognizesthegovernanceofsuchregulations(andstillsubjectalsotomandatorytermsimposedbyFIFA)in“Thetransferofplayersbetweenclubsbelongingtothesameassociation”.However,thenationallawsandtheinternalregulationsarenottheapplicablelawincaseofadisputewithaninternationalelement.Suchdisputesaresolelygovernedbythetermsofthe


FIFARSTPanditsdefinitions.(cfCAS2007/A/1370&1376 (no. 87). In such cases, the2005RSTP setdowntheapplicablecriteriatoestablishanddecideonthestatusofaplayerwhenatransferoccursbetween“clubs belonging to different associations” (see Article 1para.1ofRSTP2005).

Moreover,accordingtoArticle1para.3ofthe2005RSTP(“scope”),“Thefollowingprovisionsarebindingatnationallevelandhavetobeincluded,withoutmodification,intheAssociation’sregulations:Art.2–8,10,11and18”.ThismeansthattheBrazilianFootballAssociationshouldtranspose–withoutmodification–Article2onthe“StatusofPlayers”whichincludesthemandatory(andworldwide)definition(forthepurposesoftheRSTP)of“Professionals”and“Amateurs”.Furthermore,inaspecificreferencetothemandatoryrequirementsoftheregistrationofplayerswithnationalassociations,Article 5 para. 1 ofRSTP2005 is very clearwhenstatingthat:“Aplayermustberegisteredatanassociationtoplayforaclubaseitherprofessionaloranamateurinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofarticle2”.[Emphasisadded]FIFAcouldnotchoosemorespecificwordingtoexpressitsclearintentioninthisregard.

Therefore, even if in this case there is no need toelaborateonaninternaltransferwhenthedefinitionsof the national association are inconsistent withthose of the FIFA RSTP, in a case of a transferbetweenclubsbelongingtodifferentassociationsasthe case at hand, in case of inconsistency betweena CBF provision and a FIFA provision, the FIFAprovision should prevail. Otherwise, the deferencetointernationalsportsrulesproclaimedinBrazilianlegislation and the obligation assumed by CBF inits ownStatutes (and acceptedby its clubs, players,etc.)tocomplywithFIFAruleswouldmakenomoresense(CAS2008/A/1370&1376,para.105).

Inadditiontotheextensiveexplanationmadeabove,andinlightofthefactthatthe2005RSTPforeseeasingle remuneration-related test (see infra), theSoleArbitratorconsiders that it isnotnecessary tohaverecourse to the application of any national law ortotake intoaccounttheformalclassificationofthePlayer according to theCBF; inCAS2007/A/1207(no.87),theCASPanelruledthat“Giventheexistenceofthesingleremuneration-relatedtest,thePanelconsidersthatitisnotnecessarytoenquireanyfurtherontheclassificationoftheagreementbetween thePlayerandFiorenzuolaunder Italianlawandsportingregulations”.

Thisrulingisalsoapplicableinthecaseathand.

TurningnowtoArticle2ofRSTP2005“AProfessionalisaplayerwhohasawrittencontractwithaclubandispaidmore than the expenses he effectively incurs in return for

his footballing activity. All other players are considered asAmateurs”.

The status of the Playerwhile playing forBrusquewill be examined in light of this article. The firstcondition, namely the existence of a “writtencontract”,isundisputedlyfulfilled.ThePlayersignedthePrivateAgreementwithBrusquewhich,interalia,providesthefollowing:

“Article1:BrusquegrantstheAthleteanapprenticeship allowance in the amountof R$620 for his living costs and as anincentivetothepracticeoffootball”.

“Article 2: Brusque shall provide theAthlete with the free medical, dentaland psychological aid, as well as shallcover expenses for transportation, board,accommodation,schoollessons,nutritionistandphysicaltherapist”.

What ismore,accordingtoArticle4of thePrivateAgreement,thePlayerwasentitledtolifeinsurance.However,ifonetakesintoconsiderationthatalltheseexpenseswerealreadycoveredbytheClubBrusque,whichexpensesshouldbequalifiedas“livingcosts”?Inotherwords:whatexactlydidtheR$620reflect?The Sole Arbitrator is satisfied that this amountcannot correspond to the“expenses he effectively incursinreturnforhisfootballingactivity”sincemedical,dental,psychological aid, physical therapist, nutrition,transportation,boardandaccommodationandschoollessonscostswereallprovidedforbyBrusque.ThePlayeralsotestifiedthatthiswas“freemoney”sinceallhisexpenseswerecovered,thusallowinghimtousethismoneytosupporthisfamily.

Furthermore,theminimummonthlysalaryinBrazilin2006wasaboutR$350andR$380andtheaveragewageinBrazil in2006wasR$883.InBrazil,attherelevanttimetothiscase,R$620wasanamountthatcouldbeconsideredasalary.AfurtherargumentinfavourofthisviewstemsfromthePlayer’stestimonyduring the hearing, according to which, as alreadymentioned,thePlayerusedtosendpartofhissalarytohisfamily.Underthecriteriasetout inArticle2of2005RSTP,eveniftheamountpaidinexcessoftheexpensesisrelativelysmall(quodnon),thedecisivecriterionisstillwhethertheamountis“more”thantheexpenseseffectively incurredandit is irrelevantwhetheritismuchmoreorjustalittlemore.Havingsaid this, the Sole Arbitrators is satisfied that theamount that the Player received was in excess oftheexpensesandcostsdescribedinArticle2ofthe2005 RSTP, particularly since the costs related tothe practice of footballwere already taken over by


Brusque(SeeCAS2006/A/1177,no.7.4.6and7.4.11;seealsoCAS2006/A/1207,no.90-91).

AsestablishedthroughCASjurisprudence,theonlyrelevantcriterioniswhethertheplayerispaidmorethan the expenses he effectively incurred in returnfor his football activity (see CAS 2006/A/1177, no7.4.5).

Atthispoint,theSoleArbitratornotesthat,althoughCAS 2006/A/1177 used the terms “amateur” and“non-amateur” taken from the 2001 RSTP, theprincipleofthetwocategoriesoffootballplayers.

The Sole Arbitrator notes that there is aninconsistencyinthewordingusedintheRSTP.WhileArt.20refers to the signingof thefirstprofessionalagreement as the trigger element for the paying oftrainingcompensation,Article2para.1andArticle3 para. 1 ofAnnex 4 refer to the first registration asa professional as the trigger element for payment.Nevertheless, the articles of Annex 4 are mainlyfocusedontheprocedureforpaymentandthereforerefertoregistration,beinganeasilyidentifiableelement.However, the principle can be found by readingArticle20togetherwithArticle5ofthe2005RSTP.Article5requiresthattheregistrationwillreflectthetruestatusoftheplayer,andthusstatesclearlythattheregistrationshouldadheretothecriteriaofArticle2.TheassumptionoftheregulationsisthataPlayerwill indeedberegistered inamannerthatcomplieswiththecriteriacontainedinArticle2andtherefore,under this assumption, there can be no distinctionbetweenthesigningofthefirstprofessionalcontractandtheregistrationforthefirsttimeasaprofessional.

Furthermore, as seen above, according to Article1para.3ofthe2005RSTP,theCBF,asanationalfederation,wasobligedtoliterallytransposeArticle2 of the 2005 RSTP. Under Article 26 para. 3 ofthe2005RSTP,Article1para.3shouldhavebeenimplementedinthenationalregulationsfrom1July2005.ThemerefactthattheCBFregisteredthePlayerin a way inconsistent with the requirements of theFIFA2005RSTPshouldnotaffectthedecisionastothetruestatusofthePlayerandshouldnotremovethePlayer fromthescopeof theFIFARegulationsandthecriteriaestablished inArticle2of the2005RSTP(cfCAS2007/A/1370&1376no.87).

The Sole Arbitrator therefore concludes that thestatusof thePlayer at the timehewasplaying andregistered with Brusque was that of a professionalplayer.

In light of all of the above, the Sole ArbitratorconcludesthattheDecisionoftheDRCof9January

2009shouldbesetasideand theAppeal shouldbeupheld.


Relevantfacts

MrFilippoVolandri,bornon5September1981,isaprofessional tennis playerof Italiannationality (the“Player”).

The International Tennis Federation (ITF) is theinternational governing body for sports related totennisworldwide.IthasitsregisteredseatinLondon,England.

Sincehis early childhood,MrFilippoVolandri hassuffered from asthma. His treating physician wasthenDrFabrizioGadducci,presentlydirectoroftheBronchopneumology and Respiratory AllergologySectionoftheLivornoHospital,Italy.

Overtheyears,thePlayer’sconditionworsenedandrequirednotablyatreatmentintheformofinhalationof Ventolin, a salbutamol-based asthma medicine,achievedthroughametered-doseinhaler.Salbutamolis included in the list of prohibited substancesunder the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC),which is incorporated in the ITF Tennis Anti-Doping Programme (the “ITF Programme”). Theauthorisation to take this substance fora legitimatemedical need is treated differently depending onwhether the 2008 or the 2009 ITF Programme isapplicable. In the first case, the administration ofsalbutamolbyinhalationrequiresanapplicationforan abbreviatedTherapeuticUseExemption (TUE)

whereas in the second case, the submission for astandard Therapeutic Use Exemption is needed.Also,inthefirstcase,salbutamolinaconcentrationgreater than1,000ng/mLisaprohibitedsubstanceandnotaspecifiedsubstance,whereasinthesecondcase,salbutamol,eveninaconcentrationgreaterthan1,000 ng/mL, is qualified as a specified substance.However,boththe2008and2009ITFProgrammesprovide that despite the granting of a TUE, thepresenceofsalbutamolinurineinexcessof1,000ng/mLwillbeconsideredanadverseanalyticalfindingunless the Athlete proves that the abnormal resultwas the consequence “of the therapeutic use of inhaledsalbutamol” or “of the use of a therapeutic dose of inhaledsalbutamol”.

In respect of his use of salbutamol, Mr FilippoVolandriwas granted his first TUE in 2003. SincethenheappliedforTUEseveryyear.

On 21 November 2007, Mr Filippo Volandri andDr Fabrizio Gadducci signed a TUE applicationform for the year 2008. The prohibited substancesconcerned were formoterol and albuterol, which isanother name for salbutamol. Regarding this lastdrug,thetreatmentforeseenconsistedintwopuffsof100mcgtobeadministeredbyinhalationtwicedaily.Ontheapplicationform,theboxmarked“onceonly”andtheboxmarked“emergency”werealsotickedandthespaceprovidedto“indicateallrelevantinformationtoexplain the emergency or the insufficient time to submit theTUEapplication”wasfilledinwiththewords“2puffsifnecessary”.

It isacceptedby thepartiesaswellasby the lowerinstance that the present case must be examinedin the light of the content of theTUE applicationformsignedbythePlayeron21November2007(the“TUE of November 2007”). It is undisputed thatthesubsequentmanagementofthisdocumentbytheIDTMisirrelevant.

On19November2008,MrFilippoVolandrisigneda TUE, seeking permission to take montelukast,budesonideandsalbutamol.With regard to the lastsubstance,theindicateddosagestrengthwas2puffsof 100mcg to be administered by inhalation. Thebox related to the“frequency”of administrationwasfilledwiththewords“Rescue”and“albisogno”.On24November2008MrFilippoVolandrireceivedfrom

Panel: Mr. Efraim Barak (Israel), President Prof. Luigi Fumagalli (Italy) Prof. Ulrich Haas (Germany)

Tennis;doping/Salbutanol;CASScopeof review; burden of proof; sanction/degreeoffault

Arbitration CAS 2009/A/1782 Filippo Volandri v. International Tennis Federation (ITF)12May2009


the IDTM an approval for the therapeutic use ofbudesonide and salbutamol for two years, effectivefrom21November2008to22November2010andallowsthePlayertousesalbutamolinadosageof200mcgbyinhalation,“asneeded”.Itisalsostipulatedthatthedose,methodandfrequencyofadministrationasnotifiedhavetobefollowedmeticulously.

At the end of the year 2008,Mr Filippo Volandriwas referred to an asthma specialist, Mr PierluigiPaggiaro, Professor inRespiratoryMedicine, at theUniversityofPisa,Italy,andmemberoftheexecutivecommittee of the Global Initiative for Asthma.In awritten statementmadeon8December2008,ProfessorPierluigiPaggiaroconfirmedamongotherthingsthat“Inthelastmonths,symptomsarepresenteveryday(2-3timesdailyuseofrescuemedication)particularlyduringphysical activity. (…)Therefore, we conclude for “Bronchialasthma with severe bronchial hyperresponsiveness” and werecommended the following therapeutic regimen: Budesonide.Viatris400mcg, one inhalation in themorningand in theevening.Montelukast10mg,onetabletintheevening.Rescuesalbutamol, 2 puffs when needed. Periodic evaluations ofpulmonaryfunctionarerecommended”.

InMarch2008,MrFilippoVolandriwasparticipatingin an ATP Tour tournament, which took place inIndianWells,California,United-States.

Inthemorningof13March2008,atabout2:30,MrFilippoVolandriwas awakened bywhat he says tobe themost serious asthma attack of his life. Thishappened justa fewhoursbeforehisfirstmatch inthe tournament,whichwas scheduled for the earlyafternoonofthesameday.

On13March2008,justafterthelossofhisfirstgameintwostraightsets,MrFilippoVolandriwassubjectto in-competition doping testing. On the dopingcontrolform,thePlayerindicatedthecorrectnumberofhisTUEaswellastheuseofVentolin.

ItisundisputedthattheWADA-accreditedlaboratoryinMontreal,Canada,was instructedtoconducttheanalysis ofMrFilippoVolandri’s urine sample andthat,on9April2008, it identified inthePlayer’sAsamplethepresenceofsalbutamolinaconcentrationof1,167ng/mL.

It isonlyon25July2008(threeandahalfmonthsafterthefindingontheAsampleandfourandahalfmonthsafterthedopingtest),thatMrStuartMiller,the ITF technicalmanager, notified in writing thePlayeroftheresultoftheAsampleanalysisandaskedhimdocumentedexplanationswithregardtothesaidconcentrationof1,167ng/mL.

It then took the ITF another almost two monthsto refer to thePlayer’s answer.By courier dated18September 2008, Mr Stuart Miller acknowledgedreceiptof thePlayer’se-mailandexplainedthathisclarificationswereinsufficient.Onthisletter,thatwassentsixmonthsaftertheevent,MrMillerrequestedMrFilippoVolandritoprovidedetailsona)thetimeatwhichhe lasturinatedprior toproviding sampleon13March2008,b)thetime(s)atwhichheusedhisinhaleron13March2008andc)thenumberofpuffshetookoneachofthoseoccasions.

On22September2008, thePlayeranswered toMrStuart Miller by e-mail, referring to his TUE andconfirmingnotablythathecouldn’trememberwhatwasaskedtohimexceptthathehadtousetheinhalerseveraltimesinthosedaysbecauseofthetemperatureatdaytimeandbecauseofthedustofthecarpetinhisroomatnight.

The analysis of the Player’s B sample corroboratedthepresenceofsalbutamolinaconcentrationof1,192ng/mL.

Byletterdated13November2008,MrStuartMillernotifiedMrFilippoVolandrithathewaschargedwithcommissionofadopingoffencewithinthemeaningofarticleC.1oftheITFProgramme.

On 15 January 2009, the ITF Tribunal passed adecision (the “Appealed Decision”), in which itconcluded that the ITF had sufficiently establishedtheobjectiveelementsofaviolationoftheapplicableITF Programme, i.e. the presence of salbutamol inthePlayer’sAsampleinaconcentrationof1,167ng/mL,whichamountstoanadverseanalyticalfinding.

TheITFTribunalacceptedthatMrFilippoVolandriinhaledsalbutamolanddidnotingestitinanyotherway.However, it held that the Player did notmeethisburdenofproofthathisuseofsalbutamolon13March2008was therapeuticor in compliancewiththe TUE of November 2007, according to whichsalbutamolwastobeadministereddailywith2timestwopuffsof100mcg,plus“2puffs ifnecessary”.TheITFTribunalfoundthatthereferencetoinhalationofsalbutamol“ifnecessary”mustbeinterpretedinlinewithanobjectiveapproach,whichrequires treatingas therapeutic only doses of salbutamol whichdo not exceed what is regarded as necessary andappropriatetreatment,accordingtoacceptedmedicalopinion.TheITFTribunalheldthattheappropriatetreatmentistobefoundintheguidelinesissuedbytheGlobalInitiativeforAsthma,asrevisedin2007,known as the “GINA guidelines”. In the view ofthe circumstances and in the presence of a severeasthmaattackqualifiedbythePlayerhimselfas life


threatening,theITFTribunalwasoftheopinionthattheGINAguidelinescommendedthePlayertoseekcareinaclinicorahospital.

WithregardtothesanctionimposeduponMrFilippoVolandri, according to the 2009 ITF Programme,the ITF Tribunal, applying the lex mitior principle,accepted that salbutamol is a specified substanceand that it had not been used to enhance sportperformance or tomask the use of a performanceenhancingsubstance.ItheldnotablythatthePlayerwasat fault for inhaling toomuchsalbutamol, thattheplayer’s individualresultmustbedisqualifiedinrespectoftheIndianWellstournament,andthattheplayershallbeineligibleforaperiodofthreemonths.


1. Applicable law

ArticleR58oftheCASCodeprovidesthefollowing:

“ThePanelshalldecidethedisputeaccordingtotheapplicableregulationsandtherulesoflawchosenbythepartiesor,intheabsenceofsuchachoice,accordingtothelawofthecountryinwhich the federation,associationor sports-relatedbodywhichhas issued the challenged decision is domiciled or accordingto the rules of law, theapplicationofwhich thePaneldeemsappropriate.Inthelattercase,thePanelshallgivereasonsforitsdecision”.

In the present case, it results from their respectivesubmissions that the parties agree that the matterunderappealisgovernedbytherulesandregulationsoftheITF.

It appears that the 2009 ITF Programme containsan express transitional provision, which clearlyindicates that the 2008 ITF Programme remainsapplicable in the present proceedings because MrFilippoVolandri’scasewaspendingbeforethe2009ITFProgrammecameintoforceon1January2009.However, article A.6 of the 2009 ITF ProgrammeallowstheITFIndependentAnti-DopingTribunalaswellastheCASPaneltoapplythelexmitiorprinciple,i.e. the principle whereby a disciplinary regulationapplies as soon as it comes into force if it ismorefavourable to the accused. This is a fundamentalprinciple of law applicable and accepted by mostlegal regimesandwhichappliesbyanalogy toanti-doping regulations inviewof thequasipenalor attheveryleastdisciplinarynatureofthepenaltiesthattheyallowtobeimposed(CAS2005/C/841,page14;CAS94/128,DigestofCASAwards(1986-1998),p.477at491).

ItfollowsthattheITFregulations,inparticularthe2008 ITF Programme (subject to more favourableprovisions toMr Filippo Volandri under the 2009ITFProgramme)areapplicable.

ArticleA.10of the 2008 ITFProgrammeprovidesthat it is governed by and shall be construed inaccordancewithEnglish law, subject toarticleA.8,whichrequirestheITFProgrammetobeinterpretedinamannerthatisconsistentwiththeWADC.TheWADCprevailsintheeventofaconflictbetweenitsprovisionsandthoseoftheITFProgramme.

Theapplicationof the (rulesof) lawchosenby theparties has its confines in the ordre public (ZürcherKommentar zum IPRG/Heini, 2nd edition 2004,Art.187marg.no.18;seealsoKaufmann-Kohler/rigozzi, Arbitrage International, 2006, marg. no.657).Usually,thetermordrepublicistherebydivestedofitspurelySwisscharacterandisunderstoodinthesense of a universal, international or transnationalsense (Kaufmann-Kohler/rigozzi, ArbitrageInternational, 2006, margin no. 666; ZürcherKommentar zum IPRG/Heini, 2nd edition 2004,Art.187marginno.18;cf.alsoPortmanncausasport2/2006pp.200,203and205). Theordrepublicprovisoismeanttopreventadecisionconflictingwithbasiclegalormoralprinciples that apply supranationally.This, in turn, is to be assumed if the applicationof the rules of law agreed by the parties were tobreach fundamental legal doctrines or were simplyincompatiblewiththesystemoflawandvalues(TF8.3.2006, 4P.278/2005 marg. no. 2.2.2; ZürcherKommentarzumIPRG/Heini,2ndedition2004,Art.190marginno.44;CAS2006/A/1180,no.7.4;CAS2005/A/983&984,no.70).

2. Procedural motions – scope of review of the CAS

ArticleR57oftheCASCodeprovidesthat“thePanelshallhavefullpowertoreviewthefactsandthelaw”.Underthisprovision,thePanel’sscopeofreviewisbasicallyunrestricted.Ithasthefullpowertoreviewthefactsandthelawandmayevenrequesttheproductionoffurtherevidence.Inotherwords,thePanelnotonlyhas the power to establishwhether the decision ofa disciplinary bodybeing challengedwas lawful ornot,butalsotoissueanindependentdecision(CAS2004/A/607;CAS 2004/A/633;CAS 2005/A/1001;CAS2006/A/1153).

TheCASCodecontemplatesafullhearingdenovooftheoriginalmatter.

However,inthepresentcase,theITFsubmitsa)thatthepowerofreviewoftheCASPanelislimitedbythe


applicableITFregulationsandb)thatarticleR57oftheCASCodeappliesonlytotheextentagreedbytheparties,whichdidnotaccepttherulesofarbitrationfixed by the CASCode in whole. The ITF allegesthatthescopeofreviewoftheCASisrestrictedtodeterminingwhetherthePlayerhasestablishedthattheITFTribunal’sfindingswereerroneousbasedonalloftheevidencebeforeitatfirstinstance.

Tosupportitsopinion,theITFreferstoarticleO.5.1ofthe2008ITFProgramme.

a) The apparent conflict between the 2008 ITFProgrammearticles

PursuanttoarticleO.2.1ofthe2008ITFProgramme“AdecisionthataDopingOffencehasbeencommitted,adecisionimposingConsequencesforaDopingOffence,adecisionthatnoDopingOffencehasbeencommitted,adecisionbytheReviewBoardthatthereisnocasetoanswerinaparticularmatter,adecisionthattheITFlacksjurisdictiontoruleonanallegedDopingOffenceoritsConsequences,maybeappealedbyanyofthefollowingpartiesexclusivelytoCAS,inaccordancewithCAS’sProceduralRules forAppealArbitrationProcedures(…)”.

ArticleO.2.1ofthe2008ITFProgrammereferstotheCASCodewithoutanyrestrictionsorlimitations,whereasarticleO.5.1ofthesameProgrammeseemsto limit, in certain circumstances, the CAS Panel’sscope of review. At a first glance, the 2008 ITFProgrammeseemstooffernoindicationastowhichofthosetwoprovisionsshouldprevailorastohowthey should co-exist. However, as will be furtherexplained, thisquestion is indeedsolvedwithin theframeworkofthe2008ITFProgrammeitself.Thispossible confusion was obviously noticed by theITF which amended its 2009 ITF Programme bysuppressing the reference to the “CAS’s ProceduralRulesforAppealArbitrationProcedures”initsnewarticleO.2.1.

Moreover,theITFisasignatorytotheWADC.Its2008 Programme was adopted and implementedpursuanttothemandatoryprovisionsoftheWADC(ArticleA.2ofthe2008ITFProgramme).Accordingto article A.8 of the 2008 ITF Programme, “TheProgrammeshallbeinterpretedinamannerthatisconsistentwiththe[WADC](…).InthecaseofaconflictbetweentheProgrammeontheonehandandthemandatoryprovisionsofthe[WADC](asreferencedintheIntroductiontothe[WADC])ontheotherhand,themandatoryprovisionsofthe[WADC]shallprevail”.

In itsPartOne, the applicableWADC (theversionapproved in 2003 and effective 1 January 2004 to31December2008)readsasfollowswhererelevant:

“While someprovisionsofPartOneof the [WADC]mustbe incorporated essentially verbatim by each Anti-DopingOrganizationinitsownanti-dopingrules,otherprovisionsofPart One establish mandatory guiding principles that allowflexibility in the formulation of rules by eachAnti-DopingOrganizationorestablishrequirementsthatmustbefollowedbyeachAnti-DopingOrganizationbutneednotberepeatedinitsownanti-dopingrules.ThefollowingArticles,asapplicableto the scope of anti-doping activity which the Anti-DopingOrganization performs, must be incorporated into the rulesof each Anti-Doping Organization without any substantivechanges(allowingfornecessarynon-substantiveeditingchangesto the language in order to refer to the organization’s name,sport,sectionnumbers,etc.);Articles1(DefinitionofDoping),2 (Anti-Doping RuleViolations), 3 (Proof ofDoping), 9(Automatic Disqualification of individual Results), 10(Sanctions on Individuals), 11 (Consequences to Teams),13 (Appeals) with the exception of 13.2.2, 17 (Statute ofLimitations)andDefinitions”.

Article13oftheWADCsetsforththeappealprocessapplicableincaseofdecisionsmadeundertheWADCorrulesadoptedpursuanttotheWADC.Itspecifiesin great detail which decisions may be subject toappeal,andwhoisentitledtofileanappeal.Pursuantto article13.2.1of theWADC,“In cases arising fromcompetitions in an internationalEvent or in cases involvingInternational-Level Athletes, the decision may be appealedexclusivelytotheCourtofArbitrationforSport(“CAS”)inaccordance with the provisions applicable before such court”.[Emphasisadded]

It is therefore theviewof theCASPanel thatArt.A.8of the2008 ITFProgramme,by adopting andimplementing theprincipleof consistencywith theWADAC and the ITF’s commitment hereunder to“incorporate (…) without any substantive changes”, interalia,article13(Appeals)ofthatCode,actuallysolvesbyitselfthequestionoftheco-existenceofthesetwoarticlesandestablishesthesupremacyofArt.O.2.1.overArt.O.5.1.

b) The ambiguous wording of article O.5.1 of the2008ITFProgramme

The wording of article O.5.1 of the 2008 ITFProgramme isambiguousand leaves thePanel inastateofperplexity:

- on the one hand, the said provision allows theCAStoreviewtheappealintheformofadenovohearingonly“whererequiredinordertodojustice”.

- ontheotherhand,inalltheothercases(i.e.wherenotrequiredinordertodojustice),theCASmustlimititsscopeofreviewtoa“considerationofwhetherthedecisionbeingappealedwaserroneous”.


Theconceptof“inorder todo justice” is illustrated intheProgrammewithjustoneexample(i.e.“forexampleto cure procedural errors at first instance hearing”),whichdoesnothelptounderstandwhytheCASPaneldoesnot“justice”when/ifitconsidersthatthe“decisionbeingappealedwaserroneous”.

However,thePanelisafortioriallowedtoreviewtheAppealedDecision if it isarbitrary, i.e. if it severelyfails toconsiderfixed rules, aclearandundisputedlegalprincipleorbreachesafundamentalprinciple.Adecisionmaybeconsideredarbitraryalsoifitharmsinadeplorablewayafeelingofjusticeoroffairnessorifitisbasedonimproperconsiderationsorlacksa plausible explanation of the connection betweenthefactsfoundandthedecisionissued.Likewise,thePanelisoftheopinionthatitmustbeabletoreviewtheAppealedDecisionwith regard to the fundamentalrightsofthePlayer.Anyotherinterpretationwouldlead to possible abuse of process and of authority,whichwouldbe absolutelyunacceptable andwouldrepresentasubstantialandspecificdangertosportingspirit. Furthermore, any agreement between thepartiestorestrictthepowersofthisPanelwouldhavetobeviewedcriticallyinthelightofthelimitationsimposed by the Swiss ordre public. Agreementsbetweenathletesandinternationalfederationsare–ingeneral terms–notconcludedvoluntarilyon thepart of the athletes but rather imposed upon themunilaterallybythefederation(ATF133III235,242etseq.).Thereis,therefore,adangerthatafederationactsinexcessofitspowersunlessthecontentsoftheagreementdoestakesufficientlyintoaccountalsotheinterestsof theathlete.ThePanelhassomedoubtswhetheraprovisionthatrestrictsthePanel’spowertoamendawrongdecisionofafederationtothebenefitoftheathletebalancestheinterestsofbothpartiesinaproportionatemanner.

In order to exercise such a review (as apparentlyallowedbythe2008ITFProgramme),theCASmustbeabletoexaminetheformalaspectsoftheappealeddecisionsbutalso,aboveall,toevaluate–sometimesevendenovo–allfactsandlegalissuesinvolvedinthedispute.

ThePanelwondersifthepurposeofarticleO.5.1ofthe2008ITFProgramme is toprohibit thepartiestobringbeforetheCASPanelnewevidencewhichhasnotbeenpresentedtotheITFTribunal.Inthisrespect, the Panel observes that all the parties –including ITF–havefiled various submissions andevidenceafterthehearingbeforetheITFTribunal.Moreover,inthecaseathand,therewasno“evidentialambush”whichmighthavegivenunfairadvantagestooneortheotherparty.

In the view of all the above and under thecircumstances of the case and the findings of thePanelasexplainedhereunder,theunrestrictedscopeofreviewoftheCASPanelasprovidedunderR57oftheCASCodedoesnotseemtobelimitedbyarticleO.5.1ofthe2008ITFProgramme.Furthermore,atthepresentcase,itistheviewofthePanelthattherearesufficientgroundstoresolvetheissueatstake(i.e.its scope of review) evenwithin the framework ofarticleO.5.1.

3. Merits

a)Hasadopingoffencebeencommitted?

In the present case, Mr Filippo Volandri hasestablished, on the balance of probabilities, howthe specified substance entered his body. It is notcontested that the positive findings are the resultof the inhalationof salbutamol between 12 and 13March2008.ItisalsonotchallengedthatthePlayerestablished, to the comfortable satisfaction of thehearing body, that his ingestion of the specifiedsubstancewasnotintendedtoenhancehissportingperformanceortomasktheuseofanotherprohibitedsubstance.However,thoseacceptedfactsonlyallowthePlayertobenefitfromthepossibleeliminationorreductionoftheperiodofsuspension(SeearticleM.4ofthe2009ITFProgramme)butareirrelevantwithregard to the occurrence or nonoccurrence of theadverseanalyticalfinding.

Insum,theonlyquestionthatarisesiswhethertheconcentration of salbutamol found in Mr FilippoVolandri’s samples is consistentwith the inhalationof the substance in accordance with the GINAguidelines.

TheITFhassuccessfullyestablishedthatthepresenceofsalbutamol inMrFilippoVolandri’ssampleswasinahigherconcentrationthan1,000ng/mL.Underthe2008and2009ITFProgrammes,theburdenofadducingexculpatorycircumstancesisonMrFilippoVolandri,whomustprove that the abnormal resultwas the consequence “of the therapeutic use of inhaledsalbutamol” (Para. S3, appendix 2 to the 2008 ITFProgramme)or“oftheuseofatherapeuticdoseofinhaledsalbutamol”.

The ITF Tribunal held that the asthma attack on13 March 2008 was severe as it was potentiallylife threatening. It held that Mr Filippo Volandria) took too much salbutamol and b) should havesoughtmedicalhelpasthePlayer’sconditiondidnotimproveonehourafterthebeginningoftheasthmaattack. In particular, the patient should have gonetothehospital.TheITFTribunalconcludedthatby


not complying with those requirements, the PlayerdidnotrespecttheGINAguidelinesandtheuseofsalbutamolwasthereforenot“therapeutic”.

ItisMrFilippoVolandri’sburdentoexplainthatthepresence of salbutamol in a concentration of 1,167ng/mL is consistent with the “therapeutic” use oftheconcernedspecifiedsubstance.Withthisrespect,MrFilippoVolandri simply affirmed that, between12and13March2008,heonlytooktheamountofsalbutamol recommended by theGINAguidelines.BasedonthePocketGuideforAsthmaManagementand Prevention revised in 2007 by theGINA, thePlayersubmittedthattherewasanauthorizedintakeofapproximately32puffsofsalbutamolinthe8-18hoursbeforetheprovidingofhissampleon13March2008. The Player alleged that the concentrationof salbutamol greater than the 1,000 ng/mL is theinevitable consequence of those puffs. However,he did not offer any scientific evidencewhatsoeverto support this position. In order to corroboratehis allegations, he exclusively produced an “expertopinion”issuedon9February2009byProf.FrancoLodi,professorofforensictoxicology,attheinstituteofforensicmedicineinMilan,Italy.Thisdocumentcontainsnoreferencetoanyscientific literature,notechnical data, no indication with regard to Prof.Franco Lodi’s field of expertise or qualifications.The CAS Panel may take into consideration thedeclarationsofProf.FrancoLodi asmerepersonalstatements, with no additional evidentiary value.ThisisparticularlytrueasProf.FrancoLodiwasnotpresentatthehearing.ThePlayerchose,althoughhehadtherighttobringanywitnessbeforethePanel,nottoinvitehimtothehearing,and,therefore,Prof.Lodiwasnotexposedtoanycross-examinationonhisopinionbyCounselfortheITF,whichshouldhavebeenaminimumrequirementinordertoaddsomeweight tohisopinionwhich, as alreadymentioned,wasnotsupportedbyanyscientificliterature,noranytechnicaldata.

TheCASPanelconsiders thatMrFilippoVolandridid not offer any persuasive evidence of how theconcentrationof1,167ng/mLfoundinhisurinecouldbe the result of the therapeutic use of salbutamol.Based upon the evaluation of the foregoing facts,thePlayerhasnotsucceededindischargingtheonuson him and, hence, must be considered as havingcommittedadopingoffence.

b) Are thesanctions imposedby theITFTribunaluponthePlayerappropriate?

The CAS Panel considers the Appealed DecisionoftheITFTribunalasarbitrary,becauseitharmsafeelingofjusticeandoffairnessandbecauseitlacksa

plausibleexplanationoftheconnectionbetweenthefactsfoundandthedecisionissued.

As a matter of fact, the first instance held thatbecause Mr Filippo Volandri took between 10 to20puffsof salbutamol, he is “at fault for inhaling toomuch salbutamol”. This is inconsistent with the ITFTribunalownfindingsaccordingtowhichtheGINAguidelines determine the appropriate treatmentobjectivelyadmissibleintermsof“therapeutic”useofsalbutamol.Basedonthesaidguidelines,MrFilippoVolandri was allowed to take, during the relevantperiodoftime,muchmorepuffsthan“between10to20overall”asacceptedbytheITFTribunal.

ThePlayercouldhavetakenupto32puffsduringthe8-18hoursbeforetheprovidingofhissamples.Thereis a considerable difference between the figures inaccordancewiththeGINAguidelinesandthefigurestakenintoconsiderationbytheITFTribunal.Thus,the lower instance has not ascertained objectivelyhowthePlayer’sdegreeoffaulthasbeencalculatedoronwhatbasisitwasfounded.

The ITF Tribunal held that Mr Filippo Volandrishouldhavesoughtmedicalhelpastheasthmaattackwaslifethreatening.Itwasoftheopinionthatbynotgoing to thehospital, thePlayerdidnot followtheGINAguidelines.Further, it found that“ the playerfeltabletoregaincontrolofhisbreathingbyusingtheinhaler,withoutcallingformedicalhelp,andthatheusedhisinhalertotheextentneededtoregaincontrolofhisbreathing”.

Again,if“theextentneededtoregaincontrolofhisbreathing”amountsto10-20puffs,thenthePlayerwaswithinthelimitssetintheGINAguidelines.

Moreover, the life-threateningemergency justifyingclinicalassistanceseemsverydifficulttoassessasMrFilippo Volandri was by himself when the asthmaattack occurred. Under those circumstances, theCAS Panel does not see how the ITF Tribunal isin a better position than thePlayer to decidewhatis right for him. It is accepted by the Player thathecalledhiscoachandaskedthe latter tocometohis room.This validates the fact that the situationwassomehowoutofordinary.Itisalsoagreedthatitwas theworse asthma attack thePlayer has everdealtwithandthatthecoachsuggestedtogotothehospital.Incontrast,MrFilippoVolandriobviouslydecidedthathewasabletotakecareoftheproblem.ThisisalsoinaccordancewiththeGINAguidelineswhichseektoencourageself-management,thatis,togivepeoplewithasthmatheability tocontrol theirowncondition.Itappearsthatafteracouplehours,thesituationwentbacktonormal.


ITF submitted that after an hour following thebeginningoftheattack,thebreathingofMrFilippoVolandrididnotimprove.Inordertocorroboratethisallegation,itreferstothePlayer’sownbriefaccordingtowhichthecoachfoundthelatter“gaspingforbreath”.Here too, theonlywitnesses are thePlayerhimselfand his coach.Atwhat precise time did the coacharrive?Whatdoes“gasping forbreath”actuallymean?Doesitmeanthattherespiratorydistresswasgreaterthan the one usually observedby asthmatic peopleunderasthmaattack?Wasthecoachimpressedbyasituationheisnotfamiliarwith?HowmuchlongerwasthePlayer“gaspingforbreath”afterthearrivalofhis coach?Howmanypuffsdid thePlayer takeonthearrivalofhiscoach?Howisthelife-threateningsituation compatible with the fact that the onlytestimonyontheeventistheoneofthePlayerwhodescribeditduringhiscross-examinationinfrontoftheITFTribunalinthewords:“Iwasalittleconcernedabout the situation?”, and how is the life-threateningsituation compatible with the fact that the Playerwasable toplayhismatch8hours later, and,mostofall,withthefact that thecoach left justanhourafterhe joined thePlayer inhis room, i.e. less thantwo hours following the beginning of the asthmaattack?Undersuchcircumstances,howcantheITFTribunalqualifytheasthmaattackas“severe”andnotjust “mild”?With this regard, and according to theGINAguidelines,milder exacerbations are definedby a reduction in peak flow of less than 20% andnocturnal awakening.Whydoes this definitionnotfittheeventsofthe13March2008?

The fact that the above questions, that could leadtoabetterunderstandingof thecircumstancesandthe facts and to amore accurate assessmentof theseveranceoftheevent,didnotfindananswercannotbeblamedonMrFilippoVolandriashewasinformedof the positive findings only on 25 July 2008, thatis more than 4 month after the sample collection.Despite of the facts that those questions remainunanswered, the ITF Tribunal felt comfortable tocome to the conclusion that Mr Filippo Volandriviolated the GINA guidelines by not going to ahospital.ItisobvioustotheCASPanelthatthelowerinstancehasassumedthatthePlayerwasathighriskofasthma-relateddeath,whichisarbitraryandpurelyspeculative.

Furthermore, the ITF Tribunal has not explainedhoworwhyMrFilippoVolandrididnotrespecttheGINAguidelineswhen“heprobablytookbetween10and20puffsoverall”norhasitestablishedthatthePlayerhadtogetmedicalhelp.Undersuchcircumstances,theCASPaneldoesnot seeonwhatbasis theITFTribunal imposed such harsh sanctions upon thePlayer.

Asa result, theCASPanelconsiders that ithasnoduty of deference towards theholdings of the ITFTribunal.

TheCASPanel observes thatMrFilippoVolandriwasindeedatfault,ashehasnotbeenabletoprovethatthepresenceofsalbutamolinhissampleinexcessof1,000ng/mLwastheconsequence“ofthetherapeuticuse of inhaled salbutamol”.However, thedegreeofhisfault isminorasthethresholdof1,000ng/mLwasjustexceeded.If,asascertainedbytheITFTribunalitself,onepuffcorrespondsto100mcgofsalbutamol,the litigious excess represents less than a coupleofpuffs.Furthermore,theCASPanelcannotignorethefactthatthePlayertraveledallthewaytoCaliforniato takepart in a tournament, thathewas far fromhome, a fewhours away fromamatch, in theveryearlymorning.Afterhavingput all that effort intocomingtoplay,itisunderstandablethatMrFilippoVolandridecidednottogotothehospitalasitwouldprobablyhavekepthimfromplaying.

However, in assessing the appropriate sanction,the CAS Panel also took the following factorsinto account. First,Mr Filippo Volandri has neverpreviouslybeenfoundguiltyofananti-dopingruleviolation. This, of itself, is of comparatively littleweight:thesamepointcanbemadeforanyfirst-timeoffender.Secondly,however,andmoreimportantly,the CAS Panel has been concerned that theprocedures before the ITFwere slow and sufferedfrominconsistencies,withtheresult thatthePlayerwas left inastateofuncertaintyofover8months,whichisverylonginsportingmatters.Asamatteroffact,itisonlyon13November2008thatthePlayerwasformallychargedwithadopingoffence.Beforethen,MrFilippoVolandrireceivedinformationfromthe ITFwhich is to someextent contradictory andmayalsobeconfusing:

- The litigious samples collection occurred on 13March 2008; the positive findings were knownon9April2008butcommunicatedtothePlayeron 25 July 2008.Between the sampling and thecommunicationof itsresults, thePlayerwasabletotakepartin12tournamentsandtoundergo3anti-dopingtests(whichwereallnegative).

- On25July2005,thePlayerwasrequestedbytheITF to explain the presence of the importantconcentrationofsalbutamolfoundinhisurineinMarch2008.Thesameday,MrFilippoVolandriwrotetotheITFtogivehisversionofthefacts.Itisonlyon18September2008thattheITFreactedtothePlayer’smail.Betweenthosetwodates,thePlayertookpartinatleastfourmoretournaments.


- On8October2008,theAnti-DopingProgrammeAdministratoroftheITFProgrammewrotetothePlayeraletterwithveryambiguousterms,whichcouldeasilybemisleading:“Fortheavoidanceofanydoubt,(1)youhavenotyetbeenformallychargedwiththecommissionofaDopingOffence;and(2)unlessanduntilyouarechargedandyouhaveformallyadmittedcommittingaDopingOffence,oryouhavebeenfoundbyAnti-DopingTribunaltohavecommittedaDopingOffence,youwillnotbedeemedtohavecommittedsuchanoffence.Norwillanyprovisionalperiodofineligibilitybeimposeduponyouandyouwill remain free to compete. (SeeArticle J.4.1 of theProgramme)”.[Emphasisadded]

- Finally a notice of charge was addressed to MrFilippoVolandrion13November2008.Between18Septemberand13November2008,thelatterplayedinthreemoretournaments.

Although the ITF knew of the adverse analyticalfindings,itchosenottoinformMrFilippoVolandriandtoletthelattertakepartin19tournamentsbeforeformallycharginghimwithadopingoffence.Suchalongperiodisunacceptableandincompatiblewiththeintentionoftheanti-dopingregimethatmattersshouldbedealtwith speedily.ThePanelwas takenabackwhenitsawthaton18September2008(morethan6monthsafterthesamplingcollection)theITFrequestedMrFilippoVolandritoprovidedetailsona)thetimeatwhichhelasturinatedpriortoprovidingsampleon13March2008,b)thetime(s)atwhichheusedhisinhaleron13March2008andc)thenumberof puffs he took on each of those occasions. It isobvious that the Player was not in the position toanswertosuchquestionsprecisely,becauseofITF’sfaultandwasthereforedeprivedoftherighttofairevidenceproceedings,whichemergesfromtherighttobeheard,therighttoafairtrialandtheprincipleofequaltreatment,whicharefundamentalandwhichweredisregardedinthepresentcase.

Basedontheaboveconsiderations,thePanelisoftheopinionthatfairnessrequiresthata)areprimandisimposeduponMrFilippoVolandri,b)thatnoperiodofineligibilityisimposedonthePlayerandc)thathisindividualresultinrespectofthe2008IndianWellstournamentonlyisdisqualified,andinconsequence,theprizemoneyandrankingpointsobtainedbyhimthroughhisparticipationinthateventareforfeited.


Relevantfacts

Basketball Club UMMC Ekaterinburg (“theAppellant”)isaRussianwomen’sbasketballclubintheSverdlovskregionofRussia.

SpartakMoscowRegionisaRussianbasketballclubintheMoscowregionofRussia.

FIBA Europe e. V. (“the Respondent” or “FIBAEurope”) is the association, based in Munich,Germany, responsible for, inter alia, organisingand running the Euro League Women basketballtournament(ELW).

Inthe2007/8basketballseason,theAppellantstookpartintheELW.

The ELW is governed by the Respondent inaccordance with the FIBA Europe RegulationsGoverningtheELW(“theELWRegulations”).

The ELW Regulations for that season containedcertain rules (Art17.1,Note1andArt18.3)whicharedesignedtoensurethatthefinaloftheELWwillbeplayedbetweenclubsfromtwodifferentcountries(theEliminationRules”).

TheEliminationRulesprovidefortheeliminationofclubsinthequarterfinalplayoffsandinthefinal4,asfollows:

- According to Art. 17.1, Note 1 of the ELWRegulations,ifthereare3or4clubsofthesamenation in thequarterfinalplayoffsandtheyarenotscheduledtoplayeachotheraccordingtotheregularplayingmode,theyareforcedtoplayeachotherinordertoeliminateeachother.

- Furthermore,accordingtoArt.18.3,iftwoclubsfrom the same nation qualify for the final four,thosetwoclubsareforcedtoplayeachotherinthesemifinalinordertoeliminateeachother.

TheAppellantsappealedtotheRespondent’sAppealsCommission inviting it “to suggest to the CompetitionCommissionofFIBAEuropeassoonaspossibleandinanyeventnotlaterthanJanuary312009,todeleteoratleastnottoapply theprovisions17.1Note1and18.3Note2of theEuroLeagueWomenRegulations2008”.

TheRespondent’sAppealsCommissionbyjudgmentdated 5 February 2009 adjudicated that “… Art.17.1Note1and18.3Note2 of theEuroLeagueWomenRegulations2008ofFIBAEurope,concerningthemethodtodecideaboutthepairingsforthequarterfinalofEuroLeagueWomenisnotdiscriminatoryanddonotviolatetheOlympicCharter,sotheappealhastobedismissed”.

In addition, the Appeals Commission of theRespondent concluded its judgment of 5 February2009 by deciding that the ELW Regulations werevalidandorderingtheAppellantstopaythecostsofthatproceeding(“theDecision”).TheDecisionwasnotifiedtotheAppellantson6February2009.

On20February2009,theAppellantsjointlyappealedagainsttheDecisionbeforetheCourtofArbitrationforSport(CAS).TheychallengedtheDecision,andrequested,interalia,thattheDecisionofFebruary5,2009beannulledandRespondentbeorderednottoapplyEliminationRules in thefutureEuroLeagueCompetition.


1. Application of EC law to Russian cases in the EU

ThePanelfindsthatECLawisapplicabletoeconomicactivitiescarriedout inwholeor inpartwithin theEuropeanUnionandisrelevanttoconsidertheissues

Panel: Mr. Mark Hovell (United Kingdom), President Mr. Michele Bernasconi (Switzerland) Mr. Martin Schimke (Germany)

Basketball (women); application ofnon-discrimination EC law principlesto Russian Cases involving economicactivitiesintheEU;differencebetweentheoriginalrequestandtherequesttotheCAS;limited applicability of EC law to sportsissues of non-economic interests; powerof self-regulationof sports authorities forquestionsrelatedtosport; justificationforcasesofactualorindirectdiscrimination

Arbitration CAS 2009/A/1788Ekaterinburg v. FIBA Europe e. V29October2009


tobedeterminedinthismatter.ThePanelalsonotesthatthereissomecaselawoftheEuropeanCourtofJustice(inparticular,caseC-265/03Simutenkov)whereitwasheldthatthenon-discriminationclauseintheCommunities–RussiaPartnershipAgreementmeantthatasportingregulationimposingaquotaonnon-EUplayerscouldnotbeappliedtoRussiannationalslegally employed in the EU. This case is authoritythatnon-discriminationECLawprinciplesmayalsoapplytoRussianCasesinvolvingeconomicactivitiesintheEuropeanUnionandinthecircumstances,thePanelholdsitappropriatewithinthemeaningofR58oftheCodetoapplyECLawinthepresentmatter,ifneeded,inparticularArt.81and82ECTreaty.

2. Discrimination with regard to EC Law

Art. 12 EC Treaty forbids any discriminationwhatsoever based on nationality. This specificexpression of the general principle of equality hasalso been described as one of the guiding themesofthewholeTreaty(cf.lenz/borchhArdt (Hrsg.),EU-undEG-Vertrag,2006,Art.12EGV,Rn1).Atthe same time, however, it has been held that theprohibition on discrimination does not affect “thecomposition of sports teams, in particular national teams”(Case36/74Walravev.UnionCyclisteInternationale[1974]ECR1405)andwillnotapplywheretheruleinquestionismotivated“forreasonswhicharenotofaneconomic nature, which related to the particular nature andcontextofsuchmatchesandarethusofsportinginterestonly”(Case13/76Donàv.Mantero[1076]ECR1333).

In light of the above, the Panel considers that themainquestionbeforeitiswhethertherehasbeenanyunjustified discrimination, either under EC law ortheGeneralRegulations.

DespitethedifferentwordingoftheFIBAStatutesand Regulations with regards to the provisions ondiscrimination (“otherwise” and “other grounds”) thePanelassumesthattheFIBAdidnotintendtograntabroaderprotectionthannationalorECprovisionsondiscrimination.

Inthisrespect,thePanelhasnotedthatsportsbodiesenjoyawidemarginofdiscretionwithregardtothedesign of sporting formats for the competitionsthat theyorganiseand, inparticular, toensure thatinternational competitions retain an internationalcharacter. A pertinent example was seen in theMouscron case (Mouscron case, CommissionDecisionadoptedon3December1997)concerning thecoreorganisational format of a sporting competition(“homeandaway”rule, inthecaseof internationalclub competitions). In that case, the EuropeanCommission confirmed that matters relating to

sportscompetitionformatsfalloutsidethescopeofEULaw.

This was because the “home and away” rule waspart of the national geographical organisation offootballinEuropewhichisnotcalledintoquestionby European Community law and therefore fellwithinthelegitimatescopeofdiscretionofthesportsgoverningbody.Inthatcase,requiringaclubtoplayits “home” fixture at a ground located within theterritorial boundary of its own national associationcouldnotbeconsideredanabuseofUEFA’sregulatorypowers (Commission press release IP/99/965 of09/12/1999).Inthesamecase,itwaspointedoutthatEULawdidnotputintoquestionthepowerofself-managementor self-regulationof sports authoritiesforquestions related to the specificnatureof sport(Mouscron, cit. para. 17). Referencewasmade to theOpinionofAdvocateGeneralCosmasintheDeliègecase(C-51-96&C-19/97(2009)ECR-I-2549),wherehehadstatedthat“therightofselfregulationinsportis[...]protectedbyCommunitylaw”(Deliège,cit.,opinionofAGCosmas,para.87). Itwasheld that,whenadoptingtherule,thesportsgoverningbodyhadexerciseditslegitimaterightofself-regulationandeveniftheruledid have certain economic consequences this wasnotsufficienttocall it intoquestionunderECLaw(Mouscron,cit.para.20).

It also follows that the European Court of Justice(“theECJ”)allows,withinthescopeofapplicationoftheECTreaty,ajustificationinthecaseofactualorindirectdiscrimination(seeAstrid E.,in:cAlliess/ruFFert, Das Verfassungsrecht der EuropäischenUnion,2007,Art.12,Rn.38).Thismustbeallowedeven more so in the case of assessments madepursuant to the rules of associations. This arisesprimarily from the freedom and wide margin ofautonomyofassociationstoestablishtheirownrulesandstructures,arightwhichinmanylegaltraditionsderives from respective national constitutions andwas largely upheld by the ECJ for this reason (seejudgement of the Court of First Instance in caseT-313/02 Meca-Medina/Majcen with references tocaselawoftheECJ).Inthisrespect,referencemayalso be made, again, to theDeliège case, in whichthe ECJ confirmed that selection rules applied bya judoka federation to authorise the participationof professional or semi-professional athletes in aninternational sport competition inevitably limit thenumberofparticipants.TheECJfoundthatsuchalimitation does not in itself restrict the freedom toprovideservices,ifitderivesfromaninherentneedin the organisation of the event in question and isnot discriminatory (Deliège, supra, para. 62, 64 and69). Moreover, while the ECJ in Deliège did notapplyArt.81and82ECTreaty, it is likely that the


rule in question would also meet theMecaMedinatest for Art. 81(1) and 82 EC Treaty as its effectswouldbe inherent in thepursuanceof a legitimateobjective (proper organisation of the sport eventaccording to certain selection rules) andwouldnotbedisproportionate(seediscussionfurtherbelow).Itisthereforenecessarytoaskwhataretheobjectives,thealternatives,thecontextandthenecessity,oftheFIBARules.

3. Alternatives to the ELW elimination rules

ThePanel accepts thatmen’s football andwomen’sbasketball (and inparticular the respective sportivecompetitions) are not comparable and agrees thatthe alternatives suggested could lead to furtherdistortion,inaimingtoachievethestatedobjective.

4. The context behind the ELW elimination rules

ThePanelnotesinparticular:

- Theseruleshavebeeninexistenceformanyyears,atleastsincetheRespondenthasexistedandcopiesoftherulessince2004/5seasonwereexhibitedtotheanswer;

- AllrulechangesgothroughtheGeneralAssembly,theCompetitionsCommitteeandtheBoardoftheRespondent;

- The National Federations affiliated to theRespondentcanputforwardtheirrepresentativestothesedifferentbodiesandseektoinfluencetherulemaking;

- The Russian Federation, which represents theinterests of the Appellant, proposed changes totheELWCompetitionin2006/7seasontoallowcountriestoenterupto4,not3,clubstotheELWCompetition;

- Those changes were properly considered andpart of the consideration was the extension ofthe Elimination Rules, to maintain the statedobjective;

- SincethenothermotionsproposedbytheRussianFederationtoremovetheEliminationRuleshavebeen properly debated and considered by theRespondent;

- The Respondent has stated the objective resultsin more teams from more different NationalFederationsparticipatingintheCompetition;

- The stated objective stops the Competitionbecoming an extension of one country’s ownleague;and

- TheRespondentclaimsthatthisobjectiveworksforitssportandhasalsoachievedgreaterinterestfromspectators.

The Appellant has advanced a mathematicalargument which it believes demonstrates theElimination Rules reduce the “internationality”of theCompetition, as opposed to increase it.ThePanel,however,notesthestatedobjectiveistoensureteamsfromdifferentcountriescontestthefinal.Assuch, forcing teams from the same country toplayeach otherwill reduce the number of internationalmatches.

5. Is the affect proportionate to attaining the stated objectives?

ThePanelnotesthecontextbehindtheEliminationRules and how the pursuit of the stated objectiveis clearly desired by all otherNational Federations(as when FIBA Europe considered the RussianFederation’s latest motion, it was rejected by allbut Russia) and for this sport, believes the affectsare proportionate to the achievement of the statedobjective.

6. Are the elimination rules necessary?

Taking all the above into consideration and theparticularnatureofasportthatisstrivingtoincreaseparticipationandsupportinternationality,thePaneldetermines that the Elimination Rules are alsonecessary,which,finally,meansthateveniftherulesindisputewereindirectlydiscriminatory,theyare,inanycase,justified.

7. Competition law

TheEuropeancompetitionlegislationdoesnotallowfor an unlimited, general or specific exception inthecaseoftheentireareaofsports(seeMeca-MedinaJudgementRn.27f.)

Rather, what also must be clarified is whether thefactual requirementsof the relevantArt. 81/82ECTreatyarefulfilled.

Art.81and/or82ECTreaty:

Art. 81(1)ECTreaty prohibits “all agreements betweenundertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings andconcerted practices which may affect trade between memberstatesandwhichhaveas their object or effect theprevention,


restriction or distortion of competition within the commonmarket…”.

Art.82ECTreatyprohibits“anyabusebyoneormoreundertakingofadominantpositionwithinthecommonmarketorinasubstantialpartofit…”.

Is the Respondent “an Undertaking”? Whilst theRespondent states in its answer that “FIBAEuropecannot be considered as an undertaking or a group ofundertakings”, it does not go any further with itsargumentshere.

Under EC Law an “Undertaking” is not actuallydefined,butintheECJjudgementinKlausHofnerand Fritz Elser vMacrotonGmbH (case C-41/90,page I-01979) it is stated “It must be observed, inthe context of competition law, first that the concept of anundertaking encompasses every entity engaged inaneconomicactivity,regardlessofthelegalstatusoftheentityandthewayitisfinanced…”.

8. Is the Respondent carrying out an “economic activity”?

In EC Law there is no definition of an “EconomicActivity”however,ECJjudgementinFirmaAmbulanzGlocknervLandkreisSudwestpfalz(caseC-475/99,pageI-8089)itisstated“Anyactivityconsistinginofferinggoodsorservicesonagivenmarketisaneconomicactivity”.

ThePanelnotesthatfollowingtheECJ’sdecisionintheabovecasesandintheMeca-MedinaJudgement,it is clear that bodies such as the Respondent arenormallynowdeemedundertakingsandseentobecarrying out economic activities and as such, theirrules and regulations are subject to examinationunderECLaw.

Art.81ECTreaty isaimedatprohibitingcollusive,anti-competitiveagreementsordecisionsbetweenoraffectingmorethanoneundertakingandArt.82ECTreatymore at prohibitingmonopolistic behaviourbyoneundertaking.

The Panel believes that the Elimination Rulescould be seen to affect other undertakings andto distort the ELW competition and competitionbetween these undertakings. Whilst the numberof games may be the same, each club’s aim is towin the ELW Competition, and to alter the drawat the late stages can lead to distortion. The Panelalsofeels theRespondent is inapositiontoset theELW Regulations, which the participating clubshave to follow. Whilst the Respondent’s decisionmaking committees are elected from the NationalFederationsitrepresents,onceconstitutedtheyarein

adominantpositiontotheclubsparticipatingintheELW.Further,whilst there are other competitions,this appears to be themain one on the Europeanstage.TheArticledoesnotprohibitanundertakingbeinginadominantposition,onlytheabuseofthatposition.ThePanelnotesthattheRespondentshouldnot allow its rules to impair genuine undistortedcompetition in the commonmarket, which it feelstheEliminationRegulationscouldbeseentodo.Assuch,thePanelbelieveArt.81and82ECTreatyarerelevanttothismatter.

a)Art.81ECTreaty

ThePanelnotes that, according to theMeca-MedinaJudgment,asportsorganizationalrulemaybesubjecttothefollowingtest,namely:“thecompatibilityofruleswiththeCommunityrulescannotbeassessedinabstract.Notevery agreement between undertakings or every decision ofan association of undertakingswhich restricts the freedom ofactionofthepartiesorofoneofthemnecessarilyfallswithintheprohibitionlaiddowninArt.81(1)EC.Forthepurposesofapplicationofthatprovisiontoaparticularcase,accountmustfirstofallbetakenoftheoverallcontextinwhichthedecisionof the association of undertakings was taken or produces itseffects and,more specifically, of its objectives. It has then tobe considered whether the consequential effects restrictive ofcompetitionareinherentinthepursuitofthoseobjectives…andproportionatetothem”.

ThecontextinwhichthedecisionoftheRespondentwas taken or produces its effects and in particularits objectives were held by the Panel in detailalready above. Reference is made to the Panel’sfindings. Furthermore, in the context of Art. 81(1) EC Treaty the Panel emphasizes that a certainrestrictiononcompetitionisinherentinthepursuitof internationality of women’s basketball, becauseinternationality can only be preserved, if thesupremacyofonenationcanbeavoided.However,asdiscussedindetailabove,theserestrictiveeffectsmustbeconsideredasproportionate in the lightofRespondent’sstatedobjective.

Apart from these findings, the Panel considers theneutrality of the restriction at handwith regard tocompetition.TheECJheldagreementstobeneutralinthelightofArt.81(1)ECTreaty,whichdocontainmereside-arrangementsrequiredfortheachievementof amain purpose,which is neutral in the contextofcompetition. (summerer th., in:PraxishandbuchSportrecht, S.632, Rn. 188). Again, this exceptionrequires a proportionate measure in comparisonto its effect. (schWArze J./hetzel ph.:Der Sportim Lichte des europäischen Wettbewerbsrechts,EuR 2005 Heft 5). The proportionateness of theEliminationRuleshasbeenaddressedby thePanel


above.Furthermore,themainpurposeoftheELWrules is the provision of an orderly framework forthe European Women’s Basketball organised bythe Respondent. This main purpose includes as amatter of fact the safeguarding of Respondent’seconomicinterests,whichisrequiredforthesurvivalof European Women’s Basketball organised byRespondentandforthefulfillmentofitsobjectives.Thus, the ELW rule in question which aims atpreserving internationality in the sport serves asan auxiliary measure for the pursuit of the mainpurpose,whichisneutralwithregardtocompetition.

Finally, when weighing the interests of Appellantand Respondent the Panel notes that preservingthe internationality of the tournament serves as anadvantage for theAppellantaswell,whichbenefitsfrom the attractiveness of the tournament and thesportingeneralresultinginfinancialprofits.

The applicability of this exception in the case inquestion, however, does not have to be decidedbythe Panel. In any case, the possible restriction oncompetitionisjustifiedunderArt.81(3)ECTreaty.ItprovidesthattherestrictionsofArt.81(1)ECTreatyare not applicable to resolutions of associations ofundertakings,whichcontributetothepromotionofthe economic progress, while allowing consumersa fair share of the resulting benefit and withoutimposingrestrictionsonthepartakingundertakingswhich are not essential for the realisation of theseaims.

Thepossiblerestriction,asoutlinedindetailabove,aims at preserving the character of competitionand provides for this purpose a measure which isadequate,requiredandproportionate.

b)Art.82ECTreaty

Art. 82 EC Treaty requires the abuse of amonopolisticposition.Whetheranabusecanbeheldinthecaseinquestion,mustnotbedecided,becauseagain,apossibleabusecanbe justifiedbyobjectivereasonsincludingtheparticularitiesofsportstotheextent themeasure taken is adequate, required andproportionate (heermAnn p.W., Anwendung deseuropäischenKartellrechtsimBereichdesSportsinWuW2009,489,497).

Finally,alsotheopinionhasbeenexpressedamongstlegal scholars to apply the above-mentioned testtakenfromtheMeca-MedinaJudgment inrelationtoArt. 81 (1)EC-Treaty toArt. 82EC-Treaty aswell(heermAnn P.W., Anwendung des europäischenKartellrechts imBereichdes Sports inWuW2009,489, 498). This test, however, has been applied by

thePanelinthecontextofArt.81(1)ECTreatyanddecidedinfavourofRespondent.

In conclusion, the Panel dismisses the Appellant’sappeal.

130-Jurisprudence de la Chambre ad hoc du TAS à Vancouver / Jurisprudence of the CAS ad hoc Division in Vancouver

TheApplicantistheNationalOlympicCommitteeofAustralia(theAustralianOlympicCommittee(AOC)).TheRespondentistheFédérationInternationaledeBobsleighetdeTobboganing(FIBT)whichopposestheAOC’sappeal.

The AOC appeals against the FIBT’s decisiondated 26 January 2010 (“the challenged decision”),subsequentlyconfirmedon2February2010, tonotallocate a continental representation quota place tothe AOC in the Women’s 2-man Bobsleigh event(“Women’sBobEvent”)inthe2010WinterOlympicGamesinVancouver.

ThechallengeddecisionallocatestotheGermanandUSNOC three teams in theWomen’s BobEvent,to theCanadian,Suisse,BritishandRussianNOCstwo teams each and to each of theDutch, Italian,Belgium,Roumanian,IrishandJapaneseNOConeteam,respectively.

The FIBT’s Qualification System for XXI WinterOlympic Games, Vancouver 2010, is set out in adocument (the “Qualification System”) establishedin collaborationby theFIBTand the InternationalOlympic Committee (IOC); issued in November2008, pursuant to chapter 4.1 FIBT InternationalRulesBobsleigh2008,whichstates in relevantpart

asfollows:

“OlympicWinterGamesThecriteriafortherighttoparticipateintheOlympicWinter Games are determined by the I.O.C. Thequalification rules are determined by the I.O.C. incollaboration with the F.I.B.T. The qualificationrules are communicated directly by the I.O.C. to allNationalOlympicCommittees”.

TheQualificationSystemprovidesfortheallocationof 170 athletes for participation in the disciplineof bobsleigh at the 2010 Winter Olympic Games,including 130men and 40women.Qualification isachievedbythe“pilot’s”results,whicharethebasisfor obtaining a qualification place for the pilots’respective National Olympic Committee (NOC).The general principles of the Qualification Systemprovide guarantees of participation in the WinterOlympic Games for the best bob teams, the hostnationandnon-representedcontinents,providedthatineachcasetheathletesarerankedamongthetop50menortop40womenintheFIBTRanking2009/10bythedeadlineof17January2010.

TheQualificationSystemreadsintherelevantpartsasfollows:

“…CONTINENTALREPRESENTATION

Male and female pilots belonging toNOCs of non-represented continents may also take part in theOlympic Winter Games. Maximum of one 2-manbob team or one 4-man bob team and one women’sbob team per continent, provided that the pilots ofthese teams have taken part and were ranked in atleast five international FIBT competitions on threedifferenttracksduringthe2008/09and/or2009/10competitionseasons,andrankedamongthetop50menortop40womenintheFIBTRanking.

The selection of the pilots will be based on FIBTRanking of the 2009/10 season set up during thequalificationperiod.

Ifnopilotcanachievethiscondition,thatcontinentwillhavenorepresentative.…”.

Relevantfacts

Panel: Prof. Michael Geistlinger (Austria), President Mr. Henri Alvarez (Canada)Prof. Ulrich Haas (Germany)

Bobsleigh; Winter Olympic Games;interpretation of the Continentalrepresentation rule in the qualificationsystem; allocation or re-allocation ofplacesinthewomen’sbobevent

Arbitration CAS ad hoc division (OG Vancouver) 2010/001Australian Olympic Committee (AOC) v. Fédération Internationale de Bobsleigh et de Tobogganing (FIBT)9February2010


On 2 February 2010 the AOC filed its applicationwiththeCourtofArbitrationadhocDivision(CAS).

By email of 5 February 2010, the President of theBrazilian Ice Sport Confederation (“CBDG”)approached the CAS in the context of the presentcase and pointed to the fact that the BrazilianWomen’sBobsled team isaheadofAustralia in theFIBT Rankings of 17 January 2010. Furthermore,the CBDG submitted that the way “Ireland WomenBobsleighTeamgottoqualifyfortheOlympicswasirregular”.

By letter dated 6 February 2010 the Respondentsubmitteditsresponse.

By e-mail dated 6 February 2010 the Panel invitedthe CBDG to participate as an Interested Party atthe hearing.TheRespondent objected to this. ThePresidentofthePanelinformedtheRespondentthatthe Panel would decide upon this objection in thecontextofallotherproceduralissuesattheoutsetofthehearing.

Duringthemorningof8February2010,theCBDGformallyfiledanapplicationbeforeCAS,theFIBTbeingdesignatedastheRespondentandIrelandandAustraliaasInterestedParties.

On8February2010, theRespondent submitted its“responseregardingtheBrazilianmatter”beforetheCAS.

ThePaneldecidedtoseparatethehearinginthecaseCASarbitrationN°OG10/02CBDGv.FIBTandtopostponeittoalaterdate.Ontheotherhand,thePanelconfirmeditsdecisiontoallowtheCBDGtoparticipate in the case initiated by the AOC (CASarbitrationN°OG10/01AOCv.FIBT)asInterestedPartybecausethedecisionontheinterpretationandthe relevance of the provisions on the continentalrepresentation in the Qualification System(“Continental Representation rule”)may affect thelegal interests of the CBDG, since both the AOCandtheCBDGareseekingtheplaceoftheOlympicCouncilofIrelandintheWomen’sBobEvent.


1. Applicable law

These proceedings are governed by the CASArbitrationRulesfortheOlympicGames(the“CASadhocRules”)enactedbytheInternationalCouncilofArbitrationforSport(ICAS)on14October2003.TheyarefurthergovernedbyChapter12oftheSwissPrivateInternationalLawActof18December1987(“PILAct”).ThePILActappliestothisarbitrationasaresultofthelocationoftheseatoftheCASad

hocDivision inLausanne,Switzerland,pursuant toart.7oftheCASadhocRules.

The jurisdictionof theCASadhocDivisionarisesoutofRule59oftheOlympicCharter.Furthermore,in the case at hand none of the Parties or theInterested Parties disputed the CAS jurisdiction intheirsubmissionsatthehearing.

Under art. 17 of the CAS ad hoc Rules, the Panelmustdecidethedispute“pursuanttotheOlympicCharter,the applicable regulations, general principles of law and therulesoflaw,theapplicationofwhichitdeemsappropriate”.

According to art. 16of theCASadhocRules, thePanel has “full power to establish the facts on which theapplicationisbased”.

2. Interpretation of the continental representation rule

Having listened to all arguments of the Partiesand seen the documents submitted by them, thePanelfindsthattheQualificationSystemfirstofallmust be seen as a legal document. It contains theprovisions concerning the requirements that mustbefulfilled inordertoallowathletestocompeteattheWinterOlympicGames.AsalegaldocumenttheQualificationSystemistobeunderstoodaccordingtogeneralrulesofinterpretation.Theinterpretationhastostartfromtheordinarymeaningofthewordsusedinthiscontextandthereasonableunderstandingoftheaddresseesofsuchrules.

The parties disagree on the interpretation of theContinentalRepresentationruleintheQualificationSystemandwhetheritisapplicabletotheallocationand/or re-allocation of places in theWomen’sBobEvent. The document refers to this rule in threedifferentplaces:

a) In the chapter “Qualification System” –“GeneralPrinciples”;

b) Inthechapter“ContinentalRepresentation”;c) Inthechapter“ReallocationofUnusedQuota

Positions”.

The concept of “Continental Representation’ isnot commonly defined, nor is it defined in theQualification System. The question is whether theconceptappliestothesportofBobsleighassuch,totheMenandWomenEventsortoindividualeventsinthissport.Thecontentsoftheterm“ContinentalRepresentation’ has to be derived by interpretationoftheQualificationSystem.InthePanel’sviewthedocumentprovidesforqualificationonthreebases,participation of the best bob teams, representation


ofthehostnation,andparticipationofathletesfromnon-representedcontinents.Eachoftheseisreferredto as being “guaranteed”.This is clear language thatmustberespectedandgivenmeaning.

The chapter on Continental Representationcommences by giving a right to male and femalepilots belonging to NOCs from non-representedcontinents to take part in the Winter OlympicGames,providedtheyarerankedamongthetop50menor top 40women in theFIBTRanking.Thisrightislimitedtoa“maximumofone2-manbobteamorone4-manbobteamandonewoman’sbobteampercontinent”.[Emphasisadded]

The use of the word “and” attracted much of theparties’ attention in their written submissions andat the hearing. The Olympic Council of Irelandargued that theword should be used conjunctivelyandthat,asaresult,themaximumthattheNOCofanon-representedcontinentcouldreceivewouldbeone2-manbob team,one4-manbob teamoronewomen’s bob team.However, thiswould require achange in the actual language of the sentence andiscontrarytoitsplainmeaning.InthePanel’sviewthemaximumentitlementisarepresentationofoneman’sbobteam(a2-manbobteamora4-manbobteam) and one women’s bob team. In the contextof this sentence, the use of theword “and” clearlyreflectstheintentionofrepresentationbyonemen’sbobteamandonewomen’sbobteam.Inotherwords,“and”isusedinthesenseof“inaddition”or“also”.Inorder for theOlympicCouncilof Ireland’s and theFIBT’sinterpretationtheword“and”wouldhavetobesubstitutedby“or”.[Emphasisadded]

The Panel’s interpretation is consistent with thedistinction between men’s bobsleigh teams andwomen’s bobsleigh teams in a number of placesin the document. A review of the QualificationSystem reveals that from the outset men’s andwomen’sbobsleigh teamsare treatedseparatelyanddifferently.Themen’scategoryhastwoevents,moreteamsandmoreathletesthanthewomen’scategorywhich has only one event, fewer teams and fewerathletes.Eachof themen’sandwomen’scategorieshasaseparatedetailedsystem(“SysteminDetailforMen’sBobsleigh”and“SysteminDetailforWomen’sBobsleigh”).

The Olympic Council of Ireland also argued thatthe use of the word “may” in the first sentence ofthe chapter on Continental Representation gavetheFIBT a discretion to decidewhether to permitrepresentationbyamen’sbobteamorawomen’sbobteam.InthePanel’sviewthisisinconsistentwiththeguarantee of continental representation by a men’s

teamandawomen’steam.Rathertheuseoftheword“may”simplygrantstheentitlementtoqualifiedteamsbelonging to NOCs of non-represented continentsto takepart in theWinterOlympicGames.This isconsistentwith theuseof theword“maximum” inthenextsentence.

The FIBT argued that its intention and that ofthe IOC was to give athletes of NOCs whosecontinents were not represented in any FIBTevents an opportunity to be represented. Further,accordingtotheFIBT,itwasnotcontemplatedthatthe Continental Representation rule could be usedin order to guaranteeNOCs fromnon-representedcontinentsrepresentationinallevents.However,thisintentionisnotreflectedintheclearlanguageofthetext. Rather the language in the document reflectstheintentiontoproviderepresentationofonemen’s2-manboboronemen’s4-manbobandonewomen’sbobteampercontinent.Withrespecttomen’steamsthis clearly sets a maximum of representation inoneevent.Withrespecttowomen’steamsitmeansrepresentationintheonlywomen’sevent.

The Olympic Council of Ireland also sought tosupport its interpretation on a comparison of thelanguageusedintheHostNationQualificationruleand the Continental Representation rule. It notedthat the former provided for participation of theHostNationNOCs“…with one 2-man bob team, one4-man bob team and one women’s bob team, respectively”.Ontheotherhand, theContinentalRepresentationrule does not use theword “respectively”, but simplyprovides for a “maximum” of one 2-man bob teamorone4-manbobteamandonewomen’sbobteampercontinent.InthePanel’sviewthisdifferenceinlanguageinthetworulesisofnosignificance.TherightsofrepresentationgrantedtotheHostNationare different from those granted to NOCs fromnon-represented continents.TheNOCof theHostNation isgiventherighttotakepart intheWinterOlympicGamesineachoftheeventsfor2-manbobteams,4-manbobteamsandwomen’sbobteams.Ontheotherhand,NOCsofnon-representedcontinentshave the right to take part in theWinterOlympicGameswithonlyoneteaminthemen’seventsandoneteaminthewomen’sevent.Thus,theuseoftheword“respectively”makessenseinthecontextoftheHostNationQualificationrule,butisnotrequiredinthecontextoftheContinentalRepresentationrule.

At the hearing the Olympic Council of Irelandsubmittedanewdocumentinsupportofthepositionthat the Continental Representation rule appliedonly at the re-allocation stage. The new documentsubmittedwasapreviousdraftof theQualificationSystemdiscussedbetweentheIOCandtheFIBT.


InthePanel’sviewthedraftdocumentsubmittedbytheOlympicCouncilof Ireland isofnoassistance.Itisclearlyadraftwhichwasthesubjectofinternaldiscussionsbetween the IOCand theFIBT.Therewas no indication that the draft, or the discussionbetween the IOC and the FIBT,were provided ormadeknowntotheFIBT’smembersorthevariousNOCsorathletes.Further,areviewofthedraftrevealsthatthereareanumberofotherdifferencesbetweenitandthefinalversionoftheQualificationSystem.ThesewerenotaddressedorexplainedbytheFIBT,theIOCortheOlympicCouncilofIrelandandtherewasnoexplanationofthenatureandcontentofthediscussionrelatingtothedraftandthepreparationofthefinaldocument.Inthesecircumstances,thePanelisnotpreparedtodrawanyinferences,ordrawanyconclusionsonthebasisofthedifferentversionsoftheQualificationSystem.Itmustbaseitsdecisiononthefinal,publisheddocument.

3. Stage at which the continental representation is to be applied

It is disputed between the Parties whether theContinental Representation rule is applicable tothe re-allocation of places only, or also to theinitial allocation stage. The Qualification Systemis not self-evident as to this point and requiresinterpretation.TheFIBTsupporteditsinterpretationof theContinentalRepresentationruleonthebasisof the language of the re-allocation of unusedquota positions. The FIBT says that if continentalrepresentationwererequiredtobetakenintoaccountintheinitialallocationofquota,thentherewouldbenoneedtoreallocatepositionsnottakenuptoNOCsofnon-representedcontinents.

TheAOC says that this argument ismisplaced. Inthe AOC’s view, the FIBT’s argument based on apossible inconsistency or error in the re-allocationruledoesnotovercometheexpresslanguagesetoutinthe“GeneralPrinciples’chapterofthedocumentwhichguaranteesrepresentationofnon-representedcontinents. In the Panel’s view this is correct.The guarantee of continental representation is afundamental principle of the Qualification Systemand according to the structure of the document isindependentofthere-allocationrule.Further,atthehearinginresponsetoquestionsfromthePanel,boththe FIBT and the AOC recognized that, althoughunusual,itwaspossibleforanon-representedNOCthat had received its place through re-allocation towithdrawandhaveitsplacere-allocated.Thiswouldprovideanexampleoftheneedtore-allocateaplacetotheNOCofanon-representedcontinentunderthere-allocationrule.ThePanelacceptsthatthiswouldbeanunusualcaseandthattheremaybedifficulties

intheapplicationoftheRe-allocationruleasdrafted.However,thisdoesnotoutweightheotherpreviouslymentionedelementsthatclearlyfavortheApplicant’sinterpretation.Inconclusion,thePanelfindsthatthebetterargumentsspeak in favorofnot limiting theContinental Representation rule to the stage of re-allocation.

Given that the non-allocation of a place in theWomen’sBobEventtotheAOCisincompatiblewiththeQualificationSystemandgiven that theoverallnumberofplaces is limitedto20, thePanelhasnootherpossibilitythantosetasidetheFIBT’sdecisiondated 26 January 2010 in asmuch as it allocates aplace in the Women’s Bob Event to the OlympicCouncilofIreland.

4. Recommendation

Taking into consideration that in the case at handseveralNOCsare competing for the sameplace intheWomen’sBobEventandthatallocatingthespottoone teamwill alwaysbe to thedetrimentof theothersandthatthedisputeinquestionhasitsoriginin regulations that are not entirely clear, the Panelsuggests toaddafurther21stplaceto theWomen’sBobEvent.

ThePanel isoftheviewthataddinganextraplaceto an event is not impossible from the outset andhasbeen recommendedbypreviousCASPanels inthepast(CASOG04/001).Furthermore,thePanelnotesthattheFIBTSecretaryGeneralhasrequestedadditionalplacesineventstotheIOCSportDirectorinthepast.

ThemissionoftheCASPanelwastodecidewhichinterpretationoftheFIBTRuleswascorrectandtodetermine whether the AOC’s application shouldbe upheld or dismissed. It has ruled that theAOCshould prevail in this arbitration. Furthermore, theCAS cannot issue any order as to the inclusion ofa 21st team in the 2-man women’s bobsleigh eventwhich might require a change in the competitionformatoftheOlympicGamesandwouldrequiretheagreementof the IOCandVANOC.However, thePanelwishestoexpresstheviewthat,incasetheIOCandVANOCareinthepositiontoallocatethenon-used 30th place inMen’s Skeleton as the additional(21th) place for the 2-man Women’s Bob Event, itwouldfindsuchactionjustandequitable.


position in this procedure was that it agreed withthe AOC’s interpretation of the Rules, which wasacceptedbythePanel.FollowingarecommendationbythePanel,theIOCExecutiveBoarddecidedon10February2010,to“includeonemoreteamintheWomen’sBobsleigh competition in order to allow the Irish team toparticipateinthe2010VancouverOlympicWinterGames”.

TheFIBT’sQualificationSystemfortheXXIWinterOlympic Games, Vancouver 2010, is set out in adocument (“the Qualification System”) establishedincollaborationbetweentheFIBTandInternationalOlympicCommittee(IOC)andissuedinNovember2008basedonchapter4.1oftheFIBTInternationalRulesBobsleigh2008,whichstates in relevantpartasfollows:

“OlympicWinterGames

ThecriteriafortherighttoparticipateintheOlympicWinter Games are determined by the I.O.C. Thequalification rules are determined by the I.O.C. incollaborationwiththeF.I.B.T.ThequalificationrulesarecommunicateddirectlybytheI.O.C.toallNationalOlympicCommittees”.

TheQualificationSystemprovidesfortheallocationof 170 athletes for participation in the disciplineof Bobsleigh at the 2010 Winter Olympic Games,including 130men and 40women.Qualification isachieved by the pilots’ results, which are the basisfor obtaining a qualification place for the pilots’respective National Olympic Committee (NOC).The system provides guarantees of participation intheWinterOlympicGamesforthebestbobteams,the host country and non-represented continents,provided that in each case the athletes are rankedamongthetop50menortop40womenintheFIBTRanking2009/10bythedeadlineof17January2010.

According to the FIBT Ranking, the Irish teamachieved 488 points and the Brazilian team 356.Points canbe acquired inWorldCup competitionsandothercompetitions.TeamswhichareallowedtocompeteintheWorldCupmayachieveconsiderablymorepointsthanthoseteamsthatarenotadmittedto the World Cup. While the Brazilian team wasnot eligible for theWorldCup, the Irish teamwasadmitted to itbyadecisionof theFIBTExecutive

Arbitration CAS ad hoc division (OG Vancouver) 2010/002Confederaçao Brasiliera de Desporto no Gelo (CBDG) v. Fédération Internationale de Bobsleigh et de Tobogganing (FIBT) 12February2010

The Applicant is the Confederaçao Brasilierade Desporto no Gelo (the Brazilian Ice SportsFederation, CBDG). The Respondent is theFédération Internationale de Bobsleigh et deTobogganing (FIBT) which opposes the CBDG’sappeal.

The CBDG appeals against the FIBT’s decisiondated26January2010(“thechallengeddecision”)tonot allocate aquotaplace to theBrazilianNOC inthe interests of the CBDG in theWomen’s 2-manBobsleighevent(“Women’sBobEvent”)inthe2010WinterOlympicGamesinVancouver,Canada.

ThechallengeddecisionallocatestotheGermanandUSNOCs,threeteamsintheWomen’sBobEvent;totheCanadian,Swiss,BritishandRussianNOCs,twoteams;andtotheDutch,Italian,Belgian,Roumanian,IrishandJapaneseNOCs,oneteam,respectively.

The challenged decisionwas already the subject ofanothercase,i.e.CASarbitrationN°OG10/01 (the“AOCv.FIBTCase”) andwaspartlysetasidebyaCAS award dated 9 February 2010, which orderedthattheIrishteambereplacedbytheAustralianteamthroughapplicationofthecontinentalrepresentationrule. In these first proceedings, the CBDGparticipated as an Interested Party. The CBDG’s

Relevantfacts

Panel: Prof. Michael Geistlinger (Austria), President Mr. Henri Alvarez (Canada)Prof. Ulrich Haas (Germany)

Bobsleigh; Winter Olympic Games;allocation of quota places to NOCs;CASjurisdiction;CASscopeofreview;scope of power of an InternationalFederationExecutiveCommittee


Committee dated 26 November 2009 after thewithdrawaloftheFrenchteam.

ThedecisionoftheFIBTExecutiveCommitteeof26November 2009was communicated by email fromthe FIBT Secretary General to the Irish MemberFederationandtoFIBTofficialsattheCesanaWorldCupcompetitiononthesameday.

TheCBDGlearnedofthedecisiontoadmittheIrishteamtotheWorldCupby10December2009whenitsawthelistoftheteamsstartingattheWorldCupinWinterberg,whichincludedtheIrishteam.

On11December2009,thePresidentoftheCBDGwrote to theExecutiveCommitteeof theFIBT toinquirewhether the listingof the Irish teamwas amistake, and sought official confirmation of thesituation.ItcomplainedthattheIrishteamwasnotqualifiedtocompeteattheWorldCupcompetitionsthisseason.

Laterthatday,thePresidentoftheCBDGagainwrotetotheExecutiveCommitteeoftheFIBTnotingthatall nations qualified to compete in theWorld Cupneededtoconfirmtheirparticipationbythedeadlineof1October2009.According to theCBDG,sincetheIrishteamcouldnotconfirmitsparticipationbythisdeadline,itwasnoteligibletoreplacetheFrenchteam,whichwithdrewafterthisdeadline.

On16December2009,theFIBTSecretaryGeneraladvised the CBDG that the FIBT’s InternationalRegulationsdonotimposeanylimitwithinwhichagiven teammustconfirmorcancel itsparticipationin theWorldCup, thatIrelandwasfirstamongthecountries not qualified for theWorldCup andwasthereforeadmittedtoreplacetheFrenchteamuponitswithdrawal.

After this exchange between the Parties, someattemptsweremade to resolve the disputewithoutresort to formal dispute resolution. On 8 January2010, theCBDG submitted a request to the FIBTCourtofArbitrationinwhichitrequestedaninteriminjunction.

On15January2010,theFIBTCourtofArbitrationissued a signed statement by its President, whichrules,interalia,that:

“1.TheRequestforArbitrationistoberejected.TheFIBTCourt ofArbitration is not competent for thepresentcase.NeithertheCourtofArbitrationhastoissue further statements with regard to the decisionstakenorimplementedbytheFIBT’sbodies”.

The Parties confirmed that this statement was thefinaldecisionoftheFIBTCourtofArbitrationwithrespect to thismatter. Inparticular,on6February2010,thePresidentoftheCBDGinformedtheCAS:“that[theCBDG]ha[s]exhausted[its]casewithFIBTCoAonJanuary15th,2010”.

The Irish team participated in the World Cupcommencing with the Winterberg event and theFIBTrankingof17January2010reflectsthepointsacquiredintheseraces.

On8February2010,theCBDGfileditsapplicationwiththeCourtofArbitrationadhocDivision(CAS).

In its original application, the CBDG did notrefer to the challenged decision, nor did it referto an arbitration clause or identify the applicablerules/regulations, but it did refer to its previouscorrespondenceinconnectionwiththeAOCv.FIBTCase.

On8February2010, theRespondent submitted its“responseregardingtheBrazilianmatter”beforetheCAS,including its submissions on jurisdiction and themerits.

The hearing took place on Thursday, 11 February2010, at 1.30 pm, at the CAS Ad Hoc DivisionPremisesinVancouver.


1. CAS jurisdiction

These proceedings are governed by the CASArbitrationRulesfortheOlympicGames(the“CASadhocRules”)enactedbytheInternationalCouncilofArbitrationforSport(ICAS)on14October2003.TheyarefurthergovernedbyChapter12oftheSwissPrivateInternationalLawActof18December1987(“PILAct”).ThePILActappliestothisarbitrationasaresultofthelocationoftheseatoftheCASadhocDivision inLausanne,Switzerland,pursuant toArt.7oftheCASadhocRules.

The jurisdictionof theCASadhocDivisionarisesoutofRule59oftheOlympicCharter.Theprovisionprovides:

“Anydisputearisingontheoccasionof,orinconnectionwith,theOlympicGamesshallbesubmittedexclusivelyto theCourt ofArbitration for Sport, in accordancewiththeCodeofSports-RelatedArbitration”.

Thewording “arising on” or “in connectionwith”isbroadwordingreflectingtheIOC’sintentionthat


all disputes falling within this scope be submittedtoarbitrationandnottothejurisdictionofnationalcourts. In thepresentcase, thematter indispute iswhetherornottheBrazilianNOC,onbehalfoftheCBDG,has the right to be allocated a quota placein theWomen’sBobEvent in theWinterOlympicGames. This is a dispute which is covered by thearbitrationclauseinArt.59oftheOlympicCharter.

Art. 59 of the Olympic Charter does not specifywhichDivisionwithinCASiscompetenttodealwiththematter.However,Art.1(1)oftheadhocRulesspecifiesasfollows:

“ThepurposeofthepresentRulesistoprovide,intheinterestsoftheathletesandofsport,fortheresolutionbyarbitrationofanydisputes coveredbyRule59oftheOlympicCharter,insofarastheyariseduringtheOlympicGamesorduringaperiodoftendaysprecedingtheOpeningCeremonyoftheOlympicGames”.

WhetherornottheadhocDivisioniscompetenttodecide thematter dependson thequestion atwhatpoint in time “a dispute arises“. This question hasbeen considered by a previous CAS panel, whichheld that a dispute arises when the appeal is filed(seeCASOG06/002marg.No.13seq).ThePanelconcurswiththisjurisprudence.Inthecaseathandtheappealwasfiledon8February2010and, thus,fallswithinthe10dayperiodprecedingtheOpeningCeremony,whichisscheduledfor12February2010.Consequently,thePanelfindsthatithasjurisdictionwith respect to the CBDG’s appeal of the FIBT’sallocationof26January2010fortheWomen’sBobEvent.

2. Deadlines and internal remedies

In the case at hand, the decision challenged is thedecisionbytheFIBTExecutiveCommitteedated26January 2010 allocating to variousNOCs places intheWomen’sBobEvent.ItisundisputedamongthePartiesthatprovisionsintheFIBTStatutes(Art.18)do not provide for an internal remedy against thistypeofdecisionoftheExecutiveCommittee.Thus,the requirements listed in Art. 1 (2) (exhaustionof internal remedies) of the ad hoc Rules are alsofulfilled.

3. Applicable law

UnderArt. 17of theCAS adhocRules, thePanelmustdecidethedispute“pursuanttotheOlympicCharter,the applicable regulations, general principles of law and therulesoflaw,theapplicationofwhichitdeemsappropriate”.

4. Scope of review and merits

Art. 16 of the ad hoc Rules describes the Panel’spowertoreviewthecaseathand.Theprovisionreadsasfollows:

“ThePanelshallhavefullpowertoestablishthefactsonwhichtheapplicationisbased”.

In the case at hand it is not entirely clear how tointerprettheCBDG’sapplication.Nospecificrequesthas been filed by the CBDG in their applicationfiled 8 February 2010. Counsel for the Applicantsubmittedat thehearing that theCBDGrequestedto be allocated a place in theWomen’s BobEventand,thus,thatitsapplicationisdirectedagainsttheFIBTdecisiondated26 January2010andaimedattheadditionalplaceallocatedfor theWomen’sBobEventbytheIOC.

The question arises, however, to what extent thisPanelisallowedtoreviewsaiddecisionbytheFIBT.InthePanel’sview,limitstothescopeofreviewmayderive from the nature of the decision in dispute.ThedecisionbytheFIBTdated26January2010toallocateplaces in theWomenBobEvent tocertainNOCs is a complex one. In essence, the allocationofacertainplaceintheOlympiccompetitionisnotbasedonasingledecision,butonawholeseriesofdecisionswhichbuiltoneuponanother.

Inafirststep,theFIBThastodecidewhichteamsareallowedtoenterorparticipateintheWorldCupandothercompetitionsforthepurposeofqualification.Inafurtherstep,pointshavetobeallocatedtothevarious athletes in the competitions according tothe nature of the competition and the competitionresults obtained by the athletes. Then, at the endof the qualification period, a ranking is compiledon thebasisof thecompetition results.Finally, theQualificationSystemhastobeappliedtotheFIBTranking as it stands at the end of the qualificationperiod.

It is disputed between the Parties whether whenappealingthelast(andfinal)stepofthequalificationprocess the Panel’s scope of review extends to allpreceding steps or decisions. It is the Panel’s viewthatthisisnotthecaseif–asinthepresentcase–thepreviousstagesofthequalificationprocesshavebecomebindingupon theParties.This is true– inparticular – when earlier steps in the qualificationprocessareseparatelyreviewableandhavenotbeenchallengedorappealed.ThePanelissupportedinthisviewbytheCASjurisprudence(TAS2008/A/1740,no.128etseq.).


ItisundisputedbetweenthePartiesthatthedecisionbytheExecutiveCommitteeoftheFIBTtoawardtotheIrishteamtheplaceintheWorldCuppreviouslyheld by the French teamwas appealable. It is alsoundisputedbetweenthePartiesthattheCBDGdidnotfile an appeal orotherwise seek to set asideorannulthedecisionbytheExecutiveCommitteeoftheFIBT.TheCBDGonlyfileda“request for interiminjunction”.AtnopointintimedidtheCBDGseekto set aside or void the decision of the ExecutiveCommitteeoftheFIBTtoreplacetheFrenchteamintheWorldCupbytheIrishteam.

In addition, the competent body to appeal thedecision of the FIBT to replace the French teamwith the Irish team in theWorldCup is, accordingtotheRespondent,theCourtofArbitration(CAS)inLausanne.TheRespondentsubmitsthatthisfollowsfromthewordinginArt.18.1.2oftheFIBTStatutes.InthePanel’sviewthisappearstobecorrect.

Art. 18.3.3 of the FIBT Statutes provides that thetimelimitforsubmittinganappealtotheCASfromadecisionoftheFIBTCourtofArbitrationis21daysafterreceiptofthedecisioninquestion.Art.R49oftheCodeofSports-relatedArbitrationprovidesthatthe time limit to appeal all other decisions to theCASis21daysafterreceiptoftherelevantdecision.TheCBDGacknowledged that itwas awareof thedecision to replace the French team by the Irishteam by 10December 2009 and requested furtherinformationfromtheFIBTinthisrespect.

The FIBT communicated to the CBDG itsdecision to admit the Irish team to theWorldCupon 16December 2009. At the hearing, the Partiesconfirmed that they tried to settle their disputeamicablyandhadnegotiationswhichextendeduntilearly January.On 8 January 2010, theCBDGfiledits request foran interim injunctionwith theFIBTCourtofArbitration.

TheCBDGdidnotfileanyappealatall.Instead,itfiledonlya request for interimreliefandonlywiththeFIBTCourtofArbitration.TheCBDGfileditsappealwiththeCASadhocDivisioninrespectofthe26January2010decision.

In the Panel’s view, the source and the gravamenof the dispute between the Parties is the FIBT’sdecision on 26November 2009 to admit the Irishwomen’sBobsleighteamtotheWorldCuptoreplacetheFrenchwomen’steam.Thiswasthekeydecisionwhichaffectedtherestofthecompetition,theentirequalification process and the allocation decision.Although the Panel has jurisdiction to review theFIBT’sallocationdecisionof26January2010,itfinds

thatthedecisiontrulyindisputebetweenthePartiesisthepreviousdecisionof26November2009.ItwasopentotheCBDGtoappealthatdecision,butitdidnot. In thesecircumstances, thePanelbelieves thatitsscopeofreviewdoesnotextendtothedecisionofthe FIBT’s Executive Committee of 26November2009andthatitwouldbeinappropriatetoreviewtheFIBT’sallocationdecisionof26January2010onthebasisofallegederrorsinthatfirstdecision.

Further,andinanyevent,thePanelfindsthat,onthemerits,thedecisionof26November2009waswithinthepoweroftheExecutiveCommitteeoftheFIBTandthatitwasneitherunreasonablenorarbitrarytoreplacethewithdrawingFrenchteamwiththenextrankedIrishteam.

ThePartiesagreedthatthere isnoprovisionintheInternationalRulesBobsleigh2008(the“Rules”)forreplacement of aWorld Cup team that withdraws.Whentherearenospecificprovisions intheRules,Art. 21.1 of theFIBT Statutes gives theExecutiveCommittee competence to take any decision notforeseen in the Statutes.This article, read togetherwithArt.12.2oftheRules,whichauthorizestheFIBTExecutive Committee to determine modificationsto theRules,gives theExecutiveCommitteebroadpowertointerpret,modifyandfillgapsintheRules.In fact, the FIBT had previously made decisionsregarding the replacement of a withdrawing teamfromtheWorldCupwithoutobjectionbyanyofitsmembers.Thus,boththeStatutesandpastpracticesupporttheconclusionthattheExecutiveCommitteehadthepowertodecidewhethertoreplaceand,ifso,whichteamshouldreplacetheFrenchteamwhenitwithdrewafterthecommencementoftheseason.

AlthoughthePartiesdisagreedastotheexactrankingoftheteamsasof26November2009,therewasnodoubt that theoverall sportingperformanceof theIrishteaminthe2008/2009seasonwasbetterthanthatoftheBrazilianteam.Attheconclusionofthe2008/2009season, theIrish teamwas ranked14th,immediatelybehindtheFrenchteam,whichwasthelast team admitted to theWorld Cup. In addition,whentheIrishandBrazilianteamscompetedatthesame events, the Irish team finished ahead of theBrazilianteam.Therefore,inthePanel’sview,itwasreasonableandappropriatefortheFIBTtoallocatetheFrenchteam’splaceintheWorldCuptotheIrishwomen’s team. On the basis of the evidence andargumentspresented,thereisnobasistodisturbthatdecision.

WithrespecttoCBDG’srequestthatthePaneldirecttheIOCtoofferanadditionalplaceintheWomen’sBobEvent, the Panel finds that thiswould not be


appropriate.Firstofall,thePanel’spowerislimitedtomakingarecommendationtotheIOC,whichshouldbeexercisedonlyinexceptionalcircumstances.ThePanelhasnoauthoritytodirectthattheIOCcreateanadditionalplaceinthecompetition.Furthermore,thecircumstancesinthiscasearedifferentfromthoseintheAOCv.FIBTcaseandthesameexpectationsdonotarise.

Accordingly, for the reasons set out above, theCBDG’sapplicationmustfail.


30menand20women.

TheApplicant’sclaimisbasedonthesimplefactthatas only 28 positions out of a possible 30 positionshavebeenfilled in theMen’s skeletoncompetition,theWomen’scompetitionshouldhaveitsnumberofpositionsincreasedto21positions.Ifthatoccurred,asMsPutnamisthenext(andonly)rankedeligiblecompetitor, the Applicant should fill the vacantposition.

The FIBT’s Qualification System for XXI WinterOlympic Games, Vancouver 2010, is set out in adocument (the “Qualification System”) establishedin collaborationby theFIBTand the InternationalOlympic Committee (IOC). It was issued inNovember2008.

The relevant parts of theQualification System forskeletonaresetoutasfollows:

“EVENTS

-Men’sSkeletonCompetition-Women’sSkeletonCompetition

ATHLETE/NOCQUOTA

ATHLETESQUOTA:50athletes

-30Menincludinghostnation-20Womenincludinghostnation...

QUALIFICATIONSYSTEM

GENERALPRINCIPLES

Participation on the Olympic Winter Games isguaranteedforthebestathletes.Representationofthehost country and non-represented continents is alsoguaranteed, provided that athletes are rankedamongthetop60menortop45womenintheFIBTRanking.…

SYSTEM IN DETAIL FOR WOMEN’SSKELETON

Arbitration CAS ad hoc division (OG Vancouver) 2010/003Virgin Islands Olympic Committee (VIOC) v. International Olympic Committee (IOC)12February2010

The Applicant is the Virgin Islands OlympicCommittee. The Respondent is the InternationalOlympicCommittee(IOC).

TheApplicant challenges the decision of the IOC,theRespondent,givenon3February2010,torefusetore-allocateamen’sskeletonquotapositiontotheApplicant to allow an additional women’s skeletoncompetitortoparticipateintheXXIOlympicWinterGames Vancouver 2010. On 27 January 2010 theApplicantformallypetitionedtheFIBTtoreallocatetheunusedmen’squotapositiontoitforthewomen’scompetition.TheApplicant’s petition reliedon theFIBT Qualification System for the XXI OlympicWinterGamesVancouver2010issuedinNovember2008andaprecedentestablishedattheXXOlympicWinterGamesTorino2006where amen’sunfilledquota position was transferred to a woman in thesportofluge.TheApplicant’spetitionwasforwardedbytheFIBTtotheIOC,who,byitsdeterminationdated 3 February 2010, refused the Applicant thereliefitsought.

The Qualification System for the XXI WinterOlympicGames,Vancouver2010issuedbytheFIBTfor skeleton refers to two events: Men’s skeletoncompetition and Women’s skeleton competition.There isa totalof50athletesspecified,comprising

Relevantfacts

Panel: Mr. David Grace QC (Australia), President Mr. Chi Liu (China)Mr. José-Juan Pintó (Spain)

Skeleton; Winter Olympic Games;reallocation of unused quota position;interpretation of the qualificationsystem


The participation in theOlympicWinterGames islimitedto:

-2NOCswith3athletes-4NOCswith2athletes-6NOCswith1athlete

Thechosenathletesmustberankedamongthetop45athletesofthe2009/10FIBTrankingofthe2009/10seasonduringthequalificationperiod.

REALLOCATIONOFUNUSEDQUOTAPOSITIONS

Placesearnedandnottakenuparereallocateduntilall30places(Men)or20places(Women)arefilled, inthefollowingorderofpriority:...”

On11February2010theApplicantfileditsapplicationwiththeCourtofArbitrationadhocDivision(CAS).

Thehearing tookplaceon12February2010at theCASHearing Room, 3rd Floor, RenaissanceHotel,WestHastingsStreet,Vancouver,BritishColombia,Canada.


1. Applicable law

These proceedings are governed by the CASArbitrationRulesfortheOlympicGames(the“CASadhocRules”)enactedbytheInternationalCouncilofArbitrationforSport(ICAS)on14October2003.TheyarefurthergovernedbyChapter12oftheSwissPrivateInternationalLawActof18December1987(“PILAct”).ThePILActappliestothisarbitrationasaresultofthelocationoftheseatoftheCASadhocDivision inLausanne,Switzerland,pursuant toart.7oftheCASadhocRules.

The jurisdictionof theCASadhocDivisionarisesoutofRule59oftheOlympicCharter.Furthermore,noneofthePartiesortheInterestedPartydisputedthe CAS jurisdiction in their submissions at thehearing.

Under art. 17 of the CAS ad hoc Rules, the Panelmustdecidethedispute“pursuanttotheOlympicCharter,the applicable regulations, general principles of law and therulesoflaw,theapplicationofwhichitdeemsappropriate”.

According to art. 16of theCASadhocRules, thePanel has “full power to establish the facts on which theapplicationisbased”.

2. Merits

ThePanelhascarefullyconsidered thesubmissionsofthepartiesandthedocumentssubmittedbythem.The Qualification System is a legal document. Itcontainstheprovisionsconcerningtherequirementsthat must be fulfilled in order to allow athletesto compete at the XXI Winter Olympic Games,Vancouver2010.Generalrulesofinterpretationmustbeapplied.Theordinarymeaningofthewordsusedmustbeconsidered inthecontextofthedocumentunderconsideration,thedocumentbeingconsideredasawhole.

TheprincipalquestiontobedeterminediswhethertheQualificationSystem allows the transfer of anyunused quota positions in the Men’s Competitionto the Women’s competition. The words of thedocumentmustbegiventheclosestscrutiny.

The starting point is the fact that there are twocompetitions in skeleton,men’s andwomen’s. Thiswasacceptedbyallparties.Furthermore,althoughthedocumentspecifiesanathlete’squotaof50athletes,this provision is clearly qualified in the document.Firstly, the quota of 50 athletes is divided into 30menand20women.Secondly,whendescribingthequalification system in detail for either men’s orwomen’sskeleton,clearwordswereusedlimitingthenumberofathletesinrelationtoWomen’sskeleton:“Theparticipation in theWinterOlympicGames is limitedto”(seeabove).

Thisprovisionclearlyindicatesbysimplecalculationthatthelimitofathletesforwomen’sskeletonis20,providedthateachofthoseathletesisrankedamongthetop45athletes in the2009/2010FIBTrankinglist.

The reallocation provisions, in our opinion, clearlydifferentiates between the men’s and women’scompetitions. Thewords used “places earned and nottakenuparereallocateduntilall30places(Men)or20places(women)arefilled…”clearly indicatethattherecanbeno transfer of unallocated quota positions in oneevent to another. If that hadbeen the intentionofthe Respondent, the provision would have read asfollows:“placesearnedandnottakenuparereallocateduntilall50placesarefilled”.

The Panel is of the opinion that theQualificationSystem introduced for the XXI Olympic WinterGames,Vancouver2010revealstheclearintentionthateachquotafortheMen’sandWomen’scompetitionsbe filled separately and that the quotas cannot bebundled together. The Applicant’s submissionthat therewas no express provision preventing the


transferoftheunusedquotasfromMen’stoWomen’scompetitiondoesnotaffectourconclusion.OurroleistointerprettheQualificationSystemdocumentandinouropiniontheinterpretationisclear,asexplainedabove.

There is no basis upon which reliance can bemaintained on the suggested “precedent” thatoccurredattheXXWinterOlympicGames,Torino2006, in the sport of luge. Firstly, the rules underconsideration for those Games were different tothoseconsideredby thisPanel.Secondly, thePanelcannotlegislateonbehalfoftheRespondent.

There is force in theRespondent’s submission thatthequalificationsystemoughtnotbeinterpretedinawaythatpermitsarbitrarytransferofunusedquotapositionsfromonecompetitiontoanother.

It was within the province and jurisdiction ofthe Respondent to accede to the request of theApplicant communicated through FIBT to amendtheQualificationSystemtoallowforthetransferofunusedquotapositionsfromtheMen’scompetitiontotheWomen’scompetition.Itdeclinedtodosoaswasitsentitlement.


“to allow the participation of theApplicant inthosecompetitionsmentionedabove”.

In order to understand the context in which thepresentApplicationhasbeenfiled,itisessentialforthePaneltosetoutthefollowingrelevantfacts:

- On5March2009,theSecondInterestedParty,the ISU, filed a Statement of Complaint withthe ISUDisciplinaryCommission accusing theApplicantofhavingusedaprohibitedsubstanceand/or a prohibited method which constitutedananti-dopingruleviolationunderArticle2.2oftheISUAnti-DopingRules.

- On 1 July 2009, following a hearing, the ISUDisciplinary Commission issued a decisionruling,inpart,asfollows:

“1. Claudia Pechstein is declared responsible for an

Anti-Doping violation under Article 2.2 of theISUADRbyusingtheprohibitedmethodofblooddoping.

2. The results obtained by Claudia Pechstein in the500m and 3000m races at theWorld AllroundSpeed Skating Championships on February 7,2009,aredisqualifiedandherpoints,pri[z ]esandmedalsforfeited.

3. Atwoyears’ineligibility,beginningonFebruary9,2009,isimposedonClaudiaPechstein.”

- On 21 July 2009, the Applicant and the FirstInterestedParty,theDESG,filedwiththeCourtofArbitrationforSport(CAS)anappealagainstthedecisionoftheISUDisciplinaryCommission.

- On25November2009,followingahearing,theCASdismissedtheappeals.

TheApplicant,on7December2009,filedanappeal(“recours”)with theSwissFederalTribunal againsttheCASAwardof25November2009.

On 10 February 2010, the Swiss Federal TribunaldismissedtheappealoftheApplicant.The Panel notes that, as one of the consequencesof that decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, the

Arbitration CAS ad hoc division (OG Vancouver) 2010/004Claudia Pechstein v. Deutscher Olympischer Sportbund (DOSB) & International Olympic Committee (IOC) 18February2010

TheApplicant,MsClaudiaPechstein, is aGermanspeedskaterwhohasbelongedtotheWorldEliteofspeedskatingsince1988.

TheFirstRespondentistheDeutscherOlympischerSportbund(DOSB), theGermanNationalOlympicCommittee.

TheSecondRespondentistheInternationalOlympicCommittee(IOC).

The First Interested Party is the DeutscheEisschnelllauf-Gemeinschaft e.V. (DESG), theGermanSpeedSkatingAssociation.

The Second Interested Party is the InternationalSkatingUnion(ISU).

The Applicant, in her Application of 15 February2010,requeststheDOSB,thefirstRespondent:

“tonominatetheApplicantfortheparticipationin the competitions of the female speed skatersduringtheOlympicWinterGamesinVancouver2010”.

andtheIOC,theSecondRespondent:

Relevantfacts

Panel: Mr. Yves Fortier QC (Canada), President Mr. Olivier Carrard (Switzerland)Mr. José-Juan Pintó (Spain)

Skating;WinterOlympicGames; CASjurisdiction


Applicant, to the present day, remains ineligible tocompeteinanyspeedskatingcompetition.

On 12 February 2010, the Applicant wrote to theFirstRespondent,theDOSB.TheApplicantalledgedthat, “after the CAS hearing” she had obtained “newmedical evidence”.Sheconcludedasfollows:“IdemandtheDOSGtomakesurethatI’mallowedbytheDOSBandthe IOC to participate in the Olympic Team race in speedskatingon26and27February2010inVancouver.IexpectyourconfirmationofmynominationandmyrighttostartuntilMonday,15February2010,12hCET”.

TherewasnoreplyfromtheDOSBby12hCETon15February2010.InherApplicationof15February2010 (see above), the Applicant asserts that sincetherehadbeennoreplyfromtheDOSB“within thetimelimit,itmustbeassumedthattheRespondent(DOSB)willdenytheApplicant’sdemandfornominationatthecurrentOlympicGames”.

The Applicant also argues in her Application thatthe Panel is not bound by the CAS Award of 25November 20009 since “the proceedings were filed onlyagainsttheISUandtheRespondents,theDOSBandIOC,werenotinvolvedatall.Thus,theadhocpanelwillactasfirstinstance”.

Finally, the Applicant avers that the jurisdictionof theCAS follows from the fact that the conflictconcernedhappened“inthepreparation for theOlympicWinterGames”.

TheFirstRespondent,DOSB,on17February2010,filed its Answer to theApplication requesting thattheApplicationberejected.

TheSecondRespondent,theIOC,alsosubmitteditsAnsweron17Februar.

At 16:24 on 17 February 2010, the Applicant filed“additional explanations”. She represented, in part,asfollows:

“1. The decision which is appealed is not theCAS award of 25November 2009, but thedecisionofDOSBof29January2010,nottonominatetheApplicantfortheOlympicWinterGames, although the Deutsche Eisschnelllauf- Gemeinschaft (DESG) had proposed hernominationtoDOSBon15.12.2009.

TheDOSBhadalreadytakenanotherdecisionon 22 January 2010 not to nominate theApplicant.Suchadecisioncanbeappealedbythe athlete whowas not nominated (seeCASOG10/02).

I emphasize that the Respondents IOC andDOSB accept the jurisdiction of CAS.[EmphasisaddedbythePanel]

2. Theapplicationwasfiledon15January2010,that means after the opening ceremony of theWinterGames.Thisistherelevantdatewhenthe dispute arose (CAS OG 06/002 andCASOG10/02).

…”

At 19.30 on 17 February 2010, the Applicantsubmitted additional remarks. In the view of thePanel,theseremarksfromtheApplicantbecauseoftheirimportancetoitsdecisionshouldbereproducedinfull.Shewrote:

“The applicant appeals all the decisions ofDOSBconcerningthenominationofathletestoIOC,mentionedearlier.[EmphasisaddedbythePanel]

TheApplicant agrees on the conclusion of anagreement about the jurisdiction of CAS,in case the CAS should not have jurisdictionprovidedforinthestatutesandregulationsoftheRespondents”.


The Panel’s analysis must commence, and in thepresent instance end, with Article 1 of the CASArbitrationRules for theOlympicGames (the “adhocRules”)which is abundantly clear. It provides,inpart,thatthedisputetoberesolvedbyarbitrationmust arise during theOlympicGames or during aperiodoftendaysprecedingtheOpeningCeremonyof the Olympic Games and must be against “adecisionpronouncedbytheIOC,andNOC,anInternationalFederation or an Organizing Committee for the OlympicGames”.[EmphasisaddedbythePanel]

Quite logically,Article10oftheCASadhocRulesthenstipulates thatany individualwishing tobringbeforetheadhocDivisionoftheCAS“adisputewithinthemeaningofArticle1ofthepresentRulesshallfileawrittenapplicationwiththeCourtOffice”andthattheapplicationshallinclude:

- a copy of the decision being challenged …[EmphasisaddedbythePanel]

Inthepresentcase,asseenabove,thefilerevealsonekeydecisionwhichisbindingontheApplicant.ThatistheAwardoftheCASPanelof25November2009whichupheldtheearlierdecisionoftheDisciplinaryCommissionoftheISUanddeclaredtheApplicant,


Ms Claudia Pechstein, “ineligible for two years as of8February 2009” towit until 7February 2011.Theeffectoftherulingon10February2010oftheSwissFederalTribunalisthattheApplicantisineligibletoparticipate in the XXI Olympic Winter Games inVancouver.

ThePanelnotesthattheApplicantadmitsthat it isnotappealingtheCASawardof25November2009.Indeed,itcouldnotdoso.

InherApplication,theApplicant,seekingtoidentifya“decision”whichshecouldappealstatedthatsincetheDSOBdidnot“nominateherasanathleteparticipatinginthecurrentWinterGamesafterhavingnotedthejudgmentoftheSwissFederalCourt(sic) from10February2010”itmustbeassumedthattheRespondent(DOSB)shalldenytheApplicant’sdemandfornominationat thecurrent Olympic Games. [Emphasis added by thePanel]

In the Panel’s view, such an assumption by theApplicant cannot, on any reading, rise to the levelofa“decision”whichmaybeappealedtotheadhocDivision.ThePanelrecallsagainthattheApplicantwasthenandremainstodayineligibletocompeteinthepresentOlympicGames.

Whenaskedby thePanel to identifywithprecisionthe“decision”whichshewasappealing,theApplicantthen stated that it was “the decision of DOSB of 29January 2010, not to nominate her for theOlympicWinterGamesalthoughtheDESGhadproposedhernominationtoDOSBon15December2009”.

ThePanel has reviewed the letter of theDESG tothe DOSB of 15 December 2009. Simply put, thePanelfindsthatthisletter,contrarytotheApplicant’sassertion, is not a proposal byDESG to nominateher.Inthatletter,DESGstatesveryclearly:“ClaudiaPechsteinNominierungu.a.abhängigv.EntscheidSchweizerBundesgericht” which can be translated roughly as“NominationdependinginteraliaonthedecisionoftheSwissFederalTribunal”.Asnotedabove,on10February2010,the Swiss Federal Tribunal rejected theApplicant’sappeal.

ItfollowsthatwhattheApplicantcharacterizesas“adecisionoftheDOSBnottonominateher”cannot,onanyreading,beequatedwithadecisionwhichcanformthebasisofanappealbeforetheadhocDivision.

Finally,inwhatthePanelcanonlylabelasadesperateattempt by the Applicant to convince the Panelto hear her case, she submitted that she “appealsall the decisions of DOSB concerning the nomination ofathletes to IOC mentioned earlier”. [Emphasis added]

Out of deference to theApplicant and her lawyer,the Panel will refrain from stating more than thefollowing at this point: the Applicant has notidentifiedanyspecificdecisionbytheIOC,anNOC,and International Federation or an OrganisingCommitteefortheOlympicGameswhichhasarisenduring theVancouverOlympicGames or during aperiodoftendaysprecedingtheOpeningCeremonyoftheGameson12February2010whichcouldbethesubjectofanappealtotheadhocDivision.ThePanelhas,onitsown,searchedtherecordandfoundnosuchdecision.

Therefore,thePanelfindsthatitlacksjurisdictiontohearthepresentmatteranditsorules.

Before closing and in order to determine anotherpreliminaryissuewhichisbeforethePanel,thePaneladds that even if, ex hypothesis, it had jurisdictionto hear the Applicant’s appeal, it does not havethe authority to lift her binding ineligibility andthus allow her to participate in the presentWinterGames. If the Applicant was minded to requestthesuspensionofher ineligibility,shemustaddressherself toacompetent tribunalwhich isnot theadhocDivisionoftheCourtofArbitrationforSport.

145-Jugements du Tribunal Fédéral / Judgment of the Federal Tribunal

* Translation (Original: German)

Facts

Parties

Subject Matter

Composition

Internationalarbitrationcourt,

Appeal(Beschwerde)againstthearbitraldecisionbytheCourtofArbitrationforSport(CAS)of11thSeptember2008.

versus

FédérationInternationaledeFootballAssociation(FIFA),Respondent,representedbytheattorney-at-lawChristianJenny&WorldAnti-DopingAgency(WADA),Respondent,representedbytheattorneys-at-lawFrancoisKaiserandClaudeRamoni.

A.________,Appellant,representedbytheattorneys-at-lawDr.HansjörgStutzerandArlettePfister,

FederalTribunalJudgeKlett,PresidentFederalTribunalJudgeCorbozFederalTribunalJudgeKissCourtReporter:MrWidmer

4A_460/2008*

Judgment of 9 January 2009 1stCivilDivision

A.A._______(Appellant),whoisdomiciledinRiodeJaneiro,Brazil, is a professional football player andis a member of the Brazilian football association(ConfederaçàoBrasileiradeFutebol;CBF).In2007he played for the club B.______ and in 2008 heplayedfortheclubC._______.Hetookpartintheinternationalclubcompetition“CopaLibertadoresdeAmérica”severaltimes.HeplayedfortheBraziliannationalteamfivetimes.

The Fédération Internationale de FootballAssociation (FIFA, First Respondent) is the worldorganisation for football and has its registeredoffice (seat) inZurich. Its objectives are to controlfootball globally through the national footballassociations affiliated to it. For this purpose it laysdown rules and provisions and ensures that theyareenforced.

The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA; SecondRespondent)isafoundationunderSwisslaw.IthasitsheadquartersinMontreal,Canada.Theobjectofthe Second Respondent is the global fight againstdopinginsportinallofitsforms.

TheAppellantunderwentadopingcontrolon14thJune 2007 at a match between B._______ andD._______. This resulted in a positive dopingfinding.

The Superior Tribunal de Justiça Desportivado Futebol (STJD) provisionally suspended theAppellanton9thJuly2007for30days.

On24thJuly2007theDisciplinaryCommissionoftheCBF imposed a suspensionof 120days on theAppellant.

The Appellant appealed against this to the STJD,which set aside the decision by the DisciplinaryCommission on 2nd August 2007. It followed


the Appellant’s argument that he had been theinnocentvictimofcontaminationandhadnotactednegligently. It therefore terminated the Appellant’sprovisionalsuspension.

B.Both Respondents filed an appeal against thedecisionbytheSTJDwiththeCourtofArbitrationfor Sport (CAS) on 6th and 11th September 2007respectivelyanddemandedatwo-yearsuspensionoftheAppellant.

TheCAScomprisedthearbitratorsappointedbytheparties,PeterLeaverandJoséJuanPintó,andProf.MassimoCocciaastheChairman.

By letter of 6th December 2007 the parties wereadvisedthattheCASconsideredithadjurisdictiontodecidetheappealandthatthereasonsforthiswouldbedeliveredinthefinaldecision.

Byarbitraldecisionof11thSeptember2008theCASaffirmedthatithadjurisdictiontodecidetheappealsbytheRespondentstotheextentthattheywereaimedagainsttheCBFandtheAppellant.InaffirmingtheappealsitsetasidethedecisionbytheSTJDof2ndAugust2007andsuspendedtheAppellantfrom6thDecember2007until7thNovember2009.

C.With an appeal in civil matters, the Appellant isrequesting that the arbitral decisionby theCASof11thSeptember2008besetasideinfullandthatitbedeclaredthattheCASdoesnothavejurisdictiontohearthismatter.

TheRespondents are requesting that the appealbedismissed.TheCASreferstoitsarbitraldecisionof11thSeptember2008.

Considerations

1.Theappeal(Beschwerde)wassuper-provisionallygivensuspensiveeffect.SaidorderceasestoapplyandtheAppellant’sapplicationthattheappeal(Beschwerde)begiven suspensive effect is disposed of with today’sdecisiononthemerits.

2.Thearbitralawardbeingappealedagainsthasbeenworded in English. In the proceedings before theSwiss Federal Tribunal (Bundesgericht) the AppellantisusingtheGermanlanguageandtheRespondentsareusingGermanandFrenchrespectively.Sincethelanguage of the decision being appealed against isnotanofficial language, the judgmentby theSwiss

Federal Tribunal shall, in accordance with generalpractice,be rendered in the languageof the appeal(Beschwerde) (cf.Art. 54(1)FederalActon the SwissFederalTribunal(BGG)).

3.An appeal (Beschwerde) in civil matters againstdecisions by arbitration courts is admissible undertheconditionsofArt.190-192Switzerland’sFederalCodeonPrivateInternationalLaw(IPRG)(Art.77(1)FederalActontheSwissFederalTribunal(BGG)).

UnderArt. 77(3) FederalAct on the Swiss FederalTribunal (BGG) the Swiss Federal Tribunal willonly reviewcomplaints,whichwere lodgedandforwhichreasonsweregiven in theappeal (Beschwerde).The strict requirements that have to be met bythe reasons, which the Swiss Federal Tribunal(Bundesgericht) required under the rule ofArt. 90(1)(b) Swiss Federal Statute on the Organisation oftheJudiciary(OG)(cf.BGE[DecisionsoftheSwissFederalTribunal]128III50E.1cp.53)stillapplyin that connection because the Federal Act on theSwissFederalTribunal(BGG)didnotwishtomakeanychanges in that regard (BGE[Decisionsof theSwissFederalTribunal]134III186E.5).

In the present case the arbitration court has itsregisteredoffice(seat)inLausanne.TheAppellantandthe SecondRespondent donothave their domicileorregisteredoffice(seat)respectivelyinSwitzerland.SincethepartieshavenotexcludedtheapplicationoftheprovisionsofChapter12ofSwitzerland’sFederalCodeonPrivateInternationalLaw(IPRG)inwriting,saidprovisionsapply(Art.176(1)and(2)Switzerland’sFederalCodeonPrivateInternationalLaw(IPRG).

4.The appeal (Beschwerde) against independentlyinstituted preliminary and interim decisions onjurisdiction is admissible. Suchdecisions cannotbeappealedagainstlateranymore(Art.92FederalActontheSwissFederalTribunal(BGG)).

The letterbytheCAS’sSecretaryof6thDecember2007,wherebythepartieswereadvisedthattheCASconsideredithadjurisdictiontodecidethecaseandthat the reasons for thiswould be delivered in thefinaldecision, cannotbeconsidered tobe a formaldecision on jurisdiction. Rather, this is to be seenmuchmoreasguidancetothepartiesthattheCASwantedtotakeupthecase.ItcannotthereforebeheldagainsttheAppellantthatheshouldhavedemandedthe reasons following the letter of 6th December2007andthatintheabsenceofanysuchactionhisappeal against the affirmation of the jurisdictionwas excluded. The only deciding factor for the


admissibilityof theappeal (Beschwerde) is that in thepresentcasetheCASdidnotdecideonitsjurisdictioninaseparatelyinstitutedpreliminarydecisionwithinthe meaning of Art. 186(3) Switzerland’s FederalCode on Private International Law (IPRG), ratheritdealtwiththequestionofjurisdictioninthefinaldecision.Accordinglytheappealmustbeheard.

5.BasedonArt.190(2)(b)Switzerland’sFederalCodeonPrivateInternationalLaw(IPRG)theAppellantisdisputingtheCAS’sjurisdiction.

5.1 TheSwissFederalTribunal(Bundesgericht)isfreeto review the legal aspects of the complaintabout jurisdiction in accordance with Art.190(2)(b)Switzerland’sFederalCodeonPrivateInternationalLaw(IPRG),includingpreliminaryquestions of substantive law, upon whichjurisdictiondepends.However,theSwissFederalTribunal (Bundesgericht) reviews factualfindingsmade in the arbitral decision being appealedagainst, including the findings in connectionwiththecomplaintaboutjurisdiction,onlyifthecomplaints lodgedagainstsaidfactualfindingsare admissible complaints within themeaningof Art. 190(2) Switzerland’s Federal Code onPrivate International Law (IPRG) or if, as anexception,newfactsorevidencearetakenintoaccount (BGE[Decisionsof theSwissFederalTribunal]134III565E.3.1;133III139E.5p.141;129III727E.5.2.2withnotes).

5.2 TheCASaffirmed its jurisdictiongivingas itsreasonthattheCBFwasamemberofFIFAandwasthereforeboundbyitsstatutes.AccordinglyArt.1(2)andArt.5oftheCBFStatutesstatedthatthestatutes,rules,guidelines,decisionsandthe ethical rulesofFIFAhad tobe respected.AsaprofessionalfootballertheAppellantwasamemberof theBrazilianFootballAssociation.Hewasthereforesubject to its rules,whichhefurthermore acknowledged in his employmentcontract of 16th January 2007, thereby alsoacknowledging the rulesofFIFA.Pursuant toArt.61oftheFIFAStatutes,FIFAandWADAareentitledtoappealtotheCASagainstfinal(last-instance)doping-relateddecisionsbymembers.TheCAS thereby came to the conclusion thattheSTJD-eventhoughitisindependentwhendispensing justice - is an organ of the CBF,which iswhyFIFAandWADAareentitledtoappealagainstitsdecisions.

5.3 Ontheotherhand,theAppellant takestheviewthat thepresent case concernspurelynational,Brazilian facts without any international

connecting factor.TheSTJD is, he argues, anindependent,Braziliansportscourt,whichhaddecidedthismatteratfinalinstance.Itsdecisionwas not a decision by the CBF, which is whyneitherFIFAnorWADAwasentitledtoappealto theCAS against the decision.CASdid nothave jurisdictionbasedonR47oftheCodedel’arbitrage enmatière de sport (CAS Code) todecideanappealagainstthesame.TherequisitestatutorybasisintheCBF’sstatuteswasmissingforthis.

6.6.1 R47CASCodereads:

“Unappelcontreunedécisiond’unefédération,associationouautreorganismesportifpeutêtredéposéauTASsilesstatutsourèglementsduditorganismesportifleprévoientou si les parties ont conclu une convention d’arbitrageparticulièreetdanslamesureaussioùl’appelantaépuiséles voiesdedroitpréalablesà l’appeldont ildispose envertudesstatutsourèglementsduditorganismesportif”.

Intranslation:

“An appeal against the decision of a federation,associationor sports-relatedbodymaybefiledwith theCAS insofar as the statutes or regulations of the saidbodysoprovideorasthepartieshaveconcludedaspecificarbitrationagreementandinsofarastheAppellanthasexhaustedthelegalremediesavailabletohimpriortotheappeal, inaccordancewiththestatutesorregulationsofthesaidsports-relatedbody”.

Art. 61(1) of the FIFA Statutes (2007 edition)provides:

“AppealsagainstfinaldecisionspassedbyFIFA’slegalbodies,andagainstdecisionsbyConfederations,MembersorLeaguesshallbelodgedwithCASwithin21daysofnotificationofthedecisioninquestion”.

Pursuant to Art. 61 (5) and (6) of the FIFAStatutes,FIFAandWADAareentitledtoappealtotheCASagainstinternallyfinalandbindingdoping-relateddecisions.

6.2 SaidFIFArulesarebindingon theAppellant.As a professional footballer, who is playedinternationally,heisamemberoftheBrazilianfootball association CBF, which in turn is amember of FIFA. Consequently FIFA’s rules,particularlythejurisdictionoftheCASpursuanttoArt.61oftheFIFAStatutes,alsoapplytotheAppellant.TheCASadjudgedthiscorrectly.


The Appellant is of the opinion that theconditionofR47oftheCASCode,wherebyanappealagainstadecisionbyafederationcanbelodgedwith theCAS,“si les statuts ou règlementsdudit organisme sportif le prevoient” (“insofar asthe statutesor regulationsof the saidbody soprovide”)wasnotmetbecausetherulesoftheBrazilian association did not provide for anysuchappealtotheCAS.

Thiscannotbeagreedwith.Art.1(2)ofCBF’sStatutes provide, inter alia, that the athletes,who are members of the CBF, must complywithFIFA’sregulations.ThisglobalreferencetoFIFA’s regulations, and thereby to FIFA’s andWADA’srighttoappealtotheCASprovidedforinFIFA’sStatutes,issufficienttojustifyCAS’sjurisdictioninthelightofR47oftheCASCode;thisisinlinewiththecaselaw,whichconsidersa global reference to an arbitration clausecontained in the statutes of an association tobevalid(judgment4P.253/2003of25thMarch2004E.5.4,ASA-Bull.2005pp.128etseq.,136,and 4P.230/2000 of 7th February 2001E. 2a,ASA-Bull.2001pp.523 et seq.,528 et seq.,eachwithnotes;cf.alsoBGE[DecisionsoftheSwissFederalTribunal]133III235E.4.3.2.3p.245and129III727E.5.3.1p.735,eachwithnotes).

6.3 TheAppellantfurtherclaimsthat theSTJDisanindependentsportscourt.Itsdecisionsmusttherefore not be considered to be appealabledecisions of amemberwithin themeaning ofArt.61oftheFIFAStatutes.

These arguments already fail because theSwissFederalTribunal isboundbythefactualfindings in the previous instance (Art. 105(1)Federal Act on the Swiss Federal Tribunal(BGG), consideration 5.1 above). Appraisinga letter by the President of the STJD of 13thSeptember2007–inwhichthePresidentstated,“it(theSTJD)isjustoneofthebodiesoftheCBF…”–theCAScametothefactualconclusionthattheSTJDwasanorganofCBF.TheAppellanthasnot raised any complaintswithin themeaningof Art. 190(2) Switzerland’s Federal Code onPrivate International Law (IPRG) about thisfactualfinding.TheSwissFederalTribunalmustthereforepresumethattheSTJDisanorganofCBF,whichiswhytheCAScorrectlyconsideredthedecisionbytheSTJDtobethedecisionofamemberofFIFAwithinthemeaningofArt.61of theFIFAStatutes.This isnotalteredbythefactthattheSTJDactsindependentlywhendispensing justice and enjoys organisationalindependence. The fact that the STJD is anorgan of CBF and is institutionalised by its

statutesremainsthedecisivefactor.

6.4 TheAppellant’scomplaint that theCASoughtnot to have affirmed that it had jurisdictionto decide the appeals by FIFA turns out tobe unfounded. The appealmust therefore bedismissed.

7.InaccordancewiththeoutcomeoftheproceedingstheAppellantisorderedtopaycostsandcompensation(Art.66(1)andArt.68(2)FederalActon theSwissFederalTribunal(BGG)).

Accordingly, the Swiss Federal Tribunal (Bundesgericht) holds that:

1.Theappealisdismissed.

2.TheAppellantisorderedtopaythecourtfeesofFr.5,000.

3.TheAppellantmustcompensatetheRespondentsforthe proceedings before the Swiss Federal Tribunal(Bundesgericht)withFr.6,000each.

4.Theparties and theCourtofArbitration forSport(CAS)shallbenotifiedofthisjudgmentinwriting.

Lausanne,9January2009

In the name of the 1stCivilDivision of the SwissFederalTribunal(SchweizerischesBundesgericht)

ThePresident: TheCourtReporter:Klett Widmer


Facts

* Translation (Original: German)

A.A.a As the national field hockey federation of

B._______, X.________ (Appellant), whichhas its registeredoffice (seat) inA.________,is a member of the world hockey federation,Fédération Internationale de Hockey (FIH;Respondent), a federation under Swiss law,whichhasitsregisteredoffice(seat)inLausanne.

A.bFrom12thuntil20thApril2008aqualificationtournament was held in A._______, thewinnersofwhichwouldqualifyfortheSummerOlympic Games in Beijing. On 20th April2008 the Spanish national women’s team andtheRespondent’s teamfacedeachotheras thefinalistsofsaidtournament.TheSpanishteamwonthefinalwith3goalsto2.

During the tournament doping tests werecarriedout.On21stMay2008theRespondent

notified that the A samples of two of theSpanish team’splayershad testedpositive.On4th June 2008 the Respondent reported thattheBsamplesconfirmedtheAsamples.Atthesametimeitwascommunicatedthattheplayersconcernedhaddemandedahearingbefore theRespondent’sinternalJudicialCommission.

However,thehearingconcernednotonlythetwoplayers;ratheritmightaffecttheentireSpanishteambecauseArt.11.1oftheRespondent’sAnti-DopingPolicyprovidedthefollowing:

“ifmorethanoneteammemberinaTeamSportisfoundtohavecommittedanAnti-DopingRuleviolationduringtheEvent,theteammaybesubjecttoDisqualificationorotherdisciplinaryaction.”

The Respondent moved that the JudicialCommission find the two players guilty of adoping abuse and that as a consequence theSpanishteambedisqualified.

Composition

Subject Matter

Parties X.______Appellant,representedbytheattorneys-at-law(Rechtsanwälte)DrPhilippHabeggerandFabianMeier,

FédérationInternationaledeHockey(FIH),Respondent,representedbyMaîtreClaudeRamoni,attorney-at-law.

Internationalarbitrationcourt;publicpolicy(“ordrepublic” );jurisdiction

Appeal(Beschwerde)againstthedecisionsbytheCourtofArbitrationforSport(CAS),adhocDivision,of2ndAugustand8thAugust2008.

versus

FederalTribunalJudgeKlett,PresidentFederalTribunalJudgeCorbozFederalTribunalJudgeRottenbergLiatowitschCourtReporter:MrLeemann

4A_424/2008*

Judgment of 22 January 2009 1stCivilDivision


Thereupon the Judicial Commission held thatone of the Spanish players had violated theanti-dopingrules.However,becausetheplayerwas not at fault no sanction was imposed.With regard to the second player the JudicialCommission decided that no anti-doping rulehadbeenviolated.

B.TheAppellant togetherwith its team’s players andthe National Olympic Committee of B._______lodgedanappealagainstthisdecisionbytheJudicialCommissionwiththeCourtofArbitrationforSport(CAS)on31stJuly2008,themainmotionsofwhichwerethatthedecisionbytheJudicialCommissionbesetaside,thetwoSpanishplayersbefoundguiltyofadopingabuse,theSpanishteambedisqualified,theB._______ team be considered the winner of thetournament,whichshouldreplacetheSpanishteamattheOlympicGames.TheadhocDivisionoftheCASdismissedtheprayersbyarbitralawardof2ndAugust2008for“wantofstanding”onthepartoftheAppellantandtheotherpartiestoappealagainstthedecisionbytheJudicialCommission.

After the same parties had unsuccessfully tried topursue another arbitration case they arrived at thead hocDivision of theCAS for a third time,withessentiallythesameprayersashadalreadybeenfiledin thefirst proceedings.Bydecisionof 8thAugust2008theadhocDivisionoftheCASagaindismissedthearbitralaction.

C.With an appeal (Beschwerde) in civil matters theAppellant is requesting the Swiss Federal Tribunal(Bundesgericht)toquashthetwoarbitralawardsbytheCASof2ndAugust2008andof8thAugust2008.

The Respondent is requesting that the appeal(Beschwerde)bedismissedtotheextentthatitcanbeheard.TheCAShaswaivedtherighttocomment.

D.The Respondent’s request that any damages thatmaybe awarded to apartybe securedwasgrantedand the Appellant was asked to transfer Fr. 7,000tothecashier’sofficeoftheSwissFederalTribunal(Bundesgericht) by order of the President of 12thNovember2008.

Considerations

1.Pursuant to Art. 54(1) Federal Act on the SwissFederal Tribunal (BGG) the decision by the SwissFederalTribunal (Bundesgericht) is tobedelivered in

anofficiallanguage,usuallythatofthedecisionbeingappealedagainst.Ifsaiddecisionhasbeendrawnupinanotherlanguage,theSwissFederalTribunalusestheofficiallanguageusedbytheparties.

Thedecisionbeingappealedagainsthasbeendrawnup inEnglish.Sincethis isnotanofficial languageand the parties use different languages before theSwiss Federal Tribunal, the decision by the SwissFederal Tribunal shall, in accordance with generalpractice,berenderedinthelanguageoftheappeal.

2.In thefieldof international arbitral jurisdiction, anappeal(Beschwerde)incivilmattersisadmissibleundertheconditionsofArt.190-192Switzerland’sFederalCodeonPrivateInternationalLaw(IPRG)(Art.77(1)FederalActontheSwissFederalTribunal(BGG)).

2.1 Inthepresentcasethearbitrationcourthasitsregisteredoffice(seat)inLausanne.Atleastoneoftheparties,inthepresentcasetheAppellant,does not have its registered office (seat) inSwitzerland.Sincethepartieshavenotexcludedthe application of the provisions of Chapter12 of Switzerland’s Federal Code on PrivateInternational Law (IPRG) in writing, saidprovisionsapply(Art.176(1)and(2)Switzerland’sFederal Code on Private International Law(IPRG).

2.2 The only complaints that are admissible, arethose that are exhaustively set out in Art.190(2) Switzerland’s Federal Code on PrivateInternational Law (IPRG) (BGE [Decisionsof the Swiss Federal Tribunal] 134 III 186 E.5;128III50E.1ap.53;127III279E.1ap.282). Pursuant to Art. 77(3) Federal Act onthe Swiss Federal Tribunal (BGG) the SwissFederal Tribunal only reviews the complaintsthat have been pleaded and substantiated inthe appeal; this complies with the obligationwherebyacomplaintconcerningtheviolationoffundamental rights and of cantonal and inter-cantonal lawmust be pleaded as stipulated inArt. 106(2) Federal Act on the Swiss FederalTribunal (BGG) (BGE[Decisionsof theSwissFederalTribunal]134III186E.5withanote).In the case of complaints under Art. 190(2)(e) Switzerland’s Federal Code on PrivateInternationalLaw(IPRG)theincompatibilityofthe arbitral awardbeing appealed againstwithpublic policy (“ordre public”)must be shown indetail (BGE [Decisions of the Swiss FederalTribunal] 117 II 604E. 3p. 606).Appellatorycriticismisinadmissible(BGE[DecisionsoftheSwissFederalTribunal]119II380E.3bp.382).


2.3 The Swiss Federal Tribunal will base itsjudgment on the facts established by thearbitrationcourt(Art.105(1)FederalActontheSwiss Federal Tribunal (BGG)). It can neithercorrectnor add to the facts establishedby thearbitration court even if said established factswereobviouslyincorrectorbasedonaviolationofthelawwithinthemeaningofArt.95FederalAct on the Swiss Federal Tribunal (BGG) (cf.Art. 77(2) Federal Act on the Swiss FederalTribunal(BGG),whichexcludestheapplicationofArt. 105(2) andArt. 97FederalAct on theSwiss Federal Tribunal (BGG)). However, theSwiss Federal Tribunal can review the factualfindings made in the arbitral decision beingappealedagainstifadmissiblecomplaintswithinthemeaningofArt.190(2)Switzerland’sFederalCode on Private International Law (IPRG)are pleaded or, as an exception, new facts orevidence compared with said factual findingsaretakenintoaccount(BGE[DecisionsoftheSwissFederalTribunal]133III139E.5p.141;129 III 727 E. 5.2.2 p. 733; each with notes).Whoever invokesanexceptiontotherulethatthe Swiss Federal Tribunal is bound by thefactual findings of the previous instance and,basedon this,wishes to correct or add to thefacts must demonstrate with reference to thefiles that such factual claimshad alreadybeenmade in the previous instance in accordancewiththeprocedurallaw(cf.BGE[DecisionsoftheSwissFederalTribunal]115II484E.2ap.486;111II471E.1cp.473;eachwithnotes).

The Appellant precedes its legal submissionswith a detailed statement of facts, in whichit describes the sequence of events and theproceedingsbefore theprevious instancefromits point of view. In said statement of facts itdeviates from or adds to the factual findingsof the previous instance in numerous pointswithout claiming any substantiated exceptionsto the rule that the Swiss Federal Tribunal isboundby thefactsestablishedby thepreviousinstancepursuanttoArt.105(2)andArt.97(1)Federal Act on the Swiss Federal Tribunal(BGG).To that extent its submissionsmustbedisregarded.

3.InvokingArt. 190(2)(b) Switzerland’sFederalCodeonPrivate InternationalLaw (IPRG) theAppellantisclaimingthatthepreviousinstanceoughttohaveheldthatitdidnothavejurisdiction.

3.1 Applying Art. 11 and 13.2 of the FIH Anti-DopingPolicy theprevious instancedismissed

both arbitral actions on the ground that theAppellant did not have standing to appealagainsttheJudicialCommission’sdecision.

3.2 In reply to this the Appellant submits thattherearemanysituationsinwhichthequestionof the binding nature of the main contract(competenceinrespectofthesubjectmatteroftheclaim (Sachlegitimation)) cannotbe separatedfrom the binding nature of the arbitrationagreement (capacity tobe aparty to an action(Parteifähigkeit)), which is why in such casesan arbitration court must, when reviewingthe question of jurisdiction, fully review as apreliminary question whether the parties arebound by, or the competence of the partieswithrespectto,themaincontract(competencein respect of the subject matter of the claim(Sachlegitimation)).Ifthedecisiononjurisdictionis negative, the arbitration court that doesnothavejurisdictionhasnocompetencetoassessthecompetence inrespectofthesubjectmatteroftheclaims(Sachlegitimation)arisingoutofthemaincontract; rather it renders a purely proceduraljudgment.TheAppellantfurtherclaimsthatthearbitration court lacked subjective arbitrability,which is why both arbitration courts - if theydid not share theAppellant’s interpretationofArt. 13.2.1 in conjunction with Art. 13.2.3 oftheFIHAnti-DopingPolicy,oughttohaveheldthattheydidnothavejurisdictionandcouldnotdismisstheactionsubstantively.

3.3 TheSwissFederalTribunal(Bundesgericht)isfreeto review the legal aspects of the complaintabout jurisdiction in accordance with Art.190(2)(b) Switzerland’s Federal Code onPrivate International Law (IPRG), includingpreliminaryquestionsofsubstantive law,uponwhichjurisdictiondepends(BGE[DecisionsoftheSwissFederalTribunal]133III139E.5p.141;129III727E.5.2.2p.733;128III50E.2ap.54).However,theAppellanthasfailedtoappreciatethatthequestionofstandingtoappealagainst the Judicial Commission’s decision,which it has criticised, is not a substantivepreliminaryquestioninrelationtothejudgmentonjurisdiction.WhetherapartyhasstandingtoappealagainstthedecisionoftheRespondent’sinternal organ under the applicable provisionsin the federation’s statutes and statutoryprovisions does not concern the jurisdictionof the arbitration court intended to resolvethe dispute; rather it concerns the question ofstanding to bring an action (Aktivlegitimation).On the basis of Art. 13.2 FIH Anti-DopingPolicy,whichdoesnotprovidearightofappeal


forthenationalfederationsinconnectionwithinternationalcompetitions,theadhocDivisionoftheCASansweredthisquestionwithregardto the arbitral action by the Appellant in thenegative(“nostandingtorequestrelieffor themerits”),AlsotakingintoaccountArt.11FIHAnti-DopingPolicy theprevious instanceheldthat the Appellant did not have standing tobringanaction(Aktivlegitimation).

Contrary to the Appellant’s opinion, in thecasetobedecided,thequestionofcompetencein respect of the subject matter of the claim(Sachlegitimation) can be clearly separated fromthequestionofbeingboundbythearbitrationagreement. The Appellant’s submissionsmadeunder the guise of a complaint under Art.190(2)(b)Switzerland’sFederalCodeonPrivateInternational Law (IPRG), is correctly seen,appellatorycriticismoftheCAS’sinterpretationof Art. 11 and 13.2 of the FIH Anti-DopingPolicy,whichgoverntheconditionsforanappealagainstdecisionsofthefederationinconnectionwith doping offences. The previous instancereviewed the conditions for an appeal againstthe Judicial Commission’s decision, held thattheAppellantdidnothavestandingtobringanaction(Aktivlegitimation)andthereforedismisseditsprayers.TheSwissFederalTribunaldoesnotreviewwhetherthearbitrationcourtappliedthelaw,uponwhichitbaseditsdecision,correctly.The Appellant’s submissions therefore leadnowhere.

Besides this, the Appellant instituted botharbitrationcaseswiththepreviousinstanceandthereforeassumedthatithadjurisdiction.EvenforthisreasonalonetheSwissFederalTribunalcannothearitwithapleaoflackofjurisdiction(cf. Art. 186(2) Switzerland’s Federal Code onPrivateInternationalLaw(IPRG)).

3.4 Under these aspects, the decisions beingappealed against, with which the previousinstance judgedtheAppellant’sarbitralactionsand dismissed them for want of standing tobring an action, cannot be criticised. TheAppellant’s false accusation that the previousinstance failed to review whether the claimsassertedweresubstantiatedandthereforeviolatedpublic policy (“ordre public”) also lead nowhere.Finally, the fact introduced by the Appellantthatthetwoarbitralawards,asjudgmentsonthemerits (Sachurteile),have substantive legal force,whichwouldpossiblyprecludeanactiontosetaside(Anfechtungsklage)theJudicialCommission’sdecision within the meaning of Art. 75 Swiss

CivilCode(ZGB)broughtbeforeastatecourt,cannot - contrary to theAppellant’s opinion -beconsideredtobeaviolationofpublicpolicy(“ordre public”) (Art. 190(2) (e) Switzerland’sFederal Code on Private International Law(IPRG)), rather it follows logically from thesubstantive assessment and dismissal of itsprayers.

4.Theappeal(Beschwerde)provestobeunfoundedandmustbedismissedtotheextentthatitcanbeheard.InaccordancewiththeoutcomeoftheproceedingstheAppellantisorderedtopaycostsandcompensation(Art.66(1)andArt.68(2)FederalActon theSwissFederalTribunal(BGG)).

Accordingly, the Swiss Federal Tribunal (Bundesgericht) holds that:

1.Theappeal isdismissedtotheextentthat itcanbeheard.

2.TheAppellantisorderedtopaythecourtfeesofFr.6,000.

3.TheAppellantmustcompensatetheRespondentforthe proceedings before the Swiss Federal Tribunal(Bundesgericht)withFr.7,000.Saidcompensationshallbepaidoutofthesecurityfurnishedasapaymenttothecourt’scashier’soffice.

4.Theparties and theCourtofArbitration forSport(CAS), ad hoc Division, shall be notified of thisjudgmentinwriting.

Lausanne,22January2009

In the name of the 1stCivilDivision of the SwissFederalTribunal(SchweizerischesBundesgericht)

ThePresident: TheCourtReporter:Klett Leemann


A.Le22février2006,leclubdefootballY.________a saisi la Fédération Internationale de FootballAssociation (FIFA) d’une demande visant,notamment, àobtenir deX.________, son ancienentraîneur, le paiement de 400’000 euros à titred’indemnité conventionnelle pour résiliationanticipéeducontratdetravail.Alléguant avoir déjà versé cette somme au club enquestion,ledéfendeuraconcluaurejetdelademande.Par décision du 13mars 2008, notifiée aux partiesle20juin2008,laCommissionduStatutduJoueur,considérantquelapreuvedecepaiementn’avaitpasété apportée, a condamné le défendeur à verser audemandeurlasommede400’000eurosetlesintérêtsyafférents.B.B.a Le 7 juillet 2008, Me Z.________, avocat à

Paris, a déposé une déclaration d’appel auprès

duTribunalArbitralduSport(TAS)aunometpourlecomptedudéfendeur.

Par lettredu23 juillet2008, leGreffeduTAS

a accusé réception de la déclaration d’appel etattiré l’attention des parties sur le fait qu’ellesseraient invitées à verser des avances de frais,conformémentàl’art.R64duCodedel’arbitrageen matière de sport (ci-après: le Code). Leschiffres1et2decettedispositionénoncentcequisuit:

“R64.1 Lorsdudépôtdelarequête/déclarationd’appel,

ledemandeurverseundroitdeGreffeminimumdeCHF500.-,fautedequoileTASneprocèdepas.CetémolumentresteacquisauTAS.LaFormation en tient compte dans le décomptefinaldesfrais.

R64.2 LorsdelaconstitutiondelaFormation,leGreffe

fixe, sous réserve de modifications ultérieures,le montant et les modalités de paiement de la

Faits

contre

Composition

Parties

Objet arbitrageinternational;avancedefrais;délai,recoursenmatièrecivilecontrel’Orderrendule18novembre2008parleTribunalArbitralduSport(TAS).

Y.________,intimé,représentéparMeEttoreMazzilli.

MmesetM.lesJugesKlett,Présidente,KollyetKissGreffier:M.Carruzzo

X.________,recourant,représentéparMeCédricAguet,

4A_600/2008Arrêt du 20 février 2009IreCourdedroitcivil


provision de frais.L’introduction de demandesreconventionnelles ou nouvelles entraîne lafixationdeprovisionsdistinctes.

Pourfixerlemontantdelaprovision,leGreffe

estime les fraisd’arbitragequiserontsupportésparlespartiesconformémentàl’articleR64.4.La provision est versée à parts égales par lapartie demanderesse et la partie défenderesse.Siunepartieneversepassapart, l’autrepeutle faire à sa place; en cas de non-paiement, lademande/déclarationd’appel est réputée retirée;cette disposition s’applique également auxéventuellesdemandesreconventionnelles”.

Endate du29 août 2008, leGreffe duTAS a

invité les deux parties à verser chacune uneprovision de 19’000 fr. jusqu’au 15 septembre2008.L’appelantadonnésuiteàcetteinvitation.L’intimé, en revanche, n’apas versé sapart del’avancedefraisrequise.

Sur quoi, le Greffe du TAS, par lettre du 25

septembre 2008, se référant à son précédentcourrier et à l’art. R64.2 du Code, a fixé àl’appelant un délai au 10 octobre 2008 pourverser une avance de frais complémentaire de19’000fr.Cettelettreseterminaitparlaphrasesuivante:“Iremindyouthatintheabsenceofpaymentwithin the said time limit, the appeal will be deemedwithdrawn” (soulignementfigurantdans le texteoriginal).

Parlettredu15octobre2008,leGreffeduTAS,

relevantqueledélaifixéétaitéchudepuisle10dumêmemois,ademandéaurecourantde luifournir la preuve du paiement de la secondeavancede19’000fr.

Le conseil du recourant lui a répondu en ces

termesparcourrierdu17octobre2008(sic):“Ireceivedyour letterdatedoctober,15 informingme thatyouareexpettingtothesecondadvanceofcostsofCHF19.000. My client informed me that payment will bemadeshortly”.

Le 12 novembre 2008, le Greffe du TAS,

constatant que la provision complémentairen’avaittoujourspasétéversée,aenvoyéunfaxaux parties pour les informer que l’appel étaitréputé retiré, en application de l’art. R64.2 duCode, et qu’une ordonnance de clôture leurseraitnotifiéedanslesprochainsjours.

Parcourrierdu13novembre2008,leconseilde

l’appelantaadresséauTASune“attestationdepaiement”etluiademandédel’informerausujet

delasuitedelaprocédure.Lapièceannexéeàcecourrier est, en fait, une copie d’une lettre du12novembre2008parlaquellel’appelantpriesabanquedeverserlasommede19’000fr.surlecomptebancaireduTAS.

B.bParOrder du 18 novembre 2008, le Présidentsuppléant de la Chambre arbitrale d’appel duTAS, constatant que l’appel était réputé retirédufaitquelesavancesdefraisrequisesn’avaientpas toutesétépayées,aprononcé laclôturedelaprocédure,rayélacausedurôleetordonnélarestitutionàl’appelantdumontantverséparlui.L’ordonnanceaététransmiseauxpartiesparfaxdumêmejour.

Le20novembre2008,leGreffeduTASareçuunavisdecréditd’unebanquel’informantquel’appelantavaitversélasommede19’000fr.surlecompteduTAS,valeur18novembre2008.

C.Agissant par la voie du recours en matière civile,X.________, représenté par un nouvel avocat,demandeauTribunal fédérald’annuler la“sentencearbitrale” rendue le 18 novembre 2008. A titreprincipal,ilseplaintd’uneviolationdel’ordrepublicmatériel,enparticulierduprincipedelabonnefoietdel’interdictiondel’abusdedroit.Subsidiairement,lerecourantdénonceuneviolationparleTASdel’ordrepublicprocédural.L’intimén’apasdéposéderéponsedansledélaiquiluiavaitétéimpartiàcettefin.Danssaréponse, leTAS,quiaproduitsondossier,conclutaurejetdurecours.L’effet suspensif a été accordé au recours parordonnanceprésidentielledu21janvier2009.

Considérantendroit1.D’aprèsl’art.54al.1LTF,leTribunalfédéralrédigesonarrêtdansunelangueofficielle,enrèglegénéraledans la langue de la décision attaquée. Lorsquecette décision est rédigée dans une autre langue(ici l’anglais), le Tribunal fédéral utilise la langueofficielle choisie par les parties. Devant le TAS,celles-ci ont utilisé l’anglais.Dans lemémoire qu’ilaadresséauTribunalfédéral,lerecourantaemployélefrançais.Conformémentàsapratique,leTribunalfédéraladoptera la languedurecoursetrendra,parconséquent,sonarrêtenfrançais.


2.2.1 Dansledomainedel’arbitrageinternational, le

recoursenmatièrecivileestrecevablecontrelesdécisionsdetribunauxarbitrauxauxconditionsprévuesparlesart.190à192LDIP(art.77al.1LTF).

2.2 Le siège du TAS se trouve à Lausanne. L’une

despartiesaumoins(enl’occurrence,lesdeux)n’avait pas son domicile en Suisse aumomentdéterminant. Les dispositions du chapitre 12delaLDIPsontdoncapplicables(art.176al.1LDIP).

2.3 Dans sa réponseau recours, leTAS fait valoirque ladécisionattaquéen’estpasunesentencearbitrale,encesensqu’ellen’apasétépriseparune Formation arbitrale mais par le Présidentsuppléant de la Chambre arbitrale d’appel,lequelestunmembreduConseil Internationalde l’Arbitrage enmatièrede Sport (CIAS)quecet organisme élit pour remplacer le Présidenten cas d’empêchement (art. S6.2 du Code) etremplir lesfonctionsquisontdévoluesàcelui-ci,tellelaconstitutiondelaFormation(art.R52duCode).

A ne considérer que son intitulé (Order), la

décision attaquée pourrait être une simpleordonnance de procédure susceptible d’êtremodifiée ou rapportée en cours d’instance;commetelle,ellenepourraitpasêtredéféréeauTribunal fédéral (cf.ATF 122 III 492 consid.1b/bb).Toutefois, pour juger de la recevabilitédu recours, ce qui est déterminant n’est pas ladénomination du prononcé entrepris, mais lecontenudecelui-ci.Decepointdevue,iln’estpas douteux que, dans sa décision, le TAS nes’estpasbornéàfixer la suitede laprocédure.Ilyconstatequel’avancedefraisrequisen’apasétéfaitedansledélaifixéàceteffetetentirelaconséquence que prévoit l’art. R64.2 duCode,c’est-à-dire la fiction irréfragable du retrait del’appel.Sonprononcés’apparenteàunedécisiond’irrecevabilité qui clôt l’affaire pour unmotiftirédesrèglesdelaprocédure.Qu’ilémaneduPrésident suppléant de la Chambre arbitraled’appel plutôt que d’une Formation arbitrale,laquelle n’était du reste pas encore constituée,n’empêche pas qu’il s’agit bien d’une décisionsusceptiblederecoursauTribunalfédéral(danscesens,cf.l’arrêt4A_126/2008du9mai2008consid.1).

2.4 Le recourant est directement touché par la

décisionattaquée,puisquecelle-cileprivedelapossibilitéderemettreencause,devantleTAS,

ladécisiondu13mars2008autermedelaquellelaCommissionduStatutduJoueurl’acondamnéàverserà l’intimélasommede400’000euros,intérêts en sus. Il a ainsi un intérêt personnel,actuel et juridiquement protégé à ce que ladécisionduTASn’aitpasétérendueenviolationdel’art.190al.2let.eLDIP,cequiluiconfèrelaqualitépourrecourir(art.76al.1LTF).

Déposédansles30jourssuivantlanotification

de la sentence attaquée (art. 100 al. 1 LTF enliaisonavecl’art.46al.1let.cLTF),lerecours,quisatisfaitauxexigencesformellesposéesparl’art.42al.1LTF,estrecevable.

3.LeTribunalfédéralstatuesurlabasedesfaitsétablisparleTribunalarbitral(art.105al.1LTF).Ilnepeutrectifier ou compléter d’office les constatations desarbitres,mêmesilesfaitsontétéétablisdemanièremanifestementinexacteouenviolationdudroit(cf.l’art.77al.2LTFquiexclutl’applicationdel’art.105al.2LTF).Enrevanche,commec’étaitdéjàlecassousl’empiredelaloifédéraled’organisationjudiciaire(cf.ATF 129 III 727 consid. 5.2.2; 128 III 50 consid.2aetlesarrêtscités),leTribunalfédéralconservelafacultéderevoirl’étatdefaitàlabasedelasentenceattaquéesi l’undesgriefsmentionnésàl’art.190al.2LDIPestsoulevéàl’encontreduditétatdefaitouque des faits ou des moyens de preuve nouveauxsont exceptionnellement pris en considération danslecadredelaprocéduredurecoursenmatièrecivile(arrêt4A_450/2007du7janvier2008consid.2.2).Ces principes ne sont pas directement applicablesenl’espèce,étantdonnéqueleprononcéattaquénefait que constater le retrait - présumé irrévocable -deladéclarationd’appel,consécutivementaudéfautde paiement de la provision requise par le TAS.Cependant, ils peuvent l’être, à tout le moins, paranalogie.AussilaCourdecéanstiendra-t-ellecompte,pour l’examen du cas présent, des circonstancesrelatéesdansladécisiondelaCommissionduStatutduJoueurainsiquedudéroulementdelaprocéduredevant le TAS, tel qu’il ressort du dossier produitparcedernier.Enrevanche,elleneprendrapasenconsidération les allégations du recourant relativesà des circonstances exorbitantes de la procédurearbitraleencause, tellesque la référenceàunautrearbitrageconduitdevantleTASparlemêmeconseilfrançais que celui qui a assisté le recourant dans laprocédure arbitrale close par la décision querellée(affaireT.________). 4.Atitreprincipal,lerecourantseplaintd’uneviolationde l’ordre public matériel, plus précisément du


principedelabonnefoietdel’interdictiondel’abusdedroit.4.1 Une sentence est contraire à l’ordre public

matériel lorsqu’elle viole des principesfondamentauxdudroitdefondaupointdeneplusêtreconciliableavec l’ordre juridiqueet lesystèmedevaleursdéterminants;aunombredeces principes figurent, notamment, la fidélitécontractuelle, le respectdes règlesde labonnefoi,l’interdictiondel’abusdedroit,laprohibitiondes mesures discriminatoires ou spoliatrices,ainsiquelaprotectiondespersonnescivilementincapables(ATF 132 III 389consid.2.2.1).

Selonlajurisprudence,lesrèglesdelabonnefoi

et l’interdiction de l’abus de droit doivent êtrecomprisesàlalumièredelajurisprudencerendueausujetdel’art.2CC(arrêt4A_220/2007du21septembre2007,consid.12.2.2).

4.24.2.14.2.1.1 Dans la première branche de son moyen

principal, le recourant expose, tout d’abord,quel’avocatfrançaisquil’areprésentédevantle TAS avait agi antérieurement devant lamême institution en qualité de conseil d’unjeune footballeur dénommé T.________.Or,danscetteaffaire,leTAS,faisantpreuved’une“grandesouplesse”quantaurespectdudélaidanslequelildevaitrendresasentence,en application de l’art. R59 al. 5 du Code,avait “outrageusement” étendu ce délai.Aussi,confiantdanscettesouplesseduTAS,le recourant n’avait-il pas versé l’avance defraisdans ledélaiqui lui avaitété imparti àcettefin.

Le moyen considéré repose sur un fait

étranger à la procédure arbitrale en cause.Commetel,ilestirrecevable(cf.,ci-dessus,leconsid.3infine).Cemoyenestdetoutefaçoninconsistant. Le recourant admet d’ailleurslui-même que le TAS n’a pas adopté un“comportementcontradictoireausensstrict”,puisqu’ilneluiapasfixéundélaipéremptoirequ’il n’aurait pas imparti aux parties dansl’affaire T.________. De surcroît, le TASprécise,souschiffre17desaréponse,quelesdélaisfixésdanslaprocédurerelativeàcetteaffaire ont tous été respectés, qu’ils aientétéprolongésounon.Onpeineàdiscerner,au demeurant, ce qu’il pourrait y avoir decommun entre le fait, pour un tribunalarbitral,denepasrendreunesentencedansledélaid’ordreprévuàceteffet(surlanature

decedélaidans lecasduTAS,cf.AntonioRigozzi,L’arbitrage international enmatièredesport,2005,p.516n.1005)etlefaitpourune partie de ne pas verser une avance defraisdansledélaiquiluiaétéfixésouspeinedevoirsonappelêtreconsidérécommeretiréirrémédiablement.Ilparaîtenfinsurprenant,pournepasdireplus,delapartd’unavocat,de ne pas attacher d’importance au respectd’unteldélaisurlaseulefoid’uneprétenduesouplesse avec laquelle le tribunal arbitralappliquerait lesrèglesprocédurales touchantlesdélais.

4.2.1.2 De ce que le délai litigieux aurait pu êtreprolongé,envertude l’art.R32duCode, lerecourant entend déduire, ensuite, que ledélai en question ne revêt aucun “caractèreabsolu”. L’argument est dénué de toutfondement.Qu’undélaipuisseêtreprolongéestunechose.Quelenon-respectd’undélaiprolongeable,mais qui n’a pas été prolongéfauted’unerequêteadhoc,nedoivepasêtresanctionnéenestuneautre.

4.2.1.3Lerecourantsoutient,enfin,quel’art.R64.2du Code ne sanctionne que le défaut depaiementdelaprovisionetnonl’omissionderespecterledélaiimpartipourlaverser.Pourlui, ledélaienquestionneseraitqu’undélaid’ordre.Dès lors, la décision attaquée, prise“dans unmouvement d’humeurmanifeste”,serait contraire au principe de la bonne foien tant qu’elle sanctionne exclusivementl’omissiondedemanderlaprolongationd’undélai d’ordre et qu’elle entraîne la perte de400’000eurospourla“victimedelamauvaisefoid’uneinstitutionarbitrale”.

Semblable grief, inutilement blessant dans

sa formulation, ne résiste pas à l’examen.Il a échappé à son auteur que l’applicationerronée, voire arbitraire, d’un règlementd’arbitrage ne constitue pas en soi uneviolationdel’ordrepublic(ATF 126 III 249consid. 3b et les arrêts cités). Qui plus est,l’interprétationlittéraledeladispositioncitée,queproposelerecourant,impliquerait,sielleétaitsuivie,quelespartiespourraientdéciderelles-mêmes, sans égard auxdélaisfixésparleTAS,lemomentauquelilleurconviendraitdeversertoutoupartiedesavancesdefraisrequisesparl’institutionarbitrale.Outrequ’ilmettraitenpérillasécuritédudroitetl’égalitédesparties,untelsystèmeseraitdenatureàparalyserlefonctionnementd’uneinstitutionqui n’a pas la possibilité de fournir ses


servicesàcrédit,ainsiquelesouligneleTASsouschiffre24desaréponse.Ilvasansdire,enfin,que, lorsque la sanctiondécoulantdunon-respectd’undélaiestl’irrecevabilitéou-cequirevientaumême-leretrait,présumédemanière irréfragable, d’un recours, la partiequi a exercé lemoyendedroitn’estplus enmesure de faire sanctionner par l’autoritéde recours une éventuelle erreur commiseparcellequiarenduladécisionattaquée.Etl’onn’imaginepasquecette sanctionpuisses’appliquerounon suivant les conséquencespécuniaires plus oumoins graves que cettedécision entraîne pour la partie recourante,sauf à ouvrir la porte à l’arbitraire. Pourle surplus, il n’y a pas ici la moindre tracede la mauvaise foi que le recourant imputegratuitementauTAS.

4.2.2 Dans la seconde branche de son moyenprincipal, le recourant fait grief au TAS den’avoir pas réagi au courrier qu’il lui avaitadressé le 17 octobre 2008 et de lui avoirlaissécroire,endemeurantsilencieuxpendantplusieurs semaines, que le délai initialementfixéau10octobre2008pourleversementdel’avance de frais avait été prolongé par acteconcluant.Alesuivre,labonnefoi,danscesconditions,auraitimposéauTASdeluifixerundernierdélaipoureffectuerceversement.

Il n’en est rien. La lettre du TAS du 25

septembre 2008 indiquait clairement lasanction à laquelle le recourant s’exposaits’ilneversaitpasl’avancedefraisde19’000fr. jusqu’au 10 octobre 2008 inclusivement.Par courrier du 15 octobre 2008, le GreffeduTAS,relevantque ledélaifixéétaitéchudepuis le 10 du même mois, a demandéau recourant de lui fournir la preuve de cepaiement. Il ne lui a donc nullement laisséentendreque son inaction avant l’expirationdecedélainetireraitpasàconséquence.Surquoi,leconseildurecourant,parcourrierdu17octobre2008,asimplementinforméleTASqueleversementattenduseraiteffectuésouspeu.Al’évidence,ilnepouvaitpasconsidérerde bonne foi l’absence de réaction du TASà ce courrier en ce sens que l’institutiond’arbitrageavaittraitélalettredu17octobre2008commeunerequêtedeprolongationdedélai,qu’elleavaitadmiseparl’acteconcluantqueconstituaitsonsilence.Ilpouvaitd’autantmoinslefairequeleTASvenaitdel’inviteràprouverqu’ilavaitrespectéledélaifixéau10octobre2008.

Partant, le grief examiné, qui confine à latémérité,tombeàfaux.

5.A titre subsidiaire, le recourant reproche au TASd’avoirviolél’ordrepublicprocédural.5.1 L’ordre public procédural garantit aux parties

le droit à un jugement indépendant sur lesconclusionset l’étatde fait soumisauTribunalarbitral d’une manière conforme au droitde procédure applicable; il y a violation del’ordre public procédural lorsque des principesfondamentaux et généralement reconnus ontété violés, ce qui conduit à une contradictioninsupportableaveclesentimentdelajustice,detellesortequeladécisionapparaîtincompatibleaveclesvaleursreconnuesdansunEtatdedroit(ATF 132 III 389consid.2.2.1).

5.25.2.1 Le recourant soutient, en substance, que le

TASafaitpreuvedeformalismeexcessifenrayantlacausedurôleaprèsavoirreçul’entierdelaprovisionrequise.Selonlui,ladécisionde clôture était dépourvue d’intérêt pour leTAS, auquel elle ne causait pas le moindrepréjudice, tandis qu’elle faisait perdre à lapartierecourantetoutepossibilitéd’échapperaupaiementàdoubledumontantde400’000euros.

5.2.2 Le formalismeestqualifiéd’excessif lorsquelastricteapplicationdesrèglesdeprocédurene se justifie par aucun intérêt digne deprotection,devientunefinensoi,compliquede manière insoutenable la réalisationdu droit matériel ou entrave de manièreinadmissible l’accès aux tribunaux. Selonunejurisprudencebienétablie,iln’yapasderigueurexcessiveànepasentrerenmatièresur un recours lorsque, conformément audroitdeprocédureapplicable, larecevabilitéde celui-ci est subordonnée au versementd’uneavancedefraisdansundélaidéterminé;ilfautcependantquesonauteuraitétéavertide façon appropriée du montant à verser,du délai imparti pour le paiement et desconséquences de l’inobservation de ce délai(ATF 104 Ia 105 consid. 5p.112;96 I 521consid.4p.523).

En l’occurrence, la lettre que le TAS avait

adressée au recourant le 25 septembre2008remplissait toutes ces conditions. Aussi leTAS pouvait-il constater, sans commettreunexcèsdeformalisme,quelaconséquence


attachée par l’art. R64.2 du Code au défautdeversementdel’avanceétaitapplicableauxcirconstancesducasquiluiétaitsoumis.

Quel’avanceaitbienétéverséeavantquele

TASprenneacteduretraitdel’appeldansladécisionattaquéen’estpasdéterminant,quoiqu’endise le recourant, sanscompterque leversement,opéréparcedernierlemêmejourqueceluioùladitedécisionaétérendue,n’estparvenuàlaconnaissanceduTASquedeuxjours plus tard. Le Tribunal fédéral n’entrepas non plus en matière sur un recours,conformément à l’art. 62 al. 3 LTF, quandl’avancedefraisn’apasétéverséeen tempsutile,mêmes’ilestenpossessiondumontantdecetteavanceeffectuéehorsdélai lorsqu’ilprononcel’arrêtd’irrecevabilité.Ilconsidère,en effet, que les formes procédurales sontnécessairesdanslamiseenoeuvredesvoiesde droit, ne serait-ce que pour assurer ledéroulementde laprocédureconformémentauprincipedel’égalitédetraitement.Onnevoitpaspourquoiildevraitenallerautrementdans le cas d’une institution d’arbitrage.Ce serait oublier que, dans une procédurearbitrale, tout comme dans une procédureétatique, la partie intimée est en droitd’attendre du tribunal arbitral qu’il appliqueet respecte les dispositions de son proprerèglementdeprocédure.

L’arrêt4P.2/2003du12mars2003,citéparle

recourant,neluiestd’aucunsecours.Ilinvitele tribunal arbitral à déterminer clairementla conséquence péremptoire éventuellementliée au non-paiement de l’avance de fraispourautantquelerèglementapplicablenelastipulepasdéjà(consid.3.4).Or,c’estbiencequ’afaitleTASenl’espèce,parsoncourrierdu25septembre2008,danslequelilrappelleaurecourantlasanctionprévueàl’art.R64.2du Code en cas de défaut de versement del’avancedefrais.

Quantauxargumentsdurecouranttirésdela

comparaisonavecleprécédentT.________etdel’incidencedeladécisionattaquéesursasituationpatrimoniale,ilsontdéjàétéécartésplus haut, de sorte qu’il n’y a pas lieu d’yrevenir(cf.consid.4.2.1.1et4.2.1.3infine).

6.Il ressort de cet examen que le recourant a tentéen vain d’imputer au TAS la négligence dont sonancienmandataireafaitpreuvedanslaconduitedelaprocéduredevantcetteinstitution.Leprésentrecours

nepeut,dèslors,qu’êtrerejetédanslamesureoùilestrecevable.Parvoiedeconséquence,lerecourantdevrapayerlesfraisjudiciairesrelatifsàlaprocédurefédérale(art.66al.1LTF).En revanche, iln’aurapasà indemniserl’intimépuisquecelui-cin’apasdéposéderéponse.

Par ces motifs, le Tribunal fédéral prononce:1.Lerecoursestrejetédanslamesureoùilestrecevable.2.Lesfraisjudiciaires,arrêtésà5’000fr.,sontmisàlachargedurecourant. 3.Le présent arrêt est communiqué aux mandatairesdespartiesetauTribunalArbitralduSport(TAS).

Lausanne,le20février2009Au nom de la Ire Cour de droit civil du Tribunalfédéralsuisse

LaPrésidente: LeGreffier:Klett Carruzzo


A.Par contrat du 15 novembre 2007, soumis au droitsuisse, la société X.________ Sàrl, responsablefinancière de l’équipe professionnelle de cyclismeW.________, a engagé le coureur cyclisteprofessionnelY.________pouruneduréededeuxansàcompterdu1erjanvier2008.Larémunérationducoureurcyclisteaétéfixéeà275’000eurospour2008età340’000eurospour2009.X.________ Sàrl a résilié ledit contrat avec effetimmédiat par lettre recommandée du 23 juillet2008, au motif qu’un rapport médical, annexé àcettelettre,faisaitapparaîtredesanomaliesdanslesvaleursdel’urineetdusangprélevéssur lecoureurcycliste à l’occasion d’un contrôle interne effectuéparl’équipe.Selonelle,ilyavaitlàdesérieuxindicesd’unestimulationdelamoelleosseuseconsécutiveàl’administrationd’EPOexogène. B.Le1erseptembre2008,Y.________,sefondantsur

la clause compromissoire insérée dans le contrat, adéposé une requête d’arbitrage auprès du TribunalArbitral du Sport (TAS) afin d’obtenir quelque 5,7millionsd’eurosd’indemnitésenapplicationdesart.49,328et337cCO.X.________ Sàrl a conclu au rejet de la demandeet,reconventionnellement,àl’octroid’uneindemnitéd’un million d’euros à titre de réparation du tortmoral.Par sentence du 15 juin 2009, le TAS, admettantpartiellementlademande,acondamnéX.________SàrlàpayeràY.________lasommede654’166,67euros avec intérêts à5%dès le27novembre2008,autorisé la publication de la sentence par ses soinset décidé de transmettre celle-ci à l’Union CyclisteInternationale(UCI).Ilamis75%desfraisd’arbitrageà la charge de X.________ Sàrl, condamné cettedernièreàverser25’000fr.dedépensàY.________etrejetétoutesautresouplusamplesconclusionsdesparties.Enrésumé,leTASaconsidéréquel’employeuravaitrésiliédemanièreinjustifiéelecontratdetravailliant les parties, sur la base d’une simple suspicion

Faits

Composition

Parties

Objet arbitrageinternational;révision,demandederévisiondelasentencerenduele15juin2009parleTribunalArbitralduSport(TAS).

Y.________,intimé,représentéparMeRoccoTaminelli.

contre

X.________Sàrl,requérante,représentéeparMesDouglasHornungetTetianaBersheda,

MmeetMM.lesJugesKlett,PrésidenteCorbozetKollyGreffier:M.Carruzzo

4A_368/2009Arrêt du 13 octobre 2009IreCourdedroitcivil


dedopageetsansavoirmisenoeuvrelaprocédurepréalableadhocprévuedanslecontrat.C.Le 15 juillet 2009, X.________ Sàrl a formé unrecoursenmatièrecivilecontrelasentencedu15juin2009.Ce recoursa été rejetépar arrêt séparédecejour.D.Endatedu10août2009,X.________Sàrladéposéunedemandederévisionenvued’obtenirl’annulationdelamêmesentence.L’intiméconclutprincipalementàl’irrecevabilitédelademandeet,subsidiairement,aurejetdecelle-ci.LeTASproposelerejetdelademande.

Considérantendroit1.La loi sur le droit international privé (LDIP; RS291) ne contient aucune disposition relative à larévisiondessentencesarbitralesausensdesart.176ssLDIP.LeTribunal fédéralacomblécette lacuneparvoie jurisprudentielle.Lesmotifsderévisiondeces sentences étaient ceux que prévoyait l’art. 137OJ. Ils sont désormais visés par l’art. 123 LTF. LeTribunal fédéral est l’autorité judiciaire compétentepour connaître de la demande de révision de toutesentence arbitrale internationale, qu’elle soit finale,partielle ou préjudicielle; sa compétence en cedomaine ne concerne que les sentences liant letribunal arbitral dont elles émanent, à l’exclusiondessimplesordonnancesoudirectivesdeprocéduresusceptiblesd’êtremodifiéesourapportéesencoursd’instance. S’il admet une demande de révision, leTribunalfédéralneseprononcepaslui-mêmesurlefondmaisrenvoielacauseautribunalarbitralquiastatuéouàunnouveautribunalarbitralàconstituer(ATF 134 III 286consid.2etlesréférences).2.L’intimé conteste la recevabilité de la demandede révision en faisant valoir que la requérante avalablement renoncé à attaquer la sentence. Onlaissera en suspens, ici, le point de savoir si larenonciationàrecourir,prétendumentinclusedanslaclausecompromissoire,excluaitaussi ledépôtd’unedemande de révision (cf. l’arrêt 4A_234/2008 du14août2008consid.2.1etlesréférences).Eneffet,pour lesmotifs indiqués au considérant 3de l’arrêtrenducejoursurlerecoursenmatièrededroitcivilconnexe, la renonciation en question est, de toutefaçon,inopérante.

3.3.1 Dans sa demande de révision, la requérante

invoquel’existenced’unfaitnouveauetdepreuvesnouvellesconstituéspar lespiècesqu’elleafaitparvenirauTASenannexeàsonfaxdatédu12juin2009(maisenvoyéle15dumêmemois).Lacirconstancenouvellealléguéeparelleconsistedans l’adoption, le 9 mai 2009, et l’entrée envigueur,le31mai2009,denouvellesdirectivestechniques de l’Agence Mondiale Antidopage(AMA) au sujet de l’EPO (TD2009EPO).Selon elle, la stimulation de lamoelle osseusede l’intimé causée par l’administration d’EPOexogènedevraitêtretenuepouravéréeauregardde ces nouvelles directives, ce qui suffirait àjustifieraprèscouplebien-fondédulicenciementimmédiatducoureurcycliste.

3.23.2.1 En vertu de l’art. 123 al. 2 let. a LTF, la

révisionpeutêtredemandéedanslesaffairesciviles si le requérant découvre après coupdesfaitspertinentsoudesmoyensdepreuveconcluantsqu’iln’avaitpaspuinvoquerdanslaprocédureprécédente,àl’exclusiondesfaitsoumoyensdepreuvepostérieursàl’arrêt.

Cettedisposition reprendensubstance l’art.

137let.baOJ,desortequela jurisprudenceantérieure conserve toute sa valeur. Ainsi,seuls peuvent justifier une révision fondéesur l’art. 123al.2 let. aLTF les faitsqui sesont produits jusqu’au moment où, dans laprocédure principale, des allégations de faitétaient encore recevables,mais qui n’étaientpas connus du requérant malgré toute sadiligenceetn’ontétédécouvertspar luiquepostérieurement au prononcé de la décisiondont la révision est demandée; ces faitsdoivent,desurcroît,êtrepertinents,àsavoirde nature à modifier l’état de fait qui est àla base de la décision attaquée et à aboutirà un jugement différent en fonction d’uneappréciationjuridiquecorrecte(ATF 134 III 669 consid. 2 et les références). Il en va demême,mutatismutandis,encequiconcerneles preuves nouvelles (cf. arrêt 4P.213/1998du11mai1999consid.2b).

3.2.2 Les conditions justifiant une révision de lasentence du TAS sur le fondement de l’art.123al.2let.aLTFnesontdetouteévidencepasrempliesenl’espèce.

Danssonrecoursenmatièrecivileconnexe,la requérante soutenait que la directiveTD2009EPO était certes entrée en vigueurle 31mai 2009, c’est-à-dire postérieurement


àl’audiencedu29avril2009,maisqu’ilavaitété signalé, lorsde cette audience, “qu’il estprobable que cette nouvelle norme entreraen vigueur prochainement” (p. 18, dernier§). L’intéressée allègue derechef, dans sademandederévision,qu’ilabienétéquestion,au cours de ladite audience, des nouvellesnormesdel’AMA,“dontl’entréeenvigueurétaitpossiblepourlafinmai2009”;elleajoutequelemédecindel’équipeavaitprécisémentappliquécesnouvellesrègles(mémoire,p.8,ch.23).Parailleurs,ellefaitremonterau9mai2009lemomentdeladécouvertedumotifderévision,quidéterminelepointdedépartdudélaifixépar l’art.124al.1 let.dLTFpourledépôtdelademandeadhoc(mémoire,p.12let.c).Ilestainsiclairementétabliquelarequéranteaeuconnaissanceduprétendufaitnouveau, resp. des preuves nouvelles, avantla communicationde la sentencedu15 juin2009.

Qu’illuieûtétépossibled’introduirele“faitnouveau”pendenteliten’estguèrecontestable,quoiqu’elleendise.Ilenavaitétéquestion,faut-illerappeler,aucoursdel’audiencedu29avril 2009.Dès lors, l’élémentaire prudenceeûtcommandéàcettepartied’inviterleTASàprendreenconsidérationlanouvelledirectivequi était sur le point d’être adoptée et dontl’entrée en vigueur était envisagée pour lafindumoissuivantdéjà,quitteàrequérir,aubesoin,lasuspensiondelaprocédurearbitralejusqu’àl’entréeenforcedeladirectiveàvenir.Au lieu de quoi, la requérante a attendu deconnaître le sort réservé à la demande del’intimépourseprévaloir,alorsseulement,dela circonstance prétendument nouvelle. Or,contrairementàcequ’elleaffirmeetcommeleTASlefaitremarqueravecraisondanssaréponseàlademandederévision,l’art.R.44.3duCodedel’arbitrageenmatièredesportluipermettait d’intervenir auprès du TAS afinqu’ilprîtencomptepareillecirconstance.Parconséquent,larequérantedoit,detoutefaçon,selaisseropposersonmanquedediligence.

3.3 Audemeurant,mêmesilemotifderévisionétaitavéré, la demande de révision ne pourrait êtreadmise.Ilressort,eneffet,deschiffres87à96delasentenceattaquéeque,del’avisduTAS,larequérante n’a pasmis enoeuvre la procédurepréalable prévue dans le contrat de travail quiauraitdûêtreappliquéeavantquel’intimépuisseêtre licencié. Cet argument surabondant, quela requérante laisse intact, suffirait à justifierlemaintiende ladite sentencemême s’il fallait

admettre, sur levudesnouvellesdirectivesdel’AMA,quel’intimés’esteffectivementdopéetque lessoupçonsde la requéranteétaientdoncfondés.

4.Cela étant, la demande de révision ne peut qu’êtrerejetée, ce qui rend sans objet la requête d’effetsuspensifpendante.Enconséquence,larequérante,quisuccombe,devrapayer les frais de la procédure fédérale (art. 66 al.1LTF)etverserdesdépensà l’intimé(art.68al.2LTF).

Par ces motifs, le Tribunal fédéral prononce:1.Lademandederévisionestrejetée.2.Lesfraisjudiciaires,arrêtésà9’000fr.,sontmisàlachargedelarequérante.3.La requérante versera à l’intimé une indemnité de10’000fr.àtitrededépens.4.Le présent arrêt est communiqué aux mandatairesdespartiesetauTribunalArbitralduSport(TAS).

Lausanne,le13octobre2009Au nom de la Ire Cour de droit civil du Tribunalfédéralsuisse

LaPrésidente: LeGreffier:Klett Carruzzo


A. A.aA._____ (the Appellant) domiciled in

D.______isaprofessionalicehockeyplayer.Hetookpart invariousinternationalcompetitionswith the German national team and amongothers in theworld ice hockey championshipsoftheyears2003,2004,2006,2007and2008aswellasintheWinterOlympicsinTurinin2006.TheWorldAnti-DopingAgency(WADA)(theRespondent) is a foundation under Swiss lawwithseatinLausanne.Itsgoalistheworldwidebattleagainstdopinginsport.TheInternationalIceHockeyFederation(IIHF)istheinternationalicehockeyfederationwithitsseatinZurich.

A.bOnMarch 6, 2008 at 12.30pm,MrB._____,acting on behalf of the German NationalAnti-Doping Agency (NADA) appeared atthe Appellant’s domicile to undertake an out-

of-competition sample collection1. Accordingto the Respondent the Appellant refused tosubmit to the test even after he was advisedbythecontrollerofpossibleheavydisciplinarysanctions. It is undisputed that the dopingcontrollerlefttheAppellant’sdomicileat12.50pm without accomplishing anything. Fourminutes later the Appellant called NADA toinform them of what had happened. At 2.16pmhe calledNADA again and stated that hewanted to submit to a sample collection andNADAtoldhimthatarepetitionofthetestwasnotpossible.Laterandathisinitiative,adopingtesttookplacethesamedayat5pm,organisedby theGerman IceHockeyFederation (DEB)and carriedout byMrB._____.The testwasanalysed by the Institute of Doping AnalysisandSportsBiochemistryDresden;noforbiddensubstanceorimpermissiblemethodwasshown.

1.Translator’snote:inEnglishintheoriginaltext.

Facts

4A_358/2009**

Judgement of 6 November 20091stCivilDivision

Parties

Composition

versus

WorldAnti-DopingAgency(WADA),Respondent,representedbyMrFrançoisKaiserandMrYvanHenzer.

A.________,Appellant,representedbyDrMauriceCourvoisierandDrPhilippeNordmann,

FederalTribunalJudgeKlett,PresidentFederalTribunalJudgeCorbozFederalTribunalJudgeRottenbergLiatowitschFederalTribunalJudgeKollyFederalTribunalJudgeKissClerkoftheCourt:MrLeemann

* From Charles Poncet’s translation, courtesy of the law firm ZPG/Geneva (www.praetor.ch).* Translator’s note: Quote as A._____ v. World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), 4A_358/2009. The original of the decision is in German.

The text is available on the website of the Federal Tribunal www.bger.ch.


A.cOnMarch7,2008,NADAinformedtheGermanIceHockeyFederationof the case.OnMarch19,2008,thelatteradvisedNADAofitsintenttowarntheAppellantpublically.NADAagaintoldtheDEBthatrefusingasamplecollectionwas a violation of article 2.3 of the NADAcode (NADC), which corresponds to article2.3 of theWADA code (WADC) and had tobesanctionedaccordingly.TheDEBinformedNADAthatthesanctionsintheNADCortheWADCweredisproportionateandthatinviewofthecircumstancesofthecaseapublicwarningwouldbesufficient.Accordinglyitpronounceda public warning against the player on April15,2008andpunishedhimwithafineofEur.5’000.-and56hoursofcharitablework.NADAbecameawareofthedecisionoftheDEBinthemediaandlearnedalsothattheIIHFapproveditandwouldlettheplayerplayintheWorldIceHockeyChampionshipinCanadaonMay2–11,2008.NADAadvisedtheRespondentonApril21,2008inordertoenableittotakemeasures.In a letter of May 6, 2008, the Respondentrequested the directorate of the IIHF WorldChampionship to suspend the Appellantprovisionally fromMay 6, 2008 and requestedtheIIHFtoissueadecisionwithin48hoursastohisprovisionalsuspension.FurthermoretheRespondent requested the IIHF disciplinarycommittee to initiate a disciplinary procedureagainsttheAppellantandtosanctionhimwitha two years suspension.Thepresidencyof theIIHF advised the Respondent in an e-mail ofMay7,2008thatitwasnotinapositiontoactaccording to the request. The IIHF pointedout among other things that the disciplinarycommittee set in motion by the German IceHockeyFederationhadissuedadecisioninthematteronApril 15,2008and that the time toappeal was not yet expired. The Respondentwrote to the IIHF on the same day that itassumed that the letter ofMay 7, 2008 was adecisionwithinthemeaningoftheIIHFRules,whichwassubjecttoanappealtotheCourtofArbitrationforSport(CAS).

A.dOnMay9, 2008 theRespondent appealed thedecisionoftheDEBofApril15,2008tothead-hocArbitralTribunalof theGermanOlympicsSports Confederation and submitted that thedecision should be annulled and a two yearssuspensionpronouncedagainsttheplayer.Thead-hocarbitrationtribunalrejectedtheappealina decision ofDecember 3, 2008, as therewasnolegalbasisforthesanctionsrequestedbytheRespondent.

B. OnMay 27, 2008 the Respondent appealed to theCAS against the IIHF letter of May 7, 2008 andsubmitted that a two years suspension shouldbe ordered (CAS case 2008/A/1564). It pointedout that the request for arbitration was made toprotect its rights in particular should the requestberejected,whichithadfiledwiththeGermanad-hoc Arbitral Tribunal. The proceedings were thenstayed until a decision by the German ArbitralTribunal. Subsequently the Respondent appealedthe decision of the ad-hoc Arbitral tribunal of theGerman Olympics Sports Confederation in frontof the CAS as well (CAS case 2008/A/1738). In adecisionofJune23,2009,theCASheldthat ithadnojurisdiction.TheIIHFdidnotparticipateinthearbitration.TheAppellantraisedinparticularthelackofjurisdictionastherewasnoarbitrationagreement.

C.With regard to the first appeal (CAS case2008/A/1564),theCASheldthatithadjurisdictiononthebasisonthe“PlayerRegistrationForm”signedbytheAppellanteachtimewithaviewtotheWorldChampionshipandheldthattheMay7,2008e-mailfromtheIIHFwasadecisionthatcouldbeappealed.InanawardofJune23,2009, itannulledtheIIHFdecision and ordered the Appellant suspended fortwoyears.

D.InaCivillawappealtheAppellantsubmitsthattheFederal Tribunal should annul the CAS award ofJune 23, 2009 (CAS case 2008/A/1564). Both theRespondent and the CAS2 submit that the appealshouldberejected.TheAppellantsubmittedareplytotheFederalTribunal.

E. TheFederalTribunalorderedastayoftheawardonSeptember7,2009.

Considerations

1. Accordingtoart.54(1)BGG3,theFederalTribunalissues its decision in one of the official languages,as a rule that of the decision under appeal. Shouldthe decision have been issued in another language,theFederalTribunalresortstotheofficiallanguageusedbytheparties.ThedecisionunderappealisinEnglish.AsEnglishisnota(Swiss)officiallanguageandthepartiesuseddifferent languages infrontof

2. Translator’s note: In the following developments I translated theword“Vorinstanz”by“CAS”,althoughthewordliterallymeans“thelowercourt”.CASisclearerinthecontext.3.Translator’snote:BGGistheGermanabbreviationfortheFederalStatuteofJune17,2005organizingtheFederalTribunal,RS173.110.


theFederalTribunal,thedecisionshallbeissuedinthelanguageoftheappealbriefaccordingtopractice.

2.In the field of international arbitration a Civil lawappealispossibleundertherequirementsofart.190-192PILA4(art.77(1BGG)).

2.1 TheseatoftheArbitralTribunalisinLausanneinthiscase.AttherelevanttimetheAppellanthad neither his domicile nor his habitualresidenceinSwitzerland.AsthePartiesdidnotruleoutinwritingtheprovisionsofchapter12PILA,thesearetobeapplied(art.176(1)and(2)PILA).

2.2 Allgrievancesexhaustivelysetforthinart.190(2)PILAareadmissible(BGE134III186at5p.187;128III50at1ap.53;127III279at1ap.282).Accordingtoart.77(3)BGGtheFederalTribunalreviewsonlythegrievanceswhicharebroughtforwardandreasonedintheappeal;thiscorresponds to the requirement at art. 106 (2)BGGastotheviolationofconstitutionalrightsorofcantonalandintercantonallaw(BGG134III186at5withreferences).

2.3 TheFederalTribunalbases itsdecisionon thefactsfoundbythearbitraltribunal(art.105(1)BGG). It may not rectify or supplement thefactual findings of the arbitral tribunal, evenwhen these aremanifestly wrong or rely on aviolationofthelawwithinthemeaningofart.95BGG(seeart.77(2)BGG),whichrulesouttheapplicationofart.105(2)andart.97BGG).However theFederalTribunalmay review thefactual findings of the decision under appealwhen some admissible grievances are madeagainst them within the meaning of art. 190(2 PILA) or exceptionally when new evidenceis taken into consideration (BGG 133 III 139at 5 p. 141; 129 III 727 at 5.2.2 p. 733 withreferences).Newfactsorevidencemayonlybepresentedtotheextentthatthedecisionofthelower jurisdiction itself justifies doing so (art.99 (1BGG). The Appellant precedes his legaldevelopmentswithadetailedstatementoffactsinwhichhepresents the courseof events andtheproceedingsfromhispointofview.AstheRespondentrightlyobjects,he thusdeviates invariouspointsfromthefactualfindingsoftheCAS or broadens them without claiming anyexceptionstothebindingcharacterofthefactualfindingsaccordingtoart.105(2)andart.97(1)

4.Translator’snote:PILAisthemostfrequentlyusedEnglishabbre-viationfortheFederalStatuteofDecember18,1987,onPrivateInter-nationalLaw,RS291.

BGG.His submissions shallbedisregarded tothatextent.ThenewevidenceintroducedbytheAppellantisalsoirrelevant.

3.Basedonart.190(2)(b)PILAtheAppellantclaimsthattheCASwronglyacceptedjurisdiction.

3.1 The CAS initially held that in view of theWADC’sdutytocomplywithandimplementthebroadpurposeoftheIIHFStatutesatthetime,which went beyond the IIHF championshipsandinviewofthemembershipoftheDEBinthe IHF, the Appellant had to be considered,fromthepointofviewoftheIIHFStatutes,asaplayersummonedforanIIHFchampionshiporeventandassuchhewasboundbytheIIHFStatutes and had to recognize the final andbinding decision power of the IIHF. On theoccasionofanIIHFchampionshiporanIIHFevent, the IIHF would consequently requestfrom theplayers that they sign aPlayerEntryForm5whichreads inparticularasfollows:“I,the undersigned, declare, on my honour thata) I am under the jurisdiction of theNationalAssociation I represent. ... 1) I agree to abideby and observe the IIHF Statutes, By-Lawsand Regulations (including those relating toMedicalDopingControl) and thedecisionsbytheIIHFandtheChampionshipDirectorateinallmattersincludingdisciplinarymeasures,notto involve any third party whatsoever outsideoftheIIHFChampionshipand/ortheStatutes,By-Laws and Regulations and decisions madeby the IIHF relating thereto excepting wherehavingexhaustedtheappealprocedureswithinthe IIHF inwhichcase Iundertake to submitanysuchdisputetothejurisdictionoftheCourtof Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in Lausanne,Switzerland,fordefinitiveandfinalresolution”.6The CAS rightly held that the aforesaidarbitration clause would have to meet therequirements of art. 178 PILA and that theparties agree that Swiss law is applicable. TheCASthusinterpretedtheAppellant’sstatementon the basis of the principle of trust andconsideredthattheplayerswouldhavedeclaredthemselvesgenerallyboundbytheIIHFStatutesandRegulationsaswellasbythedecisionsissuedby the IIHF (including disciplinarymeasures).ThedutytoseizetheCASafterexhaustingtheinternallegalremedieswouldapplynotonlytodisputesinrelationwiththeIIHFChampionshipbut also to those which are not necessarilyconnectedtotheIIHFChampionshipandtothe

5.Translator’snote:InEnglishintheoriginaltext.6.Translator’snote:InEnglishintheoriginaltext.


aspectsoftheIIHFStatutesandRegulationsinrelationthereto.Thiswouldresultfromtheuseof thewords“and/or” in the textof litt. l andfrom the general wording of the introductorysentence in that clause. Nothing would pointtoanexclusionof the jurisdictionof theCAS.MoreovertheCASadjudicatedthatthefactthatthe Appellant signed the aforesaid applicationform almost every year since 2003 would notmeanthatthevalidityofthedocumentwouldbelimitedtoayear.Besides, theIIHFdemandedrepeatedsignaturesforadministrativepurposeson the occasion of each IIHF Championshipalso from players who had already signedsuch a form and only in order to ensure thateveryone at the present IIHF Championshipwould have signed the form. Since the IIHFcouldnotknowwhetheraplayersummonedtooneIIHFchampionshipwouldalsoparticipatein the following or in a later championship,due to injuryor feebleperformance, the IIHFcouldmeetitsdutytowardsWADAtoperformsample collections during training andoutsidethe seasononly if players once summoned foran IIHF Championship remain within thelegal jurisdiction of the IIHF as long as theymaybeconsideredforfuturechampionshipsorevents. According to theCAS the registrationform signed by the Appellant thus meets therequirements of a valid arbitration clause.MoreovertheIIHFletterofMay7,2008mustbeconsideredasadecisionoftheIIHFdisciplinaryCommitteethusgivingjurisdictiontotheCASas to theRespondent’s appeal pursuant to art.3.9of theIIHF2004DisciplinaryRegulationsin connection with article 47-49 of the IIHFStatutes in force at the time, which allow foran appeal to the CAS. To the extent that theAppellant signed the registration form, inparticularonApril26,2007aswellasonMay1st,2008,heisboundbytheseprovisions.

3.23.2.1 The Federal Tribunal exercises free judicial

review from a legal point of view as tojurisdictional grievances according to art.190 (2) (b)PILA, including thepreliminarymaterialissuesfromwhichthedeterminationof jurisdictiondepends.On theotherhand,evenwithin the framework of an appeal astojurisdiction,(theFederalTribunal)reviewsthefactualfindingsoftheawardunderappealonly to the extent that some admissiblegrievances within the meaning of art. 190(2) PILA are brought forward against suchfactual findings or exceptionally when newevidence is taken into consideration (BGE

134III565at3.1p.567;133III139at5p.141;129III727at5.2.2p.733).

3.2.2 Being unable to determine an actual intentoftheparties,theCASaccuratelyinterpretedthe statement of intent contained in theregistration form according to the principleof trust (see BGE 132 III 268 at 2.3.2 p.274 with references). The statement musttherefore be interpreted as it could andshould have been understood accordingto its wording and context and under thecircumstances(BGE133III61at2.2.1p.67;132III268at2.3.2p.274f;130III417at3.2p.424,686at4.3.1p.689;with references).According to litt. l of the inscription form,the player submits certain disputes – “suchdispute”7 – to the jurisdiction of the CAS.Theprecedingpartofthesentencedescribesto which disputes this undertaking relates,namely “the resolution of any disputewhatsoever arising in connection with theIIHFChampionshipand/ortheStatutes,By-LawsandRegulationsanddecisionsmadebytheIIHFrelatingthereto”8.Tobeginwiththewording,theuseofthetwowords“and/or”doessuggestthatthestatutesandregulationsconcerningdisputesevenwithoutconnectiontotheIIHFChampionshipthenheldwouldhavetobesubmittedtotheCAS,astheCASrecognized accurately in principle. On theotherhandtheAppellant’sobjectioncannotbe rejected out of hand, that the additional“relating thereto” must be understood asa limitation, namely that disputes relatingto the statutes, regulations anddecisions ofthe IIHF can be covered by the arbitrationclauseonlywhen they are connected to theIIHFChampionship.Theissueneedsnotbeanalysedindepthhoweverasthemeaningofthestatementathandcanbedeductedfromthe context according to the rules of goodfaith.

3.2.3 The Appellant signed the registration format the time with a view to participating intheIIHFChampionship.The“PlayerEntryForm”9 consisted of a one page form, onwhich the IIHF competition involved, itsvenue and date aswell as the player’s teamwere mentioned first of all. Moreover thedescription of the competition appeared inpart already on the letterhead (for instance

7.Translator’snote:InEnglishintheoriginaltext.8.Translator’snote:InEnglishintheoriginaltext.9.Translator’snote:InEnglishintheoriginaltext.


in the years 2006 and 2007: “IIHF WorldChampionship, Men”10) once also withthe corresponding logo of the WorldChampionship (in the year 2007: “WorldChampionship, Russia”11). The player’spersonaldataareregisteredinthemainbodyof the form whilst various explanations,includingtheaforesaidarbitrationclausearementioned in some distinctly smaller andthushardlyreadablefonts.Irrespectiveofthewording of the clause the player filling outandsigningtheinscriptionforminprincipleforayearinarecurringmanneratirregularintervals should assume that his statementsandtheindicationsgivenrelatetoaspecificcompetition.Whensigningwithaviewtoasportcompetitionpreciselydescribedintimeandspaceheshouldnottakeintoaccountthathewould submit at the same time in smallfonts, generally and without connection tothespecificchampionshiptothejurisdictionofanarbitral tribunal foranydisputes.TheRespondent’s argument and the reasons ofthe CAS, according to which a signaturerecurring yearly would be necessary merelyfor administrative purposes and wouldchangenothingtotheunlimitedvalidityastotimeandobjectarenotpersuasive.Itismuchmoreplausiblethattheinscriptionformwastobefilledand signedby theplayersyearlyprecisely and exclusivelywith a view to thecomingworldchampionship,correspondingto itspurpose, to thedescriptionas“PlayerEntry Form” and to its reference to aspecific tournament.TheRespondent failedto demonstrate a connection between thesamplecollectionorderedonMarch6,2008aswellastherequestedgeneralsuspensionfortwoyearsandtheIIHFWorldChampionshiptaking place in Canada onMay 2-11, 2008.According to the factual findings of thedecision under appeal, the testwas orderedneitherbyWADAnorbyIIHFandthelatterheldtothecontrarythatithadnojurisdictioninthematter.ThetestwasnotconductedbyWADAbutbyNADAand theGermanIceHockeyFederationwasprimarilycompetenttoassessitsresults.ThereferencebytheCASto thedutyof the IIHF towardsWADAtoconducttestsduringtrainingandoutsidetheseason could not justify a connection to anIIHF competition. According to the rulesof good faith, the Appellant did not haveto assume that by signing the inscriptionformofMay 1st, 2008, hewould enter into

10.Translator’snote:InEnglishintheoriginaltext.11.Translator’snote:InEnglishintheoriginaltext.

an arbitration agreement which includedsanctionsforhisbehaviourastothedopingtestofMarch6,2008,whichhadalreadyledto disciplinary proceedings in front of thenational federation. The dispute at hand astothetwoyearssuspensionrequestedbytheRespondent in connection with the dopingtestconductedbyNADAonMarch6,2008is not included in the arbitration clausecontainedinlitt.lofthePlayerEntryForm12.Contrary to the decision under appeal theCASjurisdictionagainsttheAppellantcannotbedeductedfromtheregistrationform.

3.2.4 Except for the registration form to theWorld Championship, which has proved tobe insufficient for the purposes of art. 178PILA, the factual findings of the decisionunder appeal do not show any effectivearbitrationclausewithinthemeaningofthatprovision.TheRespondentflatlyclaimsinitsanswer thatby signing the inscription formtheAppellantwouldhavemerelyconfirmeda pre-existing state of affairs as he belongsto a national federation participating inthe World Championship which is itselfa member of the international federationIIHF.YettheCASbaseditsfindingthattheAppellant was bound to its jurisdiction onthe signatureof the IIHF inscription form,inparticularin2007and2008.Initsbriefitdoes hold that the IIHF statutes and otherIIHF regulations, in particular article 3.1of the IIHF 2004Disciplinary Regulationsestablished an additional legal ground forits jurisdiction, yet it refers again to thesignature of the inscription form to claimthattheplayerwasbound,totheextentthatitholdsthatthesecondlegalbasiswouldbededucted from the first one “in cascade”.Neither theCASnor theRespondent showconcretely how the Appellant would havesubmittedinaformallyvalidandgeneralwayto the IIHF Statutes and other provisions,in particular the IIHF 2004 DisciplinaryRegulations. Admittedly case law as to thevalidity of arbitration agreements in thefieldof internationalarbitration isgenerous,as shown in adjudicating the validity ofarbitration agreements by reference (BGE133III235at4.3.2.3p.244withreferences).Hence the Federal Tribunal found that aglobal reference to an arbitration clausecontainedinthestatutesofafederationwasvalid (Decision 4A_460/2008, January 9,

12.Translator’snote:InEnglishintheoriginaltext.


2009 at 6.2; 4P.253/2003, March 25, 2004at5.4;4P.230/2000,February7,2001at2A;4C.44/1996,October31,1996at3c;seealsoBGE133III235at4.3.2.3p.245;129III727at5.3.1p.735;withreferences).Also, inthecaseof a football playerwhobelonged to anationalfederation,whichhadinitsstatutesaprovisionaccordingtowhichthememberswouldhavetoabidebytherulesofFIFA,itheldthattherewasalegallyvalidreferencetothearbitrationclausecontainedintheFIFAStatutes (Decision4A_460/2008, January9,2009 at 6.2). However, the factual findingsof the decision under appeal do not showthatinthecaseathandtherewouldbesomecorrespondingrelationship.Contrarytowhatwasheld in thedecisionunder appeal thereis no valid arbitration agreement accordingto art. 178 PILA. The CAS was wrongto accept jurisdiction to decide the caseat hand on the basis of the “Player EntryForm”13.Whetherornotonthebasisofthesubmissions of the Parties in the arbitralproceedings, jurisdiction, if any, could bebasedon a reference acceptedby theplayerto an arbitration clause contained in theregulationsofafederationremainsopen.

4.The Civil law appeal against international arbitralawardsonlypurportstotheannulmentofthedecision(seeart.77(2)BGG),rulingouttheapplicationofart.107(2)BGG,withsomeexceptions,theconditionsofwhicharenotmethere(seeBGE127III279at1bp.282;117II94at4p.95f.).ThedecisionoftheCASof June23,2009 is accordingly tobeannulledasaconsequenceoftheappealbeingaccepted.InviewoftheoutcomeoftheproceedingstheRespondentmustpaythecostsandcompensatetheotherparty(art.66(1)andart.68(2)BGG).

13.Translator’snote:InEnglishintheoriginaltext.

Therefore the Federal Tribunal pronounces:

1.TheappealisacceptedandthedecisionoftheCASofJune23,2009isannulled.

2.Thejudicialcosts,setatCHF5’000.-,shallbepaidbytheRespondent.

3.TheRespondentshallpaytotheAppellantanamountofCHF6’000.-forthefederaljudicialproceedings.

4.This judgment shall be notified in writing to theparties and to the Court of Arbitration for Sport(CAS).

Lausanne,6November2009

InthenameoftheFirstCivilLawCourtoftheSwissFederalTribunal

ThePresidingJudge: TheClerk:Klett Leemann


A.A.aClubAtléticodeMadridSAD (Appellant) is a

SpanishfootballclubbasedinMadrid.

Sport Lisboa E Benfica - Futebol SAD(Respondent) is a Portuguese football clubbasedinLisbon.

Both are members of their respectiveNational Federations, which in their turnbelong to the Fédération Internationale deFootballAssociation (FIFA;Participant in theproceedings), an Association under Swiss lawhavingitsseatinZurich.

A.b In the beginning of September 2000 theRespondent hired the Portuguese playerX.________ from the Dutch football clubAFCAjaxNV.Thecorrespondingemployment

contract was executed on September 13, 2000andanticipatedadurationoffourseasons.Theparties had a dispute shortly afterwards andplayerX.________terminatedthecontractforcauseonDecember6,2000.

OnDecember 19, 2000 X.________ enteredinto a new employment contract with theAppellant. The claims and counterclaimsbetweenX.________ and the Respondent infrontof theLisbonLabourCourtweresettledonJanuary9,2003.

B.B.aOn June 1st, 2001 the Respondent claimed

compensation for training and promotionwithin the meaning of Art. 14.1 of the thenin force FIFA Regulations for the Status andTransfer of Players1, October 1997 edition

1.Translator’snote:InEnglishintheoriginalGermantext.

Facts

4A_490/2009*

Judgement of 13 April 20101stCivilDivision

Composition

versus

Parties

SportLisboaEBenfica-FutebolSAD,Respondent,representedbytheattorney-at-lawMrEttoreMazzilli&FédérationInternationaledeFootballAssociation(FIFA),Participantintheproceedings,representedbytheattorney-at-lawMrChristianJenny.

ClubAtléticodeMadridSAD,Appellant,representedbytheattorney-at-lawMrPhilippJ.Dickenmann,

FederalTribunalJudgeKlett,PresidentFederalTribunalJudgeCorbozFederalTribunalJudgeRottenbergLiatowitschFederalTribunalJudgeKollyFederalTribunalJudgeKissClerkoftheCourt:MrLeemann

* Translator’s note: Quote as Club Atlético de Madrid SAD v. Sport Lisboa E Benfica - Futebol SAD and Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), 4A_490/2009. The original of the decision is in German. The text is available on the website of the Fede-ral Tribunal www.bger.ch.


(hereafter 1997 FIFA Transfer Regulation)againsttheAppellant.

OnApril26,2002theFIFASpecialCommitteegrantedcompensationtotheRespondentintheamount of USD 2.5 million for training andpromotionofplayerX.________.

In June 2002, the Appellant challenged thedecision of the FIFA Special Committee ofApril26,2002infrontoftheCommercialCourtof the Canton of Zurich. In a judgement ofJune21,2004theCommercialCourtheldthatthe decision of the FIFA Special Committeewas void. It held that the 1997FIFATransferRegulation violated European and SwissCompetitionlawsamongotherthingsandwasthereforeinvalid,aswellasthedecisionoftheFIFA Special Committeewhichwas based onit. No appeal was made against the judgmentoftheCommercialCourt.TheRespondentwasnotinvolvedintheproceedings.

Further to the judgment of the CommercialCourt, the Appellant and FIFA entered intoan agreement on August 25, 2004 by whichFIFAundertooktotake intoconsiderationthejudgment of theZurichCommercial Court ofJune21,2004shouldtheRespondentmakeanynewclaimswithFIFAagainsttheAppellantinthesamematter.

B.b On October 21, 2004 the Respondent againsoughtadecisionfromFIFAastocompensationfor the training and/or promotion of playerX.________andsubmittedthattheAppellantshouldpayEUR3’165’928.-.TheFIFASpecialCommittee rejected theRespondent’s claim ina decision of February 14, 2008 (notified onDecember23,2008).

B.c OnJanuary13,2009theRespondentappealedthedecisionoftheFIFASpecialCommitteeofFebruary14,2008totheCourtofArbitrationforSport (CAS)anddemanded its reversalaswellas EUR 3’165’928.93 plus interest or a higheramounttobedeterminedbythearbitraltribunal,alternativelytheremandingtotheFIFASpecial

Committeeforanewdecision.

TheAppellantopposed theappealandamongotherthingsreliedontheresiudicataeffectofthejudgment of theZurichCommercial Court ofJune21,2004.

InanawardofAugust31,2009,theCASupheldthe Respondent’s appeal in part and ordered

the Appellant to pay EUR 400’000.- to theRespondent based on the 1997 FIFATransferRegulation.

C.InaCivillawappealtheAppellantsubmitsprincipallythat theFederalTribunal should set aside theCASarbitralawardofAugust31,2009.

TheRespondentandtheCASsubmitthattheappealshouldberejected.FIFAdidnotparticipateactivelyintheproceedings.

D.OnFebruary24,2010theFederalTribunalrejectedtheAppellant’srequestforaninterlocutorydecisionastothetimelinessoftheanswertotheappealandtherequestforatimelimittofileabriefinrebuttal.(TheCourt) also indicated to theAppellant that itwouldbedeemed to renounce abrief in rebuttal ifthe brief was not filedwithin a few days after thedecision.Consequently, theAppellantdidnotfileabriefinrebuttal.

Considerations

1.ACivillawappealisallowedagainstarbitralawardsundertherequirementsofArt.190-192PILA2(Art.77(1)BGG43).

1.1 TheseatoftheArbitralTribunalisinLausanneinthiscase.TheAppellantandtheRespondentboth had their seat outside Switzerland at therelevantpointintime.SincethePartiesdidnotruleoutinwritingtheprovisionsofChapter12PILA,theyapply(Art.176(1)and(2)PILA).

TheCASheldthatSwisslawwasapplicablealongwith the provisions of the FIFA Regulations.ThePartiesdonotchallengetheapplicabilityofSwisslaw.Inthearbitralproceedingstheyalsoagreedthatthe1997FIFATransferRegulationappliestotheissueathand.

1.2 Only thegrievances limitativelyenumerated inArt. 190 (2) PILA are allowed. (BGE 134 III186E.5p.187;128III50E.1ap.53;127III279E.1ap.282).AccordingtoArt.77(3)BGGtheFederalTribunalreviewsonlythegrievanceswhicharebroughtforwardandreasonedintheappeal.Thiscorrespondstothedutytoprovide

2. Translator’s note: PILA is the most commonly used Englishabbreviation for the Federal Statute on International Private Law ofDecember18,1987,RS291.3. Translator’s note: BBG is the German abbreviation for theFederal Statuteof June 17, 2005organising theFederalTribunal,RS173.110.


reasons contained in Art. 106 (2) BGG withregard to the violation of constitutional rightsand of cantonal and inter-cantonal law (BGE134III186E.5p.187withreferences).Criticismofanappellatenatureisnotallowed(BGE119II380E.3bp.382).

1.3 TheissueastowhethertheRespondenttimelysubmitted its request to extend the time limitforitsanswerandthustimelysubmitteditsbriefto theFederalTribunal needsnotbe exploredindepthastheappeal istobegrantedeveninconsiderationoftheanswer.

2.TheAppellant claims that theCASviolatedpublicpolicy (Art. 190 (2) (e) PILA) as it did not heedthe material legal validity of the judgment of theCommercialCourtoftheCantonofZurichofJune21,2004inthesamecase.

2.1 Publicpolicy(Art.190(2)(e)PILA)hasmaterialandproceduralcontents.

Procedural public policy is breached in caseof violation of fundamental and generallyrecognisedproceduralprinciples, thedisregardofwhichcontradicts the senseof justice in anintolerable way, so that the decision appearsabsolutelyincompatiblewiththevaluesandlegalorderofastateruledbylaws(BGE132III389E.2.2.1p.392;128III191E.4ap.194;126III249E.3bp.253withreferences).

Thearbitral tribunalviolatesproceduralpublicpolicy when it leaves unheeded in its awardthematerial legal force of an earlier judgmentorwhenitdeviatesinthefinalawardfromtheopinionexpressedinapreliminaryawardastoamaterialpreliminaryissue(BGE128III191E.4ap.194withreferences;seealsoBGE127III279E.2bp.283).Res iudicata is limited to theholdingofthejudgment.Itdoesnotextendtoitsreasons.Thereasonsofajudgmenthavenobindingeffectastoanotherdisputedissue,buttheymayhave tobe reliedupon toclarify thescopeoftheholdingofthejudgment(BGE128III191E.4ap.195;125III8E.3bp.13;123III16E.2ap.18f.).

Thescopeofthespecificholdingofthecaseisaccordingly tobe assessed in eachcaseon thebasisoftheentirereasonsinthejudgment.

2.2 TheCASwaswrongtorejectthedefenceofresiudicatainthearbitralproceedings.

2.2.1 The CAS wrongly overlooked that theproceedings in front of the CommercialCourt of the Canton of Zurich did notinvolve an appeal against a FIFA decision,aswasthecaseinfrontoftheCAS,buttheimpugnmentofthedecisionofanassociationaccording to Art. 75 ZGB54. Contrary tothe award under review, it is irrelevant tothe assessment of the legal effect of theCommercial Court judgement of June 21,2004thattheproceedingsinvolvedwerenotarbitral proceedings but an “independentSwissdomesticprocedureaimingtocontestadecisionrenderedbyaSwisslawassociation”65accordingtoArt.75ZGB(seeBGE127III279at2c/bbp.284).AstheAppellantrightlyarguesandastheRespondentdoesnotdeny,upon receiving the original decision of theFIFASpecialCommitteeofApril26,2002,itwasnotforlackofarbitrabilitythatanarbitraltribunal could not be seized to impugn thedecision,butbecauseat thetimethereviewofthedecisionsoftheassociationbytheCASwasnotcontemplatedbytheFIFAStatutes.Accordingly the FIFA decision had to beappealed to aStateCourt according toArt.75ZGB.

Contrary to theRespondent’sview, the factthattheseconddecisionoftheFIFASpecialCommittee of February 14, 2008 could beappealed to theCAS due to the arbitrationclauseintheFIFAStatutes,doesnotchangeanything to the fact that these proceedingsonce more involved the decision of theassociation as to the Respondent’s claimagainst the Appellant for the award ofcompensation for training and promotingplayerX.________.

Ultimately, the proceedings in front of theCAS, in which the Respondent challengedthe denial by FIFA of the compensationsought, are nothing else than the arbitraladjudicationoftheimpugnmentofadecisionof a Swiss association (see Urs Scherrer,Aktuelle Rechtsfragen bei Sportvereinen,in: Riemer [Hrsg.], Aktuelle Fragen ausdem Vereinsrecht, 2005, p. 60 f.; Heini/Portmann,DasSchweizerischeVereinsrecht,in: Schweizerisches Privatrecht, Bd. II/5,3. edition 2005, Rz. 285). With regard tojurisdiction, the CAS refers to Art. R47of the CAS Code, which among other

4.Translator’snote:ZGBistheGermanabbreviationfortheSwissCivilCode.5Translator’snote:InEnglishintheoriginalGermantext.


things provides for an appeal against thedecisions of an association (see the caption“SpecialProvisionsApplicabletotheAppealArbitrationProcedure”6)andnottoArt.R38ff of the CAS Code concerning OrdinaryArbitrationProcedure87, basedonArt.R38ffoftheCASCode,whichconcernsadisputeirrespective of a decision by an association(seeArt.R27CASCode).

2.2.2 InthetwoproceedingsinfrontoftheZurichCommercialCourtand in frontof theCASthe legality of the decision of the FIFASpecial Committee as to the Respondent’sclaimagainst theAppellant as to formationandpromotionofplayerX.________hadtobeadjudicated.InadecisionofJune21,2004,the Commercial Court held that the FIFATransfer Regulation of 1997 on which thefirstdecisionoftheFIFASpecialCommitteerelied was void because the decision wasbasedonatransferregulationwhich,amongother things,wasvoiddue toaviolationofEuropean and Swiss Competition Rules.Whilst the impugnment allowed by Art.75 ZGBmay as a matter of principle onlyoverturn a decision, the competentbodyofthe association is bound by the judgmentwith which the decision of the associationunder review is setaside (BGE118II12at1c p. 14 with reference to Riemer, BernerKommentar,3rdedition1990,N.82atArt.75ZGB).TheFIFASpecialCommitteehadallthemoretoabidebythejudgmentoftheCommercialCourt that itsdecisionwasnotmerelyrescindedduetoaninvalidlegalbasisbutheldtobevoid(seeRiemeratN129f.atArt.75ZGB)anditcouldnotproceedtoawardthe Respondent compensation for trainingand promotion of playerX.________ in anewdecisionbasedonthesame1997FIFATransferRegulation.Accordingly, the FIFASpecialCommitteerejectedtheRespondent’srenewedclaimforcompensationfortrainingand promotion of playerX.________ in adecisionofFebruary14,2008whichiscorrectinitsresult.Onappeal,theCASimposedontheAppellantcompensationintheamountofEUR400’000.-basedonArt.14ofthe1997FIFATransferRegulationandsetitsquantumby applying Art. 42 (2) OR98 alternatively.In doing so it ignored the judgment of theCommercialCourtof theCantonofZurich

6.Translator’snote:InEnglishintheoriginalGermantext.7.Translator’snote:InEnglishintheoriginalGermantext.8.Translator’snote:ORistheGermanabbreviationfortheSwissCodeofObligations.

of June 21, 2004, which held as void theAppellant’s obligation to pay compensationfor theformationandpromotionasper theFIFASpecialCommitteebasedonthe1997FIFATransferRegulation.TheRespondent’sargument, based on the right to be heard,thatitwasnotapartytotheproceedingsinfrontof theCommercialCourt anddidnotparticipateintheminanyotherwaydoesnotchangethesituation.ThepartiesinfrontoftheCommercialCourtwerelogicallydeterminedby Art. 75 ZGB which, in an action forimpugnment, always gives standing to besuedtotheassociationandnottosomeothermemberinterestedinthedecision(Riemer,adN.60atArt.75ZGB;seealsoBGE132III503E.3.1p.507).Apartfromthis,whentheimpugnmentofthedecisionofanassociationor a challenge is upheld, this, as opposedto its rejection,has an effectnotonly as tothepartiestotheproceedingsbutergaomnes(Riemer,Anfechtungs-undNichtigkeitsklageim schweizerischen Gesellschaftsrecht[AG, GmbH, Genossenschaft, Verein,Stockwerkeigentümergemeinschaft], 1998,Rz. 304, 218; derselbe, at N. 81 at Art. 75ZGB;Heini/Scherrer,in:BaslerKommentar,ZivilgesetzbuchI,3rdedition2006,N.31and38atArt.75ZGB;seealsoHenkFenners,DerAusschlussderstaatlichenGerichtsbarkeitimorganisiertenSport,2006,p75Rz.253;BGE122III279E.3c/bbp.284f.aswellasArt.706Abs.5OR).

ThefactthatFIFAsubsequently introducedanarbitralproceduretoimpugnitsdecisions,to which the Respondent is now a partyandwhichmakes itpossiblefortheCAStodecide thecase anew (Art.R57of theCASCode) does not change the fact that theissue in front of theCAS as to the legalityof the decision by which the FIFA SpecialCommitteegrantedorrefusedcompensationbetween theRespondent and theAppellantastothetrainingand/orpromotionofplayerX.________hadalreadybeendecided inadecisionoftheCommercialCourtofJune21,2004,which is enforceable.The subsequentintroduction of an arbitral review of thedecisionsoftheassociationremainedwithoutinfluence on the enforceability of the StateCourtdecisionson impugnmentspreviouslyissued. In relation to the new impugnmentpossibilities as well, contradictory decisionson the same issue in different proceedingshad to be prevented (see Max Guldener,Schweizerisches Zivilprozessrecht, 3rd


edition1979,p.10364).Whetherornot theCommercialCourtof theCantonofZurichwouldhavebeenboundbyitsearlierdecisioninwhichitheldthatthecompensationawardedby FIFA was void due to the invalidity oftheFIFATransferRegulationof1997hadasecond impugnmentbemadeagainstanewFIFAdecisionastocompensationforplayerX.________’s formation and promotion,the Arbitral Tribunal obtaining jurisdictionlatercouldnotexamineanewanissuewhichhadalreadybeendecided.

2.2.3 Moreover theArbitral Tribunalmay not befollowed when it holds that the Appellantand FIFA, in connection with the issueof res iudicata, would have provided in theiragreementofAugust25,2004followingthejudgment of the Zurich Commercial Courtthatanewclaimcouldbemadeinthesamematter.When FIFA undertook towards theAppellantthatitwouldtakeintoconsiderationthejudgmentoftheCommercialCourtshouldtheRespondentmakenewclaimsagainsttheAppellantinthesamematter,thisreinforceditsvalidityforlaterproceedings,contrarytotheviewoftheCAS.That(FIFA)reckonedwithfurtherclaimsinnowaymeansthattheywouldhaveagreedwithanewadjudicationofthesameclaims.

2.2.4 The CAS award as to compensationfor training and promotion of playerX.________ is barred by res iudicata. Thearbitral award by which the CAS awardedcompensation for training and promotionof the player X.________ in the amountofEUR400’000.- on the basis of the 1997FIFA Transfer Regulation to the AppellantindisregardofthemateriallegaleffectofthejudgmentoftheZurichCommercialCourtofJune21,2004accordinglyviolatesproceduralpublicpolicy.

3.Theappeal is tobegrantedandtheCASAwardofAugust31st2009setaside.

In view of the outcome of the proceedings theRespondentshallpaycostsandcompensatetheotherParty(Art.66(1)andArt.68(2)BGG).

Therefore, the Federal Tribunal pronounces:

1.The appeal is upheld and the award ofAugust 21,2009issetaside.

2.Thejudicialcosts,setatCHF8’500.-shallbepaidbytheRespondent.

3.TheRespondentshallpaytotheAppellantanamountofCHF9’500.-forthefederaljudicialproceedings.

4 . This judgment shall be notified in writing to theParties and to the Court of Arbitration for Sport(CAS).

Lausanne,13April2010

InthenameoftheFirstCivilLawCourtoftheSwissFederalTribunal

ThePresidingJudge: TheClerk:Klett Leemann


Observations related to the judgment of the Swiss Federal Tribunal 4A_490/2009

1. On13April2010,theSwissFederalTribunalhasannulled theCASaward issued in thecaseCAS2009/A/1965 Sport Lisboa & Benfica v. ClubAtléticodeMadridSAD&FIFAonthebasisofaviolationofSwissproceduralpublicpolicy(article190(1)(d) of the Swiss Private International LawAct),andmorepreciselyoftheresjudicataprinciple.

TheCAS case concerned a dispute between thePortuguesefootballclubSportLisboa&Benfica(hereinafter “Benfica”) and the Spanish footballclub Atlético de Madrid SAD (hereinafter“Atlético”) with respect to the trainingcompensation requested by Benfica to Atléticoconcerning a Portuguese player on the basis ofarticle14(1)oftheFIFARegulationsfortheStatusandTransferofPlayers,edition1997.

On 26 April 2002, FIFA’s Special CommitteeissuedadecisionwherebyAtléticowasorderedtopay toBenfica an amount ofUSD 2,500,000 as“compensation for the training and/or development of theplayer”. This sumwascalculatedon thebasisofcriteriausedatthattimebyFIFAwhendecidingdisputesinvolvingbreachofcontracts(regardlessof the titleof thecompensation)which includedtheremunerationsandpremiumsreceivedbytheplayer,hiscareeraswellashisinternationalability.

Atlético appealed this decision before theCommercialCourtoftheCantonofZurich1.Thejudicial proceeding involved FIFA and Atlético,but not Benfica who, in spite of being a directinterestedpartytothedispute,wasnotjoinedasapartytotheproceedings.

On21 June 2004, theCommercialCourt of theCantonofZurich issued its decisionbywhich itrendered null and void the FIFA decision of 26April 2002. This decision by the CommercialCourt of the Canton of Zurich has not beenappealedagainst.

On25August2004,FIFAandAtléticoconcludedanagreementbymeansofwhichitwasagreedthatintheeventthatBenficawouldlodgeanewclaim

1.AtthetimeofthedecisionofFIFA’sSpecialCommittee,noappealtoCASwasavailable.However,pursuanttoarticle75oftheSwissCivilCode,“[e]verymemberofasocietyisabsolutelyentitledbylawtoapplytothecourtstoavoidanyresolutionspassedbythesocietywithouthisassent,whicharecontrarytolawortheconstitutionofthesociety,providedtheapplicationismadewithinonemonthfromthedayonwhichhebecamecognizantofsuchresolutions”.

withFIFAforcompensationforthetrainingand/orcompensationof theplayer,FIFAwould takeinto account the findings of the decision of theCommercialCourtoftheCantonofZurichwhenconducting the proceedings.Again, Benficawasnotapartytothisagreement.

On 21 October 2004, As indeed foreseen byFIFA andAtleticowhen signing the agreement,BenficasoughtanewdecisionfromFIFAonthecompensationpayablebyAtléticoforthetrainingand/ordevelopmentoftheplayer.On14February2008, the FIFA Special Committee decided torejectBenfica’sclaimafterenteringintothemeritsofthecase.

This second decision from the FIFA SpecialCommitteewas referred to theCASbyBenfica.TheCASupheld the appeal inpart andorderedAtlético to pay to Benfica the amount of EUR400,000 based on the FIFARegulations for theStatusandTransferofPlayers,1997edition.

2. Thepresent comment from thePanelonly aimsat expressing thePanel’spointofviewon issuesraisedbytheFederalTribunalinitsdecisionof13August2010.

As stated by the Federal Tribunal itself in itsjudgment:“[r]es judicatais limitedtotheholdingof thejudgment.Itdoesnotextendtoitsreasons.Thereasonsofajudgmenthavenobindingeffectastoanotherdisputedissue,buttheymayhavetobereliedupontoclarifythescopeoftheholdingofthejudgment”.

AccordingtotheholdingofthedecisionfromtheCommercial Court of the Canton of Zurich of21June2004,thedecisionrenderedbytheFIFASpecialCommitteeon26April 2002 isnull andvoid. A null decision suffers from such seriousirregularitythatitcannotdeployanyeffect.Suchdecision is effective as long as it has not beencontestedanditsnullitystated.Thenullityofthedecisionmeans that itneverexisted froma legalpoint of view. It also implies that this decisionneverhadanyeffect,evenpriortothe judgmentstatingitsnullity(extunc).

When reviewing the decision from theCommercialCourtof theCantonofZurich, thePanel, like the FIFA Special Committee in its


second decision of 14 February 2008, followinga new claim from Benfica against Atlético deMadrid, considered that the first decision fromtheFIFASpecialCommitteehadbeendeclaredbytheCommercialCourtnullandvoidasithadbeenreached arbitrarily. Basedon this consideration,andtheclearunderstandingthatthedisputewasadisputeoncompensationforbreachofcontract,theFIFASpecialCommittee, and then theCASPanel,enteredintothesubstanceofthedisputeinorder to determine objectively, applying specificcriteria,whetherBenficawas entitled tohave itsclaim upheld. The CAS Panel considered thatarticle14oftheFIFARegulationsfortheTransferand Status of Players, edition 1997, applicableto thedispute,wasnotconsiderednull andvoidpersebytheCommercialCourtoftheCantonofZurich,butthatonlythefirstdecisionrenderedbytheFIFASpecialCommitteewasnullandvoidasreachedarbitrarily.TheCASPanelonlyreviewedthe second decision from the FIFA SpecialCommittee while respecting the decision of theCommercialCourtoftheCantonofZurichastothenullityofthefirstdecisionoftheFIFASpecialCommittee.Therefore,thePanelconsidersitwascomplyingwiththeresjudicataprinciple.

Moreover, the Panel wishes to emphasize thatarticle 75 of the Swiss Civil Code, onwhich anappeal against a decision rendered by FIFAwasbased2 prior to the insertion of the arbitrationclause in favor of the CAS, does not takeinto consideration the specificities of sportorganizations. In fact, article 75 of the SwissCivilCodeisbasedonthepremisesofaverticalrelationshipbetweentheassociationandoneofitsmembers or several of itsmembers individually,whose rights this provision is aiming toprotect.The present decision from FIFA has a judicialaspect as it settles a dispute between two of itsmembers, and does not address the relationshipbetween the association and its members.Therefore, when appealing the first decisionfrom theFIFASpecialCommittee, even thoughit was legally correct to have only Atlético (theappellant)andFIFA(theassociation)aspartiestotheproceedingsbeforetheCommercialCourtoftheCantonofZurich,thePanelstillconsidersthatsuch an appeal does not guarantee the rights ofoneoftheconcernedpartiestothedisputewhichhasbeensettled(inthepresentcaseBenfica),suchasaCASprocedurewoulddo.

3. In view of the definition of res judicata given bytheSwissFederalTribunalwhichseemstoallow

2.SeenoteN°1

a more intrusive control of the enforcementof judgments, and the fact that the situationwas altered in application of a regulationwhichdoes not take into consideration the currentorganizationofprofessionalsport,theCASPanelisoftheopinionthatthecharacteristicsoftheresjudicata principlewerenot straightforward in thecaseatstake.

Lausanne,October2010

HenrikWillem KeslerPresidentofthePanel

EfraimBarak JoséJuanPintó SalaArbitratorArbitrator

175-Informations diverses / Miscellaneous

• AndersonP.(dir.),2009AnnualSurvey:RecentDevelopments in Sports Law, 20 MarquetteSportsLawReview2/2010,p.497ss(spéc.TASp.541-563)

• Crespo Perez J. D. (dir.), Tribunal Arbitral delDeporte, Revista Aranzadi de Derecho deDeporteyEntretenimiento1/2010,p.557ss

• Crespo Perez J. D. (dir.), Tribunal Arbitral delDeporte, Revista Aranzadi de Derecho deDeporteyEntretenimiento2/2010,p.463ss

• Dubey J.-P., Panorama 2009 des sentences duTribunal Arbitral du Sport, Jurisport 99/2010,p.27ss

Publications récentes relatives au TAS / Recent publications related to CAS

• Hascher D./Loquin E., Tribunal Arbitral duSport,JDI1/2010,chron.1,p.199ss

• Maisonneuve M., Chronique de jurisprudencearbitraleenmatièresportive,Revuedel’arbitrage3/2010,p.601ss

• MaisonneuveM.,L’arbitragedeslitigessportifs,coll.Bibliothèquededroitpublic,Paris:LGDJ,àparaître

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