RULE 131 BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS

BURDEN OF PROOF – Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.

UPON WHOM BURDEN OF PROOF RESTS and DEGREE OF PROOF THAT SATISFIES THE BURDEN OF PROOF:

ADMINISTRATIVE CASES

In administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that the respondent committed the acts complained of rests on the complainant. The complainant must be able to show this by substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, otherwise, the complaint must be dismissed. (Sec. 5 , Rule 133, Rules of Court).

In an illegal dismissal case, the onus probandi rests on the employer to prove that its dismissal of an employee was for a valid cause. However, before a case for illegal dismissal can prosper, an employer-employee relationship must first be established. In filing a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal based on the premise that petitioner was an employee of respondent, it is incumbent upon petitioner to prove the employee-employer relationship by substantial evidence. (Lopez v. Bodega City, G.R. No. 155731).

Moreover, it is settled that in administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that the respondent committed the acts complained of rests on the complainant. In fact, if the complainant upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the respondent is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense. Even in administrative cases, if a court employee or magistrate is to be disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence against him should be competent and should be derived from direct knowledge. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his duties will prevail. (The Law Firm of Chavez Miranda Aseoche, A.M. No. CA-09-48-J).

Before a claim for discrimination can prosper, it must be established that, first, there is no reasonable distinction or classification that can be obtained between persons belonging to the same class and second, persons belonging to the same class have not been treated alike. In this case, petitioner failed to establish that he possessed the same skills, competencies and expertise as those of the newly hired bank officers so as to eliminate any possibility of substantial distinction that may warrant the unequal treatment between them. No proof was likewise presented by petitioner to show that the functions, duties and responsibilities he was performing are the same as those of the newly hired bank officers. (Portuguez v. GSIS Family Bank, G.R. No. 169570)

In recognition and protection of the tenant’s right to security of tenure, the burden of proof is upon the agricultural lessor to show the existence of the lawful causes for ejectment or dispossession under Section 36 of Republic Act No. 3844. (Antonio v. Manahan, G.R. No. 176091)

In deportation proceedings, the alien bears the burden of proving that he entered the Philippines lawfully. All non-immigrants are required to present unexpired passports and valid visas prior to their admission into the Philippines under Section 10 of the Immigration Act. (The Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation v. Park, G.R. No. 159835)

       

LOLITA LOPEZ vs. BODEGA CITY G.R. No. 155731    

FACTS:Respondent Bodega is a corporation duly registered under the laws of the

Phiklippines while respondent Andres C. Torres-Yap (Yap) is its owner/ manager. Petitioner was the “lady keeper” of Bodega City tasked with manning its ladies’ comfort room.

In a letter signed by Yap, petitioner was made to explain why the concessionaire agreement between her and respondents should not be terminated or suspended in view of an incident wherein petitioner was seen to have acted in a hostile manner against a lady customer of Bodega City who informed the management that she saw petitioner sleeping while on duty. In a subsequent letter, Yap informed petitioner that because of such incident, respondents had decided to terminate the concessionaire agreement between them.

Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal against respondents contending that she was dismissed from her employment without cause and due process. In their answer, respondents contended that no employer-employee relationship ever existed between them and petitioner; that the latter’s services rendered within the premises of Bodega City was by virtue of a concessionaire agreement she entered into with respondents.

Labor Arbiter rendered judgment finding that petitioner was an employee of respondents and that the latter illegally dismissed her. This was however, reversed by NLRC. The CA also ruled in favor of respondent.

Petitioner further argues that her receipt of a special allowance from respondents is a clear evidence that she was an employee of the latter, as the amount she received was equivalent to the minimum wage at that time.

Petitioner also contends that her identification card clearly shows that she was not a concessionaire but an employee of respondents; that if respondents really intended the ID card issued to her to be used simply for having access to the premises of Bodega City, then respondents could have clearly indicated such intent on the said ID card.

Moreover, petitioner submits that the fact that she was required to follow rules and regulations prescribing appropriate conduct while she was in the premises of Bodega City is clear evidence of the existence of an employer-employee relationship between her and petitioners.

ISSUE:Whether or not Lopez is an employee of respondent.

HELD:It is a basic rule of evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation.

If he claims a right granted by law, he must prove his claim by competent evidence, relying on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of his opponent.

The test for determining on whom the burden of proof lies is found in the result of an inquiry as to which party would be successful if no evidence of such matters were given.

In an illegal dismissal case, the onus probandi rests on the employer to prove that its dismissal of an employee was for a valid cause. However, before a case for illegal dismissal can prosper, an employer-employee relationship must first be established. In filing a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal based on the premise that she was an employee of respondent, it is incumbent upon petitioner to prove the employee-employer relationship by substantial evidence.

The Court applies the four-fold test expounded in Abante v. Lamadrid Bearing and Parts Corp.,[16] to wit:To ascertain the existence of an employer-employee relationship, jurisprudence has invariably applied the four-fold test, namely: (1) the manner of selection and engagement; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the presence or absence of the power of dismissal; and (4) the presence or absence of the power of control. Of these four, the last one is the most important. The so-called “control test” is commonly regarded as the most crucial and determinative indicator of the presence or absence of an employer-employee relationship. Under the control test, an employer-employee relationship exists where the person for whom the services are performed reserves the right to control not only the end achieved, but also the manner and means to be used in reaching that end.

To prove the element of payment of wages, petitioner presented a petty cash voucher showing that she received an allowance for five (5) days. The CA did not err when it held that a solitary petty cash voucher did not prove that petitioner had been receiving salary from respondents or that she had been respondents’ employee for 10 years.

Indeed, if petitioner was really an employee of respondents for that length of time, she should have been able to present salary vouchers or pay slips and not just a single petty cash voucher. The Court agrees with respondents that petitioner could have easily shown other pieces of evidence such as a contract of employment, SSS or Medicare forms, or certificates of withholding tax on compensation income; or she could have presented witnesses to prove her contention that she was an employee of respondents. Petitioner failed to do so.

Anent the element of control, petitioner’s contention that she was an employee of respondents because she was subject to their control does not hold water. Petitioner failed to cite a single instance to prove that she was subject to the control of respondents insofar as the manner in which she should perform her job as a “lady keeper” was concerned. It is true that petitioner was required to follow rules and

regulations prescribing appropriate conduct while within the premises of Bodega City. However, this was imposed upon petitioner as part of the terms and conditions in the concessionaire agreement embodied in a 1992 letter of Yap addressed to petitioner.

Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the letter; neither does she deny that respondents offered her the subject concessionaire agreement. However, she contends that she could not have entered into the said agreement with respondents because she did not sign the document evidencing the same. Settled is the rule that contracts are perfected by mere consent, upon the acceptance by the offeree of the offer made by the offeror.

Petitioner is likewise estopped from denying the existence of the subject concessionaire agreement. She should not, after enjoying the benefits of the concessionaire agreement with respondents, be allowed to later disown the same through her allegation that she was an employee of the respondents when the said agreement was terminated by reason of her violation of the terms and conditions thereof.

As to the ID card, it is true that the words “EMPLOYEE’S NAME” appear printed below petitioner’s name. However, she failed to dispute respondents’ evidence consisting of Habitan’s testimony, that he and the other “contractors” of Bodega City such as the singers and band performers, were also issued the same ID cards for the purpose of enabling them to enter the premises of Bodega City.

With respect to the petty cash voucher, petitioner failed to refute respondent’s claim that it was not given to her for services rendered or on a regular basis, but simply granted as financial assistance to help her temporarily meet her family’s needs.

Hence, going back to the element of control, the concessionaire agreement merely stated that petitioner shall maintain the cleanliness of the ladies’ comfort room and observe courtesy guidelines that would help her obtain the results they wanted to achieve. There is nothing in the agreement which specifies the methods by which petitioner should achieve these results. Respondents did not indicate the manner in which she should go about in maintaining the cleanliness of the ladies’ comfort room. Neither did respondents determine the means and methods by which petitioner could ensure the satisfaction of respondent company’s customers. In other words, petitioner was given a free hand as to how she would perform her job as a “lady keeper.” In fact, the last paragraph of the concessionaire agreement even allowed petitioner to engage persons to work with or assist her in the discharge of her functions.

Moreover, petitioner was not subjected to definite hours or conditions of work. The fact that she was expected to maintain the cleanliness of respondent company’s ladies’ comfort room during Bodega City’s operating hours does not indicate that her performance of her job was subject to the control of respondents as to make her an employee of the latter. Instead, the requirement that she had to render her services while Bodega City was open for business was dictated simply by the very nature of her undertaking, which was to give assistance to the users of the ladies’ comfort room.

Lastly, the Court finds that the elements of selection and engagement as well as the power of dismissal are not present in the instant case.

It has been established that there has been no employer-employee relationship between respondents and petitioner. Their contractual relationship was governed by the concessionaire agreement embodied in the 1992 letter. Thus, petitioner was not

dismissed by respondents. Instead, as shown by the letter of Yap to her dated February 15, 1995, their contractual relationship was terminated by reason of respondents' termination of the subject concessionaire agreement, which was in accordance with the provisions of the agreement in case of violation of its terms and conditions.

       

PORTUGUEZ, Petitioner, vs. GSIS FAMILY BANK G.R. No. 169570    

FACTS:Petitioner was employed by the respondent bank as utility clerk on 1 February

1971. Later, he rose from the ranks and was promoted as branch manager of the Gen. Trias Branch, and was subsequently assigned to other branches of respondent bank within the Province of Cavite. Eventually, he was appointed as Business Development and Public Relations (BDPR) Officer of the entire respondent bank. In addition to his regular duties as BDPR Officer, petitioner was designated as a member of the Procurement Bidding and Awards Committee (PBAC), Oversight Committee and Investigating Committee of the respondent bank.

On 23 October 1997, petitioner was temporarily assigned as caretaker of respondent bank. Finally, he was designated as Acting Assistant Vice-President and at the same time Officer-In-Charge of the respondent bank on 15 June 1998.

In 1987, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) acquired the interest of the Commercial Bank of Manila in the respondent bank and together with the Central Bank and the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). Resultantly, GSIS took over the control and management of the respondent bank that was renamed as GSIS Family Savings Bank.

Accordingly, Amando Macalino (Macalino) was appointed as President of the respondent bank. In view of Macalino’s appointment, the designation of petitioner as Officer-In-Charge and caretaker of respondent bank was recalled; however, his appointment as Acting Assistant Vice-President was retained. Meanwhile, respondent bank came up with an early voluntary retirement program and petitioner opted to avail himself of this retirement package, supposedly, under protest, and received the amount of P1.324 Million as retirement pay.

Petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent bank and Macalino for constructive dismissal and underpayment of wages, 13th month pay and retirement benefits before the Labor Arbiter. Petitioner alleged that due to discrimination, unfair treatment, and intense pressure he had received from the new management through Macalino, he was forced to retire at the prime of his life. Substantively, petitioner alleges that respondent bank, through Macalino, subjected him to all forms of unbearable harassment that can be mustered in order to force him to resign. Petitioner specifically claims that he was deprived of his salary and other benefits and privileges appurtenant to his position as the Acting Assistant Vice-President, including his office. Respondent bank allegedly granted much higher salary to the newly hired bank officers compared to what he was receiving during his tenure. In contrast, respondent bank maintains that petitioner was not coerced to resign but voluntarily opted to avail himself of the early retirement program and was duly paid his retirement benefits. 

The Labor Arbiter adjudged the respondent bank guilty of illegal dismissal. Aggrieved, respondent bank appealed the adverse decision to the NLRC which affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUES:Whether or not there was evidence to prove that there was discrimination.Whether or not petitioner was constructively dismissed from employment.

HELD:No evidence, substantial or otherwise, was ever submitted by petitioner to

buttress the very premise of his position that there was discrimination.Discrimination has been defined as the failure to treat all persons equally when

no reasonable distinction can be found between those favored and those not favored. Thus, before a claim for discrimination can prosper, it must be established that, first, there is no reasonable distinction or classification that can be obtained between persons belonging to the same class, and second, persons belonging to the same class have not been treated alike.

Apropos thereto, petitioner failed to establish that he possessed the same skills, competencies and expertise as those of the newly hired bank officers so as to eliminate any possibility of substantial distinction that may warrant the unequal treatment between them. No proof was likewise presented by petitioner to show that the functions, duties and responsibilities he was performing are the same as those of the newly hired bank officers.

Petitioner likewise failed to present any proof tending to show that he was discriminated against by the respondent bank. While he vigorously cried that the newly hired bank officers were afforded higher salaries and benefits compared to what he was earning, petitioner, however, miserably failed to substantiate his claim. No evidence was ever offered by petitioner to prove the amount of salaries and bonuses actually enjoyed by the newly hired bank officers, except for his bare allegations contained in his demand letter dated 20 February 2001, to wit: Mr. Portuguez has reliably learned that Bank records could show that your newly hired officers are being paid the basic salaries in the range of P25,000 to P30,000.

Such bare and sweeping statement contains nothing but empty imputation of a fact that could hardly be given any evidentiary weight by this Court. It is indeed true that the demand letter made reference to bank records upon which petitioner purportedly derived his allegation but no such bank records were ever presented as evidence at any stage of the proceedings.

Indubitably, such self-serving and unsubstantiated declaration is insufficient to establish a case before quasi-judicial bodies. Well-entrenched is the rule that the quantum of evidence required to establish a fact in quasi-judicial bodies is substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might opine otherwise.

It is beyond question that the evidence presented by petitioner cannot be considered as substantial evidence. Verily, petitioner’s case is devoid of substance to

convince even the unreasonable minds, for evidently the records are stripped of supporting proofs to, at the very least, even just verify his claim.

In addition, petitioner asseverates that in cases of constructive dismissal, the burden of proof rests on the employer to show that the employee was dismissed on a valid and just cause. And failing to discharge such presumption, as in the case at bar, respondent bank should be adjudged guilty of illegal dismissal.

The court is not persuaded. It is a statutory rule that in illegal dismissal cases, the employer has the onus probandi to show that the employee’s separation from employment is not motivated by discrimination, made in bad faith, or effected as a form of punishment or demotion without sufficient cause. It bears stressing, however, that this legal principle presupposes that there is indeed an involuntary separation from employment and the facts attendant to such forced separation was clearly established.

This legal principle has no application in the instant controversy for as we have succinctly pointed above, petitioner failed to establish that indeed he was discriminated against and on account of such discrimination, he was forced to sever his employment from the respondent bank. What is undisputed is the fact that petitioner availed himself of respondent bank’s early voluntary retirement program and accordingly received his retirement pay in the amount ofP1.324 Million under such program. Consequently, the burden of proof will not vest on respondent bank to prove the legality of petitioner’s separation from employment but aptly remains with the petitioner to prove his allegation that his availment of the early voluntary retirement program was, in fact, done involuntarily.

The rule is that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; thus, petitioners were burdened to prove their allegation that respondents dismissed them from their employment. It must be stressed that the evidence to prove this fact must be clear, positive and convincing. The rule that the employer bears the burden of proof in illegal dismissal cases finds no application here because the respondents deny having dismissed the petitioners.

Verily, petitioner did not present any clear, positive or convincing evidence in the present case to support his claims. Indeed, he never presented any evidence at all other than his own self-serving declarations. We must bear in mind the legal dictum that, "he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove."

JARL CONSTRUCTION vs. ATENCIO G.R. NO. 175969

FACTS:This case stems from a complaint for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of salaries,

and 13th month pay filed by respondent Simeon A. Atencio with NLRC against petitioners JARL Construction and its general manager, Armando K. Tejada. JARL, through its general manager, Tejada, hired Atencio as its chief operating manager, whose primary function was to direct and manage JARL’s construction projects. According to Atencio, he discovered during his employment that JARL did not have the proper facilities, personnel, and equipment to undertake the Caltex project, hence he and Tejada discussed the need for hiring subcontractors. It was during these meetings that Tejada agreed to hire Atencio’s construction company, Safemark, to perform works

for the Caltex project. On May 24, 1999, Tejada informed Atencio and Safemark that JARL was terminating Atencio’s management and supervision works for the Caltex project effective May 20, 1999. Atencio construed the above letter as a termination of the subcontract between his company and JARL. Believing, however, that his employment as JARL’s chief operating manager was separate from their subcontracting agreement, Atencio allegedly continued reporting for work to the Caltex project site until, sometime in June 1999,14 when he was barred from entering the said premises.15 On his complaint, Atencio maintained that JARL did not inform him of the charges leveled against him and of his termination from employment. He claimed learning of his termination only through the letter that JARL sent to Caltex Philippines.

ISSUE:Whether petitioners were able to prove their substantial compliance with the procedural due process requirements?

HELD:NO. Petitioners’ evidence fails to prove their contention that they afforded

Atencio with due process. The June 21, 1999 letter, which allegedly proves Atencio’s knowledge of the charges against him, and which allegedly constitutes Atencio’s explanation, clearly discusses an entirely different topic – which is the removal of his construction company from the Caltex project. As for the May 24, 1999 letter, which allegedly constitutes the notice of termination of Atencio’s employment as JARL’s chief operating manager, the said letter involves the termination of the subcontracting agreement between JARL and Atencio’s company, and not the termination of Atencio’s employment. For petitioners’ failure to observe the two-notice rule under Article 277(b) of the Labor Code, respondent is entitled to nominal damages. The Court explained the purposes of the two notices: The first notice, which may be considered as the proper charge, serves to apprise the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought. The second notice on the other hand seeks to inform the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him. This decision, however, must come only after the employee is given a reasonable period from receipt of the first notice within which to answer the charge and ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the assistance of a representative, if he so desires. This is in consonance with the express provision of the law on the protection to labor and the broader dictates of procedural due process. Non-compliance therewith is fatal because these requirements are conditions sine qua non before dismissal may be validly effected.

THE LAW FIRM OF CHAVEZ MIRANDA A.M. No. CA-09-48-J

FACTS:This is an administrative complaint against Justice Isaias P. Dicdican, Chairman

of the 19th Division of the Court of Appeals based in Cebu City, for violation of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Ma. Krissyl Asparen filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City for nullification of disciplinary sanctions, damages with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO)/injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 0512512, entitled “Ma. Krissyl M. Asparen v. St. Mary Mazzarrello and Sr. Maria Pacencia Bandalan, FMA, Department of Education.”  The school involved in the case had imposed disciplinary sanctions on its student, Ma. Krissyl M. Asparen, but the same was lifted upon the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction by Hon. Elumba, the presiding judge of the trial court. The matter was then elevated to the Court of Appeals which issued a TRO, penned by respondent Justice, preventing the enforcement of the order and writ of the trial court. 

Immediately thereafter, complainant and Ma. Krissyl Asparen sought the inhibition of respondent from the case on the ground that the latter had previously represented various religious organizations and institutions during his practice of law and the petitioner school in the case is run by a religious organization while petitioner Sr. Bandalan is a nun belonging to said organization. 

In a Resolution, respondent Justice admitted on record that he once served as counsel of religious organizations but denied that such circumstance affected his impartiality in the case. Respondent Justice, however, found it proper to voluntarily inhibit himself to disabuse the mind of the student and complainant of any suspicion as to his impartiality.

Despite his inhibition, respondent Justice allegedly participated again in the case when his name appeared as one of the signatories of a Resolution dated 21 November 2006 of the Court of Appeals admitting the memorandum of the petitioner school and which deemed the petition as submitted for decision. As such, complainant filed a Manifestation and Motion for respondent Justice to maintain his earlier inhibition; complainant again filed a Reiterative Motion for Justice Dicdican to Maintain His Earlier Inhibition from the Present Case.  

Complainant alleged that respondent Justice’s actions showed his manifest bias and prejudice against his client in the case—a blatant disregard of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.  

For his part, respondent Justice maintained that he never participated again in the case after his inhibition therefrom on 1 April 2005. In fact, he never received any of the manifestations and motions filed by complainant subsequent to his inhibition because the case filed was no longer with him and the case documents were not forwarded to him. Respondent Justice likewise averred that the assailed Resolution of 21 November 2005 was promulgated based on the agendum which was actually signed by Justices Barza, asponente, Baltazar-Padilla and Gonzales-Sison. This is clearly shown in the Report made by the Court of Appeals Division Clerk dated 25 April 2008. 

Moreover, records show that Division Clerk of Court May Faith Trumata forwarded to the Raffle Committee of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City Station the rollo of the case for reraffling to another justice in view of respondent Justice’s inhibition therefrom. The case was reraffled and was assigned to Justice Enrico Lanzanas. However, Justice Lanzanas was transferred to the Court of Appeals of Manila. Consequently, the case was reassigned as part of his initial case load to Justice Romeo F. Barza, a junior member of the 18thDivision. As a result of a reorganization, Justice Barza became a senior member of the 19 th Division of which respondent Justice is the Chairman. Considering that respondent Justice could no longer participate in the case, Justice Marlene Sison was designated as third member of the 19th Division. 

On 21 November 2006, the assailed Resolution was promulgated with Stenographer Agnes Joy S. Nobleza mistakenly including respondent Justice as one of the signatories. Proof of this inadvertence is the letter of apology dated 8 November 2007 sent to respondent Justice by Stenographer Nobleza. Clearly, respondent Justice asserted, the charges leveled against him are devoid of factual basis. Respondent Justice strongly contended, in fact, that complainant should be the one made to answer for the false accusations and insults he had made against the court. ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Justice’s actions showed his manifest bias and prejudice against his client in the case, which is a blatant disregard of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

HELD: The Court finds the instant administrative complaint devoid of merit and should

accordingly be dismissed. 

It is settled that in administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that the respondent committed the acts complained of rests on the complainant. In fact, if the complainant upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the respondent is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense. Even in administrative cases, if a court employee or magistrate is to be disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence against him should be competent and should be derived from direct knowledge. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his duties will prevail.  

In the present case, complainant failed to substantiate his imputations of impropriety and partiality against respondent Justice. Aside from his naked allegations, conjecture and speculations, he failed to present any other evidence to prove his charges.  Hence, the presumption that respondent regularly performed his duties prevails. On the other hand, respondent Justice adequately explained that since his

voluntary inhibition from the case, he no longer participated in the case and his perceived participation in the issuance of the assailed Resolution was a result of a typographical mistake. 

It also bears reiteration that a party’s remedy, if prejudiced by the orders of a magistrate lies with the proper reviewing court, not with the Office of the Court Administrator by means of an administrative complaint. It is axiomatic that, where some other judicial means is available, an administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every act of a judge deemed aberrant or irregular.  

Antonio vs Manahan G.R. No. 176091

Facts:

   The suit concerns two (2) parcels of agricultural land situated at Gitnang Bayan I, San Mateo, Rizal registered in the name of private respondent Gregorio Manahan (Manahan) under Original Certificate of Title Nos. 9200 and 9150 of the Rizal Provincial Registry. Manahan and Antonio entered into a Kasunduang Buwisan sa Sakahan (Leasehold Agreement) whereby the latter undertook to cultivate the subject parcels for an annual rental of 70 cavans of dried, cleaned and good quality palay, each weighing 44 kilos.  Subject to the provisions of Republic Act No. 6389, the Leasehold Agreement provided, among other terms and conditions, that the land shall be exclusively planted to rice; that Antonio shall neither expand the 12x12 square meter portion on which his house stands nor allow others to construct their homes on the lands in litigation; that the planting and harvest on both parcels shall be simultaneously accomplished by Antonio; and, that Manahan shall be entitled to a three-day prior notice of the harvests done on the property. 

          In 1994, 1996 and 1997, Manahan filed complaints before the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) against Antonio, for such violations of the Leasehold Agreement. On the ground that Antonio persisted with the foregoing violations of the Leasehold Agreement, Manahan filed a Complaint for Ejectment before the Rizal Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAD).   In addition to Antonio’s peaceful surrender of said parcels, Manahan sought indemnities for accrued lease rentals in the sum of P30,000.00 and the costs of the suit.

On the other hand, Antonio averred that he remitted the stipulated rentals regularly, except for the year 1993 when Manahan refused to accept the same; that his failure to notify Manahan of impending plantings and harvests is not an authorized cause for the dispossession of a tenant under Republic Act No. 6389; that the kangkong plants on Manahan’s property were not deliberately introduced to impair its fertility but, rather, grew naturally without any effort exerted on his part;  that even assuming that they were introduced by him, said plants merely affected a very insignificant portion of the subject parcels and were intended as supplement to his daily subsistence; and, that the plants’ existence cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be considered as violation of proven farm practices which connotes major agricultural improvements affecting the productivity of the land as a whole.  Alongside the dismissal

of the complaint, Antonio prayed for the grant of his counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages.

 

          The Provincial Adjudicator Rosalina Amonoy-Vergel de Dios rendered a decision for Manahan. On appeal, the foregoing decision was initially reversed and set-aside in the decision rendered by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).  Aggrieved, Manahan moved for the reconsideration of the DARAB’s Decision on the ground, among other matters, that not being attributable to fortuitous event or force majeure, Antonio’s failure to pay the rentals in full constituted sufficient ground for his dispossession under Section 36 of Republic Act No. 3844; and, that the established utilization of a substantial portion of the property for the planting of kangkong debunked Antonio’s claim that the same grew naturally on the land.  Contending that Antonio committed further violations of the Leasehold Agreement by planting string beans and building a second house and three (3) pig pens on the property, Manahan further moved that an ocular inspection of the premises be conducted by the DARAB.

Finding merit in Manahan’s motion as aforesaid, the DARAB issued a Resolution which reconsidered its previous Decision and reinstated the PARAD’s former Decision.

Antonio filed the petition for review arguing that the DARAB gravely erred in finding that he violated the Leasehold Agreement and in interpreting laws and jurisprudence applicable to tenancy relationships. Concluding that Antonio’s failure to pay the rentals in full over the years and his planting of kangkong on the property were violations of the Leasehold Agreement which justified his dispossession under Section 36 of Republic Act No. 3844, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision, dismissing the petition and affirming the DARAB’s 28 December 2004 Resolution. Antonio’s motion for reconsideration of said decision was denied for lack of merit in the CA’s 4 January 2007 resolution, hence, this petition.          

 

Issues:

          Whether or not the CA erred when:

1. It declared that he is guilty of non-payment of lease renatals due to shortage of lease rentals delivered on certain agricultural crop years.

2. It declared that he violated the terms and conditions of the leasehold contract due to alleged planting of kangkong on a single occasion.

3. It applied Section 36 )Paragraphs 3 and 4) of RA 3844 as authorized causes for dispossession of petitioner.

Ruling:

An agricultural leasehold relationship is said to exist upon the concurrence of the following essential requisites: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or

agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. Once the tenancy relationship is established, the tenant is entitled to security of tenure and cannot be ejected by the landlord unless ordered by the court for causes provided by law.  In recognition and protection of the tenant’s right to security of tenure, the burden of proof is upon the agricultural lessor to show the existence of the lawful causes for ejectment or dispossession under Section 36 of Republic Act No. 3844 which provides as follows:

 Section 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. — Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:

(3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the landholding for a purpose other than what had been previously agreed upon;

(4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices as determined under paragraph 3 of Section twenty-nine;

 As agricultural tenant, Antonio was ordered dispossessed of Manahan’s

landholding by the CA, the DARAB and the PARAD, on the ground that he failed to remit the stipulated rentals and violated the terms and conditions of the Leasehold Agreement.  In taking exception to the findings of said court and tribunals, Antonio insists that he had religiously delivered the sacks of palay agreed upon as rentals, except for the years 1993 and 2001, when Manahan rejected the same due to poor quality.  Maintaining that his arrearages/shortages in earlier years were paid/settled from subsequent harvests, Antonio argues that Manahan’s continued acceptance of his deliveries over the years indicates that he had religiously complied with his obligation to pay the stipulated rentals.  Absent a deliberate intent to pay, moreover, Antonio claims that arrears in lease rentals are considered as debts, which the tenant is simply obliged to repay during the ensuing years until the same is fully paid.

 The rule is settled that failure to pay the lease rentals must be willful and

deliberate in order to be considered as ground for dispossession of an agricultural tenant. While the “term ‘deliberate’ is characterized by or results from slow, careful, thorough calculation and consideration of effects and consequences,” the term "willful" has been “defined as one governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason.” Despite the complaints Manahan filed with the MARO in 1994 and 1996, our perusal of the record shows that Antonio’s failure to pay and/or incurrence of shortages from the stipulated annual lease rentals of 70 Cavans of palay weighing 40 Kilos cannot be considered willful and deliberate.  Even with Manahan’s rejection of the rentals tendered by Antonio in 1993 and 2001 for supposed poor quality,  the receipts on record

show that the latter was able to remit the following rentals which were duly received by the former.

 Evident from the foregoing rental remittances is the fact that Antonio exerted

effort to make up for the shortages which resulted from Manahan’s rejection of the rentals he tendered for the years 1993 and 2001.   Having already compensated for the 1993 deficiency, Antonio appears to have started making up for his 2001 shortage. Manahan’s claim that Antonio had consistently failed to remit the stipulated rentals for the past thirteen years (13) ignores the clear showing in the receipts evidencing payment of said rentals that the rejected rentals tendered for the years 1993 and 2001 were simply carried over to and accordingly compensated by the yields from the subsequent years.   Even in the absence of showing that Antonio’s shortages were attributable to fortuitous event or force majeure, we consequently find that Manahan failed to discharge the onus of proving that said shortages were willful and deliberate.  Hence, the CA reversibly erred in upholding the DARAB’s ruling that Antonio’s dispossession of the subject parcels is justified by his non-payment of the stipulated rentals.

 The foregoing disquisition notwithstanding, we find that Antonio’s dispossession is, however, still warranted by his repeated violations of the terms of the Leasehold Agreement which prohibited, among other matters, the cultivation of other plants on Manahan’s properties, the expansion of the tenant’s dwelling as well as the non-synchronized  plantings and harvests thereon.  Granted that paragraph III (G) of DAR Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 1993 allows the tenant to plant secondary crop on the land provided he shoulders the expenses thereof, Antonio’s planting of kangkong directly flies in the face of the categorical prohibition in the Leasehold Agreement against the planting of other plants on the land and Manahan’s objections/complaints against the same as early as 24 November 1994.  Antonio’s claim that that kangkong grew naturally on the property is belied by the pictures submitted by Manahan and the PARAD’s finding that a 3,000 square meter portion of the property was devoted to said plant. To our mind, the legitimacy of Manahan’s complaint is borne out by the 7 October 1998 certification issued by the Bureau of Soils and Water Management (BSWM) that kangkong deprives rice plants of essential plant foods, overcrowds them and generally reduces the yield.

 In addition, it was likewise established that Antonio planted other vegetable crops like string beans, tomatoes, squash and eggplant, built three pigpens and another residential structure on the land and resorted to rice planting in three phases, in violation of the express prohibitions in the Leasehold Agreement.   While it may be conceded that these added violations were not included in the 16 September 1997 complaint from which the ejectment suit stemmed, the record shows that, upon Manahan’s motion, an ocular inspection was ordered by the DARAB on 9 March 2004, with due notice to both parties. 

 

The Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation vs. Park G.R. No. 159835

Facts: Respondent Jung Keun Park (Park) is a national of the Republic of Korea who

came to the Philippines with his family in the early 1990s to invest in various businesses in the country. Sometime in 2000, the BID received a letter from Gyung Taek Cha, Consul/Police Attaché of the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Manila, requesting the BID’s assistance and cooperation in deporting Park as he was purportedly facing charges of fraud in Korea for which a warrant for his arrest had been issued by the Korean Police. The letter also stated that Park’s Korean Passport No. NW0057145 had been cancelled on March 8, 2000 and no other passport had been issued to him since.  Acting on this  letter, the BID officials arrested Park and deported him to Korea on July 24, 2000. 

 On October 28, 2000, Park returned to the Philippines, entering via Zamboanga City from Malaysia, aboard the Sampaguita Ferry 2.  Believing that Park re-entered the country without a valid passport, the BID again arrested Park and, through a Charge Sheet, indicted him for violating Section 37(a)(7) [6] of Commonwealth Act No. 613 or the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended (Immigration Act). On the very same date that Park was indicted, the BID issued a Summary Deportation Order (SDO) against Park after finding that he had indeed violated the Immigration Act.  Accordingly, the BID ordered Park to be deported, imposed upon him administrative fines and fees, and included him in its Blacklist. To secure his provisional release pending deportation, Park filed a Petition for Bail with the BID, stating that he had already paid the administrative fines and fees imposed on him in the SDO.  Park also claimed that he should no longer be considered an undocumented alien because (a) he had been issued a Travel Certificate by the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Manila that was valid from January 16, 2001 up to June 19, 2001, and (b) he was a holder of a Special Investor’s Resident Visa (SIRV).  The BID, however, did not act on his petition, prompting Park to move for its early resolution. Apart from reiterating his plea for his provisional liberty, Park pointed out that there was no longer any basis for the execution of the SDO.  Apparently, Park learned, after communicating with the Korean Embassy, that it did not issue the July 6, 2000 letter that declared his Passport No. NW0057145 as cancelled.  Park argued that since the SDO was issued solely on the basis of the July 6, 2000 letter, the Korean Embassy’s disavowal of the letter should result in the nullification of the SDO against him. The BID granted Park’s petition for bail but did not resolve his claim against the validity of the SDO. Through a certiorari petition filed before the CA, he reiterated his contentions why he should no longer be considered as an undocumented alien and also claimed that he had been denied of his right to due process, since no hearing of his case was conducted before the BID’s Board of Special Inquiry or the Board of Commissioners.

  

ISSUE:Whether or not the two issuances by the BID: the SDO dated December 22, 2000 and the October 15, 2001 Resolution denying Park’s motion to set aside the SDO are valid.  

RULING:          A review of the records compels us to rule that the BID had sufficient factual and legal basis for the SDO and the October 15, 2001 Resolution. The CA committed legal error in finding that the BID acted with grave abuse of discretion when it issued the SDO and the October 15, 2001 Resolution. 

All non-immigrants are required to present unexpired passports and valid visas prior to their admission into the Philippines under Section 10 of the Immigration Act. Park was indicted for violating this requirement because when he returned to the Philippines on October 28, 2000, he used his Passport No. NW0057145 – a passport that had already been cancelled according to the Korean Embassy’s July 6, 2000 letter.  At the time Park was indicted, there was no official document repudiating the July 6, 2000letter.  Park did not present other competent proofs that his Passport No. NW0057145 had not been cancelled.  In deportation proceedings, the alien bears the burden of proving that he entered the Philippines lawfully. We do not believe that Park was able to discharge this burden by belatedly presenting a photocopy of his Passport No. NW0057145 that bore stamp marks of the date of his arrival in and departure from Malaysia, just days before his return to the country.  In all his pleadings before the BID and the CA, he never mentioned this prior Malaysian trip, and he conveniently excused the presentation of his Passport No. NW0057145 by claiming he had misplaced/lost it.  Since the authenticity of the arrival and departure stamp marks in Park’s Passport No. NW0057145 had not been passed upon by either the BID or the CA, we cannot accord it weight and credence.

  Were the documents that Park subsequently presented sufficient to set aside the

SDO?  The BID posits that these documents should not even be considered because the SDO had already lapsed into finality (for which reason, the BID denied Park’s motion in its October 15, 2001 Resolution).  Park disagrees and claims that the SDO cannot be final because its issuance was tainted with due process violations by the BID.  We, however, fail to see the SDO the way Park does.

 The Charge Sheet indicted Park for violating Section 37(a)(7) of the Immigration Act. However, the Charge Sheet contained not just a citation of the provision of law allegedly violated by Park, but more importantly, a statement of the act constituting the offense, i.e., Park’s status as an undocumented alien whose passport had been cancelled by the Korean Government.  The actual designation of the offense is not material so long as the act constituting the offense was clearly alleged in the Charge Sheet and sufficient enough to inform Park of the specific ground for his deportation. In this case, we think it was.  Notably, in the pleadings Park filed with the BID, he insisted that his Passport No. NW0057145 had not been cancelled; that he possessed the requisite travel documents; and that he is not an undocumented alien.  Under these circumstances, we highly doubt Park’s claim that he had been denied of his right to be informed; otherwise, he would

not have found the need to raise such defenses against the charge.  Our opinion is fortified by the fact that Park never raised this particular objection to the charge when the case was still before the BID and the CA.  Thus, the allegations in the Charge Sheet were sufficient, and there was full compliance by the BID with the requirement under Section 37(c) that no alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for his deportation. 

CIVIL CASES

In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. (Sec. 1, Rule 133, Rules of Court). Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other.1

In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number. (Sec. 1, Rule 133, Rules of Court).

As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. The burden rests on the debtor to prove payment, rather than on the creditor to prove non-payment. The debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by payment. True, the law requires in civil cases that the party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. In this case, however, the burden of proof is on Locsin because she alleges and affirmative defense, namely, payment. Locsin failed to discharge that burden. (Vitarich v. Locsin, G.R. No. 181560).

Moreover, it is a basic rule in evidence that the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the allegations– ei incumbit probatio, qui dicit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum negantis probatio nulla sit. If he claims a right granted by law, he must prove it by competent evidence, relying on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of his opponent. More specifically, allegations of a defect in or lack of valid consent to a contract by reason of fraud or undue influence are never presumed but must be established not by mere preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence. (Acabal v. Acabal, G.R. No. 148376).

When a plaintiff’s case depends upon the establishment of a negative fact, and the means of proving the fact are equally within the control of each party, then the burden of proof is upon the party averring the negative fact. (Sps. Cheng v. Sps. Javier, G.R. No. 182485).1 Riano, Willard B. Evidence (The Bar Lecture Series). Manila: REX Book Store, 2013.

VITARICH CORP. vs LOCSIN G.R. No. 181560

FACTS:Chona Locsin was in the fastfood and catering services business named

Glamours Chicked House, and the Davao branch of Vitarich had been her supplier of poultry meat. From July to November 1996, Locsin’s orders of dressed chicken and other meat products allegedly amounted to P921,083.10. During this period, Locsin’s poultry meat needs for her business were serviced by Rodrigo Directo and Allan Rosa, both salesmen and authorized collectors of Vitarich, and Arnold Baybay, a supervisor of the corporation. Directo’s services were terminated by Vitarich without Locsin’s knowledge, while Rosa and Baybay resigned later on. The three did not turn over pertinent invoices covering Locsin’s account.

Subsequently, demand letters were sent to Locsin covering her alleged unpaid account. When Locsin checked her records, she discovered that she had an overpayment of P500,000 to Vitarich. She relayed this to Vitarich and further informed the latter that the checks were issued and the same were collected by Directo. Vitarich filed a complaint for Sum of Money against Locsin, Directo, Rosa and Baybay, with the RTC ruling in favor of Vitarich. On appeal, however, the RTC’s decision was reversed and the CA ruled in favor of Locsin. The CA ruled that Vitarich, who had the burden of proof, failed to establish its case by preponderance of evidence.

ISSUE: Who has the burden of proof between Vitarich and Locsin and WON they were

successful in establishing their case

HELD: As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. The

burden rests on the debtor to prove payment, rather than on the creditor to prove non-payment. The debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by payment. True, the law requires in civil cases that the party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. In this case, however, the burden of proof is on Locsin because she alleges and affirmative defense, namely, payment. Locsin failed to discharge that burden.

After examination of the evidence presented, the Court is of the opinion that Locsin failed to present a single official receipt to prove payment. This is contrary to the well-settled rule that a receipt, which is a written and signed acknowledgement that money and goods have been delivered, is the best evidence of the fact of payment although not exclusive. All she presented were copies of the list of checks allegedly issued to Vitarich through its agent Directo, a Statement of Payments Made to Vitarich, and apparently copies of the pertinent history of her checking account with RCBC. At best, these may only serve as documentary records of her business dealings with Vitarich to keep track of the payments made but these are not enough to prove payment.

Also, in the case at bar, no cash payment was proved. It was neither confirmed that the checks issued by Locsin were actually encashed by Vitarich. Thus, the Court cannot consider that payment, much less overpayment, made by Locsin.

INDUSTRIAL FINANCE CORPORATION vs TOBIAS G.R. No. L-41555

FACTS:Respondent Castor Tobias bought on installment one (1) Dodge truck from

Leelin Motors, Inc., and executed a promissory note in favor of the latter payable in thirty-six (36) equal installments with interest. To secure payment of the promissory note, Tobias executed in favor of Leelin Motors a chattel mortgage on the Dodge truck. Leelin Motors indorsed the promissory note and assigned the chattel mortgage to petitioner Industrial Finance Corporation. Tobias paid six (6) installments on the promissory note directly to petitioner.

Almost a year later, Tobias was in arrears in the payment of more than two (2) installments. Petitioner's counsel wrote to respondent demanding either payment of the balance or the surrender of the Dodge truck to petitioner under pain of litigation. Tobias then wrote petitioner's counsel a letter stating that he was voluntarily and willingly surrendering the truck because it figured in an accident and he was not satisfied with the repair thereof, and that he was giving full authority to petitioner to get the truck. Upon learning of all this, petitioner decided not to get the truck anymore.

Petitioner filed with the Manila CFI an action for recovery of the unpaid balance of the note against Tobias. The CFI dismissed the complaint, holding that since Tobias voluntarily and willingly surrendered the truck pursuant to the demand to surrender, he thus complied with the petitioner's demands. The CA affirmed the lower court's decision – hence, this petition.

Petitioner contends that the CA erred in its ruling by not considering his right as an unpaid vendor of the Dodge truck under Article 1484 of the Civil Code. Tobias claims, however, that petitioner was estopped from insisting on its claim on the balance when it demanded the return or surrender of the truck, to which he acceded.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was estopped from claiming on the balance of the

promissory note.

HELD: NO. The judgment of the CA affirming that of the CFI was set aside and a new

one was rendered ordering Tobias to pay petitioner the balance of the purchase price of the truck, plus interest.

Art. 1484 provides that should the vendee of a personal property be in default in the payment of two or more of the agreed installments, the vendor has the option to either exact fulfillment by the purchaser of the obligation, or to cancel the sale, or to foreclose the mortgage on the purchased personal property, if one was constituted. The remedies provided for are alternative, not cumulative, such that the exercise of one would bar the exercise by the others. Here, petitioner has not cancelled the sale, nor

has it exercised the remedy of foreclosure. Since petitioner has not availed itself of the remedy of cancelling the sale of the truck or of foreclosing the chattel mortgage on it, petitioner is still free to avail of the remedy of exacting fulfillment of Tobias' obligation to pay.

To hold petitioner in estoppel, it must be shown that when it gave Tobias the choice of either paying the balance of the purchase price or of surrendering the truck, it had already knowledge of the accident and the consequent damage to the truck. Petitioner claims no knowledge of the accident when it gave Tobias the choice of either paying the balance of the note or surrendering the truck – this allegation is a negative one and needs no evidence to support it, not being an essential part of the statement of the right on which the cause of action is founded. It is therefore Tobias who has the burden of disproving the claim of petitioner that he has no knowledge of the accident when it made the offer to him either to pay up or to surrender the truck. Tobias failed in this.

Tobias claimed that he has surrendered the truck to petitioner in his letter; however, this alleged surrender was ineffectual as far as petitioner is concerned. After all, petitioner could not take possession of the truck as it was in the custody of Leelin Motors which had a mechanic's lien over it. Moreover, Tobias cannot expect petitioner to accept the term of surrender because aside from the fact that the truck met an accident, petitioner (and, as per his letter, even Tobias himself) was not satisfied with the repair of the finished portion of the truck in question. Petitioner therefore was justified in refusing to accept such surrender and in bringing suit to recover the balance of the purchase price.

SPOUSES CHENG vs SPOUSES JAVIER G.R. No. 182485

FACTS:Respondents filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract of Sale involving a

parcel of land in Tanay, Rizal. They alleged that the petitioners took advantage of respondent Jose Javier’s illiteracy and deceived him to sign a Deed of sale over the subject property; and that the petitioners did not pay in full the contract price.

RTC ruled in favor of plaintiffs. Respondents filed a Notice of Appeal which was denied for having belatedly filed. Petitioners filed an MR which was also denied.

Thirteen (13) years thereafter, respondents allegedly discovered that no copy of the October 1989 Order was sent to petitioners. They filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the transmittal of said Order to petitioners which was granted by the trial court. Petitioners filed a Manifestation that their previous counsel received a copy of the October Order sometime in November 1989 thus making the service of another copy superfluous and unnecessary. Nonetheless, it was still served upon them. The respondents moved for the Execution of Judgment but it was denied by the trial court. Respondents appealed to the CA . CA set aside the Order of the RTC and directed the TC to issue a writ of execution. MR was filed by the respondents but it was denied. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner insist that their former counsel received a copy of the October 16, 1989 Order but they opted not to appeal the same anymore. They contend that it was sent to

them at the same time a copy thereof was sent to respondents, in view of the presumption of regularity in the performance of the postmaster’s official duty.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision dated 29 Oct 1987 became final and executory only

in 2002.

HELD:No. The decision dated Oct 1987 had become final and executory on October 16,

1989 in favor of the petitioners.In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a

preponderance of evidence. When a plaintiff’s case depends upon the establishment of a negative fact, and the means of proving the fact are equally within the control of each party, then the burden of proof is upon the party averring the negative fact.

In the instant case, respondents assert the negative fact, i.e. that no copy of the Order was sent to petitioners. In short, they have the burden of proof to show that petitioners were not furnished with a copy of the Order.

To prove that the petitioners did not receive a copy of the Order, respondents submitted the certification of the Acting Brach Clerk of Court of the RTC stating that “there is no showing that the Order which was sent by registered mail to Atty. Martin at his address appearing on record was received by the said counsel” and that “the registry receipt number evidencing that this Court had indeed sent the said Order by registered mail to Atty. Martin at his given address is no longer available and cannot be located anymore despite diligent efforts.”

However, said certification does not conclusively prove that the Order was not sent to or received by petitioner’s counsel. On the contrary, what the certification shows is that a copy of the Order was sent by registered mail to petitioner’s counsel but the registry receipt accompanying the same could no longer be found in the records. Besides, the best evidence to prove that notice was sent would be a certification from the postmaster, and not from the clerk of court, who should certify not only that the notice was issued or sent but also to how, when and to whom the delivery thereof was made. The mailman may also testify that the notice was actually delivered.Respondents are guilty of laches.

ACABAL vs ACABAL G.R. No. 148376

FACTS:The parents of respondent Villaner Acabal owned a parcel of land which the

former transferred ownership to the latter via Deed of Absolute Sale. On April 19, 1990, he executed a deed conveying the land in favor of his grandson-nephew petitioner Leonardo Acabal. He later disputed that what he signed was not actually a Deed of Absolute Sale, but a Contract of Lease. Villaner filed a complaint against petitioners Leonardo and Ramon Nicolas to whom Leonardo in turn conveyed the property, for the annulment of deeds of sale. Leonardo asserted that what Villaner executed was a Deed of Sale the consideration of which he had fully paid. Witness to the executed of the

Deed, Carmelo Cadalin, corroborated Leonardo's claim. The trial court dismissed the complaint, but on appeal, the CA declared the Deed of Sale simulated and fictitious. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court erred in ruling in favor of Villaner when he did

not present a single witness to testify on the alleged contract of lease which he allegedly signed.

HELD: Yes. It is a basic rule in evidence that the burden of proof lies on the party who

makes the allegations– ei incumbit probatio, qui dicit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum negantis probatio nulla sit. If he claims a right granted by law, he must prove it by competent evidence, relying on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of his opponent. More specifically, allegations of a defect in or lack of valid consent to a contract by reason of fraud or undue influence are never presumed but must be established not by mere preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence.

In the case at bar, it was incumbent on the plaintiff-herein respondent Villaner to prove that he was deceived into executing the Deed of Absolute Sale. Except for his bare allegation that the transaction was one of lease, he failed to adduce evidence in support thereof. His conjecture that “perhaps those copies of the deed of sale were placed by Mr. Cadalin under the documents which I signed the contract of lease,” must fail, for facts not conjectures decide cases. Hence, the petitipn was granted and the Decision of the CA reversed.

CRIMINAL CASES:

In all criminal cases, the burden of proof as to the guilt of the accused lies with the prosecution because of the presumption that the accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proven. (Sec. 14[2], Art. III, Bill of Rights, Philippine Constitution).

In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. (Sec. 2, Rule 133, Rules of Court).

In discharging this burden, the Prosecution’s duty is to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein. The Prosecution must further prove participation of the accused in the commission of the offense. In doing all these, the Prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence, and not anchor its success upon the weakness of the evidence of the accused. The burden of proof placed

on the Prosecution arises from the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused that no less than the Constitution has guaranteed. (Patula v. People)

In People v. Manalo, The Supreme Court has held that "The general rule is that if a criminal charge is predicated on a negative allegation, or a negative averment is an essential element of a crime, the prosecution has the burden to prove the charge. However, this rule admits of exceptions. Where the negative of an issue does not permit of direct proof, or where the facts are more immediately within the knowledge of the accused, the onus probandi rests upon him.

Even in the case of Pajenado, this Court categorically ruled that although the prosecution has the burden of proving a negative averment which is an essential element of a crime, the prosecution, in view of the difficulty of proving a negative allegation, "need only establish a prima facie case from the best evidence obtainable.” (PP v. Pajenado, G.R. No. L-27680-81).

In cases of illegal possession of firearms, the burden of proof as to the negative averments in the information to the effect that the accused possesses the firearms without the corresponding license is on the defense. It is the accused who is called upon to prove that he possesses the license. In other words, the fact relied upon by the accused as a justification or excuse being one that is related to him personally or otherwise within his peculiar knowledge, "the general rule is that the burden of proof as to such averment or fact is on the accused." (PP v. Tiozon, G.R. No. 89823).

In one case, the court ruled that when the accused admits killing a person but pleads self-defense, the burden of proof of evidence shifts to him to prove by clear and convincing evidence the elements of his defense. In the case at bar, the accused failed to satisfy the requirements of self-defense. (PP v. Damitan, G.R. No. 140544).

When a person accused of a capital offense asks to be admitted to bail before conviction, the burden of proof lies, not on him, but on the prosecution to show that he is not bailable. (Marcos v. Cruz, G.R. No. L-46490).

 PATULA vs. PP GR No 164457

FACTS:

Petitioner Anna Patulawas charged with estafa and she pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Petitioner was an employee of Footlucker’s, starting as a saleslady in 1996 until she became a sales representative; that as a sales representative she was authorized to take orders from wholesale customers coming from different towns and to collect payments from them; that she could issue and sign official receipts of Footlucker’s for the payments, which she would then remit; that she would then submit the receipts for the payments for tallying and reconciliation; that at first her volume of sales was quite high, but later on dropped, leading Lambert Go, branch manager of

Footlucker’s, to confront her; that she responded that business was slow; that he summoned the accounting clerk to verify the matter; that the accounting clerk discovered erasures on some collection receipts.

Lambert Go then decided to subject petitioner to an audit by company auditor Karen Guivencan, wherein she testified that Go had requested her to audit petitioner after some customers had told him that they had already paid their accounts but the office ledger had still reflected outstanding balances for them; that she first conducted her audit by going to the customers in places that she discovered in the course of her audit that the amounts appearing on the original copies of receipts in the possession of around 50 customers varied from the amounts written on the duplicate copies of the receipts petitioner submitted to the office; that upon completing her audit, she submitted to Go a written report marked as Exhibit A; and that based on the report, petitioner had misappropriated the total amount ofP131,286.92.

During Guivencan’s stint as a witness, the Prosecution marked the ledgers of petitioner’s various customers allegedly with discrepancies as Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive. Only 49 of the ledgers were formally offered and admitted by the RTC because the 50th ledger could no longer be found. Petitioner’s counsel interposed a continuing objection on the ground that the figures entered in Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive, were hearsay because the persons who had made the entries were not themselves presented in court. RTC then rendered petitioner guilty for the crime of estafa. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Prosecution was able to adduce evidence that proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioner for the estafa charged in the information?

RULING: NO. Patula is thus acquitted for the prosecution’s failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

In all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the burden to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In discharging this burden, the Prosecution’s duty is to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein. The Prosecution must further prove the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense. In doing all these, the Prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence, and not anchor its success upon the weakness of the evidence of the accused. The burden of proof placed on the Prosecution arises from the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused that no less than the Constitution has guaranteed.

Conversely, as to his innocence, the accused has no burden of proof, that he must then be acquitted and set free should the Prosecution not overcome the presumption of innocence in his favor. In other words, the weakness of the defense put up by the accused is inconsequential in the proceedings for as long as the Prosecution

has not discharged its burden of proof in establishing the commission of the crime charged and in identifying the accused as the malefactor responsible for it.

To establish the elements of estafa earlier mentioned, the Prosecution presented the testimonies of Go and Guivencan, and various documentsconsisting of: (a) the receipts allegedly issued by petitioner to each of her customers upon their payment, (b) the ledgers listing the accounts pertaining to each customer with the corresponding notations of the receipt numbers for each of the payments, and (c) the confirmation sheets accomplished by Guivencan herself. The ledgers and receipts were marked and formally offered as Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive. On his part, Go essentially described for the trial court the various duties of petitioner as Footlucker’s sales representative. On her part, Guivencan conceded having no personal knowledge of the amounts actually received by petitioner from the customers or remitted by petitioner to Footlucker’s. This means that persons other than Guivencan prepared Exhibits  B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive, and that Guivencan based her testimony on the entries found in the receipts supposedly issued by petitioner and in the ledgers held by Footlucker’s corresponding to each customer, as well as on the unsworn statements of some of the customers. Accordingly, her being the only witness  who testified on the entries effectively deprived the RTC of the reasonable opportunity to validate and test the veracity and reliability of the entries as evidence of petitioner’s misappropriation or conversion through cross-examination by petitioner. The denial of that opportunity rendered the entire proof of misappropriation or conversion hearsay, and thus unreliable and untrustworthy for purposes of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.

PP vs. PAJENADO G.R. No. L-27680-81

FACTS:

Prosecution witness Epifanio Cabe was walking along the street and arrived in front of the house of one Pablo Jazmines, he saw appellant holding the now deceased Carlos Tapong by the neck. As the two were apparently wrestling with each other, Carlito Pajenado, appellant’s cousin, intervened and the two Pajenados were able to throw Tapong to the ground. Carlito Pajenado held Tapong by the shoulder and pinned him down to the ground, while appellant held him by one leg. As they thus held Carlos Tapong helpless, appellant drew his gun and fired at him. Thereupon, Carlito Pajenado stood up and ran away, while appellant remained at the scene of the crime with his drawn gun until a policeman, another Pajenado (Ernesto), arrived and took the firearm from him. Carlos Tapong, mortally wounded, was thereafter carried home by his father and other relatives.

Another prosecution witness, Pelagia Tapong, testified that at noon on the day in question, while she was at the window of the house of her elder brother, Angel, along the street where the incident took place, she saw appellant standing on the street; that when Carlos Tapong appeared, appellant immediately met him and held him by the

neck; that thereafter Carlito Pajenado intervened and with his help appellant was able to fell Carlos to the ground. Carlos Tapong died as a result of the gun-shot wound inflicted upon him on that occasion. Testifying on the nature thereof, the municipal health officer conducted a post mortem examination of the cadaver found that the deceased sustained three gun-shot wounds which, in his opinion, were caused by a single shot from a .45 caliber pistol. He also testified that considering the presence of powder burns in the body of the deceased, he must have been shot at a distance of less than one meter, and that the cause of his death was shock due to external and internal hemorrhage. The Court of First Instance convicted the accused both for the crime of murder and illegal possession of firearm. The Solicitor General agreed that the latter should be convicted merely of homicide.

ISSUE:

Whether or not upon the evidence of record, he should also be found guilty of the crime of illegal possession of a firearm.

HELD:

NO. It is incumbent upon a person charged with illegal possession of a firearm, to prove the issuance to him of a license to possess the firearm, but the Court are, of the considered opinion that under the provisions of Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court which, provide that in criminal cases the burden of proof as to the offense charged lies on the prosecution and that a negative fact alleged by the prosecution must be proven if “it is an essential ingredient of the offense charged”, the burden of proof was with the prosecution in this case to prove that the firearm used by appellant in committing the offense charged was not properly licensed.

It cannot be denied that the lack or absence of a license is an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of a firearm. The information filed against appellant specifically alleged that he had no “license or permit to possess” the .45 caliber pistol mentioned therein. Thus it seems clear that it was the prosecution’s duty not merely to allege that negative fact but to prove it. In the case before Us, both appellant and the Solicitor General agree that there was not even a prima facie case upon which to hold appellant guilty of the illegal possession of a firearm. Former Chief Justice Moran upholds this view as follows: “The mere fact that the adverse party has the control of the better means of proof of the fact alleged, should not relieve the party making the averment of the burden of proving it. This is so, because a party who alleges a fact must be assumed to have acquired some knowledge thereof, otherwise he could not have alleged it. Naturally, as the subject matter of the averment is one which lies peculiarly within the control or knowledge of the accused prima facie evidence thereof on the part of the prosecution shall suffice to cast the onus upon him.”

PEOPLE vs TIOZON G.R. No. 89823

FACTS:Leonardo Mesia and his wife were sleeping when they were awakened by loud

knocks on their door. Leonardo opened the door and saw the accused. He invited the accused, who appears very drunk, inside their house. Leonardo's wife saw the accused showing her husband a gun and later toyed with it. The wife got irritated and took a few steps away from them. The two left. Five minutes later, the wife heard two successive gunshots. The accused informed her that he accidentally shot Leonardo, "Mare, mare, nabaril ko si Pare, hindi ko sinasadya." Leonardo's wife asked for help to carry her husband and be brought to the hospital. The accused extended his help but changed his mind and reasoned out that the victim was already dead. Upon the arrival of policemen, the accused was arrested.

Pat. Orlando Valencia of the Caloocan Police Force testified that a shooting incident was reported to him and he responded by proceeding to the crime scene. Upon arriving, he saw the lifeless body of the victim as well as the accused whose clothes were full of bloodstains. The accused was arrested and the day after, at around 10:00 in the evening, and upon instructions of Pfc. Alilam, he together with other policemen accompanied the accused in retrieving the firearm which the accused threw at the grassy area at the back of his house. They were able to recover the firearm together with 2 spent bullets and 3 live ammunitions.

The defense alleged that the accused was on his way home from work and passed by the house of his Pareng Nardo, the victim. Nardo called him up and invited him inside the former's house. When he was about to enter the door of the house of the victim, the latter, from the back of the door, poked a gun at him. He grabbed the gun from Nardo and at that instance, Rosalina Bolima emerging from her room, saw him holding the gun. He returned the gun to Nardo and the latter tucked it in his waistline. He was served with a beer and after he and the victim consumed about two bottles of beer, they went out to buy some more. After they were able to buy some more bottles of beer, victim carried the same and left ahead of the accused. The accused was left behind to answer the call of nature. While in the act of urinating, he heard two successive gunshots. He saw the victim aleady sprawled on the ground. He asked Nardo as to what had happened to him, "Pareng Nardo, ano ang nangyari sa iyo? and the victim replied, "Pare, binaril ako", he further inquired as to who shot him but the victim who was gasping for breath could no longer talk. He saw a gun near the body of Nardo. He picked the same, but after he got hold of the gun, he suddenly realized that the policemen might see him holding it, so he threw the very same gun to the grassy area. He then ran towards the house of the victim and he informed the wife of the latter that Nardo was shot to death. He further alleged that he did not see the actual shooting incident; never did he declare nor utter before her Mareng Lina or before any police authorities that he accidentally shoot the victim. However, he admitted that it was him who accompanied the policemen in retrieving the fatal gun at the grassy area at the back of his house. He also claimed that he did not own the said gun and that it is the accused who owns the same.

The accused was charged for violation of PD 1866 and pleaded not guilty when arraigned. RTC - guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On appeal, the accused contends

that the RTC erred in convicting him of the crime illegal possession of firearms with murder by relying upon circumstantial evidences which are insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE: Whether the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the

accused is liable for illegal possession of firearms.

HELD: The records and the evidence fail to disclose that the prosecution presented any

evidence to prove that the accused-appellant was not authorized to possess the firearm alleged in the information. Had illegal possession of firearms been duly proven as alleged, it would not have mattered whether the killing was simple homicide or murder since Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 expressly provides that: If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed..which penalty, however, had been automatically reduced to reclusion perpetua in view of the abolition of the death penalty.

The issue concerning the failure of the prosecution to prove that he had no authority to possess the firearm has not been raised in this appeal. Interestingly, accused-appellant raised it in his motion to reconsider the decision of the trial court. In its resolution denying the motion, the trial court admitted, in effect, that the prosecution did not offer any evidence to prove that the accused-appellant had no license to possess or carry the firearm in question; it however, threw the burden on the accused-appellant to prove that he has that authority. Thus, it ruled: Where accused relies as a matter of defense on an exception in a statute which is not in the enacting clause by which the offense is described and forbidden, he has the burden of proving that he is within the exception.

Where the subject matter of a negative averment in the information, or a fact relied upon by defendant as a justification or excuse, relates to him personally or otherwise lie peculiarly within his knowledge, the general rule is that the burden of proof of such averment or fact is on him. An illustrative case of this rule may be found in prosecution for exercising a trade or profession, or doing other acts, without a license. In such cases, it would greatly inconvenience the prosecution to prove that the defendant had no license, whereas the defendant could easily prove that he did have one.

In cases of illegal possession of firearms, the burden of proof as to the negative averments in the information to the effect that the accused possesses the firearms without the corresponding license is on the defense. It is the accused who is called upon to prove that he possesses the license. In other words, the fact relied upon by the accused as a justification or excuse being one that is related to him personally or otherwise within his peculiar knowledge, "the general rule is that the burden of proof as to such averment or fact is on the accused."

PEOPLE vs CERCADO G.R. No. 144494

FACTS:Appellant Ferdinand Cercado y Mozada was found by the Regional Trial Court of

Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch 46 guilty of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine ofP1,000,000.00 without any subsidiary penalty.

The prosecution presented the testimony of the following witnesses: PO2 Torres, PO2 Perez, P/Supt. Bugayong-Cid, and P/Sr. Inspector Abrahano.

PO2 Torres testified that he was one of the elements of the First Regional Narcotics Office, PNP Narcotics Group who arrested appellant by acting as poseur-buyer in a buy-bust operation at Brgy. Alipangpang, Pangasinan. He recounted that while he was in his office at La Union, a civilian confidential informant reported that he could buy one (1) kilo of marijuana from a certain "Alyas Imok" (who later turned out to be appellant). He relayed this information to his Team Leader, P/Insp. Abrahano, who evaluated the report and ordered a buy-bust operation. P/Insp. Abrahano designated PO2 Torres as poseur-buyer and gave him the boodle money. P/Insp. Abrahano, PO2 Navarette and PO2 Perez were to act as back-up arresting officers. He narrated that the team thereafter proceeded to the PNP Pozorrubio Station to coordinate with the local police in charge with the narcotics operations in the area. He presented a Memorandum addressed to the Chief of Police of Pozorrubio to prove that they in fact coordinated with the latter. After the PNP of Pozorrubio entered the Memorandum in the blotter, the team proceeded to the house of appellant at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. Upon reaching the house of appellant, the confidential informant introduced PO2 Torres to "Alyas Imok" as an interested buyer of one (1) kilo of marijuana which appellant priced at P2,000.00 per kilo. Appellant told PO2 Torres and the confidential informant to wait for him and left the house. They waited in front of the house of appellant for about four (4) hours. When appellant arrived at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening, he handed a plastic bag to PO2 Torres and demanded for the payment. PO2 Torres, in turn, gave appellant the P2,000.00 boodle money. After having ascertained that the material inside the plastic bag was marijuana, PO2 Torres lighted a cigarette, the pre-arranged signal, and his back-up arresting officers rushed to arrest the appellant. PO2 Perez recovered the boodle money and the brick of marijuana from appellant. After the arrest, the team, together with appellant, went back to the PNP Pozorrubio Station to blotter the case. Subsequently, they proceeded to their sub-office in Nancayasan, Urdaneta City for proper investigation. The Booking Sheet, Arrest Report, Affidavit of Arrest and other documents relevant to the filing of the case were prepared in this office.

PO2 Perez, also a policeman assigned at the First Regional Narcotics Office, testified that he was one of the back-up arresting officers who arrested appellant. He corroborated the testimony of PO2 Torres.

P/Supt. Bugayong-Cid, a Forensic Chemist at the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office of La Union testified that they submitted to her one (1) white plastic bag with markings containing one (1) brick of suspected dried marijuana leaves and seeds, weighing 905.3 grams. Based on a Physical Science Report, the specimen was found positive for the presence of marijuana, a prohibited drug. P/Sr. Inspector

Christopher N. Abrahano, the Team Leader of the Narcotics Group on the buy-bust operation, testified and corroborated the testimonies of PO2 Torres and PO2 Perez.

The defense presented the sole testimony of appellant. He testified that at the time the alleged incident took place, he was inside his house. At 7pm, three (3) unidentified men allegedly entered and ransacked his house. He was then with his wife and two (2) children. He narrates that the three (3) men had guns and one of them was carrying a bag. Appellant asked for their names but got no reply. After searching the whole house without presenting any warrant, the three men brought appellant outside and asked him to admit possession of the marijuana inside the bag that one of them was carrying. They likewise asked appellant to give them P5,000.00. When he refused to admit and give them money, the three (3) men beat him up and later brought him to the "barangay". He later learned that one of them was PO2 Perez. He never knew the names of the two (2) others, except that he remembers they have ID's and thinks that they are policemen. On cross-examination, appellant maintained that the brick of marijuana was merely planted by the police operatives.

Appellant contends, that granting arguendo, he sold one (1) kilo of dried marijuana leaves, the evidence remains insufficient to convict him since the prosecution failed to prove that he had no legal authority to sell marijuana. Relying on People vs. Pajenado, he invokes the rule that negative allegations need no proof except when such negative allegation is an essential element of an offense. Hence, in this case, where the lack of authority or license to sell marijuana is an essential element of the offense charged, the failure of the prosecution to prove this negative allegation entitles him to an acquittal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in not holding that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD:NO. We reiterate the case law that material to a prosecution for illegal sale of

dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. In the case at bar, all these elements were proven. First, there was meeting of the minds between the buyer and the seller. PO2 Torres, the poseur-buyer, was willing to buy marijuana from appellant at P2,000.00 per kilo. Second, there was consideration for the sale, the parties having agreed upon the amount of P2,000.00. Third, there was delivery of one (1) kilo of dried marijuana leaves, the subject of the sale.

We also find no merit in the second assignment of error of the appellant. The doctrine in Pajenado has been modified in the case of People v. de los Reyes. In de los Reyes, we held that the Dangerous Drugs Act applies generally to all persons and proscribes the sale of dangerous drugs by any person and no person is presumed authorized to sell such drugs. It is the accused, claiming the benefit of the exemption, who must prove that he falls under the protective mantle of the exemption.

In People v. Manalo, we explained the rationale for the modification of the rule, thus: "The general rule is that if a criminal charge is predicated on a negative allegation, or a negative averment is an essential element of a crime, the prosecution has the

burden to prove the charge. However, this rule admits of exceptions. Where the negative of an issue does not permit of direct proof, or where the facts are more immediately within the knowledge of the accused, the onus probandi rests upon him. Stated otherwise, it is not incumbent on the prosecution to adduce positive evidence to support a negative averment the truth of which is fairly indicated by established circumstances and which, if untrue, could readily be disproved by the production of documents or other evidence within the defendant's knowledge or control. For example, where a charge is made that a defendant carried on a certain business without a license (as in the case at bar where the accused is charged with the sale of a regulated drug without authority), the fact that he has a license is a matter which is peculiarly within his knowledge and he must establish the fact or suffer conviction (29 Am. Jur., 2d 184).” Even in the case of Pajenado, this Court categorically ruled that although the prosecution has the burden of proving a negative averment which is an essential element of a crime, the prosecution, in view of the difficulty of proving a negative allegation, "need only establish a prima facie case from the best evidence obtainable.

In the case at bar, it is clear that appellant had no authority or license to sell marijuana leaves. He was caught selling the prohibited drug in front of his house. He himself delivered the drug to the poseur-buyer and accepted the buy-bust money. He did not protest his arrest on the ground that he has authority to sell the drug. Until now, he has not produced any authority by way of defense.

PEOPLE vs DAMITAN G.R. No. 140544

FACTS:Damitan was charged with murder for killing Leon Cahapon by means of

treachery armed with a sharp bladed weapon. According to the version of the prosecution, Cahapon was at the barrio hall when his grandson arrived and asked the victim to adjust the rope of his horse. While Cahapon was fixing the rope, accused Damitan arrived and stabbed the victim twice with a hunting knife.

The defense version on the other hand, as testified by Damitan that he saw the victim's wife shooing his chicken towards their house and told that the chickens belonged to them. Damitan added that he saw the victim at another time, catching his chicken. This prompted Damitan to complain against the victim which angered him. Cahapon boxed Damitan and tried to stab him but was able to take possession of the knife and stabbed the victim. During trial Damitan claimed that he stabbed Cahapon in self-defense. The RTC found him guilty of the crime of murder.

ISSUE:Whether or not the burden of proof is shifted to the accused to prove his claim of

self-defense.

HELD:The court ruled that when the accused admits killing a person but pleads self-

defense, the burden of proof of evidence shifts to him to prove by clear and convincing evidence the elements of his defense. In the case at bar, the accused failed to satisfy

the requirements of self-defense: 1.)Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; 2.)Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression. 3.)Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused or the person defending himself. The absence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, the presence of two fatal wounds and the nature, location and number of the wounds inflicted negates the existence of self-defense. The accused had inflicted 2 stab wounds, one on the breast and another while the victim was already lying down and defenseless. Furthermore, the bare and self-serving assertions of the accused cannot prevail over the positive identification of the prosecution witnesses.

G.R. No. L-46490

MARCOS vs CRUZ

FACTS:On December 7, 1938, the provincial fiscal of Laguna, who was assigned as

such in Ilocos Norte, filed an information charging Mariano Marcos, Pio Marcos, Ferdinand Marcos, Quirino Lizardo, and John Doe (whose identity has so far not been established), with the crime of murder of one Julio Nalundasan, then representative-elect for the second district of Ilocos Norte.

The information was submitted to the respondent judge who, after examining prosecution witnesses Calixto Aguinaldo and Valentin Rubio, on that very day issued the warrant for the arrest of the accused, stating that from the testimony of these witnesses it was evident that the crime charged had been committed and that the accused had probably committed it. Being of the opinion that the crime charged was penalized with a capital punishment, and that the accused were not entitled to bail, the court likewise decreed that the accused remain in detention. At the investigation conducted by the respondent judge, where Calixto Aguinaldo and Valentin Rubio testified, the accused were not present, and the whole proceeding took place in their absence. The accused then moved to be admitted to bail. This motion was set for hearing but at the request of the accused, who wanted to file a supplementary motion, the hearing was postponed till the following day. On December 21st, the four accused filed the supplementary motion praying that they be released on bail, and in their sworn statements Mariano Marcos, Ferdinand Marcos and Quirino Lizardo declared that the testimony of Calixto Aguinaldo and Valentin Rubio accusing them of murder was false, and that they were innocent.

These motions came up for hearing before the respondent judge, Fiscal Macadaeg appearing for the prosecution, and Attorney Vicente J. Francisco for the defense. The latter asked that the prosecution present its evidence to show that the accused fell within the exception of section 1, paragraph 16, Article III of the Constitution, and section 63 of General Orders, No. 58, that is, that they were accused of a capital offense, that the proof of guilt was evident and the presumption of guilt strong. The fiscal refused to do so and contended that under the law the prosecution was not bound to adduce such evidence, that the judge might take into account that adduced during the investigation he had made, and that at any rate it was the defense

that was bound to establish the right of the accused to bail. The respondent judged issued an order against the accused, ruling that they were not entitled to bail because they were charged with a capital offense, the proof against them was evident, and the presumption of guilt strong.

ISSUE:WON the burden of proof lies on the accused.

HELD:No. The Court held that when a person accused of a capital offense asks to be

admitted to bail before conviction, the burden of proof lies, not on him, but on the prosecution to show that he is not bailable.

“It is argued that the respondent judge, before issuing the warrant for the arrest of the accused, examined the two witnesses for the prosecution presented by the fiscal, and that their testimony raised the presumption of the defendants' guilt and supplied the further requirement that proof of guilt must be evident. We cannot give our assent to this connection. It ought not to be forgotten that such testimony was taken in the absence of the accused, and that the latter had no opportunity to see the witnesses testify or to cross-examine them. We are not unmindful of the fact that in People vs. Solon (47 Phil., 443), and in Payao vs. Lesaca (63 Phil., 210), we said that when the investigation of a criminal case is conducted by a judge of first instance, it includes both the summary investigation spoken of in Act No. 194, as amended by Acts Nos. 1450 and 1627, and the preliminary investigation referred to in section 13 of General Orders, No. 58; and we are aware of the contention of the prosecution that applying the doctrine laid down in those two cases, the evidence adduced before the respondent judge could be used against the accused and in fact established the presumption of guilt. But it must be borne in mind that the hearing required by section 66 of General Orders, No. 58, is essentially different from the preliminary investigation to which every person is entitled who is accused of a crime triable before the Court of First Instance, and that if the prosecution had intended the summary investigation conducted by the respondent judge to be a preliminary investigation, its duty was to summon the accused and adduce its evidence in their presence. Other reasons preventing the consideration of such evidence against the accused are: that the fiscal did not reproduce or offer it at the hearing of the petitions for bail; and that in the sworn statements which the accused attached to their supplementary motion, they denied the imputation of guilt, and rebutted the testimony of Calixto Aguinaldo and Valentin Rubio, which they described as false and improbable. In these circumstances it was the duty of the respondent judge, to require the fiscal to adduce his evidence in order to show that the crime charged was capital, that the proof was evident, and the presumption of guilt strong.”