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Bureaucratic corruption in africa: causes, consequencesand remediesDavid J. Gould a & Tshiabukole B. Mukendi ba Development Management Seminar Programs Graduate School of Public and InternationalAffairs , University of Pittsburgh , Associate Professorb Development Management Seminar Programs Graduate School of Public and InternationalAffairs , University of Pittsburgh ,Published online: 26 Jun 2007.

To cite this article: David J. Gould & Tshiabukole B. Mukendi (1989) Bureaucratic corruption in africa: causes, consequences andremedies, International Journal of Public Administration, 12:3, 427-457, DOI: 10.1080/01900698908524633

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INT'L. 3 . OF PUB. ADMIN., 12(3), 427-457 (1989)

BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION IN AFRICA: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND REMEDIES

David J ~ o u l d *

T shrabukole B ~ukend l -

ABSTRACT

One of the cr~t~cal pollcy ~ s s ~ e s In Afrrcan management today IS bureaucrat~c corruptlon

Th~s problem has In some countr,es reached such proportions as to frustrate good pol~cy

lntentlons and to paralyze management operat~ons The study examlnes the extent of

bureaucrat~c corruptlon In selected Afrtcan countr~es analyzes ther potent~al causes.

cr~t~cally assesses ther consequences on the pattern of pollt~cal, soclo-economlc and

adm~n~strat~ve development and revrews the effect~veness of remed~es proposed or actually

t r~ea

INTRODUCTION

Bureaucrat~c corruptlon In the Th~rd World In general and In Afr~ca In particular has

become a subject of Increased nat~onal and lnternat~onal concern All governments

denounce ~t yet most pract~ce or at least tolerate ~t One of the major reasons for the

escalatrng debt crrsls paralyzing Afr~can development prospects IS bel~eved to be the

pervastveness of corrupt practices In the management of development programs (1)

Desp~te wldespreao condemnation of the ev~ls of corrupt behav~ors, they contlnue to eat

. Associate Professor md D~rector of Developmenl Marvgement Semlrur Programs. Graduate School of Publlc

and Internn~oru A f f a ~ r s Un~vers~rv of P~ttsbwgh

.I

Research and Evaluat~on Speclalist Development Management Sernlnar Programs Graduate School of Pubk an0 Internatlow A'frlrs Un~vers~ty of P~nsburph

C o p y M t Q 1989 by Murcel Dckker, Inc.

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GOULD AND MUKENDI

deeply knto the fabrlc of soc~etles Ant)-corruption laws and agenoes have prohferated

w ~ t h ranglng degrees of saliency over the last two decades in vrtually all African countries

yet corruption seems t o have reached crlsis or systemlc proportions In fact the problem

of corrupt~on and the w~despread perCeptlOn of ~nstitut~onal decay, admln~strat~ve

lnefflcienc~es and the 'softness of state' seem to be eauated

It is relevant to ask why bureaucratic corruption is so persistent, how signifcant the

problem of corruption is in some.Sub-Saharan Afrcan countries, what impact it has on

soc~etal development and how effective have been the strategbes to combat corrupt

practices The answers t o these querles are crucla! slnce the factors that seem to

encourage corruptlon ln Africa are the same as those that prevent any meaningful

organlrationai reform from taklng place

The purpose of th~s paper 1s to analyze the major forms of bureaucratc corrupt~on In

Sub-Saharan Afrtca and to evaluate ther consequences for development efforts The

specif~c 0 b j e ~ t l ~ e ~ of the study are (11 to assess the nature and extent of bureaucrat~c

corruptlon In Sub-Saharan Af r~ca 12) to ident~fy factors and cond~tlons whhch contr~bute to

corrupt~on and thus constrain efforts for the achlevernent of ef f lc~ency and ef f ect~veness

in government management (3) t o ascertain the effects of bureaucrat~c corrupt~on on

soclal, pollt~cal, and economic development performance and (41 to evaluate the utilny of

exlstlng techniques and tools for cornbatt~ng bureaucratlc corrupt~on In Afrlca The central

argument of the paper revolves around the proposlt~on that corruptlon IS part of a more

or less conscious rullng strategy pursued by those In control of the state apparatus for

pr~vate-regardmg mot~ves

1 DEFINING CORRUPTION

There is no one agreed-upon definition o f corruption in the literature. This lack o f

definitional consensus further aggravates the problem of determtning the criteria according

to which a corrupt behavior can be said t o occur Yet most o f the debate on the subject

has focused on examlning the functional~ty or disfunctio~liry of corrupt pract~ces from

political, sociological and economic viewpoints 121 Despite the diversity of views and

varylng degrees in emphasis, bureaucratic corruption typically connotes abuse of the public

trust, misuse of authority, and sacrifice of the publlc for private benefit Let us now

examine the manifestations of bureaucratic corruption in some African countries Dow

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BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION IN AFRICA 429

2 THE INCIDENCE OF CORRUPTION IN AFRICA

A number of studies and press reports provide ev~dence of the operation and prevalence

of lnst~tutional~zed or systemtc corruption In Sub-Saharan Af rca While these stud~es vary

in the focus and circumstances in which the corrupt behavior thrives, they nevertheless

exampl~ty the ways In whch state resources can be diverted to prtvate ends

A comparattve analys~s of bureaucratc corrupt~on In lvory Coast Ghana Mall, and Zare

po~nted out that corruptton IS an essential lubr~cant o f l ~ f e and may take several forms

Among valor infract~ons committed by publlc o f f ~ctals between 1954- 1974, the cases of

embezzle~ent of pubhc funds represented oveF 90 percent of the total cases respect~vely

for Mal and Zare as shown In Table 1 Except In Ivory Coast most of the cases o f

corruption weve concentrate0 between 1966 and 1974

Table 1: Cases of Corrupt~on In Four Afr~can Countrtes*

country Total )le of 1 E w b e r r l ~ n t I Brlbery I Extortrons Cases 1954-741 % of t o t a l X 1 -----------------------.---------------------------------------------------

Ivory Coast 458 4 3 . 0 0 1 . 6 22,W Ghana 100 37.00 5 4 . 0 8,W Ma1 I 50 1 9 4 . 4 1 2 , s 10.33 Z a i n 450 BZ.00 3 .35 0.02 -------.---------------.---------------------------------------------------- * = Only cases known and reported by Appeal Courts I n c .p f ta l c l t l e s of these f w n t r l e s Source Hyactnthe Sarassorc, La corruption des f o m t ionnai res en If rique . (Paris Economics, 10801, pp. 201-205

Recen: illustrat~ons of bureaucratc corrupt~on ind~cate rather worsening trends

Bureaucrat~c corruption IS w~dely reported to be ' a way of I~ fe ' In countries such as Zatre.

Ghana. N~ger~a, and Zamb~a

One of the worst cases of bureaucratic oorruptlon is Zaire. where state resources are

plundered and laws and admlnistratlve regulations abused by officials at all levels of

government Research indicates that the whole bureaucratic structure has been converted

Into an Instrument of self-advancement and enrichment by top offcials 13) President

Mobutu hlmself has ackrrowledged that corruption is probably the biggest Zairian sickness

On several occasions, he has made explicit references to abuses such as the case o f army

officials who dlvert for the~r personal profit the military supplies intended for frontline

soldiers, mlsuse of judicial machinery for avenging private disputes, selective justice

depend~ng on ones wealth and status, Sm~ggllng Of some exportable products Such as

coffee and d~amonds and the non-repatriatlon of proflts made on them, monthly salary

payment to flcttt~ous pubic o f f~c~a ls and teachers and masswe evasion of lmport dutles (by

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GOULD AND MUKENDI

firms which have ties with the ruling elitesl, etc. (41 Rough estimates suggest that between

60 to 70 9b of the annual national budget disappears from the official circuit

A cancerous form of corruption permeates most official and private transactions Recent

accounts of corrupt practices in the medical sector are just isolated manifestations of a

systemic behavior Accord~ng to the official newspaper m a the mono in the dellvery of

medical re-vices is Pave ou tu creves (unless you pay, you die1 whch is complemented by

another motto un medecin QUI ne percoit pas dhonorares est un imbec~le (a physician who

does not collect ~llicit fees is fool~shi I51 Often medical supplies available In hospitals are

sold by hospital offcials and may be easily found in the market place The pilferage

throughout the pharmaceutical distribution system is deemed in part to be responsible for

the shortage of drugs essential for use in the medical sector. Theft is pervasive f rom the

load~ng po~nt, along the transport route and the actual delivery at the rnedical facil~ty There,

the pilferage is commonly committed by hosp~tal administrators doctors and nurses and

support personnel on wards The Catholic bishop of Lubumbashi has attributed many cases

o f infant and adult deaths to the ~nab~lity o f most families to bribe the medical personnel

who are supposeo to care for them 161

Corruption IS pervasive at all levels of gove-nment and take three major forms (11

corruption in the routlne course of government business (eg bribery patd to have

compromlslng documerlts removed from flies salary computerizat~on fraud and

embezzlement In ~ t s varlous forms I 12) Corrupt~on In the ~mplementation o f substantwe

government programs 1eg false b~l ls Income tax fraud import tax fraud export tax fraud

i and (31 Corruption In the exercise of government regulatory functions (eg d~scrim~nation

In commerc~al and c~vi l law application and ~rregular~t~es In price control and tax

assessment (7, These practices are ~ngralned ~nstitutional~zed and routinized and result In

the systemat~c bleed~ng of the state treasury as Indicated above

Zaire's case illustrates some of the political advantages of corruption. Over two decades,

the regime has been able to forestall any challenge and maintain a semblance of political

stability. Strategic elites are kept in line through vartous state-sponsored polic~es and

incentive system. 18) On the other hand. Zaire's experience examplifies one of the best

illustrations of the debilitating consequences o f systemic corruption. As many as two-

thirds o f the country's civil servants may be fictitious, and this represented In 1978 a total

budgetary evasion of 288 million zaires. that is, nearly half o f the annual budget deficit for

that year. 19) While some privileged elltes are growing richer and richer through such

budgetary hemorrhage and several other corrupt practices chronicled in this study, Zaire ts

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BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION IN AFRICA 431

today - desprte ~ t s abundant mlneral agrrcultural and human resources - among the least

developed natlons, hav~ng one of the lowest per caplta Incomes In black Afrlca Over 50%

of cixldren are reportdly suf f erlng from kwashrorbor the most extreme and Irf e-

threatentng form of protem defrclency (1 01

Bureaucratrc corruptron IS also reported to be a contlnulng publrc p o k y problem In

Nrger~a Yet revelattons of corruptron on a large scale we frequently suppressed before

publ~catton or soon thereafter, unless they serve a pol~tlcal purpose Of Me Important

cases that escape concealment. many are etther dtsmtssed and/or burled In lnvestlgatory

commtttees ( 1 1)

An emptrcal study of bureadcratrc corruptron for 1976- 1979 pertod revealed that 70

percent of reported cases of corruptron were In the pubic sector, the remarnlng bemg

spl,t among prrvate tnddstry commerce and baqklng 1121 Accordng to the same study

corr~pt lon was more wrdespreaa In the l oh a?d rned~um status group durrng 1970-1973

and wrtnessed a sharp Increase In hrgh-level corruptton In the per~od 1974-76 followrng

the spectacular Increase m or1 revenues ano governmental expendrtures By 1979

corrcrDtron seems to have spread rtself throughou! all levels of the bureaucracy 113)

A 1980 Mrnrstry of Justtce study places uwetected rnc~dences of corruptron as hlgcl as

87 E percent o f all cases reported (141 So pervascve IS corruptron that some wrrters lrke

E d ~ t r Madunagu have referred t o rt as "the polttrcal economy of state robbery' (15)

Between January and December 1984, an estimated 120.000 tc 150.000 publrc servants

at both federal and state levels were allegedly accused of corrupt practices and some

were subsequently either dismissed, retired or demoted (1 61 Many officials accused of

corruption could not satrsfactorily account for money whlch they had and which was

clearly beyond their known or legrtimate sources of Income.

Corruptton is also reported In Zambira, yet the relative frequency with which it is

dtscovered and punished suggests that it may remain a somewhat risky undertaking

According to a report from the Mrnlstry o f Home Affarrs in 1980, 8 5 cases of corruption

were reported to the police in the flrst half of 1980 This represented an increase o f

500 percent compared to the f r s t half o f 1979 rn whlch only 17 cases of corruption

we-e reported (1 7)

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432 GOULD AND MUKENDI

Corruption tn Zambia constitutes one significant way In which public wealth and Influence

IS appropriated and accumulated by indtv~duals wlth access to public off ice or to public

o f f~cers According to Szeftel 1181 corruption In Zamb~a IS one Important means of

providing access to sste resources to new Afrcan rulers and their chents and for

permlttlng expatriates to preserve ther Inks wlth the state In a neo-colon~al setttng

Wealth illegally acqured from the holding o f pol~tical office IS used to acqure land. houses

small service ~ndustries or for polltical patronage and clientelism etc (191

The evidence o f systemic corrupt~on has become increasingly so widespread that it

cannot be denled For Instance government vehicles are used as prlvate taxis state lands

are sold to res~dents seeklng plots for hous~ng where such lands have not been offered

fop sale In other Instances the payment of salarleslwages to flctit~ous employees IS a

common practlce The provinc~al off ize of one mlntstry was sa~d t o have collectec

K78 697 tn overtime wage and allowances paid to nonexistent officials In 1975 (201

Moreover, some 198 offlc~als were dlsmtssed from the civ~l serv~ce In 1971 for

misaDpropriation o f publlc funds In 1976 the Prime Minister answering a question tn the

Natlona' Assembly stated that In 1974 fourteen office-s had been conv~cted of offenses

related to corrupt practices sixty-e~ght of corrupt~on and more than a thousand o f theft

b\ publ~c servants (21)

Concern with corruption has equally spread even to those countries which previously had

low records on misappropriation of public resources and abuse of power for private

regarding motives The Former Kenyan Chief Justice. C.6 Madan recently voiced his

dissatisfaction with the legal system of his Country. asserting that bureaucratic corruption In

the judicial system moves In circles from lawyers to judges and court clerks One

manifestation of the systematc corruption which he cited is the tactical postponement in

the hearing of cases which flnally lead to repeated losses o f files or removal of

compromis~ng documents (22) Yet, i t is an axiom that justice delayed is justrce denied

Such actions also constitute a form s f corruption to the extent that those involved in these

practices UtihZe their public positions for activities ultimately aimed at personal or private

benefit

In the foregolng dlscuss~on we have seen that corruption IS pervasrve and perhaps

systemic m several countries throughout A f r~ca It lnvolves more than a personal aberration

It becomes a powerful motor o f polttical survival by sustaining networks of patronage and

cltentel~sm Awareness of the phenomenon IS also widespread How t o cope wtth

corruption IS another matter The way t o deal effect~vely w ~ t h corrupt pract~ces will

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BUREAUCRATIC CORROPTION IN AFRICA 433

depend upon ones d~agnos~s of the particular causes responsible for the phenomenon Let

US tnerefore examlne some of the more Lkely explanat~ons that account for corruptlon In

Afrca

3 CONDITIONS CONTRIBUTING TO CORRUPTION

T ~ E causes of corruption are complex and difficult to determine due to chang~ng

deft i~t~o?s of the phenomenon and the ecolog~cal as well as socia' and poht~cal dynamlcr

underlymg ~t It 1s probably better to examlne those ~ndrv~dual and structural condit~ons that

create opportunities and incentives for corruptlon to occur

br?er the expianatlo? IS placed at the mdividua' level corrupt~on IS v~ewed as the result

of ~idlvidua~ greed or the ~nablllty to resist temptat~ons on the part of lnsuff~ciently ethlca'

o f f~c~a lc Hence corrupt officials are e~ther 'grass eaters or 'mea: eaters' depend~ng on

tne extent of ther personal greed (231

The Impazt of lndiv~dual corVupt~oi IS pa-titularly damaglng on the economy when the

chte. carnivores a-e at the h~ghest level of leadersh~p Large-scale corruptlon In h~gh

places In governments has been c~ted as belng respons~ble for soclo-economlc

detevorat~on and subsequent coups detat In much of Afrca In the 1960s among the

prlnclpal causes cited for the fall o f Ghanas Kwame Nkrumah was corruptlon Similar

observations can be made for Mall under Modlbo Ke~ta Congo-Brazzav~lle under Fulbert

You<ou and Zalre (then Republique Democrat~que du Congo) under Joseph Kasavubu where

COUPS were a logical consequence of w~despread governmental corruptlon (241 Of the 80

coups attempted In Africa between 1960-1982 almost all were justifled as reactlon to

and as efforts to Improve upon corrupt reglmes 125) Even In countries where coup

attenpts are not frequent, but where successful pol~t~cal patronage patr~monialisrn, and

clientellsm allow reglmes to forestall drect challenges corruption remains a prlnc~pal

feature of pol~tical and economic underdevelopment block~ng initiatives and frustrat~ng the

most arnb~t~ous change prospects

It 1s often proposed that "if we just get r id of X corrupt leader, and replace him with an

honest one. we Carl get r ~ d o f corruption". But what is happening In this regard is the

repetitive nature o f corruption in most countries Idealistic leaders, most strident in

denounc~ng corrupt regimes and even successful in overthrowing them, end up becoming

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4 34 GOULD AND MUKENDI

"as bad as' those they flrst denounced- if not worse The case o f N~ger~a. Uganda. Ghana,

and Liberia come to mlnd

Thus the 'bad apple' hypothes~s 1s not a su f fc~ent explanat~on of corruptlon Structural-

level var~ables also have a bear~ng on corruptlon Seven prlnclpal structural cond~t~on~ng

factors are the nature of the state and ~ t s leadersh~p the expanded role of the state In the

economy the Increase0 ~nvolvement o f the bureaucracy In party pollt~cs, soc~al and

economtc cond~t~ons organ~zat~onal factors and fore~gn corruptmg influences and supports

3.1 The Nature o f the State and its Leadership

Bureaucratc corruptlon tends t o be widespread where thev€ IS ambguty about the

mission o f the state and the purpose pursued by publlc o f fces and lnstttuttons The 'sof!

state' embod~es a weak or d~ffuse sense o f nat~onal Interest and the absence of a

commltmen? to pubhc sewlce (26)

Many observers have polnted to the lack o f publ~c splr~tedness or devot~on to pubk dUfy

and Interest In much o f A f rca Publlc o f f ~ c e IS l~ke any other opportun~ty t o be explo~ted

for personal galn In some countries the whole state apparatus has been preempted by

the task of advanctng the personal enrchment o f top off lc~als to the polnt that the prlmary

focus of state actlvtty IS seen as one of facthtatlng the systemat~c extractton o f surplus on

the~r behalf (27) As a result people tend to regard the state as allen arb~trary or

corrupt and consequently res~st ldenttfylng themselves w ~ t h the government As Keth Hart

polnts out Afr~can governments represent In themselves the s~ngle greatest threat to ther

clttzens They treat the rule of law w ~ t h contempt and mult~ply hast~ly publ~c schemes

des~gned prlnc~pally to ther own prlvate and collect~ve enrtchment (28)

The lack o f commitment to public interest manifests itself In various forms of social

lndlscipllne e.g def~cienc~es In leg~slation and enforcement of laws, caprclous and lax

apphcat~on of formal rules In order to extract personal advantages Myrda! explalns this

phenomenon as resulting from the softness of state (291 Broadly speaking. a soft state is

incapable o f ach~eving targeted plan outputs and the intended level o f soc~al and economic

prosperity A soft state is characterned by: (a1 high dependence on external assistance - the extent o f development being largely determined and limited by outside opportunit~es and

constraints: (b) widespread social indiscipline and disobedience to public authority: (cl

overcentralized government, thereby undermining local initiatives and expanding opportunit~es

for bureaucrat~c corruption; and (dl rigid bureaucracy unable to adjust to changing

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BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION IN AFRICA 43 5

circumstances, persisting with outmoded attitudes and arrangements and rely~ng on heavy-

handed enforcement (30)

Bureaucratic corruptton and underdevelopment are the result and conseqdence of the

persistence of the weaknesses of state First Afr~can states are h~ghly dependent on a

few prlmapy export commod~ties whlch constitute the prlnctpal sources of fore~gn earnings

and government revenues That has been the case In Zambta and tatre (copper), Nigeria

lo111 Ivory Coast and Ghana (cocoa1 etc Such slngle mlneral ov ag%ultural dependent

economies are vulnevable to fluctuations In world commodtty prtces that are In most cases

f~xed by ~nternattonal cartels In the case of agrtcultural commod~t~es they are, In add~t~on,

Subte3 to weather changes and harvest r~sks Hence, durtng bad trnes the Issue o f

survtval of state proves to be cructal Afrtcan governments tend to resort to corruptton

or d~scr~minatory allocat~on of resources to strategic elites In the name of preserving

stab~l~ty peace or promotmg development

Second, lacktng industrial and manufacturing sectors o f any stgn~flcance, many African

states are dependent on tmports most o f whlch cater to the needs o f consumptlon-

ortented bureaucrats The latter enjoys a standard of ltvlng far In excess of the nat~onal

average In Tany cases the economy is therefore explo~ted to support the poltttcal and

bureaucratic class 131) Thrd Afrtcan states nave distanced themselves from thew own

popillat~on only passively transformed Into clttzens A recent comparatlve study of Afr~can

management systeqs across ~deologcal lmes revealed the persistence of colontal

adrn nistratlve structures ortented toward law and order rather than consultat~on and

partic~patton 132) In these circumstances poltttcs deals prlmartly w t h efforts from excluded

soc~al groups t o thwart pollcy ~mplementatton or access to scarce resources rather than on

pollcy Issues It is tn fact at thls level of ~mplementatton that some segments o f the

populat~on can get nvolved in the process of resource distr~but~on, ~e through patron-

chent networks Hence the lnstttutlon of government and the resources tt makes ava~lable

become property to be acqutred for the benef~t o f ones self and ones chents (331

Fourth and finally, the inst~tutional weakness of African states has been aggravated by the

questionable reliability of their administrative personnel. The issue of inefficient personnel

was succinctly raised in a 1977 report by Julius Nyerere on socialist progress In Tanzania

He -toted that ministries were overspending in disregard o f severe budgetary restraints, the

Rural Development Bank was issuing loans that were not being repaid, state enterprises

were operating far below capaclty - sometimes at less than 50 4' - management was

preoccup~ed with privilege and displayed l~tt le commltment, entreprise and workers were

slack, incompetent and indiscipltned. (341

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436 GOULD AND MUKENDI

The overall softness of state makes corruption possible. and in turn the prevalence o f

corruption compounds softness in keeping African countries as soft states.

3.2 The Expanded Role o f the State in the Economy

W ~ t h the comlng o f polltlcal Independence In the early 1960's, the state became the

malor engmeer o f soc~al and econome changes and the focus o f new aspratlons and

demands The state became the ch~ef ~nvestor, Importer of goods and suppl~es needed In

the development process and the d~str~butor of scarce hard currency to publlc and prwate

users The expandtng role of the state has been accompanied by a parallel Increase In

regulat~ons, sometimes confusing The prlnclpal beneflc~ar~es of these cumbersome

regulat~ons have been publlc o f f~c~a ls who Interpret them so as to extract personal

advantages Hence publlc contracts may be accorded on a non-competltrve bas~s to

powerful businessmen In return for 10 percent to be pocketed by the o f f ~ c ~ a l In charge

(351 Moreover, the excluswe control over the provision o f servlces and goods by the state

has glven off lc~als In charge considerable d~scretlonary and barga~n~ng power In thelr

relat~ons w ~ t h the publlc These offlclals create art l f~c~al bottlenecks whlch can only be

rel~eved wlth br~bes Bureaucratc delay~ng tactics are slmply an ~nd~catior; that only a br~be

can open the door to the needed servlce Thls phenomenon IS part~cularly acute when

there 1s an Imbalance betweei supply ano demand Finally wh~le large amounts are bemg

expended new regulations made and ne* lnstrtutions set up the monltorlng of such

spendlng and cnstrtut~ons has often been weak and Ineffectwe lneffect~ve flnanc~al and

ldmlntstrat~ve controls encourage corruption

3.3 The Increased Involvement of the Bureaucracy in Party Politics

With the achievement of political independence In most African countries, the need for

bo~i t lcal mobihzation and control led to the dominance o f political over bureaucratic values

(361 The resultant politicizat~on has created an administrative elite whose members are

dependent for their advancement and career success on the degree of loyalty to the party

in power or t o dominant pol~t~cal f~gures, rather than on a high degree o f professionaltsm

In particular, the need for polltcal control has been matched by the strengthening of the

personal powers of chief executive leadership. In countr~es such as Zambia, Zaire and

Togo, the President appoints and dismisses all top polittcal and administrative o f f~c~a l s from

the army, bureaucracy, labor unions, state corporations, etc The President's plcture 1s &

r_!0ueur in all public places, officials must swear personal loyalty to h~m, and his party role

is given prominence even over his chief-of-state function This process guarantees the

indispensabil~ty or relevance of the chief executive t o the system and his role as the chief

dispenser and distributor of spoils. Hence loyalty and subservience to the chief exectitwe

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BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION IN AFRICA

become key attributes of a successful career In public adrnlnistrat~on and pazy bureaucrat)

Thls pattern of centralrty o f personal rule and cl~entel~zat~on of the state-civil soctety

relat~onsh~p IS well captured by Jackson and Rosberg according to whom the rulers In

Afrlca a-e not lmked w ~ t h the publ~c or even w ~ t h the ruled (at least not directly), but w ~ t h

patrons associates cltents supporters and rlvals who constitute the system (37)

Such a pol~t~cally personal~zed env~ronment prov~des fert~le ground for nepotism ethnc

pol~tics and chentellsrn and hence a source for the subordlnat~on o f publlc to partlculartst~c

Interes's and norms Udmln~stratrve structures are used essentially as patronage lnstltut~ons

rather than as vehlcles of social and economlc development

Thls sttuat~on IS not by no means spec~flc to new natlons Chapmans class~c study (38)

showed how in Brtta~n officials subvert the neutrality prlnclple by treat~ng top adrn~n~strat~ve

poslttons as 'posts of conf~dence' This process requlres a personal advlsory cablnet to

the mlnlster and these together engage In self-centered manlpulatlve polltlcs

Yet in Afr~ca the lnsecurtty surrounding the tenure of publlc o f f ~ c e puts pressure on

of f lc~a s to establ~sh a confortable flnanclal sltuatlon generally at the expense of the publlc

treasury The frequent changes In pollcles create excesstve uncertainty In these

ctrcumstances lncumbeits are tempted to explo~t the~r offlclal posttlon as quickly as they

can for prlvate gains

3.4 Soclal and Econom~c Conditions

Bureaucrat~c corruption IS agreed to be w~despread In cond~ttons of extreme ~nequal~ty

and absolute poverty (39) The mean per caplta GNP In Afrtca seldom exceeds S400

Poorly -pa~d m~ddle and low level personnel perform most o f the work In N~ger~a the clvit

servlcc pay scale has remalned substant~ally unstructured desplte the Udoj~ Salary Rev~ew

Cornrn sslon f~nd~ngs and recommendations in 1974 The gap between top officials and

low-raiktng personnel IS st111 very w~de The ratlo o f the salary of the h~ghest patd to the

lowest-pa~d publlc of f lc~al In N~geria IS about 30 1 In the USA and USSR the ratlos are

7 5 1 and 4 5 1 respectwely (40)

A study of the publlc sector cond~t~ons in t a r e indicated that 92 percent o f state

emplovees earned less than 200 zaires per month in 1977-76 (41) By matching the

salary levels with the cost of ltving during the same period, it was found that these 92

percent of wage earners were unable to meet their basic subsistence needs (food, clothing,

hous~ngl with their monthly pay packages Skyrocketing inflation contributed to making life

so unbearable to the majority of the population that even an employee's monthly salary

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438 GOULD AND MUKENDI

not meet his or her family's needs. let alone h ~ s or her other basic needs In such

circumstances, poverty impels people to desperation not only t o tolerate corruptlon, but

also t o take advantage o f it

3.5 Cultural Factors

Some analysts of bureaucratic corruptlon argue that corrupt~on 1s the outgrowth o f some

defectwe Afrlcan cultural norms a ~ d behav~oral patterns (421 The coextstence between

tradltlonal and modern values produces what Robert Merton I431 has called 'amb~valence' or

the lncompatlble normatwe expectatlons of attitudes behefs and behavlor asstgned to a

soc~al status or a set o f statutes In soclety For Merton confltctmg normattve expectatlons

socdly deflned for a soctal role place contradictory demands upon the occupant of a

status In a pa-tcular social relat~on

In much o f A f r~ca lnd~vldual rlghts and personal accountab~l~ty matter less than the

loyalt~es to the ~nd~v~duals ethnlc group and klnsh~p values The resulting confllct between

traditional norms and the standaros of modern bureaucracy provides an Impetus for

corrupt~on Ekpo (441 has lnd~cated for example that corruptlon In Nlgerla IS the result of

the continuation of trad~t~ona' practices o f gift-glvln~ It IS not uncommon to see a clerk

or a messenger turn back part o f h ~ s salary t o a top offlclal Although thls act IS not

regarded as corruptlon 11 IS Intended to influence decls~ons on the part o f the offlclal

In addltlon. the extended famtly system prevalllng In Afr~ca creates pressure on off~cials

to seek extra-legal Income IP order t o attend t o numerous extended fam~ly obhgations and

demands The process of moderntzatlon has drawn youth from rural areas toward urban

centers In search of educatton or employment These mlgrants expect to be taken care of

by klns people who have preceded them t o cltles and w ~ t h whom they may have vague

famlly relat~onsh~ps Custom prohlblts a relatwely well-off person such as a c1v11 servant

from turnlng away s relatlve regardless o f hts stature w~thln the llneage Expelltng a

relatwe would subject hlm to recrlmlnatlon from the whole village and ultimately to sertous

dangers and 'evil spells te sudden contraction of a deadly or dlsabllng dlsease loss of

h ~ s job through lnvocatlon of evil sptrlts or witchcraft The host CIVI! servant must

therefore, do h ~ s best to provlde not only shelter, food and some money t o purchase

clgarenes and clothes, but also to help In f ~ n d ~ n g a well-pa~d job or paytng kckbacks for

school admlss~on and subsequent charges for students It 1s not uncommon to f ~ n d a c1v11

servant who earns a monthly salary o f $100 supporting a dozen unemployed relatives

lncludlng ststers brothers uncles and aunts In the context o f high cost o f llvlng and low

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BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION IN AFRICA

government salar~es, these socto-cultural pressures can result In the commiss~on o f acts o f

CorwDtlon In order to accommodate varlous extended family members' needs

Fdrthermore cultural expectat~ons regard~ng the role o f publlc 0fftclal create rncentrves

for corruptton Tradit~onally, Afrlcans expect a chief or publlc servant to be a carlng

person, a '.pater famillas' who does not always dec~de on the basts o f impersonal norms

Thvc att~tude IS somehow reflected In the ambwalence toward law As one Ghanalan

jo~malts! observed

We [Gha~a~ans] have abays turned two faces toward a pokeman WE expect htm to be human yet Inhuman We employ hlm t c adrn~nlster the la* yet ash h ~ m to walve ~t in certaln Instances Vve resent h ~ m when he enforces the law In our case yet demand hts d~srnlssal whpn he doer ~t elsewhere We shamelessly of fer hlm brlbes yet denounce h ~ s corruptlon (45)

'bough these cultural practrces are not In themselves causes of corruptlon, they

coqstrtute SOCIO-polttrca condrt~ons wh~ch sometimes lead drectiy or lndlrectly to the

conmtsslon of acts of corruptron

3.6 Organizational Factors

3.6.1 The Slowness o f the Policy Process

4esource concentration IS probably one of the d~st~ncttve features of Afrca?

aomtnrstratlons Ever minor adm~ntstratlve dectslons are made a%ay from local entlt~es As

a -esA h~gher offlcials opevate In condttlons of chron~c work overload wh~le m~ddle and

ICA level managers are In state of slackness It has developed from th~s patterr. 'des

aomlnlstrat~ons des dossiers' whe-ebv central offlcials are submerged w ~ t h thousands of

f~ es f r o r thev locallv operating unlts Before a decls~or. IS made a chent may be

requested to exhbt ar un~mag~nable number of documents photocop~es or to make

several trtps or to Walt long hours standlng In llne As a consequence a problem that

aould be dealt wtth wtthln a week may take long months Salary computerlzatlon In the

cap~tal clty can take up to three years Impatlent cl~ents cannot wart too long Only a

brtbe can act~vate the process In some Instances the 'come back tomorrow' delays are

stmply an ~ndlcatfon that a brlbe IS necessary if the desred servlce IS ever to be obtalned

rn rthm a reasonable tlme llmtt

3 6.2 Poor Control and Accountability Systems

The lack of admlnlstrat~ve control and f~nanc~al accountabll~ty IS also c~ted as a major

bottleneck of Afrlcan admlntstrat~ons (461 Some offlc~als accused o f corruptlon are

transferred to other edm~nlstratlve posts One d~rector In the Zalrtan Department of F~nance

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GOULD AND MUKENDI

mlsused an estrmated SlOO 000 for h ~ s own needs In 1973 lnstead o f betng prosecuted

he was removed from hls post and a year later he was appocnted as drector In another

publ~c off lce 147) Thus the problem was merely exported to another locus In the system

In add~t~on those In cha-ge o f audrt~ng functions can themselves be corrupt thereby

u*ldermnng any effectwe control mechan~sm from b e r g Installed

Moreover, due to the lack of competent and suff~c~ent staff, accounts are not aud~tea

for a long t~me Th~s makes ~t easy for off lc~als to cornmlt fraud or to embezzle pubhc

funds because before the ~rregulant~es are d~scovered the offcers rn~ght wel! no longer be

around

3.6.3 Incongruence Between the Legal System and Societal Demand

Generally. the law and legal system and ~rocedures In Afr~can countr~es are a legacy from

colon~al powers The relevance o f European norms to Afrcan raal~tres was assumed

leadrng to gaps between prescrbed norms and soc~al realrty

In some cou~tr~es. the legal system does not adequately respond to comrnunlty

expectations and asplratlons Offlc~als are thus suscept~ble to be~ng br~bed I? orde- to

overlook vlolatrons deslred by a segment of the pubic (481 For example some

construct~ons In urban areas of Afrlca v~olate bu~ld~ng code provlslons Bur tne drff~cult

soc~o-economlc condmons may lead o f f~c~a l s to avo~d order~ng ther destructlor, Instead

rnformally negot~ated arrangements can be reached between part~es

A somewhat d~fferent problem concerns the arnbrgutty of extstrng laws and the

tneffecrrveness of the~r enforcement whch create opportunmes for corruptlon On the

one hand people are generally unclea* about what the off lc~al rules are and wha: really

constitutes breaklng them On the other hand, the poltce who are charged w ~ t h law

enforcement are among the laws worst offenders There are cases of the pol~ce turning

a bl~nd eye from the actlv~tles of contraband~sts th~eves and robbers In exchange for

ranson Somettmes they actlvely help the crlmlnals

3.7 Foreign Corruptmg Influences and Supports

One problem of cons~derable Importance requlrlng spec~frc anent~on IS the role o f fore~gn

busrness Interests and governments rn feedlng corruptlon In the th rd world (491 Indeed

the desre to malntaln monopolies over markets access to contracts and cheap labor and

to secure large uneyned pro f~ ts 1s the prrnc~pal le~tmot~f In promotmg corrupt practces by

mult~nat~onal corporations In Af r~ca -As Szeftel observed In Zarnb~a

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BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION IN AFRICA 441

lllustrat~ons of how pubic resources can be appropr~ated by prlvate capltal work~ng through officials can be found In the report on the Ratlways In one Instance cltec a p o k e lnvestlgatlon revealed that ratlway o f f~cers had stopped purchas~ng supphes from wholesale~s an0 retalers w ~ t h whom Zamb~a Ra~lways operated accounts and had redrected all such orders t h ro~gh one commerc~al company Thts cornpan\ ~t transpred purchased the supphes from the same flrms that hao prev~ousl) sold to the rallways dlrectly but the neb lnteVmedlary now Inflated the prlces enormousl\ (by over 350 b In one case1 An employee who quer~ed thls change was threatened by the superlor who had inrtiated the change (501

There are also cases in wh~ch forergn business mterests fmd lt necessary to bribe h~gh

and low of f ic ia!~ in order t o circumvent hard and cumbersome government reg~lations In

Ke~ya. management posit~ons supposed to have beer; turned over to Kenyans under the

Kenyanizat~on Act are repoptedly st111 occupled by expatriates thanks to corrupt

arraigements between corporate represeitatives and rnrn~yat~on offlclals In one case the

K r a t h Street branch of the Natrobl-based H a m Ba'lk Ltd allegedly gave tne asslstant

pr lmpa immigrat~on officer e present costlng shs 8 030 to keep h ~ m happy because he

IS charge of the Kenyan,zat~on depa-tment (51) In other case the Hab~d Balk AG Zurlch

was reported to have spent far more every year to keep fr~endly reiat~ons w ~ t h ~mm~grat~on

04f clals (521 These forelgn business-~nduced corrupt practices help to Integrate Into the

sysrev expatriates whom the government t e ~ d s to exclude anc by tne same token

unoermlne efforts toward economlc Independence

Bdt bevond speclfc bus~ness Interests are iong-term strategic and econornrc Interests of

foVelgn governments that breen corruptlon Research has for Instance shown that the US

govevnment generally tdrns a bllnd eye on the systernatlc mlsuse o f US a ~ d by Zaman

bureaucratic elites The US support to the government of Zaire was found to be

essent~ally predicated on the desre (1) to malntaln a fr~endly relat~onshlp with a country

strateg~cally located at the heart o f Afrlca and whose government IS supportwe of US

po ~ c y (2) to malntarn ongoing US programs and to keep AID rnlsslons staffed up after

pavtng Ilp service to outs~de crltlctsm and (31 to protect and expand US pubic and prlvate

Investments whlch amounted to nearly 1 bdl~on In 1979 (53)

Thus, a ~ d was found to be used as a pol~t~cal instrument to strengthen the prestcge and

the authorltar~an stance of the government, thus contributmg to more corruptlon, social and

economic d~sparit~es and ~nstabillty. To the extent that some corrupt practices can serve to

advance forelgn Interests and prlorlties, the ultmate solution to corruption must also

encompass those external forces whlch Induce or provide support to corruptlon

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442 GOULD AND MUKENDI

In sum we have seen tnat a set of cond~t~ons create opportunltles for corrupt~on to

occur the nature of state and the extent o f ~ t s involvement In the economy the degree of

pol~t~c~rat lon and cl~entel~zat~on o f the bureaucracy, prevacltng soc~al and economtc

cond~t~ons organ~zat~onal constramts cultural attltudes and behawor and fore~gn corruptcng

Influences and support of corrupt~on No one smgle condtt~on chroncled above Can

account for the observed lnc~dence of corruptton In Afrcca Each condtt~on adds to others

and all thus Interact so as t o produce some consequence on the pattern of admlntstrat~ve

economlc and soc~o-pol~t~cal development We will now examlne these consequences

4 THE CONSEQUENCES OF CORRUPTION

There IS little agreement among studeits of corrupt~on about the effects of thts

phenomenon Some have tended to regard ~t as havmg certatn poslttve consequences on

moderntzatton and econontc and polctcal development It would be worthwhde to evaluate

the allegedly benef~ctal aspects of corrupt~on In cornpartson to ~ t s negatcve conseqdences

4.1 Positlve Consequences of Corruption

Nye Bayley and Leff 1541 have all concluded In ther studtes of corrupt~on that th~s

phenomenon has both beneftctal and harmful effects on the soclety where tt 15 found

Generally speanlng corruptlon IS vtewec as havlng benef~c~ai results from three polnts of

vlew (11 Corrupt~on can enhance economlc development by st~mulatmg capctal format~on

and channelitng resources t o the most entrepreneur~al people (2) Corruptton can play a i

lntegrat~ve role by allowing access to publlc off~cials to groups whlch would be otherw~se

al~enated Corrupt~on can mltlgate conflcts between polltlctans and bureaucrats slnce

w~despraad corrupt~on prov~des proftts to everyone and (3) Corruptton can lead to a more

humane and flexlble admlnlstrat~on by cuttlng bureaucratc r lg~d~ty and red-tape Corrupt~on

can reduce the losses from ill-concetved and 111-structured pollc~es by maklng poss~ble the

pursult of a course of actlon supported by a d~ssent~ng segment o f expert oplnlon

Llnle ev~dence IS ava~lable in support of the flrst p ropos~t~on above LeV~ne's study of

Ghana showed for example that cap~tal derwed f rom corruptlon was e~ther Invested outs~de

the country or spent on conspicuous consumption of luxur~ous goods Even when stolen

money was Invested In the country, there was l~tt le tr~ckle down beneflt to the publlc at

Large (551 Furthermore. despite the oil boom of the 1970's. Ntgeria failed to reach the

desired level o f social and economic development owing in part to serious fraud and

misappropr~at~on of funds In h~gh places The so-called 'petro-naira rnilhonaires' were

prominent p u b k figures deeply involved in smuggling, bribery and shady financial dealings

which have in turn pa~alyzed the economy. (56)

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BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION IN AFRICA 44 3

The evidence on the second propositlon is very debatable Althought it is recognized that

systemlc corruptlon at the political level has helped some states to maintain a degree of

politcal stability or the survlval o f the regimes. ~t IS also acknowledged that such stability

has been ach~eved at cons~derable human and f~nanc~al costs Numeris economic

mwwnagernen: was dehberately Intended to buy loyalt~es from upper and middle classes

anc contributed t c Sudans growlng ~ndebtedqes whlch had grown stead~ly from S3 b~lhon In

19'8 to almost $9 bill~on In 1985 (571 The ensulng paralys~s of economlc actrvlty and the

chrsn~c shortage of basic food commoa~t~es culm~nated In an unprecedented level of

unoewour~shment and malnutr~tion for most low Income groups These processes

exazerbated b) urban terrorism ano viole?ce and ethnic-rel~g~ous conflicts prec~p~tated hls

renmval from Dower In 1985

Ir regard to the thrd propositlon the benef~ts of corrupt~on are generally llm~ted to the

partles In corrupt .tra?satt~ons Even ~f corruptlon grants certaln short-term advantages

whether by clrcumveWng rlgta bureadcratlc plpellnes or by d~str~but~ng goods more w~dely

ma. does the o f f ~ c ~ a l system ~t IS st111 hard to say how such benef~ts w ~ l l st111 rernaln

benef~ts In the long-run as corrupt practices become more regularized and lnst~tut~onahzed

anc as it becomes d~f f~cu l t to l m t any wastage of resources le Some Afrcan countrhes

yearly lose m~ll~ons due to the rnlsappropriat~on of funds by publlc off~clals In 1971 for

example the losses due to corrupt~on In publlc servlces were reported as follows

1 439 000 Frs CFA (Ivory Coast) 863 000 ced~ (Ghana' 1 14.945 990 Frs CFA (Mall), and

17 774,340 zalres (Za~rel or a total per year o+ 134.995 330 Frs CFA (581 In a context

of scarclty of economlc resources and large unmet needs the dlsslpat~on o f even $1

m ~ l ion can have a yea: effect on .the economy and the overall efforts toward ach~evlng

social and economlc progress for all cltlzens

4.2 Negative Consequences of Corruption

4 2 1 Consequences on Adrn~n~st ra t~ve Performance

Corrupt~on can have var~ously adverse effects on admlnstrat~ve development F~rst,

corruptlon distorts pol~cylproject goals and makes ~t lrnposslble t o conduct clearly

recognizable pol~c~es and to implement them effectively (591 For example the

governments o f Kenya and Zambia faded to lrnplement ther respectwe ~nd~genizat~on

programs as scheduled because some offlc~als reportedly conn~ved w ~ t h fore~gn busmess t o

ensure poor execution One study on Za~re 1601 showed how the 'Za~r~an~zat~on' measures

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444 GOULD AND HUKENDI

intended to broaden the soclal base and achieve economlc Independence, were h~jacked in

the interest of private accumulation. Top off lc~als used their publlc positions to maximize

their private gains and at the same tlme to pollce the operation so that i t truly benef~ted

the entlre populat~on Ir, the flna resort, the unfold~ng measures dramatzed to cwil society

the moral vacuum In whlch the state operated (61)

Further, corrupt~on In development programs or projects can substant~ally reduce the total

amounts of allocated funds for the project thereby causlng delays orland poor results

Accordmg to one study tne costs of most contracts In N~ger~a are dei~berately ~nflated

leading to h~gh construct~ov costs andlor severe delays In project rnplementat~on (62) A

mln~ster~al commlnec In 1980 established that the costs of government contracts In N~ger~a

were 200 percent htghe* than In Kenya and 130 percent h~gher than In Alger~a (631

Second corruptton rases the cost of admli~strat~on to the publ~c Taxpayers are

subjected to several unofflc~al taxes for the same servlces In N~ger~a as well as In Zare

a patlent may pay three to four tlmes more than the of f ic~al fee for the profess~onal

servlces of doctors surgeons and medcal spec~allsts In publlc pract~ce The result IS that

only a small portton o f those requlrlng medlcal attent~on recelve ~t owlng t o a mult~tude of

~llegal charges (641

Thrd corrupt~on has a demorallzlng effect generating considerable d~strust throughout the

bureaucracy lnh~b~tlng delegat~on o f power and reduclng effectweness In the use of

manpower and resources Where corruptlon has gotten out o f proportton the goal of

bu~ld~ng an adrnln~strat~ve system grounded on merlt and competence can be substant~ally

frustrated Recruitment select~on and promotion of personnel wdl be seldom based on

quahftcat~on and experience rather on the proper connect~ons as well as loyalty and

subservience to top offtc~als Szeftet pointed out that some junlor o f f~cers In Zamb~a feel

~t rtsky to cross a superlor and may therefore agree to decls~ons they constder as

Improper and erroneous onlb to project the lmpresslon that they agree w ~ t h ther

superlors Several parastatals reportedly suffered In thls way as o f f~cers tried to evaluate

projects In terms of the preferences they perceive the~r superlors to hold (651 In suck

instances c1v11 servants feel compelled to say what IS wanted rather than what IS needed

wlth the result that plans programs, and projects often remaln Inadequately checked before

be~ng lmplernented

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BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION IN AFRICA

4.2.2 Consequences on Economlc Development

Corrupt~on results In a net loss to the economy by causlng rnasslve cap~tal outflow and

the oeslgn of less econom~cally prof~table projects wvose sols benefrt 1s the

aggrand~zernent of parrres ~nvolved In corrupt transact~ons Young and Tu~ne- (661 have

recent y described what they see as implau$lble ventures and lrrat~onal Investment dec~sions

whrch are based not on sound economlc feas~b~lity analyses but are des~gned to conceat

the dlders~on o f resources to pr~vate enrrchment They report the case In whlch advlsec

bk t h ~ Italian consultma f r m SICAI the governmelt o f Zalre embarked on the constructlon

of a stee' mill at MaluKu abou! 80 krn from K~nshasa SICAls economlc C a l ~ u I a t ~ ~ n ~

emphas~zed tne Import subst~tut~on merits as well as the linkage effects of the steel rnlll to

the Zarria? economy The cost of the project was almost entrely f~nanced by the Zanan

state as potentla1 Investors were reluctant to pour ther money Into what they percelveci as

a rtshy undertak~ng By the t~me the project was completed In 1975 there war no

posstb~l~ty o f obta~n~ng the caprtal requrred to oevelop Internal Iron ore depos~ts at Banalla

or Luebo so the steel m~l l had to operate entrely w ~ t h Imported scrap Prod~ctron costs

per tcn proved to be S660 rather than the S450-$480 predcted by SICAI and up to e~ght

tlmes the cost of Imported steel The m~ l l never operated at more than 10 percent of ~ t s

250 000 ton capaclty By 1980 ~t had virtually ceased to operate Some concluded that

the constructlon o f tne plant was a slmpk pretext for the mvolved Itallan and German

f~rms to obta~n Import hcences not to mentlon the great proftts der~ved from the turnkey

contract (671

Moreover economlc development car be enhanced by a vigorous fscal p o k y notably

through the mob~i~zat~or aqd allocat~on o f resources for the purpose of development In

A ~ ~ I C G however state tax revenues are dra~ned by ord~nary expenses whlch are sad to be

used for burldmg patrop-clrent networks A World Bank study 1681 est~mated that between

60 t> 70 percent of publlc budget In Afr~ca are devoted to personnel salaries For

tnstarrce over 60 percent of government of Zamb~as spending went t o support urban

burea~CratS through saiarv payments and programs whlch benefrted clty dwellers whde

neglectrng soc~a! and economlc programs favorlng the est~mated 70 9; o f the populat~on

that hved In rural areas (691 For fear OF undevnm~ng the power base of the regme the

government has beer1 reluctant to Impose equal dlstr~but~on of resources whlch could be

distasteful to strategrc copperbel? eirtes whose consurnerlst prol~cttv~t~es would have to be

curtailed

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446 GOULD AND MUKENDI

It IS not uncommon to see public corporations beng tnstituted only to prov~de jobs to

retred polltlc~ans who are appotnted to the boards or as senior executives In order to put

them beyond threatenmg the current reglme Conversely ftnanclal accountlng IS neglected

In these crcumstances even prlvate lnltlatlve IS less l~kely to be eff luent because much of

the states ~ w f f l c ~ e ~ y IS In fact the result of the eagerness o f lndlvldual chents t o t a ~ e

advantage o f state resources made ava~lable tc then

Corrupt practices can also mh~btt capital formation from fore~gn sources On the one

hand systemic corruptton can be used as a just~flcat~on by donor countrtes t o reduce me

amount of thelr a ~ d or to prov~de ald and Investment funds unless the project unde. revlev*

1s controlled by expatrlate manpower Th~s mil~tates agatnst the ef for t toward afrlcaniratton

and reduct~on In unemployment On the other hand, the expatriate personnel can take

advantage o f ther spec~al flnanclal and soc~al status In order to galn a preferentlal access

to publlc servlces As a result contracts wlll be awarded not to the most producttve

entrepreneurs. but the ones who can af ford a b ~ g k~ckback

4.2.3 Consequences for Social and Political Development

One of the most tmportant functions of a government IS to prov~de goods and services

to quaitfled reclp~ents on an equttable and f ~ r s t come bass As corruptlon becomes

lnst~tut~onal~zed goods and serv~ces' are delwered on a h~ghly select~ve basts depending on

ones abhty to pay the unof f~c~a ' but unexpressed fees or through a network o f lnforrnal

relattonsh~ps Those unable to pay or those not belongtng t o the network are excluded In

thts respect corruption engenaers soc~al lnequatittes end accentuates those that already

8 X l S t

Systemc corruptlon Imparts to the publlc the Idea that politics concerns self-~nterest and

self-preservat~on Commentlng on the posstblllt) that workers representatrves m~ght run

for Parliament In the 1978 elect~ons to protect the working populatton from 'polit~cal

mercenaries' who made the admlnlstrat~on the despalr of every c~t~zen, the chalrman of the

Zarnb~a Congress of Trade observed "pol~tlc~ans are all the same They promlse to butld a

br~dge where there IS no rlver In fact pol~tlcs IS the conduct o f publlc af fa~rs for prlvate

advantage' (701 Such pronouncements are clearly lnd~cattve of how corruption can sap the

foundat~ons of a pol~t~cal soctety

Furthermore, large-scale corruptton In government can reduce tts capaclty to cope

effectively with the challenges o f modernizatlon and development Thls is part~cularly

relevant to Afrlcan states whlch are expected to prov~de quick solutions to soc~al

problems, to achieve economic development and social mobilization. and to del~ver goods

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BURE4UCRATIC CORRUPTION IN AFRICA 44 7

and servlces to ther people Trier development prospects largely depend on attalnlng the

targe:s chartered In development plans ano by very h~gh mapglns If the top pol~t~cal ehte

of a country consumes ~ t s t~me and energy In trying to get rlch by corrupt means. ~t IS not

hkely that the development plans will be fulfdled (7 11

Thts study has illustrated the extent of corruptlon and its underdevelopmentslist

consequences in Africa lnstead o f strengthentng the institutions and enhancing the

prospects for social and economic develapment, corrupt~on undermines them Instead of

promotlng growth, corrupt~on serves as an Important factor of nonproductivity and

ineffect~veness It is therefore evident that efforts t o stamp out or to reduce corruptlon

must be seen as a s~gniflcant step toward lmprovlng management in Afrlca

5 ATTEMPTS AT CONTROLLING CORRUPTION

It has been establ~shed that corruptton has a negatlve Impact on development Slnce

some governments need corruptton as a cl~enteltstlc strategy to enhance thetr prospects of

contlnutng to rule, they will make cosmetlc noses about the phenomenon for popular

consumDtlon whde contlnulng to promote rt

Indeed since the last two decades several attempts have been made throughout Afr~ca In

the name of combatting corrupt~on Ghana has more thar any othe. countr~es produced an

Impresswe amount of reports of committees and cornmlsslons of tnqulry on allegat~ons of

corruption Durtng the Second Republlc (1966-19721 LeVlne ~ d e n t ~ f ~ e d 29 reports of

commmees and commlsslons o f tnqulry dealing wlth corrupt practces In government (721

The serles of probes and commlsslons o f lnqulry were for the most part ~ntended to

prov~de ev~dence on the corrupt character o f the Nkrumah reglrne and thus convtnce the

publlc about t h ~ ~ndlspensab~llty of mllltary lnterventlon The successwe mdrtary and clv~ltan

governments succumbed to the same corrupt charges as the~r predecessors (73)

In Ntger,a too there hdve been concerted efforts by both the m~lttary and clvlllan rulers

to eraatcate corrupt~on Following the Udo]~ Comm~ss~on flnd~ngs and recornrnendatlons

publ~c complaint commrsslons - ombudsman-hke lnstitutlons - were set up In N~ger~a In

order tc provlde ample opportunity for the ~rnparttal ~nvest~gaf~on of clttzens cornplarnts

and to preserve the tntegvty of government In 1975 the Bureaux for Complarnts were

establ~shed at all levels of government w ~ t h the power to lnvest~gate not only cornplamts

lodged before them but also on thelr own tnit~atlve any complamts about rnaladrn~n~stratton,

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448 GOULD AND MUKENDI

instances of derellctlon of duty or abuse of o f f ~ c e by public off lc~als (74) The

effect~veness of the Bureaux for Complaints has yet to be assessed lbrah~m Ornales study

lndcates however. tnat the Compla~nt Commlsslons have had hm~ted success In part

because of the d~scretionary power o f the bureaucracy In particular the Pres~dent has

both the power to stop an Investtgatton and to drect the conduct o f one In the way he

sees f ~ t (751 Several other measures have been enacted In order t o eradicate corruption

(76) But the contlnulng prevalence of corrupt practices In t h~s country suggests that such

measures could have been enacted ~ncons~stently or lneffect~vely or were cosmetic or

retr~butive steps Intended to dlscred~t outgolng regimes rather than to be apphed In a

thor oughgolng f ash~on

Meanwhile slnce the m~d- 1970s. the government of Zalre has taken e cortege o f actions

In an attempt t o reduce corrupt~on.ln publlc servlces The 1977 elected Parl~ament was

for example, grarlted the right t o quest~on or '~nterpellate' Cablnet members on issues

concerning publlc m~smanagement The lnterpellat~on procedure was later leglt~mlzed In the

Januar) 1978 constltvt~onal reform After several months of open debates and otherwise

st~muiatlng democratic process the outspoken membe-s of the Parhament were glven

dlplomat~c posts abroaa or sw~tched to other more prof~t-makmg poslt~ons w ~ t h ~ n the

party Thts was In part the result of growtng publlc awareness that corrupt~on and

mtsmanagement were less the consequence of admlnlstFatlve Incompetence than a part of

larger strategy of embourgeotsement In htgh places The lnterpellat~ons were then pursued

under controlled cond~t~ons servlng as a k~nd o f conjunctural 'safety valve' In which

grievances were ared b) strategic elements of the system but watered down s~gniflcantly

(771

Moreover. In an effort to control the problem o f dtversion o f publlc funds from

fictitious and Inactwe personnel In the publtc sector, the government of Zare has lnitlated a

series o f inspection controls o f public servants anb teachers Such controls were

conjomtly carried out by the Commission Permanente de I'Administrat~on Publique in 1976

and the Parliament in 1980. 198 1 and 1982, as key supplements to the 1976- 1978 publlc

sector reform (78) The major aim of the inspections was to identify civil

servants/teachers who were on the public payroll but were inactwe, ret~red , demoted or

were rece~ving more than one salary. A fullfledged evaluation o f these control strategies

has yet to be conducted. But mounting ev~dence of corruption attests to their limited

impact on bureaucratic behavior. Often, one inspect~on team proceeds to an inspect~on

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BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION IN AFRICA

wtthoil! careful cons~derat~on of tne recommendat~ons made by the prlor team In the

process Inspectors become themselves mrrupt as they surrender to temptat~ons from

rnspectees The conluncturat nature of the operations severely ~nhib~ts ther effect~veness

The zontrol measures are launched not wtth the alrn o f rootlng out deep-seated

corrupt~on-~nduc~ng factors but generally as a response to pressures from fore~gn a ~ d

agencies (791

In Zambta the Unrted Krngdom Preventton o f Corruptton Act o f 1916 and the Penal Code

whlch served as basrc laws regulat~ng corruptton up to 1980 went through a systemat~c

revlev so as to adapt the provlslons to new condrtlons A Corrupt Pract~ces Act was

passed and an Anti-Corrupt~on Cornm~s~~on created In 1980 In order to erad~cate

corruptlon (801 But the Commrss~on 1s denled access to armed forces securlty servlces

and to the secret or conf~dent~al deJberat~ons of the Central Cornmrnee of the rul~ng Party

or tne Cabmet or any of their sub-comm~ttees Thls restrlct~on regarding top party and

govervnent offlc~als meav that crrt~cal areas of power are not w ~ t h ~ n the jur~sdrctron of

the Comrnlss~on Hence the abrl~ty of top offtc~als to remarn above the law causes

resenment and IS seen as the prlnc~pal lmpedtment to an effectwe strategy t o combat

corruptlon In Zamb~a (8 11

It siould be made clear that we do not imply that serlous efforts have not been

atternoted to erad~cate corruptlon In Afr~can publlc admln~strat~ons Upon succeedmg

Arnadou Ah~djo Prestdent Paul Mblya In Cameroon has Introduced a polrt~cal program based

on la rlaueur ( r~gor l In government It IS beheved that he can ach~eve th~s because he has

persoqal cred~blltty and a strong reputation for lntegrlty (821 Moreover ~t IS darned that

the ex~stence of the Comrn~ss~on o f lnqulry In Tanranla has greatly reduced the lnc~dence

o f abdse of power or o f f ~ c e In th~s country (83) Cornplalnts made agalnst any off~cral In

the direct~on o f rnrsconduct or abuse of offrce or authortty are rnvest~gated where the

Comm~ss~on feels that some case has been establ~shed agalnst an o f f ~ c ~ a l The fact that the

Comm~ss~on has dealt ma~nly w ~ t h h~gClly placed off lc~als demonstrate0 ~ t s sercousness In the

eyes ~f c~t~zens Thls 1s d~fferent from other cases rev~ewed above

Notwrthstandmg a few successful and otherwtse sttmillatrng cases, the general tendency

has been succ~nctly captured by Jean-Franco~s Meda:

Pevod~cally we see a Pres~dent, himself famous for h ~ s personal corrupt~on, ~ h o launches an anti-corrupt~on campaign, more or less under the pressure o f ~nternat~onal organizat~ons whlch demand cleanlng up measures t o be taken before grantlng a loan Then he effectwely f~ghts agalnst corruptlon of h ~ s

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GOULD AND MUKENDI

subordmates f res some o f them ja~ls some others somet~mes organues a pubic prosecutlon For the most part nobody IS arrested the culpr~ts are lust put 'in reserve of the Republic', and med~rate for some tlme on thelr d~sgrace unt~l they are glven a new post thanks to pres~dent~a! favors These measures slow down corrupt~on for a time but are more akm to public relattons devlces than a slncere anempt t o change reahty 1841

The reasons for the lm ted success of corruption-control strategtes are multlvar~ed and

dependent for the most part on pecullar condlt~ons of each country Yet some common

pattern of explanat~ons can be der~ved from the l~terature and everyday observattons

1 Legal~stlc emphas~s of corrupt~on-control steps taken 1.e Issuance o f laws and admlntstrat~ve regulattons Thls 1s part o f a procllv~ty toward or structural formallsrn or a tendency to solve soclal problems by enact~ng laws and lssulng admlnlstratlve drectlves w ~ t h J~ttle cons~derat~on gtven to the~r ~mplernentablllty Some of these laws and rules are sweeplng andlor lack~ng In clar~ty, whtch adds more confurlon to the ~mplementat~on phase thereby provldlng ample opponunlt~es for corruptlon

2 Concern more w ~ t h ~nvesttgarlon and prosecutlon of ~ndtv~duals than w ~ t h structural changes amed at the preventton or reduct~on In opportunltles for corruptlon Llttle ef for t to relate remedles tc deep-seated cadses o f corrupt~on

3 lnvest~gat~ons are often undertaken more w ~ t h the lntent~on o f d~scredltmg the former regme or polltlclans currentl) on the outs so as to enhance the reputatlo and percewed lntegrtty of the current or new leadership Hence ilttle sustalnablllty or follow-up act~on can be expected beyond the early rhetor~c

4 Top admlnlstrat~ve off lc~als obtatn recognltlon and rewards depend~ng on ther loyalty to the party and/or leader In power. not on the prob~ty and lntegrlty of thelr staff

5 Contlnulng deterioratton in economic cond~tions and the subsequent inadequacy of resources to mount effect~ve corruptlor.-control poltc~es

6 Adopt~on of measures to promote h~gh eth~cal standards IS not matched by adequate ~mplementatton of supporting leg~slatton regarding the organlzatlon of a career system that ensures job securlty salaries based on the cost o f llvlng on whlch c1v11 servants and the~r fam~lles can h e the use o f appropriate methods of select~on and promouon contlnulng m-serv~ce tralnlng and sound personnel management practices

6 CONCLUDING REMARKS

Bureaucrat~c corruptlon is still an important pollcy problem in Africa. particularly when it

is seen in terms o f its consequences on administratwe, economic, and socio-political

development Corruption tends to produce its own political, social, and administrative

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BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTlON IN AFRICA 451

culture which withstands any attempt at meaningful organrzational reforms and changes

As th!s study ~nd~cates. no single prescript~on is sufficient to deal more effectively with

corruptton in publlc life Each nation must devise its strategy with due considerat~on to

corruptton's m a p contributtng factors The study has highl~ghted a set of the most

prominent explanat~ons o f corruptton Yet signifcant changes can hardly take place without

due recognition of the role and commitment of the highest politcal leadership to curb

corrupt~on Rules and regulattons will continue to be disregarded where top government

officials do not set good examples

REFERENCES

(1) Ste~hany Gr~ff~th-Jones, "Proposals to Manage the Debt Problem', Develo~ment Pollcy

w, Vol 3. No2. (November 19851 See also West Afr~ca, April 1986

(21 For a revlew o f the competrng vlews in the hterature S~mcha B Werner, "New

D~rections In the Study of Admin~stratlve Corruption'. Publtc Admlnistratton Review

(March Aprd 19831

(31 Davtd J Gould "Underdevelopment Admtntst~atton Systerntc Corrupt~on In the Pubhc

Bursaxracy of Contemporary Zarre Conference on Poltt~cal Cl~entel~sm Patronage and

Development Betlaglo ltalr August 1978 See also Ghtslam C Kabw~t 'Zare The Roots of

the Cont~nutng Crlsrs The Journal of Modern Afr~car, Stud~es Vol 17 3(1979) pp

388-437

(41 Pres~dent Mobutus Speech November 25, 1977 See also Robert H Jackson and Carl

G Rosberg "Why Afrcas Weak States Pers~st The Empir~cal and the Juridtcal In

Statehood World Pol~ttcs Vol XXXV, No 1 119821 pp 9- 10 West A f r~ca No 3255,

December 3 1979

(5) Em. No 144, Mercred~ 6 Ma1 1980 Quoted In Tshlabukole Mukend~. "An Inquiry into

the Eifects of Health P o k y or Health Underdevelopment In Zarre A Survey Case o f

Zatre PhD D~ssertatton Unlverstty of PittsbuFgh 1986 pp 64

(6) Msgr Kabanga, Je suts un homrne, Luburnbasht, March 1976

(7! 3avtd J. Gould, "'The Problem of Seepage in lnternat~onal Development Assistance Why

United States Aid to Zaire Goes Astray', Civil~sations, Vol XXIV. (1979). No 314. pp. 26 1

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452 GOULD AND MUKENDI

(81 David J. Gould. "The Administration of Underdevelopment. In Zaire The Political

Economv of Underdevelopment. Guy Gran fed). (New York Praeger. 19791, pp 87- 107.

(9; Gould, Bureaucratic Corrupt~on and Underdevelopment in the Third World The Case

of Zaire (New York. Pergarnon Press. 19801, pp 72

(101 Annual Reports Mama Yemo Hosp~tal. Ktntarnbo Hosptal Un~vers~ty Cllncs Kmshasa

Cllnlcs and Ngaltema Cltncs Ktnshasa, 1982 Quoted In Mukendl , pp 78-79

(1 1) Varda Eker. "On the Ortgtns of Corrupt~on. Irregular Incentives In N~geria", The

Journal of Modern African Studies Vol 19. No. 1. 0 9 8 I), pp 178

(15) Edwtn Madunagu Nlcie71a The Economv and the Peovle ,(London New Beacon Books,

1983). pp 10

(16) See for example. Dele Olowu. "Bureaucratc Corrupt~on and Public Accountability in

Nigeria An Assessment of Recent Developments", lnternat~onal Review of Administrative

Science, Vol. LI, No. 1, (1985L pp 7-12.

(171 Parhamentary debates, February 27, 1973. Quoted in John Hatchard. "Crime and

Penal Policy in Zavbit". The Journal of Modern African Studies. 23, 3(19851. pp 493

(18) Morris Szefte! "Corrupt~on and the Spoils System In Zambia". In M Clarke (ed).

Corruptton Cadses. Conseauences and Control (New York St Mart~ns Press 19833, pp

161-789

(19) Szeftel. -. pp 184- 785

(20) lb pp. 172

(21) lb. pp. 173

(22) The Weeklv Review. December 19, 1986. pp. 6-7

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BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION IN AFRICA 453

(23) 'evf~k F Nas Albert C Pr~ce Charles T Weber A Pol~cy-Ortented Theory o f

Corrupt~on Arnewan Pol~tlcal Sc~ence Rev~ew Vol 80. No 1 (March 1986) pp 109

(241 Hyacinthe Sarassoro. La corruptton des foncttonnaires en A f r i ~ u e (Pars Economica.

1980i pp 5

(251 Crawford Young "Pol~tlcs in Afrtca'. In Gabr~el A Almond and B~ngham G Powell Jr

(edl Qmparatwe Pol~t~csTodav . (Boston 1984L pp 468-9

1261 Colm Leys "What IS the Problem about Corruption'. In M U Ekpo led). Bureaucrat~c

Corruption In Sub-Saharan Afr~ca Toward a Search of Causes and Conseguences

(Washlngron DC Un~vers~ty Press of Arne-ca 19791 pp 145

(27) 1s pp 147-150 Gerald E Caiden. "Public Maladministrat~on and Bureaucrattc

Corrupton In Fraud Waste and Abase in Governmen Jerome B McKmey & Mchae'

Johnston led (Ph~ladelp'xa ISHI Publcat~o'ls 1986'. pp 39-4 1

(281 Ke~th Hart. The Pol~tical Economy of West Afr~can Aaricillture Cambr~dge Carnbr~dge

Universcy Press. 1982). pp 104

(291 Gunnar Myrdal The Challenoe of World Poverty .(Penguin, Harmondsworth. 1970). p p

208

(301 .Jay Wes te r and John Welnstem "Dependency Softness of State and Natlonal

Development Toward an Integrated Theory Paper prese~ted at the Georg~a Foltt~cal

Sc~ence Associat~on Seventh Ain~ve~sary Convention Atlanta Februa-y 1978

I311 Robert H Jackson and Carl G Rosberg "Why Afr~cas Weah States Pers~st The

Ernprtca and the Jurldlcal In Statehood' World Pol~t~cs. Vo! XXXV, No 1. 11 982) pp

11-12

(32) David J Gould "Popular Part~c~pat~on In Afrcan Development Plann~ng and

Management In Jean-Claude Garcia-Zamor led) Publtc Partc~pat~on in Development

Mana~ement The Case of Afrca and Asla (London Westv~ew Press 19851, pp 35-50

See also Crawford Young ldeologv and Development In Afr~ca (New Haven and London

Yale Univers~ty Press, 19821 See chap 6

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454 GOULD AND MUKENDI

(33) B. J. Berman, "Cl~entelisrn and Neocolonial~sm Center-Periphery Relations and Pol~t~cal

Development in African States', Stud~es in Corn~aratwe lnternat~onal Development. Vol IX.

(1974). pp 1- 25

(341 Jullus M Nyerere. The Arusha Declarat~on Ten Years After. (Dar es Salaam

Government Prlnter, 1977). Chap 3. pp 27-48. Quoted in Jackson and Rosberg. m. PP. 9

1351 K E de Graft-Johnson "Adrnln~strat~on and Corrupt~on In Ghana, Paper prepared for

conference on Admln~strattve Reform and Corruptton lnstltute of Development Studles

Unwerslty of Sussex Br~ghton March 12- 14, pp 12

(361 Kernpo R Hope "Pol~tlcs. Bureaucrat~c Corrupt~on and Maladm~ntstratton In the Thrd

World'. Internatonal Rev~ew of Admln~stratlve Sc~ence No 1, (19851, pp 1

137) Robert H Jackson and Carl G Rosberg. Persona' Rule In Black Afr~ca. (Berkeley

Un~verstty of Cahf ornm Press. 19821, pp 17- 19

(38) Br~an Chapman, The Profess~on of Government, (London Allen and Unwin. 19591.

Chapter 14

139 Leys 'Vdhat IS the Problem about Corrupt~on, pp 146

(401 Adede)~ Adebayo "Formulating Adm~n~stratlve Reform Strategies In Af rca , Qua-terly

Journal of Admln~strat~on Vol 6, No 3 (19721, pp 235

14 1) World Bank, Zalre Current Econorn~c S~tuattor and Constrants (Washington DC Tne

World Bank, 19791, pp 2 2

(421 J. G. Jabban, "Bureaucratic Corrupt~on in the Thrd World Causes and Rerned~es"'.

Indian Journal of Public Admin~stration. Vol. 22, (OctoberIDecember 1976!, pp 673-674

(431 Robert K Merton, Sociological Ambivalence and Other Essays, (New York MacMillan.

The Free Press. 1976)

(44) M U. Ekpo. "Gift-Gwng and Bureaucratic Corruption in Nigeria", In Ekpo, pp.

161-188

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BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION IN AFRICA 455

(451 The Ghana~an &s, 14 October 1969 Quoted !n H Werlln. "The Roots of

Corruptlon The Ghana~an Enqulry, pp 389

(46 Jon R Morls "The Transferabhty o f Western Management Concepts and Programs

an East Afr~can Exper~ence' In L D St~fel JC Coleman JE Black (ed1 Educat~on and

m i a for Public Sector Managemelt In Developtrta: Countrter (Nevi York The Rockefeller

Foundallon 1976

(47 Ngen Sang-Mpam. 'Pe-~pheval Capttaltsm the State abd Cr~s~s The Determ~nants of

Publl: Fol~cy In Za~re' , Ph D Dtssertatlon Unlvers~ty of Chlcago 1984, pp 3 10

( 4 E levflk F Nas et al.' A Pol~cy-Oriented Theory of Corruptlon', Amencan Polltrcal

Scleqce Remew, Vol 80. No 1. IMarch 19861. pp 108 --

(491 Gunna- Myrdal. As~an Drama An lnqurrv mto the Poverty of Natlons Vol II (New

Yorh Pantheon 1968). pp 945-958

(571 Szeftel, op.cr: p? 184

(5') Tne Weekly R e . December 19 1966, pp 1 1

(53, Could, "The Problem of Seepag~ In International Development Assstance, opclt.pp

253-267

(541 Nye op c ~ t Dav~d H Bayley 'The Effects of Corruptlon In a Develop~ng Nat~on

Western Pol~tlcal Qua-terly Vol XIX 4fDecember 1966) pp 719- 732 Nathaniel Leff

"Economic Development through Bureaucrat~c Corruptlon' The Amewan Behavjoral SclentlS ,

8iNovember 19641 p p 13

(55) Victor LeVine, The Polrtical Corruption The Ghana Case, (Stanford Hoover Institution

Press, 19751, pp 103- 108

(56) See for example Ter~sa Turner, "Commercial Capitalism and the 1975 Coup', In Ke~th

Panter (ed) W r s and Oil The Political Transformailon o f N~ger~a,(London: 19781, pp.

166-197. See also K Barber. "Popular React~ons t o the Petro-Naira", The Journal of

Modern Afr~can Stud~es Vol 20, 311982L pp. 431-450. -

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456 GOULD AND HUKENDI

(57) Peter Woodward, "Sudan af!er Numelrr, Thlrd World Quarterly Vol. 7 No 4. (

October 19851. pp 970.

(581 Sarassoro. op c t . pp 206

(591 Thomas B Smltn "Evaluatmg Development PO~ICI~S and Programmes tn the Th~rd

World Publ~c Adrnlnfstration and Development Vol5, Nc 2. 119851, pp 129- 144

(60) Gould. Bureaucrat~c Corruption and ilnderdevelopment in the Thrd World The Case

of Zare opclt, pp 52

16 11 Crawf ord Young and Thomas Turner. The R~se and Decllne of the Zalrlan State . (Wscons~n The Un~verslty of Wlsconsln Press, 19851 pp 343-344

(62) Shehu Othman. "Class Crlses and Coup The Dernlse of Shagarys Reglme". m n

nffal.s. Vo! 83. No 333 (October 1984). pp 450

(64) Mukendl An lnqu~ry Into the Effects of Healtr~ Fol~cy on Health Underdeveiopmeq?

pp 148-9 Egdn,ob~ Tlmothy 'Characterlst~cs of Health Care Resource Problems In

N~ger~a Canaaian Journa of Africa- Stud~es Vol 17 11'983) pp 235-238

(651 Szefte!, opclt. pp 180

t66! Young and Turner, op.cit. pp 297

(67) Ib. pp 300-301

(681 See example of Za~res study World Bank Zare Current Economlc Cond~tlons and

Constra~nts . (Wash~ngton DC World Bank. 19791 pp 67 See also World Bank, Accelerated

Develo~ment In Sub-Saharan Afrlca An A~enda for Act~on(Wash~ngton DC The World

Bank 19811. pp 41

(69) Country Report, Informal Consultation on Costing of Primary Health Care in Zambia.

Ethlopla. 1983, pp. 10-11. Do?ald Rothchild. "Rural-Urban Inequities and Resource

Allocation in Zambia", Journal of Commonwealth Politcal Studies Vol. X, N0.3, (November

19721, pp 222-242.

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BUREAUCkATIC CORRUPTION IN AFRICA

(701 Szeftel op crt pp 182

(721 LeVrne, op crt Append~x A, pp 1 15

(74) lbrah~m Omale "When N~gerrans Complam An Assessment of the Rationale for and

the Functions of the Pdbllc Complaints Commrss~on". Ph D D~ssertat~on, Unrversrty o f

Plttsburgn October 198 1

176) See for example Olowu. opcl:

(771 G3uld Bu~eaucrat~c Corruption and Underdevelopment In the Thrd Worlo The Case

o f Zaire opclt. pp 65-86 92-96

(781 Mukoka Nsenda 'La reforme de ladrn~ntstrat~on pubhque au Zare Quelle Reforme

pour quelle Admrnlstratron', CAFRAD . No 27, (19861 pp 99- 1 13

(791 Mukoka opclt pp 1 1 1 - 1 13 See also Tshiabukole Mukendi Ntumba L Lumu

"Problemat~que de lapplrcation dun plan nat~onal de deveioppernent au Zarre Une questlon

d hommes D~scusslon Pa~ers No 8012 (1 9801 CIEDOP. Krnshasa

(80) Hatchard. opcrt. pp 492-493.

(611 G F Lungu 'The lmplementabll~ty of Zambias Corrupt Practices Act Zambla Law

1;. (19811 pp 1-4 Quoted rn Hatchard pp 493

1821 dean-Francors Msdard, "Public Corruption In Africa A Comparative Perspectrve".

Corruption and Reform Vol 1. No 2. (19861, pp 130.

1831 4labs Ogunsanwo "lnst~rutronal and Adrn~ntstratrve Perspectwe for Natlonal

Development The Case o f Tanzania' In Mahmud Tukur B Tunjr Olagungu (edi Nloerra In

Search for a Vrable Polrty (Baraka Press Ltd Nrgerla 19721 pp 32-33

(84) Medard. opcit, pp. 130

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