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The following PDF was originally published as follows:

Burgess, Chris

2012 '‘It’s Better if they Speak Broken Japanese’: Language as a Pathway or

an Obstacle to Citizenship in Japan?', in Language and Citizenship in Japan.

edited by Nanette Gottlieb. London and New York: Routledge, pp.37-57.

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‘It’s Better if they Speak Broken Japanese’: Language as a Pathway or an Obstacle to

Citizenship in Japan?1

Chris Burgess

“How much ice have we got left?”

“’Bout twenty pounds, master. Will only last today I think. I find it very difficult

to keep ice cool now.”

“Don’t talk like that, damn you – ‘I find it very difficult’. Have you swallowed a

dictionary? ‘Please, master, can’t keeping ice cool’ – that’s how you ought to

talk. We should have to sack this fellow if he gets to talk English too well. I

can’t stick servants who talk English. D’you hear, butler?”

“Yes, master,” said the butler, and retired.

Conversation in the club, Burmese Days, Orwell (1955: 26)

Introduction

In Japan, the Japanese language has long been viewed as something more than simply a

means of communication. In the past, Japanese was argued to possess a mystical spirit –

kotodama – which saw the language as inextricably intertwined with Japanese race and

culture, that is, with Japanese identity. The idea that non-Japanese could not properly be

expected to understand and to become fluent in the language permeated both popular attitudes

and approaches to the teaching of Japanese as a Second/Foreign Language (JSFL). Politicians

too continued to promote the myth in the form of regular pronouncements on Japan as a

homogeneous nation (tan’itsu minzoku) with one race, culture, and language. These attitudes

are reflected in – and in turn reinforce – attitudes towards migrants and migration in general.

This chapter argues that this perception of the national language as for ‘Japanese only’ is

closely associated with the country’s reluctance to accept and integrate migrants into society.

In other words, language is argued to be an obstacle to citizenship, where ‘citizen’ is defined

not in the formal legal sense of state membership (Japanese nationality) but rather in the

1 Many of the ideas in the first part of this paper were originally explored in Burgess (1997).

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broader sense of being a member of society who is able to actively participate/function in and

contribute to the local communities in which they are rooted and settled.

Recent government reforms offer some signs that the clover-leaf-like equation of language

with race and culture might be beginning to come apart. These developments include

revisions to the basic immigration control law, new guidelines on teaching Japanese to foreign

residents, the ‘Global 30’ international student initiative, and acceptance of Indonesian and

Filipino nurses and caregivers. This chapter explores these reforms and revisions in detail in

order to assess whether attitudes which make the Japanese language an obstacle rather than a

pathway to full participation in society (as detailed in Part 1) are gradually disappearing or

still remain (Part 2).

1. The Clover-Leaf

1.1 ‘It’s Better if they Speak Broken Japanese’

In October 1996, Kume Hiroshi of the popular nightly show News Station, following a piece

featuring a fluent Japanese-speaking Indian restaurant owner, made a rather unusual

comment: “It’s better when foreigners speak broken Japanese” (gaikokujin no nihongo wa

katagoto no hō ga ii yo ne). This caused sufficient controversy in hyperspace and elsewhere

that TV Asahi decided to do a follow-up segment on the issue put together by Asahi’s first

full-time foreign employee, David Zopetti.2 The story also attracted attention outside Japan.

Articles in the New Zealand Herald (1996) and the Chicago Tribune (Lev 1996) (the latter

entitled ‘When in Tokyo, don’t speak as the Japanese do’) presented a number of examples of

Japanese unnerved by foreigners who speak Japanese ‘too well.’ Those non-Japanese

residents interviewed for the articles speculated that these feelings of aversion are related to

the idea that the Japanese language is for the Japanese only, a kind of ‘defensive superiority’

that sees people feel threatened when distinctions become blurred and their ‘unique’ identity

is challenged.

Miller (1982: 156) explains such attitudes using the ‘Law of Inverse Returns’:

2 Kume did eventually offer an apology – some ten years later. “I can see now that this was rather a rude thing to

say,” wrote Kume in an e-mail to activist Arudou Debito, “I regret the narrowness of such an ‘island nation’

mentality (shimaguni konjō)” (Asahi Shimbun 2006).

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[T]he better you get at the language, the less credit you are given for your

accomplishments; the more fluently you speak it, the less your hard-won skills

will do for you in the way of making friends and impressing people. But by the

same token…the less you can do with the language, the more you will be

praised and encouraged by Japanese society in general and by your Japanese

friends in particular.

The Kume incident is not the only evidence that Miller’s Law of Inverse Returns may have

some basis in reality. A survey by Keio University’s Institute for Communications Research

carried out over a ten-year period found that greater language proficiency among foreign

students led to increased dissatisfaction with Japanese attitudes towards foreigners (Iwai and

Hagiwara 1987; 1988). “While most Japanese are sympathetic with the communication efforts

of foreigners who speak Japanese only haltingly,” concludes Hagiwara “some are nonplussed

by foreigners who speak like a native” (1990: 162). The survey also found that the greater the

students’ language abilities “the more likely they were to hold a negative image of the

Japanese, choosing such modifiers as ‘cold,’ ‘unfriendly,’ and ‘prejudiced’ to describe

them” (Hagiwara 1990: 161).

Analyzing why fluency in Japanese led to dissatisfaction with personal relationships and

negative feelings towards the Japanese, Hagiwara (1990: 161, 163) points to the xenophobic

nature of Japanese society. Hagiwara describes an ‘invisible barrier to intimacy’ which sees

Japanese strive to maintain distance from foreign ‘guests,’ even as the ‘guests’ seek greater

acceptance. The Japanese concept of kokusaika (internationalization), he suggests, does not

include the idea of welcoming foreigners into Japan to live and work in society.

Backing up Miller’s claim that the Law of Inverse Returns applies mainly to Caucasians, the

Keio survey also found some discrepancy between Western and Asian speakers of Japanese.

Respondents noted that whereas Westerners tended to be praised however elementary their

language skills, Asian students were treated less kindly if they were unable to speak well.

“Japanese seem to expect Asians to have good command of the language,” speculates

Hagiwara (1990: 162), “perhaps because Asian speakers’ Oriental features belie their

non-native ability with the language.” The idea that the Japanese tend to be more surprised

and unsettled by fluent Japanese coming out of a Caucasian mouth has been described in

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detail by a number of researchers (see, for example, Suzuki 1973: 199; 1975: 173). As Tsuda

(1990: 187) explains, when encountering a foreigner fluent in Japanese, it is not uncommon

for Japanese to try to convince themselves that they are being spoken to in English in order to

hide a deep anxiety and distaste. Similarly, when Japanese meet a foreigner, even if they are

in Japan, they often have a strong conviction that they have to speak in English (1990: 124).

Suzuki (1975: 165) explains this as follows:

Japanese have a firm belief that foreigners should not properly be expected to understand

Japanese (gaikokujin ni nihongo wa wakaru hazu ga nai)…It has to be said that we Japanese

have, deep in our hearts, a mysterious conviction that the Japanese language is a thing for the

Japanese only. (my translation)

Expectations about what will/should come out of a foreigner’s mouth – and the pain when

these expectations are not met – may differ depending on what the foreigner looks like. The

discomfort of the listener seems to increase the less ‘Japanese’ looking the speaker appears,

suggesting some kind of link between race and language. Nevertheless, as the Keio survey

shows, the difference is just one of degree: for both Western and Asian students alike feelings

of dissatisfaction increased as their language skills improved.

Tanaka ,in a study of female Asian migrants’ attitudes towards the Japanese language, is

surprised when a Thai working in a hostess bar says she ‘hates’ the language. On interviewing

a Japanese familiar with such establishments, she is told that customers actually prefer women

who speak broken Japanese: if they become more fluent, they lose their ‘cuteness’ (1996: 29).

Tanaka sees this as a manifestation of unequal power relations, with Japanese as an

‘oppressor’s language’ which fixes or positions the foreigner as incomplete or ‘disabled.’

Tsuda comes to a similar conclusion in the context of foreign ‘guest workers’ (Gastarbeiter)

in Germany, interpreting pidginization of their German and refusal to learn German as the

result of ideologies and policies which marginalize them however hard they strive to be

accepted in German society (1986: 36). In sum, what may be at work here is some kind of

‘boundary-maintaining mechanism’ (Befu and Manabe 1990: 127), a genetic view of Japanese

identity which “denies the foreigner’s ability to assimilate into Japanese society, understand

Japanese culture, and speak the language.”

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1.2 Japanese Identity

The genetic or biological view of Japanese

identity sees race, language/culture, and

citizenship (nationality) as synonymous. “If you

are genetically Japanese,” write Befu and Manabe

(1990: 126/7), “you are culturally Japanese and if

you are not genetically Japanese, you are not

culturally Japanese.” This ‘homogeneous nation’

(tan’itsu minzoku kokka) ideology ties together

three disparate threads, so that looking Japanese,

being a member of Japanese society, and speaking

and acting Japanese become indivisible parts of a

whole like the leaves of a clover (Figure 1). Here,

the key term is minzoku (the (Japanese) people) which encompasses more than just race or

ethnicity. Morris-Suzuki likens it to the German Volk, a term combining cultural and genetic

aspects which emphasizes the organic unity of the Japanese people/nation as a community

“bound together by ties of language or tradition” (1998: 32, 87). Thus, when a person with

non-Japanese features speaks Japanese it feels ‘strange’ (okashii) to many Japanese (Suzuki

1975: 178) because the balance or harmony of the clover-leaf minzoku construction is

disturbed: the ‘set’ is incomplete or out of kilter (see also Kindaichi 1988: 13-14).

Kondo a third-generation (sansei) Japanese-American anthropologist, suggests that this

‘clover-leaf’ conception of Japanese identity is widely held by ordinary Japanese:

Most Japanese people I knew seemed to adhere to an eminently biological

definition of Japaneseness. Race, language, and culture are interlaced, so much

so that any challenge to this firmly entrenched conceptual scheme – a Caucasian

who speaks flawlessly idiomatic and unaccented Japanese, or a person of

Japanese ancestry who cannot – meets with all manner of unpleasant reactions:

in the former case, coldness and intimations that such behavior is unnatural and

repulsive; in the latter, with exasperation and disbelief. (1986: 76),

Figure 1: The Clover Leaf

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Thus, regardless of whether the speaker has a Japanese or non-Japanese face, dissonance is

felt when the face and voice do not match expectations. One might speculate that if the

mismatch is not so pronounced – say, in the case of a Korean or Chinese who, physically, may

pass as a Japanese – the dissonance is less acute. However, this may only last until the race of

the speaker is discovered. This point is important because there is evidence that the clover

leaves are not necessarily all the same size. Tsuda who has done extensive research on

Nikkeijin – Brazilians and others of Japanese descent – in Japan, argues that race (blood) is

the major defining characteristic of Japanese identity:

“Japanese blood” takes precedence over ‘culture’ as the first and foremost

fundamental criterion that determines who can be considered “Japanese.”. This

is shown in the case of the Korean-Japanese and other foreigners of

non-Japanese descent, who can never be considered ethnically Japanese even if

they are born and raised in Japan and have become culturally indistinguishable

from the Japanese … Therefore, although the Japanese-Brazilians are not

considered ethnically Japanese because of their Brazilian cultural characteristics,

a consciousness of shared descent remains dominant among most Japanese. My

Japanese informants frequently mentioned how they feel shitashimi (familiarity

and friendship) toward the Nikkeijin in contrast to other foreigners of

non-Japanese descent and claimed that ethnic prejudice toward them was much

less. There was a strong sense that the Nikkeijin could somehow be

comprehended despite their different behavioral patterns and language. (1998:

322),

This belief3 is made possible by the fact that Japanese is (generally) only spoken in Japan and

that Japan, not having experienced the influx of migrants characteristic of many other

industrialized countries, remains relatively homogeneous in population.

Elsewhere (Burgess 2010), I have presented evidence that ‘homogeneous Japan’ is indeed the

3 It is important here to stress that what we are talking about are beliefs and perceptions. Clearly, there is no

connection between race and language/culture: a child will come to speak whatever language they are exposed to.

However, as I argue in detail elsewhere (Burgess 2010), perceptions and beliefs, even if they are objectively

unfounded, play a key role in structuring both national identity and social reality.

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dominant discourse amongst the average Japanese. The 2003 International Social Survey

Programme (ISSP) on national identity contains a number of questions which sheds light on

Japanese attitudes concerning homogeneity and ethnic identification. For example, the ISSP

data show that 95% of Japanese feel close to their minzoku, with Japanese attaching more

importance to ancestry (blood) than those in other countries (Burgess 2010: Tables 2, 3, 4).

However, in terms of the individual elements (clover-leaves) that make up ‘Japaneseness,’

despite Tsuda’s claim that ‘blood’ is the major defining characteristic, questionnaire data

actually show language to be ranked higher:

TABLE 1: Criteria Considered Important for Determining Japaneseness

Shikama (2002) ISSP (2003) Tanabe (2008)

Self-definition (=feeling

Japanese)

82.1% 87.6% 84.8%

Citizenship (kokuseki) 71% no data 84.5%

Japanese Language

(competence)

80.5% 78.4% 75.4%

Parents/ancestry/blood 31.6% 72.1% 69.7%

Source: Shikama (2005); ISSP from Burgess (2010: Table 2); Tanabe data from Sugimoto

(2010: 195)

Other surveys have investigated the pervasiveness of the ‘homogeneous Japan’ discourse in

Japan. In a 1987 study, 63% of respondents answered that foreigners were incapable of

completely understanding Japanese culture (Befu and Manabe 1990: Table 6, 132). Part of the

reason for this is undoubtedly the perception that the Japanese language (and by association,

Japanese culture) is somehow ‘difficult’ or ‘vague’ (Haugh 1998: 34, 43). In those writings on

Japanese identity known as Nihonjinron, for example, the Japanese language is portrayed as a

“uniquely difficult and impenetrable barrier” (Gottlieb 2005: 4), a “semantic bamboo curtain

between Japan and the outside world” (Dale 1986: 60). The expectation is that only those who

have been born and brought up in Japan can properly be expected to attain native-speaker like

proficiency.4

4 This belief is reinforced by the reality that it takes Japanese at least nine (usually twelve) years to become fully

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Dorinne Kondo, the Japanese-American anthropologist introduced earlier, illustrates the

strength of such expectations – and the painful consequences when they were flouted – in

excruciating detail:

As a Japanese-American, I created a conceptual dilemma for the Japanese I

encountered. For them, I was a living oxymoron, someone who was both

Japanese and not Japanese … How can someone who is racially Japanese lack

‘cultural competence’? During my first few months in Tokyo, many tried to

resolve this paradox by asking which of my parents was ‘really’ American.

Indeed it is a minor miracle that those first few months did not lead to an acute

case of agoraphobia, for I knew that once I set foot outside the door, someone

somewhere (a taxi driver? a salesperson? a bank clerk?) would greet one of my

linguistic mistakes with an astonished ‘Eh?’ I became all too familiar with the

series of expressions that would flicker over those faces: bewilderment,

incredulity, embarrassment, even anger, at having to deal with this odd person

who looked Japanese and therefore human, but who must be retarded, deranged,

or – equally undesirable in Japanese eyes – Chinese or Korean. (1990: 11),

For those around her, Kondo posed a challenge to their sense of Japanese identity; in the end,

the only way they could feel comfortable with her was if she acted Japanese, that is

completely assimilated (Kondo 1990: 13).

The Nikkeijin provide a final example of the clover-leaf construction of Japanese identity in

action. Interestingly, while Nikkeijin return migrants initially tend to be viewed as Japanese in

the popular imagination, they are apt to be subsequently downgraded to ‘pseudo-Japanese’

after direct contact. For example, Tsuda, in a detailed ethnographic study entitled Strangers in

the Ethnic Homeland, notes that when the workers were initially hired they were expected to

behave and speak like Japanese even though they were culturally/linguistically Brazilian or

Peruvian. But as Japanese got to know their new co-workers, attitudes changed. The phrase

proficient with the adult writing system; for Galan (2005), this is a serious barrier to non-Japanese because it

restricts access to information which is crucial for social integration.

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that cropped up again and again was ‘culturally disappointing’ in the sense that the Nikkeijin

(like Kondo) fail to live up to expectations raised by their Japanese ‘blood’(2003: 292).

Elsewhere, he notes that his Japanese informants used words such as gakkari (disappointed),

kitai hazure (not what I expected), shitsubō (disillusioning), and ‘feeling betrayed’ to

describe their reactions (1998: 331-2). According to Tsuda, cultural differences, such as the

inability to speak language and act Japanese, “become a stigma – an attribute that discredits

them because it makes them incongruous with social expectations” (1998: 331).

1.3 Kokugo vs. Nihongo

The apparent belief – at least amongst some Japanese – of a clover-leaf genetic view of

Japanese identity raises the question of whether such a view has influenced the teaching of

Japanese. One distinction which is relevant here is the kokugo/nihongo distinction. Generally,

in Japan today, kokugo (literally national language) describes the Japanese language which

Japanese people learn and nihongo the Japanese language which non-Japanese people learn.

The distinction has often been controversial. While some private organizations – such as the

Kokugo Gakkai, since 2004 the Nihongo Gakkai – have changed their name in response to

criticism that the term kokugo is parochial (Asahi Shimbun 2002), government organizations

have tended not to. For example, the Agency for Cultural Affairs (ACA, Bunkachō) continues

to use both terms, distinguishing ‘National Language Policy’ from ‘Japanese Language

Education for Foreigners’ (www.bunka.go.jp/kokugo_nihongo/index.html). Also, the National

Institute for Japanese Language and Linguistics (NINJAL) is still the Kokuritsu Kokugo

Kenkyūjo in Japanese even though its research activities include “Japanese-language

education in multicultural communities” (National Institute for Japanese Language and

Lingusitics 2011: 4). The reasoning is that kokugo does not refer only to the Japanese

language but also incorporates elements of culture (Asahi Shimbun 2003b). Behind this ‘plus

alpha’ concept of kokugo is that notion that kokugo has a key role in forming nihonjin

(Japanese people) (Asahi Shimbun 2003a).

The linkage between kokugo and ‘learning to be Japanese’ has some historical basis.

Elaborating on the historical roots of kokugo, the Asahi Shimbun (2003b) notes that supporters

of kokugo sometimes cite the academic tradition of kokugaku which goes back to the Edo

Period (1603-1868). Kokugaku (‘national learning’) was an intellectual movement which

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emerged in late eighteenth century Japan. Kokugaku was essentially a contrastive movement,

stressing differences between indigenous culture (for example, native Shinto) and the foreign

(the creeds of Confucianism and Buddhism). For example, Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801),

perhaps the most well known of the nativist scholars, focused on Yamato kotoba (Japanese?

language), reviving the idea of a unique ‘spirit’ or kotodama which distinguished Japanese

from other languages. “These scholars,” notes van-Wolferen, “were the first to introduce the

modern notion of a Japanese uniqueness and superiority traceable to the original innocence

and purity of the race” (1989: 331).

Kokugo itself, in the modern sense of ‘the spiritual blood of the Japanese people,’ was a Meiji

Period (1868-1912) construction, a tool for nation-building in a rapidly modernizing – and

expanding – Japan (Lee 2010; Ramsey 2004). Thus, Japanese-language education in colonies

such as Taiwan and Korea was not nihongo kyōiku but rather kokugo kyōiku (Gottlieb 2005:

15, 48). In other words the ideology of empire which saw Asia as part of Japan included

imperial subjects as nationals (kokumin) and labeled language classes accordingly. This bears

comparison with Japanese public schools where rapid assimilation – the Japanizing of

non-Japanese (Nukaga 2003: 82) – remains the dominant ideology in the kokugo classroom

(Burgess 2011). The fact that for various minority groups in Japan – such as oldcomers,

newcomers, and returnees – kokugo and nihongo are not necessarily synonymous has become

a core problem for many educators and researchers of minority education (Tsuneyoshi et al.

2011).

The other side of an assimilatory kokugo, one that urges non-Japanese students to quickly

become more ‘Japanese-like,’ is an exclusionary nihongo which works against the integration

of non-Japanese into Japanese society. Indeed, Tai suggests that the field of nihongo education

was created to exclude foreigners and protect kokugo for the Japanese nation (2003: 19). A

key question here is: why teach Japanese to foreigners? Given that during the Edo Period

learning (and thereby teaching) Japanese was actually prohibited, this question is not as

strange as it first appears (Miller 1982: 262). Even when it was no longer legally forbidden to

study Japanese, Suzuki (1999: 171) argues that the Japanese themselves had very little

enthusiasm for nihongo education: rather, they were forced to respond or react to outside

pressure from those who wanted to learn Japanese:

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There are hardly any Japanese who see the Japanese language in an international

light ... once one steps outside of Japan, the fact that Japanese is not used is

obvious – no-one thinks this is strange. Thus, even now, when Japanese are

suddenly faced with foreigners who want to study Japanese – that is an external

movement, what one might call ‘outside pressure’ – this is not part of our own

problem consciousness. Rather, with regard to these external demands, we

respond negatively and reluctantly: we still think, ‘Do you really want to study

this thing? Isn’t it a waste of time?’ (my translation)

It is certainly no coincidence that the post-war development of JSFL in Japan coincided with

the development of Japan’s economy. Thus, the 1970s saw the formation of bodies such as the

Japan Foundation, set up to promote knowledge of Japan’s culture and language overseas

(Gottlieb 2001: 27). Soon after, the notion of kokusaika emerged, a complex discourse that

helps answer the question: ‘why teach Japanese?’

Elsewhere (Burgess 2004), I describe kokusaika in detail as a defensive nationalist reaction to

foreign pressure whose major concern is the promotion of the ‘correct understanding’ of Japan

abroad. In other words, kokusaika is less about transcending cultural barriers than it is about

protecting them. In this context, nihongo kyōiku can be argued to be less about ‘opening up’

the country – accepting and integrating migrants – than about maintaining boundaries.

Evidence for this comes from Nihon Jijō, classes on Japanese culture and society which are

often taught in parallel with the language, particularly to international university students. The

problem is that the content of Nihon Jijō is frequently over-generalized and simplified,

presenting ethnocentric and stereotypical images of Japan/ese not dissimilar to the

Nihonjinron images discussed earlier (Nagata 1998: 94-95). Thus, at the same time they are

attempting to learn the language, foreigners are faced with an ideological world-view that is at

base homogeneous, conservative, and closed. Similarly, in terms of JSFL textbooks, critics

have noted how “essentialistic characterization” of Japanese (culture) as exceptionally polite,

indirect, or formal acts as a barrier to the development of learner sociolinguistic competence

(Matsumoto and Okamoto 2003: 43).

Further evidence that JSFL creates rather than dissolves boundaries comes in the form of a

second question: what kind of Japanese should be taught to foreigners? This is the question

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that participants of the March 1978 inaugural Nihongo Kyōiku Gakkai International

Conference addressed (Miller 1982: 273+). Miller (1982: 272) rephrases the question as

follows: “what kinds of Nihongo were of so little socio-linguistic consequence to Japanese

society that it was safe to allow foreigners to get at them?” He notes that, much to the

consternation of the non-Japanese present, the Japanese participants argued for a special,

limited type of foreigners’ Japanese. This proposal was codified in a (1979) paper by

Nomoto,Kikuo former head of the National Institute for Japanese Language, who outlined a

‘simplified Japanese’ (kan’yaku nihongo) for foreigners – ‘in order for Japanese to become an

international language.’ More recently, the idea of yasashii nihongo (‘easy Japanese’) – often

contrasted with futsū (‘normal’) no nihongo – has been promoted to help communicate

evacuation and safety information to non-Japanese in emergencies, such as earthquakes

(Hirosaki University 2011).

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the kan’yaku and yasashii nihongo movements,

although well meaning, are simply a different version of the ‘broken Japanese is best’

argument that seeks to maintain the kokugo/nihongo insider/outsider distinction.5 Both are

rooted in the perception that because of its ‘difficulty’ and linkage with race, foreigners

cannot be properly expected to understand the Japanese language. The idea that foreigners

cannot understand Japanese is in turn connected to the belief that they should not understand

Japanese. Notions of ‘difficulty’ and ‘spirit’ hide the fact that foreigners – migrants – are not

particularly welcome in a Japanese society which remains relatively closed. In other words,

historically produced ideologies have constructed concrete policy which in turn has reinforced

ideologies of homogeneity. The question is: in a rapidly globalizing Japan, are there any signs

that the ideology-policy circle might be breaking up?

2. Separating the Leaves of the Clover?

A discourse – a system of knowledge – is rarely dominant enough that it is held to be true by

all people in a particular society. Multiple discourses exist at any one time and their

dominance changes over time. In a rapidly globalizing Japan, one where Japanese-speaking

foreigners are no longer unusual, is the ‘clover-leaf’ discourse that equates race, language,

5 Nagata (quoted in Gottlieb 2005: 53) describes kan’yaku nihongo as ‘linguistic apartheid.’

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culture, and nation sustainable? A number of recent policy initiatives – particularly those

relating to migration and settlement – suggest, on the surface at least, that the biological view

of Japanese identity is becoming increasingly untenable. But are the leaves of the clover

really separating?

2.1 Multicultural Japan?

In a 2007 paper, I argued that Japan does not appear to be multicultural in terms of either its

ideology, policies, or people. Since then, there have been significant policy developments that

demand my conclusions be re-examined. As I argue elsewhere (Burgess 2010), public policy

and ideology are closely related, so that any concrete changes to policy can influence popular

discourse. In turn, new policy – particularly immigration policy – can affect numbers of

migrants.

In November 2007, a number of changes were made to the Immigration Control and Refugee

Recognition Act. One of the most significant was that all non-Japanese entrants (except for

special permanent residents6) were to be fingerprinted and photographed on entry, a move

billed as an anti-terrorist measure. In a 2008 article, I argued that the revisions had given

Japan some of the strictest border security measures in the world. In an unrelated

development, in January 2008 then Foreign Minister Komura proposed adding a

Japanese-language requirement for long-term foreign residents. “Being able to speak Japanese

is important to improve the lives of foreign residents in Japan,” Komura told reporters, “while

it is also essential to Japanese society” (Japan Times 2008b)However, while framed as an

incentive for foreigners to learn Japanese, the move can also be seen as placing new

restrictions by imposing a tough language-ability requirement (Burgess 2008).. More

significantly, the idea appears exclusionary, with Nikkeijin, since 1990 given special

dispensation to live and work in Japan due to their Japanese ‘blood,’ mooted as the targets of

the test. As seen above, the original belief that Japanese blood descendants would not be so

different from other Japanese and would assimilate and learn the language relatively quickly

has proved to be unfounded.7 Thus, the test – reported to be equivalent to Level 1 of the

6 ‘Special Permanent Residence’ is a visa category typically held by resident Koreans whose descendants came

(or were forced to come) to Japan during the colonial period. 7 In 2006, then Senior Vice Justice Minister Kano called the government's current policy of granting preferential

treatment to people of Japanese descent a ‘mistake’ and said the policy must be ‘reconsidered’ (Japan Times

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Japanese Language Proficiency Test 8which entails an estimated 900 hours of study – appears

to be a tool for repatriating Nikkeijin by blocking visa extensions. This contrasts sharply with

the global norm that sees language tests as a path, not a barrier, to citizenship.9

On top of the ‘stick’ approach, there is also a ‘carrot’ approach to removing the

‘disappointing’ Nikkeijin. Since April 2009, ‘repatriation grants’ have been offered to

thousands of unemployed Nikkeijin if they and their families wish to return to their home

countries (Cabinet Office 2009). Morris-Suzuki (2002) notes that Japan’s ‘exclusionary’

migration system in which only a few specific categories of skilled foreign migrants are

allowed has more or less existed unchanged since 1899. Indeed, foreigners coming to Japan

remain ‘entrants’ (temporary residents) not ‘(im)migrants’; Sassen (1994: 64) notes that the

concept of immigration does not exist in Japanese law.10

Pak calls the government position

the ‘no immigration principle,’ an institutionalization of the tan’itsu minzoku idiom which

underlies the state system for controlling foreigners (1998: 140-42). She quotes an official

from the Immigration Bureau on this point:

We do not accept immigrants. The Immigration Act does not provide conditions

for the acceptance of immigrants. To this extent, it provides a different kind of

legal framework than those of the United States, Canada, and Australia, etc. who

do accept immigrants. A representative example of such difference is that we

have no provision for granting permanent residency at the time of initial entry.

Furthermore, this means that on the policy side it is necessary to do as much as

possible to prevent foreigners in general from staying long or settling down.

2006). 8 The Japanese Language Proficiency Test (JLPT) is a test ‘to evaluate and certify the Japanese proficiency of

non-native speakers’ (www.jlpt.jp/e/about/purpose.html). 9 For example, since 2007 anyone seeking indefinite leave to stay in the UK has had to demonstrate “adequate”

knowledge of the English language and British society (Daily Yomiuri 2010a). Also in 2007 (revised in 2009),

Australia unveiled a new citizenship test that includes assessment of English skills and knowledge of Australian

history, values, and culture (www.citizenship.gov.au/learn/cit_test/test_changes/new_test/). What is notable

about both these initiatives, as the cultural aspect suggests, is that both aim to assist integration; this contrasts

with the Japanese proposal, which has no culture component and an extremely high language hurdle. 10

A radical proposal in 2008 by a group of LDP lawmakers to raise the ratio of immigrants in Japan to about

10% over the next 50 years was reportedly the first time the government used the term ‘immigrant’ (imin) in the

international sense (Japan Times 2008a). The proposal also promoted the establishment of an ‘immigration

agency’ within three years to unify the management of foreigner-related affairs. Unsurprisingly, nothing more

was heard of the proposal. As I have argued elsewhere (Burgess 2007), such proposals are, in a number of senses,

politically and popularly ‘unsayable’ and unthinkable.

15

(120)

Although the Japan Business Federation (Keidanren) has pushed for an easing of Japan’s

prohibition against unskilled labor migration, the government has shown, to date, no sign of

loosening this long-held policy.11

All Basic Plans for Immigration Control – released in 1992,

2000, 2005, and 2010 – have emphasized the “smooth acceptance of foreigners” and

“rejection of unfavorable foreigners”12

as the “very mission of immigration control”

(Ministry of Justice 2006).

Whereas control of migrants has visibly toughened over the last few years, there have

nevertheless been a few signs that the government is beginning to also consider issues of

integration. Up to now local governments have tended to take the lead in formulating

‘multicultural’ policies, known as ‘multicultural community building’ (tabunka kyōsei) (Pak

2000). For example, in 2001, 13 municipalities formed the Committee for Localities with a

Concentrated Foreign Population (Gaikokujin Shuju Toshi Kaigi); thereafter, starting with the

‘Hamamatsu Declaration’ of October the same year, the group – currently consisting of 28

cities and towns – repeatedly called on the central government to develop a coordinated and

coherent integration policy (Yamawaki 2002). By 2009, despite some discussions and the

creation of a 2006 document entitled ‘Comprehensive Measures Concerning Foreign

Residents,’ the municipalities called again for the central government to set up a new agency

aimed at improving the livelihoods of foreign residents (Daily Yomiuri 2009). Prompted by

rising unemployment amongst Nikkeijin in particular, the Cabinet Office did set up an office

in charge of policies for resident foreigners in January 2009, with a website in April of the

same year (Cabinet Office 2009). However, it is important (as the website makes clear) to

place this move in the context of an unprecedented economic downturn, raising serious doubts

whether it will remain and transform itself into an integration agency once the economy picks

up. Elsewhere, I have argued that Japanese-style multiculturalism, at least at the national

11

There are clearly differences in opinion about immigration between various state actors such as the Ministry

of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Labour. Nevertheless, the principle of keeping

immigration to a minimum has tended to dominate government policy making. 12

In recent years, the stress has arguably been on the latter. The 2004 five-year plan to halve the number of

‘illegals’ was a great success: numbers of estimated overstayers fell from 207,299 in 2005 to 91,778 in 2010

(Ministry of Justice 2010a).

16

level, is better viewed as a successor to kokusaika, i.e., as the latest ideological tool to

maintain a homogeneous discourse of national identity (Burgess 2004).

One of the most concrete recent examples of practical rather than cosmetic multiculturalism is

the bilateral economic partnership agreements (EPA) signed with the Philippines and

Indonesia which have seen the arrival of almost one thousand nurses and caregivers since

2008 (Daily Yomiuri 2010b). Although qualified in their home country, while working as

trainees the newcomers have to pass a national examination in Japanese within three years

(four in the case of caregivers) if they wish to remain in the country. Unfortunately, the

technical language in the test has proved to be an almost impossible barrier, with only a

handful of foreign applicants passing to date compared to – in the case of the nursing exam –

around 90% of Japanese test-takers (Japan Times 2010a). Even those who pass the

examination are only permitted to work in Japan for a limited number of years, despite a

serious labor shortage in the area, restrictions even the conservative Yomiuri Shimbun

described as “excessive” (2010a).13

Interestingly, the government’s solution to the difficulty

of the Japanese examination was not to add kana glosses to difficult kanji (Chinese

characters), allow use of dictionaries, use more common vocabulary, or provide explanations

in Japanese but to provide English explanations and translations of medical terms (Daily

Yomiuri 2011b; Yomiuri Shimbun 2010b).14

The increasing use of English in Japan can be read as a tacit admission of the impenetrability

of Japanese to foreigners, making settlement and integration more rather than less difficult.

For example, in 2008, the government announced a plan to increase the number of foreign

students studying in Japan to 300,000 by 2020. The 300,000 foreign student plan provided the

stimulus for the launch of – and the driving force behind – the Global 30 Project, a 15 billion

yen project for upgrading thirty existing institutions into an ‘internationalized’ core (Burgess

et al. 2010). A key feature of the Global 30 is the expansion of course programs by which

13

A later editorial was entitled ‘Don’t let Japanese (language) be ‘nontariff barrier’’ CHECK QUOTE MARKS

HERE(Daily Yomiuri 2011a). The 4th

Basic Plan for Immigration Control promises to re-examine such ‘barriers.’

The hurdles the nurses and caregivers face contrast rather ironically with the government’s recent efforts to

promote ‘medical tourism’ (Daily Yomiuri 2010c). This is part of a wider strategy of creating a ‘tourism nation’

to boost the economy (www.mlit.go.jp/kankocho/en/about/keiki.html). It is difficult to escape the conclusion that

the government is more interested in temporary short-term stay than long-term permanent settlement. 14

Exasperated at the Health Ministry’s intransigence, then Foreign Minister Maehara warned that “in the future,

Japanese elderly people may need to master English so they can receive services by foreign caregivers” (Daily

Yomiuri 2011c).

17

degrees can be earned through English-only classes. However, this expansion of English-only

classes– and promotion of English in research institutions – could have serious implications

for employment after graduation. If non-Japanese students are able to graduate from a

Japanese university never having taken content classes in Japanese, their employment

prospects in Japan will inevitably be limited and Japan will likely lose much of the very

‘top-class talent’ the project aims to retain. Even in 2008, only half the number of foreign

students who wanted to secure employment in Japan after graduation actually did so (Yomiuri

Shimbun 2009). In other words, the spread of English may have actually made it more

difficult for foreign graduates to secure employment and settle in Japan.

What is the significance of the process of Englishification for Japanese language education?

In simple terms, it is becoming easier and easier for foreign visitors and residents alike to get

by in Japan using English alone. In other words, it is becoming more difficult to stay

motivated to learn Japanese, which is becoming increasingly unnecessary to function in

Japanese society, particularly in urban areas. Broken Japanese, if not preferable, is sufficient.

In other words, Englishification – and for that matter the spread of multilingual support in

general (Nagy 2009: 182) – can, ironically, act as a barrier to foreign integration and

settlement, maintaining the very boundaries between Japanese and foreigners that ideologies

of homogeneity and uniqueness originally promulgated.

2.2 JSFL

Following the establishment in 1972 of the Japan Foundation, which is largely concerned with

the teaching and testing of Japanese outside Japan (Japanese as a Foreign Language, JFL), the

expansion of overseas Japanese-language facilities has continued to receive significant

government funding. But while much effort has been put into compiling textbooks for

individual countries and creating international standards for Japanese language education

abroad, national teaching guidelines and curriculum detailing how to teach Japanese to

foreigners living inside Japan still do not exist. Data on numbers of learners, teachers, and

schools reveal the neglected state of Japanese as a second language (JSL) education within

Japan:

Figure 2: JSL Teachers, Students, and Schools in Japan 2003-2008

18

Source: ACA 2010a: 48

While (legal) foreign residents totaled almost 2.2 million in 2009 (Ministry of Justice 2010b)

as Figure 2 shows the number of students of Japanese was only 166,631. This is not due to

lack of demand: the ACA estimates that about one million foreign residents need to study

Japanese (Daily Yomiuri 2010d). Yet, no system of public language education for migrants, as

found in places like Australia and Germany, exists in Japan (Yomiuri Shimbun 2010c).

Moreover, the number of teachers, while seemingly high at almost 31,000, hides the fact that

only a small minority (4,000) are able to enjoy relatively stable working conditions as

full-time instructors: the remainder are either part-time instructors (11,000) or volunteers

(16,000) (Daily Yomiuri 2010e).15

The fact that volunteers tend to play the main role in

teaching Japanese to foreigners in turn reflects the fact that no official license or qualification

exists for JSFL teachers (Japan Times 2010b).

Only in 2007, with the establishment of the Nihongo Kyōiku Shōiinkai, a committee of the

Japanese Language Subdivision of the Agency for Cultural Affairs, did the government begin

to move. Since October 2008, this committee has been working on draft guidelines – a

standard curriculum – on teaching Japanese to foreign residents; when the final report was

issued in May 2010, the media noted that this was the first attempt of its kind to compile

15

The percentage of volunteer teachers has actually risen in recent years, from 51.6% in 1998 to 54% in 2009

(Japan Times 2010b).

19

government standards on the extent to which foreign residents should learn Japanese (ACA

2010b; Daily Yomiuri 2010d; 2010f). However, it is important to stress that this was just a

preparatory curriculum; there is much more work to be done before the curriculum is finalized

and actually put to use in the classroom.16

In the final analysis, the question is how seriously

the government takes teaching the Japanese language to foreigners, something that is

inextricably tied up with government attitudes towards migration.

Conclusion: The Right to Speech

For Bourdieu, a key element of language is the power relationship between two speakers.

Bourdieu defines competence as the ‘right to speech,’ the capacity to command a listener. “A

person speaks not only to be understood,” he writes, “but also to be believed, obeyed,

respected, distinguished” (1977: 649). Building on this idea, Norton-Peirce argues that

learners expect something in return for their hard work in learning a new language: “if

learners invest in a second language, they do so with the understanding that they will acquire

a wider range of symbolic and material resources” (1995: 17). Thus, migrants are more likely

to acquire a target language “when the host society is perceived as holding positive attitudes

towards them and immigration in general” (Scully 2002: 413). In contrast, negative attitudes

towards migrants result in limited opportunities to practice the language, silencing them and

creating social and psychological distance between (increasingly marginalized) learners and

the target community (Norton 2000: 116).

In Japan, a ‘no-immigration’ policy at the governmental level both reflects and reinforces a

clover-leaf ideology of Japanese identity that generates various beliefs relating to

Japanese-speaking foreigners and the ‘difference’ between kokugo and nihongo. Positive and

coherent policies towards migration, settlement, and JSFL education would undoubtedly

undermine that ideology and see many of these beliefs fade away over time. Unfortunately,

even in a rapidly globalizing Japan, there is little sign that this is happening, suggesting that

the Japanese language remains more of an obstacle than a pathway to citizenship: a barrier to

being accepted as a member – a citizen – of Japanese society with the full range of rights and

16

For example, the guidelines, aimed at foreigners who have just started living in Japan, recommend a 60-hour

three-month course of study (ACA 2010b: 5). This contrasts with some 900 hours for Level 1 of the Japanese

Language Proficiency Test.

20

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