AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP

BURKINA FASO: YOUNG FARMERS’ TRAINING PROJECT

Project Performance Evaluation Report (PPER)

OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEPARTMENT (OPEV)

4 January 2002

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page CURRENCY EQUIVALENT i ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ii FOREWORD iii BASIC PROJECT DATA iv 1. EVALUATION SUMMARY 1 1.1 Project Objective and Scope 1 1.2 Implementation Performance 1 1.3 Institutional Aspects 2 1.4 Project Impact 2 1.5 Sustainability 2 1.6 Conclusions 3 1.7 Retroaction and Recommendations 3 1.8 Follow-up Action 6 2. PROJECT CONTEXT 6 2.1 National Economic Context 6 2.2 Background of Operations in the Social Sector 7 2.3 Project Design 7 2.4 Project Rationale 8 2.5 Project Objectives and Scope during Appraisal 9 2.6 Financial Provisions 9 2.7 Appraisal Methodology and Approach 10 3. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION 10 3.1 Loan Effectiveness and Start-Up 10 3.2 Project Modifications 10 3.3 Implementation Schedule 11 3.4 Forwarding of Reports 12 3.5 Procurement of Goods and Services 12 3.6 Project Cost 12 3.7 Disbursements and Sources of Finance 12 3.8 Respect of Loan Conditions and Provisions 13 4. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 13 4.1 Operating Performance 13 4.2 Financial Performance 15 4.3 Economic Performance 15 4.4 Institutional and Social Performance 16 4.5 Environmental Performance 16 4.6 Impact on Women 17 4.7 Performance of Consultants, Contractors, Suppliers and the Borrower 17 4.8 Bank Group Performance 18

TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont’d) Page 5. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY 18 5.1 Physical Sustainability (Maintenance) 18 5.2 Project Impact Sustainability 19 6. PERFORMANCE RATING 19 7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 20 7.1 Overall Evaluation 20 7.2 Retroaction 21 7.3 Recommendations 21 7.4 Follow-up Actions 23 ANNEXES : Number of Pages 1. Matrix of Recommendations and Follow-up Actions 3 2. Retrospective Matrix of the Project Logical Framework 3 3. Overall Project Performance Evaluation System 3 4. Status of FJA Centres and Farmers’ Cooperatives as at 31 December 1996 1 5. CFJA, GJA, GV, GVF Trend from 1992 to 1996 4 6. Structure of the Education System 1 Tables 3.1 Estimated and Actual ADF Schedule 13 4.1 Trend of Staff of the Young Farmers’ Training Centres 14 This report was prepared by Messrs. M. THIAM, Principal Evaluation Officer, OPEV (Head of Mission) and Z. KONE, consulting specialist in education, education programmes and equipment following their evaluation mission to Burkina Faso from 13 to 30 July 1998 in connection with the Young Farmers’ Project. Questions should be referred to Mr. G.M.B. KARIISA, Director, OPEV (Ext. 4052).

i

CURRENCY EQUIVALENT

Currency Unit Appraisal Completion During Evaluation (1st Quarter 1979) (4th Quarter 1994) (3rd Quarter 1998) UA 1 = FCFA 213.88 FCFA 774.979 FCFA 814.556 UA 1 = US $ 1.11111 US $ 1.46738 US $ 1.,33314 UNITS OF MEASURE 1 metre (m) = 3.28 feet 1 kilometre (km) = 0.6 mile 1 square metre (m²) = 10.76 square feet 1 square kilometre (km²) = 0.38 square mile 1 hectare (ha) = 2.47 acres 1 kilogram (kg) = 2.2 pounds 1 litre (l) = 1.06 quart FINANCIAL YEAR 1January – 31 December

ii

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADB : African Development Bank PEA : Project Executing Agency IDB : Islamic Development Bank ECOWAS : Economic Community of West African States CEPE : Primary and Elementary School Certificate CFFA : Farmers’ Trainers Training Centre (Centre de formation des formateurs

d’agriculteurs) CFJA : Young Farmers’ Training Centre (Centre de formation des jeunes agriculteurs) CFMR : Rural Teachers’ Training Centre (Centre de formation des maîtres ruraux) CPR : Rural Promotion Centre (Centre de promotion rurale) CVC : Centre Village Council (Conseil villageois du centre) BD : Bidding Document DFMOR : Rural Training Directorate (Direction de la formation du monde rural) ADF : African Development Fund FAO : United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization FJA : Young Farmers’ Training (Formation des jeunes agriculteurs) GJA : Young Farmers’ Cooperative (Groupement des jeunes agriculteurs) GV : Village Cooperative (Groupement villageois) GVF : Village Women’s Cooperative (Groupement villageois féminin) IDA : International Development Association IEC : Information, Education and Communication MEBA : Ministry of Basic Education and Literacy MESSRS : Ministry of Secondary/Tertiary Education and Scientific Research NGO : Non-Governmental Organization RDA : Regional Development Agency SAP : Structural Adjustement Programme ASAP : Agricultural Sector Adjustment Programme (Phase I) T-SAP : Transport Sector Adjustment Programme GDP : Gross Domestic Product GNP : Gross National Product UNDP : United Nations Development Programme PCR : Project Completion Report PPAR : Project Performance Audit Report SPAJP : Permanent Secretariat to Support Young Farmers (Secrétariat permanent pour

l’appui aux jeunes producteurs) SP-OFPP : Provincial Vocational Farmers’ Organization and Training Department

(Service provincial d’organisation et de formation professionnelle des producteurs)

FUA : ADF Unit of Account UEMOA : West African Economic and Monetary Union UFTRCTP : Rural Construction and Public Works Technician Training Unit (Unité de

formation des techniciens ruraux en construction et travaux publics)

iii

FOREWORD

1. This Project Performance Audit Report (PPAR) concerns the Young Farmers’ Training Project for which the Bank on 16 May 1979 granted Burkina Faso a loan amounting to UA 6.7 million. 2. The aim of the project, which fell within the framework of Government national development priorities, was to provide education and training to youths in the rural area. The specific project objective was to assist the Government of Burkina Faso to extend and improve the basic education and training system directed at rural youths. 3. The aim of the project was to encourage rural youths to participate in the then Upper Volta’s economic, social and cultural development by offering them jobs in rural cottage industry and diversified agricultural specialties. 4. The project completion report (PCR) prepared in July 1994 by the Bank rated the projects as satisfactory. However, it is worth pointing out the late project start-up, the delayed implementation, managers’ inability to familiarize themselves with the project during the initial years, the country’s bureaucracy and the political instability that prevailed throughout the implementation phase (PCR, page 24). The overall PCR rating enabled the Bank to schedule a performance audit mission to better evaluate the project performance and enhance the operation of the PIA, implementation, institutional development and draw lessons from the project impact on the country’s development. 5. This performance audit report was prepared following a Bank mission to Burkina Faso from 13 to 30 July 1998. The report tapped from the following information and documents: (i) project appraisal report No. CS/HV/AGR/79/7 of March 1979 prepared in the wake of an appraisal mission conducted in February 1979; (ii) project completion report (PCR) prepared in July 1994; (iii) Borrower’s completion report prepared in September 1993; (iv) project documents available in the Bank and at the permanent secretariat in charge of young farmers’ training in the Ministry of Agriculture; (v) discussions that the mission had in the field and at the Bank; and (vi) visit of a sample of project achievements. 6. This intermediate PPAR evaluates the operating, financial, economic, institutional, social, environmental performance as well as project sustainability, and presents conclusions, lessons, recommendations and follow-up action. Thanks to the PPAR, lessons were drawn on the implementation of an agro-pastoral training project and a foundation laid on a future poverty control project in Burkina Faso that would take into account youths’ insertion into the labour market with a view to their economic independence. 7. Copies of the PPAR were forwarded to the Government of Burkina Faso and the Bank’s operational departments. The final report took their comments into account.

iv

PROJECT BASIC DATA

A. PRELIMINARY DATA 1. Country : Republic of Burkina Faso 2. Project Name : Young Farmers’ Training Project 3. Loan Reference : CS/HV/AGR/79/7 4. Borrower : Government of the Republic of Burkina Faso 5. Beneficiary : Ministry of National Education 6. Executing Agency : Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (Project Executing Agency) B. PROJECT BASIC DATA EST. ACTUAL 1. Official request : - - 2. Loan amount : UA 6.70 million UA 6.17 million 3. Interest : 0.75 % yearly on the disbursed and unreimbursed about 4. Duration : 50 years, including a 10-year grace period 5. Reimbursement : 1 % of the borrowed capital each year from the 11th to the 20th year, and 3% yearly thereafter. 6. Evaluation - February 1979 7. Date of loan negotiation : - - 8. Date of loan approval : - 22/03/79 9. Date of loan signature : - 16/05/79 10. Date of entry into force : - 04/09/79 11. Start-up date : - October 1979 12. Completion date : November 1983 October 1992 C. PROJECT COST AND FINANCING PLAN (in UA million) EST. ACTUAL 1. Total cost : 21.9 20.16 2. Financing plan :

Estimated Actual

Foreign Exchange

Local Currency Total % Foreign Exchange

Local Currency Total %

ADF 4.2 2.5 6.7 31 3.86 2.30 6.17 31

IDA 6.2 6.4 12.6 57 5.71 5.90 11.60 57

GOV. - 2.6 2.6 12 - 2.39 2.39 12

TOTAL 10.4 11.5 21.9 100 9.57 10.59 20.16 100

3. Deadline of first disbursement : October 1979 29/08/80 4. Deadline of last disbursement : October 1983 30/06/94

v

D. PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 1. Cost overrun : None 2. Project duration : 156 months 3. Shift in the date of entry into force : 19 months 4. Shift in the date of first disbursement. : 12 months 5. Number of disbursement date postponements. : 8 6. Shift in start-up date : 12 months 7. Shift in completion date : 109 months 8. Status of implementation : Completed 9. Performance of the executing agency : Satisfactory 10. Bank performance : Satisfactory 11. Overall project performance : Satisfactory E. ADF MISSIONS:

Type of Mission Number of Missions

Responsibility Dates Number of Persons

Man/Days

Appraisal 1 ADF January 1979 2 -

Supervision 10 ADF 1981-1992 2 280

Completion (PCR) 1 ADF 27/6 - 11/07/1994 2 28

Performance Audit (PPAR)

1 ADF 13/07 - 30/07/1998 2 36

F. ADF DISBURSEMENT (UA) 1. Total disbursement : 6 152 663.64 2. Amount cancelled : 18 384.78 Total : 6 171 048.42

G. MAJOR CONTRACTORS AND SUPPLIERS See PCR pages 14 and 15 H. OTHER SOCIAL SECTOR PROJECTS FINANCED BY THE BANK Year of

Approval Loan (UA

Million)

Status of Implementation

Date of PCR Mission

Date of PPAR

Mission Health Services Improvement 30/10/75 3.84 Completed N.A. N.A. Strengthening of Primary/Secondary Education and the Rural Development

24/10/85 11.97 Completed N.A. N.A.

Health Sector Study 15/02/90 0.62 Completed N.A. N.A. Improvement of Education Quality 28/08/91 9.21 Ongoing N.A. N.A.

Djibo and Dori Health Services Renovation 16/12/91 10.96 N.A. N.A. N.A. Population Sector Study 17/06/91 0.76 Completed N.A. N.A. Education Project IV June 1997 16.50 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.: Not Applicable

1

1. EVALUATION SUMMARY

1.1 Project Objective and Scope 1.1.1 This performance audit report is on the Young Farmers’ Training Project. The project was the World Bank’s second operation and the Bank Group’s first in Burkina Faso. Its aim was to help extend and improve the basic education and training system. Following the success of the first programme implemented in 1961, the Government decided to have it extended and consolidated. The World Bank funded the first programme between 1974 and 1978. In May 1978, a World Bank mission conducted an investment study within the Education Project II framework. 1.1.2 The project had four key objectives: (a) improve and raise the level of training dispensed to young farmers in the six ORDs by providing the schools existing at the time with additional infrastructure; (b) extend the rural education programme to new villages through the construction of new CFJAs; (c) consolidate the rural education programme administration and support services, improve the training of teachers and staff; (d) assist youths trained in the CFJAs to settle in their villages with the farming equipment that they will be provided with. The specific objectives aimed at extending and improving the basic education and training system through the construction of 45 Young Farmers Training Centres (CFJAs) and 2 Rural Development Centres (CPRs). Within five years, these structures would provide training for 21 000 pupils in 548 CFJAs, refresher course for 136 trainers (both genders) in addition to the existing 305, and from 1984 train 184 new trainers. Furthermore, the project would provide support to the Rural Construction and Works Technician Training Unit, set up and equip 600 Young Farmers Cooperatives (GJAs) with farming implements and supplies.

1.2 Implementation Performance 1.2.1 The Government did not fulfill all conditions for entry into force especially the development of plots of land set aside for the construction of the 2 CPRs. The first loan disbursement became effective a whole 19 months following loan signature. The delay was attributable in the main to Government’s poor knowledge of Bank rules and procedures and the bureaucracy associated with fulfilling conditions precedent to the first disbursement. Modifications, addenda and cancellation of categories of expenditure on construction, equipment and furniture were introduced during the implementation phase with no cost overrun. 1.2.2 Rules and procedures for the procurement of goods and services were respected. Delays, sanctions against the country for non-payment of arrears, bureaucracy, political instability and additional works extended the implementation timeframe. 1.2.3 The consultants, contractors and suppliers performed satisfactorily, notwithstanding problems in connection with extended implementation. 1.2.4 The operating performance is rated unsatisfactory. Infrastructure, especially the CPRs, furniture, equipment and farm implements were not optimally used. Training and farming activities were only half-executed. Project building design was satisfactory overall. Although the CPRs were designed to recruit 50 pupils per cycle, only 20 to 24 are actually enrolled. The situation in the CFFAs is far worse (instead of training 20 trainers yearly, only four were trained last year). Nevertheless, the project contributed to the extension of the rural training system.

2

1.2.5 The financial performance is unsatisfactory. Institutions emanating from the project have faced difficulties in meeting their recurrent expenditure, especially maintenance costs. Their financial viability depends on the State’s capacity to put financial resources at their disposal (taking into account problems vis-à-vis the structural adjustment plan negotiated with the Bretton Woods institutions). In view of the limited resources allocated by the Government, certain CPRs initiated income-generating operations (e.g. leasing out halls for seminars, sale of agricultural produce from demonstration plots, etc. ). 1.3 Institutional Aspects 1.3.1 The World Bank and the Government identified and prepared the project. The Bank was responsible for appraising the component it funded. Its contribution consisted in providing Government with financial assistance to solve the following problems: (i) lack of training infrastructure and rural development support services; (ii) lack of FJA teachers and necessary recommendations for smooth project implementation by the project executing agency. 1.3.2 The project executing agency was able to conduct follow-up, organization and construction operations which led to the establishment of a Ministry of Agriculture provided with training institutions and rural development support services that contributed to the decentralization of training activities for farmers. 1.4 Project Impact The sectoral objectives were attained since results obtained by the CFJAs, CPRs and CJAs helped to address the needs in terms of well-trained managers and farmers in the agricultural sector, and to put at the disposal of the agriculture ministry training structures on the basis of which future projects would be prepared. The establishment of the CFJAs and CPRs promoted the development of agriculture in Burkina Faso. According to statistics from the project executing agency, the number of farmers trained and village cooperatives increased considerably. From 1992 to 1996, although the number of CFJAs nose-dived from 408 to 118, that of farmers increased in contrast from 374 928 to 713 173, i.e. a net growth of 90.21%. Over the same period, the number of women members of farmers’ cooperatives (as a percentage of total membership) rose from 20.15% to 23.95%. Women’s village cooperatives have not rested on their oars either, since their number increased from 2 430 in 1992 to 5 201 in 1996, and membership from 134 351 to 287 450 (or a net growth of 213.95%). 1.5 Sustainability 1.5.1 Overall, the buildings have been well-kept; although those in certain CPRs look new, maintenance has been a problem to such an extent that some walls have cracked. Furthermore, equipment is not adequately maintained. The two CFFAs built by the IDA and furnished with ADF loan resources face similar difficulties. The best-kept CFJAs are those set up with ADF resources, even though they are fewer in number. Given the Government’s insufficient finances, the CFJAs have not been consistently monitored. 1.5.2 Although the Ministry of Agriculture has expressed its willingness to continue to train young farmers, that desire is not systematically carried through in the field. The structures set up under the project only run at a quarter or at most half their capacity. There has been a change in the perception and attitude of farmers and target groups towards the FJA system, with greater preference for the formal education system. Dropouts have joined the ranks of the FJA trainees. One of the consequences of SAPs negotiated with Bretton Woods institutions, especially the

3

decision to no longer recruit for ministries other than health, education and finance, has affected the capacity of structures to attain the objectives set at appraisal. To attain such objectives, the secretariat supporting young farmers’ training plans to optimize these investments by opening CPRs to youths, dropouts from the formal education system and farmers. Project impact sustainability is unsatisfactory. 1.6 Conclusions 1.6.1 The performance indicators as contained in the appraisal report should have matched project objectives (which, unfortunately, were far from realistic). The Education Project I components were satisfactorily implemented and within cost, even though the execution phase lasted 13 years owing to fluctuations in the FUA and lengthy dossier processing periods. The Government satisfactorily implemented additional works, notwithstanding the delay in overall project schedule. 1.6.2 The country’s suspension on several occasions by the Bank in the course of project implementation, many changes of directors within the project executing agency and additional works extended the implementation period for nine years, excluding the three years that it took for the loan to become effective. Bank supervision during project implementation was unsatisfactory especially since it had only begun operations in the education sector. Since the set objectives were unrealistic, evaluation became difficult. Lastly, statistics in the project executing agency are rather imprecise, especially those in connection with education. 1.6.3 The Government currently provides inadequate finances for the running of the centres, resulting in a fall in the management and staff quality. There are issues with regard to maintenance of infrastructure set up under the project. Consequently, materials and equipment were not replaced following the departure of donors. 1.7 Retroaction and Recommendations The PPAR mission agreed with the conclusions and recommendations of the PCR. Apart from those contained in the PCR, the following key lessons may be drawn from the project: (A) Retroaction Lesson N°1: the non-participation of the ADF in identifying and preparing the project restricted its vision in setting the qualitative and quantitative objectives and judiciously allocating resources to such components as construction, material and equipment supply (par. 4.8.1). Lesson N°2: the absence of performance indicators in the appraisal report and lack of statistical information rendered difficult the evaluation of the project impact (par. 4.8.2). Lesson N°3: the Borrower’s non-submission of scheduled status reports did not permit the Bank to plan realistic and appropriate terms of reference for its missions or decide on the urgency of the missions to assist the executing agency to overcome emerging difficulties (par 3.4.1). Lesson N°4: the Borrower’s poor knowledge of ADF rules and procedures led to delays in project implementation (par. 3.3.1).

4

Lesson N°5: several suspensions owing to the Borrower’s non-payment of arrears considerably delayed project implementation. (par. 3.3.1). Lesson N°6 : the overlapping of two education projects implemented by the same executing agency prevents the ADF from assessing the management of each project and assigning responsibility. Moreover, it creates difficulties for the executing agency which is yet to fully learn the rules and procedures for the procurement of goods and services (par. 3.3.1). Lesson N°7: inadequate operating budget (maintenance, repairs, support for training activities) is a serious handicap to sustaining project results (par. 4.2). Lesson N°8: to sustain project achievements, the Government should renew equipment and materials (par. 5.1.2).

(B) Recommendations I) Recommendations to the Government To help attain the development objectives in the training sectors in general and the agro-pastoral sector in particular, it is recommended that the Government:

(i) respect ADF guidelines (par. 3.1.1) ; (ii) set aside an envelope for the preparation of future projects, in collaboration with

donors (par. 3.1.1); (iii) avoid frequent change of project directors and managers during the

implementation phase (par. 3.3.1); iv) rapidly undertake the preparation, invitation and analysis of bids for the

procurement of goods and services (par. 4.7.2.2); (v) raise the recruitment age into the CFJAs to sixteen instead of eleven years

(par. 4.4.3); (vi) give priority to future rural training projects that will emphasize poverty

reduction, projects targeting women, rural youths and adults as beneficiaries; training in cooperative management, environmental protection (par. 5.2.1).

(vii) conduct studies better targeting the development objectives in the following

activities: youth settlement following their training in CPRs, strengthening of existing and future agricultural training structure; trainers’ training by strengthening the Farakoba and Kamboinse CFFAs; women’s support project comprising functional literacy, training in farming methods, IEC, credit, training in organization and management of cooperatives and simplified accounting; project to settle youth in the land (training/production and settlement) (par. 5.2.1 and 7.1.9);

5

(viii) put in place an equipment replacement policy to facilitate appropriate follow-

up following the departure of donors (par. 5.1.2); (ix) undertake to provide adequate budget to centres for the maintenance of

project equipment and achievements (par. 5.2.1); (x) give a national public establishment status to the centres to enable them to

legally constitute their own budget through agricultural and livestock production from production units (par. 5.2.1);

(xi) with donors, define a common rural development strategy to revitalize project

infrastructure and render it cost effective (par. 5.2.1); (xii) develop training structures set up within the project framework and make the

best of the human resources involved in its management (education and financial) to offset the non-recruitment of trainers in the Ministry of Agriculture following the implementation of SAPs (par. 5.2.2).

II) Recommendations to the Bank

(i) enhance involvement in the identification, preparation and appraisal of projects

jointly financed with other donors, especially the World Bank (par. 4.8.1);

(ii) state the social indicators during project identification, preparation and appraisal for better supervision and retrospective evaluation (par. 4.8.2);

(iii) set aside an envelope for the preparation of future projects, in collaboration with

donors (par. 3.1.1);

(iv) ensure better supervision of ongoing projects even when the country is under sanctions (par. 4.8.3);

(v) strengthen the team of experts to avoid slow disbursement and delayed response

with the Borrowing country (par. 4.8.4); (vi) uniformize the types of construction to avoid the selection of different

construction materials (e.g. semi-durable for the IDA and durable for the ADF) during joint financing (par. 4.8.5 and 5.1.2);

(vii) continue to support rural development by putting together poverty reduction

projects (par. 7.1.9); viii) conduct sectoral studies with a view to defining the sectoral development

strategies for the sector in collaboration with other donors, while bearing in mind the rules of each donor (par. 5.2.4);

(ix) encourage the establishment of an education projects coordination unit which

will facilitate consultation among donors (par. 5.2.4).

6

1.8 Follow-up Actions The follow-up action matrix is given in Annex 2. 2. PROJECT CONTEXT 2.1 National Economic Context 2.1.1 The economy of Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) is based mostly on agriculture and livestock which make up more than 30% of the GDP and account for 80% of total exports. Eighty-six percent (86%) of the economically active population works in agriculture and livestock, 5.8% in other rural activities, 4% in urban industry and cottage industry and 4.2% in services. 2.1.2 In 1979, production fluctuated in the wake of successive droughts, and the agricultural sector contributed about 40% of the GDP formation even as it provided employment to 90% of the active population. The constant trend of the GDP between 1975 and 1977 reached close to FCFA 160 billion, increasing by 10% when compared with the previous year. The commercial balance posted a deficit of FCFA 1 360 and FCFA 2 300 million in 1975 and 1977, respectively. The deficit was almost totally covered by private transfers, public transfers and balance of payment capital movements. 2.1.3 National investment financing over the period recorded the opposite trend, falling by 29% from year to year. That trend reflected the country’s difficulties and the need to obtain foreign support to implement the five-year development plan (1977-1981). However, the then Upper Volta had to face the problem of coping with the migration of its bones and sinews to work outside the country. The Government sought to create employment opportunities to retain qualified managers and farmers. In pursuit of its economic and social development plan which focused on water control, rural development, education, training and employment, the young farmers training programme provided an opportunity to find a solution that combined the education of rural youths and their vocational preparation as farmers. 2.1.4 The agricultural and livestock sectors are characterized by low productivity. Indeed, small family farms of 3 to 6 hectares cultivated by 3 to 5 farmers largely dominate agriculture. Agriculture is mostly subsistent based on cereals (sorghum, millet and maize) that occupy 88% of the annual cultivated area, and cash crops (cotton, groundnut, sesame, etc.) which cover 12% of the annual farm space. Moreover, low fertilizer and pesticide use (except in the case of cotton), the insufficient equipment (nearly 30% of animal-drawn cultivation) and very limited application of research technology results in poor output largely tributary to vagaries of the weather. Concerning livestock, transhumance is the most current practice. 2.1.5 Agriculture and livestock are subject to unfavourable pedo-climatic conditions. Rainfall is unevenly distributed in time and space. The soil is poor in organic matter and mostly deficient in phosphorous and nitrogen. Farmland is estimated at 8.9 million hectares of which 3.5 million (39%) currently under cultivation. In many provinces, especially those in the central plateau, pressure on farmland is very high and the cropping intensity coefficient largely above 50%. 2.1.6 Since the early ’nineties and in concert with development partners, reforms were implemented to create an economic and political institutional environment that would enhance Burkina Faso’s joining the new global economy. In the light of their role as the locomotive of the national economy and against their inadequate performance highlighted in various diagnostic studies, the agricultural and livestock sectors have been of key concern to the Government. The

7

negative trends should be reversed with a view to increasing and sustainably supporting the country’s capacity to preserve and strengthen its comparative advantages in the new sub-regional economic space under construction, in particular those of the UEMOA and ECOWAS. 2.1.7 The economic recovery that began timidly in 1994 in the wake of the CFA Franc devaluation (+1.2%) continued in 1995 (3.9%) and was consolidated by 1996 with a real GDP growth rate of 6.2%, i.e. a 3.3% increase in the per capita income. Inflation, measured as a function of the consumer price dropped from 7.8% in 1995 to 6.1% in 1996. The inflationary trend is linked to the untoward impact of the slightly deteriorating budgetary deficit (-0.3% of the GDP), the increase in agricultural product demand, the fall in the money supply and the consequences of the 18% VAT increase. The GDP increase is attributable to the growth in agricultural activities (food crops and the cotton boom in particular, the production of which practically doubled form 115 000 tonnes to 215 000 tonnes). 2.1.8 Thanks to the reforms already implemented under the SAP and ASAP-I framework, some positive results have been recorded. However, certain emergency measures are needed to sustainably consolidate the agricultural and livestock sectors in the medium and long term. In that connection, the Government with the support of its partners prepared a sustainable growth operational strategy for both sectors. The strategy which takes into account the analyses and recommendations of the Sahel 21 Project, the World Food Summit and the Convention on Desert Control falls within the framework of overall Government policy. 2.1.9 The agro-pastoral and artisanal training system is a government priority characterized by young farmers’ training. It was set up in 1961 and reviewed in 1994. The FJA enabled the country to set up structures that suited its needs, notwithstanding budgetary restrictions. 2.2 Background of Operations in the Sector 2.2.1 Bank Group’s total commitment in Burkina Faso amounts to UA 268.83 million net of cancellations, for 39 operations. The Young Farmers Training Project, which dates back to 1979, marked the Bank’s first involvement in the social sector. In the education sector, the ADF had previously funded three projects for UA 27.35 million. The Education IV Project which was recently approved will be funded to the tune of UA 16.50 million. In other social sub-sectors, two health projects and a study were funded with a total envelope of UA 15.42 million. A population study was also financed to the tune of UA 0.76 million. 2.2.2 The World Bank also financed operations in the education sector. The Education Project IV, the IDB, the EDF, the ABEDA, UNICEF, France, Norway, Canada and the United States all supported the Government of Burkina Faso in meeting its rural training objectives. 2.3 Project Formulation 2.3.1 The Young Farmers’ Training Project was one of Government’s priorities and an integral part of a vast programme for training young farmers by offering them basic functional education accompanied with vocational agricultural training. The first rural education programme which began in 1961 set the pace. In 1972, SEDES, World Bank and Government advisers conducted a pilot experience which ran from 1974 to 1978 in the Koudougou and Kaya ORDs with the support of the IBRD, the EDF and several bilateral cooperation agencies. Overall, the Government was satisfied with World Bank operations. Following the success of the pilot experience, the World Bank conducted a detailed investment study for implementation in the six ORDs under the Education Project II, involving the construction of buildings, establishment of support services, staff training and education. In May 1978, the Bank received a request to participate in funding the project.

8

2.3.2 The project falls within the framework of the second World Bank operation and the ADB’s first in Burkina Faso’s education sector. The operation was aimed at extending and improving the basic education and training system designed for rural youths. 2.3.3 During appraisal, the aim of the project was to extend and improve the basic education and training system through the construction of 45 Young Farmers’ Training Centres (CFJAs) and 2 Rural Development Centres (CPRs). The structures were designed to permit the training in five years of 21 000 pupils in 548 CFJAs, conduct refresher courses for 136 trainers (both genders) in addition to the 305 in activity, and from 1984, train 184 new trainers. Furthermore, the project was to support the Rural Construction and Public Works Technicians Training Unit, equip and set up 600 Young Farmers’ Cooperatives (GJAs) with farm implements and materials, central and regional departments of the Directorate for the Training of Young Farmers (DFJA), offer training to managers of agricultural projects, construction contractors and cottage industry operators. 2.4 Project Rationale 2.4.1 At appraisal, the Burkina Faso education system comprised two sub-systems: (i) the classical sub-system for the three age groups corresponding to the

primary, secondary and tertiary levels, under the responsibility of the MEN; (ii) the sub-system for youths in the field, directly linking education with the

acquisition of enhanced production capacity. The Ministry of Rural Education was in charge of the sub-system which offered training to young farmers. The FJA is now under the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture through the SPAJP (which replaced the DFMOR). Annex 6 shows the education system structure and its place in agro-pastoral training. It shows the importance of the project within the Burkina education system.

2.4.2 The project’s rationale lies in the fact that the country faced the emigration to Cote d’Ivoire of part of its workforce and the Government sought to create employment opportunities that would keep its qualified hands and farmers. To halt the exodus and solve issues arising from the economic growth, the FJA was to represent a human resources and agricultural development investment (PCR, page 6). 2.4.3 The young farmers’ training as designed in 1961 aimed to offer basic education to all rural children, accompanied with adequate vocational agricultural training that would transform them into competent farmers. At the same time, they were to learn to read, write, count, speak their maternal language and French. The young farmers were to be aware of their role and responsibility in their villages and country and participate in economic and social development within Government guidelines by farming their individual or community plot, or investing in cottage industry. 2.4.4 The development of farming in a predominantly agricultural country justified the need to extend the young farmers’ training programme. At the end of the training, youths trained would work in their native rural areas. Hence, their contribution would be to participate in the economic and social development of rural regions (PCR, paragraph 5.0.3).

9

2.5 Project Objectives and Scope at Appraisal 2.5.1 The logical framework matrix was not included in the appraisal report since the Bank had by 1979 not adopted guidelines on the logical framework approach. However, the report clearly consistently discussed the rural education sub-system. 2.5.2 The matrix presented in Annex 2 gives a synthesis of the project at evaluation. For the purpose of that evaluation, a retrospective matrix was prepared and performance and impact indicators identified for performance assessment in terms of their results and the project’s attainment of its objectives. 2.5.3 The appraisal report clearly indicated project aims and objectives, although it did not examine the consequences and risks related to the socio-political environment which became very unstable thereafter for a long time and had a negative impact on project implementation. Furthermore, the sectoral indicators were scattered all over the appraisal report instead of being presented in the section defining the project and its objectives. In contrast, the qualitative and quantitative indicators explained in detail in the section enabled the evaluation mission to reconstitute the logical framework. Thus, the detailed description of components helped to determine (a) the construction of 45 CFJA buildings, two CPRs, the directorate; (b) the equipment and facilities for 300 CFJAs, two CPRs, the directorate, 600 GJA centres, Bobo-Dioulasso regional departments, two CFMRs and the UFTRCTP; (c) the procurement of furniture for 80 new CFJAs, equipment for 300 CFJAs, furniture and equipment for the same centres and departments mentioned above. In addition, the appraisal report gave the total number of youths in the CJAs, the CFJAs and the number of trainers, while projecting the enrolment figure on project completion (e.g. train 184 new trainers and offer refresher courses for 136 others already in activity in the CFMRs, to receive 21 000 pupils in the GJAs, including 160 CJAs that will receive new buildings (see pages 12 to 18). No objectively verifiable figures were mentioned in connection with the CPRs. 2.5.4 On analyzing the logical framework reconstituted for evaluation purposes, the project input showed consistency with the objectives. The extension of the rural education programme required the construction of a number of CFJAs in villages. In order to consolidate programme administration and support services and improve trainers’ and staff training, refresher courses for 136 trainers and training of 184 new trainers would help to attain that objective. Moreover, the objective to help youths trained in the CFJAs to settle in their villages with the farm implements given to them could not be attained since there were no provisions under the project to equip and settle 600 GJAs made up of former CFJA pupils. 2.5.5 Most of the set objectives were unrealistic since they showed no achievement indicators. The ADF and IDA components are highlighted in the PCR (pages 3 and 4). 2.5.6 In terms of education, the appraisal report did not specify what programmes the GJAs, CFJAs and CPRs would run, but limited itself to exposing the outlines on the objectives of the agricultural training centres (page 13 to 16). Hence, it was not possible to verify the number of hours invested in training per se. 2.6 Financial Provisions 2.6.1 During appraisal, the Young Farmers’ Training Project was estimated to cost UA 21.9 million, of which 57% slated for IDA funding (FUA 12.6 million) and 31% for ADF funding (UA 6.7 million). The Government was to finance 12% of the cost (FUA 2.6 million).

10

2.6.2 The financial provisions contained the following ADF disbursement conditions:

(i) Written commitment to include in its annual budget enough allocations to cover its financial participation in the project;

(ii) Written undertaking to cover eventual cost overruns;

(iii) Written undertaking to issue instructions to the FJA Directorate in charge of

managing project expenditure to have a separate account funded with the ADF credit.

2.7 Appraisal Methodology and Approach 2.7.1 Based on the logical framework as set forth in Annex 2 and in the light of each objective, the mission measured project performance by reviewing the direct output and trend of indicators in question at the project upstream and downstream sub-system level:

i) working session at the project executing agency to consult documents, discussions with officials to collect detailed information;

ii) discussions with the Ministry of Agriculture, various directorates and

departments of the Ministry of Agriculture as well as international agencies operating in the education and agricultural sectors (FAO, UNDP, World Bank) in Burkina Faso;

iii) site visits in Kadiogo, Bam, Soum, Boulkemde and Sanguie Provinces (visit

of all premises and units of production, meeting with management and staff) helped to assess operations within structures set up under the project;

vi) meeting with contractors, suppliers, consulting firms participating in the

implementation phase. 2.7.2 These activities were conducted with the close cooperation of the departments of the Ministry of Agriculture. 3. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION 3.1 Project Entry into Force and Start-up The project was approved on 22 March 1979 and the loan signed on 16 May 1979. The loan entered into force on 4 September 1979 and the first disbursement was effected on 29 September 1980, nineteen months following loan signature. The delay was due to poor knowledge by Burkina Faso authorities of Bank rules and procedures and bureaucracy surrounding the fulfillment of conditions precedent to the first disbursement. The Borrower did not respect the condition in connection with developing land on which the 2 CPRs were scheduled for construction. 3.2 Project Modifications 3.2.1 In terms of construction, the ADF component funded the following additional works:

11

i) the construction of five buildings for office use at the following localities:

Orodara, Reo, Dedougou, Djibo and Po; ii) the construction of a building for store and office use at Dedougou; iii) the construction of buildings for use as store, parking and cafeteria within the

Directorate of Young Farmers’ Training at Ouagadougou; iv) rehabilitation of office buildings at Koudougou and Gorom-Gorom; v) introduction of a village water supply programme by drilling 16 boreholes for

the CFJAs, of which 13 equipped with pumps, and the construction of a dam at Dioro for the Goundi CPR.

3.2.2 Apart from modifications during construction, the following equipment, changes and additions were noted: A) equipment and facilities for 248 CFJA instead of 300; B) equipment and facilities for 310 GJAs instead of 600; C) support to regional departments (5 regional offices); D) procurement of equipment for 179 CFJAs instead of 80; E) procurement of equipment for 278 CFJAs instead of 300; 3.2.3 These changes were possible due to FUA fluctuations and did not entail additional cost. 3.3 Implementation Schedule 3.3.1 Approved in October 1979, the project was completed in October 1992, i.e. an implementation period of 13 years instead of the initial 5, and 8 years behind schedule (from entry into force to completion). The delay is attributable to the following: (i) since the project was the Bank Group’s first operation in Burkina Faso,

national managers were not sufficiently in tune with the Bank’s rules and procedures;

(ii) several disbursement suspensions disrupted harmonious project operation; (iii) bureaucracy also impacted negatively on project implementation; (iv) political instability that affected the country throughout the project period.

These events brought several structural changes to the supervising ministry especially in connection with the project executing agency. Indeed, the project executing agency changed directors thirteen times and was often reorganized and transferred under several departments;

(v) the Bank’s responsibility is clearly stated in the PCR (page 7); (vi) the addition of other activities to the project also contributed to the delay; (vii) from 1998, the project executing agency was saddled with executing two

projects (with the start-up of Education Project II). That led to the dispersion

12

of human resources even though the agency had not mastered the Bank’s rules and procedures.

3.3.2 The key data of the projected and actual schedule are given in the PCR (page [i]). 3.4 Forwarding of Reports The project appraisal provided for quarterly reports on the project status to be sent to the Bank. In all, the Bank between 30 October 1981 and March 1992 received 15 instead of the 44 planned (i.e. over a 13 year period). The Bank’s laxity over enforcing the rules and procedures in that respect contributed to that state of affairs. However, the project executing agency managed information to a considerable extent because, notwithstanding the repeated change of project management, it managed to maintain the archives – a factor which facilitated the task of the evaluation mission in July 1998. 3.5 Procurement of Goods and Services Overall, goods and services were procured in line with Bank rules and procedures. However, certain contracts were implemented on force account (i.e. by the State) following prior approval by the Bank; the contracts were in fields where the private sector lacked the right skills (PCR, page 11). 3.6 Project Cost The total cost of the project at appraisal was put at FUA 21.9 million, of which FUA 10.4 million in foreign exchange and FUA 11.5 million in local currency. On completion, the actual cost as stated in the evaluation report amounted to UA 20.16 million (PCR, page 5). The foreign exchange portion stood at UA 9.57 million (47%) while the local currency expenditure amounted to UA 10.59 million (53% of the total). 3.7 Disbursements and Sources of Finance 3.7.1 ADF-projected financing was put at UA 9.57 million during appraisal. On completion, the ADF component actually cost FUA 6.17 million. The gap between the cost at appraisal and completion is attributable to the upward variation in the FUA recorded during the implementation phase, thanks to which the cost overrun due to extension of the implementation period was absorbed. Indeed, the FUA rate which at appraisal was FUA 1 = FCFA 232.22 had appreciated to FCFA 774.979 on completion. The sources of finance at appraisal and completion are given on Page [vi] of this document and Page 5 of the PCR. 3.7.2 Certain expenditure categories were not taken into account during appraisal for various reasons: (a) the architectural studies during which the plans were to have been designed by the construction section of the FJA based on studies conducted by Dutch and American volunteers with IDA financing; (b) operating expenses given the fact that the component was to be jointly financed by the IDA and the Government; (c) technical assistance services became necessary following the reassignment of the national coordinator back to his ministry of origin. Hence, UA 113 926.09, UA 473 692.33 and UA 114 775.75 were spent on the above categories, respectively. 3.7.3 Table 3.1 below shows the annual disbursements over the thirteen years of project implementation. The first year may be considered as having had no disbursements. Subsequently, the sum of disbursements of the first four years is nearly equivalent to what was scheduled for the

13

first year of the project. That reflects the executing agency’s inability to effectively execute bidding operations and construction works as initially planned. From the sixth year of implementation, disbursements per tranche exceeded UA 1 million; yearly disbursements mostly fell below UA 500 000. Since financing was parallel, each donor prepared its PCR with financing and disbursement details.

Table 3.1

Projected and Actual Disbursement Schedule on ADF Resources Years Estimated (UA Million) Actual (UA Million)

1979 1.83 - 1980 2.21 0.52 1981 1.77 0.41 1982 0.79 0.25 1983 0.08 0.55 1984 0.42 1985 0.53 1986 1.25 1987 0.57 1988 0.97 1989 0.25 1990 0.12 1991 0.15 1992 0.03 1993 0.05 TOTAL 6.70 6.15 Balance cancelled on 13/05/93 0.01 Source: 1994 PCR and 1998 PPAR Mission. 3.8 Respect of Loan Conditions and Provisions Most of the loan and other conditions were fulfilled. However, those in connection with Government counterpart financing and provision of developed land were not respected. Interim reports and reports of external auditors were also not forwarded to the Bank. 4. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 4.1 Operating Performance 4.1.1 Infrastructure set up under the project are not rationally used due to the country’s financial situation in the wake of conditions imposed by such international institutions as the World Bank and the IMF. The infrastructure set up, the furniture, the agricultural equipment and implements are unsatisfactorily operated. Training and production activities only operate at half capacity. Building design is satisfactory overall. The performance is inadequate for the following reasons: i) change in the training duration; ii) under-utilization and non-utilization of certain infrastructure due to absence

of appropriate operating systems, clear policy or pedagogic orientation and reduction of the operating budget;

14

iii) the momentary suspension of CFFA trainers and the reduction of youth

beneficiaries due to demotivation, change of attitude and the SAP. 4.1.2 As can be noted, Table 4.1 clearly shows a fall in the number of enrolments into training structures of the Ministry of Agriculture, Government effort notwithstanding:

Table 4.1 Trend of Enrolments into Young Farmers’ Training Centres

CENTRES

1980

1994

1996

CFJA (open) 507 315 118Number of youths 17 436 5 773 1 813Youths/class 26 18 18Facilitators 441 737 398 CFFA (open) 3 3 3Retrained trainers 863 737 346Trained supervisors - 180 95 GJA (open) 123 394 501Members - 8 200 12 610Facilitators 246 394 45 CPR (open) 3 5 5Trained youths - 200 176Trained farmers - 684 410Source: Statistics compiled by the Permanent Secretariat in support of young farmers and the July 1998 post evaluation mission. 4.1.3 The operating performance faltered due to inadequacies in running the infrastructure set up under the project (inadequate budget, declining enrolment, inconsistent educational and production objectives). Data at project appraisal differed from those obtained during post-evaluation. Overall, the infrastructure set up was adequate. No repeating is allowed under the training system. Internal output analysis is not applicable. 4.1.4 The situation is worse in the CFFAs (ex-CFMR) where trainers are trained. The number of pupil advisers enrolled in the Kamboinse CFFA fell from 20 in 1993/94 to 8 in 1996-1998. Over the same period, the number of trainers remained unchanged (8 or 9). For an establishment designed for 50 student advisers in a two-year cycle, the teacher/pupil ratio has been below 1 for the 1996/98, 97/99 and 98/2000 cycles (9 trainers for 4 pupil advisers). This situation is attributable to Government decision following the plans under the structural adjustment programme to freeze recruitments except those in the Ministries of Education, Health and Finance. 4.1.5 The situation has had an impact on the CFJAs which increased from 507 in 1980 to 650 in 1984, only to reduce to 118 in 1996. Over the same period, the enrolment declined from 17 436 to 17 000 in 1984, then to 1 104 in 1996. The sharp decline in enrolment is mostly attributable to problems with regard to the target group and decreasing staff. Parents no longer want to send their children aged 12 to 16 to the CFJAs since the former consider the latter as useful labour. In contrast, dropouts form the formal education system (youths from grade nine to twelve) who think

15

that these agricultural schools are the solution to their employment and social development problems enroll into the CFJAs. Certain CFJA facilitators would want the FJA movement revitalized by inducting dropouts from the formal education system and raising the recruitment age from 11 to 16/18. Contrary to education objectives during the appraisal, children of 8 to 11 years were rarely found in the CFJAs in 1997/98. In these centres, the teaching staff (advisers) is aging; teachers are not replaced in the event of death or departure on retirement. Moreover, most of the advisers in active services are one or two years from retirement. 4.2 Financial Performance 4.2.1 The financial performance is rated as unsatisfactory. The State does not enforce the cost recovery mechanism. Institutions set up under the project have difficulties in meeting their recurrent expenditure, especially maintenance cost. Their financial viability depends on the State’s capacity to put financial resources at their disposal in view of the difficulties it faces vis-à-vis the structural adjustment programme negotiated with the Bretton Woods institutions. Following the withdrawal of donors, the budget allocated to the CPRs for their operations (salaries and allowances, input procurement) is equivalent to FCFA 11 million. 4.2.2 Under the FJA system, the project training structures have not been rationally used due to the absence of appropriate operating systems, clear policy or educational guidelines adapted to the prevailing sociological situation or lack of adequate budget. The CPR budgets were backed by the Education I and II projects; however, at project completion, the Government did not support the centres to the level that it should have. The budget fell from FCFA 41 million to FCFA 11 million mostly to pay salaries and general expenses. There is acute shortage of resources in support of production. These units, together with the CFFAs, could generate annual profit of nearly FCFA 40 million if production was adequately organized. Economic support for education would come from profit accruing from the sale of agricultural and pastoral products by the centres and the use of trainers’ skills (who are not only farmers but trainers) in development projects by donors and international NGOs so many of which are interested in Burkina Faso. The CFJAs, CFFAs and CPRs are not autonomous and are unable to fund their own operations. 4.2.3 In the light of the limited resources allocated by the State, the CPRs and the CFMRs initiated the following actions: (i) hiring of halls during seminars; (ii) revitalization of small crop and livestock production units the products of

which are sold in the local market. 4.3 Economic Performance 4.3.1 The economic performance is rated as unsatisfactory. The project was implemented within a difficult macro-economic framework. It contributed positively to the development of the agricultural training system. It also helped to develop the national economy by improving the agricultural sector. 4.3.2 The project contributed to extending the rural education programme to the whole country through the establishment of young farmers’ training centres at the CFJAs, CPRs and GJAs. Between 1980 and 1994 when the project was completed, 200 youths were trained and 684 farmers benefited from refresher courses. In the CFJAs, 5 773 youths received training from 737 trainers. Youths trained went into farming.

16

4.3.3 However, the cost of training one pupil over one year in the CPRs increased from FCFA 410 000 in 1979 to FCFA 1 666 666 in 1997-98, for an annual budget of FCFA 28 million. The project is running at half its capacity and the average cost of training one youth has practically doubled (taking into account the 1994 FCFA devaluation). 4.4 Institutional and Social Performance

(a) Institutional Development 4.4.1 Since 1974, the training of young farmers was transferred form the Ministry of National Education to the Ministry of Rural Development (Directorate of Young Farmers’ Training). Thereafter, the establishment of the directorate led to the creation of the Ministry of Agriculture. The project set up and supported ORDs. Furthermore, the establishment of FJA centres in all provinces contributed to the decentralization of farmers’ training activities. 4.4.2 Recently, within the Ministry of Agriculture, the secretariat in support of young farmers (SPAJP) was set up and charged with projections, training organization and search for donor financing. Continuous training was provided for managers of the project executing agency. Moreover, the reassignment of managers with experience from the project executing agency to projects helped such projects to attain their set objectives. (b) Effective Management and Organization 4.4.3 The institutional impact in the rural training sector was concretized by the implementation by the project executing agency and SPAJP of follow-up activities, organization and preparation of programmes for improving training. New topics were introduced into the CPR programmes, especially IEC and market gardening. (c) Socio-economic impact 4.4.4 The establishment of CFJAs and CPRs gave impetus to the development of agriculture in Burkina Faso. According to statistics from the project executing agency, the number of farmers trained and farmers’ cooperatives increased significantly. From 1992 to 1996, notwithstanding the drastic drop in the number of CFJAs (408 to 118), the number of farmers practically doubled (from 374 928 to 713 173) or a net increase of 52.5% (Annexes 7 and 8). Over the same period, the number of women members of farmers’ cooperatives increased from 20.15% to 23.95%. Women’s cooperatives also increased from 2 430 in 1992 to 5 201. Membership increased from 134 351 to 287 450 or a net increase of 46.7%. Between 1990 and 1996, notwithstanding the overlapping of the Young Farmers’ Training Project and the Rural Primary and Secondary Education Strengthening Project (Education II), the number of youths trained in the CPRs increased considerably from 36 to 443. Hence, 443 trained young farmers exercise their profession. In the past two years, private young farmers’ training centres have been set up with the authorization of the Ministry of Agriculture, thus demonstrating the interest of rural dwellers in the system which enables them to be economically independent. 4.5 Environmental Performance 4.5.1 The environmental was not an issue in development projects in the seventies. In recent years, however, such projects have paid more attention to environmental issues. Nonetheless, the CFJAs and the CPRs built have had no serious environmental impact. With regard to their

17

integration into the physical environment, it should be pointed out that most of the centres merge into their surroundings, thanks to the agricultural and pastoral vocation of the surrounding population. However, the use of firewood for cooking in the CPR in order to feed trainees could in the long run impact negatively on surrounding woods. The authorities in charge of the centres do little to stress environmental concerns, especially reforestation. 4.5.2 Concerning integration into the economic and socio-cultural environment, it has been noted that the centres have brought some development to neigbouring villages which fetch potable water from boreholes at those establishments and make the best of opportunities offered them to earn income by working in the centres or units of productions set up therein as farm hands. 4.6 Impact on Women There are no female teachers at the CPRs and the CFFAs. Statistics compiled by the SP-OFPP on the Reo Circuit indicated the number of women farmers to triple that of men. In 429 farmers’ cooperatives, women number 12 079 of the 17 440 membership (i.e. 69.26%). Since the situation is similar throughout the country, it reflects the key role that women should play in economic development. 4.7 Performance of Consultants, Contractors, Suppliers and the Borrower 4.7.1 Performance of Consultants Provision was not made at appraisal to recruit a technical assistance staff for public works. The need to do so was felt during the implementation phase, for the purpose of monitoring construction works on the Goundi and Koudougou CPRs (buildings, dams, boreholes, installation of generators and a solar pump for 17 months). Overall, technical assistance was satisfactory. That notwithstanding, the technical assistance staff is blamed often for allowing the use of equipment that more often than not was unsuitable for the project sites. For instance, the Goundi and Koudougou electricity generators are under-used since their capacity is far above the need of both CPRs. The officer in charge of the architectural design of the two CPRs and the FJA directorate, including the preparation of the technical sketches, performed satisfactorily although both CPRs would have done better with a storm water drainage system. 4.7.2 Performance of Contractors 4.7.2.1 Within the project context, 72 works, supplies and services contracts were awarded. Generally the contracts were satisfactorily implemented except for two cases where they were terminated. 4.7.2.2 Nonetheless, several difficulties were recorded in connection with works contracts, especially the construction of the Goundi and Kodougou CPRs and the Dedougou regional office the contracting firms of which were put under administrative supervision following their inability to perform; the remaining works were implemented on semi-force account. 4.7.2.3 There were delays in the following: submission of bids, proclamation of results (6 to 7 months), non-communication of bidding results to unsuccessful firms which continued to bear the cost of banking guarantees, long delay recorded by the Bank before making direct payments, clarification of technical specifications for equipment and supplies in the bidding documents. The situation described delayed the operations of contracting firms.

18

4.7.3 Borrower’s Performance The Borrower performed satisfactorily and overall, the project was well implemented. However, the following issues were highlighted: too long a delay before project entry into force, non-forwarding of progress reports on time to the Bank, sanctions for non-payment of arrears, restrictive budgets. In all, the project was adequately executed despite the financial difficulties in running the structures set up. 4.8 Bank Group Performance 4.8.1 The Bank did not participate in identifying and preparing the project. During the appraisal, no implementation schedule was mentioned. 4.8.2 The quantifiable objectives were not treated in the appropriate project definition section. The sectoral, quantitative and qualitative objectives were not realistically defined. Furthermore, the contribution of the centres earmarked in attaining those objectives was not determined with a view to sustaining the achievements in terms of rural training, infrastructure and education and for the purpose of smooth organization, management, production methods and coordination. 4.8.3 Between 1981 and 1992, the Bank organized ten supervision missions, i.e. less than one mission yearly. The missions helped the Borrower to acquire the skills for organizing bids within the timeframe specified during the appraisal. 4.8.4 The Bank faced the following problems: delay in processing documents to be forwarded to the Borrower; processing of bidding documents; direct payment to contracting firms; inadequate supervision missions organized by the Bank when the country was under sanctions; lack of coordination with the IDA; absence of training for officials of the executing agency. In view of the issues raised above, the Bank’s performance is rated average. 4.8.5 Furthermore, the bank did not participate in identifying and preparing the project, as a result of which it could not clarify its approach with the IDA’s with regard to the choice of CFJA construction materials. The IDA planned to use semi-durable materials while the Bank preferred durable materials. Moreover, the appraisal report did not specify the State’s contribution in terms of components, expenditure categories and financing schedule. The State maintains that it paid its counterpart contribution by way of salaries to staff of the project executing agency. It was noted that the project executing agency neither received nor kept account of such counterpart funding. 5. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY 5.1 Physical Sustainability (Maintenance) 5.1.1 The buildings are generally well preserved. Although some CPRs look new, maintenance has not been regular, as a result of which the walls of certain CPR buildings have cracked. Moreover, classroom and workshop ceilings in the Konguoussi CPR have holes on certain spots. Furthermore, equipment have not been properly maintained. The same problems are noted in the two CFFAs. 5.1.2 With regard to the CFJAs, the well-preserved buildings are those in durable material that the ADF built. Most other buildings in semi-durable material funded by the IDA have deteriorated since adobe bricks cannot resist bad weather for more than ten years. It should be pointed out that in

19

most of the CFJAs, equipment and materials procured are no longer in place. Livestock procured under the project have all died and not been replaced. Lastly, the number of CFJAs in operation has dropped considerably in view of changes in the way farmers and the target groups look at the FJA system. 5.2 Project Impact Sustainability 5.2.1 Sustainability of the project impact is threatened: the Ministry of Agriculture shows no desire to revitalize the structures set up under the project which is part of a vast programme to develop agricultural training in the country. 5.2.2 Current facilities (FJA, CPR and CFFA centres) are not run optimally. Nearly all these centres operate below capacity. One of the impacts of SAPs negotiated by the Bretton Woods institutions with the Government, especially the decision to no longer recruit staff for ministries other than health, education and finance led to a freeze in the recruitment of managers for the Ministry of Agriculture. The situation demotivated trainers and led to a fall in their number and that of young trainees in the centre. The same problems impacted on the capacity of the structures set up to attain the objectives assigned at appraisal. Considering the fact that the aim of offering training to youths in the CPRs, CFJAs and GJAs is not to recruit them into the civil service but to help them set themselves up and become economically independent, it is not necessary to reduce training in the centres. Going by the optimistic assumption of training 100 youths per CPR in bi-annual cycles (18 months), the two CPRs built under the project should train 200 youths at the end of each training cycle. By raising the recruitment age into the CFJAs to 16 or 18 instead of 11 and 12 projected at appraisal, especially dropouts from the ninth grade, the 118 CFJAs opened (each with a reception capacity for 35 pupils) should turn out 4 130 young farmers yearly. Thus the project sustainability will be maintained. 5.2.3 The secretariat in support of young farmers does not maximize the investments made by opening the CPRs to youths, school dropouts and farmers. Short-term training of farmers can be organized within the context of a general poverty reduction project. The establishment of production units could contribute substantially to the operating cost. Through discussions of the evaluation mission with CPR directors, it is obvious that crop and livestock production could generate annual turnover of FCFA 40 million, not counting the hiring out of halls for seminars. The use of the skills of trainers by international NGOs active in the provinces is yet another opportunity for the centres to build up financial resources. 5.2.4 Furthermore, donors have been financing education and training projects without any coordination. There is no common development strategy accepted by all donors. The Government does not invite the donors for an annual review of the sector. 6. PERFORMANCE RATING 6.1 The performance rating is given in Annex 4. The project implementation performance is rated as satisfactory. The average rating stands at 2.46, classifying the performance in category S. The Bank’s performance is considered satisfactory, although it neither identified nor prepared the project. Bank delay in processing bidding documents and the low supervision mission frequency impacted negatively on project implementation. 6.2 Attainment of objectives is rated 2.57 average and classified under S. However, return on investments is not effective since the training centres do not participate enough in constituting their own resources through the establishment of production units. Youths who graduated from the

20

production centres join the private sector where they participate in the country’s agricultural development. 6.3 Institutional development is rated 3.25. The freeze of recruitment in the Ministry of Agriculture in the wake of SAP led to a lull in training activities. The establishment of training and support structures led to the creation of the Ministry of Agriculture. The project executing agency was strengthened with competent staff. 6.4 The project sustainability with an average of 1.57 is inadequate in a politically unstable environment, punctuated by several coups d’etat. Furthermore, the operating programmes are not sufficiently sustained and the state does not provide enough budget to the centres nor does it renew vehicles and equipment procured under the project. 7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 7.1 Overall Evaluation 7.1.1 Performance indicators are scattered all over the Appraisal Report (they should have been treated in the “Project Objectives” section), are ill-defined and unrealistic. 7.1.2 The Education I project components were satisfactorily implemented without cost overrun even though the implementation phase covered thirteen years. The Government implemented additional works. 7.1.3 Overall, Bank rules and procedures were respected. Architectural studies funded by the IDA and the ADF faced follow-up difficulties. The harmonization of construction models caused certain delays in works implementation. The IDA proposed construction in semi-durable materials while the ADF opted for durable materials to guarantee the sustainability of installations. Time has proven that buildings in durable materials are better since those in semi-durable materials have either deteriorated or are in ruins. 7.1.4 The series of suspensions that the country suffered during the implementation phase extended the implementation period from 8 to 13 years. For its part, the Bank did not adequately supervise project implementation especially since both the Institution and the country had only begun to implement basic education and rural projects. The objectives having been ill-defined, post evaluation became difficult. 7.1.5 The current operation of the centres is not adequately backed with State financial support, as a result of which there has been a fall in the quality of management and staff of the centres. The situation has raised issues related to the maintenance of infrastructure set up under the project. Materials and equipment have not been renewed following the withdrawal of donors. 7.1.6 At the economic front, the project put at the country’s disposal training and production structures as well as agricultural managers whose action has had a positive impact on local, regional and national agricultural production. 7.1.7 The project had a positive impact especially through the development of farmers’ cooperatives the membership of which increased considerably. However, these positive effects need to be strengthened. 7.1.8 At the educational level, it was noted that the programmes have improved and take into

21

account Government priorities and guidelines. New crops have also been introduced. 7.2 Retroaction The PPAR mission agreed with the conclusions and recommendations of the PCR. Apart from those contained in the PCR, the following key lessons may be drawn from the project: Lessons Lesson N°1: the non-participation of the ADF in identifying and preparing the project restricted its vision in setting the qualitative and quantitative objectives and judiciously allocating resources to such components as construction, material and equipment supply (par. 4.8.1). Lesson N°2: the absence of performance indicators in the appraisal report and lack of statistical information rendered difficult the evaluation of the project impact (par. 4.8.2). Lesson N°3: the Borrower’s non-submission of scheduled status reports did not permit the Bank to plan realistic and appropriate terms of reference for its missions or decide on the urgency of the missions to assist the executing agency to overcome emerging difficulties (par 3.4.1). Lesson N°4: the Borrower’s poor knowledge of ADF rules and procedures leads to delays in project implementation (par. 3.3.1). Lesson N°5: several suspensions for the Borrower’s non payment of arrears considerably delayed project implementation. (par. 3.3.1). Lesson N°6: the overlapping of two education projects implemented by the same executing agency prevents the ADF from assessing the management of each project and assigning responsibility. Moreover, it creates difficulties for the executing agency which is yet to fully learn the rules and procedures for the procurement of goods and services (par. 3.3.1). Lesson N°7: inadequate operating budget (maintenance, repairs, support for training activities) is a serious handicap to sustaining project results (par. 4.2). Lesson N°8: to sustain project achievements, the Government should renew equipment and materials (par. 5.1.2). 7.3 Recommendations 7.3.1 Recommendations to the Government To help attain the development objectives in the training sectors in general and the agro-pastoral sector in particular, it is recommended that the Government:

(i) respect ADF guidelines (par. 3.1.1) ;

22

(ii) set aside an envelope for the preparation of future projects, in collaboration with

donors (par. 3.1.1); (iii) avoid frequent change of project directors and managers during the

implementation phase (par. 3.3.1); iv) rapidly undertake the preparation, invitation and analysis of bids for the

procurement of goods and services (par. 4.7.2.2); (v) raise the recruitment age into the CFJAs to sixteen instead of eleven (par.

4.4.3); (vi) give priority to future rural training projects that will emphasize poverty

reduction, projects targeting women, rural youths and adults as beneficiaries; training in cooperative management, environmental protection (par. 5.2.1);

(vii) conduct studies better targeting the development objectives in the following

activities: youth settlement following their training in CPRs, strengthening of existing and future agricultural training structure; trainers’ training by strengthening the Farakoba and Kamboinse CFFAs; women’s support project comprising functional literacy, training in farming methods, IEC, credit, training in organization and management of cooperatives and simplified accounting; project to settle youth in the land (training/production and settlement) (par. 5.2.1 and 7.1.9);

(viii) put in place an equipment replacement policy to facilitate appropriate follow-

up following the departure of donors (par. 5.1.2); (ix) undertake to provide adequate budget to centres for the maintenance of

project equipment and achievements (par. 5.2.1); (x) give a national public establishment status to the centres to enable them to

legally constitute their own budget through agricultural and livestock production from production units (par. 5.2.1);

(xi) with donors, define a common rural development strategy to revitalize

infrastructure set up by projects and render it cost effective (par. 5.2.1); (xii) develop training structures set up within the project framework and make the

best of the human resources involved in management (education and financial) to offset the non-recruitment of trainers in the Ministry of Agriculture following the implementation of SAPs (par. 5.2.2).

7.3.2 Recommendations to the Bank

(i) enhance involvement in the identification, preparation and appraisal of projects

jointly financed with other donors, especially the World Bank (par. 4.8.1);

(ii) state the social indicators during project identification, preparation and appraisal for better supervision and retrospective evaluation (par. 4.8.2);

23 (iii) set aside an envelope for the preparation of future projects, in collaboration with

donors (par. 3.1.1);

(iv) ensure better supervision of ongoing projects even when the country is under sanctions (par. 4.8.3);

(v) strengthen the team of experts to avoid slow disbursement and delayed response

with the Borrowing country (par. 4.8.4); (vi) uniformize the types of construction to avoid the selection of different

construction materials (e.g. semi-durable for the IDA and durable for the ADF) during joint financing (par. 4.8.5 and 5.1.2);

(vii) continue to support rural development by putting together poverty reduction

projects (par. 7.1.9); viii) conduct sectoral studies with a view to defining the sectoral and development

strategies for the sector in collaboration with other donors, while bearing in mind the rules of each donor (par. 5.2.4);

(ix) encourage the establishment of an education projects coordination unit which

will facilitate consultation among donors (par. 5.2.4). 7.4 Follow-up Action By the Burkina Faso Government 7.4.1 Strengthen the activities of the centres by setting up a production unit to enable them to build resources for their operating budget. Review the status of the centres by transforming them into National Public Establishments to enable them to legally perform the above functions. 7.4.2 Integrate the centres (CFJAs, CPRs and CFFAs) into poverty reduction projects by giving proper opportunity therein to women, youths and adults. 7.4.3 Define a common rural development strategy with a view to revitalizing project infrastructure. There should be return on investments. By the Bank 7.4.4 Continue to support the training of young farmers by preparing projects that emphasize poverty reduction, settlement of youths trained and access to credit. 7.4.5 Plan a sectoral study that will define a common programme for each donor that will make parallel or joint contribution with a coordination unit that should meet yearly.

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1 PAGE 1 OF 3

REPUBLIC OF BURKINA FASO

YOUNG FARMERS’ TRAINING PROJECT MATRIX OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND FOLLOW-UP ACTION

Main Conclusions

Recommendations

Follow-up Actions

Responsibility

1.Project Preparation and Justification 1.1 The performance indicators are scattered throughout the appraisal report. They should have been put together under “project objectives”. The said objectives were defined in rather ideological terms and unrealistically. 1.2 The ADF did not participate in project identification or preparation even though it was to finance the operation jointly with the World Bank. 2.Project Implementation 2.1 Project implementation took thirteen years instead of the five initially scheduled. 2.2 13 directors and managers successively headed the project during the implementation phase

1.1.1 Project objectives should have been defined in quantifiable terms. 1.2.1 The ADF should systematically prepare all projects that it funds with other donors to avoid modifications during implementation. 2.1.1 The ADF should ensure that the rules and procedures are known and enforced by the executing agency. 2.1.2 The Government of Burkina Faso should set aside funds for entry into force of future projects and provide the necessary resources. 2.2.1 The Government should avoid frequent change of project directors and managers.

1.1.1.1 Define the objectives in quantifiable and measurable terms. 1.2.1.1 Prepare all jointly financed projects. 1.2.1.2 Set up a coordination unit with cofinanciers and the Government for enhanced project management. 2.1.1.1 The ADF should organize orientation seminars for project executing agency staff prior to project start-up and intervene as soon as possible in case of problems. 2.1.2.1 Include allocations to new projects in the annual budget. 2.2.1.1 During the implementation phase, maintain project directors and managers irrespective of the prevailing political situation.

• ADF (Operations Department) • ADF (Operations Department) • ADF (Operations Department) • Borrower • Borrower

ANNEX 1 PAGE 2 OF 3

REPUBLIC OF BURKINA FASO YOUNG FARMERS’ TRAINING PROJECT

MATRIX OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND FOLLOW-UP ACTION

Main Conclusions

Recommendations

Follow-up Actions

Responsibility

2. Project Implementation (cont’d) 2.3 The ADF did not supervise the project throughout the period that the country was under sanctions for non-payment of arrears. 3. Respect of Loan Conditions 3.1 The third condition which required the Government to pay its counterpart contribution to the executing agency and the fifth condition on making developed plots ready for the construction of the two CPRs were not fulfilled. 4. Project Performance and Results 4.1 The operating performance is considered unsatisfactory since the facilities are not used to their full capacity. The current running of the centres is not adequately supported with Government funding, leading to a decline in the quality of management and staff of the centres. The situation raises issues of maintenance of infrastructure set up under the project.

2.3.1 It should ensure better supervision of ongoing projects by organizing several supervision missions yearly on projects concerned. 3.1.1 During loan negotiations, the Government should point out to the ADF conditions that it technically cannot fulfill. 4.1.1 The Borrower should develop training structures set up under the project as well as human resources that manage such structures (educational and financial) to avoid difficulties created by Bretton Woods institutions that impose structural adjustment programmes. 4.1.2 The ADF should continue to support agriculture by implementing poverty reduction projects.

2.3.1.1 Strengthen supervision guidelines 3.1.1.1 The ADF should not make a first disbursement insofar as the precedent conditions have not been met. 4.1.1.1 Strengthen the centres set up by granting them adequate operating budget to enable them to obtain resources by establishing training units and organizing cut-to-measure and short-term programmes. 4.1.2.1 Plan poverty reduction projects.

• ADF (Operations Department) • ADF (Operations Department) • The Borrower • The ADF (Operations Department, OPEV)

ANNEX 1 PAGE 3 OF 3

REPUBLIC OF BURKINA FASO YOUNG FARMERS’ TRAINING PROJECT

MATRIX OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND FOLLOW-UP ACTION

Main Conclusions

Recommendations

Follow-up Action

Responsibility

4. Evaluation of Project Performance and Results (cont’d) 4.2 The ADF did not follow-up the project as it should have; it conducted ten supervision missions over the thirteen-years implementation period. 4.3 Quarterly project progress reports were often not submitted when due. 4.4.The harmonization of construction models led to some delays in executing works. The IDA proposed construction using semi-durable materials while the ADF opted for durable materials with a view to sustainability. 5. Sustainability 5.1 Government financial support is not enough to maintain equipment procured under the project. 5.2 Equipment has not been renewed since the withdrawal of donors. 5.3 Lack of operating budget support to the centres poses a serious sustainability problem to the project.

4.2.1 The ADF should closely monitor project activities by scheduling regular field supervision missions. 4.3.1 The borrower should submit quarterly project progress reports regularly to enable the ADF to assist in solving outstanding problems. 4.4.1 The ADF should participate in project preparation with the cofinancier with a view to harmonizing points of view and decisions during implementation. 5.1.1 The Government should provide the centres with enough budget for maintaining project assets and achievements. 5.2.1 The Government should ensure that equipment are renewed to facilitate adequate follow-up following the departure of donors. 5.3.1 The Government should put adequate operating budget at the disposal of the centres to enable them to set up farming and pastoral units, and build up their own budget.

4.2.1.1 Prepare a clear action plan with deadlines for necessary action. 4.3.1.1 Enforce guidelines in connection with deadlines for quarterly progress reports. 4.3.1.2 The ADF should react rapidly. 4.4.1.Encourage joint missions with cofinanciers in order to harmonize points of view. 5.1.1.1 The Government is responsible for maintaining buildings and equipment with a view to project sustainability. 5.2.1.1 Renew equipment for project sustainability. 5.3.1.1 Change the status of the centres (CPR, CFFA) to national public establishments to enable them to build up their own budget to add to Government allocation.

•ADF (Operations Department) •Borrower •ADF •ADF (Operations Department). • Borrower • Borrower • Borrower

ANNEX 2 PAGE 1 OF 3

REPUBLIC OF BURKINA FASO YOUNG FARMERS’ TRAINING PROJECT

PROJECT RETROSPECTIVE LOGICAL FRAMEWORK MATRIX

HIERARCHY OF OBJECTIVES

OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS

MEANS OF

VERIFICATION

ASSUMPTION (Verification)

Appraisal

Completion Post-Evaluation

SECTORAL OBJECTIVES 1. Promote the extension and improvement of the basic education system. PROJECT OBJECTIVES 1. Improve and raise the level of training for young farmers in the six ORDs by providing existing institutions with additional infrastructure. 2. Extend the rural education programme to new villages by building new CFJAs. 3. Consolidate the administration and support services in charge of the rural education programme; improve teacher and staff training.

1.1 725 CFJAs for 25 478 pupils; 3 CFMRs; 123 GJAs and 863 trainers, 246 trainers in the 123 GJAs, 3 CPRs. 1.1 Enrolment of nearly 21 000 pupils in 548 CFJAs, of which 160 new CFJAs; 35 pupils per class. 2.1 Build and equip 45 CFJAs with a total capacity for 1 600 trainees. 3.1 Retrain 136 male and female trainers in addition to the 305 already existing in the Kamboinse CMFR; train new male and female trainers between 1979 and 1984 at the Fakoroba CMFR.

1.1 315 CFJAs for 5 773 pupils; 3 CFFAs, 394 GJAs for 8 200 members, 5 CPRs train 200 youths and 684 farmers. 1.1. 16 000 youths enrolled, 25 pupils per class in 408 CFJAs 2.1. Implemented (45 CFJAs built) 3.1. In 1994, 737 trainers at work, 180 supervisors trained.

1.1 118 CFJAs for 1 813; 3 CFFA trained 95 trainers; 501 GJAs for 12 610 members, 5 CPRs trained 176 youths and 410 farmers. 1.1. 1 813 pupils in 118 CFJAs in 1996; 15 pupils per class 2.1.. Idem 3.1. In 1996, 346 trainers on the job and 95 supervisors trained

1.1.1 Statistics of FJA, MA and PEA education departments 1.1.1 MA statistics 1.1.2 IDA reports 2.1.1 MA statistics 3.1.1 MA statistics

1.1.1.1 Project successfully implemented 2.1.1.1 Idem 3.1.1.1 SAP slowed the recruitment of trainers in the Ministry of Agriculture

ANNEX 2 PAGE 2 OF 3

REPUBLIC OF BURKINA FASO YOUNG FARMERS’ TRAINING PROJECT

PROJECT RETROSPECTIVE LOGICAL FRAMEWORK MATRIX

HIERARCHY OF OBJECTIVES

OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS

MEANS OF

VERIFICATION

ASSUMPTION (Verification)

Appraisal

Completion Post-Evaluation

PROJECT OBJECTIVES (cont’d) 4. Help youths trained in the CFJAs to set themselves up in their villages with the agricultural implements provided to them. ACHIEVEMENTS 1. Construction of 45 FJA centres, 2 CPRs, the FJA Directorate. 2. Set up and equip 300 CFJAs, 600 GJAs, the Bobo-Dioulasso regional departments, 2 CPRs, the rural technician and public works training unit. 3. Procure furniture and equipment for 80 new FJA centres, 300 CFJAs, 2 CPRs, the Directorate, support departments, regional support departments, the UFTRCTP

4.1 Set up and equip 600 GJAs comprising former CFJA pupils. 1.1 Idem 1.1 Idem 3.1 Procure furniture and equipment for 80 new FJA centres, 300 CFJA centres, the Directorate, the support departments, the regional support departments, the UFTRCTP

4.1 Establishment and equipment of 248 CFJAs instead of 300, 310 GJAs instead of 600 1.1 Implemented 1.1 Implemented. Establishment and equipment of 248 CFJAs instead of 300, 2 CPRs, 310 GJAs instead of 600, regional departments, 2 CFMRs, the UFTRCTP, 5 regional offices with the balance 3.1 Implemented. Furniture for 179 CFJAs instead of 80 new CFJAs, equipment for 298 CFJAs instead of 300, 2 CPRs, the Directorate, support departments, regional supports departments, the UFTRCTP

4.1 Idem 1.1 Idem 1.1 Inadequate maintenance 3.1 Idem

4.1.1 Minutes of reception of agricultural equipment and materials 4.1.1.1 IDA and NGO reports 1.1.1 Minutes of reception of works, quarterly reports, PCR. 1.1.1 Quarterly progress reports, PCR 3.1.1 Idem

4.1.1.1 Slowing rhythm of the CFJA movement due to changes in parental and youth perception (preference for formal education) 1.1.1.1 Coordinators oversee follow-up 1.1.1.1 State operating budget is not enough to cover adequate equipment maintenance. 3.1.1.1 Idem

ANNEX 2 PAGE 3 OF 3

REPUBLIC OF BURKINA FASO YOUNG FARMERS’ TRAINING PROJECT

PROJECT RETROSPECTIVE LOGICAL FRAMEWORK MATRIX

HIERARCHY OF OBJECTIVES

OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS

MEANS OF

VERIFICATION

ASSUMPTION (Verification)

ACTIVITIES 1. Construction 2. Equipment supply 3. Procurement of furniture and equipment

BUDGETARY RESOURCES (in UA Million) Expenditure Categories Est Actual Construction 4.2 3.86 Furniture 0.5 0.46 Technical equipment and materials 3.1 2.86 Technical assistance 3.0 2.77 Processing and operating expenditure 5.6 5.15 Base cost 16.4 15.10 Quantity overrun 5% 0.8 0.76 17.2 15.86 Inflation 4.7 4.30 Total project cost 21.9 20.16 Sources of Finance Est. Actual - ADF 6.7 6.17 - IDA 12.6 11.60 - Government 2.6 2.39 Total 21.9 20.16

Bank quarterly progress and supervision reports - Internal audit reports, Bank disbursement ledger

- Donor actions are coordinated. - No cost overrun. - Balance cancelled on 13 May 1993. Supervision is not suspended even if ADF arrears are outstanding.

ANNEX 3 PAGE 1 OF 3

YOUNG FARMERS’ TRAINING PROJECT FORM PR1

IMPLEMENTATION PERFORMANCE

No. INDICATORS RATING (1 to 4)

REMARKS

1. Respect of the implementation schedule

1 There is no implementation schedule in the PCR. The implementation period took 13 years instead of the 5 initially planned. Bureaucracy, poor knowledge of ADF rules and suspension of the country due to arrears affected the implementation schedule.

2 Respect of cost 4 The project was implemented within the limit of resources allocated, thanks to increase in the UA

3 Respect of loan conditions and provisions

3 Satisfactory overall, except for certain conditions that were not respected (budget and development)

4 Adequate supervision and progress reports

1 Progress and quarterly reports were not regularly issued

5 Satisfactory operations where necessary

2 Facilities of satisfactory quality; however, there is lack of maintenance and repairs. The facilities run at a quarter of their capacity

Overall evaluation of implementation performance

2,4 The implementation performance is satisfactory overall

FORM PB1

BANK PERFORMANCE

No. INDICATORS RATING (1 to 4)

REMARKS

1 At identification NA The Bank did not identify the project 2 At preparation 2 The Bank did not prepare the project 3 At appraisal 2 The Bank used the World Bank and Government documents

to appraise the project. The objectives were ill-defined. There was no project logical framework, assumptions and risks.

4 At supervision 2 Over 13 years of actual implementation, the Bank conducted only 10 supervision missions, i.e. less than one per year.

Evaluation of overall Bank performance

2 Bank performance is satisfactory overall

ANNEX 3 PAGE 2 OF 3

FORM RP1 PROJECT PERFORMANCE

No. INDICATOR RATING

(1 to 4) REMARKS

1 Relevance and attainment of objectives

2.57 Satisfactory

i) Macro-economic policy 2 The project was implemented within a difficult macro-economic context. Current government reforms should be supported despite the consequences of the SAP. The Government has FAO and UNDP backing.

ii) Sectoral policy 3 The sectoral policy with regard to farmers’ training plans for several projects in the field including the revitalization of the centres, the project to support young farmers and people’s credit funds.

iii) Physical achievements (including production)

3 Facilities are of satisfactory quality.

iv) Financial performance 1 Return on investments is not effective. The training centres contribute little to their own budget. They could do so if production units are set up.

v) Poverty reduction 3 During appraisal, poverty issues were not considered. There has been some impact in terms of employment and income distribution. The number of women farmers’ cooperatives is on the increase. The country should have as priority the inclusion of women components in poverty reduction projects.

vi) Environment 3 The facilities pose no serious environmental problems. The centres are a training base and merge perfectly with the environment.

Vii Private sector development 3 The private agricultural sector comprises youths from the training centres next to the farmers’ cooperatives. The interest in farmers’ training has encouraged private operators to set up training centres.

viii) Others (specify) NA 2 Institutional development 2.75 Satisfactory i) Institutional framework, including

restructuring 3 The establishment of structures, decentralization,

enhancement of the PEA experience and the creation of the MA are all extended impacts of the project.

ii) Financial and management information system, including audit systems

4 A computerized accounting system and reliable statistics were noted.

iii) Technology transfer 3 Introduction of new production methods disseminated in the agricultural sub-sector. Managers trained abroad. A data base, albeit embryonic, has been put into use

iv) Qualified staff (including rotation), training, counterpart staff

3 The PEA comprises staff with thorough knowledge in project implementation. Staff received continuous training.

ANNEX 3 PAGE 3 OF 3

3 Sustainability 1.57

Satisfactory

i) Borrower’s continued commitment 1 Although the borrower has expressed willingness to continue

training in institutions set up under the project (now running at a quarter or half their capacity), the budget allocated to the centres is not adequate.

ii) Political environment 1 The unstable political environment influenced implementation.

iii) Institutional framework 3 The permanent nature of the project executing agency is an asset. The project led to the establishment of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development.

iv) Technical viability and staff development

3 Technical and staff viability is satisfactory.

v) Financial viability including cost recovery systems

1 The cost recovery system is not well defined.

vi) Economic viability NA Vii Environmental viability 3 The location of the farmers’ training centres has no negative

impact on the environment. Instead, the centres merge with the immediate environment and are sources of potable water for the neighbouring villages.

viii) Operating and maintenance mechanisms (availability of recurrent funds, foreign exchange, spare parts, maintenance workshop)

2 The operating mechanisms are not sufficiently guaranteed. The Government does not provide adequate budget for the centres. The vehicles bought under the project have all broken down or were repaired and sold.

4 Internal rate of return NA

Overall performance evaluation 2.46 The performance is satisfactory overall.