burnyeat.conflicting appearances

PROCEEDINGS OF THE

BRITISH ACADEMY VOLUME LXV

1 9 7 9

L O N D O N

P U B L I S H E D F O R T H E B R I T I S H A C A D E M Y

τ

DAWES H I C K S L E C T U R E

CONFLICTING APPEARANCES'

BY M . F . B U R N Y E A T

Read 1 February 1979

M y incapac i ty t o ex tend the b o u n d a r y of m y ' this ' , m y inabi l i ty t o g a i n a n i m m e d i a t e exper ience of t h a t in w h i c h it is s u b o r d i n a t e d a n d r e d u c e d — i s m y m e r e imper fec t ion . Because I c a n n o t spread o u t m y w i n d o w unt i l a l l is t r a n s p a r e n t , a n d all windows d i s a p p e a r , th is does n o t jus t i fy m e i n insisting o n m y w i n d o w - f r a m e ' s r ig idi ty . F o r t h a t f r a m e has, as such , no exis tence in rea l i ty , bu t only i n o u r i m p o t e n c e .

F . H . B rad l ey .

I

F ^ R O M t h e fact t ha t honey appea r s b i t te r to some a n d sweet to o thers Democr i tu s conc luded t h a t it is ne i the r

sweet nor b i t t e r , Herac l i tus t h a t it is bo th . ' This r e p o r t f r o m Sextus Empi r icus [PH ii. 63) testifies t h a t a rgumen t s f r o m conflicting appea rances c a m e early to t h e reper to i re of phi losophy. Democr i tus ' pu rpose w a s to establish the v iew s u m m e d u p in a famous f r a g m e n t : 'Sweet exists b y convent ion, b i t t e r by convent ion , co lour by convent ion ; i n reality a t o m s a n d the void exist ' (frag. 125). I f w e speak of honey as sweet, it is because this is the response sanct ioned b y custom a n d convent ion, especially l inguistic convent ion, to t h e way ce r t a in a t o m s impinge o n our o rgans of taste, bu t t h e r e is no m o r e to i t t han t h a t : no more t h a n a response to a tomic st imuli . T e r m s like ' sweet ' a n d 'b i t t e r ' , 'wh i te ' and ' b l ack ' , correspond to no th ing in t h e collections of a t o m s which const i tute t h e th ings in the wor ld a r o u n d us. O u r a t t r ibu t ions of w h a t we re l a t e r to be ca l led secondary qual i t ies are a projec t ion o n to t h a t world of o u r own, mere ly subject ive affections.

Herac l i tus ' message was qu i t e d i f fe ren t : n o t t h e empty sub-jec t iv i ty of sensible appea rances b u t their one-s ided par t ia l i ty . I t m a y be ques t ioned w h e t h e r h e actual ly used the honey example , b u t t he r e is n o d o u b t t h a t his s t r ange g n o m i c u t te rances i nc lude others to the s ame or similar effect.

104 PROCEEDINGS OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY

Sea is t h e mos t p u r e a n d t h e most p o l l u t e d w a t e r : d r inkab le a n d sa lu ta ry fo r fishes, bu t u n d r i n k a b l e a n d des t ruc t ive f o r men.

( f rag . 6 i )

Aga in , ' D o n k e y s would choose chaf f r a t h e r t h a n gold ' ( f rag . 9) , 'Pigs e n j o y m u d ra the r t h a n clean w a t e r ' for w a s h i n g in ( f rag . 13 w i t h Sext . E m p . PHi. 56) . A r e they r i g h t or w e ? T h e i m p l i e d answer is t h a t each is r i g h t — f r o m his o w n p o i n t of v iew. I t follows t h a t t h e d i f ferent b u t equa l ly va l id p o i n t s of v i ew a re one-s ided , p a r t i a l reflect ions of real i ty . A t s o m e deeper level, f r o m as i t ^vere a n abso lu te god ' s -eye v a n t a g e - p o i n t , the o p p o -sition a n d c o n t r a s t is o v e r c o m e . T h e sea is b o t h pure a n d i m -p u r e ; m u d is b o t h clean a n d d i r t y ; r u b b i s h is wea l t h . I t sounds like a c o n t r a d i c t i o n , a n d so it i s—wi th in ou r h u m a n l a n g u a g e . O u r l a n g u a g e is so s t r u c t u r e d t h a t t o cal l some th ing p u r e is to i m p l y t h a t i t is no t i m p u r e a n d v ice versa. But t h a t o n l y raises t h e ques t ion , a gene ra l i za t ion of the ques t ion w e m e t w i th in Democr i t u s , w h e t h e r the oppos i t ions and con t r a s t s e n c o d e d in o u r l anguage co r r e spond to a n y t h i n g in rea l i ty . M a y b e the l a n g u a g e w h i c h makes us t r e a t t h e conflict of a p -p e a r a n c e s as a conflict , w h i c h m a k e s us say t h a t where a p p e a r -ances conf l ic t b o t h c a n n o t be r igh t , is itself a n aspect of o u r a n t h r o p o c e n t r i c par t ia l i ty .

Bu t w e b e g a n with Sex tus E m p i r i c u s , a n d Sextus , as a good P y r r h o n i a n sceptic , has h is o w n m o r a l to d r a w f rom t h e fac t t h a t h o n e y a p p e a r s b i t t e r to some a n d sweet to others . T h e scept ica l conc lus ion is t h a t the re is n o say ing w h i c h it i s ; o n e m u s t s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t o n w h e t h e r i t is rea l ly sweet o r rea l ly b i t t e r ( P / / i . l o i , 213-14) . A n d P y r r h o n i a n scepticism e x t e n d s this p a t t e r n of reason ing b e y o n d the f ie ld of sensible a p p e a r a n c e s to eve ry sub jec t of inqu i ry . I n mora l s , for e x a m p l e , because to some societies o r ind iv idua ls it a p p e a r s r igh t , t o others w r o n g , for a m a n to m a r r y h is sister or h a v e sexua l in te rcourse in pub l i c , t he scep t ic suspends j u d g e m e n t o n w h e t h e r it is r i g h t o r w r o n g ( F N i. 145-63) . S imi lar ly w i t h a n y ques t ion a b o u t h o w th ings r ea l l y a r e — t h e r e is a lways a conf l ic t of a p p e a r a n c e s a n d a lways t h e sceptic f i n d s himself u n a b l e t o dec ide b e t w e e n t h e m .

W e n o w h a v e three d i f f e ren t , a c tua l l y t h r e e i n c o m p a t i b l e conc lus ions f r o m a single premiss . W h i c h m i g h t seem m o r e t h a n e n o u g h . But w e have y e t to r eckon w i t h P ro tagoras . I t w a s p r o b a b l y P ro tagoras , w i t h some p r e c e d e n t in Herac l i tus , w h o gave c u r r e n c y t o the e x t e n d e d n o t i o n of a p p e a r a n c e w h e r e b y

CONFLICTING APPEARANCES 71

sense-percept ion b u t w h e r e v e r t h e r e is d i s ag reemen t a n d o n e v iew is opposed to a n o t h e r . A n d t h e mora l P r o t a g o r a s d r e w was t h a t each of t he conf l i c t ing a p p e a r a n c e s is t rue for t h e p e r s o n whose a p p e a r a n c e i t is. H i s doct r ine t h a t m a n is t h e m e a s u r e of al l th ings r e c o m m e n d s a relat ivist ic a c c o u n t of t r u t h which a l lows the h o n e y to be b o t h sweet a n d bi t ter , s u b -j e c t t o the qua l i f i ca t ion t h a t i t is swee t for (in r e l a t i on to) s o m e p a l a t e s and b i t t e r for o thers . By re la t iv iz ing t h e a t t r i bu t ions of swee t a n d b i t t e r P r o t a g o r a s avo ids the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s e m -b r a c e d by Herac l i t u s . S imi l a r ly in mora ls , t h e doc t r i ne t h a t m a n is the m e a s u r e of all th ings asserts t h a t m a r r y i n g one ' s sister is r ight f o r one i n d i v i d u a l o r society, w r o n g for a n o t h e r .

So f a r we h a v e four anc i en t c h a r a c t e r s on the s t age . W e s h o u l d b r i n g on some of their m o d e r n - d r e s s coun te rpa r t s . A n d first Berkeley. You d o n o t h a v e to r e a d f a r in to the f i r s t of Berkeley 's Three Dialogues be fo re you f i n d the fo l lowing:

T h a t which a t o t h e r t imes seems sweet, shal l to a d i s t empered p a l a t e a p p e a r bit ter . A n d no th ing c a n be p l a i n e r , t h a n t h a t divers pe r sons pe rce ive d i f fe ren t tastes in t h e s ame f o o d , since t h a t w h i c h one m a n de l igh t s in, a n o t h e r abhors . A n d h o w c o u l d this be , i f the tas te was s o m e t h i n g real ly i n h e r e n t in t h e f o o d ? (p . 180)'

Berke ley agrees wi th D e m o c r i t u s in c o n c l u d i n g f r o m the c o n -fl ict of a p p e a r a n c e s t h a t t h e food is not i n h e r e n t l y sweet or b i t t e r . O n the o t h e r h a n d , h e sides w i t h H e r a c l i t u s a n d P r o t a -go ra s against D e m o c r i t u s in w a n t i n g t o count b o t h a p p e a r a n c e s ver id ica l . T h e r e real ly is s o m e t h i n g sweet a n d s o m e t h i n g b i t t e r . B u t since ( c o n t r a r y to He rac l i t u s ) n o t h i n g c a n b e bo th sweet a n d bi t ter , t h e sweet t h i n g a n d t h e b i t ter t h i n g are s e p a r a t e a n d distinct. T h e sweetness be longs to an idea pe rce ived b y or in t h e m i n d of o n e person, t h e b i t t e rness to an i d e a pe rce ived b y or i n t he m i n d of a n o t h e r (or t h e s a m e person a t a n o t h e r t i m e ) . T h i s looks l ike P ro tagoras , s ince swee t a n d b i t t e r al ike exist on ly for one w h o tastes it , a n d w e sha l l see t h a t i t does h a v e a lot i n c o m m o n wi th a t h e o r y of p e r c e p t u a l re la t iv ism w h i c h P l a t o deve loped o u t of P r o t a g o r e a n mate r i a l s i n t h e Theaetetus, w h i c h theory Berkeley h imsel f t h o u g h t was exac t l y like his o w n (Siris, § 311). B u t the re is in fac t a d i f ference . W h e n P r o t a g o r a s says t h a t s o m e t h i n g exists for t h e pe r son to w h o m it a p p e a r s , h e does not i n t e n d Berkeley 's idea l i s t conclus ion t h a t sensible

I References to the Three Dialogues a re by page n u m b e r in The Works of George Berkeley, ed. A. A. Luce and T . E. Jessop, vol. ii (London,


qual i t ies exist i n t he m i n d w h i c h perce ives theni.^ In this lec-t u r e I sha l l b e m o r e c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e r e s e m b l a n c e s t h a n w i t h t h e d i f fe rences be tween Berke ley a n d P r o t a g o r a s , b u t in v i e w of t h e d i f f e rence j u s t noted w e shou ld in p r inc ip l e c o u n t Berkeley's a f i f th conc lus ion f rom t h e premiss of conf l i c t ing a p p e a r a n c e s . T h e conc lus ion , namely , t h a t each a p p e a r a n c e reveals a dis-t inc t b u t m e n t a l existence.

T h e issue b e t w e e n Berkeley a n d P r o t a g o r a s b r e a k s out a g a i n in t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y d i spu tes a b o u t w h e t h e r sense-da ta a r e m e n t a l o r m e r e l y d e p e n d e n t for t he i r ex is tence on a m i n d p e r c e i v i n g t h e m . For i n t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y a r g u m e n t s f r o m conf l ic t ing a p p e a r a n c e s h a v e f r e q u e n t l y been u s e d to es tabl ish t h a t w h a t we perce ive is sense -da ta r a t h e r t h a n physica l ob jec t s . Russel l , for e x a m p l e , in The Problems of Philosophy^ c h a p , i , a r g u e s t h a t because a t a b l e a p p e a r s to be of d i f f e r e n t c o l o u r s and of dif-f e r en t shapes f r o m di f fe ren t po in t s of v iew, as t he resul t of v a r i a -t ions i n l i gh t ing a n d perspect ive , t he re fo re we d o n o t see t h e rea l co lour o r t h e r e a l shape of t h e table . W e m a y say, f o r the p u r p o s e s of o r d i n a r y p r a c t i c a l life, t h a t t he real c o l o u r of t h e table is b r o w n a n d its r e a l s h a p e r ec t angu l a r , b u t al l w e a c t u a l l y see is a series of a p p e a r a n c e s (sense-data) n o one of w h i c h h a s more r i g h t t h a n its c o m p e t i t o r s to s t a n d as the t a b l e ' s rea l co lou r or s h a p e . O t h e r theor is ts i n t r o d u c e sense-da ta b y w a y of ' t h e a r g u m e n t f r o m i l lus ion ' , b u t of ten, i n A y e r for e x a m p l e {The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, p . 3) , this is j u s t t he s a m e a r g u m e n t u n d e r a n o t h e r n a m e . T h e on ly d i f f e rence is t h a t it is p r e s u p -p o s e d — o u r m o r e sceptical c h a r a c t e r s m i g h t s a y gra tu i tous ly p r e s u p p o s e d — t h a t we k n o w which a p p e a r a n c e is correct a n d wh ich t h e i l lusion.

Conf l i c t ing a p p e a r a n c e s c o n t i n u e t o b e p o p u l a r in m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y also. Mos t recen t ly , J . L . M a c k i e (Ethics'. Inventing Right and Wrong, chaps. 8 a n d 10) h a s a p p e a l e d to the r a d i c a l d ive rgences b e t w e e n the m o r a l codes of d i f f e r e n t groups a n d societies as s u p p o r t for t h e thesis t h a t va lues a r e n o t p a r t of t h e ob jec t ive f a b r i c of the w o r l d . I f t hey w e r e ob jec t ive , he th inks , it w o u l d be h a r d to exp la in t he d ive rgences a n d d i sagreements . W h e r e a s if t h e y a r e in f a c t subjec t ive , w e c a n e x p l a i n t h e e r ro -neous c l a i m to ob jec t iv i ty w h i c h seems to be b u i l t in to m o r a l l a n g u a g e . I t is a p ro jec t ion of subjec t ive p re fe rences a n d loca l p r ac t i c e s w h i c h a r e felt t o b e in n e e d of e x t e r n a l va l ida t ion .

I See m y ' Idea l i sm and Greek Philosophy; W h a t Descartes Saw a n d Berkeley Missed' , in G. N. A. Vesey ed.. Idealism Past and Present (Royal Inst i tute of PhilosoDhv Lectures iq riQ78/ql, forthcoming:).


W e a r e back, i t seems, w i t h D e m o c r i t u s , except t h a t the scene h a s shif ted to t h e mora l s p h e r e . A n d tha t is n o nove l ty e i t he r . F o r D e m o c r i t u s p r o b a b l y m o d e l l e d his reason ing on a p a t t e r n of a r g u m e n t w h i c h o r i g ina t ed in f i f t h -cen tu ry deba tes a b o u t w h e t h e r jus t ice a n d o the r va lues a r e n a t u r a l o r conven t iona l . I n o n e form o r ano the r , a n c i e n t d r a m a is still b e i n g r e p e a t e d .

T h a t more o r less comple te s m y cas t of pe r fo rmers . T h e m i n o r roles can b e filled as they a r e n e e d e d . I t r e m a i n s to spo t l igh t t h e cr i t ic i n t h e aud ience . I n Sense and Sensibilia, well a w a r e t h a t he is a t t a c k i n g a t r a d i t i o n of t h o u g h t w h i c h goes b a c k to He rac l i t u s ( p p . 1 - 2 ) , A u s t i n wr i t e s :

W h a t is wrong, what is even faintly surprising, in the idea of a stick's being straight but looking bent sometimes? Does anyone suppose that if something is straight, then it jolly well has to look straight at all times and in all circumstances,^ Obviously n o one seriously supposes this. (P· 29)

T h e fact is, as w e h a v e seen, m a n y ph i losophers h a v e s u p p o s e d e x a c t l y this. T h e y h a v e a p p e a l e d t o cases of conf l i c t ing a p p e a r -a n c e s in o r d e r to call in ques t ion the u n q u a l i f i e d l a n g u a g e in which w e o rd ina r i ly a t t r i b u t e sensible qual i t ies , m o r a l p roper t i e s , a n d so on , a n d t h e y h a v e d o n e so in a m a n n e r p l a i n l y p r e suppos ing t h a t i t w o u l d o n l y be co r r ec t to say w i t h o u t f u r t h e r qua l i f i ca t ion t h a t h o n e y is sweet a n d t h e stick s t r a igh t , o r t h a t m a r r y i n g one 's sister is w r o n g , if it a p p e a r e d so t o ail a l ike .

I I

W h a t emerges f r o m th i s b r ie f his tor ical r e v i e w is a typ ica l ph i losoph ica l p r o b l e m . I d o n o t m e a n the p r o b l e m of d e c i d i n g w h a t does fo l low f rom t h e p remis s t h a t a p p e a r a n c e s conf l ic t . F o r t h e a n s w e r t o t h a t ques t ion , I believe, is t h a t n o t h i n g fol-l o w s : n o t h i n g of a n y ep i s t emolog ie al s ignif icance a t al l . T h e p r o b l e m r a t h e r is to d iscover w h y so m a n y conf l ic t ing con-clus ions h a v e b e e n t h o u g h t t o fo l low. W h y h a v e s o m e p h i l o -sophers b e e n so impressed , wh i l e o thers l ike Aus t in r e m a i n un impres sed , b y the f a m i l i a r f ac t t h a t a p p e a r a n c e s conf l i c t? W h a t assumpt ions , spoken o r u n s p o k e n , a r e a t work t o m a k e t h e fami l ia r f a c t seem p r o b l e m a t i c ?

T h a t t he a n s w e r is to b e s o u g h t , a t least somet imes , a t t he level of u n s p o k e n a s sumpt ions m a y begin to look likely if w e r e t u r n to A u s t i n ' s r e m a r k t h a t n o one seriously supposes t h a t if somethingr is s t ra ight , t h e n i t j o l ly well h a s to look s t r a i g h t


a t a l l t imes a n d in al l c i r cums tances . W e h a v e a l r e a d y seen t h a t , t a k e n as a claim a b o u t the h i s to r ica l r e c o r d , this is w r o n g . I t h a s to be w r o n g because the fo l lowing t w o propos i t ions a r e e q u i v a l e n t b y the rule of con t rapos i t ion :

(1) I f s o m e t h i n g a p p e a r s F to s o m e observers a n d not- i^ to o t h e r s , t h e n i t is n o t i nhe ren t ly / r ea l ly / in i tself F.

(2) I f s o m e t h i n g is i nhe ren t l y / r ea l i y / i n itself F, then i t a p p e a r s F to all observers o r it a p p e a r s not-F to all .

A n d fo r t he purposes of t he p resen t discussion we m a y s imp ly b r a c k e t off as i r r e l evan t t h e second d i s junc t in (2). For n o one , o r n o o n e e x c e p t possibly Berkeley 's H y l a s i n a m o m e n t of d ia lec t ica l despe ra t ion {Three Dialogues^ p p . 181-3, 187) , is go ing to p r o p o s e tha t fo r a t h i n g to b e real ly F i t must a p p e a r o the rwise to every observer . T o b e sure , D e m o c r i t u s c la ims t h a t t h e r ea l p rope r t i e s o f t h ings a r e h i d d e n , i .e . do n o t a p p e a r to a n y of u s : ' M a n m u s t k n o w by th i s ru le , t h a t he is c u t of f f r o m t h e r e a l ' (frag. 6) , ' I n rea l i ty w e k n o w n o t h i n g ; f o r t he t r u t h is in t h e dep ths ' ( f rag . 117). B u t D e m o c r i t u s c la ims this, I t a k e i t , n o t f r o m H y l a s ' m o t i v e b u t b e c a u s e h e accepts ( i ) , h e n c e also (2) , a n d h e c a n n o t find a n y i n s t a n c e wi th in h u m a n expe r i ence w h e r e s o m e t h i n g a p p e a r s F to everyone.^ H o n e y a n d t h e stick h a v e no p rope r t i e s w h i c h a p p e a r t he s a m e t o all observers , so t h e y themselves a re m e r e l y p h e n o m e n a l , t h e ef fec t o n h u m a n sensibil i ty of t h e m o t i o n s o f a t o m s : ' I n r e a l i t y w e k n o w n o t h i n g of any th ing , b u t belief is a f l o w i n g in u p o n e a c h of us ' ( f rag . 7 ; cf. f rag. 9).^ T h u s w i t h i n t he macroscop ic w o r l d of h u m a n exper ience t h e second d i s j unc t of (2) is not o p e r a t i v e fo r D e m o c r i t u s ei ther . A n d (2) w i t h o u t its s e c o n d d i s j unc t is t he ve ry t h i n g t h a t Aus t in said no o n e ser iously supposes t o b e the case.

W h a t is t r u e is tha t a to t a l ly explici t tex t for (2) is r e m a r k a b l y h a r d t o find. I n o n e vers ion o r a n o t h e r f o r m u l a t i o n ( i ) a b o u n d s . T h e a r g u m e n t s c i ted f r o m D e m o c r i t u s a n d P ro t ago ra s , Berke ley a n d Russel l , all rest on ( i ) , wh i l e Sextus q u i t e f r e q u e n t l y app l i e s its ep i s t emic c o u n t e r p a r t

( i ' ) I f s o m e t h i n g a p p e a r s F to s o m e observers a n d n o t - F to o the rs , then w e d o no t k n o w ( c a n n o t d e t e r m i n e ) w h e t h e r i t is i nhe ren t ly / r ea l ly / i n itself Κ

( i ' ) i n t u r n t ransposes t o

' See Die ls -Kranz , Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker^ 68 A i ï 2 , A 135 §§ 63-4, 6 9 - 7 0 .

^ See f u r t h e r Die l s -Kranz , 67 A 32, 68 A 37, A 57.


(2') I f w e k n o w w h e t h e r some th ing is i nhe ren t ly / r ea l ly / i n itself F , t h e n i t a p p e a r s F to al l observers o r it a p p e a r s not -Fto a l l .

B u t I can find n o clear i n s t ance of (2') in t h e l eng thy e p i s t e m o -logical d isquis i t ions of Sex tus ' Outlines of Pyrrhonism a n d Ad-versus Mathematicos. O n c e or t w i c e we c a t c h a gl impse of (2) {PH\. 177, iii . 179, ? M vili . 37) , b u t it is t h e excep t ion r a t h e r t h a n the r u l e . S imi lar ly w i th Berkeley, I c o u n t some e igh t ins tances of ( i ) in the first Dialogue,^ as a g a i n s t a m e r e coup le of instances of (2), a n d these last a r e in a n y case confused w i th some th ing d i f f e r en t (see V be low) . As for Russel l ' s t r e a t m e n t of these issues in The Problems of Philosophy^ i t is all b a s e d o n ( i ) with n o t so m u c h as a h i n t of (2).

W^e m a y w o n d e r w h y peop le shou ld be s h y of t ak ing the i r s t a n d on f o r m u l a t i o n (2) . A n d w h y , for t h a t m a t t e r , A u s t i n shou ld seeming ly have fa i l ed to no t i ce t h a t w h a t he says n o o n e w o u l d ser iously suppose is j u s t a r e f o r m u l a t i o n of t h e sort of v i e w he h a s b e e n shoo t ing a t all a long. P e r h a p s the r e a s o n is t h a t (2) is manifestly i m p l a u s i b l e in some w a y t h a t ( i ) is no t . T h a t would i m p l y t h a t ( i ) has b e e n persuasive because i t w r a p s t h ings u p a b i t , keeps h i d d e n a n inf luence w h i c h comes closer t o the su r face in (2). I a m go ing to p ropose t h a t t he h i d d e n in f luence is a cer ta in u n d e c l a r e d p i c tu re or m o d e l of w h a t pe r -cept ion is o r o u g h t to b e like. I t is an i n a p p r o p r i a t e p i c tu r e , e v e n more i n a p p r o p r i a t e w h e n car r ied ove r in to t h e m o r a l sphere , a n d fo r t h a t r ea son i t is n o t s o m e t h i n g a ph i lo sophe r wil l readi ly acknowledge , even to himself

T h e r e a re , I fear , obv ious p i t fa l l s in the w a y of a d iagnos is s u c h as this. T h e his tory of ph i losophy m u s t respect its texts a n d the a r g u m e n t s in those texts, a n d if one is going to suggest t h a t there is m o r e to a n a r g u m e n t t h a n a p p e a r s in the text one n e e d s to h a v e good g r o u n d s in t he t ex t itself. W e have all k n o w n occasions w h e n it was r e a s o n a b l e to say of someone , ' H e only m a i n t a i n s t h a t b e c a u s e a t some level he th inks t h a t q, a l t h o u g h h e might n o t accep t q if h e was explicitly a sked a b o u t i t . ' But w e also k n o w t h a t this t y p e of diagnosis c a n b e abused , a n d in t h e history of ph i losophy it ha s somet imes b e e n abused . Being m i n d f u l , the re fo re , of t h e d a n g e r s ahead , I p ropose to set ou t f r o m a . de t a i l ed t ex tua l e x a m i n a t i o n of one of the a r g u m e n t s f r o m conf l ic t ing a p p e a r a n c e s w h e r e , if I a m r igh t , the i n f l u e n c e of an i n a p p r o p r i a t e m o d e l of pe r cep t i on c a n b e d iscerned.

' pp. i80j 181, 185,? 186, 189 (3 times), 191.

104 PROCEEDINGS OF T H E BRITISH ACADEMY

But a t o n c e w e face a h i s to r ica l p r o b l e m . W e c a n n o t go d i -rect ly to P r o t a g o r a s or D e m o c r i t u s , since the i r a r g u m e n t s su r -vive on ly in s e c o n d - h a n d r e p o r t s ; a n d H e r a c l i t u s p re fe r red g n o m i c p a r a d o x t o the m u n d a n e process of ge t t ing f r o m premises to conclusions. T h e earliest r e a s o n e d a r g u m e n t o n ou r sub jec t w h i c h we can s t udy in t h e or ig ina l words is a n a r g u m e n t in P l a t o ' s Theaetetiis on beha l f of P r o t a g o r e a n rela^ tivism, o c c u r r i n g i n a passage (153 D-154 B) w h i c h has n e v e r , I th ink , b e e n g iven the e x t e n d e d discussion it deserves. P r o t a -goras is t h e benef i c i a ry of t h e a r g u m e n t , n o t its a u t h o r : t h e r e is every r ea son t o think t h a t t h e a r g u m e n t is a dialect ical cons t ruc t ion b y P l a t o himself , r a t h e r t h a n s o m e t h i n g ex t rac ted f r o m P r o t a g o r a s ' o w n wr i t ings . C o n s e q u e n t l y w e must b e a r in m i n d t h a t we shall be v i ewing the a r g u m e n t in a d o u b l e perspect ive , ou r o w n a n d P la to ' s . T h i s is P l a to ' s a t t e m p t to b r ing o u t t h e k i n d of t h i n k i n g wh ich leads to a relativist ic a c c o u n t of sensible quali t ies, so it a l r e a d y c o n t a i n s an e l e m e n t of diagnosis . I bel ieve, h o w e v e r , t h a t P l a t o ' s d iagnos is is o n t h e r igh t lines, a n d t h a t all we n e e d d o is c o m p l e t e t he j o b he b e g a n .

I l l

153D SOCRATES. Wel l then , you m u s t th ink l ike this. I n t h e case of t h e eyes, first, you m u s t n ' t th ink of w h a t you ca l l wh i t e co lou r as b e i n g some d i s t inc t t h i n g outside y o u r eyes, or in y o u r eyes e i t he r—in f a c t

E you m u s t n ' t assign a n y place to i t ; because i n t h a t case i t would, sure ly , be a t its ass igned p l a c e and in a s t a t e of rest, r a t h e r t h a n coming t o be .

THE AE TETUS. W e l l , how c a n I think of i t ? SOCRATES. Le t ' s follow w h a t w e said j u s t n o w , a n d l a y it d o w n t h a t

n o t h i n g is o n e t h i n g jus t by itself. O n those l ines, we ' l l find tha t b l a c k , whi te , o r a n y o t h e r colour will t u r n o u t to h a v e c o m e i n t o being, f r o m

154A t h e collision of t h e eyes wi th t h e a p p r o p r i a t e m o t i o n . W h a t w e say a g iven co lou r is wi l l be ne i t he r t h e th ing w h i c h collides, no r the t h i n g i t collides wi th , b u t someth ing w h i c h has c o m e i n t o be ing b e t w e e n t h e m ; s o m e t h i n g p r iva t e to e a c h one . O r w o u l d y o u b e p r e p a r e d to insist t l i a t eve ry c o l o u r appea r s t o a dog, o r a n y o t h e r l iv ing thing, j u s t t h e w a y i t a p p e a r s t o you?

T H E A E T E T u s . Cer ta in ly n o t . SOCRATES. A n d w h a t a b o u t a n o t h e r m a n ? Is t h e way a n y t h i n g

a p p e a r s t o h i m l ike t h e way i t a p p e a r s to y o u ? C a n y o u insist on t h a t ? O r w o u l d n ' t you m u c h r a t h e r say t h a t i t d o e s n ' t a p p e a r t h e s ame even to yourself , b e c a u s e you ' r e n e v e r in a s imi lar c o n d i t i o n t o yoursel f?

THEAETETUS. Yes, I t h i n k t ha t ' s n e a r e r t h e t r u t h t h a n t l ie first a l t e rna t ive .

Β SOCRATES. S u r e l y then, if w h a t we m e a s u r e ourseh^es aga ins t o r

CONFLICTING APPEARANCES 77 t o u c h h a d been l a rge , whi te , o r ho t , i t would n e v e r have b e c o m e d i f f e r e n t by b u m p i n g in to a d i f f e r e n t perceiver , a t a n y r a t e n o t if i t d i d n ' t unde rgo a n y c h a n g e i tself A n d on t h e other h a n d , if w h a t does t h e m e a s u r i n g o r t o u c h i n g h a d b e e n a n y of those th ings , t hen a g a i n , i t w o u l d n ' t have b e c o m e d i f fe ren t w h e n a n o t h e r th ing c a m e u p a g a i n s t it, or t h e thing w h i c h came u p aga ins t it h a d someth ing h a p p e n t o i t : n o t if i t h a d n ' t , i tself, h a d a n y t h i n g h a p p e n to it.^

Socra tes ' a i m in this pas sage is to establish o n beha l f of P r o t a g o r a s t h a t sensible qua l i t i e s l ike h o t a n d co ld , whi te a n d b lack , are essential ly re la t ive to t h e ind iv idua l pe rce iv ing s u b -j ec t . T h i s thesis is expressed in t w o connec t ed ways , (a) T h e co lou r white , fo r example , is n o t to b e located i n (153 D 9 - E I) or ident i f ied w i t h (154 A 1 - 2 ) e i the r t h e object pe r ce ived o r t h e eye o f the pe rce ive r . I t is n o t a d i s t inc t th ing ex is t ing a n y w h e r e a t all , b u t w h e n a n eye l igh ts on^ w h a t we w o u l d o r d i n a r i l y desc r ibe as a w h i t e stick o r a w h i t e stone,^ s o m e t h i n g o c c u r s b e t w e e n t h e m a n d it is in t h i s t r a n s a c t i o n t h a t t h e colour w h i t e ar ises o r comes t o be. I n o t h e r words , t he colour is a r e l a t i ona l h a p p e n i n g o r occu r r ence , essent ial ly involving b o t h pa r t i e s to t he p e r c e p t u a l e n c o u n t e r (153 D - 1 5 4 W N e i t h e r the o b j e c t seen n o r the p e r c e i v i n g s u b j e c t is in itself whi te (154 B). I n d e e d , n o t h i n g is in itself a n y one t h i n g a t al l ( 153 e 4 - 5 , r e fe r r ing b a c k to 152 D).

T h e s e two f o r m u l a t i o n s a d d u p t o a p roposa l t o t rea t t e r m s like ' ho t ' a n d ' co ld ' , ' w h i t e ' a n d 'b lack ' , as i n c o m p l e t e o r r e l a t iona l p red ica tes . F r o m f o r m u l a t i o n [b) in i ts P r o t a g o r e a n c o n t e x t we m a y g a t h e r t h a t n o sen tence of t h e f o r m 'x is w h i t e ' is t r u e as i t s t ands , w i t h o u t a qua l i fy ing c lause specifying a perce iver for w h o m it is t r u e . T h i s gives us t h e result t h a t t h e c o l o u r whi te is essentially r e l a t i ona l a n d its occur rences s h o u l d

' Quoted in the t ransladon of J o h n McDowell , Plato— Theaeteius (Oxford, 1973), with the following modifications : [a) Socrates' last speech a t 154 Β 1 ff. should begin wi th an inferential 'Surely then', not McDowell 's 'Well now' (the Greek is ούκοΰν), and should no t be spaced off f rom 154 A as a separate pa ragraph designed to set a puzzle (McDowell, pp. 19, 131). {b) A t 154 Β 2 McDowell has ' bumping in to a different person' , where the Greek is not so specific and where we should allow for the animal perceivers cited in 154 A. (C) For ίδιον at 154 A 2 McDowell has 'peculiar ' , b u t it is not misleading to use the epistemologically loaded te rm 'private ' (cf 161 D, 166 c) .

2 I choose this English expression to counterbalance the exaggeratedly somatic overtones of McDowell 's translation in terms of colliding and bumping , προσβάλλειν is used of the sun's rays striking the earth and in similar cases.

^ For the examples, cf. 156 E.

104 PROCEEDINGS O F THE BRITISH ACADEMY

canon i ca l l y b e r e p r e s e n t e d i n sen tences of t h e f o r m 'x i s /be-comes w h i t e for so-and-so ' . B u t now, if t h a t is so, there is n o u n q u a l i f i e d p r e d i c a t e ' w h i t e ' to be a b s t r a c t e d f r o m its p r e d i -ca t ive pos i t ion a n d m a d e t h e sub jec t of t h e de f in i t i ona l q u e s t i o n ' W h a t is w h i t e ? ' . T h e r e is n o such t h i n g as (be ing) white sim-pUciter, o n l y w h i t e for you a n d whi t e f o r me.^ H e n c e , finally, f o r m u l a t i o n (a) : whi te is n o t a d is t inc t t h i n g exis t ing i n t h e sub jec t o r in t he ob jec t of pe rcep t ion .

W e n o w h a v e a thesis: sensible qua l i t i e s like h o t and co ld , wh i t e a n d b lack , a re essential ly re la t ive to perce ivers . W h a t a re t he g r o u n d s f o r a ccep t i ng i t ? T h e y a r e no t , as c o m m e n -t a to r s s o m e t i m e s suggest,^ g r o u n d s p e r t a i n i n g to a theory of t h e m e c h a n i s m of pe rcep t ion . T h e thesis is m e a n t to b e es tabl ished i n d e p e n d e n t l y of a n y de ta i l ed u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e c o m m e r c e b e t w e e n p e r c e i v e r a n d pe rce ived ;^ i n d e e d , t h e thes i s will s h a p e the t h e o r y of p e r c e p t i o n to b e e l a b o r a t e d in t he d i a logue (156 A ff.) r a t h e r t h a n b e i n g s h a p e d b y it. T h e a r g u m e n t for the r e l a -t ivi ty of sensible qual i t ies is ent i re ly gene ra l , a n d its l e a d i n g premiss is t he conf l ic t of sensible a p p e a r a n c e s .

Socra tes in 154 A ment ions t h r e e types of v a r i a t i o n or conf l ic t b e t w e e n a p p e a r a n c e s , in a c lass i f icat ion t h a t w a s t o b e c o m e t r ad i t i ona l . C o l o u r a p p e a r a n c e s v a r y b e t w e e n m a n and o t h e r an imals , b e t w e e n o n e m a n a n d ano the r , a n d b e t w e e n one t i m e a n d a n o t h e r w i t h i n the e x p e r i e n c e of a s ingle man. '^ Soc ra t e s ac tua l ly imp l i e s t h e strongest possible c l a i m , t h a t n o two co lou r a p p e a r a n c e s a r e alike, b u t I w a n t to l e a v e t h a t as ide for t h e m o m e n t . I t will b e sufficient fo r t h e a r g u m e n t Soc ra t e s h a s i n view to s t a r t f r o m the m o r e modes t c l a i m t h a t va r ia t ions d o occur . F o r h e asserts a t 154 Β t h a t this is i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h a t t r i b u t i n g sensible qual i t ies c i the r to t h e o b j e c t o r t o the s u b -j e c t of p e r c e p t i o n .

W e m a y e l u c i d a t e his c l a i m as follows. T a k e , as before, a n

^ The abstraction-move underlying δ δή εκαστον είναί φαμεν χρώμα (153 ^ 7" 154 Α ι) is standard in Plato: sec G. E. L. Owen, 'Dialectic and Eristic in the Treatment of the Forms', in G. E. L. Owen ed., Aristotle on Dialectic (Oxford, 1968), pp. 114-15.

2 e.g. F. M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge (London, 1935), p. 40, McDowell, op. cit., p. 131.

3 Witness the difficulty (adverted to by McDowell, pp. 130-1) of fitting the language used to describe perception here into the more detailed story that comes later.

^ The first two types of variation correspond to the first two of the Ten A'lodes of Pyrrhonian scepticism, the third is expanded in a number of the remaining Modes (Sext. Emp. PH1. QÖff.l.

CONFLICTING APPEARANCES 79 e v e n t of the k i n d we w o u l d o r d i n a r i l y descr ibe as the see ing of a whi te s t o n e ( ' m e a s u r i n g ourselves agains t ' is P r o t a g o r e a n fo r pe rce iv ing o f a n y k i n d ) . T h e n , first, t h e s t o n e c a n n o t b e w h i t e in itself o r else, so l o n g as it suf fe red n o c h a n g e , it w o u l d a p p e a r whi te t o a n y o t h e r pe rce ive r . Second, t h e sub jec t of pe r cep t i on c a n n o t itself b e w h i t e e i the r , or else, so long as i t s u f f e r e d no c h a n g e , it w o u l d see eve ry th ing w h i t e : i n c l u d i n g the s tone we s t a r t e d with , s u p p o s i n g t h a t to h a v e been p a i n t e d red.^ M o r e genera l ly , if sensible qual i t ies i n h e r e in the ob jec t s of pe r cep t i on , t h e y ough t t o m a k e themselves a p p a r e n t to eve ry pe rce ive r al ike, regardless of d i f ferences b e t w e e n perce ivers o r changes in t h e cond i t i on of a s ingle pe rce ive r ; if, a l t e r n a -t ively , they i n h e r e in t he p e r c e i v i n g subject, t h e n conversely the i r a p p e a r a n c e should n o t be a f f ec ted b y d i f ferences a n d c h a n g e s in t h e objec ts pe rce ived . B u t it is a f ac t of exper ience f a m i l i a r to us al l t h a t sensible a p p e a r a n c e s v a r y wi th d i f f e r -ences and c h a n g e s on e i the r side of t h e p e r c e p t u a l e n c o u n t e r . So w e are i n v i t e d to d r a w t h e des i red conc lu s ion : sens ib le qua l i t i e s are essential ly r e l a t ive to t h e ind iv idua l perce iver .

T h a t is t he a r g u m e n t , a n d a t f irst r ead ing i t m a y no t seem a s ignif icant a d v a n c e . T h e w o r d s O r would y o u be p r e p a r e d to insist . . . ' a t 154A 2 - 3 i n d i c a t e t h a t it is t h e confl ic t of a p p e a r a n c e s w h i c h is to s h o w t h a t colours a r e no t i n h e r e n t in t h e object o r t h e subjec t , b u t re la t iona l . T h a t is, in 153 E -4 A t h e a r g u m e n t rests o n ( i ) . Bu t t h e n Socra tes p roceeds in 154 Β to spell o u t his a r g u m e n t in t e r m s of (2). A n d we h a v e a l r e a d y seen t h a t (2) is j u s t a r e f o r m u l a t i o n of ( i ) ; it p rov ides n o add i t i ona l s u p p o r t for t h e conc lus ion he wishes to d r a w .

B u t this dismissive j u d g e m e n t is p r e m a t u r e . I n the first p l ace , we shou ld be g ra t e fu l to P l a t o for p u t t i n g the emphas i s on f o r m u l a t i o n (2), the t h i n g A u s t i n said n o o n e wou ld seri-ously suppose. G i v e n the r a r i t y of (2) in l a t e r ph i losophers , i t is n o t to b e a s s u m e d t h a t i t was p r o m i n e n t in ear l ie r p r e s e n -t a t i ons of the l ine of t h o u g h t w h i c h Pla to is r econs t ruc t ing . W e c a n also t h a n k P la to for m a k i n g absolute ly explicit t h e i m p o r t a n t p o i n t t h a t w i th e i the r f o r m u l a t i o n t h e a r g u m e n t on ly applies o n the a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t he th ing w e are t a l k i n g a b o u t remains u n c h a n g e d (cf Ayer . p p . 14 -15) . Second, ( i ) a n d (2) as f o r m u l a t e d c o n c e r n on ly t h e ob jec t of pe rcep t ion , w h i l e Socra tes ' a r g u m e n t f o r a re la t iv is t ic a c c o u n t of sensible

' I t was, I think, R. Hackforth, 'Notes on Plato's Theaetetus\ Mnemosyne series 4, 10 (1957), p. 130, who first made sense of ή τι ttoÔôvtos (154 β 5)5

quali t ies comes in two halves. O n e half a t tends t o the ob jec t of percep t ion , the other tackles the cur ious-sounding suggestion tha t the th ing w h i c h is wh i t e in itself, or the t h i n g where the whiteness is to be found, is t h e perceiving subject . W h y should anyone suppose t h a t ? A n d , if he did, w h a t on ear th w o u l d he m e a n by it?

I n his a d m i r a b l e c o m m e n t a r y on t h e Theaetetus J o h n M c -Dowell suggests^ t h a t the issue is not w h e t h e r t h e perceiver is coloured whi te b u t whether he is seeing white . A perceiver cannot be said, in the o r d i n a r y unqua l i f i ed way, to be seeing whi te unless, so long as he undergoes n o change , h e sees every-th ing w h i t e ; i.e. i t is a condi t ion of his seeing w h i t e at all t h a t he sees only whi te , not also o ther colours. I do n o t think this can be t h e r ight reading of the text. Fo r one th ing , it involves unde r s t and ing ' a n y of those things' (154 Β 4) as taking u p 'measur ing or touching ' , i .e. perceiving, r a t h e r than ' large, white, or ho t ' , wh ich is t h e obvious reference for the phrase . McDowe l l only makes the suggestion because h e finds it ob -scure ' w h y a n y o n e might b e though t to w a n t to say (except for obviously i r re levant reasons) tha t a n eye is whi te ' ; w h y , in o ther words, there should be an issue as to whether t h e subject of percep t ion , as opposed to its object , is in itself col-oured . W h y i n d e e d ? This is exactly t h e sort of he rmeneu t i c puzzle in the face of wh ich it becomes reasonab le to p r o b e for unspoken assumptions under ly ing t h e surface text .

W i t h this in m i n d I w a n t to br ing to bea r on our text two passages f r o m la t e r writers, one ancient a n d o n e modern . I n the first c h a p t e r of Appearance and Reality Bradley presents t h e following a r g u m e n t against t he reality of secondary qualit ies :

W e assume tha t a th ing must be self-consistent and self-dependent . I t ei ther has a qua l i ty or has no t got it. And , if i t has it , it cannot h a v e it only sometimes, a n d merely in this or tha t re la t ion . But such a pr inciple is the c o n d e m n a t i o n of secondary qualities.

I t ma t t e r s very little how in detai l we work wi th i t . A th ing is coloured, b u t not coloured in t he same way to every eye ; and, except to some eye, it seems not coloured a t all. Is i t t h e n coloured or not? A n d the eye—rela t ion to which appea r s somehow to m a k e the qua l i ty— does t ha t itself possess colour? Clear ly not so, unless there is another eye which sees it. N o t h i n g therefore is really co loured ; colour seems only to belong to w h a t itself is colourless. A n d the same result holds, again, wi th cold a n d hea t . A th ing may be cold or hot accord ing to different pa r t s of my skin; and , wi thou t some relat ion to a skin, it seems wi thout a n y

' op. cit., pp. 131-3.

such qual i ty . A n d , by "a like a r g u m e n t , t h e skin is p r o v e d UOL luseu liïf

own t h e quality, w h i c h is hence possessed by nothing, (pp. 9-10)

T h e resemblances are striking. W h e t h e r Bradley h a d the Theae-tetus passage in m i n d I d o n o t know. I f he did, h e preferred to c h a n g e the a r g u m e n t , for Bradley 's reason for deny ing co lour to t h e eye is t h a t i t is only co loured w h e n seen b y a second eye, w h i c h seems to assume the conclusion to be p r o v e d . But a t least he re is one serious phi losopher witnessing to t h e re levance in this sort of c o n t e x t of the t h o u g h t t h a t the co lour of t h e eye m i g h t be the source of the co lour w e see. A n d t h e r e is a n o t h e r resemblance. A l t h o u g h Brad ley endorses the a r g u m e n t , a n d will l a te r (pp. 12 f.) say t h a t i t appl ies equa l ly to p r i m a r y qual i t ies , his a t t i tude to i t has n o n e t h e less a certain d e t a c h m e n t his presentat ion, l ike Plato's, is mixed w i t h diagnosis. So i t is n o t w i t h o u t interest t h a t he s tar ts off w i t h tha t r a r e thing, a c lear a n d explicit vers ion of (2) ; Ά th ing . . . ei ther h a s a qua l i ty or has n o t got i t . A n d , if it ha s , i t c a n n o t have i t on ly somet imes a n d merely in this or t h a t re la t ion . '

T h e second passage for c o m p a r i s o n is Sextus on the sub jec t

of percept ion : Sufferers f rom j a u n d i c e say t h a t things which a p p e a r white to us a re yel low, and those whose eyes a re b loodshot say t h e y are b lood-red . Since, then, some animals also h a v e yellow eyes, o thers bloodshot eyes, o thers albino, a n d others eyes of yet a n o t h e r colour, i t is likely, I t h ink , t h a t they have a di f ferent pe rcep t ion of colours. ( Ρ Ι ί i . 44)

W h y is it l ikely? D o th ings real ly look b lood- red w h e n you w a k e u p f r o m a heavy d r ink ing-bou t with bloodshot eyes? I w a n t to suggest tha t a n y o n e w h o thinks it l ikely is in t h e gr ip of a certain p i c tu re or m o d e l of percept ion . I f one th inks of visual percept ion as a m a t t e r of looking ou t t h r o u g h the eyes as th rough a w indow, t h e n co loured eyes will b e like the t in t ed spectacles f a v o u r e d by m o d e r n phi losophers of percept ion , on ly fu r ther i n ; j u s t so, o n Sextus ' explana t ion of the p h e n o m -e n o n (PH Ì. 126) yellow o r r e d in the eye is a n admix tu r e of co lour within t h e field of vision. S o m e animals look out t h r o u g h a yellow or a b lood-red w i n d o w - p a n e , and so will you too if y o u r eyes go yel low wi th j a u n d i c e o r b lood-red f rom d r ink ing too much . I f o rbea r f r o m q u o t i n g Sextus' f u r t he r r e m a r k s

' Because he thinks that at the common-sense level it is perfectly correct to say that secondary qualities, no less than primary, are ' a n actual par t of the physical world' (p. 247). W h a t he is most opposed to is the metaphysical bifurcation of pr imary and secondary qualities.


{PH i. 47) a b o u t the s h a p e th ings m u s t look t o an imals w h o s e eyes h a v e s l a n t i n g or e l o n g a t e d pupi ls .

I t shou ld n o t be t h o u g h t t h a t this is j u s t a p iece of a n t i q u e physio logy. Descar tes , n o s t r ange r to opt ics , c i t e s the e x a m p l e of a m a n w i t h j a u n d i c e t o w h o m t h i n g s look yellow because his eye is t i n g e d wi th ye l low (Regulae, X I I ) , a n d so does Berke ley {Three Dialogues, p. 185), w h o coup les i t w i t h the e x a m p l e of a n i m a l s w i t h eyes of a d i f fe ren t t e x t u r e f r o m ours. Russe l l b r o a d c a s t t he j a u n d i c e e x a m p l e f r o m t h e BBC i n 1948.^ I t was still g o i n g s t r o n g in 1963 w h e n Professor R o d e r i c k C h i s h o l m used i t in a p a p e r on ' T h e T h e o r y of A p p e a r i n g ' , ^ and i t gave e v i d e n c e for b o t h sides of an Ar i s to te l i an Soc ie ty s y m p o s i u m in 1968.3 Ye t i t is qu i t e false t h a t p e o p l e w i t h j a u n d i c e see (whi te ) t h i n g s yellow. O f th i s I a m a s su red b o t h by m e d i c a l a u t h o r i t y a n d b y those w h o have h a d the condi t ion . As a m a t t e r of fac t , w e all h a v e yel low ins ide ou r eyes. I n h u m a n s a n d a r a n g e o f other a n i m a l s the lens of t h e eye is ye l low. Bu t so f a r f r o m m a k i n g t h i n g s look ye l low, th is e n h a n c e s c o l o u r con t r a s t a n d e l iminates b l u r f r o m t h e d i f f e ren t i a l r e f r a c t i v e p rope r t i e s of d i f fe ren t w a v e l e n g t h s of l ight . R e d can h e l p too : tu r t les h a v e r e d oil d r o p l e t s in t he i r eyes t o i m p r o v e the i r vision ove r t h e g la ry su r f ace of the w a t e r . B u t these a r e re la -t ively r e c e n t discoveries.'^ W h a t we h a v e to ask is w h y for cen tu r i e s t h e m y t h a b o u t j a u n d i c e shou ld con t inue t o b e be l ieved , as i t ev ident ly still is be l ieved . (Someone a c t u a l l y sa id to m e , ' B u t surely, t h e y h a v e ye l low eyes ' , and a p p e a l e d to t he p h r a s e ' a j a u n d i c e d v iew of th ings ' . ) F o r tha t m a t t e r , a c c o r d i n g to A u s t i n (p. 4 9 ) , i t is e q u a l l y false to say, wi th A y e r (p. 6),5 ' W h e n , as the resu l t of m y p u t t i n g o n g r e e n spectacles , t he w h i t e walls of my r o o m a p p e a r to b e g reen , m y exper i ence is qua l i t a t i ve ly t he s ame as if I w e r e p e r c e i v i n g walls t h a t rea l ly w e r e g r e e n . ' Aust in does no t say w h y it is false, but I t h i n k

1 See Bertrand Russell, Why I am not a Christian and other essays on religion and related topics (London, 1957), pp. 161-2.

^ Cited fi'om Robert J . Swartz ed., Perceiving, Sensing, and Knowing (New York, 1965), p. 183.

3 F. N. Sibley a n d Michael Tanner , Objectivi ty and Aesthetics', Arisi. Soc. Suppl. Vol. 42 (1968), pp. 39 and 60.

* Gleaned from the fascinating store of empirical detail in Gordon Lynn Walls, The Vertebrate Eye and Its Adaptive Radiation, Cranbrook Institute of Science Bulletin No. 19 (Michigan, 1942), pp. 191 ff. More recent still is knowledge of picrotoxin. Picrotoxin intoxication, I am informed, yellows the skin (but not the eye) and does make things seen assume a yellowish look.

s But Ayer is actuallv retailing examoles from other πρπηίρ

CONFLICTING APPEARANCES 83 it wou ld b e co r rec t to insist t h a t t he e x p e r i e n c e of look ing through green a n d the expe r i ence of looking at g r e e n are i m p o r -t a n t l y dist inct . So those w h o cite t h e j a u n d i c e e x a m p l e a r e c o m -m i t t i n g a d o u b l e er ror of f a c t if t h e y say w i t h o u t qua l i f i ca t i on t h a t the c o n d i t i o n makes th ings look yellow. Fi rs t , t he re is n o s u c h yel lowing ef fec t ; s econd , if seeing t h r o u g h yel low eyes r ea l l y were l ike seeing t h r o u g h ye l low- t in ted glass, i t w o u l d still be d i s t inguishab le f r o m the exper ience of seeing a ye l low o b j e c t . But t h e i m p o r t a n t p o i n t is t h a t t h e m a n n e r in w h i c h ph i losophers t h r o u g h t h e cen tu r i e s have r e p e a t e d this t ype o f example , i n de f i ance o f a sce r t a inab l e fac t , is ev idence t h a t a t some level p e o p l e a r e p o w e r f u l l y d r a w n to t h e t h o u g h t t h a t w e look t h r o u g h ou r eyes as t h r o u g h a w i n d o w .

T h a t we a r e dea l ing w i t h a n impl ic i t p i c t u r e or m o d e l of pe rcep t ion , n o t a n explicit i n f e rence f r o m o u t m o d e d physiology, is c lear even i n an t i qu i t y . O n e ea r ly c i t ing of the j a u n d i c e e x a m p l e is b y Luc re t iu s (iv. 3 3 2 - 6 ) , and o n t h e a tomis t as-s u m p t i o n s o f Luc re t iu s ' of f ic ia l phys io logy o f p e r c e p t i o n o n e m i g h t well t h i n k t h a t t h e e x a m p l e should b e nonsense . F o r r e m e m b e r t h a t for an a t o m i s t ye l low is n o t h i n g b u t t h e e f fec t of ce r t a in a t o m s i m p i n g i n g o n t h e eye, no t a cha rac te r i s t i c of t h e eye or of a n y t h i n g else. L u c r e t i u s , however , ha s an a n s w e r . T h e eyes a n d b o d y of t h e j a u n d i c e d person emi t n u m e r o u s a t o m i c eff luences of the t y p e requ i s i t e for h i m t o a p p e a r ye l low to o t h e r p e o p l e a n d some o f these 'seeds of ye l low ' r e t u r n t o his o w n eye m i x e d u p w i th t h e eff luences f r o m outs ide objec ts , w i t h the resu l t t h a t those ob jec t s look yellow t o h im. I t is a n obv ious d i f f icul ty for th is e x p l a n a t i o η t h a t i t should i m p l y t h a t if s o m e o n e whose eyes a p p e a r a n o r m a l h e a l t h y w h i t e p u t s on a c l e a n whi t e t o g a , h e will see e v e r y t h i n g whi t e . L u -c re t i u s offers n o t h i n g to ease this difficulty, a n d seems n o t to h a v e not iced i t . Clear ly , h is bel ief t h a t ye l l ow eyes p r o d u c e ye l l ow a p p e a r a n c e s is n o t a d e d u c t i o n f rom physio logica l t h e o r y b u t a not ion i n d e p e n d e n t l y a c q u i r e d , which phys io logy is t h e n m a d e to a c c o m m o d a t e . A n d t h e in f luence of t h e w i n d o w m o d e l shows itself w h e n h e a d d s a r e f e r e n c e to 'seeds of yel low' i n t he eye itself ( 3 3 5 ) — a s if t h e eye w e r e wi th in t h e field of v is ion a n d the m a n w e r e look ing t h r o u g h i t .

T h i s ev idence f r o m L u c r e t i u s is t h e m o r e r e m a r k a b l e be -c a u s e a t iii. 3 5 9 - 6 9 he a t t a c k s a v i ew which expl ic i t ly c o m p a r e d t h e eyes to w i n d o w s t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e m i n d looks ou t a t things.^

^ Lucretius actually says 'doors' {fores), not 'windows', but the parallels

T h e po in t a t issue is w h e t h e r it is the eyes themselves o r the m i n d wi th in wh ich is the p roper subject of percept ion . T h e w indow compar i son comes f rom someone advoca t ing a vers ion of Pla to 's view (see V I I I below) tha t it is a u n i t a r y mind , no t the separa te sense-organs, wh ich does o u r perce iv ing . ' Lucre t ius disagrees, for it is Ep icurean doct r ine t h a t the b o d y is e n d o w e d by the soul w i t h a pe rcep tua l sensitivity of its own. T h a t is, he disavows the window mode l when it is p u t t o him. Bu t , I claim, he w o u l d not have said w h a t h e later says abou t the j a u n d i c e e x a m p l e unless a t a less concious level he was still susceptible to its influence.

I t is n o t unl ikely that s imilar examples were a l r e a d y cur ren t by the t ime P la to w r o t e the Theaetetus. P e r h a p s the earliest a t tes ted appea l to the j aund i ce e x a m p l e — t h e earliest, a t any rate , t h a t I have found , a n d it has a blood-red example to go with i t—is due to t h e Cyrena ic school, w h o developed a hard- l ine sceptical epis temology in the second half of t h e four th century B.C. By Sextus ' a ccoun t ( M vii. 192, 197-8) , they used these and o ther examples to argue t h a t we h a v e no knowledge of or access to a n y t h i n g beyond our own exper iences . For in such cases it is t rue t h a t we a re 'yel lowed' or ' r e d d e n e d ' (the cur ious te rminology for the exper ience of someth ing ' s appea r ing yel-low/red is reveal ingly sui ted to the examples) , b u t false—as any-one will a g r e e — t h a t the objects seen a re yellow o r red . So h o w on any o the r occasion can we be sure of m o r e t h a n t h a t we a re thus 'yel lowed' or ' r e d d e n e d ' ? I t would b e in teres t ing to be be t t e r i n f o r m e d t h a n w e are a b o u t the Cyrena i c epistemology,^ b u t for p resen t purposes the i m p o r t a n t t h i n g is t h a t the examples

(quoted by Cyril Bailey, Lucreti De Rerum Natura [Oxford, 1947], ä p . 1052) make it likely that fores renders θυρίδες, 'windows'.

' Who was this someone? Bailey, loc. cit., says, ' T h e theory which Lucretius here refutes is quite definitely that of the Stoics', and cites the Cicero passage—but Cicero does not name his source. Sextus traces the comparison to Strato of Lampsacus and to Aenesidemus' work on Heraclitus. Sextus wishes to think (Mvii. 364) that the point of the comparison is to make a claim that the mind can get a direct, unmediated perception of things, in contrast to a view of the senses as obstructively 'in front o f the mind ( M vii. 352-3). Lucretius and Cicero, however, make it clear that the issue is the one discussed at Theaet. i84Bff . , about the subject of perception and its unity; Tertull ian, De Anima 14 confirms that this was Strato's and Aeneside-mus' concern also. To get back from this evidence to Stoic doctrine (whether Posidonius or earlier) is a mat ter of unravelling the tangled knots of Aenesi-demus' work on Heraclitus: see Ulrich Burkhard, Die angebliche Heraklit-Nachfolge des Skeptikers Aenesidem (Bonn, 1973).

2 For a few suggestions, see 'Idealism and Greek Philosophy', op. cit.

w o u l d only serve to i l lustrate a n d r e c o m m e n d so ex t reme a t heo ry if they were of a t y p e wh ich the a u d i e n c e was an te -cedent ly disposed to accept as fami l ia r and uncontroversial .^

I hope this is enough jus t i f i ca t ion—I do no t th ink it is m o r e t h a n enough—for a diagnosis of w h a t is going o n in the second ha l f of the a r g u m e n t before us. I n te rms of the window mode l , Socrates ' po in t is t ha t if t h e whi te were in the eye of the per-ceiving subject , then he w o u l d b e looking o u t , as it were , t h r o u g h a whi te - t in ted p a n e a n d so should see everyth ing whi te .

N o w apply t h e window m o d e l to t h e first half of the a r g u m e n t . I f t h e white were out the re in the stone, n o t in the eye of the beholder , a n d one looks t h r o u g h t h e eye as t h r o u g h a w indow, t h e n one's view of the whi te mus t be unobs t ruc ted . T h e w i n d o w -p a n e should be t r ansparen t , w i thou t spot or b lemish . O r be t t e r , since classical Greek windows we re unglazed, the eye should be a n open a p e r t u r e wi th n o p a n e a t all. T h e r e is as i t were n o t h i n g be tween the perceiver a n d the th ing h e perceives. I n t l ia t case the s tone should a p p e a r whi te to every perceiver .

M y suggestion, then, is t h a t t he window m o d e l makes sense of a n a r g u m e n t which otherwise is no a r g u m e n t at all . T h e nex t step is to look for con f i rma t ion of this diagnosis in the w i d e r context of the d ia logue as a whole.

I V

T h e passage u n d e r discussion is p a r t of an e labora te dialectical construct ion designed to un rave l t h e implicat ions and c o m m i t -m e n t s of Theae t e tu s ' def in i t ion of knowledge as pe rcep t ion (151 e).^ T h e quest ion a t issue is th i s : if we accep t t ha t know-ledge is percep t ion , w h a t m u s t w e suppose a b o u t pe rcep t ion a n d the wor ld for the def ini t ion to hold g o o d ? T h e answer , in b r o a d out l ine , is tha t we m u s t accep t a P ro t ago rean epis temo-logy and a Herac l i t ean accoun t of the wor ld . P ro tagoras said, ' M a n is t h e measure of all things, of those tha t are , t h a t t hey are, a n d of those t h a t a re not , t ha t they a r e not ' , m e a n i n g by this t ha t wha tever a p p e a r a n c e s a person has , they a re t rue for h im—th ings really a re , for h i m , as t hey appea r to h i m to b e — a n d , conversely, t h e only th ings tha t a re rea l for h i m are those that a p p e a r to h im. Fo r the present w e c a n confine our-selves to sensible appea rances a n d to the first ha l f of the doub le

1 νενόμιστσι at M vii. 193 reports precisely that the examples are common currency.

^ For a more textual justification of this reading than I can offer here see 'Idealism and Greek Philosophy', op. cit.

86 PROCEEDINGS OF T H E BRITISH ACADEMY thesis c o n t a i n e d i n the m e a s u r e d o c t r i n e : w h a t e v e r sensible a p p e a r a n c e s a p e r s o n h a s , t h e y a r e t r u e for h i m . I f w e a d o p t t h i s p r i n c i p l e , w e w i l l p o s t u l a t e a s t a t e o f a f f a i r s m a t c h i n g e v e r y sensible a p p e a r a n c e , to r e n d e r t h a t a p p e a r a n c e t r u e , and t h e n , if p e r c e p t i o n is cons t rued in P r o t a g o r e a n t e rms as the h a v i n g of sensible a p p e a r a n c e s (cf. 152 Β I I - C I ) , eve ry pe rcep t ion will be t he u n e r r i n g a p p r e h e n s i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e of a f f a i r s : t he s ta te of a f fa i r s which consists in s o m e t h i n g ' s real ly b e i n g , for t h e pe rce ive r , as it a p p e a r s to h i m to be. By this l ine of a r g u m e n t eve ry case of p e r c e p t i o n is a case of knowledge a n d T h e a e t e t u s ' de f in i t ion is so f a r v ind i ca t ed .

I t is a t this p o i n t tha t t h e a r g u m e n t w^e h a v e b e e n puzz l ing over b e c o m e s r e l evan t , a n d w e c a n n o w see why Socra tes m a k e s t he very s t r ong suggest ion t h a t n o two co lour a p p e a r a n c e s a r e alike. T h e t h e o r y h e is e l a b o r a t i n g is c o m m i t t e d to the v i e w t h a t , if th i s we re so, each a p p e a r a n c e s h o u l d still yield k n o w -ledge of a r ea l s t a t e of a f fa i r s . I f the t h e o r y is t o h o l d good , it m u s t b e a b l e to t ake in its s t r ide t he m o s t e x t r e m e va r i a t i on i m a g i n a b l e in t h e course of a p p e a r a n c e s . So w e had b e t t e r suppose , fo r t h e sake of t h e a r g u m e n t , t h a t e x t r e m e v a r i a t i o n ac tua l ly ob t a in s . Each a p p e a r a n c e is i n d e p e n d e n t of e v e r y o the r a p p e a r a n c e , yet e a c h is knowledge .

Bu t n o w , if e a c h a p p e a r a n c e is i n d e p e n d e n t of every o t h e r , yet e a c h is knowledge , t h e r e m u s t be a matching va r ia t ion in t he s ta tes of a f f a i r s wh ich co r r e spond . E v e r y t h i n g I know a n d perce ive m u s t b e cha rac t e r i zab l e i n d e p e n d e n t l y of w h a t is t h e case for a n y o t h e r perceiver , i n c l u d i n g myself a t a n o t h e r t ime , a n d i n d e e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y of w h a t is t h e case for my o t h e r senses a t t he p re sen t t ime . So we a r e l e f t w i t h such i t e m s as a t h ing ' s b e i n g w h i t e for m y eye now. N o t h i n g c a n be w h i t e in itself a n d w h i t e is not a d is t inc t t h i n g in itself, only w h i t e for m e / m y eye n o w .

T h u s t h e a r g u m e n t is p l a i n sai l ing if we p u t i t back i n t o its con tex t i n t h e d ia logue a n d a d d to t h e p remiss of conf l ic t ing a p p e a r a n c e s t h e P r o t a g o r e a n p r inc ip l e t h a t e a c h a n d every p e r c e p t u a l a p p e a r a n c e is t h e m e a s u r e o r c r i t e r ion of w h a t is t he case for t h e pe rce ive r ; o r , m o r e b r ie f ly , t h a t eve ry p e r c e p t i o n is k n o w l e d g e . F r o m this c o m b i n a t i o n of premisses it does fo l low t h a t sensible qual i t ies c a n n o t i n h e r e e i the r in t h e objec t o r i n t he sub jec t of p e r c e p t i o n . B u t n o w : w h a t is t h e P r o t a g o r e a n p r i n c i p l e b u t a cool theore t ica l f o r m u l a t i o n of t h e w i n d o w model ( t r ans -p a r e n t vers ion) ? As P la to p u t s i t e l sewhere in t h e d ia logue, w h a t t he p r i n c i p l e c la ims is t h a t every p e r c e p t i o n is ' c l ea r ' (179 c ) .

C O N F L I C T I N G A P P E A R A N C E S

I t h i n k this d iagnos is is co r r ec t . T h e P r o t a g o r e a n p r inc ip l e does n o t cha l lenge t h e a s sumpt ions o f the w i n d o w model b u t c o n f i r m s them. I t embod ies a thesis t h a t p e r c e p t u a l expe r i ence is t r a n s p a r e n t a n d saves i t f r o m the object ion ra i sed aga ins t t r a n s p a r e n c y a t 154 Β by m a k i n g t h e whi t e p r i v a t e to the e y e w h i c h sees it (154 A 2) a n d by d e n y i n g the d i s t ance w h i c h s epa ra t e s the eye f r o m its ob j ec t . T h e colour w h i t e is not in m e n o r o u t there b u t in be tween , s o m e t h i n g p r i v a t e to m e a n d t h e o b j e c t I see (153 DE, 154 A ) — t h e spat ia l l a n g u a g e m a y b e m e t a p h o r i c a l b u t conf l ic t ing a p p e a r a n c e s are o f t e n effects of t he i n t e rven ing m e d i u m . T h e cho ice of m e t a p h o r reveals t h a t t h e w i n d o w m o d e l is still d o m i n a n t . P r o t a g o r e a n windows p r o -v ide a flawless c lose-up v iew of t h e con ten t s of a p r i v a t e w o r l d .

S o m e o n e m a y ob jec t t h a t this ev idence f r o m the w i d e r c o n t e x t of t h e d i a logue a c t u a l l y c u t s the o t h e r w a y . T o say t h a t a ph i lo sophe r is in t h e g r i p of a n i n a p p r o p r i a t e p i c t u r e of pe r cep t i on m a k e s i t s o u n d as if s o m e t h i n g r a t h e r d i s r e p u t a b l e is g o i n g on. B u t i t has n o w t u r n e d o u t tha t , o n t h e c o n t r a r y , P l a t o ' s a r g u m e n t is g u i d e d b y a n en t i re ly expl ic i t , coolly t h e o -re t i ca l p r inc ip le wh ich is q u i t e suff ic ient to g e t us f r o m the conf l ic t of a p p e a r a n c e s to t h e re la t iv i ty of sens ib le qual i t ies . I f so, i t seems n o t only r u d e b u t unnecessa ry t o b r ing i n th is ta lk o f the w i n d o w mode l . N e v e r m i n d t h a t t h e P r o t a g o r e a n p r i n c i p l e c a n b e seen as i tself a n exempl i f i ca t ion o f the w i n d o w m o d e l . T h e q u e s t i o n is, w h y shou ld i t be?

B u t here w e m u s t reca l l t he d o u b l e pe rspec t ive I spoke of ea r l i e r . I t is P l a t o w h o h a s c o n t r i v e d t h a t t h e a r g u m e n t f r o m conf l ic t ing a p p e a r a n c e s c o m e s a f t e r the de f in i t i on of k n o w -ledge as p e r c e p t i o n a n d a f t e r t h e f o r m u l a t i o n o f t he P r o t a g o -r e a n p r inc ip le w h i c h s u p p o r t s i t . T h e w h o l e passage, as I n o t e d earlier, is p a r t of a n e l a b o r a t e work ing o u t of the i m p l i -c a t i o n s and c o m m i t m e n t s of t h e in i t i a l def in i t ion . T h e t r o u b l e is t h a t n o t h i n g h a s b e e n sa id so f a r as to w h y a n y o n e w o u l d b e t e m p t e d t o t h ink t h a t k n o w l e d g e is p e r c e p t i o n , a n d n o m o t i v a t i o n h a s b e e n g iven fo r a d o p t i n g the P r o t a g o r e a n p r i n -c ip l e except t h a t i t is necessary to d o so if t h e def in i t ion is to h o l d good. A n d even this c o n s i d e r a t i o n is n o t r i g h t ou t i n t o t h e o p e n yet . T h e discussion s ta r t s f r o m t h e de f in i t ion , as Soc ra t i c discussions typ ica l ly do , a n d Socra t e s tu rns a t o n c e to a r g u e , in t h e m a n n e r descr ibed , t h a t t h e def in i t ion requi res to b e s u p p o r t e d b y a P r o t a g o r e a n epis temology a n d so is effect ively e q u i v a l e n t t o t h e doc t r ine t h a t m a n is the m e a s u r e of all t h i n g s ; ' P r o t a g o r a s s a i d t h e s a m e t h i n g as T h e a e t e t u s b u t p u t i t a


d i f f e r en t w a y ' {152 A). O n l y la ter , as t h e discussion develops , is t h e r e a n o p p o r t u n i t y to go in to t h e ph i losoph ica l mo t iva t i ons for h o l d i n g a relat ivist ic view. A n d ' l a t e r ' m e a n s , i n t h e first ins t ance , t h e passage w e a r e looking at . T h a t passage p lays a d o u b l e ro le . Cons ide red as a d e v e l o p m e n t of t he pos i t ion a l r e a d y p remissed for e x a m i n a t i o n , i t m a y b e al lowed t o p r e -suppose t h e P r o t a g o r e a n p r inc ip le t h a t every p e r c e p t u a l a p p e a r -a n c e is t he m e a s u r e o r cr i te r ion of w h a t is t h e case f o r t h e p e r c e i v e r ; in wh ich ca se t h e a r g u m e n t goes t h r o u g h . B u t con-s ide red as P l a to ' s a t t e m p t to b r i n g o u t t he k i n d of t h i n k i n g w h i c h m o t i v a t e s p e r c e p t u a l re la t iv i sm, i t m u s t s t and o n i ts o w n feet.^ If , t h e n , we raise t h e ques t ion h o w P r o t a g o r a s h imsel f c a m e to t h e doc t r ine t h a t m a n is t h e m e a s u r e of al l th ings , if w e ask w h y he m a i n t a i n e d t h a t every a p p e a r a n c e is t h e m e a s u r e o r cr i te r ion of w h a t is t he case for t h e person whose a p p e a r a n c e i t is, P la to ' s answer is t h a t i t was h i s solution to t he p r o b l e m of conf l ic t ing a p p e a r a n c e s . I n t he Theaetetus, i n d e e d , t he m e a s u r e doc t r ine is ini t ia l ly i n t r o d u c e d a n d exp l a ined i n t e r m s of w h a t P r o t a g o r a s wou ld say a b o u t an e x a m p l e of conf l i c t ing a p p e a r a n c e s , t h e e x a m p l e of t h e w i n d w h i c h feels cold to one person a n d does no t feel cold t o ano the r (152 B). A n d t h e r e c a n h a r d l y b e a n y serious d i s p u t e t h a t P la to ' s answer is r i gh t . N o ph i losopher w h o was n o t an t eceden t ly w o r r i e d a b o u t conf l i c t ing a p p e a r a n c e s w o u l d p r o p o s e a t h o r o u g h g o i n g re la t iv i sm of t h e P r o t a g o r e a n k ind .

B u t th is m e a n s t h a t t h e w i n d o w m o d e l is n o t otiose. I f w e d o ask the a r g u m e n t f r o m conf l ic t ing a p p e a r a n c e s t o s t a n d o n its o w n fee t , it s tumbles . H e n c e i t is l eg i t imate t o suggest t h a t a n y o n e w h o finds i t persuas ive is l e a n i n g on s o m e ex t r a s u p p o r t , w h e t h e r or n o t h e is a w a r e of t he f ac t .

V

I n t e r e s t i n g l y — a n d this m a y help m y d iagnos is—we e n c o u n t e r a r a t h e r s imi la r p r o b l e m of d o u b l e pe r spec t ive in Berke ley ' s first Dialogue. H e r e w e find a w h o l e series of a r g u m e n t s f r o m conf l i c t ing a p p e a r a n c e s : t he case of sweet a n d bi t ter q u o t e d ear l ie r , t he f a m o u s e x a m p l e of t h e w a t e r w h i c h feels w a r m to

I Tha t the passage has this additional role is confirmed by comparing it with the immediately preceding 153 AD, which performs a parallel function for the Heraclitean component of Plato's dialectical construction. This is a light-hearted collection of Heraclitean considerations, capped by a joking inter-pretation of Homer, the whole making no contribution to the serious business


o n e h a n d a n d cold to t h e o t h e r , and m a n y more. B u t before e m b a r k i n g o n these a n d o t h e r a r g u m e n t s Berkeley h a s la id d o w n a n o t i o n of i m m e d i a t e pe rcep t ion w h i c h t u r n s ou t to e m b o d y a vers ion of t h e P r o t a g o r e a n p r i n c i p l e we h a v e been discussing. I m m e d i a t e p e r c e p t i o n is k n o w l e d g e (cf. T h e a e t e t u s ' def in i t ion) , w h a t is i m m e d i a t e l y perceived m u s t rea l ly be as i t appears t o be, h e n c e t h e s ta tes of affairs (ideas) a p p r e h e n d e d i n pe r cep t i on mus t v a r y to m a t c h each a n d every c h a n g e in sensible a p p e a r a n c e s . O r be t t e r , where t he P r o t a g o r e a n t h e o r y h a s real i ty c h a n g e to k e e p p a c e w i t h the c h a n g i n g a p p e a r a n c e s , f o r Berkeley the states of a f fa i r s a p p r e h e n d e d in i m m e d i a t e pe r cep t i on s imply a re t h e a p p e a r a n c e s . T h i s no t ion of i m m e d i -a t e pe r cep t i on defines a Berke leyan perspec t ive g r a n t e d w h i c h t h e ensu ing a r g u m e n t s a r e impeccab le . T h e t roub le is t h a t a t the s t a r t of the first Dialogue the ful l imp l i ca t ions of t h e no t ion of i m m e d i a t e p e r c e p t i o n a r e not b r o u g h t in to t h e o p e n , a n d if w e ask w h y we shou ld a c c e p t the n o t i o n , why w e shou ld a d o p t t h e Berke leyan pe r spec t ive , the a n s w e r is tha t i t is Berke-ley 's so lu t ion to the p r o b l e m of confl ic t ing a p p e a r a n c e s . As in t h e Theaetetus, so in t h e Three Dialogues, t h e n o t i o n w h i c h comes first in t h e o r d e r of exposi t ion shou ld , in t h e o r d e r of a r g u m e n t , c o m e last.

This is c l ea r if we c o m p a r e t h e Three Dialogues wi th Berke ley ' s earl ier w o r k , The Principles of Human Knowledge. I n t h a t t rea t i se a r g u m e n t s f r o m conf l ic t ing a p p e a r a n c e s a r e m u c h less p r o m i -nen t , t he r ea son b e i n g t h a t t h e y a re n o w n o t Berkeley 's o w n w e a p o n b u t p a r t of t h e a r m o u r y of the scep t ic w h o m h e takes as his o p p o n e n t . T h e conc lus ion f r o m the p remiss of conf l i c t ing a p p e a r a n c e s is no t t h e Three Dialogues conc lus ion bu t t h e scepti-c a l conclus ion u r g e d b y Sextus E m p i r i c u s : ' I t m u s t be confessed t h a t this m e t h o d of a r g u i n g d o t h n o t so m u c h prove t h a t t h e r e is no ex tens ion or co lou r in a n o u t w a r d ob jec t , as t h a t w e d o n o t know b y sense w h i c h is t h e t r u e ex tens ion or co lou r of t h e objec t ' (Princ. § 15). ( T h e echo of Sextus is n o a c c i d e n t : t h e r e is evidence t h a t Berkeley 's p r o j e c t for r e f u t i n g scept icism w a s c o n n e c t e d w i t h his r e a d i n g of the P y r r h o n i a n a r g u m e n t s t r a n s m i t t e d b y Bayle 's Dictionary.Y I n Berkeley 's v iew, t h e n , t h e ( P y r r h o n i a n ) scept ic has a good a r g u m e n t to s h o w t h a t 'Th ings r e m a i n i n g t h e same , o u r ideas v a r y , a n d w h i c h of t h e m , o r e v e n w h e t h e r a n y of t h e m at al l r ep resen t t h e t r u e qua l i t y r ea l l y existing in t he t h i n g , it is o u t of ou r r e a c h to

' Richard Popkin, 'Berkeley and Pyrrhonism', Review of Metaphysics 5

dete rmine ' [Princ. § 87). T h e only answer is to deny t h e contrast between h o w things appear a n d how they really a r e : 'Coiour, figure, mot ion , extension a n d the like, cons idered only as so m a n y sensations in the mind , a re perfectly known, there be ing noth ing in t h e m which is n o t perceived ' (ibid.) But n o w : to say there is n o t h i n g in the idea wh ich is not perceived a n d the reby perfectly k n o w n is to make explicit , in a cool theoret ical f o r m u -lat ion, the p r i m e des ide ra tum of the w indow mode l—trans -pa ren t , close-up version (Berkeley is f a m o u s for his denial t h a t sensible qual i t ies a r e at the dis tance we take t h e m to be). T h e thesis is t ha t , wha tever else m a y go on in w h a t we would o rd in -arily descr ibe as t h e seeing of a whi te stone, at t h e core of the process is a t ransparen t ly c lear ' immed ia t e ' awareness of whi te , a whi te wh ich is no t at a d is tance f r o m the eye.^ Instead of looking t h r o u g h t h e eye, w e enjoy a m o r e satisfactorily t rans -pa ren t v iew of t h e contents of our o w n minds. T o them we look t h r o u g h — n o t h i n g a t all . Th is is Berkeley's solution to t h e chal lenge of the sceptical use of conflict ing appearances .

But t h e Three Dialogues tries to r e c o m m e n d t h a t solution f rom the perspect ive of t h e o rd ina ry m a n . I t is a popula r ex-posit ion, wr i t t en to take r eade r s into the pr incip les of Berkeley's ph i losophy ' in t h e most easy a n d fami l ia r m a n n e r ' (Preface, p. 168). T o t h a t end Berkeley app rop r i a t e s the sceptic's a r g u -ments from confl ict ing appea rances and tries to m a k e them p r o v e directly t h a t sensible qualit ies do not i nhe re in o u t w a r d objects. T h e y w o u l d p r o v e this if t h e y could call o n the no t ion of i m m e -d ia te pe rcep t ion a n d the P ro tagorean pr inc ip le it embodies. Bu t these, of course, a re no p a r t of the o r d i n a r y m a n ' s perspective. A n d wi thou t t h a t assistance the a rgumen t s do n o more t h a n assert p ropos i t ion ( i ) for a succession of d i f fe ren t values of F. O n c e o r twice Berkeley transposes ( i ) i n t o (2). T h u s after c i t ing the j a u n d i c e example a n d an imals wi th d i f fe ren t ly textured eyes to show t h a t colours are n o t inheren t in any ou tward ob jec t , i.e. a f ter an a r g u m e n t w h i c h rests on ( i ) , he cont inues :

T h e po in t will be pas t all d o u b t , if you consider, t h a t in case colours were rea l proper t ies or affect ions inheren t in ex te rna l bodies, they could a d m i t of n o al terat ion, w i thou t some c h a n g e w r o u g h t in t he very bodies themselves, (p. 185)

But t h a t t ransposit ion, as w e have seen, is n o h e l p to the cause. A n d p e r h a p s i t only looks as if it m i g h t he lp because Berkeley's fo rmula t ion is ambiguous as be tween (2) a n d t h e qui te d i f fe ren t

' At Siris § 317 Berkeley endorses the Theaeteius account of white.

•p*'·****" !̂— ·̂—^nr-· ' • -η- ----- . of it , the colour could n o t actual ly change (as opposea^Tor i r could not a p p e a r to change) w i t h o u t a c h a n g e in the th ing itself. This pr inc ip le could well seem plausible, b u t it is i rrele-v a n t here, since the examples Berkeley is t a lk ing abou t are examples of a p p a r e n t changes in t h e colour of a th ing. T h e s a m e goes for a la ter passage on p r i m a r y qual i t ies :

N o rea l inherent proper ty of a n y object c a n be changed , without some c h a n g e in the th ing itself. . . . Bu t as we approach to o r recede f r o m an objec t , the visible extension varies, b e i n g at one dis tance ten o r an h u n d r e d times g rea te r t han a t ano the r . Doth it n o t therefore follow f r o m hence likewise, tha t it is n o t really inherent in t he object? (p. 189)

T h e principle of the a r g u m e n t talks about r e a l change, the i l lustration a b o u t a p p a r e n t c h a n g e in size, so w h a t is c la imed to follow does n o t follow a t all.

T h e r e is n o gett ing a w a y f r o m this dist inct ion. I t is one t h i n g to say t h a t the real or i n h e r e n t features of an object can-n o t be a.mong those t h a t a r e a f fec ted by changes externa l to the object, e.g. in the s u r r o u n d i n g env i ronmen t or in t h e per-ceiver. This means , roughly , t h a t t h e real i n h e r e n t fea tures of an object m u s t no t be re la t iona l (cf. Sext. E m p . Λί viii. 4 5 3 - 7 ) . I t is quite a n o t h e r to suggest t h a t the real inheren t fea tures c a n n o t be a m o n g those t h a t appear to vary w i t h changes out-side the object . T h e la t te r p r inc ip le is the o n e whose pe r sua -siveness we a re trying to d iagnose ; confusion wi th the f o r m e r occurs too se ldom to expla in its pervasive in f luence in t h e first Dialogue. I n t h e end, I th ink , if Berkeley or his reader is led by the a r g u m e n t f rom confl ic t ing appearances to accept the conclusion t h a t sensible quali t ies d o not i n h e r e in o u t w a r d things, it is in good m e a s u r e d u e to the suppor t ing in f luence of the ha l f - formula ted t h o u g h t — h a l f - f o r m u l a t e d because it is suggested b u t n o t fully spelt ou t w h e n the n o t i o n of i m m e d i a t e percept ion is first i n t r o d u c e d — t h a t every pe rcep tua l exper ience contains w i th in it a direct awareness of something. W h i c h is to say that Berkeley's r ebu t t a l of scepticism in t h e first Dialogue only works to the extent t ha t a n in ternal ized version of the window m o d e l is implici t ly present all along.

V I

Is it just coincidence t h a t the ambiguit ies of the Theaetetus a r g u m e n t a n d of Berkeley's first Dialogue r u n paral le l? I have a l ready m e n t i o n e d tha t Berkeley himself t h o u g h t the Theaetetus

1

104 PROCEEDINGS O F T H E BRITISH ACADEMY

theory exactly like his own. Perhaps, then, the common features can tell us something about why relativistic views have exercised such a strong hold on the philosophy of perception.

Our inheritance from Protagoras and Berkeley is modern sense-datum theory, which has reworked the old materials in a manner which may tend to disguise their essentially rela-tivistic character. But it is quite profitable, I think, to read the seemingly sterile disputes about whether sense-data can exist unsensed, or whether they can be identified with parts of the surfaces of things, as disputes about the possibility of restoring some independence and externality to one term of the Prota-gorean relation. Better still, we can recognize a rather explicit expression of the window model in the notion, central to sense-datum theory, of sensing or acquaintance or direct awareness— the terminology varies but most theorists are agreed that the relation we have to the object or sense-datum which is pre-sented to us in perceptual experience is a relation of unmediated non-inferential knowing (cf. Theaetetus' definition).^

Predictably, it is G. E. Moore who gives the most 'window-like' account of the matter : When we refer to introspection and try to discover what the sensation of blue is, it is very easy to suppose that we have before us only a single term. The term 'blue' is easy enough to distinguish, but the other element which I have called 'consciousness'—that which sensation of blue has in common with sensation of green—is extremely difficult to fix. That many people fail to distinguish it at all is sufficiently shown by the fact that there are materialists. And, in general, that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact seems to escape us: it seems, if I may use a metaphor, to be transparent—we look through it and see nothing but the blue. ('The Refutation of Idealism', Philosophical Studies, p. 20.)

So nearly explicit a picture of an internal window may help to make plausible what I said about an internalized version of the window model in Berkeley. Moore comes back to it later:

When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other element is as if it were diaphanous, (p. 25)

This 'other element', the sensation or consiousness, Moore says is in fact a 'knowing' or 'being aware o f or 'experiencing' something, viz. blue (p. 24). Admittedly, Moore does not here

' See, for example, H. H. Price, Perception (London, 1932), pp. 3, 31; C. D. Broad, 'Some Elementary Reflexions on Sense-Preception' (1952), cited from Swartz, op. cit., p. 44.


talk his usual sense-datum language about blue, but his dia-phanous awareness of blue is a good preparation for it.

If other sense-datum theorists are less candidly revealing about the pictures which guide their thinking, they tell us more about the philosophical motivation for bringing in the notion of sensing or acquaintance. Russell sums up the results of the first chapter of The Problems of Philosophy in these terms :

What the senses immediately tell us is not the truth about the object as it is apart from us, but only the truth about certain sense-data which, so far as we can see, depend upon the relations between us and the object. Thus what we directly see and feel is merely 'appearance', which we believe to be a sign of some 'reality' behind, (p. 16)

This direct seeing and feeling of appearances or sense-data is what he later calls acquaintance or direct awareness, where this is one kind of knowledge of things (p. 46). But remember that chapter i of The Problems of Philosophy begins with the arguments from conflicting appearances which I cited at the outset of this lecture. So in Russell's case also it is reflection on conflicting appearances which is supposed to lead us to adopt the notion of acquaintance.

The examples of conflicting appearances bring to our atten-tion the fact that, as Russell puts it in the passage just quoted, 'sense-data . . . depend upon the relations between us and the object'. And it is clear from the discussion which precedes that what Russell means by this is that the way things appear to us at a given moment from a given point of view is causally dependent on the state of our sensory apparatus, the condition of the inter-vening medium, on perspectival effects and so on. ΑΠ of which is undeniably correct. But unless ( i) is true, for which Russell offers no independent argument, none of this shows that the colour or the shape which the table appears to have is not its real colour or shape. It shows only that if and when the table does appear the colour or the shape it really is, it does so thanks to the causal interaction of our sensory apparatus with a variety of environmental factors. And this, I think, is what at bottom Russell is getting at when he invokes the notion of what we directly or immediately see and feel. His idea is that if, per impossibile, the senses could tell us about 'the object as it is apart from us', they would have to do so directly or immediately, where 'directly' and 'immediately' can only mean: not by way of a causal interaction between us and the environment.


N o d o u b t Russe l l would n o t like th is w a y of p u t t i n g i t . T h e idea on ly w o r k s because i t r e m a i n s h a l f - f o r m u l a t e d . B u t t h a t i t is t h e i d e a w h i c h g u i d e s h is t h o u g h t is c o n f i r m e d w h e n h e says t h a t we d o directly a n d i m m e d i a t e l y see a n d feel t h e sense-da ta o r a p p e a r a n c e s w h i c h themselves d e p e n d upon t h e re la t ion b e t w e e n us and t h e ob jec t . All t h e causa l aspects of the p e r c e p t u a l process hav ing b e e n assigned to t h e p r o d u c t i o n of sense-da ta , to t h e b r ing ing a b o u t of t h e r e l a t ion o f a c q u a i n -tance , t h a t r e l a t ion itself is le f t f ree of causa l i ty .

W e are b a c k a t Tkeaetetus 154 AB. C a u s a l i t y m a k e s the a p -p e a r a n c e s re la t ive t o the cond i t i ons of p e r c e p t i o n , and t h a t wrecks t h e h o p e o f a t r a n s p a r e n t view of t he e x t e r n a l o b j e c t w i th its rea l ( i nhe ren t ) p roper t i es . But w e c a n save t r a n s p a r e n c y b y m a k i n g t h e ' i m m e d i a t e ' o b j e c t of p e r c e p t i o n p r i v a t e to t h e perce iver a n d b y abol i sh ing t h e d is tance b e t w e e n subject a n d ob j ec t ; t h u s Russe l l locates sense -da ta in t h e p r i v a t e ( a p p a r e n t ) space of t h e i n d i v i d u a l pe r ce ive r , a g a i n o n g r o u n d s h a v i n g to d o w i th conf l i c t ing a p p e a r a n c e s (pp. 2 9 - 3 0 ) .

Not ice , t he re fo re , t h a t if t h e r e were such a t h i n g as pe r cep t i on w i t h o u t causa l i ty , p ropos i t ion (2) w o u l d very l ikely be t r u e . A g rea t m a n y , a t least , of t h e cases w h e r e a t h i n g w h i c h is r ea l ly F a p p e a r s t o s o m e o n e n o t t o b e F a r e cases of i n t e r f e r ence o r -b r e a k d o w n in t h e causal process b y w h i c h w e o b t a i n i n f o r m a -t ion t h r o u g h the senses. M o r e o v e r , (2) does h o l d fo r sense-data . A s e n s e - d a t u m of necessity r ea l ly is as i t a p p e a r s t o be to t h e one observer w h o h a s access t o i t ; (2) ho lds he r e j u s t because causal i ty does n o t get in t h e way . B u t Russe l l ' s a r g u m e n t rests o n ( i ) , w h i c h we s a w t o b e e q u i v a l e n t to (2). So t h e a r g u m e n t h a s t h e same a m b i g u i t y as w e f o u n d i n Berkeley a n d the Tkeaetetus. W h a t is supposed t o c o m e o u t of it is a cool t heo re t i ca l f o r m u l a t i o n of t he w i n d o w m o d e l : the thesis t h a t w e h a v e knowledge b y a c q u a i n t a n c e or d i r ec t awareness of sense-da ta . Bu t t h e a r g u m e n t only w o r k s to t h e extent t h a t a h a l f - f o r m u l a t e d version of t h e w i n d o w m o d e l is p resen t f r o m the s ta r t . I t is p r e s e n t because ( i ) , wh ich is f o r m u l a t e d , r educes to (2), w h i c h c o n t a i n s (in i ts first d i s junc t ) t h e u n f o r m u l a t e d d e m a n d for t r a n s p a r e n c y .

I will n o t v e n t u r e to assert t h a t w h a t I say t h r e e t imes is t r u e . But a t least , if i t is t rue , it c a n h a r d l y b e c o i n c i d e n c e tha t i t is t r ue . T h a t is o n e g a i n f r o m fo l lowing the fortuna o f t h e w i n d o w m o d e l i n m o d e r n t imes . A n o t h e r ga in is t h a t w e h a v e come t o see t h a t t h e a p p e a l of t he w i n d o w m o d e l is connec t ed w i t h worries a b o u t causal i ty . Pe rcep t ion , it is felt , o u g h t not to b e


m e d i a t e d by a c a u s a l process.^ Bu t a las , t h a t c a n n o t be. T h e t r u t h is tha t t he w i n d o w m o d e l is u t t e r l y i n a p p r o p r i a t e to t h e r ea l f a c t s of p e r c e p t i o n . B u t i n s t e a d o f coming t o te rms w i t h reaUty , o u r theor i s t s find a p l a c e for t h e window m o d e l w i t h i n p e r c e p t i o n . L e t causa l i ty d o i ts wors t : a t the co re of the p e r -c e p t u a l exper ience t h e r e wil l still be a n u n m e d i a t e d k n o w i n g , l ike M o o r e ' s d i a p h a n o u s awareness of b lue , a n d w h e n a su i t ab le s tory h a s been to ld a b o u t t h e ob jec t s of this k n o w i n g , t h e p r o b l e m of conf l i c t ing a p p e a r a n c e s is solved. I t is a p h a n t a s y so lu t ion , in a q u i t e p r o p e r sense. F o r i f my ef for ts a t d iagnosis h a v e h i t the m a r k , t h e conf l ic t of a p p e a r a n c e s o n l y ever b e c a m e t h e p r o b l e m these theorists t o o k i t to b e because th i s was g o i n g to b e t h e solut ion.

V I I

A t th i s point , n o w t h a t w e h a v e c o n n e c t e d t h e w i n d o w m o d e l w i t h a desire to c u t f ree f r o m t h e t r a m m e l s o f causal i ty , w e s h o u l d t u r n a s ide br ief ly t o t h e field of mora ls . O n t h e face of i t , if conf l ic t ing a p p e a r a n c e s a r e a p r o b l e m here , i t should b e a d i i ï e r e n t p r o b l e m . W e do n o t ascr ibe m o r a l p r o p e r t i e s to th ings , as w e ascribe sensible qual i t ies , on t h e basis of a causal t r a n s -a c t i o n be tween u s a n d t h e m . T h a t m a y h o l d somet imes of p r e d i c a t e s like ' n i c e ' a n d ' n a s t y ' , p r e d i c a t e s w h i c h mere ly express a r eac t ion to th ings . But i t ce r t a in ly d o e s not h o l d of t e r m s l ike ' r i g h t ' and ' w r o n g ' or ' loya l ' , ' h o n e s t ' , ' cha r i t ab l e ' , a n d ' b r a v e ' . T r u e , t he c r u d e r f o r m o f emot iv i s t theory assimilates m o r a l p r e d i c a t e s to p r e d i c a t e s of r e a c t i o n , b u t the v e r y imp laus ib i l i t y of t h a t ass imi la t ion is s t r o n g e v i d e n c e t h a t m o r a l conflict o u g h t

' T h e day after this lecture was delivered, there arrived on my desk a copy of Mind 88 (Jan. 1979), containing Maurice Charlesworth's paper, 'Sense-impressions : A New Model'. The 'new model' is none other than the window model, recommended as a means of picturing a role for sensations in percep-tion which does not make them representative of external things. Roughly, if we can perceive the world through sensations as through a transparent window-pane, we will not be stuck with the traditionally problematic notion that we perceive sensations instead of the world outside (which they merely represent), and by this means we can avoid the dilemmatic choice between representative realism and phenomenalism. I t is most instructive to see how, to make the model work, Charlesworth eventually finds it necessary to abandon simple transparency and imagine a physics for the glass we look through, a physics which makes its own contribution to the way things appear to us. In other words, he has to make the window a properly causal medium. Just this is what Berkeley and Russell are unwilling to do for immediate awareness.

96 P R O C E E D I N G S OF T H E B R I T I S H A C A D E M Y

to be a qu i t e d i f fe ren t type of issue, with difficulties of its own a n d pecul iar to itself.

All too of ten , however , w h a t one finds in the philosophical l i te ra ture is a repet i t ion of the deba t e a b o u t sensible qualities. T h e same f o r m of a r g u m e n t is used (in Sextus, as we saw earlier, t he para l le l is del iberate a n d explicit , a n d it w a s almost certainly t h a t way i n Protagoras also) ; o f t en there is the s ame rel iance on a my th i ca l example which for some reason people w a n t to bel ieve ( those distant t r ibes who h a v e sexual intercourse in publ ic a re a recur r ing presence in Greek l i t e ra ture f r o m Herodo tus onwards , and they are still a t it in Montaigne) .^ But over a n d above these paral lels w i th the d e b a t e a b o u t percept ion, the re is also in t h e mora l d e b a t e a p reoccupa t ion with percept ion itself, and it is this tha t we need to scrutinize.

W h e n M a c k i e presents ' t h e a r g u m e n t f r o m relativity ' for the thesis t h a t m o r a l values a r e no t object ive, n o t p a r t of t h e fabr ic of the wor ld (note the ini t ial choice of m e t a p h o r [p. 15]), he starts off b y acknowledging tha t the d ivergence in m o r a l beliefs be tween o n e group a n d another is in itself mere ly 'a f ac t of an thropology which entai ls nei ther first o rder n o r second order ethical views' (p. 36) . Nevertheless, such divergence requires exp lana t ion . T h e n e x t step is to a r g u e t h a t the d iver -gences in belief w o u l d be diff icul t to expla in on the a s sumpt ion tha t m o r a l values are object ive, whereas on the opposite as-sumpt ion t h a t values are n o t objective the divergences c a n qui te reasonably b e explained as d u e ( a n d Mack ie must m e a n they are all entirely due) to local or pe rsona l differences in the ways of life which give rise (by a process of p ro jec t ion or objec-tification) to the conflicting value-systems. H o w , t h e n , is it to b e shown t h a t the objectivist will find it diff icult to explain m o r a l conflict a n d d isagreement?

For this key s tep in the a r g u m e n t Mack ie offers just two models for unde r s t and ing d isagreement . O n e is d i sagreement be tween scientific investigators in cases whe re the issue is object ive b u t the evidence is insufficient to decide between the speculat ive hypotheses f avoured by d i f ferent investigators (p. 36). Th i s , w e may agree, is not a p laus ib le paral le l for t h e moral case. T h e other m o d e l is d ivergence in percept ion:^

1 Apologie de Raimond Sebond, Essais ed. Pierre Villey (Paris, 1922), ii. p . 341. Monta igne also retails, as we would expect, both the honey and the j aund ice exaraples (pp. 348, 362).

2 Cf. Gilbert K a r m a n , The Nature of Morality (New York, 1977), c h a p , i , who asks whether mora l principles can be tested and confirmed and proceeds

T h e a r g u m e n t f r o m relat ivi ty h a s some forcc simply b e c a u s e the a c t u a l v a r i a t i o n s in t h e m o r a l codes a r c m o r e readily e x p l a i n e d by t h e hypo thes i s that t h e y reflect w a y s of life t h a n by the hypothes is t h a t they express pe rcep t ions , most of t h e m seriously i n a d e q u a t e and b a d l y d i s to r t ed , of ob jec t ive values, (p. 37)

But w h y would t h e objectivist have n o choice b u t this? W h y must b e treat m o r a l divergence, like perceptua l divergence, as a s t ra igh t fo rward indica t ion of e r ro r on somebody 's p a r t , a n d t h e n explain moral e r ro r on t h e analogy of pe rcep tua l e r ro r? Mackie says, and this is his second a r g u m e n t aga ins t the objectivity of values, ' t h e a r g u m e n t f rom qucerness '—

If t h e r e were ob jec t ive values, t h e n they w o u l d be ent i t ies o r qual i t ies o r r e l a t ions of a ve ry s t r ange sort , u t t e r l y d i f f e r en t f r o m a n y t h i n g else in t h e universe . Cor re spond ing ly , i f w e were a w a r e of t h e m , i t would h a v e to be b y some spec ia l facul ty of m o r a l pe r cep t i on or i n t u i t i o n , u t t e r l y d i f f e r e n t from o u r o r d i n a r y w a y s of k n o w i n g eve ry th ing else. (p. 38)

I t is Mackie w h o in t roduces the pe rcep tua l mode l , not his objectivist o p p o n e n t , M a c k i e who claims t h a t object ivism m u s t sooner or la ter t u r n in to intui t ionism : ' In tu i t ion i sm mere ly makes u n p a l a t a b l y p la in w h a t other fo rms of objec-t ivism wrap u p ' (ibid.). No t only should the objectivist d i spu te this assertion, b u t he should not ice t h a t the on ly substant ive a r g u m e n t M a c k i e offers for it is t he following: w h e n peop le j u d g e that some things a r e good o r right, a n d others b a d or wrong , for the mos t pa r t t hey do so 'not because—or a t a n y ra te n o t only because—they exempl i fy some genera l pr inc ip le for which widespread implic i t acceptance cou ld be c la imed, b u t because someth ing a b o u t those things arouses ce r t a in responses immedia te ly in t hem, though they would a rouse radical ly and irresolvably d i f fe ren t responses in others. ' M o r a l sense' or ' in tu i t ion ' is an ini t ial ly m o r e plausible descr ipt ion of w h a t supplies m a n y of our basic m o r a l j u d g e m e n t s t h a n ' reason ' . W i t h regard to all these s ta r t ing points of m o r a l th inking the a r g u m e n t f r o m relativity r emains in full force ' (p. 378) I t is the emotivist assimilation to predica tes of r e a c t i o n / over la id by a perceptua l gloss. T h a t is why t h e a r g u m e n t f rom relat ivi ty

to inquire whether they can be tested and confirmed by observation, only to find tha t ' there does not seem to be any way in which t h e actual Tightness or wrongness of a given situation can have any effect on your perceptual appara tus ' (p. 8).

^ Cf. p. 42 where , to illustrate our projection or objectification of moral attitudes, Mackie uses the analogy of someone who calls a fungus foul because it fills h i m with disgust.

gS PROCEJiUlINCjS u r ι π Ε . o r v i i i o i i i

remains in full force. M o r a l predicates express a n immedia te response or reac t ion to things, so if t he object ivist is to m a k e intell igible the not ion of a mistaken app l ica t ion of such p re -dicates, h e mus t say t h a t something goes w r o n g in the t r ans -action be tween us and t h e m . A n d for this it is no d o u b t t rue t h a t the on ly decent model we h a v e is t h e model of misperceiving.

T h u s Mack ie ' s whole case rests on the premiss that , for the most p a r t a t least, we a p p l y mora l predica tes to things, as we apply sensory predicates , o n the basis of a t ransac t ion be tween us a n d t h e m . A t this po in t Mackie ' s accoun t of morals real ly is para l le l to Democr i tus ' account of secondary quali t ies . ' Any sensible objectivist w h o denies the premiss gets off scot free. But w h a t is of interest h e r e is the w a y Mack ie argues t h a t a p e r c e p t u a l mode l for the supposed t ransac t ion breaks d o w n , a n d can b e seen to be absu rd , as soon as one t r ies to fill in a cer ta in a m o u n t of as it we re 'causal ' deta i l to explain w h a t h a p p e n s w h e n things go wrong . I n effect , M a c k i e first projects u p o n t h e objectivist his own a t t a c h m e n t to the window mode l , t r anspa ren t d is tance version (an in tu i t ion of non -na tu ra l qua l i -ties ou t there in t h e fabric of the world) , a n d t h e n he compla ins tha t the mode l is unrealist ic because it c a n n o t cope wi th the conflict of appearances . H e n c e values a re subjective. A n d this does seem remarkab ly like Democr i tus conc lud ing that h o n e y is ne i the r sweet n o r bit ter on the g rounds that , whi le it a p p e a r s sweet to you a n d me, it also appears b i t te r—so Sextus assures us (PH i. 101), a n d Sextus was a doctor·—to people wi th j a u n d i c e .

V I I I

N o n e of this shows, of course, t h a t m o r a l values a r e objective or t ha t the object ivist can in f ac t give a plausible account of m o r a l d isagreement . Likewise, m y earlier discussion d id n o t a t t e m p t to prove t h a t sensible qualit ies a re inheren t in the th ings we ascr ibe them to. I h a v e no t a rgued tha t there is n o t r u t h in relat ivism or in subject ivism, whe the r these a re t aken as theories a b o u t values, a b o u t secondary qual i t ies or a b o u t p r i m a r y quali t ies as well. I h a v e criticized w h a t may in ful l p ropr ie ty be cal led the classical a rguments for relativism a n d subjectivism, b u t I have cri t icized t hem chiefly wi th a view to unde r s t and ing their appea l . A n y o n e who teaches outside the walls of a convent ional

' Cf. also Mackie's remarks on the extent to which moral values exist by convention, pp. 36, 42 ff.

C O N F L I C T I N G APPEAKANUKS 99 university phi losophy d e p a r t m e n t soon finds t h a t these a rgu-m e n t s are a p o t e n t force in the wide r cul ture of our society: as po ten t as t h e y were in anc ien t Greece. T h e y seem to come na tura l ly , of the i r own accord , to m a n y people u n t u t o r e d in philosophy, as soon as t h e y engage with Herac l i tus ' ques t ion, h o w far our l anguage a n d t h e ways we ord inar i ly speak a b o u t th ings can c l a im absolute val idi ty. Argumen t s which have t h a t kind of a p p e a l call fo r diagnosis as m u c h as for s t ra ight-f o r w a r d logical appraisal .

I shall r e t u r n to this m a t t e r of diagnosis, b u t first, to p r e v e n t misunders tand ing , there a re several fur ther points I should ment ion , if only to make it c lear w h e r e they fit in and w h a t I do a n d do not w a n t to say a b o u t t h e m .

( i ) I have n o t said, no r d o I believe, that t h e window mode l is a n aber ra t ion of phi losophers whose worries a b o u t conflict ing appea rances t ake a re lat ivis t or subjectivist t u rn . A n o t h e r adhe ren t of t h e p ic ture is P l a to himself.

P l a to sets u p relativism in the Theaetetus in order to a rgue t h a t when its implicat ions a n d c o m m i t m e n t s are fol lowed t h r o u g h it will be seen to lead to mul t ip le absurdit ies, n o t the least of which is tha t in t h e end those pr ivate , relative occur -rences of whi te a n d other sensible quali t ies c a n n o t be ident i f ied or described as, e.g., whi te r a t h e r t h a n anyth ing else; pe rcep tua l relativism m a k e s language impossible. W h a t P l a t o most objects to in the k ind of empir ic ism represented by Theae te tus ' defi-n i t ion and Pro tagoras ' ep is temology is tha t i t covertly assigns to pe rcep tua l experience as such those func t ions of t h o u g h t wh ich are r equ i r ed for t h e perceiver to ident i fy wha t his ex-per ience is of. H i s target in this po lemic is the Berkeleyan view t h a t one has only to sense whi te to know i t for w h a t it is. Accordingly, w h e n the Theaetetus goes on ( 1 8 4 B - 7 A ) to give Pla to ' s own accoun t of t h e m a t t e r , a very s h a r p dist inction is d r a w n be tween percept ion a n d j u d g e m e n t . I t is one t h i n g to perceive a colour , qui te a n o t h e r to j u d g e or b e aware t h a t it is t he colour whi te . However , in thus arguing t h a t percept ion as such cannot be knowledge, because percept ion o n its own has no p o w e r of j u d g e m e n t or conceptua l iza t ion , P l a to himself makes h e a v y use of t h e window m o d e l in t h e interests of an i m p o r t a n t thesis about t h e uni ty of the perceiving consciousness. '

» See my 'Plato on the Grammar of Perceiving', Classical Quarterly NS 26 (1976), PP· 29-51, to which I must refer for a detailed defence of the inter-pretation sketched out here.

1

ΙΟΟ PROCEEDINGS OF T H E BRITISH ACADEMY

Pla to ' s c o n t e n t i o n is t h a t w e canno t m a k e sense o f percep t ion (whe the r as phi losophers o r as perceivers) e x c e p t in t e r m s of a u n i t a r y m i n d or soul w h i c h can t h i n k a n d reason a b o u t t he ob jec t s of d i f f e ren t senses a n d m a k e c o m p a r i s o n s be tween th ings pe rce ived a t d i f fe ren t t imes. I t m u s t be o n e a n d t h e s a m e e n d u r i n g soul which perce ives all t h e objects o f the several senses a n d i t m u s t be tha t s a m e p a r t of ourselves wh ich app l ies t h o u g h t to w h a t w e perceive. F o r this thesis P l a t o offers cool theore t i ca l a r g u m e n t , r a t h e r good a r g u m e n t , b u t in add i t i on h e helps t he a r g u m e n t a l o n g wi th mode l s a n d m e t a p h o r s . I f t he re w e r e n o u n i t a r y consciousness, t h e several senses w o u l d be like t h e b a n d of war r io rs in t he w o o d e n horse a t Troy, e a c h ca r ry ing o n his p e r c e p t u a l ac t iv i ty i n d e p e n d e n t l y of the o the r s a n d of t h e w h o l e which c o n t a i n s t h e m . I n p lace o f this p i c t u r e P la to p u t s a n o t h e r , be t t e r one. Co lour s a n d o t h e r sensible qual i t ies a r e o u t there , w i t h a (non- re la t ive) n a t u r e or essence of the i r o w n ; t h e soul ga ins access to t h e m t h r o u g h the senses o r sense-organs ; a n d we a r e e n c o u r a g e d t o take t h e prepos i t ion ' t h r o u g h ' , o n w h i c h m u c h emphas i s is l a id , as a spat ial m e t a -p h o r . ^ T h e m e t a p h o r of o r g a n s or senses as a p e r t u r e s fo r t h e soul to pe rce ive t h r o u g h c o n j u r e s u p a p i c t u r e of a un i t a ry soul wh ich , because i t s tands b a c k as i t w e r e f r o m t h e ind iv idua l senses, is ab le b o t h to pe rce ive t he ob jec t s of m o r e t h a n o n e sense a n d to t h i n k abou t w h a t it perce ives in genera l t e r m s . I n a w o r d , a u n i t a r y soul , a n d on ly a u n i t a r y soul, c a n be conscious.

All th is s t ands i n power fu l con t ra s t t o t h e empi r i c i sm i n i t i a t e d b y T h e a e t e t u s ' def in i t ion . I f t he empi r ic i s t w e r e to r ep ly b y press ing P l a t o w i t h his o w n a r g u m e n t a t 154 AB, the a n s w e r w o u l d b e t h a t i t does no t w o r k because t h e n o t i o n of a p p e a r i n g a l r e a d y i n c o r p o r a t e s t h e perce iver ' s t h o u g h t o r j u d g e m e n t (cf Sophist 264 B), and i t is t h o u g h t w h i c h appl ies t h e p red ica tes ' F ' or ' n o t - F ' t o th ings ; t h e p e r c e p t u a l e l e m e n t i n a p p e a r a n c e c a n be desc r ibed in causa l t e r m s b u t t h a t is all t he re is t o say a b o u t i t .

I g ive this v e r y s u m m a r y sketch of P la to ' s o w n pos i t ion , n o t because I t h ink his final answer sa t i s fac tory , bu t b e c a u s e I t h ink t h a t h is use of t h e w i n d o w m o d e l b r i n g s out a n i m -p o r t a n t p o i n t . So far f r o m be ing a n a b e r r a t i o n of c e r t a i n empi r ic i s t phi losophers , t h e p i c t u r e associa ted w i t h the m o d e l is one compe l l i ng ly n a t u r a l expression of t h e d i f f icul ty of c o m i n g

' I t was this, presumably, tha t inspired the explicit window comparison attacked by Lucretius (III p. 84 above).

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to t e r m s with w h a t it is to b e bo th in the wor ld a n d cogn i zan t of t h e world. T h e eyes a n d the r e m a i n i n g senr.ory a p p a r a t u s of t h e body a r e e n t a n g l e d in the causa l m e c h a n i s m s wh ich a r e necessary to p e r c e p t i o n . I n ce r t a in ph i losophica l moods it m a y str ike us t h a t t h e y are too m u c h in t h e world t o b e cogn i zan t of i t . T o exp la in p e r c e p t u a l consciousness it is t h e n t e m p t i n g to i m a g i n e onese l f s t and ing off , as i t were , f r o m o n e ' s own b o d y a n d its causal invo lvements , looking t h rough i t ( to use P l a t o ' s a m b i g u o u s p repos i t ion) a t t h e w o r l d beyond . A n d here too, as i n t h e empir ic is ts , t he m e t a p h o r i c a l looking is f r e e of causa l i ty , b e c a u s e the causa l i ty gets u s e d u p , so to speak , in the b o d y ' s in t e rac t ion w i t h t he e n v i r o m e n t .

(2) I have n o t sa id a n y t h i n g a b o u t the i n a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of t he w i n d o w m o d e l to senses o t h e r t h a n sight. I h a v e n o t d o n e this because w h a t is i n t e re s t ing a n d reveal ing a b o u t the m o d e l is t h e way i n w h i c h it is i n a d e q u a t e to t he specific m o d e of pe rcep t ion , n a m e l y sight, b y w h i c h i t is insp i red . I t has o f t e n b e e n r e m a r k e d t h a t t he p h i l o s o p h y of p e r c e p t i o n has t e n d e d t o g ive the p r i m a c y to s ight , a l lowing the o ther senses to p r o v i d e u s e f u l examples of i l lusion or conf l ic t ing a p p e a r a n c e s b u t o therwise l eav ing t h e m t o t a g a long . P e r h a p s the w i n d o w m o d e l has s o m e t h i n g to d o w i t h th i s t endency .

I n this c o n n e c t i o n t h e Theaetetus passage w e s ta r ted f r o m is q u i t e r evea l ing . I t sets f o r t h i ts thesis in t e r m s of c o l o u r predica tes , a n d w h e n i t does c o m e to m e n t i o n others , t he examples g i v e n a r e ' l a rge ' a n d ' h o t ' . N o w ' l a rge ' is c lear ly suggested b y t h e P r o t a g o r e a n i m a g e of pe rce iv ing as m e a s u r i n g . W e are to t h i n k of a s i t ua t ion in w h i c h w e l i teral ly m e a s u r e ourselves a g a i n s t an o b j e c t in o r d e r to e s t i m a t e its size b y c o m p a r i s o n w i t h ou r o w n . T h a t is, t h e e x a m p l e invites a v i sua l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n aga in . W h a t is m o r e , it invi tes us to p i c t u r e o u r o w n b o d y as wi th in t h e v isual field.

I t would , howeve r , b e pe r fec t ly possible to t a k e one ' s inspi-r a t i o n from a sense o the r t h a n sight . C. D. B r o a d once p r e s e n t e d t h e a r g u m e n t f r o m conf l ic t ing a p p e a r a n c e s in i m a g e s of j u m p i n g a n d g rasp ing :

I n its purely phenomenologicai aspect seeing is ostensibly saltatory. I t seems to leap the spatial gap between the percipient's body and a remote region of space. Then, again, it is ostensibly prehensive of the surfaces of distant bodies as coloured and extended, and of external events as colour-occurrences localized in remote regions of space. ('Some Elementary Reflexions on Sense-Perception', op. cit., p. 32.)

Given this image ry to work with, Broad ' s conclusion f r o m the usual survey of conflicting appea rances is t ha t t h e phenomeno-logy is mis leading, the d i s tance to those r e m o t e regions can -no t be j u m p e d , so we h a v e to say t h a t p e r c e p t u a l experiences are 'p rehens ions ' of non-physical pa r t i cu la r s which do real ly have t h e qual i t ies of redness, squeakiness, hotness , etc., wh ich they a p p e a r to h a v e (p. 42) . I t is the Theaetetus a r g u m e n t aga in , conduc ted in t e rms of m o v e m e n t a n d t h e m o d a l i t y of t ouch .

N o w Broad ' s ^prehensions' have a m o r e e m b o d i e d p receden t in the hand-ges tures wi th wh ich Zeno of C i t i u m il lustrated the Stoic theory of t h e cata lept ic or 'g rasp ing ' impression (Cicero, Academica i. 41, ii. 145), a t r u th -gua ran t ee ing experience which the Stoics also imaged as a perfect p i c tu re of its object (Sext. E m p . M vii. 248) and as a clear a n d dist inct impression of it (Diogenes Laer t ius vii. 46) . T h e d i f fe rence is that, whe re Broad has to content himself with a non-phys ica l grasp of a non-physica l par t icu lar , t h e Stoics h a v e e n o u g h faith i n the n a t u r a l adap tedness of o u r faculties to the universe we live in to be whole -hea r ted physicalists. T h e i r grasping, p ic tur ing or clear a n d dis t inct impression is a causal ly de te rmined , whol ly physical process in which one body , the perceiver , achieves cer ta in t ru th a b o u t a n o t h e r body. W h a t links t h e bodily g rasp of the Stoics to Broad's e ther ia l prehensions is o u r word 'per -cept ion ' . I t comes f rom t h e La t in 'percep t io ' , m e a n i n g ' a t ak ing hold ο f ' , wh ich was one of Cicero's t rans la t ions of t h e Stoic t e rm 'catalepsis ' , grasp (cf. Cic. Acad. ii. 17). I t looks very m u c h as t h o u g h the idea of percept ion as a firm grasp of an object is some sort of ant i thesis to t h e w i n d o w model , a n d p e r h a p s a d i f ferent , if r a t h e r less c o m m o n , w a y of coping wi th the s ame u l t i m a t e p rob lem.

(3) I h a v e n o t so far said any th ing a b o u t a rgumen t s in wh ich the premise of conflicting appea rances is over t ly and del iber-ately c o m b i n e d with f u r t h e r premisses. Mos t of the scept ical a r g u m e n t s in Sextus a re of this k ind. I n his be t ter m o m e n t s Sextus knows t h a t Berkeley was w r o n g to s ay i t follows j u s t f r o m t h e confl ict of a p p e a r a n c e s t h a t 'we d o not k n o w by sense wh ich is t h e t rue extension or colour of the object ' . O f course, if we a re told t h a t something appea r s F to one person and no t -F to another , w e cannot dec ide on t h a t basis a lone w h e t h e r the t h i n g is F o r n o t - f . Bu t this does no t p rove t h a t it c a n n o t be de te rmined a t all, nor t h a t it c a n n o t be de t e rmined by sense.

At. ί» 1»»» ' I s i t F or n o t - F ? ' ( answer ; ' I t a p p e a r s to be F') with t h e out-sider 's quest ion ' Is it real ly F as it appears to h im to be? ' I t is easy to confuse the two because of course the perceiver himself can s tep back a n d ask a b o u t himself the outs ider ' s quest ion in t h e form ' I s it really F as it a p p e a r s to me to be? ' N o w , in a confl ict case the outs ider needs a reason to prefer o n e person's appea rances to ano ther ' s . N o t h i n g has been said so f a r to show h e cannot h a v e it. Suppose he does. Tl ien cer ta inly , his knowledge t h a t the t h i n g is real ly F is n o t based o n sense a lone . But for all tha t has been shown so far to the cont ra ry , he is n o w enti t led to say of the person to w h o m i t appears F t h a t he knows it is F because a n d s imply because he perceives it to be so. T h a t is, t h e outsider m a y very well r e a c h the conclusion t h a t the condi t ions are right for t h e insider to gain knowledge f r o m his percept ion . H u m e ' s assessment of t h e sceptical a rgu-m e n t f rom confl ict ing a p p e a r a n c e s has it exact ly right : These sceptical topics, indeed, are only sufficient to prove, that the senses alone are not implicitly to be depended on; but that we must correct their evidence by reason, and by considerations derived from the nature of the medium, the distance of the object, and the disposi-rion of the organ, in order to render them, within their sphere, the proper crìterìa of truth and falsehood. {Enquiry concerning Human Under-standing Xll. 117.)

W h a t is t r u e is tha t if as outsiders we become convinced t h a t t he r e is never reason to prefer one person 's appearances to another ' s , w e shall conc lude t h a t unde r no c i rcumstances does knowledge result w h e n t h e insider judges t h a t something is F because it appea r s so to h im . But , cont ra ry to Berkeley, this canno t be p r o v e d by the conflict of appearances alone. Accord-ingly, m u c h of Sextus' eflfort goes into a rguing , explicitly a n d in detail, t h a t there is never reason to prefer one a p p e a r a n c e to another ; o r as he pu t s it, t h a t the re is n o cr i ter ion of t r u t h — nei ther t h e senses nor any th ing else are ' t h e proper cr i ter ia of t ru th a n d falsehood' . A d d t h a t to the premiss of confl ic t ing appearances a n d the sceptical a r g u m e n t goes th rough. Fo r if t he re is n o cri terion of t ru th , all appearances are of equa l strength, equal ly wor thy a n d equal ly u n w o r t h y of belief, and w e are forced to suspend j u d g e m e n t .

So put , t h e sceptical chal lenge seems to m e to deserve some-th ing bet ter t h a n the p h a n t a s y solutions it has so often received. I t calls for a detai led e x a m i n a t i o n and appra i sa l of the g rounds on which w e ordinar i ly prefer some appearances to others.

H


I t is n o t e n o u g h , for e x a m p l e , to talk in a g e n e r a l promissory w a y a b o u t h e a l t h y minds in hea l thy bodies u n d e r n o r m a l condi t ions of pe rcep t ion . T h e jus t i f i ca t ion for t a k i n g these as t he m e a s u r e or cr i ter ion of w h a t sensible qua l i t ies things h a v e m u s t lie i n a de ta i l ed u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e i n t e r ac t i on b e t w e e n perce iver a n d perceived. T h e ques t ion of the rel iabi l i ty of t h e processes b y w h i c h we o b t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t the w o r l d m u s t b e s q u a r e l y faced in causa l te rms , n o t a v o i d e d by t a k i n g re fuge i n t h e w i n d o w m o d e l a n d its i l lusory a l t e rna t ive to t h e causal m e d i u m i n which p e r c e p t i o n is i m m e r s e d .

(4) I h a v e no t so far cal led a t t en t ion to d i f f e rences a m o n g the t h r e e ca tegor ies of va r i a t ion o r confl ic t b e t w e e n a p p e a r a n c e s w h i c h Socra tes sets out a t Theaetetus 154 A. Bu t clearly, t h e r e a r e i m p o r t a n t d i f ferences b o t h b e t w e e n a n d wi th in these categories . I n mora l s , for ins tance , t h e y a r e d i f f e ren t sorts of d i f f e rence of ou t look and j u d g e m e n t w h i c h dis t inguish a m a n in his m a t u r i t y f r o m t h a t s a m e m a n in adolescence , a m a n h u n g r y a n d oppressed f r o m t h a t s a m e m a n w h e n h e h a s become t h e leader of his peop le , a n d a m a n i n f l a m e d wi th passion f r o m t h a t s a m e m a n ref lect ing n e x t day . A n d these differences should themse lves be con t r a s t ed , no t e q u a t e d , w i th t he dif-ferences b e t w e e n one m a n a n d his con tempora r i e s , w h i c h a r e d i f f e r en t a g a i n f r o m t h e d i f ferences b e t w e e n h i m a n d people of o t h e r times a n d places. S imi l a r p o i n t s could b e m a d e a b o u t d i f ferences in t h e i m p o r t of con f l i c t ing a p p e a r a n c e s for t h e d i f f e r e n t sense modal i t i es . Bu t w h e r e pe r cep t i on is c o n c e r n e d , i t seems to m e t h a t the in te res t ing ca tegory is t h e one least a t t e n d e d to in m o d e r n discussions, t h e v a r i a t i o n b e t w e e n m a n a n d other an imal s . T h e in t e re s t ing p r o b l e m is no t re la t iv i ty o r subjec t iv i ty in genera l , b u t Herac l i t u s ' p r o b l e m of an thropocent r ic i ty .^

Suppose we h a v e been a b l e to jus t i fy o u r p r a c t i c e of p re fe r r ing the a p p e a r a n c e s en joyed b y hea l thy h u m a n s i n no rma l con -di t ions of pe r cep t i on over those of h u m a n subjects a f f ec ted b y j a u n d i c e a n d other d i sadvan tages . Sex tus wi l l argue, a n d h e ha s b o t h He rac l i t u s a n d P r o t a g o r a s b e h i n d h i m , tha t even so i t is a r b i t r a r y to prefer h u m a n a p p e a r a n c e s , however c a r e -ful ly selected, t o the conf l ic t ing a p p e a r a n c e s which o t h e r an ima l s ge t f r o m the s ame things . T h e r e is n o n e e d to resor t to

^ Compare David Wiggins, 'Truth , Invention, and the Meaning of Life', Proc. Bnt. Acad. Ixii (1976), pp. 331-78, at pp. 348-9; Thomas Nagel, 'What is it like to be a Bat?', Philosophical Review 83 (1974), pp. 435-50.


q u a i n t e x a m p l e s like H e r a c l i t u s ' pigs e n j o y i n g the m i r e . ' W e know, o r h a v e good r ea son to believe, t h a t a tab le w h i c h n o r m a l l y looks b r o w n to us looks very d i f f e r e n t to a n o r m a l h e a l t h y ca t , w h o has o n l y b lack a n d w h i t e vision a n d sees every th ing in g rada t ions of grey. Is it not a k i n d of ep i s temo-logical ' speciesism' (cf. PHì. 59) t o prefer o u r o w n pe rcep t ions to t h e cat 's

A s it s tands , this is n o t a good a r g u m e n t . W e do not i n fac t p r e f e r in a comple te ly g e n e r a l w a y our o w n pe rcep t ions to t h o s e of o t h e r animals . W e read i ly accept , a n d so does Sextus (PH i. 62 ff), t h a t an ima l s a r e o f t e n more sensitive to smells t h a n we are , a n d in some ways m o r e sensitive to sound. E v e n in t h e case of colour , w e could believe, a n d i t m a y ac tua l l y b e t h e case, t h a t some a n i m a l s h a v e a spec t rum wide r t h a n ours . I n sum, we h a v e a n o t i o n of b e t t e r or worse p e r c e p t u a l e q u i p -m e n t and t h a t no t ion is n o t species-specific. I t is an e m p i r i c a l ques t ion , w h o is best a t p e r c e i v i n g what , a n d the c i t ing of var ia t ions in pe r cep t i on b e t w e e n us and o t h e r species does n o t h i n g to s h o w t h a t t h e ques t ion canno t eve r have a well-g r o u n d e d a n s w e r .

T h u s Sex tus ' a r g u m e n t fails. B u t Herac l i tus will c o m e b a c k to m a k e the c h a r g e of a n t h r o p o c e n t r i c p a r t i a l i t y at a h i g h e r level . I t is o u r h u m a n l a n g u a g e in wh ich all th is has b e e n said, o u r l anguage in which t h e scientist 's empi r ica l inves t iga t ion is c a r r i e d out . T h e in te res t ing case w o u l d be o n e where i t is n o t j u s t tha t t h e o t h e r a n i m a l is miss ing someth ing w e can p i ck u p o r vice versa, b u t r a t h e r t h a t h e ha s an expe r i ence of co lour , say , which is t h r o u g h a n d t h r o u g h di f ferent f r o m t h a t of a n y h u m a n . 3 T h e n some of H e r a c l i t u s ' pa radoxes could b e g i n to b i t e .

^ Though Berkeley did : Three Dialogues y "p. 181. 2 Another way of getting to the problem is by changing human beings.

For ways of doing this, see Jona than Bennett, 'Substance, Reality and Primary Qualities', Amer. Phil. (^art. 2 (1965), pp. 1-17, who is concerned to draw a moral about the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Bennett shows that the objectivity of primary qualities is more fundamental, in a certain clear sense, than the objectivity of secondary qualities, but it would be wrong to conclude that this makes my problem disappear. We still have to explain what type of objectivity the secondary qualities can enjoy. And here the variety of animal perceptions (the first Mode of Pyrrho-nian scepticism) offers a more radical challenge than, for example, limited colour blindness in human beings.

^ If I mention here Gerald H. Jacobs and Robert L. Yolton, 'Visual Sensitivity and Colour Vision in Ground Squirrels', Vision Research 11 (1971), pp. 511-37, it is without confidence that they intend to describe such a case.

ïo6 PROCEEDINGS O F T H E BRITISH ACADEMY

Suppose we had elaborated a scheme of colour predicates to describe the other animars experience from his point of view. Let one of these predicates be 'huey'. Would it be a contradiction for one and the same thing to be both blue and huey all over at the same time? Must we oppose the colour-qualities things have for us (the Protagorean idiom seeming inescapable as the only alternative to paradox) to those they have for the other creature, insisting that 'blue* and 'huey' be regarded as contraries in the same way as 'blue' and 'red' within our own colour vocabulary? Many will prefer the Demo-critean solution that the object in itself, absolutely considered, is neither blue nor huey, all colour being equally subjective. But Heraclitus himself was not so despairing.

Heraclitus' version of the absolute god's-eye vantage-point is not designed to show us the world 'as it is apart from us'. On the contrary, when he talks of the god's-eye view, he pro-jects into it all our opposing, relativity-conditioned predicates : To god all things are fair and just: but men suppose some things just and others unjust, (frag. 102)̂

I interpret this to mean that our human contrast between justice and injustice has no absolute validity, even though it is necessary to the very meaning of the terms in our language: For [men] would not know the name of Dike [ = Justice] if these things [sc. injustices] did not exist, (frag. 23)

From an absolute vantage point everything is just—but not in a way that contrasts with injustice. For at that level it is equally true that justice is strife, i.e. what men think of as injustice:

What one ought to understand is that war [sc. that which separates] is common [sc. that which connects] and justice is strife, and that all things which come to pass do so in accordance with strife and what ought to be. (frag. 80)

And what holds for moral predicates holds for the rest of our language: God is day night, winter summer, war peace, hunger satiety: he changes [sc. becomes many opposite things] in the way that fire [sc. the fire at a sacrifice], when it is mixed with spices, is named according to the scent of each. (frag. 67)

No matter. We can still try to imagine a case and consider what we could say about it.

I Text as in M. Marcovich, Heraclitus, Editio Maior (Mérida, 1967), pp. 480-a.

C O N t L I C l I I N t i

I n sum, the absolute viewpoint, far from being different from every partial viewpoint, would be one which saw that every partial viewpoint is correct.

All this may seem indulgent mystification, even if I am pardoned for thinking that we might apply what Heraclitus says about opposed predicates within language as it is to the imagined case of 'blue' and 'huey'. What possible alternative to Democritus can Heraclitus offer unless he explains what the overcoming of opposition and contradiction within the god's-eye vantage-point amounts to? But reasonable as it may seem to ask for such an explanation, to expect Heraclitus to say that the predicates are not really opposed, the strife image tells us that of course they are opposed (so too frags. 102 and 23, quoted above) ; and many other fragments convey the same message with unmistakeable force. Heraclitus' solution to the problem of conflicting appearances is not an explanation but a certain kind of awareness :

To those who are awake the world-order is one, common to all; but the sleeping turn aside each into a private world, (frag. 8g)'

The world as we ordinarily understand it is from a god's-eye view relative to us and the categories of our language, as a dreamer's world is to him. The trouble is that people are not aware of this. Most men 'fail to notice what they do after they wake up, just as they forget what they do when asleep' (frag. i) . A true awakening would remember the dream world and be aware that it was a private world.

For those who have heard not me but the Logos wisdom is agreeing that all things are one. (frag. 50)

Wisdom is becoming aware of the relativity of one's categories and experience, not thereby denying its (partial) validity but putting it into perspective along with other viewpoints. The Logos which connects things that our language separates and opposes is itself still language, our own language. The god's-eye view for Heraclitus is simply this : seeing that the human view is the human view and no more. One carries on as before—one speaks and can only speak from within one's own language. But the wise man is awake to what he is doing. That is how Heraclitus could sum up his whole philosophy in the words Ί searched out myself (frag. lo r ) .

' For a defence of the authenticity of this fragment see Marcovich, op. cit., pp. 99-100.


W h a t th is a c c o u n t of H e r a c l i t u s suggests as h i s answer to ou r ear l ie r p r o b l e m is the fo l lowing. T h e i n c l i n a t i o n to r e g a r d ' b lue ' a n d ' h u e y ' as i n c o m p a t i b l y o p p o s e d is n o t to be s u p -pressed b u t r a t h e r recognized for w h a t i t is, n a m e l y , a m a n i -fes ta t ion of t he f a c t tha t w e c a n n o t a b s o r b the o t h e r c r ea tu re ' s colour s cheme i n t o our o w n . T o recognize this is t o recognize t h a t i t lies in t h e n a t u r e of a v i e w p o i n t — a n y v i e w p o i n t — t o c l a im t h e a b s o l u t e al legiance of the o n e whose v i ewpo in t i t is. H e r a c l i t e a n w i s d o m is t hus c o m p a r a b l e t o t he s t a n c e of a m a n w h o recognizes t h a t his m o r a l i t y is one a m o n g o thers , yet does n o t on t h a t a c c o u n t feel, n o r th ink t h a t he o u g h t to feel, its values to be a n y the less abso lu te or b i n d i n g . T h e r e m a y b e diff icult ies in expressing a n d m a i n t a i n i n g this s tance , b u t i t is rea l ly n o less d i f f icul t to c o n c e i v e a P r o t a g o r e a n o r D e m o c r i t e a n life w h i c h seriously a t t e m p t e d to t r e a t first-order exper ience a n d conce rns as relat ive o r subjective.^ A n d this brings m e to t he ques t i on of diagnosis.

I X

W h e n I was discussing t h e re la t ion of t h e Theaetetus a r g u m e n t to the P r o t a g o r e a n p r inc ip le la id d o w n a t t he beg inn ing of t h e d ia logue , I cons idered t h e ob jec t ion t h a t m y w i n d o w - m o d e l d iagnosis was b o t h rude a n d unnecessa ry . I h a v e , I hope, dea l t suff icient ly w i t h t he c l a im t h a t it is n o t necessary . But I h a v e no t addressed t h e compla in t t h a t I m a k e i t s o u n d as if some th ing r a t h e r d i s r e p u t a b l e is g o i n g o n in t h e Theaetetus a r g u m e n t a n d the o the r s we h a v e been look ing at . I a m ve ry f a r f r o m t h i n k i n g this to be so. I have i n d e e d e m p h a s i z e d t h e p ic tu res a n d t h e m e t a p h o r s , b u t so tha t w e m a y see t h e m for w h a t t h e y a re . W h e t h e r i t is t h e flawless c lose-up vision or t h e p rehens ive grasp , w h e t h e r i t secures a who le o b j e c t or o n l y some p a r t of t he su r f ace of o n e or j u s t a non -phys i ca l subs t i tu te for these , such p i c tu r e s h a v e the i r or ig in in o u r ear l ies t and deepes t exper ience . I f t h e y have el ici ted a smile , i t s h o u l d h a v e b e e n a smi le of recogni t ion , n o t c o n t e m p t . F o r if, as H e r a c l i t u s advised , we r e m e m b e r o u r d r e a m s , w e will recognize t h a t the re was a t i m e in ou r o w n lives w h e n the p r o b l e m o f con -f l ic t ing a p p e a r a n c e s e n g a g e d ou r s t ronges t feel ings; a t ime , m o r e o v e r , w h e n pe rcep t ion a n d v a l u a t i o n we re n o t yet dis t in-gu ished . W e k n o w too l i t t le a b o u t t h e psychic roo ts of c r ea t i ve ph i l o sophy to t u r n our backs o n these sources of insp i ra t ion . I f t h e y a r e f o u n d d i s repu tab le , the f a u l t rea l ly is, for once , in

I For valuable discussion of this and related issues, see Wiggins, op. cit.


t h e eye of t h e beho lder . O f cour se the a r g u m e n t s m u s t be cr i t ic ized. Bu t t h e po in t is t h a t t h e criticism m u s t be j o i n e d by respec t a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g .

I t is t h a t e l e m e n t of respect , so necessary fo r real u n d e r -s t and ing , w h i c h I miss i n Aus t i n ' s work as a critic o f the t r ad i t i on w h i c h he r igh t ly saw as s t emming f r o m Herac l i tus . A u s t i n is a t h i r d case of d o u b l e perspect ive . I n his first c h a p t e r h e explains t h a t he c a n n o t go b a c k to the v e r y earl iest texts f r o m before P la to , since t h e y a r e no longer extant . So he chooses Ayer as his ' ch ief s ta lk ing horse ' , w i t h subs id iary re-ferences to P r i c e and to W a r n o c k ' s book o n Berkeley. T h e s e w o r k s seem to h i m ' to p r o v i d e t he best ava i l ab l e exposit ions of t h e app roved reasons for h o l d i n g theories w h i c h are a t leas t as o ld as H e r a c l i t u s — m o r e full , cohe ren t , a n d t e rmino log ica l ly e x a c t t h a n y o u find, fo r e x a m p l e , in Desca r tes or Berkeley ' (p. i ) . But u n f o r t u n a t e l y , this w a s a serious his tor ical m i s t a k e o n Aust in 's p a r t .

I t was a m i s t a k e because t he reasons Ayer provides f o r t he i n t r o d u c t i o n of sense-da ta a r e not the t r ad i t iona l ly a p p r o v e d reasons, t h o u g h Ayer h imse l f c la ims tha t t h e y a r e :

W h a t the advocates of the sense-datum theory have done is to decide to apply the word 'see' or any other words tha t designate modes of perception to delusive as well as to veridical experiences, a n d a t the same time to use these words in such a way that w h a t is seen or other-wise sensibly experienced mus t really exist and m u s t really have the properties t ha t i t appears to have. N o doub t they also use these words in other, more familiar, senses. But i t is this usage t ha t leads t h e m to the introduction of sense-data. (p. 24) '

T h i s was w r o n g as h i s t o r y — n e i t h e r P r o t a g o r a s nor Berke ley n o r Russell re l ied on a nove l sense of 'see' o r ' p e r c e i v e ' — b u t co r rec t as a n a c c o u n t of w h a t A y e r himself w i s h e d to do , w h i c h w a s to m a k e t h e whole issue a ques t ion of w h i c h l a n g u a g e one chooses for t h e purposes of ph i losoph ica l t heo ry . O n the r e a d i n g I h a v e o f f e r e d in this l ec tu re , t h e t r ad i t i ona l a r g u m e n t f r o m conf l ic t ing a p p e a r a n c e s sets u p a pr iva te subs t i tu te o b j e c t to b e perce ived i n the very s a m e sense of the v e r b as t h a t i n w h i c h w e original ly w a n t e d to pe rce ive w h o l e objec ts o u t t h e r e in t h e wor ld . W h a t is c h a n g e d b y a d d i n g the relat ivist ic qua l i f ie r s

I A footnote on the next page refers to G. A. Paul, 'Is there a Problem about Sense-Data?' (1936), in Swartz, op. cit., pp. 271-87, as clearly bring-ing out the point that the sense-datum theorist is simply recommending a new verbal usage. But Paul denies that the sense-datum theorists themselves would represent their procedure in such terms (pp. 227—9).


' for m e ' , ' i m m e d i a t e l y ' , ' d i r ec t ly ' , a n d t h e like, is n o t the sense of t he v e r b 'perce ive ' b u t its object . W h a t g u a r a n t e e s t h a t s o m e t h i n g rea l ly is as it a p p e a r s to be is n o t a special sense of t he v e r b b u t its t ak ing as o b j e c t s o m e t h i n g w h i c h is itself ( an ) a p p e a r a n c e . ' A n d this is comple t e ly a t v a r i a n c e vsrith Aus t in ' s d iagnosis in t e r m s of l inguist ic sleight of h a n d (cf. p p . 3-5) o r t h e un jus t i f i ed i n v e n t i o n of a specia l sense of ' p e r ce ive ' (chap. I X ) , I t is t r u e t h a t Aus t in t e m p e r s his d iagnos is f r o m time to t i m e w i t h a n a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t t h a t it was A y e r w h o gave the sub-j e c t a l inguis t ic t u r n {cf. p . 102). Bu t t h a t a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t is itself m o d i f i e d b y Aust in ' s v iew t h a t t h e n e w linguistic c l o t h i n g is rea l ly j u s t a disguise for t he o ld t r a d i t i o n a l a r g u m e n t s f o r an on to log ica l d i c h o t o m y b e t w e e n sense-da ta a n d ma te r i a l ob jec t s (pp. 5 9 - 6 1 , 84, 105-7). A n d despi te these qual i f ica t ions , he con t inues to discuss the a r g u m e n t s a n d d i agnose their mis takes in p r e d o m i n a n t l y l inguistic te rms , t a k i n g i t t h a t Ayer does give ' t he a p p r o v e d reasons ' f o r t h e old theory.^ T h e effect, as m a n y r eade r s of Sense and Sensibilia h a v e felt, is t h a t Aus t in ' s ob jec t ions fall u n h a p p i l y be tween t w o stools. T h e y n e i t h e r get to the b o t t o m of t he t r ad i t i ona l a r g u m e n t s , w h i c h r e q u i r e a d iagnos is deepe r t h a n l inguist ic m e t h o d s can ach ieve , n o r a r e they a p p r o -p r i a t e t o t h e essentially s t ipula t ive , cons t ruc t i ve cha rac t e r of Aye r ' s o w n enterpr i se .

I t seems to m e , then, t h a t as a cr i t ic A u s t i n fal ls short b e c a u s e he d i d n o t p r o p e r l y sort o u t t he d o u b l e pe r spec t ive he a d o p t e d w h e n h e d e c i d e d to look a t t he h i s to ry t h r o u g h Ayer 's spec-tacles. H e w o u l d have d o n e be t te r t o go b a c k to the o r ig ina l sources, w h i c h h e was of course well e q u i p p e d t o hand le . E v e n the ear l ies t sources, p r i o r t o P la to , a r e n o t comple te ly b e y o n d the r e a c h of his torical u n d e r s t a n d i n g — a s I h o p e to have s h o w n . I n t r y i n g to show this, m y essential c la im h a s been t h a t a

' Let me add that I have nothing to say in this lecture about phenomena-lism. Considered as a theory about the analysis of material object statements in terms of statements about perceptual experience, phenomenalism is a separate issue from the introduction of sense-data (just one approach to perceptual experience) with which it has historically been associated.

^ T o mention just one of the historical distortions that result, Price, who really belongs to the prelinguistic phase, gets landed with Ayer's account (as quoted above) of hoAv sense-data are introduced (Ausün, p. 103). A footnote seeks to make amends, but it does not make clear that Price only raised the matter of the senses of 'perceive' in chapter 2 of Perception (pp. 22 £f.), after introducing sense-data in chapter 1 on the basis of an entirely epistemologica! argument from what we can and cannot doubt (though cf. p. 5 η.).

^WiNTL·!«^ 1 1J1VJ i»»

respectful h is tor ica l u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the o r ig ina l sources is a first step t o w a r d s real ism in o u r o w n ph i losophy .

X I t is only fitting tha t t h e ep i logue be given t o the f o u n d e r of t h e series of lectures in wh ich I have the h o n o u r to speak . I n a phi losophica l ly j u d i c i o u s a n d historical ly i n f o r m e d p a p e r o n ' A p p e a r a n c e a n d R e a l E x i s t e n c e ' ' — a p a p e r which t rea ts anc ien t a n d m o d e r n p h i l o s o p h y as a single c o n t i n u i n g story, w i t h equa l h o n o u r s for P l a t o , K a n t , and H e g e l — D a w e s Hicks h a s this to say a b o u t Russel l ' s version of t h e a r g u m e n t f r o m confl ic t ing a p p e a r a n c e s in The Problems of Philosophy:

I t is obvious, I think, t ha t this a rgumen t is fallacious, and t h a t the conclusion does not follow f r o m the premises. For , in order to test it, suppose t ha t colour of some kind is inherent in the table, that the table has a specific colour. T h e n , surely, there would b e nothing to conflict wi th this supposition in the circumstances that such real colour will present a dif ferent aspect if another colour be reflected u p o n it, or if a blue pair of spectacles intervene between it and the eyes of the observer, o r if it be enveloped in darkness r a the r than in dayl ight . The reasoning would only be valid on the assumption that if the table is really coloured, the real colour must appea r the same in darkness a n d in day-light, through a pair of b lue spectacles and wi thou t them, in artificial l ight and in the sun's l ight—an assumption which, on the view I a m taking, is a t once to be dismissed as untenable. I f the colour d id appea r to be the same in these varying circumstances, then certainly there would be reason, and sufficient reason, for d o u b t i n g the reliability of visual apprehension.- For obviously the conditions ment ioned—real , objective conditions, as I t ake them to be—cannot be without influence upon any real colour the table may be said to possess, (p. 42)

T h i s is w h e r e we c a m e in , Russel l ' s a r g u m e n t rests on p ropos i -t ion ( i ) , ( i ) is e q u i v a l e n t to (2) , and (2) is mani fes t ly false. T h e r e i t i s—the logical r e f u t a t i o n neat ly l a i d out , c l ea r a n d conclusive, j u s t one y e a r a f te r t h e pub l i c a t i on of The Problems of Philosophy. W h y d id i t m a k e n o d i f fe rence? W h y , if s t r a igh t -fo rward logica l r e f u t a t i o n is e n o u g h , d o t h e a r g u m e n t s f r o m confl ic t ing a p p e a r a n c e s live o n ?

' Proc. Arisi. Soc. 14. (1913/14), pp. 1-48. - Compare Augustine, Contra Academicos iii, 26: ' I f an oar dipped in water

looked straight, I would rather accuse my eyes of false testimony'—so far as I can discover, the point is original with Augustine, one of several that make the Contra Academicos a pioneering work.

burnyeat.conflicting appearances

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