bush and the ayatollah
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Bush and the Ayatollah. Shiite Politics in Iraq Juan Cole (www.juancole.com). The Prophet’s Family. Daughter Fatimah Son-in-law Ali Grandsons Hasan and Husain. Ashura. Prophet’s grandson Husain mounts rebellion 680 killed on 10 th of Muharram Called Ashura’ Shiites mourn, flagellate. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Bush and the Ayatollah
Shiite Politics in Iraq
Juan Cole (www.juancole.com)
The Prophet’s Family Daughter Fatimah Son-in-law Ali Grandsons Hasan
and Husain
Ashura Prophet’s grandson
Husain mounts rebellion 680
killed on 10th of Muharram
Called Ashura’
Shiites mourn, flagellate
Wolfowitz on Iraqi Shiites “The Iraqis are . . . by
and large quite secular. They are overwhelmingly Shi‘a which is different from the Wahabis of the peninsula, and they don’t bring the sensitivity of having the holy cities of Islam being on their territory.”
-Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy SecDef, NPR, Feb. 18, 2003
Shi’ite Crescent (King Abdullah) Iran 90 % (63 mn.) Afghanistan 15 % ( 4 mn) Iraq 62 % (15 mn.) Pakistan 13 % (19 mn) Bahrain 65 % ( 0.25 mn) Saudi Arabia 10 % ( 1.5 mn) Lebanon 40% ( 1.4 mn.) Syria 16 % ( 2.7 mn)
India 0.5% ( 6 mn)
Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (d. 1980) Dawa Party founded
1958 to work for Islamic state
Al-Sadr theorizes Islamic government
Allows consultative “elections”
Wants Islamic Law, Economy
Iranian Theocracy 1979 Iranian
revolution
Khomeini: Guardianship of the Jurisprudent
Saddam Cracks down 1980
Da’wa unrest in late 1970s
Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and other Shiite leaders are executed
Capital crime to belong to the al-Da`wa Party
Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim
Becomes head of Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq in Tehran, 1984
SCIRI mounts Khomeinist insurgency
Jaafari and Dawa Ibrahim Jaafari B. Karbala 1947 Medical School
Mosul Joined Dawa 1968 Jailed 1970s Fled to Iran 1980 Went to London
1989
Shiite Leadership In 1990s After failed 1991 uprising
Older, nonpolitical Shiites follow Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani From Iran, came in 1951
Younger, more radical Shiites follow Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr
Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani
Emerges after fall of Saddam, April, 2003
Insisted on election of drafters of new constitution
Wanted early direct elections
Wanted American withdrawal as soon as feasible
Islamic Law Sistani wants
Islamic law as law of land
Clerics would be judges
Would issue fatwas (legal rulings)
Nomocracy as Theocracy Sistani allows lay
parliament, prime minister
But wants religious judiciary
With power of judicial review
Sistani: Two Sources of Legitimacy
Government must be elected because sovereignty lies in Iraqi people
Must be approved by Grand Ayatollahs
Rousseau wins
Two-Stage Theory of SCIRI The al-Hakims
believe Iraq will have two stages
1. Pluralistic, parliamentary government
2. Islamic Republic when Shiite majority asserts itself
Sadr Movement Demands
immediate withdrawal of US
Wants Khomeini-style Islamic Republic
Militant demonstrations
Clashes with US Troops April 2, 2004
Bremer suddenly comes after Muqtada
Muqtada launches uprising throughout South
Mahdi Militia
Sistani helps with negotiated settlement in Najaf June 1
“Transfer of Sovereignty” Bremer flees June
28, no public ceremony
UN/ US appointed Iyad Allawi as interim PM
UNSC Resolution 1546 prescribes elections by Jan. 2005
Najaf II Second Battle of
Najaf Aug. 2004
Massive US bombardment of city
Threats to storm shrine of Ali
Sistani saves the day with march on city
Fallujah Alienates Sunni Arabs After Fallujah campaign, Nov. 2004 Association of Muslim Scholars
calls for boycott of elections Iraqi Islamic Party withdraws Mosul, other cities fall into chaos
with counter-attacks
Sistani’s List Sistani appoints 6-
man committee to unite all major Shiite religious parties in one list, United Iraqi Alliance
SCIRI Al-Da`wa 30 Sadrists as
independents Tribal shaikhs of
Middle Euphrates
Danger of Sectarian Imbalance Sunni Arabs do not vote in Jan. 30,
2005 election Dawa and Supreme Council
essentially win Jaafari Prime Minister
Constitution No civil legislation may be passed
by parliament that contravenes the established laws of Islam
Personal status by religious law where desired
Sistani’s influence
Federalism Over Sistani’s objections
Shiites accept Federalism, possibility of provincial confederations
Sunnis reject this provision Sistani declines to urge a vote for the
constitution or to endorse a party in Dec. 15 elections
Conclusion Religious Shiite parties have the
momentum
Are likely to dominate next parliament if elections are free and open
Can the US, the Kurds and the Sunni Arabs live with this outcome?