(c) crown copyright

Catalogue Reference:CAB/23/31 Image Reference:0011

(£his document is the property of His Britannic Majesty "s Government.)

C A B I B E T 58/28.

COHCLUSIOBS of a meeting of the Cabinet held at lo. 10 Downing street, S.W., on Friday,- 6th October, 1922, at 11-15 a.m.

P R E S E K T

The Prime Minister (In the chair).

Sight Hon. A, Chamberlain. M.P. The Right Hon. The Earl of Balfour, lord Privy Seal. E.G.,0,M., Lord President of the

Council

Right HOn. Viscount Birkenhead, The Eight Hon. Sir Robert H o m e , G.B.E lord Chancellor. K.C,,M,P., Chancellor of the Exchequer

fhe Right Hon. E, Shortt, K.C,,Ii.P. The Most Eon. The Marquess Curzon of Secretary of State for Home Eedlestou, X. G., G.C. S. I., G.C. I.E., iff airs. , Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

She Right Hon. W.S. Churchill, M.P. The Eight Eon Viscount Peel, G.B.E., Secretary of State for the Colonies, Secretary of State for India.

She Right Hon. Sir L. Worthingt on*- The Right Hon. Lord Lee of Fareham, Evans, fifrt, G.B.E., M.P., Secretary G.B.E. ,X.C.B,, First Lord of the of State for War, Admiralty.

Bit Right Hon. S. Baldwin, M.P., The Right Hon. Sir A. Mond, Bart., President of the Board of Trade. K.P.,, Minister of Health.

ile Right Hon. H.A.L. Fisher, M.P., The Right Hon. Sir A, Griffith­resident of the Board of Education. Boscawen, M.P., Minister of Agriculture

and Fisheries. Hie Right Hon, T.J. Macnamara, M.P. The Eight Hon. R. Munro, K.C. ,M.P., fdnister of Labour. Secretary for Scotland.

fee Right Hon. Sir Haisar Greenwood, The Right Hon. The Earl of Crawford] jfert., K.C.,TT.P., Chief Secretary for & Balcarres, K.T., First Commissioner Ireland, of works.

The foljo.wing \vere also present:­

&e Right Hon. F.E. Guest, CtB.E.,- Sir Edward Grigg,K.C.V.O., C.TT.G., J'S,0.fw.P., Secretary of State for

O^eut.-Col. Sir M.P.A. Hankey, G.C.B. * A * * Secretary. R.B. Howorth, , a e & * * S * Assistant Secretary. o o 3 a

KHJAfXQIS 1. With reference to Cabinet 5? (82). the Cabinet srere

$0, BAST. informed that the' Foreign Office and War Office had,, during

for Horace the night, received very important telegrams from Sir Horace ybold*e [glegx-ame. Humbcld and General Harington, which, on the whole, answered

the enactions which had been raised at the Cabinet*s previous

meeting, (Siscwssion was adjourned for ten minutes pending the arrival of the Lord President .of the"Council.)

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs re;ad to

the Cabinet telegram No. 523 (gee, Appendix I) received from

Sir Horace Humbold. giving a description of the proceedings

at the i&idania Conference, in the course of which lamet Pasha

had, at the last moment, demanded, contrary to the terms of

the Paris Hots, that Eastern Thrace should he handed over to

the Turks before the Peace Treaty, and that all the Allied

contingents and missions should be withdrawn, and ted inti*­

mated that he would set hie troops in motion unless this

proposal was at once agreed to. This development had neees­

sitated an adjournment of the Conference, and lamet Pasha had

agreed not to move his troops until 11-30 a.m., Greenwich

time, today. Tho French General had announced that he. had .

been authorised by his Government not only to sign the

Protocol, giving groat and important concessions..to the

Turks, but, also to agree to the restitution to the Turkish

authorities of Eastern Thrace before the Peace Treaty, and

without Allied supervision. The view of General Harington

and Admiral Brock was that the only way to avoid a conflict

was for His Majesty's Government to authorise General

Harington to tell the Turks that His l&jesty*s Government

would summon the. Greeks to leave Eastern Thrace., and Allied

troops would be 3snt there forthwith to replace the Greeks. A further telegram (No. 524.) from Sir Horace Rumbold (See

Appendix II) was also read to the Cabinet^ giving a

(fir I E !IR BASS.jy HoracemiiboM*e eiegrams.' Rumbold and General Harington, which, on the whole, answered

Cl fx i"1 (CD /

1. With raf&renee to Qsfcinet 57 (82), the Cabinet were

info rased that the Foreign Office and War Office had,. during the night, received very important telegrams from Sir Horace

the Questions which had been raised at the Cabinet1e previous

meeting. (Discussion was adjourned for ten minutes pending the arrival of the Lord President .of the Geuneil.)

The Secretary of State for For sign Affairs read to

the Cabinet telegram Ho, 523 (See Appendix I ) received from

Sir Horace Rumbcld, giving a description of the proceedings

at the Modania Conference, in the course of which Ismst Pasha

had, at the last moment, demanded, contrary to the terms of

the Paris Mote, that Eastern $brace should be handed over to

tho Turhs before the Peace Treaty, and that all the Allied

contingents and missions should be withdrawn, and had inti­

mated that he woo Id set M s troops in motion unless this

proposal was at once agreed to. This development had neees­

sitated an adjournment of the Conference, and Ismet Pasha had

agreed not to move his troops until 11-30 a.m., ' Greenwich

time, today. The French General had announced that he had

been authorised by his Government not only to sign the

Protocol, giving great and important concessions.to the

Turks, but also to agree to the restitution to the "Turkish

authorities of Eastern Thrace before the Peace Treaty, and

without Allied supervision. The view of General Harington

and Admiral Brock was that the only way to avoid a conflict

was for His Majesty's Government to authorise General . .

Harington to tell the Turks that His ?&jesty's Government

would summon the Greeks to leave Pastern Thrace, and Allied

troops would be sent there forthwith to replace the Greeks.

A further telegram (Ho. 524,) from Sir Horace Rumbold (See

Appendix II) was also read to the Cabinet^ giving a

-1­

d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e m e e t i n g o f t h e A l l i e d H i g h Gommis a i o n s - r e

and G e n e r a l s t o d i e o n e s t h e d e a d l o c k r e a c h e d a t ftidania.

I n t h e c o a r s e o f t h i s m e e t i n g t h e F r e n c h H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r

h a d i n t i m a t e d t h a t , a c c o r d i n g t o M. P r a n k l i n - B o u i l l o n * s

i n s t m o t i o n s , i t w a s d e s i r a b l e , i f p o s s i b l e , t o m a i n t a i n

t h a A l l i e d Commis s i on s a n d c o n t i n g e n t s - i n E a s t e r n T h r a c e

u n t i l t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f p e a c e , w h i c h i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e i r

m a i n t e n a n c e , i n t h e v i e w of t h e F r e n c h Government, , w a s n o t

i n d i s p e n s a b l e . The F r e n c h a n d I t a l i a n H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r s

w e r e s t r o n g l y i n f a v o u r o f y i e l d i n g t o a l l t h e T u r k i s h tmm.

d e m a n d s , a n d made it c l e a r t h a t t h e Questions o f K a r a j&ga tch

a n d $ a s t e r n T h r a c e w e r e n o t s u c h as w o u l d j u s t i f y h o s t i l i t i e s

The F r e n c h High C o m m i s s i o n e r h a d u r g e d t h a t s e v e r a l A l l i e d

B a t t a l i o n s s h o u l d a t o n c e b e d e s p a t c h e d i n t o T h r a c e a s p r o o f

o f good f a i t h , a n d t h e G e n e r a l s h a d a g r e e d t h a t w i t h o u t some

s u c h g e s t u r e t h e T u r k s w o u l d no t a g r e e t o f u r t h e r d e l a y s a n d

w o u l d o r d e r t h e i r t r o o p s t o a d v a n c e . The B r i t i s h H i g h

C o m m i s s i o n e r h a d r e p r e s e n t e d t h a t t h e r e w e r e l i m i t s t o t h e

f o r b e a r a n c e o f H i s M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t , a n d t h a t t h e more

t h a t w a s y i e l d e d t o t h e T u r k s t h e more w o u l d b e d e m a n d e d .

He h a d a l s o r e q u e s t s d G e n e r a l R a r i n g t o n to make e v e r y e f f o r t

t o g a i n f u r t h e r t i m e . The c o n c r e t e p r o p o s a l i n t h e s e t e l e ­

g r a m s . L o r d Cur s o n p o i n t e d o u t , w a s t h a t we s h o u l d a n n o u n c e

o t i r i n t e n t i o n t o s e n d A l l i e d t r o o p s t o T h r a c e and summon

t h e G r e e k s t o w i t h d r a w b e h i n d t h e M & r i t z a . The c o n t e n t s o f

t h e s e t e l e g r a m s , h o w e v e r , r a i s e d a much l a r g e r q u e s t i o n ,

n a m e l y , t h a t o f A l l i e d s o l i d a r i t y and t h e f u l l m a i n t e n a n c e ,

i n l e t t e r a n d i n s p i r i t , o f t h e P a r i s H o t s . I n h i s o p i n i o n

t h e t i m e h a d now a r r i v e d "when i t w a s n e c e s s a r y t o s e n d a n

i m m e d i a t e c o m m u n i c a t i o n t o t h e F r e n c h Government p o i n t i n g

e u t t h a t t h e p o l i c y w h i c h F r a n c e w a s p u r s u i n g i n t h e H e a r

F a s t w a s w h o l l y i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e s o l e m n p l e d g e s w h i c h

h a d b e e n g i v e n t o t h e A l l i e d and e m b o d i e d i n t h e P a r i s H o t s ?

- 2 ­

peral pington's flegrams.

0 3

pointing out to her the consequences that must inevitably

follow from her action? and ashing her definitely to state ­

whether she was prepared to stand side by side with. Great

Britain in carrying out the policy agreed upon in the Parts

Hots. It would be necessary. In the proposed ccmmunteatioii.

to acquaint "the "French Gevexament with the fact that the

British Government fully realised the trend of French policy,

and the French Government would have to ba told that Great.

Britain would be prepared, in the event of the Greeks retiring

from Has tern Thrace, to sand British troops into B & s t e m

Thrace for control purposes. The French Government should

be asked whether they were prepared to join with Great Britain,

and, if not, how they could justify such a refusal. the

consequences of which mast inevitably be the end to all

Allied eo-operation in the Bast and possibly alsswhara. A

communication of this character should be made t o the French

Government at once, as i t was essential to bring homo to IS,

Poincare himself the very serious situation which had arisen

in consequence of the inexplicable attitude adopted by France

in the last few days.

The terms of the Paris Note (Paper G.P.-4SS8) were, read

to the Cabinet, and particular attention was directed to

paragraph 3, in which the Allied Governments stated their

willingness to support at the Conference the attribution of

the Maritza-Adrianople frontier to Turkey. The whole tenemr

of the Mote was unmistakable, and it was most difficult to

see how the French Government could reconcile - their present

conduct with its terms. It was not likely that M. Poincare

would, be prepared, when faced with the facts, to give a

direct negative to Great Britaln*s request for co-operation.

The Cabinet, were then informed of the contents of tele­

grams Mos. B-3 and 15-4 (Bee Appendix III), which had just

been received from General Harington, and which confirmed

2 i (l

the information contained in Sir Horace Basfcold^ telegrams.

In part S of D-4, .General Harington intimated that he had

no doubt that unlees the Allied Governments acted at once

the nationalists weald march on Constantinople "and can crocs

into our area in three or four days". This referred to the

small perimeter at Scutari at present held by the British

troops, and not, of course, to the Ismid neutral so na. In

Part S of the same telegram General Harington ashed whether

he was to defend Scutari and Constantinople as long as he

could with five Battalions and a few batteries and aeroplanes,

assisted by the Navy, in the hole of holding on until-rein­

for cements arrived, or whether he should evacuate at once to

Gallipoli and Chanak, leaving a fait, aeoomolj in Constantly

nopla.

The Cabinet at this point were informed that a telegram

(No .514) (See Av)penAl%. .1?) had just been received from Sir

Horace Humbold, giving particulars of the present civil

administration in Eastern Thrace. This administration was

Greek, and the Police and Gendarmerie were also Greek. If

the Greek Army withdrew from Eastern Thrace it would be most

difficult, if not impossible, to persuade the officials to

remain unless they had very definite guarantees of Safety,

It would be impracticable for the Allies' to organise a civil

administration in the time available, nor could the Gonstan­

tinople Government provide such an administration. Trie only

alternative, therefore, appeared to be to allow the Kemalists

to take over the civil administration, the Allies taking Steps

to avoid disturbance and panic. These visa.'a were shared by

the British Commissioners French and Italian colleagues,

and in this connection Sir Horace Rumbold referred to his

telegram Ko.506. It seemed clear that the British Commissloner

contemplated a Turkish military occupation of Eastern Thrace

to prevent fighting and disorder, and a civil administration

which, in the elroums taneae', aa martial law would be in

operation, would be' of" a subordinate character; that

Allied forces should be sent Into Eastern Thrace, if avail­

able? and that-, purely from the point of view of the main­

tenanca of order, the country would not be worse off under

a Kernel 1st civil administration than under a Greek re aims

deprived of fresk military help. Sir Horace Bumbo Id was

disposed, therefore^ to advise that Great Britain should

yield to the Turkish demand and admit a number of Turkish

officials into Eastern Thrace.

Tbe Cabinet were reminded that one of the /fundamental

conditions of the Paris Mote had been that the Kemalist

forces should evacuate the neutral zones. Was it now pro­

posed to water down this most important condition? S u c h

a decision might have to be taken, but the full consequences

should be weighed before Great Britain lightly abandoned the

position which she had up to the present maintained through

the negotlations.

The view was then expressed that the responsibility for

the consequences would rest with our Allies; that public

opinion in Great Britain was not prepared in any event to

undertake a war with Turkey,, and particularly was not pre­

pared to fight to keep the Turks out of Europe. Xn theas

circumstances, it was asked, ought the British Government

to take the responsibility of adopting military action in

the Near East when her French and Italian Allies had decided

that the issues at stake were not worth the contest? The

question put on the previous evening (Cabinet 5 ?

was repeated:- "Suppose a decision is taken to instruct

General Harington to allow the Turks to occupy Thrace, and

suppose the Greeks decline to accept; in those circumstances

to what lengths should the British Government be pzepared to

go to put pressure on Greece?" The reply was made that no'

pressure should he put on Greece, but that Mustapha Kemal

should be all or ed - S i m s we could not prevent him '— to

cross into Europe and fight it out with the Greeks . There

had, it was pointed, out, been Balkan Ware in the past in

which Great Britain had not been involved, and we ought

to limit ourselves strictly to securing the freedom of the

Straits . On the other hand, it was pointed out that if

Great Britain should now surrender to the Turkish demands

and allow the Turks to re-occupy Eastern Thrace, the

Greeks would rightly represent that the terms of the Paris

Note; had been violated. It should be remembered that - the Greeks were now prepared to agree to the evacuation of Eastern Thrace provided that the Allies took over the

control of that country. Was it proposed, in these sir­

cumstances, to allow the Kemslists to cross the Bosphorus

and fight out their quarrel with the Greeks in Europe?

It was one thing to say to the Turks that Great Britain

would not. allow the invasion of Europe. It might be

doubtful whether Great Britain alonw had the

/power

- 5 a­

9 'r1 9

power to prevent such an invasion, "but it was quite another thing after the neutral sones had been violated for Great Britain to put pressure on the Greeks to evacuate Eastern Thraoe. She most she could be excepted to do in the circumstanoes was to remain strictly neutral.

It was then urged that instead of ending a written coinmunica­tion to the French Government it would "be far hatter, if such a course were practicable, for the Secretary of state for foreign Affairs £imself to go over to Paris this afternoon and state to Monsieur poincare in person the British objections to and critic a isms of the- French line of policy and also to speak very plainly to him on the subject of the activities of Monsieur Franklin Bouillon. It should "be made clear to the French Government that Great Britain had gone to the very furthest limit in promising Eastern Thraoe to the Turks, and it should also he made clear that the British Govem­ment recognised that it was no longer possible for Great Britain alone to carry out the jpull policy of the Paris Hots in the absence of French and Italian support. In these circumstances it was necessary for Great Britain to separate herself from her Allies in this and perhaps in othef questions and she would proceed to occupy and hold Gallipoli and Ohanak with such assistance as she could obtain from other quarters. In other respects she ceased to interesl herself or taice any responsibility for what might happen in Constantinople or in the Balkans and in Thraee. Through the treachery of Mrar allies Great Britqin had been rendered powerless ti

agreed carry out the axigiHHl policy and the only course consistent with her honour was the one proposed. It was generally accepted that lord Curaon must have authority to speak to Monsieur poincare in some such terms if khe found that the situation required it.

Some discussion then tookmplace as to the action to be taken in the not impossible event of hostilities breaking out with the Turks in the next few days. General agreement

was/

was expressed with the view that in any event Chanak and the Gallipoli Peninsula would have to be defended. With regard to the Scutari position it was urged the situation was very difficult. The view was expressed that if it became necessary for Great Britain to adopt a neutral attitude towards the Turks and to permit them to cross the Straits, it would be essential to adopt a correspondingly neutral attitude towards the Greeks and to permit their forces, both naval and military, to enter the neutral zones for the purpose of defending the territory allotted to them under the Treaty of Sevres. Further, it might be necessary to take steps to secure that other powers maintained an equally neutral attitude towards both combatants. It was also pointed out that if the French Government maintained their present attitude it would be most difficult for Great Britain to justify the continuance of those provisions of the Treaty of jSeuilly under which Bulgaria was not allowed to maintain an effective army, and indeed that all the peace treaties would be in jeopardy.

It was agreed:­(l) That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

should be requested to proceed to Paris that afternoon for the purpose of laying before Monsieur Poincare the views of the British Govern­ment on the lines indicated in the dicussion.

(2) That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should cause a telegram to be despatched to Sir Horace Kumbold informing the latter that the position was regarded as so grave that he (lord Curzon) was leaving for Paris to discuss the position with the French Government and that arrangements should be made to secure that General Harington should not return to Mudania or if he had already left for that place he should be warned not to commit himself on any important point without further instructions.

(3) That the Secretary of State for War should send a telegram to General Earington to the effect that unless he could rely on the French troops standing with the British troops at Scutari he was not to fight at Scutari but was to have the fullest dis­cretion to withdraw from that position and from Constantinople at the moment when he was satisfied that such withdrawal was required by the military situation.

(4) That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should arrange for an informal message to be sent to Monsieur Teniselos in Paris inviting Monsieur Veniselos to remain in Paris in, order that he might he available in the forthcoming discussions between Lord Ourson and Monsieur Poinoard.

( 5 ) fhat the Secretary of State for Air should arrange for an aeroplane to be available in Paris to bring Lord Ourson1a account of his interview with Monsieur Poineard to the Cabinet.

pi 1 ' . QNSTAHIISOPLE.

ilitaryran sport arrangements.

2. $1th reference to Cabinet 58 (22), Appendix

Conclusion (a), the Cabinet' were informed by the

Secretary of State for War that he had received

an assurance from General Harington that he had

secured all the transport which he required, for

the effective evacuation of the British forces at

Scutari and Constantinople.

'She Cabinet took note of this communicat io a.

CONSTANTINOPLE.w w N B

Military£ran sport Arrangements.

2. With reference to Cabinet 52 (22), Appendix V,

Conclusion (a), the Cabinet wore informed by the

Secretary of State for War that he had received

an assurance from General Harington that he had

secured all the transport which he required for

the effective evacuation of the British foroes at

Scutari and Constantinople.

The Cabinet took note of this co Hirauni c at io a.

ROU-ANIA. 3. The Cabinet were informed that M. Diamandy had Request for expressed a wish to discuss with the Secretary of State for Munitions.

War the question whether Great Britain could furnish Roumania with certain arms and ammunition.

In this connection reference was made to the fact that the Serbian and Polish Governments had already made arrangements with France for the supply of munitions, and to the desirability at the present juncture of encouraging the maintenance of close and friendly relations between the British and Roumanian Governments.

The Cabinet agreed To request the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State for War to discuss the question of the supply of arms and munitions with M. Diamandy, with discretion to deal with this- requests as-they thought fit.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.,1.1. October 6, 1922.

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be returned to the Foreign Office if not required for official use.]

POLITICAL m m

Decypher. Sir Ii. Rumbold, (Constantinople). October 5th 192,

D. 3,0 a.m. October 5th 1922. R. 5.30 a.m. October 6th 1922,,

No. 523.

SUB-CQTyTMITTKE.

General Harington has returned from Mudania and has explained situation.

He has shown me protocol drafted by Allied generals as result of three days discussion with Ismet Pasha, This protocol gives very great and Important concessions to Turks. Generals hoped that this protocol would have been signed to-day but at the last moment Ismet pasha demanded that Eastern Thrace should "be handed over to the Turks before peace treaty and that all the allied contingents and missions should he withdrawn. This demand is of course entirely at variance with allied proposal of September 23rd.

Ismet Pasha intimated that he would set his troops in motion if allied generals did not agree to this proposal, which annuls the whole basis of the conference.

General Harington proposed that (? conference, omitted) should adjourn until 2.30 tomorrow afternoon in order that generals should have time to refer to their governments and High Commissioners. After some discussion Ismet agreed that he would not move his troops until 2.30 p.m. i,e. 11.30 G.M.T. tomorrow.

French

(2)

French general then announced that he was authorised by his government not o:.ly to (group omitted) protocol but to restitution to Turkish authorities of Eastern Thrace, before peace treaty, end without allied supervision. Ke had informed General Harington of these instructions before (? this) last sitting. In view of this situation which hopelessly weakens the allied front, the generals had no alternative but to return to ask for instructions.

Allied generals had no knowledge of reply from Angora accepting peace conference until after they had left Mudania this afternoon. You will have noticed that reply is entirely silent on the subject of acceptance by Mustapha Kemal of conditions attaching to promise of support of Turkish claims to Eastern Thrace.

Turkish claim to consider Eastern Thrace before peace treaty seems difficult of acceptance. I imagine that Paris proposals contemplated setting up of machinery by peace conference for adequate pro­tection of minorities. This would go by the board under new Turkish claim.

Turks (? have, omitted) just requested per­mission to transport to Eastern Thrace an unlimited force of gendarmerie which might in effect be an army. They also claim Karagach and the right to carry on military operations even (? after) signature of military convention until latter is ratified by governments concerned.

Allied High Commissioners are meeting allied generals

generals immediately to consider deadlock (group undec.) at Mudania.

My colleagues will probably wish unofficially to advise in an identic telegram to three governments. In view of French attitude which can only "be characteriz ed as a treacherous surrender inspired by Franklin Bouillon it was necessary for me to send this separate telegram. In view of General Harington and Admiral Brock the only way to avoid a conflict (? is) for His Majesty'B Government to authorise General Harington to tell Turks that His Majesty's Government will summon Greeks to leave Eastern Thrace at once and allied troops will he sent there forthwith to replace Greeks.

Please get Admiralty to send your instructions to General Harington by wireless tomorrow to "Iron Duke".

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and/ slioul returned to the Foreign Office if not required for official use.

POLITICAL TURKffY

Decypher. Sir H^Rumboli, (Constantinople); y October Bth 1922, Do 4.30 a.m. October 6th 1922. R. 8.30 a.m. October 6th 1922.

No.524. ( D ) .

Very Urgent. My immediately preceding telegram. Allied High Commissioners and Generals met to­

night to discuss deadlock reached at Mudania. I asked French High Commissioner whether French

government was as stated by Franklin Bouillon really ready to agree to Turkish demand for restoration of Eastern Thrace in full sovereignty previous to entry into force of peace treaty and without adequate guaran­tees through allied commissions for minorities there. If so it was quite contrary to Paris decisions.

French High Commissioner said that Franklin Bouillon was very affirmative on this point and that his own instructions to the effect that it was de­sirable if possible to maintain allied commissions and contingents there till conclusion of peace in­dicates that their maintenance in view of French government was not indispensable. I immediately said that I did not recognise Franklin Bouillon as representing my government and that I considered his impolicy had been pernicious.

Italian High Commissioner having said that Franklin Bouillon had had no authority to speak for Italian government at Smyrna argued strongly in

favour

(2) favour of yielding to Turks. French High Commission­er took the same line. They said that two points left outstanding namely Karagatch and maintenance un­til conclusion of peace of allied commissions in Thrace did not constitute justification for possible world war; question of Karagatch was of comparative un­importance and as a suburb of Mrianople Paris note might be interpreted as including it in that city while Thrace was in any case to be restored in a few months time to full Turkish sovereignty and that during that time conference would be sitting,

French High Commissioner pointed out that at base of Turkish demands was their distrust of vague promises of Allies and suggested that it might be possible to allay this by some immediate gesture giving proof of our good faith such as despatch forthYfith of several allied battalions into Thrace. All three generals agreed that without some such gesture Turks would not agree to further delays and would order their troops to advance,

Italian High Commissioner urged that if war resulted world would attribute it to unwillingness of allied High Commissioners and generals to take re­sponsibility for concessions which were of small account in comparison with issues involved,,

w 3 *-

I replied, that world would attribute it to intracti­bility of Turksa that the more we yielded to Turks the more demands they would make and that the next might well be evacuation of constantinoples that General Haringbon, Admiral Brock and I had done our utmost to avoid war, that there were limits to forbearance of His Majesty's Government and that I must now report facts to my Govern-, mont and leave it to them to appreciate whether in refusing these demands they were prepared to contemplate ware

In the meantime ponding the receipt of your views I have requested General Harington to make every effort to gain time5to point out to Ismet Pasha on his return to Mudania tomorrow that powers have now received reply of Angora Government and to ask him how he can reconcile readiness of that Government to attend conference with threat to recommence military operations.,

Repeated to Athens NoB 175a

gABAPHHASB* U £ 0 £ S 1'. - , $es patched 10* gum. 5/10/22.

Received 8op.au i/10/2£*

frosaj- Se&eral lading -to n* To:- far Office ' Bag. a if her first of 3 parts.

To-day at oon&renere after Generals bad done utmost te strain their powers on points of detail with a view to meeting the national is te Ismet reverted suddenly to has is of conference. He maintained that putting together the Allied note of 20th and Angora1s reply seems to he the concoction of franklin Bouillon. The basis in the event of a Conference taking place la that Eastern Thrace shall he restored fully to the nationalists fey Treaty of Peace without say foreign control when the Greeks have left. Charpy stated he mm empowered to sign to this effect. Mombelli, however, and I declared our inability to make any such contract. It was quite obvious that Franklin Bouillon has -f-rsi 4 m A *j- 1*̂ ?&i**vi h**£a 4 1\ 3 vs. If -5 str?. W a r rs rtvt "J csitff &a "i? '5" W s * A 1 "1 $ A , n irA WW .&.i£J W V *AS? J. ttJL W$* A JMgp -W *53 0 3 ^ - * ^ w a a w 4* lyf w * w IO.

meats besides the French and authorise the Generals to make political decisions. It was decided by the Generals after they had consulted together to adjourn Conference until October 6th at 14.30 hours so that they might have time to return to Constantinople and to consult High commissioner and exchange telegrams with their respective Governments. Part 2* 3. 1 think that the net result of the sboge is good as it has nowbesn made clear that Mombeili and I do not take orders from franklin Bouillon. We have undertaken to obtain Instructions on the following points by 1000 hours G.M.T. October 6 th:­(a) San we commit ourselves to basis that Eastern Thrace is to be restored to Turkish severeignty before ratification

. of peace treaty?

(o) Without ateittlng full Turkish sovereignty in Eastern Thrace oan we consent to withdrawal of Allied ?representatives and troops immediately Turkish authority has boon restored in each locality!. (o) Can Adrianopie on return of forks be considered to include the ring of forts (one group un&ex) the Marltsa and also Kara Agatoh railway station and village? forks make a strong military point of this and require Greek Administration removed from Kara Agatch. fd) Can pressure be exercised on Greeks to restore civil hostages e vacua tod by them from Anatolia? (a) If Greeks refuse t o sign convention are we still to endeavour to reach agreement with nationalists, Last Part. May tho replies to the above questions be expedited, pis ass. t o 11*1*3* Iron Bmke so as t o reach as before 1 0 0 0 hoars G.M-T. October 6th ?

Franklin Bouillon lias bean propagan&iag heavily regarding the military prowess and strength o f Sirkey* ismet tried to bluff ? into freedom to renew hostilities but ended by giving his assurance to refrain at least until 1 4 3 0 hours local time on October &th* The Tar .& are worried about report which they received yesterday regarding Greek atrocities In Thrace and they are anxious that the- Allies should immediately send troops -into Eastern Thraoe to ensure security. 1 have not yet received any confirmation o f tho report that forty villages wers burnt in Thrace the other day. in fact. Colonel Saryanis who is ^FSm there denies it emphatically.

A copy of this telegram will be conveyed to the High Commissioner by bond.

Circulated to the Cabinet,

CLEAR THE LIKE. SECRET.

From;- General Harington H,M,S. IRON DUKE. P.11,55 5.10.22.

To:- Tar Office', R.01.00 6,10.22.

D.4, cipher 5/10. Pour Parts. First. C.H.H, 114 Personal for C.I.G.S. Have had most difficult task. After ?3 days inoessant work in a network of political intrigue we had reached stage when I hoped to sign 2 conventions today (a)

- Convention dealing with evacuation of Greeks behind MARIT5A and arrangements for ?installing Turkish administration subject to approval of Allied Governments, (b) Convention ensuring security of neutral zone with modifications in case of Zone ?at Chanak to amount of SANDJAK which has already been in British occupation and a marking on ground of a safety line for immediate future. In course of todays discussion Ismet no doubt prompted by Hamid, Angora and Franklin Bouillon demanded that Eastern Thraoe and sovereignty thereof he handed over to Nationalists as soon as Nationalist administration is installed and Allied Missions and troops withdrawn that is in 1 month and without ws,iting treaty of peace. Part Two, Allied Generals have had identical instructions until today when French Government or Franklin Bouillon have given Charpy authority to agree. Mombelli and 1 refused and I have adjourned conference till tomorrow afternoon while- we refer to Governments and am return­ing to see Rumbold. After disoussion Ismet agreed to withhold operations till reply received. If unsatisfactory operations will oommenoe again ?at once against Greeks via Constantinople with diversion no doubt against CHANAK *- Greek representatives are

here. Had conference with them today. They are trying to build up force to hold Eastern Thraoe. There is no doubt in my mind that unless Allied Governments act at once Nationalists will march on Constantinople and oan cross into our area in 3 or 4 days.

part Three. Government has to say at. once whether they will take action to evacuate.Greeks immediately and send Allied troops into Eastern Thrace or whether they will engage Nationalist Army. It is very serious situation and I request to know whether I tm to defend Scutari and Constantinople as long as I can with five Battalions and a few batteries and aeroplanes assisted by Navy in the hope of holding on till reinforcements arrive or whether I shall evacuate at once to Gallipoli and Chanak leaving ?fait accompli in Constantinople. Irt reality Government havd got 24 hours in which to say whether they will give Mustapha Kemal his terms regarding Thrace or whether England is to fight him for Constantinople which it has already been agreed that he shall have. Last part* It is direct threat and at leaet 3 times during conference Ismet has said that he must oancel stoppage of movements. Charpy behaved very ?well throughout conferenoe and it was black treachery forcing him to desert me and agree to Mustapha Kemal's terms. ?If date of peace conference is actually fixed I think I could hold on at Scutari as he will probably come up against us as he has done at Chanak and see what happens. Per our prestige it is best to be here at time of Conference if we can but it will be some time-before I can get reinforcements and I cannot take much from Gallipoli and Chanak.

Received 7 am. 6.10*22.

0 o

A P P E N D I X

POLITICAL

TUSKEY.

De cypher. Sir H. Surabold. (Constantinople) October 5th 1922*

7,20 p.m* October 5th 1988 1.45 October 6th 1022.

10.514.

URGENT Your telegram No, 464. All my information shows that present civil administration

of Eastern Thrace is run by Greek superior officials many of whom come from old Greece and that subordinate staff also is mainly-Greek. Police and gendarmerie are directly controlled by military authorities.

If Greek army were to evacuate and existing civil adminis­tration were retained difficulty would be to get officials to remain unless their lives were assured by complete allied occupation.

Proceedings of first day at Mudania show that Kemalists would never accept such proposal. Greek administration and more particularly police and gendarmerie cannot fail to go to pieces once Greek army evacuates. Problem is to provide substitute. Allies cannot organise temporary administration of their own. Constantinople government has been ruled out. There remains no alternative but to let Kemalists take over. This will certainly not of itself tend to pacify the country or appease racial animosity but it will not defeat these objects any more than would the maintenance of Greek administration. It is better anyhow than chaos. My proposal is that Kemalists should take over administrative services generally,

that

that we should not attempt to establish control of all such

services, but that we should endeavour to obviate panic and

mutual vengeance by continued presence of allied commissions,

by attaching allied officers to gendarmerie and by reserving

the right to send allied detachments to Eastern Thrace.

Question of officials is one of detail. Principal

officials would doubtless come from Anatolia but Kemalists

can if they like draw on local notables and unemployed

officials here to fill subordinate posts.

Jiy French and my Italian colleagues share views

indicated in my telegram Io* 50G. While expressing readiness

to join me in elaborating scheme for civil administration as

proposed in your telegram Ho.456 they have both stated that

this procedure does not seem to them to answer the require­

ments of the situation which necessitates speed above all.

French High Commissioner states in this as in all other

matters agreement with Turks is necessary and that he has

empowered General Gharpy to settle question on which agreement

depends. In these circumstances it is useless to attempt

to formulate scheme until general principles are settled as

result of Mudania meeting as contemplated in your telegram

10.441.

I realise my proposal prejudges future of Thrace to

greater extent than yotir note contemplated but we have

promised Eastern Thrace to Turks and expediency seems to be

only possible guide on this question.

Repeated to Athens ito.169.