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821 c1I64I1III
TINhe iemw inre is d paper are thou of tie authoraMd do not 11ecsinaY refleCt the VieW0 Of theDepazment of Defense ot any of its agawk. 7Uidocumsent may not be ewed for openi pubU~ato. untlit has bemw cleated by the apprate miitay serne or
government agency.
S ELEcTrEJUN0 2 1992
A"DLOGISTICS COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) AND ITS APPLICATION
DURING DESERT SHIELD/STORM
BY
Lieutenant Colonel William H. TaylorUnited States Army
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Logistics Command and Control (C 2) and Its Application During Desert Shield/Storm
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Study Proiect I FROM TO 11992, April, 15 3316. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION
17. COSATI CODES 18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)FIELD GROUP SUB-GROUP
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)With the integration of warfighting concepts from AirLand Battle, Future to AirLand
Operations and their requirements for nonlinear battles with enduring sustainment
imperatives - anticipation, continuity, integration, responsiveness and improvisation,the future of our Army to project power on major regional contingencies depends even moreon logistics as a combat multiplier. General Norman Schwarzkopf made this clear when, in
the early stages of Desert Shield, he said "Once again the logistics tail wags the fightingdog." Our logistics decisions today will affect combat capabilities tomorrow. Our emerging
co~bat service support (CSS) doctrine, calling for a multifunctional Command and Control
(C ) headquarters at the battalion and group level set the stage to correct earlier doctrinethat seemed to lag behind our Warfighting Doctrine. Reviewing logistics lessons duringOperations Desert Shield/Storm, the outcome of the war bears out the fact that logistics
never constrained a tactical or strategic commanders' decision. While true, such a
statement may lead to the incorrect conclusion that our logistics support concept is (con't)
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JOHN E. BROWN, COL, QM, DMSPO 717) 245-440 AWCAC
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adequate for the Army of the 21st Century. In fact, our ability to support the operationmore accurately reflected the limited duration of the grouni war than our logisticsrobustness. The corps support group concept of logistics C can support forces involvedin regional contingencies, by creating sufficient flexibility to adapt to requirementsthat our country's military strategy demands. However, now that we are in a world ofhigh technology, limited resources and face a downsizing force structure, we must continueto refine logistics C and a new methodology for deploying of CSS assets, that incorporatechanges in technology and lessons from Desert Shield/Storm.
USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER
The views expressed in this paper are those of theauthor and do not necessarily reflect the views ofthe Department of Defense or any of its agencies.This document may not be released for open publicationuntil it has been cleared by the appropriate militarvservice or government agency.
LOGISTICS COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) AND ITS APPLICATION
DURING DESERT SHIELD/STORM
AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT
by
Lieutenant Colonel William H. TaylorUnited States Army
Colonel John E. BrownProject Adviser
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved fo Publfrelease* distribution is unlim"tede
U.S. Army War CollegeCarlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
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Dist SPteCiM
ABSTRACT
AUTHOR: William H. Taylor, LTC, OD
TITLE: Logistics C2 and Its Application During DesertShield/Storm
FORMAT: Individual Study Project
DATE: 15 April 1992 PAGES: 33 Unclassified
With the integration of warfighting concepts from AirLandBattle, Future to AirLand Operations and their requirements fornonlinear battles with enduring sustainment imperatives -anticipation, continuity, integration, responsiveness andimprovisation, the future of our Army to project power on majorregional contingencies depends even more on logistics as a combatmultiplier. General Norman Schwarzkopf made this clear when, inthe early stages of Desert Shield, he said "Once again thelogistics tail wags the fighting dog." Our logistics decisionstoday will affect combat capabilities tomorrow. Our emergingcombat service support (CSS) doctrine, calling for amultifunctional Command and Control (C2) headquarters at thebattalion and group level set the stage to correct earlierdoctrine that seemed to lag behind our Warfighting Doctrine.Reviewing logistics lessons during Operations DesertShield/Storm, the outcome of the war bears out the fact thatlogistics never constrained a tactical or strategic commanders'decision. While true, such a statement may lead to the incorrectconclusion that our logistics support concept is adequate for theArmy of the 21st Century. In fact, our ability to support theoperation more accurately reflected the limited duration of theground war than our logistics robustness. The corps supportgroup concept of logistics C2 can support forces involved inregional contingencies, by creating sufficient flexibility toadapt to requirements that our country's military strategydemands. However, now that we are in a world of high technology,limited resources and face a downsizing force structure, we mustcontinue to refine logistics C2 and a new methodology fordeploying of CSS assets, that incorporate changes in technologyand lessons from Desert Shield/Storm.
ii
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE DESCRIPTION PAGE
1 CSS Doctrine Past 24
2 CSS Doctrine Ad Hoc 25
3 CSS Doctrine Current 26
4 Forward CSGs Area of Responsibility 27
5 Organization of Forward and Rear CSG 28
6 CSS Laydown Clas III Fuel 29
7 CSS Laydown Class V Ammunition 30
iii
INTRODUCTION
The former Army Chief of Staff, General Carl Vuono speaking
to Army logisticians through an article in their journal said it
best: "Today, the United States Army stands at the apex of
achievement and fresh from victory in its most complex campaign
in more than two decades. Logisticians should take special pride
in Desert Storm, for logistics was fundamental in all phases of
the operation."'
Unfortunately, even as General Vuono wrote, changes were
making the chances of repeating such a success less likely, if
done the same way. New military strategy must continue to
aggressively shape the Army for the 21st Century, requiring an
overarching vision of a trained and ready force that can fulfill
its strategic mandate on a regional basis, under crisis
conditions. To realize this vision, with a downsized Army, we
must be imaginative and determined to come up with a force that
is versatile in its ability to respond by tailored force packages
to a wide range of requirements in multiple theaters of
operations. Logisticians must become adept in supporting
contingencies around the world in a theater with limited
logistics infrastructure. Likewise, our Army must be deployable
on short notice and provide power projection of combat forces
regionally. These characteristics for our Army, along with
support to an Army that is highly lethal, hinges totally on Army
logisticians' ability to arm, fix, fuel and move combat power.
Consequently, logisticians must fully understand AirLand Battle
(ALB) doctrine, understand the commander's intent, and fully
anticipate support requirements to fight the war.
This paper addresses combat service support (CSS) doctrine
on logistics (C2) structure, then reviews this concept through
lessons from Desert Storm, and finally discusses any doctrinal
changes required for the Army 2000 and beyond. Operation Desert
Shield/Storm (ODS) showed all the world to see the results of
nearly two decades of hard work in shaping a force that was
second to none. More important, ODS showed what logisticians can
do to support ALB and emphasized a seamless approach to combat
service support does work on a nonlinear battlefield.
2
For almost 200 years, students of the art of war have
recognized the importance of integrating logistics and combat
operations. CSS Doctrine restates this same premise:
"Operations on the modern battlefield are fast pacedand resource hungry. Logistics unit commanders facedecisions that previously on confronted only combatcommanders. Corps Support Groups (CSG) may form partof a forward-deployed force based abroad to supportalliance commitments of regional stability. Others arebased in CONUS prepared to deploy on short notice forcontingency operations in support of joint or combinedoperations.
"2
CSS Commanders must be able to anticipate changes in support
requirements as a tactical plan shifts. They must then
understand the tenets found in FM 100-5, Operations and be able
to apply those tenets in support of forces operating on a
nonlinear battlefield. ALB dictates a highly lethal and mobile
force. This concept has caused doctrine to make significant
changes in the force structure and the way future battles will be
fought. Logistics, although historically a combat multiplier,
has even more potential to decide on the outcome of future
battles.
In order to meet these doctrinal challenges, CSS doctrinal
writers, realized the need to review how CSS units could meet the
ALB imperatives and initiated a study at the U.S. Army Combined
Arms Support Command (CASCOM) to better focus CSS support for an
Army Corps. The outcome of the Command and Control (C2) Study
was referred to as the Corps Support Group (CSG) Concept. Better
3
support for corps non-divisional units operating in thA
divisional area was fundamental to this concept along with
providing backup support to the division as required.
Key to the CASCOM's initiative in inculcating combat
sustainment imperatives imposed by ALB were the following
principles:'
- Single supporter for combat support battalions
- Creation of distribution systems
- Support forward on an area basis
- Simplified C2 structure
Adherence to these imperatives and the concept of deep
attacks, which extended the corps boundary to an area occupying
100 by 210 kilometers or 21,000 square kilometers dictated a
single supporter positioned in the division rear boundary.
Support lines of supply were stretched further and to counter
t is, synchronization was required by logisticians to ensure
transportation and supplies were integrated into responsive
distribution systems. This concept of a single supporter for
combat and combat support units from a corps support battalion
operating as a multifunctional battalion was key to the habitual
relationships and ongoing responsiveness envisioned in this
CASCOM Study.
Moreover, the United States has continued to be committed
to a smaller force with contingency-type missions worldwide and
without the threat from another superpower. Thus, the most
economical and effective means to overcome this challenge is by
4
maintaininq a highly trained, lethal and mobile force that is
ready to deploy on short notice.
Lieutenant General (Retired) Joseph M. Heiser, Jr., in his
book, A Soldier Sup ortina Soldiers spoke of an economy of force
and its application in combat logistics in Vietnam, but his
remarks are applicable to today's forces. He states,
"The war in Vietnam is being sustained today by the mostresponsive support base in U.S. history. The objectivebefore us is also to make it the most effective, efficientlogistical operation in any combat zone. The economic andprudent management of resources in the combat area, while atthe same time unstintingly meeting the soldier's battlefieldrequirements, may at first appear incongruous. But lookingfurther, it becomes clear that the application of soundsupply, maintenance, and transportation techniques andsystems molds together the notion of responsiveness tocombat requirements and efficient management of assetsduring war. Successful mission accomplishment depends uponthe complete compatibility and integration of thesetechniques and systems."'
Finally, the CASCOM Study concluded tenets of the ALB provided
the doctrinal framework for the Army today and in the future.
Also it asserted the need for our forces to be flexible enough to
respond to the quickly changing situations on the battlefield.
Again, the Army's XVIII Airborne Corps was the innovator of
this concept back in 1987. What has now been called upon to
support rapid deploying forces with combat service support has
now been adopted worldwide as a solution in meeting the ALB
tenets found in FM 100-5. Further discussion of this doctrine
and its application to Desert Storm support follow in the
subsequent chapters.
5
OLD VERSUS CURRENT CSS DOCTRINE
Prior to the CASCOM Study on Logistics C2, the governing
regulation providing the basis for modern CSS Doctrine was fm
i00-10, Combat Service Support. CSS doctrine prior to 1989
focused on support to heavy divisions. Doctrine writers then
dictated functional alignment i.e. pure supply or maintenance at
the battalion and group levels within non-divisional units.
Support for the warfighters was found in the corps rear area.
This CSS doctrine was based on the concept that the fighting
would always be forward and the corps rear was a safe haven for
CSS units. Contingency operations mandated an ad hoc task
organization of multifunctional units into logistics support
activities (LSA). Figure 1 and 2 indicate the support laydown
for corps non-divisional units. This concept, of locating CSS
further to the corps rear, did not meet the responsiveness and
other issues dictated by ALB doctrine.
To address the operational commanders intent and provide
rapid support for non-divisional units and back-up support to
divisional units on a nonlinear battlefield, doctrine was revised
into the current corps support group concept. Current doctrine
positions commanders forward, thus, shortening the distances that
must be covered to coordinate and deliver logistics support in
the division sector. Arraying CSS support to non-divisional and
divisional soldiers this way facilitates agility; it allows the
warfighters to seize the initiative and go on the offense when
6
the opportunity presents itself. Additionally, moving
transportation assets forward under the control of a corps
support battalion (CSB), or sometimes referred as a logistics
task force (LTF) contributes to the fluidity of battle and keeps
soldiers fed, fixed and armed, whatever the battle tempo.
The CSGs are a single source for logistics support if task
organized properly with the right mix of CSS units and have the
assigned mission responsibility to provide C2 and supervision for
three to seven corps support battalions.' The basic missions
vary depending on whether the CSG deploys in the forward or rear
portion of the corps sector. Doctrine calls for one forward CSG
to be aligned to each division. This CSG has multifunctional
capabilities i.e. supply, maintenance, transportation. A rear
group has the functional responsibility to support, on an area
basis, units employed in or passing through its area. Further
discussion on both the forward and rear support groups require
more thoughts.
Forward CSGs support covers the area assigned to a division,
separate brigade or armored cavalry regiment sector of the
battlefield. The CSGs missions are to support non-divisional
forces operating well forward in the division's sector and
provide backup support to divisional units. The LTF commander is
the single point of contact for units operating in his area of
responsibility and usually provides CSS assets to fuel, feed, fix
and move warfighters in sector.
The rear CSG provides area support to units and reinforces
7
support to the forward CSGs. The rear CSG's units maintain the
bulk of the corps' general support (GS) supply base and use corps
transportation assets to push supplies forward to divisional and
non-divisional forces. The rear CSGs function as functional
battalions and include hospitals and replacement units. Figures
3 and 4 depict the doctrinal laydown of the forward and rear
CSGs.
There is no standard CSG organizational structure; rather,
the COSCOM commander tailors the CSGs to meet the needs of
supported forces and within the factors of Mission, Enemy,
Troops, Terrain and Time (METT-T) available. Figure 5 depicts a
sample organization for a forward and a rear CSG.
In order to support deep operations by a corps, CSGs help
resupply corps artillery and aviation units. The CSG commander
may attach maintenance support teams (MST) to the ground maneuver
battalion to repair critical weapon systems on-site. Further, he
could position a direct supply company or ammunition transfer
point (ATP) even farther forward to shorten the lines of
communications (LOC).
The big challenge that CSGs must face is support to a
contingency operation. Normally such operations are short in
duration, have limited objectives, and require speed and
flexibility to support forces on the ground. Requirements and
missions for CSG elements depend upon the nature of the
contingency area, expected duration, and available host nation
support (HNS) or contracted support. CSS elements for
8
contingency missions normally deploy as soon as an assault force
lands. If possible, CSS elements set up in a secure area or near
the engaged area.
9
DESERT SHIELD/STORM APPLICATION
In the 1st CorDs Suvnort Command (COSCOMI After Action
Reie dated 15 October 1991, the COSCOM Commander wrote "The
Corps Support Group/Corps Support Battalion (Log C2) Concept
worked exceptionally well in its first test in support of full
combat operations during Desert Shield/Storm. Resources and
responsibility were at the execution level where commanders were
able to tailor support to the immediate needs of combat
commanders. 'g6
The building of logistics task forces and support groups was
done throughout the XVIII and VII Corps logistical plan. More
importantly, the battlefield laydown and support
relationships worked well in support of the ground combat
commanders.
The 1st COSCOM from Fort Bragg began operations on 5 August
1990 and ended its involvement on 15 June 1991. The experiences
of the 1st COSCOM during this period covered every facet of force
structure and CSS operations. Early objectives for the XVIII
Airborne Corps were to deploy a CSS structure to support four and
two-thirds divisions in a defensive posture and, ultimately to
make a transition to conduct offensive operations.
1st COSCOM executed Operation Desert Shield without a
developed time phase force deployment data (TPFDD). However, the
corps did use an existing operations plan as a starting point to
10
develop a structure to support units designated to deploy into
theater. At the same time that corps units were being
identified, echelons above corps (EAC) were being chosen for
deployment. The identity of which units belonged respectively to
corps or EAC added to the confusion. Guidance from U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) was to create a CSS force supporting the XVIII
Airborne Corps and the supplemental EAC.
ist COSCOM created a task organization with the assumption
the 1st COSCOM would control logistics bases in theater, less
port activities, until the theater developed to accept the EAC
role. The COSCOM commander set out to build and task-organize
CSS units in theater while developing a concept of support for
Desert Shield. His approach was logical and functional using the
corps support group concept as described in FM 54-Q, Corps
Support Groups. The 1st COSCOM initially was composed of four
CSGs and a medical group.
The 1st COSCOM Commander continued to emphasize
multifunctional concepts. COSCOM planners took precautions to
ensure that CSGs task organizations were augmented with essential
units to perform all specified missions. Designated Reserve
Component, National Guard and other units were assigned to
provide a full spectrum of multifunctional capabilities. The
task organization was tailored for certain contingencies and
reshaped once units were positioned in country. As capabilities
and shortfalls emerged in a CSG, that command was given a unit to
provide that capability. Task organizations continued to be
11
revised until the corps matured within 120 days from deployment.
During this period the COSCOM grew in strength from 6,000
personnel at Fort Bragg to 24,000 plus personnel for Desert
Shield.
The forward CSGs were challenged throughout the operations
to task-organize themselves to sustain living in Tactical
Assemble Areas (TAA) for an indefinite period of time while
preparing to support combat maneuver operations once the ground
war began. Because few main supply routes (MSR) existed and
cross country mobility was difficult, CSGs were organized into
logistic task forces (LTFs) ready to support fast moving mid to
high intensity offensive operations.
The 507th CSG (rear) was task-organized for offensive
operation with six transportation companies and two trailer
transfer detachments. These units were under the 7th
Transportation Battalion to provide centralized control of
critical common user land transportation (CULT) assets. These
CULT assets provided through-put assets for the entire XVIII
Corps.
The 44th Medical Brigade initially developed medical task
forces and placed tailored mobile army surgical hospitals (MASHs)
and combat support hospitals (CSHs) under one C2 medical group to
ensure maximum focus of hospitalization support. This latitude
to task organize internally as the commanders saw fit and using
detailed planning and rehearsals aided the commanders in
organizing their units for offensive operations. Generally, task
12
forces were built around the surgical capability of the four
surgical tables of the MASH and CSH. Task forces were designed
to have surgical capability available within four hours of
arrival at an objective and full capacity within 12 to 18 hours
of arrival. The other vital part of the design of the task
forces was their ability to traverse difficult terrain and keep
up with the forces in an offensive operation that extended the
LOCs.
As the theater matured, the Brigade received an additional
medical group, the 62nd. As the ground tactical plan developed,
the combat configuration lent itself to organizing the Brigade
into forward and rear task forces (TF), each controlled by a
medical group. The 1st Medical Group was placed forward in the
corps with C2 responsibility for hospitals (MASH/CSHs),
evacuation forward and provisions for ancillary services. The
corps rear was controlled by the 62nd Medical Group, responsible
for C2 of evacuation hospitals. It kept its focus on keeping
hospitals forward clear of patients and moving rear patients to
staging areas for further evacuation to the theater assets.
1st COSCOM's final task organization in support of XVIII
Corps included five CSGs and one rear CSG. Forward CSG's
provided area support to non-divisional corps units and backup
direct and general support to divisional units. The rear group
remained functional in nature, and provided transportation,
aviation maintenance and ammunition support to the entire XVIII
Corps.
13
On the evening of 8 November 1991, VII Corps units were
notified of their deployment to support operations in Southwest
Asia. The 2d COSCOM began to pull together CSS units to support
a corps with five divisions, one armored calvary regiment, as
well as non-divisional brigades and battalion combat forces.
In order to support the main attack, 2d COSCOM and 7th Corps
Support Group (Forward) tailored four corps support battalions
across the corps into multifunctional logistics tasks forces
(LTFs) in support of the 1st and 3rd Armored Division, the 2nd
Armored Cavalry Regiment and nondivisional soldiers. Each LTF
was designed to support maneuver units during the penetration,
defeat of Iraqi tactical reserves and final destruction of the
Iraqi Republican Guard Forces. CSS capabilities consisted of
supply and services, including subsistence, fuel and water;
maintenance and transportation. The 16th Corps Group Rear was
given the mission to provide direct support (DS) to the four CSGs
forward out of logistical bases located in Saudi Arabia. Figures
6 and 7 depict the logistical laydown for fuel and ammunition
employed while operating in Iraq. This concept of support
centered on building corps logistic packages (LogPacks) at the
general supply (GS) base echo. These LogPacks consisted of fuel,
ammunition, water, subsistence and other supply classes and were
configured for units to be supported. Supplies and equipment
then were moved by truck to a trailer transfer point (TTP)
located in Iraq and subsequently pushed to logistics release
points (LRPs) near the supported units. The first Ccrps LogPack
14
travelled with the supported units in their combat formation and
proved invaluable to rapid rearm/refuel operations. The TTP was
the point where the Rear CSG the 16th, exchanged full trailers
and fuel tankers from Log Base Echo with empty trailers from
units operating in Iraq. As combat operations moved forward, the
TTP operations moved to Log Base Nelligen.
Elements of the LTFs crossing the Iraqi/Saudi border carried
personnel and equipment that could immediately affect logistics
making it a combat multipliers. These included maintenance
support teams (HSTs), maintenance collection points (MCP), fuel
and ammunition, food and water, water production teams, fuel
teams, and critical repair parts. This tailored-force concept
enabled the CSG to provide a full range of logistical support to
all units within an area.
Elements from other forward support groups, the 159th CSG
and 43rd CSG supported the 1st Calvary Division and 1st Infantry
Division using the tailored multifunctional task forces. Again,
this concept allowed CSS units to keep up with combat forces and
gave our combat power the ability to strike hard and
continuously, and to finish the fight rapidly.
The 2d COSCON Commander after the war, attributed the
logistical successes of ODS to "forward positioning of support
tied to supported units; synchronized logistics C2 with maneuver
to sustain high tempo operations; rapid logistics build up
15
CSS LESSONS
Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm were stunning
successes for the coalition forces and our trained and ready
Army. While brute force logistics enabled the coalition forces
to soundly defeat the fourth largest Army in the world, the speed
and precision with which coalition forces achieved victory should
not deter us from continuing to institute changes in CSS
doctrine. While many issues arise that indicate need for changes
in CSS equipment, doctrine and manning the force, the following
are noted shortfalls that exist at the COSCOM level. Other CSS
challenges faced by our Army 2000 will be addressed briefly with
emphasis on doctrinal issues, leader development, training,
modernization and near-term challenges to fix Desert Shield/Storm
shortcomings.
The use and employment of multifunctional LTFs in CSGs in
both corps was key to making warfighters effective on a non-
linear battlefield. Inadequate numbers of CSS units dictated by
downsizing our Army indicate fewer and fewer command and control
headquarters. Those that remain must have the capability to
direct and control the total spectrum of logistics operations.
Mobile equipment in CSS units is essential to future
successes. CSGs must be capable to move at the same speed and
over the same terrain as the supported major subordinate commands
(MSCs). Specifically, the heavy expanded mobility tactical truck
(HEMTT) tanker must replace the 5000 gallon fuel tankers. HEMTT
16
wreckers must replace the old series M816 wreckers, high mobility
multipurpose wheel vehicles (HMWVs) must be authorized for C2
vehicles. Obsolete 2-1/2 ton and 5 ton trucks must be replaced
with palletized loading systems (PLS). Materiel handling
equipment (MHE) requirements would be reduced using the PLS.
Fielding the Small Emplacement Excavator (SEE), with its cross-
terrain movement capability and engineer attachments, would also
enhance mobility while allowing rapid defensive position
emplacements by using the backhoe attachments. Likewise, if
HEMTT Tankers are not added to the force structure, HEMTT
Tractors are an alternative solution for pulling heavy trailers
and fuel tankers.
Recovery assets and our ability to transport tanks were not
up to the challenges found in Desert Storm. Our recovery vehicle
M88 and heavy equipment transports (HET) can no longer do the job
due to the weight increases in the main battle tank. HET
operations were constantly delayed due to blown tires, cracked
frames, and burned out brake lines. All these problems were
associated with overloading conditions caused by hauling MIAI
tanks. We must design and procure a new tank recovery vehicle
and HET system in sufficient numbers to allow a corps commander
to move a brigade's worth of tanks in one lift and the division
commander, a battalion worth.
Given the dispersion of CSS units and the continuous
operations of many independent missions, improved Command,
Control and Communications (C3) is vital to the CSG concept. As
17
a minimum, tactical nperational centers -- expando vans or M934
vehicles must be authorized. Tactical satellite (TACSAT)
communications, in sufficient amounts and with data links for
computer interface, provide critical backup to current
communication systems and are essential to effective logistical
operations. All tactical communication, including mobile
subscriber equipment (MSE) could not provide required
communication nodes. One of the most effective communications
devices used during Desert Storm was the Marine Satellite
Telephone Terminal. It was relatively compact, easily installed,
rugged enough to withstand the cross-terrain movement and
reliable. While it was a commercial off-the-shelf product, the
Army might consider its procurement as an interim solution.
Navigational devices i.e. LORAN, GPS were critical in
locating and linking up logistical resupply convoys at designated
logistic release points. Such devices must be incorporated into
unit table of organization and equipment (TO&E). Additionally,
small hand held VHF/UHF Motorola radios were invaluable to both
perimeter security and staging and marshalling area (STAMA)
operations. These hand held radios added to the C2 while staging
heavy equipment and supplies in logistic bases. Likewise,
resupply and convoy operations over a vast corps sector dictates
C2 assets sufficient to control logistical operations down to the
platoon level.
Logistical planning data generated from ODS should be
captured and produce new planning data. Prior to ODS our
18
logistical concept in calculating days of supply (DOS)
specifically for petroleum and ammunition was alien to combat
soldiers. CSS planners must be able to develop and lay down
logistical capabilities in terms understandable to the
Warfighters. In terms of fuel, logisticians must develop a unit-
kilometer standard that translates gallons of fuel on hand into
usable data. A consumable fuel matrix that shows, by type
vehicle, the total distance a battalion/brigade combat force
could move would give the combat planner information needed to
support a combat operation. Similarly, an ammunition matrix
developing rounds per weapon system would help to eliminate
confusion in logistical plans for ammunition.
CSS units are predominantly the initial forces introduced
into a theater of operation. Thus, any contingency force must
retain a robust CSS structure sufficient to support combat
operations in an austere theater: This means that CSGs must be
equipped and manned at an appropriate authorized level of
organization (ALO) for simultaneous contingency operations of at
least two heavy corps. CSS units must be configured in the
active forces so as to initiate emergency deployments without
having to receive any equipment or personnel. Follow-on CSS to
the theater must come from Reserve Component/National Guard
units. Similarly, critical Active Component shortfalls
including graves registration, laundry and bath, transportation,
maintenance units, and water and fuel production and distribution
must be added to CSGs to support two corps operations.
19
CONCLUSIONS
CSS doctrine with designed forward and rear CSGs has
proven its worth and now must be the building block used to
further refine logistics C2. Lessons received from ODS confirm
Log C2 demonstrated its flexibility to anticipate requirements of
the maneuvering forces and was able to meet any contingency
requirements our forces face in the 21st Century. With AirLand
Operations' focus on a lean, agile corps, CSS units must be
integrated into a force very much dependent on robust training
and technological advancements to sustain the ground campaign.
Mobility and material handling capability can greatly be improved
through the fielding of PLS which contains a highly mobile truck
with flat racks. Navigational systems such as the GPS system
used in Desert Storm must be a part of every unit. Better
communication assets i.e. TACSAT must be included down to CSS
units operating as forward or rear support battalions. Finally,
ALB which depends heavily upon synchronization would improve
drastically with the aid of Satellite Based Monitoring Systems
which could be used to track real-time movement of units and
supplies.
The Army Training and Doctrine Command's CASCOM, along with
the Ordnance school continue to look at ways to improve the way
we sustain the force. The systems called battlefield maintenance
system (BMS) must be able to rapidly diagnose faculty equipment
and fix it as far forward as possible to keep the maneuver forces
20
in the fight. The reoriented battlefield maintenance concept is
then dependent on movement and supply management to transport and
replenish critical repair parts using a battlefield distribution
system (BDS) that can pinpoint units and supplies needed on a
nonlinear battlefield. This may entail prepositioning supplies
forward into logistic release points or "cache" which relies on
technological advances discussed earlier, i.e. PLS System, GPS,
Satellite Monitoring Systems.
The Academy of Health Sciences, Fort Sam Houston, Texas,
recognized the importance of the imperative "anticipation" had in
sustaining forces during ODS. As a result of the war and lessons
concerning medical care and tailoring medical forces, medical
command used the Corps Support Group Concept to pattern their Log
C2 into a forward and rear medical battalion. Their new doctrine
found in FM 8-10, Health Services Support in a Theater of
Operations, now is able to meet the demands of ABL operations.
Now the entire Log C2 is integrated and standard across the full
spectrum of CSS support to a contingency force.
General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, former CINC Central Command,
said it best in describing the importance logistics played on the
outcome of Desert Shield/Storm when he said, "The task faced by
the logisticians can only be described as daunting and their
success can only be described as spectacular;"' or in shorter
terms General Frederick M. Franks, TRADOC Commander and former
VII Corps Commander, stated "forget logistics and you'll lose!"9
21
RECOMENDATIONS
As we look at evolving ALB doctrine for an Army 2000 and
beyond, CSS challenges can be grouped into the following
categories:
- Logistics C2 concept with forward and rear support groups
continue to be implemented for both Active and Reserve
CSS units, beginning in FY92 with completion targeted by
FY95.
- Logistical system must be one, consistent across the Army
or "seamless" support operating on a nonlinear
battlefield.
- Ensure all CSS doctrine calls for the development,
testing, and exercising of standard, fully-integrated
automated systems to support all components of the total
Army in the same way in both peace and war.
- Develop doctrine to exercise CSS automation architecture
and communications procedures as fully as combat
procedures.
LEADER DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING:
- CSS leader development must now focus on multifunctional
training with the outcome of future leaders being both
tactical and technically competent and able to translate
22
the commander's intent into a viable logistics plan that
supports the fight.
- CSS training must focus on developing a strong Reserve
Component orientation to the CSS force structure and at
the same time increasing the emphasis logistics has in
support of combat forces at the National Training Center
(NTC).
- CSS units must be heavily stressed during major exercises
whether at the NTC or under computer simulations to
prepare them for contingency operations.
MODERNIZATION:
- Continue to modernize CSS units with the latest
technological advancements in satellite-based monitoring,
communication, and navigational systems.
- Continue to field the PLS systems and other equipment to
support CSS distribution system.
- Ensure units are fully mobile and able to communicate and
control CSS units in order to unweight maneuver units
from having to drag a logictical tail across a
battlefield that has depth.
23
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Figure 3. CSS Doctrine: Employment of corps support groups.
xx x
80-100 KM xI E L- LSPT 0
xI A T
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Figure 4. Forward CSG's area of responsibility.
FO R W ARDi•
* G "
FORWARD
CS 1.
BEHIND DIV BOUNDRY DIV AREA
REAR UP
CS S& AMMO I PETRL TRANS CT W ER BSBN BN SUP BN ONSUP BN SPT BN
DS ONLY
LEGEND:
....... Variable number
1 Number of battalions dependent upon force structure, geography, and span of control.
2 DS units only.
3 May be host nation support.
4 Attached to support corps requirements in arid environment.5 As required.
Figure 5. Forward and rear corps support group organizations.
CL
0 A
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ICarl E. Vuono, General, "Desert Storm and Future LogisticsChallenges," Army Loaistician, July-August 1991, p. 28.
2U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command, CorDs SuDDortGroup Final Draft, November 1991, p. 1-1.
'U.S. Army Logistics Center, Loaistics Command and ControlInterim Operational Conceot, June 1988, p. 5.
4joseph M. Heiser, Lieutenant General, A Soldier SuDDortinggldir, Appendix A.
5U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command, pp. 1-9.
61st Corps Support Command, After Action Review, 15 October1991, p. 1-1.
7 U.S. Army 2d Corps Support Command Briefing. "OperationDesert Storm, 100 Hours War," 1 May 1991, p. 77.
$James D. Starling, Lieutenant General, Lecture, "DesertShield/Storm" (U.S. Army War College), January 1991.
9Frederick M. Franks, Jr., General, Lecture, "Approachingthe Future" (U.S. Army War College), 3 February 1992.
31
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. Ed. and Trans. Michael Howard andPeter Paret. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976.
Van Creveld, Martin. SuDlvina War: Logistics From Wallensteinto Patton. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
Heiser, Joseph M. A Soldier SuRoorting Soldiers. Washington,D.C.: Center of Military History, 1991.
U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5: Operations.Washington: May 1986.
U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-10, Combat ServiceSupport, Washington: February 1988.
U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 8-10, Health ServicesSupport in a Theater of Operations, Washington: March 1991.
U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 63-3J: Combat ServiceSupport Operations. Washington: August 1985.
U.S. Army Logistics Center. Logistics Command and ControlInterim Operational Concept. Fort Lee, Virginia: June1988.
U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command. CorDs SuDDort GroupFinal Draft. Fort Lee, Virginia: November 1991.
HQ, Department of the Army. HQ 1st Corps Support Command.After Action Review. Fort Bragg, North Carolina:15 October 1991.
HQ, Department of the Army. HQ 2d Corps Support CommandBriefing. Ooeration Desert Storm. 100 Hours War.Stuttgart, Germany: 1 May 1991.
Starling, Lieutenant General James D. Desert Shield/Storm.Lecture. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army WarCollege. January 1991.
Franks, General Frederick M. AR~roaching the Future. Lecture.Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College.February 1992.
Harper, Colonel Gilbert S. "Army Logistics in 2010."Locistician. September-October 1991.
32
Vuono, General Carl E. "Desert Storm and Future LogisticsChallenges." Army Loaistician. July-August 1991.
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33