cabotaje-tang, fernandez, b., j. emmanuel...

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESSANDIGAN BAYAN

QUEZON CITY

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,

Criminal Case No. SB-16-CRM-0270For: Violation of Section 3 (e), of

Republic Act No. 3019

EMMANUEL CEDRO ANDAYA,et al.,

CABOTAJE-TANG, P.J.,Chairperson,FERNANDEZ, B., J. andTRESPESES,J.1

For resolution is accused Antonio V. Sillona's "Motion toDismiss" dated January 17, 2018.2

Accused-movant Sillona prays that the present caseagainst him be dismissed on the ground that his constitutionalright to speedy disposition of cases had been violated. He ~

1 Sitting as a special member of the Third Division as per Administrative Order No. 091-2018 dated~February 9, 20182 pp. 35-60, Vol. II, Record k

ResolutionCriminal Cases No. SB-16-CRM-0270People vs. Andaya, et al.

that the complaint against him was filed on April 26, 2011.3However, the respondents (now accused) were required to filetheir counter-affidavits only on May 15,2012, or more than one(1) year from the filing of the said complaint. 4 The Office of theOmbudsman took another two (2)years and ten (10)months toresolve the preliminary investigation in this case, while thepresent Information was filed with the Court only on May 4,2016.5 It thus took the Officeof the Ombudsman five (5) yearsto terminate the preliminary investigation in this case ..

Relying on the case of Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,6 theaccused-movant argues that the long delay in the resolution ofthe preliminary investigation in this case violated his right tospeedy disposition of cases and speedy trial thereby warrantingthe dismissal of the present case against him.7 He maintainsthat the right to speedy disposition of cases covers not only theperiod within which the /preliminary investigation wasconducted but also all the stages to which the respondent wassubjected. In support thereof, he invokes the cases ofCoscolluela v. Sandiganbayan,8 Lopez v. Office of theOmbudsman, et al.,9 People v. Sandiganbayan, et aL,10 andTorres v. Sandiganbayan.11

Accused-movant Sillona further contends that he had been"greatly prejudiced" by the delay in this case. He claims that [1]he has remained under a cloud of uncertainty for five (5) longyears; [2]the charges against him has tainted his reputation; [3]the accusations against him caused him to be alienated fromhis friends and peers, to the extent that he was beingdiscriminated against; [4] he had suffered anxiety and unrest;[5] the stigma of the criminal accusations against him made it

/?..

M 'Y'3 p. 40, Vol. II, Record4 p. 40, Vol. II, Record5 p. 40, Vol. II, Record6159 SCRA 70 (1988)7 p. 40, Vol. II, Record8 701 SCRA 188 (2013)9 364 SCRA 569 (2001)10712 SeRA 359 (2013)11 805 SCRA 455 (2016)

ResolutionCriminal Cases No. SB-16-CRM-0270People vs. Andaya, et ai.

difficult for him to start a new career in government service;12and, [6] the prolonged investigation in this case put him at adisadvantage because the passage of time unduly affected hisand his witnesses' recollection of details and his access topertinent records and material witnesses. Thus, his defense iseffectively impaired and his financial resources had allegedlybeen depleted as he continues to incur legal expenses to defendhimself.13

Also, the accused-movant points to the fact that it is theduty of the prosecutors to speedily resolve cases pending beforethem regardless of the respondents' acquiescence to the delayor his/her failure to object thereto.14He asserts that the Officeof the Ombudsman failed to comply with the provisions ofSection 3 (f),Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which requires theinvestigating officer to determine, within ten (10) days from thetermination of the investigation, whether or not there issufficient ground to hold a respondent for trial. 15

Lastly, accused -movant Sillona invokes the ruling of theSandiganbayan, Second Division, in the case of People v.Emmanuel C. Andaya, et al,16 wherein the criminal caseagainst herein accused was dismissed on the ground of aviolation of their right to speedy disposition of cases. 17

In its "Opposition (to Accused Antonio V. Sillona's Motion toDismiss dated 17January 2018)" dated January 30,2018,18 theprosecution contends that there was no inordinate delay in thepreliminary investigation of this case or a violation of theaccused-movant's right to speedy disposition of cases.19 Itchronicles the following factual antecedents surrounding thepreliminary investigation in this case, to ~ .

/6/.12 p. 44/ Vol. 11/ Record13 p. 45/ Vol. 11/ Record14 p. 46/ Vol. 11/ Record15 p. 46/ Vol. 11/ Record16 Criminal Case No. SB-17-CRM-141817 Annex A, pp. 52-60/ Vol. 11/ Record _18 pp. 88-99, Vol. 11/ Record19 p. 92/ Vol. 11/ Record


2. The records of this case disclose that on 26 April2011, private complainant Guillermo L.Sylianteng, Jr. filed before the Office of theOmbudsman a Complaint Affidavit20 dated 25 April2011 for Violation of Section 53(b) and Section54.2(d) of R.A. No. 9184; Violation of Section 3(e)and 4(b) of R.A. No. 3019; and Violation of Article171 of the Revised Penal Code against thereinrespondents Emmanuel C. Andaya, Atty. SylviaBanda, Josefina S. Samson, Engr. Antonio V.Sillona, Bernadette T. Lagumen, Ma. Gracia L.Enriquez, Ruben Dancel (all of the NationalPrinting Office)and Advance Computer Forms, Inc.

3. The Complaint Affidavitwas forthwith evaluated on27 April 2011 and, thereafter, or on 03 June2011, forwarded to Graft Investigation andProsecution Officer Francisco Alan L. Molina forproper action. On 15 May 2012, a directive wasissued to GIPO Molina to conduct preliminaryinvestigation and administrative adjudicationproceedings. On even date, orders were issued tothe respondents for the filing of their respectivecounter-affidavits.

4. On 24 May 2012, respondents Andaya, Banda,Samson, Sillona, Lagumen and Enriquez filed aMotion for Additional Time to file Counter-Affidavitand other Supporting Documents. On 01 June2012, respondent Kevin Haw, President of AdvanceComputer Forms, Inc., likewise filed a Motion forExtension of Time to File Counter-Affidavit.

Respondent Haw filed his Counter-Affidavit on 14June 2012. In response thereto, the privatecomplainant filed a Reply Affidavit on 29 June

2012'/7 '

'r!'


6. Meanwhile respondents Andaya, Banda, Samson,Sillona, Lagumen and Enriquez filed their JointCounter-Affidavit on 15 June 2012 whilerespondent Dancel filed his Counter-Affidavit on02 July 2012. On 11 July 2012, the privatecomplainant moved for an additional time to filehis reply affidavit to the said counter-affidavits. Hefiled a Consolidated Reply Affidavit on 25 July2012.

7. Respondents Andaya, Banda, Samson, Sillona,Lagumen and Enriquez, on 09 August 2012,moved for an additional time to file rejoinder. TheirConsolidated Rejoinder Affidavitwas subsequentlyfiled on 29 August 2012.

8. For his part, the private respondent moved for anextension of time to file sur-rejoinder on 10September 2012. He filed his Sur-Rejoinder on 19September 2012.

9. GIPO Molina then proceeded to resolve thecomplaint. A draft resolution was prepared forreview and / or revision through various levels of theOffice of the Ombudsman. Meanwhile, or on 12March 2013, the private complainant filed aMotion to Resolve Complaint.

10. On 27 July 2015, the Ombudsman finallyapproved the Resolution dated 24 July 2015,finding probable cause to indict respondentsAndaya, Banda, Samson, Sillona, Lagumen andEnriquez for Violation of Section 3(e) of RepublicAct No. 3019 and recommending the filing of thecorresponding Information before theSandigan bayan.

11. On 20 August 2015, respondents Andaya, Banda,Samson, Sillona, Lagumen and Enriquez moved forthe reconsideration of the said resolution and thedeferment of the filing of the Information. Theprivate complainant filed his Opposition thereto on02 September 2015. The said respondents ~

/~


flIed their Reply thereto and Supplemental Motionfor Reconsideration on 18 September 2015. Theprivate complainant, thereafter, filed his Commentthereto on 12 October 2015.

12. In an Order dated 06 November 2015, which wasapproved by the Ombudsman on 20 January2016, the Motion for Reconsideration with Motionto Defer the Filing of Information was denied.

13. On 04 May 2016, the corresponding Informationwas flIed before the Sandiganbayan.21

The prosecu tion claims that the above chronology ofevents shows that the time taken by the Office of theOmbudsman to resolve the preliminary investigation in thiscase was neither vexatious, capricious, oppressive norunjustified. It submits that the exchange of numerous pleadingsbetween the parties; the motions for extension filed by them; theexercise of care by the Office of the Ombudsman in verifying,evaluating and assessing the charges against the respondents(now accused-movants); and, the fact that the resolution of thecase had to undergo a hierarchy of review before it was finallyapproved by the Ombudsman should all be taken intoconsideration in the determination of the existence of inordinatedelay.22

Moreover, the prosecution argues that just like theaccused-movant, it also shares the burden of producingwitnesses and other pertinent documents in order to build thecase against the accused-movant despite the passage of time.23

21 pp. 88-90, Vol. II, Record22 pp. 90-91, Vol. II, Record23 pp. 91-92, Vol. II, Record

Finally, the prosecution points to the fact that theaccused-movant never complained of a violation to his right tospeedy trial during the entire period of the preliminary

/? .~ 1-


investigation of this case.24 It is only now that he is assertingsuch right when the present case is already set for the initialpresentation of the prosecution evidence.

After an assiduous assessment of the arguments raised bythe parties, the Court finds the subject motion unmeritorious.

To begin with, it is settled that although the Constitutionguarantees the right to speedy disposition of cases, such speedydisposition is a flexible concept.25 To properly define thatconcept, the facts and circumstances surrounding each casemust be evaluated and taken into account.26 In other words,jurisprudence instructs that courts are compelled to approachsuch cases on an ad hoc basis and weigh the conducts of boththe prosecution and the accused vis-a-vis the [1]length of delay;[2] reason for the delay; [3]accused's assertion or non-assertionof his/her right to speedy trial; and, [4] prejudice caused to thedefendant resulting from the delay.27

Thus, the cases invoked by the accused-movant to supporthis claim of inordinate delay cannot be blindly applied to thepresent case without a close scrutiny of the attendant facts andcircumstances surrounding the preliminary investigation in thepresent case. To be sure, a mere mathematical reckoning of thetime involved is not sufficient to hold the existence of inordinatedelay.28

The records of this case show the following factualantecedents surrounding the preliminary investigationconducted by the Office of the Ombudsman, ~

24 p. 91, Vol. II, Record ;If; ,25 Ombudsman v. Jurado, 561 SCRA 135 (2008)26 Remulla v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 218040, Apri/17, 2017 ,./ •27 See Remulla v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 218040, Apri/17, 2017 '/28 Dela Peiia v. Sandiganbayan, 360 SCRA478 (2001)


1. On April 26, 2011, private complainant GuillermoL. Sylianteng, Jr., filed his Complaint-Affidavitdated April 25, 2011, with the Office of theOmbudsman; 29

2. On May 15, 2012, a directive was issued to GraftInvestigation and Prosecution Officer Alan L.Molina to conduct a preliminary investigation andadministrative adjudication in the present case;thereafter, orders were given to the respondents tofile their respective counter-affidavits;30

3. On May 24, 2012, then respondents Andaya,Banda, Samson, Sillona, Lagumen and Enriquezfiled a "Motion for Additional Time to File Counter-Affidavits and other Supporting Documents;"31

4. On June. 14, 2012, private respondent Haw filedhis counter-affidavit;32

5. On June 15, 2012, respondents Andaya, Banda,Samson, Sillona, Lagumen and Enriquez filed their('Joint Counter-Affidavit" dated June 14,2012;33

6. On July 2, 2012, respondent Dancel filed hiscounter-affidavit;34

7. On July 11, 2012, the private complainant prayedfor an additional time to file his reply-affidavit;35

8. On July 25, 2012, private complainant Syliantengfiled his ((Consolidated Reply Affidavit" dated July22, 2012;36 the private complainant requested andwas given an extension of time to file his reply untilJuly 26, 2012;37 ~

29 pp. 27-53, Vol. I, Record /'30 p. 89, Vol. II, Record31 p. 89, Vol. II, Record32 p. 89, Vol. II, Record33 pp. 54- 130, Vol. I, Record34 p. 89, Vol. II, Record35 p. 89, Vol. II, Record36 pp. 169-183, Vol. I, Record37 p. 169, Vol. I, Record

ResolutionCriminal Cases No. SB-l6-CRM-0270People vs. Andaya, et al.

9. On August 9, 2012, the above-mentionedrespondents also prayed for an additional time tofile their rejoinder;38

10. On August 29, 2012, respondents Andaya, Banda,Samson, Sillona, Lagumen and Enriquez filed their"Consolidated Rejoinder Affidavit" of even date;39

11. On September 10, 2012, the private complainantlikewise requested for an extension of time to filehis sur-rejoinder;4o

12. On September 19, 2012, private complainantSylianteng filed his "Sur-Rejoinder" of even date;41

13. On July 24, 2015, the Office of the Ombudsmanissued a Resolution finding probable cause to indictthen respondents Andaya, Banda, Samson, Sillona,Lagumen and Enriquez for violation of Section 3 (e)of Republic Act (R.A.)No. 3019; the said resolutionwas approved by Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales on July 27, 2015;42

14. On November 6, 2015, the Office of theOmbudsman issued an Order which denied themotions for reconsideration filed by the above-mentioned respondents; the said Order wasapproved by Ombudsman Morales on January 20,2016;43

The present Information was drafted by GenerosoSevero H. Plazo, Assitant Special Prosecutor II, onApril 1, 2016. The same Information was approvedby Ombudsman Morales on April 15, 2016;44 and,r

/1J r'38 p. 89, Vol. II, Recorst39 pp. 184-249, Vol. I, Record40 p. 89, Vol. II, Record41 pp. 131-168, Vol. I, Record42 pp. 7-21, Vol. I, Record43 pp. 22-26, Vol. I, Record44 pp. 1-4, Vol. I, Record

ResolutionCriminal Cases No. SB-16-CRM-0270People vs. Aridaya, et ai.

16. On May 4, 2016, the Information in this case wasfiled.45

Plainly, the Office of the Ombudsman took continuedactions to resolve the preliminary investigation in the presentcase. Also, the motion for reconsideration filed by therespondents was immediately resolved. Undeniably, thenumerous' pleadings filed by the parties and the motions forextension of time filed by them contributed to the delay in thiscase. While there was a delay in the disposition of the casebefore the Office of the Ombudsman, the Court does not findsuch delay as vexatious, arbitrary, capricious or oppressivewarranting the dismissal of the present case.

To repeat, the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial is arelative and flexible concept. It is consistent with reasonabledelays and depends upon the circumstances.46 What isproscribed is unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delaywhich render rights nugatory.47

Indeed, the period during which the pleadings (togetherwith its annexes) were examined and reviewed, the motions forextension of time filed by the parties, the time poured into theresearch of pertinent laws and applicable jurisprudence, thelevels of review that the case had to go through and the exerciseof legal judgment and discretion must also be taken intoconsideration in determining the existence of inordinate delay.

It is noteworthy that the accused-movant and his co-accused never raised the issue of inordinate delay, or at leasttook any step in order to accelerate the proceedings in thepreliminary investigation of their case. It is only now, or whenthe case is already set for the initial presentation' of theprosecution's evidence, that the accused-movant is minded toassert his right to speedy tri~ •

"pp. 5-£, Vol. I, Record ~ I46 Braza v. Sandiganbayan, 691 SCRA471 (2013)47 Ombudsman v. Jurado, 561 SCRA135 (2008), Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan, 440 SCRA423 (2004)


While it is true that a respondent in criminal case has noobligation to follow-up on his case, it is likewisejurisprudentially settled that the accused's assertion of his/herright to speedy disposition of cases is entitled to strongevidentiary weight in determining whether or not he/she isbeing deprived thereof; hence, failure to claim such right at theearliest opportunity willmake it difficult to prove that there wasdenial of the respondent's right to speedy trial.48

On the issue that the accused-movant was "greatlyprejudiced" because of the delay in this case, jurisprudenceabounds holding that the concept of "prejudice" should beconsidered as one of the factors in determining whether theaccused's right to speedy disposition of cases had beenviolated.49 In consideration thereof, the interests of the accused,namely: [1] to prevent an oppressive pre-trial incarceration; [2]minimize the anxiety and concern of the accused; and, [3] limitthe possibility that his/her defense will be impaired, should allbe weighed and considered in order to determine whether theaccused was seriously prejudiced by the delay.50

Here, the accused-movant immediately posted bail on May6, 2016,51or just after two (2) days52from filing of the presentInformation. Thus, the accused-movant was not subjected toany pre-trial incarceration.

On the anxiety and unrest allegedly suffered by theaccused-movant, the nature and degree thereof due to the delayin the disposition of his case must be oppressive, unnecessaryand notoriously disproportionate to the nature of the criminalcharge for it to constitute a violation of the accused's right tospeedy trial.53 The accused-movant miserably failed todemonstrate the kind of anxiety that he purportedly sUffer~

48 See Perez v. People, 544 SCRA532 (2008) citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 US 514 (1972) c'~ J49 See Jaeob v. Sandiganbayan, 635 SCRA 94 (2010), Perez v. People, 544 SCRA 532 (2008), Spouses Uy v.Adriano, 505 SCRA 625 (2006), Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, 442 SCRA294 (2004)50 Perez v. People, 544 SCRA 532 (2008) citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 US 514 (1972), Ombudsman v. Jurado, •••.

561 SCRA135 (2008) 751 p. 259, Vol. I, Record •52 The Information in this case was filed on May 4, 201653 See separate concurring opinion of Justice Josue N. Belosillo in People v. Laeson, 400 SCRA267 (2003).


during the preliminary investigation of this case. Suffice it tostate that any anxiety, suffering, mental and emotional stressdue to the uncertainties brought about by the pending chargesagainst an accused are unwelcome but attendantinconveniences that confront any respondent or any accused ina criminal case.

In the same vein, accused-movant Sillona's claim that thepassage of time unduly affected his and his witnesses'recollection of details and access to pertinent records remainunsubstantiated. In fact, he has not identified who thesepotential witnesses would be.

On accused-movant Sillona's argument that theinvestigating prosecutor should have determined the existenceof probable cause within ten (10) days from the termination ofthe preliminary investigation, pursuant to Section 3 (f), Rule112 of the Rules of Court,54 the Supreme Court has ruled thatsaid period is merely directory. In·Raro v. Sandiganbayan,55the High Court ruled:

The length of time it took before the conclusion ofthe preliminary investigation may only be attributed tothe adherence of the Ombudsman and the NBI to therules of procedure and the rudiments of fair play. Theallegations of Abaiio's complaint had to be verified; theOmbudsman did not believe the same hook, line andsinker. Recently, the Court held that while the Rulesof Court provides a ten-day period from submissionof the case within which an investigating officermust come out with a resolution, that period oftime is merely directory. 56 Thus:

"The Court is not unmindful of the duty ofthe Ombudsman under the Constitution andRepublic Act No. 6770 to act promptly onComplaints brought before him. But suchr

54 p. 47, Vol. /I, Record .55335 SeRA 581 (2000) ~ ,,/.56 Emphasis supplied [ _ /

ResolutionCriminal Cases No. SB-16-CRM-0270People vs. Andaya, et ai.

should not be mistaken with a hasty resolutionof cases at the expense of thoroughness andcorrectness. Judicial notice should be taken ofthe fact that the nature of the Office of theOmbudsman encourages individuals who clamorfor efficient· government service to freely lodgetheir Complaints against wrongdoings ofgovernment personnel, thus resulting in asteady stream of cases reaching the Officeof theOmbudsman."

Accused-movant Sillona's reliance on the ruling of theSandiganbayan, Second Division, in the case of People v.Emmanuel C. Andaya, et al.,57is misplaced.

The Sandiganbayan operates in Divisions of three (3)·Justices each and each Division functions independently of theother.58 In Francisco v. Rojas,59 the Supreme Court teachesthat while a ruling of a particular division of the Court ofAppeals may be taken cognizance of in some cases, it cannotbind or prejudice a ruling of another division thereof, the formerbeing a co-ordinate authority, thus:

In a hierarchical judicial system like ours, thedecisions of the higher courts bind the lower courts; thecourts of co-ordinate authority do not bind eachother;60and the one highest court does not bind itself,it being invested with the innate authority to ruleaccording to its best lights.61 The principle of staredecisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinalrules established by the Supreme Court in its finaldecisions.

57 Criminal Case No. SB-17-CRM-141858 Preagido v. Sandiganbayan, 476 SCRA 143 (2005) citing De Guzman vs. People, 119 SCRA337 (1982)59723 SCRA423 (2014)60 Emphasis supplied61 Footnote omitted


Applying by analogy the above-mentioned pronouncementto the present case, the rulings of the other divisions of thisCourt likewise have no binding force on the findings of thisDivision. Further, it must be emphasized that the only judicialdecisions which form part of our legal system are the decisionsof the Supreme Court.62 Thus, only the rulings and decisions ofthe Supreme Court can serve as binding precedents to thedeterminations to be made by the Sandiganbayan.63

WHEREFORE, accused-movant Antonio V. Sillona's"Motion to Dismiss" dated January 17, 2018, is DENIED for lackof merit.

Quezon City, Metro Manila

PARO M&z\1iO TANPresiding Justice

Chairperson

62 auasha Pena Ancheta &Nolasco Law Office vs. Court of Appeals, 607 SeRA 712 (2009)63 Sarriga v. Sandiganbayan, 586 seRA 63 (2009)