caed infectious contagions seminar ppt
DESCRIPTION
Powerpoint of seminar talksTRANSCRIPT
Kent State University/CAED
60114148
Designing for Highly
Infectious Contagions CAEDAIACES001
Chris Woolverton PhD, Patrick Casey AIA,
Greg Lavriha PE, and Gerald McDonnell PhD
2/23/15
Credit(s) earned on completion of this course will be reported to AIA CES for AIA members. Certificates of Completion for both AIA members and non-AIA members are available upon request.
This course is registered with AIA
CES for continuing professional
education. As such, it does not
include content that may be
deemed or construed to be an
approval or endorsement by the
AIA of any material of construction or any method or manner of handling, using, distributing, or dealing in any material or product. _______________________________________
Questions related to specific materials, methods, and services will be addressed at the conclusion of this presentation.
Course Description
Concern over infectious disease is capturing the public’s attention and
necessitates better systems to manage infectious contagions in health
care facilities at biosafety levels 2 through 4—including laboratories and
care settings.
Today's focus is on the role the design of facilities play in the
management of infectious contagions in health care settings.
This course is explores how design impacts infection control with a focus
on strategies, systems and equipment than can be implemented in any hospital to handle both a growing concern with and increasing
prevalence of infectious contagions.
Learning Objectives
1. Participants will be able to classify and differentiate various elements in health care
design based on standards for Biosafety Levels, including the practices, procedures,
containment equipment, and building system requirements that determine each level of
classifications.
2. Learners will recognize the major differences in air ventilation systems as compared
between the three main Biosafety Levels in research and laboratory spaces; new
standards, pending standards, and new technologies will be discussed.
3. Attendees will be able to specify the characteristics that guide architectural and
engineering considerations when designing for biosafety in health care settings, including
the ability to recognize minimum standards and identify enhancements that exceed
minimum standards to increase safety.
4. Participants will identify at least three design-related conditions that permit cross-
contamination and then recognize strategies, equipment, or system designs that serve to
mitigate cross-contamination and protect humans from microbial pathogens.
Biosafety as a Design Element
Christopher J. Woolverton, Ph.D.
Professor of Environmental Health Sciences
Director, Center for Public Health Preparedness
Healthcare-associated Infections
www.cdc.gov, December 2014 http://www.cdc.gov/HAI/state-based/index.html
UCLA Warns Nearly 160 Patients About Dangerous 'Superbug' Exposure http://www.nbcnews.com/
2 deaths possibly linked to 'superbug' at UCLA hospital after 7 infected, 179 exposed www.foxnews.com/
UCLA hospital cites medical scopes in superbug CRE outbreak http://www.cnn.com/
UCLA Outbreak Highlights Challenge Of Curbing Infections www.npr.org/
Nearly 200 UCLA Patients Possibly Exposed to Bacteria That Can Kill 40 Percent of Those Infected ktla.com/
Feb 18-20, 2015
21st Century Human
Pathogens (and drug resistance passed on to many)
Pathogens Recognized in last 25 Years
Pathogens Re-emerging (conquered no more)
BACTERIA Bartonella henselae Ehrlichia spp. Helicobacter pyloria Borrelia burgdorferi
BACTERIA Clostridium difficile Streptococcus pyogenes Staphylococcus aureus
FUNGUS Encephalitozoon spp. Crytococcus gattii
FUNGUS
PROTIST Babesia spp. Acenthamoebia spp. Naegleria spp.
PROTIST
VIRUS Avian influenza (H7N9) Bourbon virus Chikungunya virus Hendra virus Hepatitis C virus Hepatitis E virus Human Immunodeficiency Virus Human herpesvirus 6 Human herpesvirus 8 MERS-CoV Parvovirus B19
VIRUS Dengue virus Ebola virus Enterovirus A71 Enterovirus D68 Measles virus Mumps virus Polio virus
2001 Hamilton, NJ Post Office
Select Agents are Everywhere You Look
10
Characteristics of Tier 1 Select Agents
Agent % Lethality
(if untreated)
Incubation
Period (days)
Infectious Dose
(# organisms)
Vaccine/
Treatment
Bacteria
Anthrax >90 1-6 1-103 Yes/Yes
Plague 90 2-3 100-15,000 No/Yes
Tularemia 35 3-6 10-50 No/Yes
Brucellosis 5 5-60 10-100 No/Yes
Virus
Smallpox 30 7-17 10-100 Yes/No
Ebola 50-90 4-21 1-10 No/No
VEE 1 2-6 10-100 No/No
Toxin
Botulinum
Toxin
>90 1-5 1 ng/kg No/Yes
BioSafety Lowers Risk
• Identify agent hazards & perform initial assessment of risk
• Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)
– Donning/doffing, disinfection, hand hygiene, specific equipment use, use of sharps, maintenance
• Respiratory Protection Program
– May be required even with engineering controls
• Medical Surveillance
– Blood banking, baselines, vaccine, occupational medicine release
• Emergency Response Plans (ERPs) & Equipment
Engineering Controls
Work Practices
CDC/NIH Guidance
Work Practices Special practices & precautions Safety Equipment Primary Barrier (Personal Protective Equipment) Engineering Controls Secondary Barrier (Building & room design, ventilation, sewer, water, etc. Administrative Controls Compliance with regs, safety training, proficiency testing, etc.
Biosafety Regulations, Standards, and Guidance
ALL WORKPLACE HAZARDS OSHA General Duty Clause
and other standards (Regulatory)
INFECTIOUS AGENTS NIH/CDC BMBL
(Guidance)
SOME INFECTIOUS AGENTS Transport, Import, Export
(Regulatory)
GOOD LAB PRACTICE CLSI M29-A3 (Guidance)
BLOODBORNE PATHOGENS
OSHA Standard (Regulatory)
MEDICAL LAB SAFETY
ISO 15189/15190 (Standard)
RECOMBINANT DNA
NIH (Guidance)
Control entry and spread of communicable diseases Public Health Service Act (42 U.S. Code § 264; Section 361)
Infection Control Compliance assisted with
Joint Commission Oversight
The Joint Commission is a nonprofit organization that accredits U.S. health care agencies and programs as a condition of licensure and the receipt of Medicaid reimbursement.
The Joint Commission was formerly the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) and previous to that the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH).
BSL Agents
1 Not known to consistently cause disease in healthy adults
2 Associated with human disease, hazard = percutaneous injury, ingestion, mucous membrane exposure
3 Indigenous or exotic agents with potential for aerosol transmission; disease may have serious or lethal consequences
4 Dangerous/exotic agents which pose high risk of life-threatening disease, aerosol-transmitted lab infections; or related agents with unknown risk of transmission
Biosafety Levels for Infectious Agents
www.cdc.gov
BSL Practice
1 Standard Microbiological Practices
2 BSL-1 practice plus: Limited access, Biohazard warning signs, "Sharps" precautions,
Biosafety manual defining any needed waste decontamination or medical surveillance policies
3 BSL-2 practice plus: Controlled access, Decontamination of all waste,
Decontamination of lab clothing before laundering, Baseline serum antibody analysis
4 BSL-3 practices plus: Clothing change before entering, Shower on exit, All material
decontaminated on exit from facility
Recommended Biosafety Level Practices
www.cdc.gov
Biosafety Level 1 (BSL-1)
BSL-1 BSL-2
BSL-3 BSL-4
Healthcare Design to Control Disease Spread
Source: https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/hospital/hazards/tb/tb.html
OSHA Respiratory Standard: 29 CFR1910.134
• All patient and lab space to include:
– Nonporous floor, walls, table tops, chairs, and stools.
– Negative airflow directed to “dirtiest” area
– Sink for hand washing; Eyewash station.
– Controlled access, double-door entry; take-away windows.
• PPE and disinfection supplies nearby.
• Secure space for waste storage.
• Proper pest control practices.
• Separate storage area for personal belongings.
High Containment Space Recommendations
Risk Assessment leads to Clear Guidance
Questions ?
The University of Texas Medical Branch
Designing for Contagion Transmission Reduction
Patrick M. Casey, AIA
Office of Facilities Planning and Construction
February 23, 2015 23
Discussion Outline
1. Introduction
Personal Story
UT System – Who we are?
GNL - Facilities Best Practice
2. Lessons Learned
Infectious Disease / Biohazard Isolation Unit
Facilities Requirements
Other Alternative Solutions
Changes in CDC Protocol
Personal Story
Kent State – 1980 to 1989
University of Texas – 2015
About: The University of Texas System
About: The University of Texas
• Established 1876
• Academic – 220,000 + Students
• Healthcare – 1.3 million hospital days of
treatment
• Research – $2.5 billion in research funding
Galveston National Lab - completed 2008
Galveston National Lab – BS L4
BSL-4 Change Room
BSL-4 Body Shower
BSL-4 Suit Change Room
BSL-4 Chemical Shower (Air Lock)
BSL-4 BSL-4 Lab
BSL-4 Chemical Shower
Complexity Box-in-Box
Complexity Penetrations
Complexity Bio-Seal Doors
Complexity Air Filtering
Complexity Effluent Treatment
Complexity Bio-Safety Cabinet
Current Research
UTMB – Ebola Involvement
Dr. Tom Ksiazek – Headed up contact tracing for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Sierra Leone for six weeks August-September 2014; providing ongoing counsel to CDC
and other organizations.
Dr. James Le Duc – Member of World Health Organization (WHO) Emergency Committee on Ebola, member of the Global Outbreak and Alert Response Network (GOARN) Steering
Committee, speaker at National Academy of Sciences conference on U.S. Ebola research strategy, and numerous additional advisory roles.
Ksiazek and Le Duc – Texas Task Force on Infectious Disease Preparedness and Response.
UTMB – Ebola Research Underway
Anti-filovirus small interfering RNAs (siRNA) – a novel class of drug
developed in collaboration with Tekmira Pharmaceuticals that has
shown great promise in laboratory animals against the latest strain of
Ebola-Zaire from the current outbreak.
• Recently began clinical trials in humans
Recombinant Vesicular Stomatitis Virus (rVSV) – a vaccine candidate
that has proven effective at protecting laboratory animals challenged
with Ebola and has shown promising results even after animals have
shown signs of infection. Developed with Profectus BioSciences.
• Entering Phase 1 clinical trials soon
Studies of fully human anti-filovirus monoclonal antibodies (ZMappTM)
– conducted in collaboration with Dr. James Crowe, Jr., Vanderbilt
University, and corporate partner Mapp Biopharmaceutical.
UTMB 2014 - Biocontainment Care Unit
Commissioned by Governor’s Office and CDC – Translate the science of
biocontainment into optimal patient care and isolation practices and
provide rooms capable of CCU/ICU level care.
BioContainment Critical Care Unit (BCCCU)
= Critical Care Unit
+ Biocontainment Patient Care Unit
46
“...biocontainment patient care unit” or BPCU is a “facility designed and operated to maximize patient care with appropriate infection control practices and procedures. These units are secure, physically separated from other patient care areas, and have special air-handling systems and advanced personal protection measures for staff.” Phillips et al., Ft Detrick MD, 2006
BCCCU at UTMB: Learn from Others
47
Who:
Providence St. Patrick’s Hospital, Missoula, MT University of Nebraska Medical Center, Omaha, NE
Emory University, Atlanta, GA
What:
Site and Location Access and Adjacencies Configuration BioContainment Size and number of beds Isolation Technology Anterooms Family Spaces Technology (UV, laminar flow) Air Changes Laboratory Autoclave Dialysis, Minor Procedures Support Spaces Alternative Uses Challenges
BCCCU: Four Bed Unit
48
Four 300 S.F. ICU Room
• 120 S.F. Anteroom
• Separate Toilet Room
Equipment enables variable use
• NICU
• Bariatric
• Family Occupancy
400 S.F. Laboratory with Anteroom
Autoclave Room
Complete Support Spaces
IT for monitoring and telemedicine
BCCCU: Eight Bed Unit
49
Eight 300 S.F. ICU Room
• 120 S.F. Anteroom
• Separate Toilet Room
Other capabilities as for the four room
suites
More robust staff support space in
anticipation of larger patient population
TDCJ (Texas Department of Criminal
Justice) capable
BCCCU: Conceptual Cost Estimate
50
BCCCU: Conceptual Schedule
51
BCCCU: Next Steps
52
First 30-45 Days
• Submit Funding Request and Approval
• Receive Funding Approval
• Appoint Architect/Engineer
• Confirm Project Team Organization
• Begin Schematic Design
• Visit to Peer Institutions
• Begin Procurement of Construction Manager
BCCCU: Alternative Solutions
53
Safe Ebola Isolation
www.odulair.com+1 307 459 1350 [email protected]
The patent pending Odulair Ebola Isolation Unit is a self-contained, rapidly deployed facility that provides
unprecedented protection for your medical team and environs. Odulair ... Healthcare where you need it!
BCCCU: Alternatives Solutions
54
BCCCU: Alternatives Solutions
55
BCCCU: Alternatives Solutions
56
BCCCU: Alternatives Solutions
57
BCCCU: Alternatives Solutions
58
BCCCU: Alternative Solutions
Student Designs
59
BCCCU: Other Alternatives
60
61
Patrick M. Casey, AIA
The University of Texas System Administration
Office of Facilities Planning and Construction
TEL: 216.978.7070
Questions?
Designing For Highly Infectious Contagions Ventilation Considerations
Greg Lavriha, PE Associate, Mechanical Karpinski Engineering
Not easy
Complex buildings
24/7 Buildings
Infrastructure Limits
Patient Flow
Facility Standards
Lots of cooks
Form a team
success
Patient Care Areas
Standards
Guidance on level 4
Airborne infectious isolation (AII)
• The isolation of patients infected with organisms spread by airborne droplet nuclei less than 5 micron in diameter.
Envelope integrity
Exhaust discharge height
Exhaust discharge - location
Monitoring
• Permanent, local device • Visually indicates pressure condition
Emergency power
Energy recovery
Ante-room
Retrofit
Minimum requirements
Filtration
Fan redundancy
Filter redundancy
Redundant filters
Redundant filters & fans
Tracking airflow
Electronic monitor
Midpoint
Research Areas
BSL 2
BSL 3
BSL 4
Thank You
Recent challenges in cleaning, disinfection and sterilization
in healthcare facilities
Dr. Gerald McDonnell
HealthCare Challenges
• Cost management
• Blame culture – Legal implications
• Safety considerations
• Environmental considerations
• National and international standards/guidelines – Quality standard
– Auditing
• Increasing infection and patient complication concerns
1. The Microbial Challenges
Biosafety
Healthcare Associated Infections (HAI)*
Infections as a result of treatment in a hospital or a healthcare service unit, but secondary to the patient's
original condition Generally appear 48 hours or more after hospital admission
or within 30 days after discharge
*Also known as nosocomial infections
‘While healthcare executive may recognize the serious threat to patient health that
healthcare associated infections present, they often aren’t aware of the significant financial
drain associated with these infections
Hollenbeak, APIC, HFMA
• USA population: ~300M – In hospital (2%): 6M
• Estimated HA-infections 600,000 (10%) per year – Worldwide can range from 5-19%
• Increased length of stay ~7-9 days • Estimated deaths: 60,000 (10%) per year • Estimated cost to healthcare: $2B USD per year
– 10% reduction alone saves $200M BRL
• An additional 10-60% infections present after discharge – Additional treatment – Rehospitalization
Typical Costs
Results extrapolated based on International analysis
Microorganisms-HAIs
• Typical pathogens include – Staphylococcus aureus (21.8%);
• Including methicil lin-resistant S. aureus (MRSA)
– Enterobacteriaceae (20.2%);
– Pseudomonas spp (17.2%);
– Enterococci (10.0%);
– Escherichia coli (9 1%);
– Candida spp (8.8%);
– Coagulase-negative staphylococci (7.0%); and
– Acinetobacter spp (5.1%)
• Increasing concerns include – Carbapenem- resistant Klebsiella
pneumoniae and other Enterobacteriaceae • Resistant to almost all available antimicrobial agents
• High rates of morbidity and mortality
– Atypical mycobacteria (e.g., Mycobacterium abscessus)
• Long term development of infection
• Associated with aldehyde resistance
– Viruses • Norovirus and other non-enveloped viruses
• Ebola and other enveloped viruses
– Clostridium difficile
Prevention Culture
Immunization Containment Decontamination
Ascaris, Cryptosporidium, GiardiaVegetative Helminths and Protozoa
Staphylococcus, Streptococcus, EnterococcusGram positive bacteria
Pseudomonas, Providencia, EscherichiaGram negative bacteria
More
Resistant
Aspergillus, Trichophyton, Candida,
Chlamydomonas
Vegetative Fungi and Algae
CryptosporidiumProtozoal Oocysts
HIV, Hepatitis B virus, Herpes Simplex virusEnveloped virusesLess
Resistant
Adenoviruses, RotavirusesLarge, non-enveloped viruses
Aspergillus, PenicilliumFungal Spores
Giardia, AcanthamoebaProtozoal Cysts
Poliovirus, Parvoviruses, Papilloma virusesSmall, Non-Enveloped Viruses
Mycobacterium tuberculosis, M. terrae, M.
chelonae
Mycobacteria
Ascaris, EnterobiusHelminth Eggs
Bacillus, Geobacillus, ClostridiumBacterial Spores
Scrapie, Creutzfeld-Jakob disease, Chronic
wasting disease
Prions
ExamplesMicroorganism
Ascaris, Cryptosporidium, GiardiaVegetative Helminths and Protozoa
Staphylococcus, Streptococcus, EnterococcusGram positive bacteria
Pseudomonas, Providencia, EscherichiaGram negative bacteria
More
Resistant
Aspergillus, Trichophyton, Candida,
Chlamydomonas
Vegetative Fungi and Algae
CryptosporidiumProtozoal Oocysts
HIV, Hepatitis B virus, Herpes Simplex virusEnveloped virusesLess
Resistant
Adenoviruses, RotavirusesLarge, non-enveloped viruses
Aspergillus, PenicilliumFungal Spores
Giardia, AcanthamoebaProtozoal Cysts
Poliovirus, Parvoviruses, Papilloma virusesSmall, Non-Enveloped Viruses
Mycobacterium tuberculosis, M. terrae, M.
chelonae
Mycobacteria
Ascaris, EnterobiusHelminth Eggs
Bacillus, Geobacillus, ClostridiumBacterial Spores
Scrapie, Creutzfeld-Jakob disease, Chronic
wasting disease
Prions
ExamplesMicroorganism
McDonnell, 2007
Antibiotic Resistance?
XTB
MRSA
CRE
Greater Concerns
Adeno-Associated Virus,
1lp3, DependovirusMice Minute Virus (MVM),
Strain I, 1mvm, Parvovirus
Canine Parvovirus,
1p5y, Parvovirus
Porcine Parvovirus,
1k3v, Parvovirus
B19 Parvovirus Capsid,
1s58, Parvovirus
Adeno-Associated Virus,
1lp3, DependovirusMice Minute Virus (MVM),
Strain I, 1mvm, Parvovirus
Canine Parvovirus,
1p5y, Parvovirus
Porcine Parvovirus,
1k3v, Parvovirus
B19 Parvovirus Capsid,
1s58, Parvovirus
Patient Contact
Examples Device Classification
Minimum Inactivation
Level
Intact skin Non-Critical Cleaning and/or Low/Intermediat
e Level Disinfection
Mucous membranes or non-intact skin
Semi-Critical Cleaning and High Level
Disinfection or Sterilization
Sterile areas of the body, including blood contact
Critical Cleaning and Sterilization
2. Handling of Reusable Items
Increased Oversight
Standard Examples
• ANSI/AAMI ST79: Steam sterilization and sterility assurance in health care facilities 2010 A1, A2 2011, A3 2012, A1, A2 2013
• ANSI/AAMI ST58: 2013: Chemical sterilization and high-level disinfection in healthcare facilities
– ANSI/AAMI ST41: 2008: Ethylene oxide sterilization in health care facilities: Safety and Effectiveness
• In preparation – AAMI
• AAMI ST xx: Quality systems
• AAMI ST 91: Flexible endoscopes
• AAMI ST xx: Preparation/handling of non-critical devices
Guideline Examples
• Technical Information Reports
AAMI TIR34: 2007: Water for the reprocessing of medical devices
• Other relevant documents
AORN: Perioperative standards and recommended practices, 2014
SGNA: Standards of Infection Control in Reprocessing of Flexible Gastrointestinal Endoscopes, 2013.
CDC/ HICPAC: Guideline for disinfection and sterilization in healthcare facilities. 2008
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0 1 2
Resert XL
S40
STERISDG
What could we be missing?
• Only published reports • Source of infection, often
unknown • Latent infections
– Some infections can take years to develop
• Toxicity-related events – Irritation and immune response
• e.g., toxic anterior segment syndrome (TASS) and colitis
– Device rejection
3. Environmental Contamination
3. Handling of Wastes
Questions