caesar 08 - indecision and stress

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CAESAR - 8APPROVED FOR RELEFDATE: JUN.2007 E

INDECISION AND STRESS1950-1952

Office of Current IntelligenceC E N ~ A LNTELLIGENCE AGENCY


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Following the failnre of the Horth Korean attack on South Koreaand the failure of the Chinese Capmnmiste t o drive UIO f-ea f r amKorea , Gaviet 'leaders grew Increasingly concerned about US rearma-ment and US-iasp&d integration of Western defense efforts. Theyapparently became parti cul arl y concerned about the establishment ofUS bases in various peripheral areas of the USSR, In spite of t h i s ,Soviet policy remained sterile and provocative. Bo new policy for-mulas we r e developed t o meet the new situation. Iphere is reason t obelieve that, a s the months passed, t h i s problem became mare andm o ~ e r i t ica l an8 controversy developed mer Stalin's continuing in-f lexible line in foreign sffaire.

Coacarrently, the critical international stttlation apparentlyccmplicated Sclnriet internal planning problems.azg f t F i v e Year Plan and subsequent efforts t o re-drsft the plan tn19% and 19% probably reflected top level in8ecision regardingoverall SaPiet policy


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In February 1952, S ta l i n began the series of le t tere . publishedi n October 1952 as !Che Econaaic problem of 8ocialiem, which canati-tuted both ideological pronoancementa and observations 011 current_problems. Several analysts have lnterpmted the portions dealingvi th current problems as revealing slgnlflcsat caa t rmre y withinStal in 's immei i ia te entourage cm fundamental iseues, notab& on thef e i g n poiicy question. 'phe c h a n g e t o s t a i w ~ lex-ib le and provocative fozeign policy was overruled but subsequent >decvelcrpaaents suggest t h a t the baaic conflict waa not resolved. The de-cision t o proceed full-epeed v i t h the ljovietizatiaa at' Eastern (3erprany(evidently dating from June 1952) Indicated a further hardenlag ofSavlet foreign policy, for it necessarily inYolvea rejection of anyposstbl l l ty adt negotiation on Germsny.In early 1952, 8avie t leadere again ordered the W t i n g of afive-year plan. This order appeared t o re veal that definite Beci-slaps regsrding both fore- and domestto policy had been taken.fmere were indications of contrmrsy regarding the plan; the deci-eiana &ken did not appear t o resolve th e fundamental questlone thatare presamed t o have existed.

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By a t least June 1952, Stal ln himself began t o manifest an un-usually hlgh l e v e l of persapal activity . In July, he held an inter-vlew with au It a li e n fellow-traveller, Pi etr o Nenul; unusual in thatBenni dld not seek the internew and it was suggested by Sovlet of-f i c i a l s . hter , Stalin began t o meet foreigners nume frequentlythan he had &me a t any time since the war, He apparently did no ttake h is regular vacation a t Sochi in the f a l l , for he appeared a tStnoSoviet treaty eeremoniea in September, the Party Congress inOctober aaB the anniversary ceremanles on 7 Bopember. I I

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s phi^ unusually high level ab personal aetivity manifested byStalia cantintma u n t i l his very death. In February 1953, fo r example,he held t h e htervlew vi th forelgneke, two of these vith apibalrsa-dors.19th Party Congrese. 'phe announcement was made on 20 Augu s t , anathe Congress -6 scheauled t o beg- on 5 October. The brlef perlodbetween the announcement and the apenlng 3ate of the conference, aswell as th e apparent haste evldenceh in the organlzatlon aP the var-ioae Republic congresse8 preliminary t o the All-Union Congress, sug-gested t3 reletively ed&n decision. The Congreaa i t se l f was appar-ently dominsted by Malenkov: !Phe prLncipal speeches of the Congress

SaPetlme in aid-1952, Savlet leaders decide& o convoke theI

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I I1 1were delivered by Malenkov and by two men who sre believed t o havebeen associates or .proteges a t that t im e , Khrushchev and Saburav.Changes in Party organization and Central Commi t t e e arembershlpwhich were effected a t the Congress-appeared t o work t o Maleukov'sadvantage; furthemore, several of Beria's impartant associstesei ther disappeared or were reduced from f u l l t o alternate-membershipon the Central Committee.

In the period fram the October Party Congress t o Stalin's death,a ser ies of events took place which appeared t o r e f lec t high po l i t i -cal tension, behina-the-aceme maaeuvering and th e beginning of'-rapidpersonnel changes in important posts.ominous Do~tOr6'P l o t amouucemeat, appear t o indicate t h a t a politi-cal cr is is had f inal ly developed.Theee events, along with the

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Inadd i t ion t o the above, them were tndlcatlons of changes I nthe relationshtps sad responsibilities of the tu p Presidium figures.Foremost, of course, was the increasing praminence actor@ Malenkm.AuLbassador &man reported In June 1952 t h a t the "bets we r e q n h gtoward .klenkov," indicating t h a t Saviet af'ficlals recognized hisincmasing stature.obbcure and unexplained:Other changes 'took place, however, a c h emain

Q. In December 1952, there was fragmentary evidence=O E3 t u s r e ~ ! x m i b i l l t y ad previously %eaIn February 1953, I. G, gsbanov was identified as Chief

that agricultural reports were -Malenkov' I

2.of Gossaab which, as late as H m m b e r 1951 and possibly May1952, had been headed by K&ganovich. .

FOREIGN POLICY: S!MIEMA!I!E AF9) FRUSTRATIOEWith the collapse of the Nor th Korean Army In September 1950,the Soviet leaders were faced with the dilemma of ei ther loslng a l l

of K m a ar of at te tq t ing t o salvage the situation by allowing orpersuading the Chinese Communists t o ente r the conflict.course uas chosen. I n spite of thei r in i t ia l successes, hawever,the Chinese Communis t s were unable t o drive UN forces out of Korea.The latter

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Meanwhile, the Korean attack and the subsequent Chinese Camma-aiet Intervention had provoked the US into an extensive rearmamentprogram, had fur ther stiamlated US efforts t o strengthen WesternEurope's mili tary forces, and.had accelerated the IWCO base programin SU~& and m c a .he immediate sovtet reaction to these developments Uas one ofalarm, rage and frustration.21 January 1951 speech, which touched aff vhst later was to be B p mas the Hate-America campaign. The US Euibassy i n Moscow noted t h a tthis speech utarked a shift ia propaganda from the theme of the inev-i t a b i l i t y af csgltalism's econaulc collapse t o t h a t of' i t s defeatthrough war. The embassy f'urther noted t h a t this speech carries noassumnces t ha t thk USSR could flaally xia wlthmt wa r or t h a t theSoviet peoples would escape involvement. Bage and frustrat iun were

also evident ln Stalin's 16 February 1951 h t e M e w x l th a Ravdacorrespondent, Inwhich he repeatedly and bluntly called C h xA t t l e e , then P h u e Mlnister of' Great Br l t a l n , a liar, and gave nohint 09 diploastic negotlatlatm or c-lee. Stalln declared t h a tpeace could be preserved only if "peace-laving peoples" of Westerncouutrtes vou1~. ake i t s preeervatibrr into their own hands -- againstthe policy of their reac'tionary govermnents.

This was exemplified i n Pospelovls

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Bowever, Initla1 Sovlet feelers wltb regard t o 8 cease-fire inKo r e a were made ln Aprll 1951.had calminsted Inmassive Chinese Crmmnnis t offensives, which w e r edecisively beaten. As a result of these defeats, Soviet hopes thatthe Chinese e t e victoriaus were probab3y dispelled. Malik'scease-fire proposal followea in midJune, and the cease-fire talksbegan shortly thereafter.

In April and May, m i l i t a r y operatioas

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. !Phe t ruce talka soon bogged down m r Corrmnmist lnsistence 011the 38th Parallel as the demarcation line. The Ccamunists concur-rently were pmparlng mother =Jar off'enelve, which accwmulatellevLdence indicated vas echednled for e a r l y Septeaber 1951- This of-fensive was apparently suspended a t the last minute and, since UNaperatlone a t that ttme were not large enough t o prejuClice the of-fensive, the suspension probably represented a major policy decision.The truce talks were re8-d a t the end of October 1951, and pro-p s s e d slowly until another stalemate developed i n 1952 & r th eprisoner-&-war question.Stalln 8 death. This stalemate prevailed u n t i l after

In Europe, negotiations between the USSR, the UK, France aadth e US resulted in the prolonged and abortive Deputy Fare- Minis-ters meetings in Parls from April through June 1951.ference originally was Intended t o discu ss the German question, theWhile the con-

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Soviet delegation ins is ten tly attempted t o introduce the question ofNA!CO bases.diplauatic campaign, off icial ly protest ing t o a number of Europeanparers With regard t o EDC and HATO bases. In Gemany, a renewe8propaganda caupaign was beguu i n September for unification and 8peace treaty, standard Saviet propaganda them6 since theoarlg poet-Withlnthe USSR, there were a nuPiber of indications of apprehen-sion over and dissatlsfaation with the uncmpromising and inelas t icS ta l in i s t foreign policy. O b d e m r s of the Soviet Union are nasal-m o w in the opinion that W3 reartmsment, Western consolidation and theprogress made in establishing EWO bases constituted a growing and,finally, h i n a t i a g preoccupation of Soviet leaders tbroagh 1951 and

1952. F'urthermore, the Znelrplicdble shifts i n Korea suggest t ha tconflicting p ol it ic al tendencies were operating. !this was equallye v i h n t i n S m e t pxess discussion af foreign af fa i r s , where therewas no attempt,, as A l d b g ~ ~ a d a retman observed in June 1952, t o re-concile contradictory points of d e w re&arillng: future fore- devel-opments.

In September 1951, the Soviet Union un&rtook an intense

War Pars.

Stal in 's letter Of-FebrUary 1952, which formed th e main pieceof his Economic Problems of Socialism, discussed same of these ques-tions, but arrived a t no new policy fonrmls. Stalin reaf'finned thatthe West was lncapsble of a&levIn$ lasthg unity and that , regard-less of' Soviet intransigence, th e "peace" movement and the West'sown econamic disputes would arouse enough disagmement in the Westernw o r l d t o assure its flnal collapse.

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In t h i s letter, Stalin identified vbst might be called "apposi-tion" points of d e w on foreign policy when he said t h a t "s- com-rades" believe wars between capitalist staibs are no longer *vi-table. He denied as "heretical" the following points of view: theWS was successArlly integrating the nonSoviet Orbit powera; capi-ta l i s t leaders had learned from disas trous experience t o avoid fu-ture wars; and "imperialiem" mast a t t @ t t@ USSR, The foreign pol-icy position adopted by Sttilin in th e February 1952 letter 8 muchqufeter in tane and content than that c& one rear earlier. Ifbe let-ter was a tension-reducing statement, a f f l n a t n g t h a t there w86 noimediete danger of Western attack, but a l so giving no hint of forth-coming ccmceeslons t o the West. Stalin's position was one of no ad-ventures, but equally, no retreats.also suggested by several events tbat took place between a r c h andJune 1952.Germany which embodied several s ignif icant s h i f t s from the predous

Vacillation and possible dissension on the German question areIn March, the USSR proposed a draft peace treaty for

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~ p e r a t i a nor the five year plan presuma%ly began on 13cheduJ.eOctober 199, whlch mfe rre d t o a l6.Septemberi n 19%. !me first specific , inaicatian of indeuision appeazml.infar t k ive year plan be drawn tlp.

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In 1951, there were several references' r b t c h uggested that the planning ess naa men started-ch a tbat year.

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ofvereatlim aP A p r i l 1952, In which the Moacow epeakr m iimueaistely with the Industrial Finance' Plan. .the C m clsters checks us each day. How t h i s is a

moment was -indicated by an intercepted radlo-telephoae$cm,

rather one af pol i t ica l character.. Len* -

Stalin discussed indnstrlal plana Fn his Economic Problems of.Soclalim.1952 letter, since subsequent letters merely elaborated one oranother aspect of the f i rs t one. As in th e case of fare- pollcquestfane, Stalin merely reaff-d and defended the premiUngcourse of Soviet policy, reje ctin g "radical" solutions of eitherextreme.ments In the capital goode lndwtrles, and re3eated the possibilltyaf major cha!@eS, either in favor of heavier investment n armament

Again the document of chief Interest I s h i s February

In'other ~ o r d s 9 e defended the stand- policy of i a v e s .production or i n amsnmer goods.in 1948, was probably echeduled far completion In late 1951 or early1952.phasis Os the investment progrsm WBS sidetraoked, Le., t ha t it waspostponed unt i l the rearmsmeat program neared completion and u n t i lit became evldent w h e t h e r or not the USSR was faced with a serlauepossibi l i ty af war, Stalin apparently decided in late 1951 or early1952 that circumstances did not ca l l for plajor Increases in Savietarmuents investment; yet, In umklng th is decisim, he was appar-en tl y subJected t o considerablepressure t o expand significantly theprodaction of consumers goods.

It w i l l be recalL?d that *he Sovlet rearmament program, begunIt thus s e em very l i ke ly t h i n t the Issue of the future em-

This he refused t o do.

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It vi11 be zvxdlled tha t In February 1950 Politburo memberAndreev was cri t icized far defending ~ ~ ~ U - s c a l earming apemtion~,an8 that subsequently B. S. ghrmehchev, also a Politburo'member, be-came the leadlng Sapiet spokesman on agricultural policy.25 April 1950, ghruehchev began a new policy of merging 'small col-leotive farms pinto larger ones; later, a Party Central Commi t t e e de-cree apparently applled th is policy t o th e whole USSR.istratlve merger a9 th e kolkhozes.in a speech advocated not only the merger of the kolkh02ee8 b u t alsothe actual resettleatent of peasants belonging t o the merged kolkhozesin single **urban**enters, known as "agro-cities".plots 09 iand possessea by the individual peasants were t o be lacated

On

The new agricultuml policy provided for more than Just admin;On 28 January 1951 Xhrushchev91he personal

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. .,on the outskirts of the new settlement, thus contributing t o the"proletarlanization" of the peasantry.

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Soviet press treatment of tw o ghrushchev speeches on new agri-cultural policy prarrides the f i r s t indicathn that the new policymay have run into traubb. He delivered a mar)or speech on the mergerof th e kolkhozes on 20'December 1950, but it w ~ 6ot pubibhed until8 February 1951. A second speech on 28 January 1951, in which heaiscwaed the agro-city proposal, was not published until 4 March.Pravda which pibushed this speech, carried a curiaus editorla1 note-the follawing day stat ing that Khrushchev's article ha8 been run a smaterial far discnssion, thus implying that I t was not a s ta tenen . .of policy.

"Discussion" was not long delayed. A speech delivekd by G. A.

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Arutyunov of Soviet Armenia, published in the Armenian K o u u u d s t(@$Iy ewspaper) on 21 March, had t h i s to my:amalgemation 09 small collective farms, 8- copprsdes have ma&statements sa r i ng c-5 on..,(t~~?y e c b ) tbt one of the mainproblems of the amalgamted farms is t o move emall VLUages, Le.,merge the papulation d mnaU'villirges and reset t le it in vil-lage....I am of the o p ~ l o nh a t these proposals are closer t o fan-tasy than t o the real requirements of the collrective fai.mS.,,.Iwill not dwell on other unacceptable propossls. .,(regarding) reduc-

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ing private &den plate. . ....On 26 May 1951, Baktnskll Rabbchil af Baku published a speechaP M, D. A. Bagirov, Fi rs t Secretary of the Communiet Party of SavletAzerbaijan, in which Baglrov aeserted that the "Party had hemsndedan en&" t o the "Incorrect idea" that the most important b e k l n kol-

khoz settlements. He also eaid that the practice of reduelag thesiee of the garden plot near the peammt'8 ham and mwing psrt afkhOZ CO& t rUC t iO l l W86 tht3 m w f E m a l l H-6 h t 0 ' 6 - h kol-his plot beyind eettleabent limits-was har0d"al and intoleribie. Moatcuriausly, when Pravda pd~l i shedagirov's speech cm 29 May 1951, it-anitted th is aepect.peared from prominence, but the program of kolkhoz amalgamation con-tinued, Malenkov, a t the 19th Party Congress In October 1952, 88-serted that, as a result of the merger program, the nwnber ofcolbct ive farms had been reduced A-om 254,000 t o 97,000. With re-gard t o the agro-city program, Malenkov said t h a t "certain of ourleading officials have indulged in a wrong approach," their mistakebeing that they had "overlooked" the main task, 1.e. , griculturalproduction, Stalln, in his Econanic Problems of Socialism, avoideddirect mention of t h e agro-city policy but, in discussing the

Follcrving the above developments, the sgro-city concept dlsap-

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elimination of essential differences between "tam and country, "said t h a t "new great tams will appear as centers of the msximumdevelopment of culture,.and as centers not only of larp-scale in-dustry, but also of the processing of agricultural produce., .andKill tend t o even qp conditions of l f f e i n tom and country," Hediscussed.the agr icu ltu ral problem a t length i n each of hlgs letters(February, April, b y and September). I n general, Stalin's discus-sion envLeaged the ultimate elimination of th e "free market" aspectsof Sovlet agriculture and the expansion of so-called "product ex-change" a s th e ideal market relationshtp between kolkhozes and therest of the economy. This "product-exchange" i s simply a form ofbarter which takes place between the kolkhozes and the Sovfet Gov-ernment. S ta li n envisaged t h a t product-exchange would eventuallydisplace all farms of marketing engaged tu by the kolkhozes: How-ever, St a l in repeatedly emphasized th e long-term n a t u r e of th is pro-gram and stressed the necessity f o r proceeding slowly and cautiously.. e+ the period ?der r e v i ew , Malenkov

I rL I II I AUdreeV, too,. l a e U asinan.or tne council for Kolkhoz Affairs. An-ev. it w i l l berecalled, was no longer'the Politburo spokespnm for a& icu l tw ,followlug the censure he received i n February 1950.. The question now is: What did these varioua developments sig-

nify:posals had been originated by Stal in himself, and then withdrawnwhen they ran Into peasant resistance. Same observers have 'consid-ered the agro-city propsat t o have been an experiment in developinga new form of agricultural cqanizstion. A thm hypothesis is thatthe merger and agro-city proposals bad been advanced by 6ome one flg-ure or another below Stalln, and these praposerls met w i t h disagreementwithin the Politburo, While the problems involved in these hypothesescannot be definitely answered, sorue possib i l i t ies can be! suggested,

It has been argued that the kolkhoz merger and agro-city pro-

......_. . .... The handling of the agro-aity pruposal in Arutyunov'sr andBagiroy's. speeches suggests that it also uas Intended t o be Unlon-wide.efter i t s inauguration, without allowing t i m e for the "experiment"t o run its course, also suggests that it had not been conceived asan experimental program.The fact that the agro-cfty proposal was redected so promptly

It seems unlikely t h a t th e merger program and agro-city pro-posals were merely exgerlmental in nature.while begun in t he Moscow Oblast, was not limited t o it, b u t rstherwas applied Uni year. 'phis is"evident1The merger program,

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Furthermore, as previously noted,

.. ,. ... .- ... . . _ _ _.I-__________^______ ..sThere ts good reason t o aappose that both the kolkhoz merger an8the..agro-city proposals arlginsted with Khrushchev:who took over from Anareev I n 1950 the position aP Politburo spokes-man an agric ul ture . Secondly, the kollchoz merger progzmu was begun .by Khmshchev inMoscow Oblast a t l eas t bs April 1950, and it was n&until later that year that a Central Committee decree vas issped onthe subject. This suggests that Khrac;bchev had begun the program inloscar Oblast before it vas All-Union Party policy. Finally, Khrwh-chev, in h is t h e speeches on th e merger program and th e agro-cityproposal, continually ci ted i l lus t ra t ive exgerlences from the Ukalne,where he had been Fi rs t Secretary from 1938 to 1949 (except for a

brief period in lgki'), suggesting t h a t he was attempting t o sell, onan hl-Union basis, policies he had p r e v L k l y developed.in the

It vas Khrushchev

wralne.The last question concev the nature and ldentificatian of op-position t o the agro-city proposal. It is generauy conc6ded thatAratyrmov and Bsgirov ha8 P o u t b m le-1 support befm they-msae

curious e&Ltorialnote opening Khrushchev's 28 Jannary 1951 speech"for dlsctl~slon" s considered t o be highly Irregular and possiblyindicative of top-level ilissensfaa. Lastly, it may be nurtea thatghrushchev, unlike Andreev the year previous, was not required t oapologize or recant for his "iucorrect" views.,Who ormed this apposition? Andreev had been humlllated theprevious p ar (1950.) and he did not reappear as a prmlnent figurefollowing repudiation of Khrushchev I n 1951. Malenkov had been, and

' s t i l l was a t the t i m e of the dispute, ac tive ly concerned with -1-cu ltu ml problerepudiation.

. t he i r speeches denouncing the agrolcity p r o p o a a ~ ~iketrise,the\." .*. .. -

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nor did he lose'.J ture XOlLOWlng =h chev'sNeither Malenkov nor Stal ln, In their respectfve

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local M3B and continued vigilance by local E B rgans. He c r l t i -cized l d arty 0re;ans for insrrpficient attention t o the po lt ti ca ieducation of the sec urity police, and declared t ha t the GeFgianCentral Cotmaittee had sent mexperiencedParty workers" into the WB.He promised that th is practice would continue in the futuk.most eignff'icant aspect 09 Koshlavashvili's speech i s i t s euggestlonthat Party supremacy had been jeo&wdized by the actioas-iind negli-gence of the police; the admonition t o follow Party directives andthe transfer of Party workers t o the MGB iplply t h a t the BGB organt-zaticm had been becamiw a l a w unto i t se l f . In sadition, a reportaf December 1951 asserted that Aba-'s replacement bad been dnet o cri t icism of the security organ,

The

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wh i l t : there is no firm information on the actual reasozls fort h i s K B h i f t or on the details and r;smifications of it, the re-placement af Abakmnov by a Party figure could not have been anythtngbut a blow t o Politbu ro member Berla. Abakumov was of ! I , ~ I UW IUCE ~ E ~ ~Uorigin, and in 1938 was a junior security micer in the Caucaeus.I n 194.0 or 1941 he became Beria's counter-intelligence chief and in1943, after the EIgIzB m e eparated from the "D, he became a DeputyMinister of the BEB . He replaced 9krkulov as Minister in mid-1946.Thereafter the )IEB (formerly NEB ) continued gradually t o gatherBerla retained Politburo level responsibilityurisdiction all police and m i l i t i a functions,a t l ea st up t o May of 1950. Beris was last aesoc- .lated with security questions I n February 1951; a t that time he wentt o Prague for a series of conferences following the wldespread ar-rests of key men i n tbe Czechoslovak Communist Party and Czech Be -curity agpsrcitns.

TEE GEORGM PURGESAnother area in which prevlouer and long-stan8ing errangeulentswere changed was In tbe Georglan Republic, from the latter part of1951 through August 1952. During t h i s period there wae a- completereshuffling of positions, in the course of which all of the CentralC& i t t& secretarlee were changed, the Bur0 of the Central Commit-tee was completely revaqped, and many of the Ministries, includingthose of Internal Affairs and S t a t e Security, were given new chiefs.The personnel shifts began in Nmember 1951, when the GeorgianCentra l Cowsittee removed M. I. Baramiya f r om his post as Second

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Secretary and expelled A. N. Rapava, Minister of Justice and f-rMinister of State Security from the Party. Rapaw and Shbniya, theProcurator of the Republic, were relieved of their offices and turnedove r.to the courts for prosecution. These ac tio ns climaxed dis clo -sures of large-scale enibezehment in one of the largest Tbilisi con-struct ion trusts; the charges against the three men included the as-sertion tht, as is "well hum," they "gave protection t5 variousworkers who had perpetrated crimes, and in every way defended t h em. "A t th e same t i m e K. Chichinadze and V. Kuprava were removed fromtheir positions in the Georgian apparatus for "mistakes in.. . s ebc-ting cadres." The purges contlnued in December 1951 and January1952.. The First Secretary of the Komsanol, I. S. Zode l ava , was re-moved and replsced by M. Megrelishvili.?Ister, a t an April 1952 meeting of the Georgian Central Cbprmit-tee, which L,' P. Beria attended, Georglan Firet Secretary Charkvlaniwas removed from his position and replaced by A. I. Mgeladze, whohad been p r w n t in K a a s a m o l wo r k and was a t the time F i rs t Secre-tary of the Abkhaz ASSR. C h a r k v i s n i , who had held his post abGeorgian First Secretary since 1938, had presided a t a Jaavary meet-lng in Tbi l i s i of leading officials' a t which econcmic malfeasance inmany ministries was a-d.ter of State Security, Charkxdani's sin had been "a blunting of v2g-ilance and.. .political blindness," whlch had "enabled hostile ele-ments t o ingratia te thatseivles, occupy responsible P O S i f i O n 8 , ana.i n f l ec t damage on Party work and the Georgian people." It was m-ported that C h a r w u l had "departed from the limits of th e Repub-lic."Soviet as well as f'ran h is &her posts.

In the words of' N. Rukhadze, the Minis-

Consequently, he wa's removed from th e Presidium of the Supreme

C h a r m n i t s removal did not end the purge. In April 1952, thefour reannining old secretaries af the Georgian Kamsaaol were removed,and in July, the Mlnieter of AgrLculture, the Minister of Rgde andeven RukhaaZe, th e Mlnister of State Security, fell. A t the GeorgianParty Congress ip September 1952; it was revealed that aiueteen gav-emmental aff iciale had loet their jobs between June aOa.Angue t , andthat K - h l i y z , who had been made a Secretary of the Central Corn-mlttee & he prepLoue December, had already l o s t his post.a partial just if icat ion far the cuurplete overhaul of Georgian per-sonnel. Econamic lnefflclency on the part of governmental aff iciale,collusion With Party personnel, embezzleme& and other ecancnniccrimes, and an increase in Georgian nationalistid outbursts we r e , inthemselves, supficlent to c&mn Party leadership in Georgia. Thesecharges csrried over into the Georgian Party Congress held in Septem-ber 1952 and formed the maJor substance of the speeches. The cry

The of fi ci al chargee had s f l i c l e n t t r u t h in t h e m t o const i tute

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went up for vigilance agaipst economic saboteurs and internal andexternal enemies of the State who were t rying t o unaemnine socialistadvances a t the behest of !the capitalists.

I

There can be l i t t l e doubt that thiB purge was directed fromMOSCOW. 1I \ - *

a 7;ncmiase- p 1n worgia. P-a tha t s-11 n I~ ..._

purge of Ivomas Stalia's e

ted by Malenkav, actingthat these purps weakened

Throughout the period, propaganda insisted tha t the purge wasinst i tuted under the direct guidance of Stalin and, after Beria'sattendance a t the Plenum of 1April! which removed Charldanl, theTbilisi newspaper !&rya-Vostoks wrote that Be- "aided in.. .aacov-ering the mistakes and shortcomings in the work of the GeorglanParty organizations.sage t o Beria prmlelng him t h a t "we will resolutely struggle againstany attempts af a ho sti le agency t o harm the task of communist-can-struct ioa and undermine the m i g h t of the Sovlet State."The 17 April Tbillsi meeting adupted a mes-.

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There I s ample reason, despite Beria's presence a t the'Aprl11952 Central Committee meeting and the propaganda associating himwith the purges, for believing that the Georgiaa purges were CUI ad-verse ref lect ion on him. Beria has been assumed t o bave had a per-sonal in terest in Gearglan affaire for many years, but Stalin, aGeorgian by bbirth, had also -ken a personal in terest in these same&fairs. !i%e severity of the purges may have been an indication ofStalln's personal disltatisfactlcm wlth the course of events there.SIw;3lrl'S "ECOnoMIC PROBLE3S OF GOCIALISM"

Frequent reference has been made throughout th i s mmr toStalin's-Economic Problems of Socialism, published on 2 6ctober1952.g The publication of t h i s document, with i t s accompsnyingJ=/ mere vi11 be no attempt here t o recapituLate Stalin's i t e c w t i a aon particula r policy problems, which were covered In the appropriatesections. The attempt .here, rather, i s t o present certain aspectsof the Economic Problems not easily discussed in the other sections.- 14 -


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'.Lropaganda fsnfare, tended t o overshadow the opening of' the Party

Congress three days later.'lihe Ecoaomic Problems is a ser ies of four letters, ostensiblywritten by Stalin, dated 1February, 21 April, 22 May and 28 Septem-ber 1952. The f i rs t letter coastitate8 a comnaentary by 8talia onthe proceedings of a canference of economists, pmporteinrsr held inNovember 1951, which d i cussed a dra f ' t textbook on the " p o l i ~ i c a leconomy of Socialimn.NJ The other t b e letters aFe repl ies toeconamists who had written t o Stalin in response t o his f l r i t l e t t e r .S ta l in s letters discussed Communis t politfco-econamic theory,. the prerequisites for attaining Commmnism in the mSB, and the inevi-t ab i l i t y of war between capitalist states. As has alrea'&y been noted,a large part of the discussion of the t ransit ion t o Caumtmiam con-cerned the Saviet agricultural problem and commodity exchange in theTBSB, A s one study of ScrPiet econcaic theory bas pointed out,Stal in 's EconoPnic Problew selectively sumred upe ~ d e n tn Suvlet themetical thinkim since thedeclared it t o be "a theoreti&l grouudlng of policies andan 'attempt t o se t t le t roubles pbints of theory never- sat isfa ctor -Isaac Deutcher has noted that "the'trandition frat Socialism t o

real problems " in S ta l i n t & ?g ky The author farther commented:

ily xvxonciled wlth redlty."T?Communism is.,,the chief ' fOrakUh fo r the di6CUSSiCm O f

r/ Such a textbook had long been.discussed in the USSR, but& accept-able book had never been produced, In 1947, Zhdsnov Paenttoned t h a tone was being prepared. According t o Dedijer's biography of Tito,Malenkav told the Yugoslav~ n September 1947 that Soviet thear is t swere working out Scrviet politicosconaaic doctrine on the basis ofUtmian Soclalircm. I I r e P O r t e d -8in 1949 or 1950 t h h u n ma ssslgnea t Maleabv &e task afpmparing a standard work on the ecm ml c principles of Camnunism;reported3y the task was entrusted t o a special cMaleukm Is d.irection.told in the form of aSoviet Studies, April 1953, "A Po li ti cal Economy i n th e Making,"J, Miller,

c3/Current Soviet Policies, the Current Digest of the Sovlet Press.Sovlet Studies, A p r i l 1953, "Dogma and Reality in Stal in 's 'Eco-nmic Problems, 'n I. Deutscher.before Staln's death. This article had been written

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sStalin's recent writings offer a glimpse .of the mOVement

of ideas going on i n the Soviet ruling c irc les behind the half-real and half-deceptive facade 09 uniformity. It is t h i s move-ment that distinguishes present day Russia from the Rus sFa ofthe l at e th ir ti es which was from head t o foo t stunned and pet-r i f ied after the shock of the great purges.ideas reflects conflicting social aspirations and pm-ssureswhich even a monolithic regime is not in a position to e l i m i -nate for good."Deutscher goes on t o suggest that the discussions of th e "tran-s i t ion from social ism t o communism," which had been s tar ted in 1947,had'provided an opportunity for Iwplicit criticism of the reg-:"The guesses about the future sametimes eomd l i ke reflections onthe present -- t h l s I s not the first time that Utopia is elther an

implied critique of existing society cr an escape from it."

The movement of

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Ambassador Exman's analysis of the Economic Problems, on 20 Oc-tober 1952, drew attention to two significant aspects of the docu-ment.Sta l in as "a very old-fashioned dew," reminiscent of the th i r t iesand appearing t o ignore -."allthat h s 8 hamened in the interveningfourteen years' since H i t l e r ' s attack on Poland.t o say:

Mr. Kennan described the v i e w of the vmld put forward by

Mr. &nuan went on

"We see r efl ec te d (in th is) the fact t h a t t h i s Saviet Gov-ernment is today an old um.1'8 government, ruthless and terriblet o be sure, but insensitive to the contewarary evolution 09i t s external environment just as it is t o the deeper eof its own subject peoples, livlng i n i t s own past...Mr. Kennan then analyzed certain political implications afSt s l in ' s discussion of the capi ta l i s t world, and noted that , j e i n g

f r o p l th e letters, th e view Stalin had put farward was not a pnanimaasview in the Kremlin but one that had been opposed by a group whichdoubted i t s EJOIXI~~SBand challenged it.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .r/ This observation takes on considerable significance in 1-t ofsubsequent medical analyses 09 Staliu's physical and emcrtionalcondition, based on tb reportreport.S t a l i n had suffered emotional changes for sane t h e prior t o h isfinal i l luees, and these changes would have been in the directionof "living in the past." This xll l form the subject af a separate

paper

Stalin's iljmess and th e autopsyThe majority oplnion of medical special ists is that

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--It requires no great stretch of the imagination t o see

tha t t h i s difference of opinion was no abstract disagreementabout the nature 09 capitalism; it was a polic,y issue of great-est moplent. Whoever said that I t was dangerous t o depend onthe internal break-up of capitalism and the development ofanother war between Germany and the western parers, res sum ablysaid that you had t o face up t o the reality of the western coa-lition and i t s grawing strength, w'hich want t ha t you had t oprepare sooner or later t o f ight it or t o come t o some sor t ofaccoamDodation with it --- w h e t h e r t o do the one or the other t odepend, we must seam, on what terms you could get.however, wa nt negotiations --- and not only fdemaastrativefnegotiations far propaganda purposes, or disarming approachest o weaker members of the western coslitian with aivlsivk intent,but actually negotiations wlth th e ma3or paember of the westerncoalition: the United states.

This,

"This view was obviously overruled. !I!here are on l y twomajor arguments tha t could have been used against It by the dom-inant granp whose views found Stalin's sqpport.the argument that has now been made public: it I s unnecessaryt o negotiate with the Americans; t h e i r wor l d , wlth a littlehelp from us, will go t o pieces .on hem anyway, The secondargument, however, may have been: it is impossible t o negoti-ate wlth the Americans; they are bent only on the overthrow oft@ Soviet system, by subverslon or war as %he case may be;they could never be induced t o negotlate ser iously . Plainly3t o the extent t h a t t h i s latter thesis can be established itavershadows and zenders unnecessary further discussion ofthesXs number one. But it is thesis number one which has beenrevlealedas the real center of ideolo gical disagreement i ngi.emlin circles,"

The f i r s t is

'PBE PAKPY CONGRESS: ocs1oBEB 1952011 20 Au g u s t 1952, it was announced that the long overaue P&y!kern is some evidence which suggests t h a t the Party Congress

Congress would be convened on 6 October,was t o have been held in 1948 or 1949, For example, the new namewhich the Party adopted In October 1952, i.e,, Communis t Party ethe Soviet Union, had been used by Suslov, klenkov and 0ther8 dur-ing 1948. i s noted earlier, Madame Kollontai referred in A p r i l 1949t o a forthcaning Party Congress, and there were many lumars in 1948and 1949 that me would 8oon be held. Mkover, as MY?. Kknnan haspointed out, it is doubtful that the Sovlet Union would have accused

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Tito and the Yugoslavs of not having held a Party Congress far mwy e a r s if they were not planning t o hold one soon themselves.it appears very probable t h a t the Congress va s indeed planned a ttha t t i m e , bu t for 8- unknown mason was suspended.

When the Congress was f in al ly convoked, the period 8 U m d forthe holding of preparatory regional Congresses was extre-y short,and in many case6 there was evldence of haste.The announcement calling the Congress outllned as subjects for"discussion" a series d changes i n the Party statutes. Two of themost important changes indicated were the dissolution of the Orgburo(one of th e three bodies which had been s e t up originally t o handlematters in l ieu of meetings of the Central Carmnittee) and a changein the name of the Politburo. The new Presidium, as the Politburowas t o be called, would "control the work of the Central C omm i t t e e&tween pleaarg sessions," and th e Secl.etartat was to "control cur-rent work, primarily 0re;anizing ver ifi cat ion of fulfillment ofParty dec'isione and selection of cadres."

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As was th e case wlth the other change6 i n th e Party stetutes,these changes seemed in%ended o regularize already existing prac-t ices rather than t o i nst itu te new one6. The Orgburo apparently had .ceased t o function, and the authority of th e Secretariat in person-nel matters had been Increased accordingly. Both the Secre ta r ia tand the Orgburo had been controlled by the Politburo, which was re-sponsible for fins1 policy decisions and, in the person of Stalin,had exercised ultimate authority in th e selection of personnel forall important posts. The new statutes abolishing the Orgburo an8assigning personnel selection "primarily" t o the Secretariat did nottherefore reduce the authority of Stalin and other top Politburo(Presidium) members over top-level persoyel matters.than tbe old Politburo and may have been designed largely as an hon-orary body. While the Politburo bad ll f u l l members and one alter-nate, t h e Presidium included 25 full muhers and ll alternates.loose, umrieldy body may never haw met; decisions probably weretaken in i ts pame by a "Buro" uf the Presidium, 9 body whose exis-tence was not acknowledged until Staltn's death.--/ An analysis of

!Fhe Presidium t ha t was appointed a t the Congress was mch lskgerW e

1/ Hew members to the Presidium apparently did not surrender t he i rold pod t iom. One Presidium member, Korotcheliko was subse-quently identified as functiaaingi n h is old p o s i t i d .- 18 -


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the caqposition of the Presidium gives u6 some clues as t o its prob-able function, as well as t o the probab g membership of the ''Buro".The most imporbtint leelnbers of t h i s bcdy vere the ten men f r omthe old 12-member Politburo: Sta lin, Molotov, Malenkov, Berla, Voro-shilov, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Ehrushchev and Shveruik.gThe only portraits praminently displayed in Red Square ou-fimaher7th vere of these ten IeadRrs. The treatment these men received inpropaganda, and references after Stalin's death t o a "Buro" of thePresidium, suggests tht the Presidium as 8 whole was l n no sense aruling body, but rather th at the old Polltlruro membe r s constltutedIts nucleus.

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The remainder of the Presidium was camgosed, far the most part,of two categories of personnel: Gomrrmbent and Party administrators011 the level &stbelow the old Politburo, and regional Party secre-taries or m&rs of the Central Party ajgaratus.iacluded the four remaiaing Deputy Chainnen of th e Council of Minis-ters who had not been in th e Politburo, Pervukhln, Saburav, &lyshevadd Icevosyan; two members of the old Secretariat, Ponomarkenko audSaelov; the Secretary of' the Kcuisapnol, Mikhailov; the head 09 theParty Control CCXI~UISS~O~I ,. F. Shklryatov; and, among others,VyshLnaky, the Minister of' Fare ign Affairs, and Zvlerev, %he Mlniste r09 Finance.

The fanner group

Party Secretaries from key areas and Party and prqp8e;anda spe-cbxllsts compriseti the balance of the 36-~hemberPresidlam. BndrLaaovfrom Leningrad, Korotchenko and Melnikav fran th e Ukraine, Aristovf20m Che l y a bF n s k and Brezhnev rrom Moldavla were a few of th e re-gional ofplclals t o be facluded. From the Central C omm i t t e e appa-ratus Carme .a, M. Peguv, head of the Light Industry Section. I), I.Chesnokov, Chief E d i t o r of Questions of Philosophy, P. F. Y u d h andM, B. M i t i n represented the partg propaganda specialists.

the PoiitbuFo hadcamnittees which handled v s r l o u ~ spectsugn a systemof Soviet policy, and that top level adminLstrators bad reported t o .these comatttees on technical aspects of problems; the lnclaeioa onthe Presidium of those tDePibers aP the technical bureaucracy who pre- ,sunably would have reported t o these committees su ggests that muchof the enlargement of the Presidium was a formel recognition a' t h i ssystem.

r/ Poiitburo Paember A. A. Andreev was dropped completely, while A, 19.Icosygin was reduced to candidate membership of the new Presidium.- 1 9 -


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A t the same t ime , the enlargement of the Presidium and the Sec-retariat, as w e l l as of the Centr al Coonnittee it s e l f , created morehonurary posit ions i n the top hierarchy for deservhg Farty members,Soviet leaders may have been concerned over the gap which had beendeveloping between the top and l owe r echelons of the Party hierarchy,Since the 19308, real power had been concentrated in a sma?.l., self-ever enter-.aries had l os tily concerned with maintaining thei r positions, mising t he i r ownstandards of livlng, even illegally, and eluding th e Partys multiplecontrol ~ ~ ~ l x m l s m s .

perpetuating Functionary had 1it tlehop e crfhave reported t ha t Party function-fervor and had become prim-

A t the Congress , the spate of criticism directe d aga inst bureau-cratism and the repeated demands for improved leadership pointed t othe growth of this self-seeking group as o m .of the regimes mo s tpressing Internal problems, T6 alleviate this situation, the Kremlinwas tightening controls, demniiing greater Party d i sc ip lbe , andplacing increased embasis on education ana criticism and self-&ti-cim.

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A t the same time, however, new rules concerning methods of ex-pulsion from the Party were introduced as a means of safeguardingthe position of the members of the hierarchy. It was s t ipula tedthat, on the lower levels, a member was t o be anowed to continue totake a full part i n the work of h is cell , incluaing i ta secre t meet-ings, at11his exclusion ha6 been ratified by higher caanpittees.For members of the Party caDnnittees a t any level, expulsion was t obe decided upon by a two-thirds maJority af th e plenary session ofthe com itte e t o which the member belonged. The expulsion of anAll-Uniou Centrsl Committee m e m b e r was t o be decided upon by a Party. Co n g r e s s , t o be convened once i n every four y e a r s , or by the 811-Union Central Couun l t t ee between congresses. In th i s way, while thenew rules made greater demands on party members , they also madet h e i r positions, a t l eas t farmally, more secure.been full members of the old Central Commi t t e e elected in 1939. Theremaining three had been alternates; one of them, I. G. Igoatw, hadbeen elected as an alternate member i n 1939 but excluded in 1941 forfailure t o discharge h is duties. His r e tu r n t o membership, not onlyon the Central C a m u i t t e e but on th e Presidium and the Secretariat aswell, suggested the back- of sane powerful figure on the old Pol i t -b b o evel,the Presidium and Secretariat, had vorkd i n t he Central Committeeapparatus since a t l eas t 1947 when he was identlfied as Chief of *heLight Industry Section.

of the f ive new members added t o th e Secretariat, anly two had

N. M. Pegov, another of the newly elected membkrs of

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The elect ion t o the Central Coaun i t t e e of 125 full members and111 candidates broke a precedent set i n t he late 1920'6 when thefu l l membership was stabilized a t 71 and the candidate WEbership a t68. Prior t o this t i m e , the Central CcrPmittee had reflected the con-tinued growth in Party membership, The stabil izat ion i n 1927, des-p i t e a continually growing Party membership, occurred after Sta l in ,had completely consolidated his personal supremacy by pack- Partyorganizations vith h is own appointees.The expansion of $he Central Commi t t e e i n October 1952 indicatedthe elevation of Party careerists over special lste ana techaictsnsf r om other sections of society and clea rly indicated the comparativeimportance of the prafessionsl Party wo r k e r , This development prob-ably increased Malenkav's influence in t h i s body, since he was theParty organization speclaliet and therefore probably had had a greatdeal t o say i n these a p p o i n ~ n t s .of the 156 new Cen-1 C amm l t t e e members, some 61 full membersand 17 candidates are Party careerists, as contrasted vi th some 15full llbembers and 47 candidates who have governmental assignments.Seventy percent of the full u~embersof the Central Caarmlttee havecome up through Party ranks. Only 26 of th e 236 Central Co tmn i t t e emembers have military camnand assignments; in 1939' he r a t i o w a ~0t o 139, and in 1941 it was 2'7 t o 139. After 1941 there'were nlnefull members of the Central Commi t t e e who were career military men;the new Centml Camtttee has only five. Several aff icers who pre-

vl0usI.y bad been full members we r e dropped to alternate st8tb.Rather than having Zncreased i t s share uf -these honarary posithms,t tae military appeared t o have l o s t consi&l.sble'graund.

-... ... . .. . The belated announcement 00 30 October t h a t Marshal 0 , A.Govorcrv had been inadvertently left aM the l i s t of candidate mem-bers aroused speculation regarding th e operation of behind-the-scenesinfluences lnvolvlng military leaders. Observers pointed out that amistake of t h i s nature was inconceivable and that sane disgruntledelement must have forced the eddition of Gavorcm to the Central Can-mittee after the ini t ial select ion. Govorm, it xi11 be remembered,was apparently part cxf, or on the periphery of, the Zhdanov "faction,"and he hter figured in the Doctore' Plot announcement.

The problem of succession W ~ S ot dealt with overtly in thep p a j o r readJnstment of Party leadership a t the conclusion of the 19thParty Congress. However, th e increased importance accorded t o th e- 2 1 -


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regional Party secretaries, as demonstrated In th ei r ele ction t o theleading Party organs, reemphasized Malenlcov's key positipn. simeth e basis of their se kc tio n appears to have been more their P ~ z = ~ o z I ~ ~qualifications and connections than thk elgnfficance of the geograph-ical areas frhich they represented, it is highly probable t h a t theyowed tbir'advancetraent t o Malenkov, as well as t o s ta l in . he con-'gress itself was apparently domtnated, a t least indirect%, .by &leu-kov since It was he who delivered the keynote address, Le., the "re-port" of th e Central Committee, which a t past Congresses had beengiven by Stalin.WGT-CONGRESS DEVEIOPIBNTS: POLITICAL CR IS IS

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Every republic Congress held before the 19thAll-Union Congressstrongly emphasized the need for vigilance, s t r e s a i a g that t h e bour-geois natioualist rather than the actual "spy" was the root oftrouble. Only the Congresses in Georgia, Lithuania and Estonia spe-ci f ical ly c i ted foreign spies -- British, American and Turkish -- asth e e n e q t o be watched, but even here t h e Internal enemy, the bour-geois nationalist and the lax pereoh, was strongly c0sdePll;ed..The unifwnlty or0 certain remerks made a t these congresses, cop-cerning espiomge and hostile actions by kulaks and bourgeois nation-a l i s t s and concerning negligence and crime by industrial managers andworker t i , pointed t o the existence of one or more central Party dtrec-tives on these subjects.have been 16ng-standing apatby toward Party am, neglect aP respon-s ib i l i ty and fa i lure to react propqly t o the line of Great RussiannatioualWn. ' Speeches a t the 19th Ccmgress left no doubt concerningthese probkrae. Malenkov, Saslov, B u l g a u h and Poshbyshev, amongothers, s t rong ly warned against such e w e .which increased the Party uePiberS' duties and made i&ol&ical atudymndatorg, w e r e aimed a t erasing apathy.~hr0ughou-t member i g p a number 09 arrests for crimes rangingfrom embezzlement t o cheating the publ ic and s t a t e were announced l nthe press. ' On 2 December, the death penalty was imposed' on threepersons charged with leading a gang in "speculation, embezzlement,and racketeering." This was th f i r s t application of the death pen-alty for -economic crimes since this penalty had been reintroduced inJan- 19%. A l s o in December 1952, an editorial and propagandacampaign was begnn agatnst "wool gathering" and "gullibility."

indicated continued political tensian and maneuvering behind thescenes.

Ttbe cause for these criticsms seems t o

The Party statutes,

FolloKing the October Party Congress, a number of other events

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1. On 30 October, fifteen days after the conclmian ofthe Party Congress and the publication of the l i s t of new Cen-t ra l Camnittee mem-rs, a spe cia l announcepbent stated t h a t thename of Marshall L. A. Govorov had been mistakenly omittedfrom the l i s t of Central Committee members.the cehtral Camnittee as an alternate m a r .On 24 December, an ar t ic le in Pzqvda by M. A, Snalov

He was a&& t o-2, -ri ti ci ze d P, Fedoseev fo r haviw written articles on, t a l i n ' BEconomic Problems of Socialism without a t th e same ti&admit-tiw that he too had held the erroneous views denounced bySta lin . Fedoseev's ar ti c le s had app&ared in Imestla aboit twoweeks- ea rl ie r. Fedoseev hastily apologized in puljlic fa r t h i serror, while the Izvestia edi tor ia l b m pologized for per-mitt ing the ar t ic les t o m. I n his article, Snslov questionedwhether or no* Fedoseev was "being sly" and had really changed

h is views.3. D. T. Shepilov, ousted from Agitprop in 1949 far nu-merous "shartcomings" including complicity' in the Voznesenskyaffair , was identified in midLDecember as th e new editor ofPravda. -.-. . On 13 Januarg 1953, the D o c t o r s ' Plot was announced.5. In January 1953, conferences of econcPniats and 'of so-ci a1 sci en ti st s were held, in which various figures apologizedfor having hsld the incorrect vlews criticized by Sta1in.i Thechief report a t the session d he Academy of Sciences un31 January 1953 was given by Pave1 Yudin.

numerous specific figures were criticlzed, whlle Yudin, i n hfsspeech disclosed that the proscribed.Wews were w i d e l y held i nhigh Soviet circles.In these conferences,

6. It was l e w d in January that Pospelav had been re-moved as head of the Msrx-Engels-Leain Institute and reassigaedas a Deputy Ed i t o r of pravda. A t the 21 January ceremcmiescoamaemareting the anniversary of hnin 's death, the prin cip alspeech was given by 1. A. Mikhailov; sin- 1949, t h i s speechhad been delivered by Pospe lov .since 1925, the Soviet press fai led t o publish the l i s t ofPolitburo mePibert3 who had attended,

-Curiously, for the f i r s t time ,

7. On 6 February, Pravda published a v i t r io l i c article-ent i t led "Revolutionar~rVigilance," which was striklzq in theexten t t o which it revealed disputes. The ar t ic le lashed outat "certa in rott en theories," i.e., that capitsl ist encircle-ment no longer exists, and that capitalism will renounce i t s- 23 -


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attempts t o harm the increasingly strong Soviet UnZon.t i c l e charged t h a t "Soviet successes" had given r ise t o moodEIof complacency, se lf- sa tis fact ion and conceit. In i t s pro-nouncements on foreign policy, the a rt ic le appeared t o bothparaphrase and supplement Stalin's foreign policy discussion ofFebruary 1952. I t s sharp tone, in the Context of the vigilancecampaign following the Do c t o r s ' Plot announcement, s-@gestedthat the foreign policy disputes had not been resolved, butrather had become more acute, over the year since February 1952.

The ar-

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caesar 08 - indecision and stress

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