cag's cwg audit report - chapter - 12 (2011)

8/6/2019 CAG's CWG Audit Report - Chapter - 12 (2011)

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c : : :wl-e ..::I:uTechnology

Successful organisation of the Games required several integrated technical solutions - aTlminq, Scoring and Results (TSR)system, a Games Management System (GMS)I a GamesTime website, and supporting tt; telecom and network infrastructure.The TSRsystem is required for capturing and disseminating the detailed results of acompetition. We found that planning for TSRwas badly delayed and initiated only inJanuary 2009. The tendering and award (including re-tendering) process took anunusually long period of 13months from March 2009 to March 2010. There was anabnormal six months gap between the 1st EOIin March 2009 and the issue of the RFP(forthe 2nd tender) in October 2009. There were clear and repeated interventions at differentstages to steer the TSRcontract towards Swiss Timing Omega and eliminate MSL1Spain. The technology consultant recommended award of the contract on nomination basis

to Swiss Timing Omega. TheRFP(for the 2nd tender) favoured Swiss Timing Omega by stipulating experience in

Asian Games, CWG or Olympics during the last five years with "end-to-end service";this was further amended to change the service requirements from "Tlminq, Scoringand/or Results" to "Timing Scoring and Results":

MSL1 Spain was irregularly disqualified at the PQ staqe, overruling objections fromtwo members of the Evaluation Committee. MSL1Spain and Swiss Timing Omega hadjointly provided TSRsolutions for Melbourne CWG-20061 Doha Asian Games-2006 andBeijing Olympics 200B. Both MSL and Swiss Timing Omega were equally qualified /unqualified as to the "end-to-end service requirement" or the requirement to provideTlminq, Scoring and Results. Further, the fact that MSL had been appointed forproviding TSRfor 2010 Asian Games Guangzhou was not considered.

OC was thus left with a single financial bidder, effectively eliminating any opportunity forcompetitive pricing of TSR. This facilitated award of the TSRcontract to Swiss TimingOmega at an exorbitant cost of Rs. 135.27 crore (compared to just Rs.39.B4 croreequivalent at Melbourne CWG-2006 from the same vendor).There were several deficiencies in the performance of TSR. TSRwas not tested eitherduring the test events, or in a real-time Games situation. The Commentary InformationSystem (CIS)and remote CISdid not function properly during most part of the Games. TheGames Information System (provided as Value-in-Kind sponsorship by Swiss TimingOmega) also did notfunction properly.

Performance Audit Report on XIX Commonwealth Games (CWG-2010) 189


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Chapter 12 - Technology

The award of the Games Management System (GMS - the primary IT application foradministration of the Games) was also flawed. As in the case of TSRIthe RFPconditionswere unduly restrictive by stipulating experience in Asian Games, CWGor Olympics duringthe last five years. Three out of four bidders were disquallfied, with MSLI Spain beingeliminated through a biased evaluation. However; Gold Medal Systems was declaredeligiblel despite not submitting any documentation in support of its financial strength andfinally awarded the GMS contract at a total cost of Rs. 25.29 crore (compared to just Rs.4.15 crore equivalent at Melbourne-CWG from the same vendor).tnexplicably, OC failed to consider the need for a Games Time website (the main Internetplatform for disseminating real-time information on sporting events during the Games)till June 2010. The award of the contract to HT-Hungama was flawed and irregular. In theabsence of bids being received in a sealed cover; associated complaints, and a cashdiscount (which we cannot confirm if it was received with the bid) making the L-3 bidderinto L-ll the award procedures appeared to lack transparency. In addition to adversemedia reports about the website's performance, the CGFPresident also confirmed seriousproblems with the website; documentation with OC on this aspect wasl however; sparseand unreliable.In October 20091 OC appointed Telecommunications Consultants India Ltd. (TCIL}Ia PSUIasa turnkey implementation agency for telecom, IT and networking projects and paid Rs.18.66 crore. We found that the engagement of TCILwas uniustlfied, and TCIL'scontractwas not implemented in turnkey mode (with OC remaining in full control of approval ofindividual contracts).Further; TCIL'sconsulting services/ advice was only taken in a selective manner; and notused at all for telecom services.OC had not properly planned the decommissioning of technology and IT equipment.Rs.21.04 crore of leased equipment was yet to be returned to the vendors, while procureditems were still lying with the OC.

190 Performance Audit Report on XIX Commonwealth Games (CWG-2010)


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12.1 Overview of TechnologyRequirements

The main technology requirements forsuccessful staging of the Games covered: A Timing, Scoring and Results (TSR)

system for capturing details of theresults of the sporting events, and otherassociated systems/ modules;

A Games Management System (GMS)for supporting administration of theGames;

A Games Time Internet website forenabling public access to full details ofsporting results; and

IT, telecom and network infrastructureto support the above systems andnormal office automation applications.

12.2 Management ofTechnology FunctionalArea

We found that there was lack of adequateleadership, advice and continuity for theTechnology Functional Area: There were as many as nine key persons

associated with the functional area atdifferent points of time:

1 Shri Nourse's contract was terminated by the DC inMarch 2010, in order to enable him to commence workfor Glasgow CWG-2014.


Table 12.1 - Key persons associatedwith Technology Functional AreaPeopleassociated

PeriodVKGautam September 2007 toOctober 2009SKOass January - April 2008Sujit Panigrahi October 2008 -December 2009SandeepArya November2009 -December 2009Ajit Sirohi December 2009-

February 2010Sunil Arya February- November 2010HarshKumar February 2010 till date Shri Brian Nourse prepared the

Functional Area report for technology inAugust 2007 on behalf of EKS,and wassubsequently appointed twice asConsultant by the OC- from December2007 in intermittent spells, andcontinuously from September 2009 toOctober 20101. On both occasions, hisscope of work was not clearly defined,timelines were not given, and paymentswere not linked to achievement ofdeliverables.

12.3 Timing, Scoring andResults (TSR) System

12.3.1 Overview

The Timing, Scoring and Results (TSR)system captures the detailed results of acompetition, both during and at theconclusion of the session, and distributesthis information, while ensuring consistencyin results, outputs and graphics. Anoverview of the TSRsystem and integrationwith other systems is depicted below:



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Figure 12.1 - Overview oj TSRSystem and integration with other systems

OC pracured the TSRsystem from SwissTiming Omega at a cost of Rs. 112.45 crare(CHF2,49,90,OOO)with an additional liabilityof Rs22.82 crare for service tax (Rs. 11.58crore) and withholding tax (Rs. 11.24 crore).12.3.2 Delays in PlanningWe found that planning for TSRfor CWG-2010 was badly delayed and the first draftof the scope of work for TSRwas preparedonly in January 20092 By contrast, planningfor TSRservices for London Olympics-2012started four years in advance. The delays atthe planning stage were primarilyattributable to lack of internal expertise andcomplete reliance on the consultant.

2 Shri Bhanot, however, announced at a meeting of theCentralised Co-ordination Committee in December 2008that Swiss Timing Omega would be providing the TSRequipment, even before the TSRscope of work wasprepared.

12.3.3 BudgetingThe original budget for TSR-related activitiesof Rs.57.53 crare was increased to Rs.109.53 crare by the EFCin October 2009.The total cost of TSRof Rs. 135.27 crareexceeded the budget by Rs. 25.74 crore,despite the absence of any additionalbudget allotment / re-apprapriation.

Abnormally high cost of TSRinCWG-2010 as compared toMelbourne CWG-2006OC procured the TSR system at anabnormally high sum of Rs. 135.27 crorefrom Swiss Timing Omega in March 2010, ascompared to Rs39.84 crore" ( AUD $12million) spent for Melbourne CWG - 2006for procuring the system from the samemanufacturer i.e. Swiss Timing Omega. Thisadditional cost is abnormally high and callsinto question the reliability of thecontracting procedure.

3 1AUD=Rs.33.20 (as on 1.1.2006)



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Originally, TSRwas envisaged as a legacyitem to be procured centrally by an agencyto be designated by MYASout of the budgetprovision of venue owners'. It is only in theEFCmeeting of October 2009 that Shri VKVerma, DGOCstated that the TSRequipment would be on "lease in- leaseout" basis. However, the budget for TSRwasstill given as a grant, rather than a loan.


When the final accounts of the OC aredrawn up, this should be treated as aloan for accounting purposes, althoughthe ultimate deficit will necessarily haveto be borne by Gol.

12.3.4 Award of TSRContractWe found unduly long delays in thetendering and award of the TSRcontract:

Figure 12.2 - Undue delays in tendering and award oj TSRcontract

Planning and issueof 1st EOI Jan-March 2009

Consultant'sRecommendation forSwiss Timing Omega May 2009

Technical andCommercial Evaluation December 2009

PQevaluation November 2009

2nd Tender - Issueof RFP October 2009

There was an abnormally long gap of sixmonths between the first EOI (March 2009)and the issue of RFP(October 2009), whichwas punctuated only by the consultant'sdiscussion paper (May 2009) making a casefor engaging Swiss Timing Omega onnomination basis.

4 As clarified in the December 2008 meeting of theCentralised Co-ordination Committee.

Such unwarranted and unexplaineddelays, particularly at a stage inorganizing the Games when shortage oftime was a critical concern, suggestconsiderations other than ensuring fairand transparent practices in award ofthe contract which are borne out by ourfindings.



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We observed that there were clear andrepeated interventions to steer the contracttowards Swiss Timing Omega and eliminateMSL, Spain and other potential bidders

through biased technical evaluations torestrict competition that resulted in a singlefinancial bid with no scope for competitivepricing:

Table 12.1- Chronology oj events relating to TSRcontract

Centralised Announcement by Shri Lalit Bhanot that the hardware forCo-ordination TSRwould be supplied by SwissTiming OmegaCommittee Meeting

March EOI The EOI listed five eligibility criteria and stated that 'only2009 Swiss Timing Omega meets all the above criteria'. Shri VKGautam, COO opposed the process, as the Technology FA

was not involved.April-May Responses to EOI Two responses were received from TechnoVision SPA2009 (Italy) and Mondo (India)

Stage Intervention

Shri Bhanot, however, constituted an evaluationcommittee, which rejected both bids. Shri Bhanotrecommended Swiss Timing Omega for TSRto the MYAS.No further action was taken.

May 2009 Consultant'sDiscussion Paper toShri Bhanot

The consultant recommended a single supplier approachfor all TSRcomponents and suggested confirmation of thescope of work and direct negotiations with Swiss TimingOmega.

October2009

RFP (2 nd round oftendering)

The RFP clauses restricted competition and favoured SwissTiming Omega Experience of providing TSR systems in Asian, CWG or

Olympics during the last five years - despite objections ofthe then ADG (Technology) and Shri Gautam about itsrestrictive nature and suggestions to include Pan-American or other similar multi-sporting events, theclause was retained by Shri VK Verma, DG-OC, withoutrecorded reasons.

The scope of work required "end to end service"associated with CWG (incidentally, neither Swiss TimingOmega nor MSL, Spain fulfilled this criteria on their own).

The RFPwas amended to change the service requirementfrom 'Timing, Scoring and/or Results' to 'Timing Scoringand Results". This change formed the basis for rejectingMSL.



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' i i"tll .tjOctober -November2009

StageResponses toRFPandPre-Qualification


Intervention Two bidders responded to the RFP- Swiss Timing Omega

and MSL,Spain. The bids were to be evaluated in three stages - pre-

qualification (PQ), technical and commercial. However,MSL, Spain was disqualified at the PQ stage itself. Whiletwo members of the Evaluation Committee - ADG(Technology) and ADG (Revenue) recommended thatboth bidders be qualified - they were overruled by theother two members (with the support of Shri VK Verma,DG-OC) on the grounds that MSL did not have experienceas an end-to-end provider and had never provided thetiming function in the specified events.

Incidentally, Swiss Timing Omega and MSL, Spain werejointly providing TSR systems for Melbourne CWG-2006,Doha Asian Games -2006, and Beijing Olympics 2008 -with the timing element being provided by Swiss TimingOmega (the main contractor), the results software and theGames Information System by MSL,Spain, and the scoringelement being provided jointly by both parties. Further,OC was aware that MSL had already been appointed forproviding TSR for the 2010 Asian Games, Guangzhou.Hence, the rejection of MSL,Spain was questionable.

We conclude that if MSLwas not experienced in providingend to end solution, neither was Swiss Timing. Howeverthe evaluation was just steering towards selection of SwissTiming Omega.

OCwas left with a single financial bidder(by irregularly disqualifying the onlyother serious competitor - MSL, Spain),effectively eliminating any opportunityfor competitive pricing of TSR,whichfacilitated acceptance of the exorbitantrates quoted by Swiss Timing Omega.

Interestingly, oe also took advice on MSl,Spain's eligibility from Tell and Shri MikeHooper. Tell advised disqualification ofMSl, Spain, though it had no association ortechnical knowledge on the specific aspectsof the TSR tender. Shri Mike Hooper reliedlargely on Tell's opinion.Swiss Timing Omega offered VIK (value inkind) of 3 legacy scoreboards and GamesInformation System (GIS)5 besides a cashoe took another 4 months to complete a(now meaningless) technical and

commercial evaluation and award thecontract to Swiss Timing Omega only inMarch 2010; this further delay isinexplicable.

OC had also floated a separate tender for GIS in October2009 to which MSL, Spain had responded; this tenderwas terminated on acceptance of Swiss Timing Omega'soffer of GIS as VIKfor the TSRcontract. Incidentally,MSL, Spain was providing the GIS in previous Games asa partner of Swiss Timing Omega



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sponsorship of Rs.4.50 crore and a cashdiscount of Rs. 1.18 crore. This wasaccepted by the oc. OCextended severalundue favours to Swiss Timing Omega: Liability for Tax: OCtook an additional

liability of Rs.22.82 crore on account oftaxes on behalf of Swiss Timing Omega,contrary to the RFPprovisions. Thisvariation was neither discussed by thecommercial evaluation committee norbrought to the notice of the OCFC.

Cost of TSRsystems for test events: TheRFPwas modified by keeping costsrelating to test events out of thecommercial bids, though this formed apart of the original scope of work.Accordingly, Swiss Timing Omega in itscommercial bid asked for an additional33 per cent for providing TSRfor testevents, which was not considered by theoc.

No clause for Liquidated Damages: Thecontract had no clause for levyingliquidation damages on SwissTimingOmega for non-achievement ofmilestones or non-performance.

Terms of payment: The contractprovided for payment of 95 percentamount even before completion of thegame, thus leaving no foothold for theOC in case of poor performance.

12.3.5 Performance of TSRWe found several deficiencies in theperformance of TSR: TSRwas not tested during the test

events (due to reduction in scope ofwork) and was not tested at all in a real-time games situation.

The final user acceptance of TV graphics(to be superimposed on live video feed)was to be completed by July 2010, butthe graphics were not approved till 24September 2010.

Commentary Information System (CIS),amodule of TSR, provides real timeinformation to commentators andsports presenters of Prasar Bharati andother international broadcasters. Formost part of the Games period, the CISand remote CIS6did not functionproperly. The dissatisfaction with theservice was such that somebroadcasters sought refunds from OCfor non delivery of CISservices and theAustralian RHBeven wanted removal ofthe logo of TSRprovider from thetelecast as a penalty.

Games Information System (GIS)(provided by Swiss Timing Omega asVIK) was the link between resultsgenerated by TSRand its distribution tobroadcasters, media persons and otherusers. This did not function properlyduring CWG-2010 and the broadcasterslodged complaints in this regard.

Despite CISand GISnot functioning, OCdid not revoke the performanceguarantee of Rs5.63 crore provided bySwiss Timing Omega, which was valid till31 October 2010.

This was meant to provide CISinformation at other thanvenue locations



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12.4 Scoreboard StructuresBesides the TSRequipment, Swiss TimingOmega also provided 39 scoreboards 36 ofwhich were rental and 3 were legacy items.OC had to erect structures for mountingthese scoreboards. The contract forexecution of these structures was awardedto Advance Tech Engineering at a cost of Rs.3.40 crore. We found the followingdeficiencies in the approval process: The RFPwas issued in May 2010 without

global tendering; and Various corrigenda effecting changes in

scope of work, eligibility criteria ofturnover, consortium related conditionsand documentation to be submitted bybidders were purportedly issued. We do


not find evidence that these changeswere duly approved and advertised.

The execution of the contract and itsmonitoring was also deficient as: Scoreboards could be installed at only

10 out of 33 venues by the deadline of 1September 2010;

There was no provision for levy ofliquidated damages;

Proper testing for certifying the safety ofthe structure was not carried out; and

In case of a Rugby 7s venue, the locationand site was changed at the lastmoment by Swiss Timing Omega. Duringtesting, the scoreboard structure camecrashing down and was re-installedsubsequently.

12.5 Games ManagementSystems

The Games Management Systems (GMS) isthe primary application that deals with the

administration of the Games. OC procuredthis system from Gold Medal Systems for Rs21.02 crore with an additional liability of Rs4.27 crore towards taxes.



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Figure 12.3 - Overview oj GMS

12.5.1 Delays in Planning Figure 12.4 - Undue delays inaward oj GMS ContractFor CWG 2010, the process forprocuring GMS was initiated only inOctober 2009 and the contract couldbe signed just six months before theGames (March 2010). In contrast,CWG-Melbourne 2006 had awardedthe GMS contract 18 months prior tothe start of the Games. This createda squeeze on the delivery scheduleand, combined with lack ofcompetition, led to a 500 per centincrease in costs, with the suppliervirtually dictating all the terms.

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(N o ve m be r 20 09 )

S in gle T ec h nic al b id o f G oldM e da l S ys te m s e va lu ate d

(N o ve m b er 20 0 9)C o m m e rc ia l b id e va lu a tio n

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12.5.2 Elimination of competitionWe observed that the bidding process wastailored to eliminate competition andfacilitate Gold Medal System's emergenceas a single financial bidder: Global tendering was not resorted to

and sufficient time was not given forresponses. The RFPcould not generateadequate competitive tension, as twomajor players in the field, Atos Origin'and Sangvong", did not even respond tothe EOI.

The RFPwas restrictive in ensuringcompetition as it asked for experience ofproviding GMS in Olympics,Commonwealth or Asian Games in thelast 5 years and could effectively havehad a maximum of just 3 qualifiedbidders.

Out of the four bidders, three bidderswere disqualified on grounds ofinadequate experience, processing feeand supporting documentation. MSLSpain, which was disqualified for theTSRcontract was once again disqualifiedin the PQ evaluation for GMS, althoughit had better credentials than GoldMedal Systems. It had provided all thefive modules of GMS directly in the past,whereas Gold Medal Systems couldprovide only two out of five modules onits own and was dependent on multiplepartners for delivering the othermodules. Incidentally, Gold MedalSystems also did not furnish anydocument evidencing its tie up with itslocal partner, Tristar Enterprises.

supplier of GMS for Beijing Olympics 2008supplier of GMS for Doha Asian games 2006


Although MSL Spain had not providedGMS in Olympics, Commonwealth orAsian Games in the last five years, it hadprovided GMS for Asian Games 1998.This was not considered, due to therestrictive RFPclause.

The PQevaluation is even morequestionable as Gold Medal Systems didnot submit the required documentationin support of its purported financialstrength; whereas MSL Spain had doneso and had strong financials incomparison to Gold Medal Systems.

Evidently, the restrictive clauses in RFPand biased evaluation of bids resulted inelimination of competition, and ensuredthat the financial bid of Gold MedalSystems was the only bid to be opened.With no financial competition, and onthe plea of shortage of time, OCaccepted the highly priced bid of GoldMedal Systems. This bid was five timesthe amount (Rs. 4.15 crore) charged forMelbourne CWG-2006 by the samevendor.

As in the case of the TSRcontract, OC alsounduly favoured the vendor for GMS inseveraI ways: Liability for Tax: OCtook an additionalliability of Rs.4.27 crore on account of

taxes on behalf of Gold Medal Systems,contrary to the RFPprovisions. Thisvariation was neither discussed by thecommercial evaluation committee norbrought to the notice of the OCFC.

No clause for Liquidated Damages: Thecontract had no clause for levyingliquidation damages on Gold MedalSystems for non-achievement ofmilestones or non-performance.



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Performance Guarantee - There was noprovision for performance security inthe contract, despite OCFC'sinstructionsin view of the unascertainable financialcondition of Gold Medal Systems.

Increased Rates - A clause for paymentat increased rates for additional workwas added after EB'sapproval.

12.6 Official Games TimeWebsite12.6.1 PlanningThe Games Time website was effectively themain internet platform for CWG2010 todisseminate real time information onsporting events during the Games. Althoughthe Games Time Website is a standard andpredictable feature of all multi sportinternational events, this was not plannedor considered till June 2010, when, afterCGFcriticism, the proposal for creating aGames Time Website was initiated. OC alsofailed to exploit the opportunity for revenuegeneration from the Official Games Timewebsite through advertisement revenuedue to deficient and delayed planning.12.6.2 Irregular Award of Contract to

HT-HungamaThe bidding process was squeezed andcompleted within two months, leading toseveral irregularities in the award of thecontract to HT-Hungama at Rs. 2.95 crore inAugust 2010: Global tendering was not followed and

only 10 days time was given forresponses;

The RFPstipulated past experience ininternational multisport events as a pre-

qualification. A day before the final bidsubmission date, this criterion wasrelaxed on the grounds that no biddermight qualify on these criteria. We haveno evidence of this corrigendum beingpublished on the website/newspapers.Three bids from HT-Hungama, HCL Infosystems- NDTV Convergence and TCS-Sports interactive were received;interestingly, all three did not have suchexperience but were termed astechnically qualified under the relaxedcriteria;

The documentation from Hungamaregarding its consortium with HindustanTimes was deficient, but was ignored bythe technical evaluation committee;

Despite complaints that bids werereceived in loose sheets, unbound andunsealed, Hungama's bid was accepted;

Although Hungama's commercial bidwas L-3 at Rs.7.94 crore, it was declaredL-1 by taking into account a cashdiscount of Rs.4.65 crore offered bythem. We cannot confirm whether theoffer of cash discount was actuallyreceived along with the bid. This L-1 bidwas reduced further to Rs.2.95 croreafter negotiations.

The bids were not received in a sealedcover as is the stipulation. Thisevidently led to complaints. Further,audit has seen no proof of the cashdiscount reportedly offered by Hungamaactually accompany the bid to convert itinto L-l. There was relaxation in the RFPcriteria also. Such infirmities in theaward to Hungama lack transparencyand lead to the conclusion that theprocess was tweaked in their favour.



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12.6.3 Performance of the WebsiteWhile there were adverse media reports onthe performance of the website, quotingproblems of speed and non availability ofreal time information, the documentation atthe ~C's end was sparse and unreliable.Even the CGFhead, Shri Mike Fennel statedthat "there is certainly a big problem withthe Official Games Time Website".~C's vetting of the content hosted on thewebsite was also deficient, as the list ofparticipating nations incorrectly includedKorea, Japan, Philippines and even the u s .Even the archival CD/DVD of the fullyfunctional website, which was to beprovided by November 2010, had not beengiven by the vendor till March 2011.Despite these facts, DC failed to encash theperformance guarantee of Rs.0.29 crore;there were no other contractual provisionsfor penalties in case of non performance.12.7 Telecom, IT and

networking projects12.7.1 Appointment of TelL on

nomination basisTelecommunications Consultants IndiaLimited {TCll}, a Public Sector Undertaking,was appointed without any recordedjustification as the turnkey implementationagency for telecom, IT and networkingprojects on nomination basis in October2009. This was approved ex-facto by the EBin January 2010.DC had a 139 strong technology team(excluding 4 consultants/advisors) sinceOctober 2009. Out of the 42 technologyrelated contracts worth Rs247 crores, only12 contracts of Rs92.17 crore were

Chapter 12-Technology

awarded through TCll on behalf of the DC;for which DC paid Rs. 18.66 crore to TCll ascommission and tax. Considering that theTechnology functional area could handletechnical contracts like TSRand GMS on itsown, engaging the services of TCll for 12routine contracts is grossly unjustified.Further, many other contracts e.g. of Wi-Fiservices, data cards, official website andIPTVwere awarded by DCdirectly.Interestingly, TCll was never consulted incontracts related to telecom or IT services.

Further, the contract with TCll was notimplemented in practice in turnkey mode.At different stages of the contract fromnegotiations to bid evaluation, contractswere sent to DC for approval.Also, it was noticed that TCll's 'selective'advice was taken on other technical issuese.g. in the TSRcontract at the pre biddingstage for declaring MSl, Spain ineligible.12.7.2 Supply of Audio Video Equipment

for VenuesDC had to provide audio video equipment"at all competition and non competitionvenues for media and internationalbroadcasters. The estimation ofrequirements was faulty, went throughrevisions, and resulted in over provisioning;the equipment was finally procured fromSamsung India for Rs3.79 crore.The first round of tendering commencedwith the issue of the RFPin March 2010(without budgetary approval) and resultedin the issue of a purchase order for Rs.5.20crore to MIRC Electronics (ONIDA) in June2010. This was cancelled as there were

Ti l, TV mounts, DVD/CD, Data Projector (desktop),Digital Video Camera, Tripod for Digital V ideo Camera(Stil i), PAsystem etc.



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substantial reductions in quantities andduration of renting (on the instructions ofthe Fast Track Committee) and the vendorrevised the terms and conditions, whichTCll refused to accept. This proposal wasneither seen by the Chairman, nor ratifiedby the EBat any stage.After MIRC's refusal, on 7 September 2010,the FastTrack Committee recommendedapproaching Samsung India and lG India foroutright purchase or rental of theequipment. However, OC chose to approachonly Samsung India (and not lG India) onnomination basis on 8 September 2010 andissued the lOI on 13 September 2010 of Rs3.78 crore for outright purchase of theequipment excluding PASystems, DVDrecorder and Portable CDplayers. Therewere no recorded reasons for initialinclusion and subsequent exclusion of theseitems.12.7.3 Procurement of Computer

HardwareOC purchased/leased 3302 laptops anddesktops for Rs9.80 crore in several batchesduring April to September 2010 to meet ITrequirements at competition and non-competition venues. Strangely, thequantities required were not assessed atone go and nearly 50 percent (1638) ofthese computers were leased. We couldfind no documented criterion for decidingwhether to procure or lease. Further, theoption of getting suitable sponsorship fromIT companies for such a large requirementwas never explored by the OC at any stage.Interestingly, leased computers were alwaystaken through TCll, while purchases weredone directly by 0C. The lease rent chargedwas 76 percent of the cost, and with an

additional 9 per cent as commission and10.33 per cent as leasing charges for TCll,OC ended up paying 95 percent of thepurchase cost of equipment. In addition, OCspent Rs. 2.92 crores for purchasingsoftware licenses for these leasedcomputers.12.7.4 Maintenance of inventory,

decommissioning and legacyplanning

OC procured IT equipment worth Rs. 6.46crore and rented Rs.58 crore worth of ITequipment for the games. Thedocumentation on inventory, distributionand decommissioning was incomplete andthere were substantial delays in ascertainingthe location of all equipment. The leasedequipments were to be decommissionedand returned to the respective vendors; wefound that Rs. 21.04 crore of leasedequipments was yet to be returned. OC hasnot planned for disposal of the ownedassets. There was no policy for warehousingand legacy use of the equipment after thegames. After MYASturned down GC's initialproposal for offering this equipment to itsemployees at discounted rates, no actionhas been taken and the equipment is lyingin MDC stadium and OC headquarters(March 2011).

12.8 Provision of IT services -Other contracts12.8.1 Wi Fi services in Games VillageWithout involving TCll, OC decided inMarch 2010 to provide free wi-fi internetservice at the Games Village. While theinitial proposal was for services in onlyselected parts of the Games Village, the

202 PerformanceAuditReportonXIX Commonwealth Games (CWG-2010)


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scope of work was extended significantly,raising the estimated cost from just Rs.15lakhs to Rs.3.50 Crore. Based on a singleresponse received, the contract wasawarded to Radius Infratel at a cost ofRs.2.75 crore. Incidentally, severalcomplaints were received frominternational broadcasters about the non-functioning of Wi-Fi services and OCwascompelled to provide for alternativeservices. OC stated that necessarydeductions were being made for nonperformance.

12.8.2 Provision of data cards for mediaOC provided 1400 data cards from TataTeleservices and Reliance and took another1264 data cards on lease from MTNL at atotal cost of Rs.0.8 crore, after wirelessinternet access was barred for securityreasons. Records of usage, distribution andreturn of these datacards are very scanty.Also when some data cards did notfunction, OC had to make alternativearrangements.


12.8.3 Fixed line broadband connectionfor media persons

The work of providing high speed Internetbandwidth for media press Operations wasawarded to Tata Communications Ltd. onnomination basis in September 2010 at acost of Rs. 11.28 crore. OC stated that thiswas resorted to when CERTguidelinesdisallowed Wi Fi services in media tribunes,and the option of datacards could not fulfilthis requirement. According to the OC,prior approval from financial authoritieswas not sought due to paucity of time.12.8.4 IPTV for Games villageOC awarded a contract for Rs.0.60 crore on21 September 2010 to Bharati Airtel onnomination basis for provision of IPTV,without recorded reasons for the changefrom Cable TV. Records on actual delivery ofservices were not available.



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cag's cwg audit report - chapter - 12 (2011)

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