california natural gas pipeline system lt sezgin ozcan lt mehmet buhur
TRANSCRIPT
CALIFORNIA NATURAL GAS PIPELINE SYSTEM
LT SEZGIN OZCANLT MEHMET BUHUR
AGENDA Back-story
Node decisions How many? Where?
Model the Natural Gas Pipelines of California
Which lines would be best to attack? How bad would California be hurt? How many pipes to attack to break the system?
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CALIFORNIA'S SUPPLIES OF NATURAL GAS
BACK-STORY
2
BACK-STORY
3
Why to attack a pipeline?
4
THIMUR
Why to attack a pipeline?
4
source
sink
20-30‘’
SOURCE
30-40 ‘’
0-20 ‘’
CONSUMPTION
arizona
San Fransisco
oregon
PIPELINE
WHAT’S THE FLOW ON AN ARC ?
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NETWORK GOAL: MAXIMUM GAS FLOW
TOTAL FLOW WITHOUT INTERDICTION: 5378.5
TOTAL POPULATION : 4.043.988
NUMBER OF NODES : 23
NUMBER OF ARCS: 50
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source
WHERE TO ATTACK
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source
attack
San Jose 1.056.000 people affected
1 ATTACK
20-30‘’
SOURCE
30-40 ‘’
0-20 ‘’
CONSUMPTION
10
source
attack
3.243.988 people affected%73 system down
2 ATTACKattack
20-30‘’
SOURCE
30-40 ‘’
0-20 ‘’
CONSUMPTION
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0 1 2 30
500000
1000000
1500000
2000000
2500000
3000000
3500000
4000000
4500000
Resilience CurveSan Jose-sink
RESILIENCE CURVEPOPULATION
# ATTACKS
Source-ArizonaSource-Oregon
Source-ArizonaSource-Oregon
Source-San Francisco
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source
Only Allowed to Attack Blue and Green Colors
20-30‘’
SOURCE
30-40 ‘’
0-20 ‘’
CONSUMPTION
CONCERNS OF THIMURPIPELINES NOT CLOSE TO SURFACEMAY NEED MORE EXPLOSIVESSPARSELY POPULATED
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source
Only Allowed to Attack Blue and Green Colors 1 ATTACK
attack
20-30‘’
SOURCE
30-40 ‘’
0-20 ‘’
CONSUMPTION
408 572 PEOPLE AFFECTED
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source
Only Allowed to Attack Blue and Green Colors 2 ATTACKS
attack
20-30‘’
SOURCE
30-40 ‘’
0-20 ‘’
CONSUMPTION
attack
768 648 PEOPLE AFFECTED
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source
Only Allowed to Attack Blue and Green Colors 3 ATTACKS
attack
20-30‘’
SOURCE
30-40 ‘’
0-20 ‘’
CONSUMPTION
attack
attack
1 021 580 PEOPLE AFFECTED
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 130
200000
400000
600000
800000
1000000
1200000
Resilience CurvePOPULATION
# ATTACKS
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CONCLUSION
The system is not resilient. Only with one attack system performance drops down to % 45 affecting over 1 million people.
Other than one example, all other attacks are nested.
The effect of a pipeline disruption may vary according to the place it happens. Large diameter pipeline may cause the system to break down whereas a smaller pipeline in highly populated area can cause causality and terror.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 130
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
Resilience Curve
Resilience Curve
# ATTACKS
% GAS SHORTAGE
CONCLUSION
Future work
• We did not include the storage facilities in the system. These facilities can back up the disrupted pipelines.
• Expected causality rate of a pipeline explosion may be modeled with respect to population and diameter.
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QUESTIONS?
Flow on a pipeline
Z=Total flow-∑( xbar(i,j)*Y(i,j)*p(i,j))
p(i,j) = Diameter 40 = 1Diameter 30 = 2Diameter 20 = 10