call charles_eding wars building states_building states to build peace89098h.pdf

8/10/2019 Call Charles_Eding wars building states_Building states to build peace89098h.pdf

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x cknowledgments

University's Center on International Cooperation for their support in carry

ing out joint activities related to the project on statebuilding.

Many thanks are also due to colleagues at IPI and elsewhere who re

viewed chapters, provided comments, and offered guidance as the book de

veloped, including Abiodun Alao, Markus Bouillon, Kaysie Brown, Matt

Bryden, James Cockayne, Rahul Chandr an, Anthony Goldstone, Agnes Hur

witz, Gordon Peake, Jenna Slotin, Astri Suhrke, Susan Woodward, and two

anonymous reviewers. Special thanks in particular to Amy Scott and Mada

lene

O'Donnell

for their frank and thoughtful feedback. The volurne has

benefited enormously from their involvernent.

We are grateful to Clara Lee, ElIie Hearne, Alison Gurin, and Jeremy

Dell for editorial assistance and to IPI editor Adam

Lupel

for his able han

dling of the

entire

publication process. Of course, we would also like to

thank the staff at Lynne Rienner Publishers for their expert work, as well as

Lynne Rienner herself for stalwart support.

Finally, our thanks to Tracy Fitzsirnmons and John Wyeth, and Shayla,

Jag, Dash, and Nate.

Charles

T Call and

Fallessa Wyerh

1

Ending Wars

ui

Iding

States

harles T

Cal

cholars and

practitioners have

for centuries sought to irnprove our abil

~ j t y

to end wars. For a number of reasons, however, this challenge has re

cently taken on new urgency. The classic

peacekeeping

model aimed ar

consolidating a cease-fire between the armies

of

two warring countries

today seems a distant mernory from

simpler

times. Civil wars-historically

more difficult to settle and to keep settled-now comprise 95 percent of the

world's

armed conflicts.

Even

where

countries

go to war with one

another

(witness recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq), internal arrned conflicts and

external war making become intermingled in messy ways.

Success also seems more elusive than in the past. Early successes in se

curing negotiated settlements after the Cold War-in El Salvador, Mozam

bique, Namibia, and South Africa-gave way to several cases in Africa and

the Middle East where apparent peace failed and

war

returned with a ven

geance. Repairing the torn social fabric in such countries and preventing

nurnerous and often inchoate forces from reigniting war are difficult endeav

ors. The difficulty is compounded by

people's

rightful expectation that dis

placed persons will be able to return without fear, that human rights atroci

ties will be punished, and that infrastructure and economies will be rebuilt.

In addition, some postconflict countries experience high rates of criminal vio

lence and host threats to transnational security.

The difficulty of ending wars today is matched by its urgency: the costs

of failing to secure peace are serious, Failed peacebuilding represents one of

the worst risk factors for new wars.

Between one-quarter

and one-third of

peace agreements ending civil wars collapse within five years.' In addition,

backlash violence after a failed peace agreement is often worse than be

fore an accord was reached. If the implementation

of

only two peace agree

ments-the 1991 Bicesse Accords for Angola and the 1993 Arusha Accords

for Rwanda-had not failed, some 2 million people, roughly one-third of all


4/14

2

3

uilding States

to

uild Peace

civil

war

victims

during

the 1990s, would not have died in

subsequent

in

ternal violence.?

War's

disruption of people, econornic production, and polit

ical

certainty

combine to produce

what

is known as "r e

verse developrnent,"

or impoverishment that is

difficult

to staunch.'

Cornplicating

the

picture

are

war-torn countries where

the

institutions

of

authorrty have been destroyed or disrupted.

n places

as varied as Haiti

in

1994,

Kosovo and East Timor in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, and Iraq in

2003, military interventions dismantlcd

the

state. These interventions left

not only the usual

human

and material

debris

of warfare but also uncer

tainty about

how

and by

whom

millions

of people

would be

governed.

These international efforts, initially aimed at discrete objectives like encling

ethnic cleansing 01 toppling a dictator, uniforrnly got more than they bar

gained

for. Even in supposed peacekeeping success stories like Bosnia, East

Timor,

and Sierra Leone, external actors

found

thernselves iIl-equipped to

foster a process that would result in a legitimare, sustainable authority.

Thus we come to a major concept ancl therne of this book: the state and

its relationship to

peace. US-Ied interventions

in Kosovo, Atghanistan.

Haiti,

and Iraq suggested to

those

engaged in "postconflict" operations that re-

building the state was the logical implication. perhaps even the moral obliga

tion,

of

external interventions. Implernenting peace agreements in places

like

Bosnia also underscored how important cleveloping a viable state was for

consolidating peace-and for enabling international troops to depart, Other

factors-such as the specter of weak or "failed"

states

engaged in terrorism

and the development community's ernphasis on the nstitutional Ioundations

for

sustainable

development-also brought the

state and statebuilding 10 the

fore of

policy discussions.

To

quote the

2002 National Security Strategy 01

the Un ited Sta fes 01Ainerica

"America is now threatened less by ccnquer

ing states

than

we are by failing ones."

Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate the clifficulties

of

building

states after (and

during)

war, as well as its

importance

for international

peace and

security. The

weIl-being of the

peoples

of these lands, ol the

regions where

they are located,

and indirectly of the

rest

of the

world

depends on

whether effective and

legit-

imate states emerge

in

these war-torn societies.

Yet

the

peacekeeping

suc

cesses listed aboye,

as well as more problematic attempts to end

wars

as in

Palestine,

Somalia, and East

Timor,

point

to

problems

in the

process

of

build

ing sta tes in war-torn societies. Such experiences raise the question

of

liow

consolidating peace

relates to recrafting the institutions

01

authority-or how

building

peace relates to

building

states.

The Main Questions and Contributions of This ook

Given

these

chaIlenges,

this

book explores a number of questions. H ow does

the process

of

building states relate to the process

of

building peace' Is

Ending Wars uilding states

statebuilding somehow essential to postwar peacebuilding? Are there func

tional

priorities in fostering legitimate states in war-torn societies, and how

should

they be advanced? What

are

the

tensions between peacebuilding and

statebuilding?

Where

should policymakers look to identify and overcome the

trade-offs

and the not-so-apparent tensions that may arise between strength

ening srate institutions and seeking to address underlying causes

of

war?

The book seeks to address these questions. Academics and policy ana

lysts have already written a good deal about both peacebuilding and state

building. Much

of

this literature consists of case studies, lessons learned,

and advice for policymakers on building state institutions in postwar envi

ronments. Herein we initially sought to explore further how to build states

more effectively in ways that sustain peace. Once cornpleted, however, the

chapters yielded different and more

interesting results

than

anticipated.

First,

we do

find

guidance on

what

sorts

of

measures are likely to

yield

sustainable

postconflict state institutions

in

different circumstances.

The thernatic

chap

ters in Part 1 provide robust recommendations

about

which processes are

most

likely

to Ioster legitimare and effective state institutions-and which

processes are

likely

to be harmful.

Yet the most salient finding is

that

the relationship between peacebuild

ing and statebuilding is cornplicated, contingent, and context-dependenl.

That is not to say that the specifics

of

each case prevent generalizations

from

being drawn. However, peacebuilding cannot

be

boiled down

to

building

state

institutions.

Enhancing state

institutional capacity may potentially harm

the chances for consolidating peace and vice Versa. A number of tensions

exist between the

logic

of building

states

and that of ensuring

that

war

will

not recuro The contributors

here

add conceptual depth and

nuance

to

how

we

think

about the relationship between strengthening states and consolidating

peace and provide contingent guidance on handling the tensions and Iink

ages

between state consolidation and peace consolidation. The chapters in

this book suggest that effective peacebuilding requires strategizing around

severallinkages (\)

between

negotiated

deals

and

their consequences for

a

sustainable state; (2)

between capacity

and legitirnacy; (3)

between

urgent

short-terrn measures

and long-terrn sustainability;

4)

between international

interests

and recognition versus national interests

and

legitimacy;

and (5) be-

tween

the

interests

of

elites, especially combatants, and

of

the

population

at

large. This volume comes on the heels of important reforms in the interna

tional architecture for postconflict ancl statebuilding operations. In the early

2000s, a number

of

observers emphasized the serious limitations on external

efforts to reweave social fabrics and to rebuild state structures after wars.

Marina Ottaway,

Roland

Paris, and

others criticized the

overambitiolls

"lib

eral democratic"

prescriptions

of

international actors

in

postwar peacebuild

ing.

5

Successful peacekeeping (Le., maintenance

of

cease-fires and the com

mencell1ent of

recovery)

in places like

Liberia (1997), Kosovo and East Timor


5/14

4

5

uilding States

to

uild Peace

(1999), and

Sierra Leone

ancl Hairi (by

2000)

liad not readily led 10

peace

building successes whereby inrernational troops

could

leave behind self

sustaining states.

Frustraticns

wirh persistent gaps in international civilian

capaciries, the short attention span

of

donors once crises have fallen from

the headlines, and problems of interagency coordination led

bilateral

c1onors ancl the UN system lo restructure their organizations for such oper

ations.f The United Kingdom, Germany, Cariada, the

European

Union, and

other donors are adopting

joined-up

approaches involving closer collabo

ration

among

their defense, foreign, and

developme

nt

ministries

or offices.?

The World Bank, wliich had created a Post-Conflict Unit in 1997,8 opened

a

Fragile States

Unit in 2002

9

The debacle of postwar reconstruction in

Iraq helped stimulate the United

States

lo restructure its own institutions for

weak srates ancl postconflict

reconstruction

in

creating

an

Office

of

the Coorclinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

S/CRS)

in the State

Departrnenr.!" And with

perhaps

excessive fanfare, the UN created a

new

Peacebuilding Couunission, a mcdcst Peacebuilding Fund, and a

Peace

building Support Office withi n the UN Secretariat aimed at

strengthening

strategies, resources, and

diploma

tic

support

for selected

postconlict

coun

tries. AII these

changes

retlected an international

community

struggling

10

find

answers

to the problern

of creating sustainable

sta tes in the wake

of

war. We hope that this volume

provides clarity

and

guidance

on the re la

tionship

between enhancing

state institutions and

peacebuilding,

including

how not lO do harr n in

trying

to build states after war, that will "id in this

process of international reflecrion.

Peacebuilding hat 5 it?

One 01 the c1ifficulties in analyzing peacebuilding is the reigning conceptual

confusion about postconflict processes, A number of related terrns, defined in

the box on p. S, differ

slightly

in their denotation and the values underlying

thern. The terrn peacebuilding entered public usage through the United Na

tions.

Drawing on work by Johan Galtung and others, Secretary-General

Boulros Boulros-Ghali's

Agenda

or

Peoce

in 1992 c!efinecl peacebuilding

largely in rela!ion lo a contlicl conlinuum.

11

Passing from precontlict preven

!ion lo peacemaking and Ihen peacekeeping, the Agenda or Puree associated

peacebuilding

wilh

postconlicl societies, defining

it as

action

10

identify

anc! support structures which will lend lo slrengthen and solidify peace in

order

l

avoid a relapse inlo contlicl (para. 21 ).12

By Ihe mid-1990s Ihe

concept

of

peacebuilding

had

entered academic

ancl

policy discourse

and become more expansive,

leading

to confusion

even wilhin Ihe United Nalions. The

Supplement

to an Agenda or Pence

(1995) emphasized Ihat Ihe term applies not solely

10

postcontlict situations

~ i ~

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