can community based conservation address …...this dissertation is concerned with the community...
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Can community based conservation address poaching in Sub-Saharan Africa?
Name: Louise Heffernan
Student ID Number: 1832143
Degree Programme: International Development: Environment,
Sustainability and Politics
Year of Submission: 2018
Supervisor: Dr. Fiona Nunan
Word Count: 11,984
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank my supervisor Dr Fiona Nunan, for always being there as soon as I needed
her to be, and forever pushing me to do my best. I would also like to thank Unijee Poonan, for
showing unwavering interest in my research and continually doing her very best to put me in
contact with as many people as possible in addition to providing her own unique insight to the
research topic.
To my family and friends, for understanding and supporting me throughout, thank you.
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Abstract
The multi-billion pound Illegal Wildlife Trade (IWT) is the biggest threat to some of the world’s
most vulnerable species. The illicit trading of animal products such as rhino horn, elephant ivory
and shark fins, and the live sales of species of flora, exotic birds and pangolins, is top of the
international conservation agenda (Challender and MacMillan 2014; Sutherland et al. 2014).
Approaches to conservation are continually evolving, by the end of the 20th century advocates
for a ‘fences and fines’ approach were faced with growing calls for exclusionary methods to be
dissolved and communities to participate in the management of protected areas (PAs)
(Brockington et al, 2010). Globally, the integration of conservation into community
management systems has had mixed results, and the IWT and conservation efforts have
increasingly become entwined in global and national security agendas. The armed forces and
conservation approaches have a historical relationship, yet recent interactions are being
viewed as a fresh intersection of the military into anti-poaching (Humphreys and Smith, 2014).
Wildlife is an important natural resource for nations across Sub-Saharan Africa and has the
potential to produce significant livelihood benefits for local communities. Whilst tackling the
complex world of poaching and trafficking requires a multi-pronged approach, the growing
dismissal of community contributions to wildlife management threatens the sustainability of
conservation aims (Booker and Roe, 2017). By analysing how community participation has been
utilised in conservation across Sub-Saharan Africa, this dissertation contributes to the growing
literature on what the increased focus on militarised conservation means for community roles
in wildlife management.
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Table of contents Chapter 1 - Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 7
1.1 Research Problem ............................................................................................................................................ 7
1.2 Contextual Background ................................................................................................................................ 8
1.3 Empirical Justification ................................................................................................................................... 8
1.4 Methodology ................................................................................................................................................. 10
1.5 Structure of the dissertation ..................................................................................................................... 10
Chapter 2 – Literature Review .............................................................................................................................. 12
2.1 Community Based Natural Resource Management ................................................................................ 12
2.1.1 Critiques of CBNRM for development and conservation .............................................................. 13
2.2 – Illegal Wildlife Trade and Poaching ....................................................................................................... 14
2.2.1 – Drivers of Poaching ..................................................................................................................... 15
2.2.2 – Legal approaches to the IWT and Poaching .......................................................................... 15
2.3 – Green Militarisation ................................................................................................................................. 16
2.3.1 – Previous military and conservation relationships ................................................................. 16
2.3.2 – The Securitisation of Conservation ......................................................................................... 17
2.3.3 – Green Militarisation: In theory & practice .............................................................................. 18
2.3.4 – Responses to Green Militarisation in literature ..................................................................... 18
2.4 – Conclusion of literature review ............................................................................................................ 19
Chapter 3 – Namibia ............................................................................................................................................... 22
3.1 CBNRM in Namibia – Communal Conservancy Program ..................................................................... 23
3.1.1 Power and institutions ...................................................................................................................... 24
3.1.2 Conservancy contributions to community .................................................................................... 25
3.2 Poaching and the IWT in Namibia ............................................................................................................. 28
3.2.1 Scale of poaching in Namibia ........................................................................................................... 29
3.2.2 Scale of IWT in Namibia and drivers ............................................................................................. 30
3.3 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 31
Chapter 4 – South Africa ........................................................................................................................................ 32
4.1 People and Parks ......................................................................................................................... 32
4.1.1 Livelihood Impacts ......................................................................................................... 33
4.1.2 Revitalising Fortress conservation? ............................................................................... 34
4.2 Poaching and the IWT ................................................................................................................... 35
4.2.1 Trafficking and Poachers ................................................................................................. 36
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4.2.2 IWT in South Africa ............................................................................................................ 37
4.3 Responses: Green Militarisation .................................................................................................. 39
4.3.1 Effectiveness ...................................................................................................................... 42
4.3.2 Relationship with people ................................................................................................... 42
Chapter 5 – Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 45
Bibliography ......................................................................................................................................... 49
Figures, Boxes and Tables
Figure 1 – Map of Namibian conservancies highlighting Kunene and Zambezi regions ............. 9
Figure 2 – Map of South Africa highlighting Kruger National Park ............................................... 9
Figure 3 – Analytical Framework ..................................................................................................... 20
Figure 4 – Map of conservancies and Protected Areas in Namibia ............................................ 22
Figure 5 – Elephants and Rhinos poached in Namibia 2012-2015 ............................................. 28
Figure 6 – Rhinos poached by province in South Africa .............................................................. 34
Figure 7 – Seized rhino horn beads and carvings in South Africa ............................................... 37
Figure 8 – Kruger National Park anti-poaching force deployment ............................................. 39
Box 1 – Research Questions ............................................................................................................ 20
Box 2 - Constitutional Basis of CCP’s ............................................................................................. 21
Box 3 – Republic of South Africa Cabinet Memorandum (2001) rules relating to land claims within Protected Areas ..................................................................................................................... 32
Table 1 – Actors and responsibilities within Namibian CBNRM ................................................. 23
Table 2 – Legal categorisation of wildlife in Namibia ................................................................... 27
Table 3 – Number of rhinos poached in ‘Big 4’ range states 2013-2015 ................................. 29
Table 4 – Rhino horn seizures 2016 ............................................................................................... 37
Table 5 – Poachers killed in Kruger National Park 2010-2014 ................................................... 42
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Abbreviations
AGA – Annual General Assembly
AGM – Annual General Meeting
ANC – African National Congress
APU – Anti-Poaching Unit
CBE – Community Based Enterprise
CBNRM – Community Based Natural Resource Management
CBTES – Community Based Tourism Enterprises
CITES – Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
CRLR – Commission for Restitution of Land Rights
CWM – Community Wildlife Management
DEA – Department of Environmental Affairs
DEAT – Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism
DLA – Department of Land Affairs
ESAAMLG - Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group
FIC – Foreign Intelligence Agency
GRN – Government Republic of Namibia
HWC – Human-Wildlife Conflict
INSMR – Integrated Strategic Management of Rhinoceros
IWT – Illegal Wildlife Trade
JV – Joint Venture
KNP – Kruger National Park
LCC – Land Claims Court
MA – Ministry of Agriculture
MET – Ministry of Environment and Tourism
MOA – Memorandum of Agreement
NASCO – Namibian Association for Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) Organisations
NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation
PA – Protected Area
SADF – South African Defence Force
SANDF – South African National Defence Force
SANParks – South African National Parks
SSA – Sub-Saharan Africa
TA – Traditional Authority
UNODC – United National Office for Drugs and Crime
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 1.1 Research problem The multi-billion pound Illegal Wildlife Trade (IWT) is the biggest threat to some of the world’s
most vulnerable species. The trade is worth an estimated £15 billion which ranks it the 4th
largest illicit crime in the world (WWF, 2017). The growing trade has led to a significant rise in
the poaching of iconic species such as rhino, whereby poaching has increased by 7700% across
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) since 2007 (Stop Rhino Poaching, 2017). The illicit trading of animal
products such as rhino horn, elephant ivory and shark fins, and the live sales of species of flora,
exotic birds and pangolins, is top of the international conservation agenda (Challender and
MacMillan 2014; Sutherland et al. 2014).
Wildlife related illegalities such as those that contribute to the IWT are met by continuously
evolving conservation approaches. Until the 1980s the dominant approach to protect such
species was to keep people out of their habitats through ‘fences and fines’ (Brockington, 2010).
By the end of the 20th century advocates for a ‘fences and fines’ approach were faced with
growing calls for exclusionary methods to be dissolved and communities to participate in the
management of protected areas (PAs) (Brockington, 2010). The idea of communities as key
stakeholders within conservation has largely emerged through the practice of Community
Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM), and been facilitated through its application in
a variety of global landscapes. Globally, the adoption of participatory approaches to
conservation, involving local communities in management systems, has had mixed results, and
the IWT and conservation efforts have increasingly become entwined in global and national
security agendas. The armed forces and conservation methods have a historical relationship,
yet recent interactions are being viewed as a fresh intersection of the military into anti-
poaching, this is occurring across SSA (Humphreys and Smith, 2014). Whilst tackling the
complex world of poaching and trafficking requires a multi-pronged approach, the growing
dismissal of community contributions to wildlife management threatens the sustainability of
conservation aims and raises concerns about unequitable land distribution (Booker and Roe,
2017).
Wildlife is an important natural resource for nations across SSA and has the potential to
produce significant livelihood benefits for local communities. By analysing how community
participation has been utilised in conservation across the region, this dissertation will
contribute to the growing literature on what the increased focus on militarised conservation
means for community roles in wildlife management. Regardless of growing recognition that
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local community participation is integral to conservation efforts, evidence shows that one size
does not fit all. Namibia and South Africa have been selected for this study as the neighbouring
countries are two of the richest in biodiversity across the SSA region, yet have had divergent
results from CBRNM approaches. A comparison of their conservation approaches will enrich
existing debates on how, when and why the effectiveness of CBNRM can differ and what the
responses have been to this.
1.2 - Contextual Background
The most conventional response to the poaching and IWT crisis has been the formation of
domestic laws and international trade agreements which prohibit the poaching and sale of
certain species. Internationally wildlife trade is regulated by the UN Convention on the
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) which came into effect in 1975 to regulate
the trade and prevent the extinction of endangered species (Warchol, 2007). There are
approximately 30,000 species listed under CITES. This is a combination of species completely
banned for trading and some with regulated trade permitted (Warchol, 2007). Although the
decision making process for listed species is backed by scientific evidence, Duffy (2010: 50)
suggested decisions are highly politicised and influenced by a ‘western bias’, as many species
are native to developing nations.
Protected Areas (PAs) of various forms have long been a central tenant to conservation. In
relation to the management of wildlife they have often been associated with the ‘fortress’
conservation approach, or ‘fences and fines’ (Adams and Hulme, 2001a; Songorwa, 2000: 610).
PAs of this manner have frequently led to the displacement of indigenous communities, often
facilitated by imposing fines and erecting physical fences along constructed borders (Adams
and Hulme, 2001a). This dissertation is concerned with the Community Wildlife Management
(CWM) response to fences and fines, an important aspect of the growing CBNRM paradigm in
Africa, Asia and South America (Brockington et al, 2010). In recent years there has been a
noticeable intensification in the militarisation of approaches to conservation (Duffy, 2016).
Emerging research has found that this shift is in response to the new techniques of illegal
hunters, innovative warfare technologies and the securitisation of poaching through a
discourse of a war on biodiversity (Duffy, 2014). Recent increase in the use of paramilitary
language and techniques in the ‘fight’ against poaching has been termed ‘Green Militarisation’
(Lunstrum, 2014). The effectiveness of this response to the poaching crisis in South Africa will
be analysed, in conjunction with how this contrasts with existing CBNRM approaches.
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1.3 - Empirical Justification
Namibia and South Africa were chosen for comparison due to their similar biodiversity profiles
yet divergent approaches to wildlife management. There are significant connections between
the countries’ land tenure history, yet their contemporary approaches to PAs and community
management differ significantly. Worldwide, Namibia and South Africa have the largest
populations of rhino despite both nations’ wildlife reserves being almost completely depleted
through colonial hunting (Annecke and Masubele, 2016).
Until independence in 1990, Namibia was named ‘South West Africa’ under the South African
apartheid rule, thus both experienced disenfranchising land tenure policies which excluded
black populations from owning and utilising land (Jones, 2012). Both nations had the intent to
integrate equitable land ownership into their constitution, however results have not aligned
(Brockington et al, 2010). Namibia is commonly cited as the darling of CBNRM and has
consequently witnessed the greatest wildlife recovery on the African continent, yet South
Africa is experiencing its worst poaching crisis to date (Ogbaharya, 2006; Moneron and
Rademayer, 2017). This dissertation will predominately focus on the Kruger National Park
(KNP) within South Africa, a 20,000 sq.km National Park and the most ‘concentrated site of
rhino poaching’ in the world (Lunstrum, 2014: 816). The North-Western area of Namibia is
known as the Kunene region, this has the densest number of Communal Conservancy
Programs, followed by the Zambezi region (NASCO, 2016). The biodiversity in these regions is
similar to the KNP with considerable populations of iconic species such as rhino, elephant and
lion. CBNRM projects in these two areas have been selected for this study, Figure 1 shows the
Kunene and Zambezi region in Namibia and their corresponding conservancies, whilst Figure 2
highlights the vast KNP.
Figure 1: Map of Namibian conservancies highlighting Kunene and Zambezi regions
Figure 2: Map of South Africa highlighting Kruger National Park Source: researchgate.net
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1.4 - Methodology
This research fits into a “naturalistic” ontology whereby a deductive analysis was used
alongside purposive sampling and case study reporting (Bowen, 2005). This research is
naturalistic as it concerns how conservation interacts with people in their ‘natural setting’, this
enables the social context to be fully appreciated when drawing conclusions about changing
conservation approaches and their effects. A comparative case study approach is important for
this study as issues of community, poaching and security are intertwined in regional
environmental agendas and have cross-continental relationships across Africa (Ramutsindela,
2016). A deductive approach, as defined by Trochim (2006) ‘starts with the general and ends
with the specific’. Deductive research was used in order to build on existing theory and
contribute to understanding relationships between conservation approaches. By analysing
theory and critiques of CBNRM and Green Militarisation, this research used qualitative data on
performance in practice, whilst analysing quantitative data on the scale and drivers of
illegalities in Namibia and South Africa.
Research was facilitated through a desk-based study using primary and secondary data
collection. A comparison of South Africa and Namibia was integral in producing relative and
valid conclusions about community involvement in conservation across Africa. Because of this,
a collection of high quality field research was unattainable in the time permitted and therefore
a critical analysis of existing data was used alongside a primary skype interview.
Desk based data collection involved interrogating a range of secondary sources in order to
build up an accurate picture of CBNRM practices in SSA. Key sources were government
department reports, internal data from organisations, online databases and academic research.
Additionally, legislation analysis was integral for addressing the research questions and
understanding how CBNRM is facilitated or restricted in practice. Predominantly, statistical
and legislative data relating to South Africa was obtained from the Dept. of Environmental
Affairs (DEA) (formally Dept. of Environmental Affairs and Tourism – DEAT) and the Dept. of
Land Affairs’ (DLA) database. For Namibia, the Namibian Association of Community Based
Natural Resource Management Support Organisations (NACSO) was principally used to collect
statistical and qualitative data regarding the Communal Conservancy Program (CCP). NASCO
is a partnership between 8 Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) and the University of
Namibia. The organisation produces a book each year detailing the ‘state of community
conservation in Namibia’ and has a range of raw data relating to wildlife populations and
conservancy governance. The data is widely used as the most accurate and reliable data as it
is sourced from government censuses and verified by NGOs in specific regions (NASCO, 2013).
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The use of legislation, policy and wildlife data was used to support theoretical findings and
academic studies of CBNRM projects in Namibia and South Africa.
The merits of secondary data are that a wide variety of information can be surveyed and unique
connections drawn from this, however this can limit researcher control (Saunders et al, 2009).
Therefore primary research was also undertaken to enrich existing data and a skype interview
was conducted with Major General (Ret) Johan Jooste of SANParks. This data provided an
alternative perspective to literature surrounding the process of Green Militarisation and aimed
to enrich validity and reduce researcher bias.
1.5 - Structure of the dissertation
The following chapter details the theoretical underpinnings of the research area, including a
diagram of the analytical framework which directed the research’s analytical framework. The
themes drawn out from the literature formulate the structure of Chapters 3 and 4 which are
country specific. Chapter 3 unpacks the structure of CBNRM in Namibia and how it addresses
wildlife illegalities, followed by the current scale of poaching and the IWT. Chapter 4 unpacks
the legislative environment that restricts successful CBNRM application in South Africa,
followed by analysis of the current poaching crisis and the militarised response to this. The final
chapter will draw together the findings of Chapter 3 and 4 in order to conclude what effect
growing militarised responses to poaching are having on CBNRM in Namibia and South Africa
and how this compares to wider literature.
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review
2.1 Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM)
CBNRM is broadly informed by common-property theory which largely responds to Garett
Hardin’s (1968) Tragedy of the Commons. Hardin’s model theorises that open-access commons
(resources) will become overused and exploited as humans maximise usage for their own
benefit to the detriment of other users. Using a metaphor of grazing cattle on common
pastures, Hardin suggests that through overuse the resource will become entirely degraded
and thus unproductive (Hardin, 1968). Hardin’s model has resonated globally, informing
numerous natural resource policies and has been used to justify fortress conservation (Blaikie,
2005). Common property theory is closely associated with Elinor Ostrom, who formulated ‘8
design principles’ that she found to be effective for common pool resource governance (1990).
Around the time that Ostrom formulated her principles, support emerged worldwide for
participatory and holistic resource management. This trend was essentially in response to
‘community exclusionary conservation efforts’, there was thus an increased attempt to
incorporate local people into the management of natural resources (Songorwa et al, 2000;
Stone & Nyaupane, 2013: 17). The most utilised definition of CBNRM comes from Roe and
Nelson (2009: 5):
“The management of resources such as land, forests, wildlife and water by collective, local
institutions for local benefit”.
CBNRM posits that democratic decision making will increase ownership and responsibility over
a resource and therefore stimulate its conservation (Nunan, 2018). In terms of development, it
is envisaged that CBNRM will create benefits for the livelihoods of the communities involved
by generating employment, revenue and empowerment (Arntzen et al, 2003). CWM is a form
of CBNRM widely used across SSA, where the most common and valuable natural resource is
often wildlife. Tourism has been cited as key for revenue generation within CWM through
activities such as trophy hunting permits and wildlife safaris. Globally, CBNRM and CWM
projects have produced mixed results and highlight the complex relationship that exists
between conservation and development.
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2.1.1 Critiques of CBNRM for development and conservation
Communities are often defined within CBNRM literature as harmonised units with mutual
common objectives. Agrawal and Gibson (1999: 630) argue that portraying communities as
‘homogenous social structures’ ignores the multitude of often conflicting interests of actors,
and their capabilities to influence decision making depending on internal and external
institutions. Moreover, Taylor (2002: 125) highlighted that the word community has a ‘warm
emotional pull’. The term suggests harmonised community order and yet the nuances of
external institutions, in this case ownership, authority and land tenure need to be more
carefully considered before these ‘artificial groupings’ are set in place (Agrawal and Gibson,
1999; Songorwa, 2000; 608). The consensus within literature seems to be that viewing
communities in place-based terms leads to uncoordinated groupings of people that often have
little in common but are assumed to be homogenous (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999; Lee and
Newby, 1983). These inconsistencies mean internal power dynamics are not fully understood
and managed. The importance of power and influence within natural resource governance
means that CBNRM’s performance can be affected by internal actors and their power
distribution systems (Barnes, 2014). Elite capture is a term used when actors that possess
significant power within a locality, often traditional authorities (TAs) or those with more wealth
and social status reap the benefits of managing a resource or use their power to pursue self-
interest (Muyengwa et al, 2015; Agrawal, 2007). It has been found that the demands of elites
are commonly adhered to within CBNRM projects and thus the distributive nature of CBNRM
is reduced (Lemos and Agrawal, 2009).
Elite capture sits within broader critiques that suggest that in practice, CBNRM minimises the
interplay of institutions and does not effectively devolve power to all community actors
(Berkes, 2004). Stone and Nyaupane (2013) suggest that a lack of decentralised power is often
because community resource management schemes serve as a facade to sanction numerous
conservation projects which benefit the state through increased tourism. The use of co-
management, a common component of the CBNRM paradigm often award’s minimal land
tenure to communities in trust whilst decision making and benefit distribution remains within
the hands of the state or private sector (Barrow and Murphee, 2011). More recently there has
been a direct retreat of the ‘community’ aspect of CBNRM and states are seen to be regaining
control and therefore conservation revenues (Benjaminsen and Svarstad, 2010; Nelson, 2010).
The risk of ineffective power devolution emphasises how exclusion from land use and
subsequent benefits can potentially be reinforced through CBNRM. This often creates a
disincentive for communities to engage.
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Analysis of CBNRM critiques shows that the transfer of theory to practice is frequently weak.
Blaikie (2005) affirms that the ‘elusive’ nature of theoretical benefits such as benefit
distribution can only be achieved within small scale projects, which are not always compatible
with large-scale conservation goals. Similarly, Campbell and Shackleton (2001) found that the
notion of devolved power merely represents rhetoric rather than substance, resulting in
frequent ‘trade-offs felt by the poor’ (Blaikie, 2005: 1946).
2. 2 - Illegal Wildlife Trade and Poaching As IWT grows in scale, its effects are increasingly top of security, development and economic
agendas as well as conservation (Booker and Roe, 2017). The magnitude of the IWT is reflected
in its economic worth which is approximately US$160 billion per year (Duffy, 2010). This figure
has been rising steadily since the mid-2000s and international media has subsequently
inundated the public with figures and stories of the poaching crisis (Booker and Roe, 2017).
IWT consists of the trading of live exotic and or endangered animals or animal parts with a
variety of buyers (Warchol, 2007). Because of the vast and ‘shadowy’ world of the IWT, figures
are hard to verify and the scale is ultimately unknown (Duffy, 2010: 18). In addition to the trade
of wildlife itself, the act of poaching is increasingly multidimensional. The common definition
of poaching is, ‘all hunting not sanctioned by the state’ (Duffy, 2010: 1885). Yet this is regarded
as minimalistic of the conditions, drivers and relationships between poachers, poverty and
subsistence hunting (Duffy, 2010).
Subsistence hunting involves species being taken home for consumption rather than financial
gain, but is often also categorised within the IWT in SSA countries (Nunan, 2018). What is
termed as ‘bush-meat’ in Africa refers to a variety of insects, birds, reptiles and some mammals
that have traditionally been used as a source of protein across the continent (Warchol, 2007:
59). Although this type of poaching originated with local hunters killing what they could
consume, commercialised and militarised enterprises have exploited and expanded this sector
thus resulting in a problematic generalisation that poor communities are the driving forces of
the IWT (Duffy et al, 2016; Warchol, 2007: 59). The blurred lines between hunting and
poaching have historical roots. During colonial rule African communities were marginalised so
that their hunting became a criminal act, and trophy hunting framed as a means of conservation
by the Europeans (Duffy, 2010). This westernised notion has been integrated into CBNRM
paradigms, such that trophy hunting today is increasingly becoming a strategy of CWM and
cited widely as significant for conservation goals (Lindsey et al, 2007).
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2.2.1 - Drivers of Poaching
International markets
Literature concurs that largely, consumer demand is the most significant driver of poaching
across SSA (Duffy and St John, 2013; OECD, 2012). In South Africa, both species of Rhino are
threatened to the point of extinction due to poaching and IWT. This can largely be attributed
to an increase in demand from international markets and the rising price of rhino horn
(Strydom, 2017; Child 2012). Across SSA the demand for rhino horn and elephant ivory is
located in foreign markets, with limited sale of the products within source countries (TRAFFIC,
2017). Predominantly Asian markets promote this growth. In particular in East Asian regions
rhino horn is traditionally believed to have curing properties and is sold for medicinal purposes
(Strydom, 2017). More recently in Vietnam, the illegal trading of rhino horn is due to the
recreational consumption of a grounded version of the horn believed to improve the sexual
performance of men (Stop Rhino Poaching, 2017).
Poaching and Poverty
Analysis highlights that the IWT must be viewed as a multi-faceted chain that is comprised of
‘poachers, middlemen, processing centres and markets’ (Pires and Moreto, 2011: 104). Within
main stream meia, it is contended that traditionally, wildlife crime has been driven by consumer
demand globally and facilitated by poor communities in source countries (McLellan, 2014).
However, increasingly there has been a realisation that in addition to the growth of
sophisticated systems within organised crime, poor people are not solely responsible for
fuelling IWT (see Duffy, 2010; McLellan, 2014; Booker and Roe, 2017). Particularly research
has found that a variety of actors motivated by money, no matter their race or financial
standing, are engaging in poaching (Charlton, 2017). Within both development and
environmental discourse, there is concern that the dominant rhetoric of poaching is situated
within criminology and this is harmful for identifying the true drivers of poaching (Lynch et al,
2017; Gaston and Spicer, 2013). There is concern that this field overemphasises the role of
‘criminal violations’, and there is a lack of awareness for the role that exploitative and
unsustainable development by states plays in poaching. It is assumed that international media
and politics have ‘distorted’ the facts about biodiversity loss, such that the blame is redirected
to the poor and the exploitation of nature by capitalism is normalised (Lynch et al, 2017: 266).
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2.3 – Military approaches to conservation 2.3.1 - Previous military and conservation relationships
European colonial expansion was significant in terms of conservation approaches. Massè et al
(2017) detail how the enforcement of PA’s in southern Africa was linked with the consolidation
of British territory and subsequently with a military presence. Since this point, the connection
between the military and conservation has oscillated, yet remained close. The KNP has
repeatedly been described as an overly militarised landscape (Humphreys and Smith, 2014). In
1973 the South African Defence Force (SADF) created the Kruger Park Commando, since
which the duties of conservation and the military have been significantly blurred (Massè et al,
2017). The direct relationship between both the military and other security forces has been
fundamentally connected to the establishment of PA’s, which are interpreted as a tool to allow
the state to exert control over people and resources (Neumann, 2004). The process of using
the military as ‘apparatus’ for creating PA’s is described by Neumann (2004: 820) as ‘framing
vulnerable and marginalised people as the enemy of conservation’.
However during the post-cold war era, conceptions of security and the use of military force
narrowed significantly, making room for human-focused approaches (Buzan, 1991; Whande,
2010). Alongside shifting development theories and the subsequent growth of CBNRM, the
use of military within conservation began to retreat (Whande, 2010). Logistically, Whande
(2010) suggests this shift was driven by global calls to reduce military spending and redirect
funds to natural resource management and development approaches (Steiner, 1993; Cock and
Fig, 2002). Nevertheless, the current and widespread poaching crisis has meant that the retreat
in the military-conservation nexus has not endured. Rather it has evolved into the use of
paramilitary techniques and personnel engaged directly in the ‘pursuit of conservation’
(Lunstrum, 2014: 814). The consensus within the Green Militarisation literature is that the
difference between previous military involvement and current approaches is that today,
‘…such involvement is quickly intensifying and vastly expanding within a broadly framed
conservation context and sense of ecological crisis” (Massè et al, 2017: 3).
The concept of Green Militarisation is thus part of a broader process of the securitising
conservation.
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2.3.2 - The Securitisation of Conservation
The linking of the IWT and poaching with threats to national and global security are part of a
wider effort to bring issues of the environment into security agendas (Floyd & Matthew, 2013).
Massè et al (2017: 3) suggest the development-security nexus is starting to take on issues of
conservation, forming a ‘development-security-conservation’ nexus. The theory of
Securitisation is predominately rooted in the work of the Copenhagen School, who developed
the theory to unpack the construction of security and how it is articulated in practice (Floyd,
2011). Lead by Ole Weaver (1995) and Barry Buzan et al (1998), Securitisation is a discursive
process and defined as,
‘an issue that is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority; thus, by labelling it as a
security threat an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means’
(Buzan et al., 1998: 26)
Particularly relevant for the notion of IWT, Securitisation theory does not consider that new
threats emerge, it posits that issues are ‘transformed’ into a security threat by the political
economy, and constructed through ‘linguistic representation’ (Trombetta, 2008: 586;
McDonald, 2008: 563). Contextually, issues of poaching and wildlife extinction are more
frequently being posed as threats to national and global security (Williams, 2003). Concerns
have arisen that the redefinition of conservation may lead to ‘repressive, coercive and violent
practices’ such as state-authorised killing of poachers (Duffy, 2014: 833; Humphreys and
Smith, 2014; Lunstrum, 2014; Neumann, 2004).
The Securitisation theory as outlined by the Copenhagen School suggests that when an issue
becomes securitised, ‘normal politics’ is suspended so that a sense of urgency is invoked and
radical actions are justified (Buzan et al, 1998: 29). Literature discusses the rapid expansion of
national armies, soldiers for hire and global mercenaries that have been deployed in response
to the apocalyptic language used to frame poachers and the IWT as security threats (Cavanagh
et al, 2015; Devine 2013; Lombard, 2012). Masse and Lunstrum (2016: 229) labelled the
Securitisation of conservation as a two-step process; firstly by categorising issues of
conservation as issues of security, and secondly by invoking security actors to address
conservation issues through security measures.
18
2.3.3 - Green Militarisation: In theory & practice
The specific term ‘Green militarisation’, a label for the process of securitising conservation, was
coined by Elizabeth Lunstrum. The concept is defined as “the use of military and paramilitary
(military-like) actors, techniques, technologies, and partnerships in the pursuit of conservation”
(Lunstrum, 2014, 817). In practice, the process of green militarisation has significantly involved
conservation NGOs and federal conservationists turning to private military companies to
enforce PA’s and community land in the name of biodiversity (Duffy, 2014). The case of South
Africa demonstrates the reality of the process. The state and conservationists have made a
conscious effort to build partnerships with the defence sector to ‘secure its goods and services’
(Massè et al, 2017: 4). Within literature, the notion of ‘green militarisation’ in South Africa has
notably been associated with the appointment of Major General (Ret) Johan Jooste (veteran of
South African Border Wars with Angola 1966-1989) as Commanding Officer of Special
Projects to head anti-poaching operations in the KNP (Lunstrum, 2014: 823). The 2011
appointment of Johan Jooste has been interpreted as a symbol that South Africa is intensifying
its anti-poaching operations. Some have termed the approach the ‘Jooste War’ (Humphrey and
Smith, 2014: 798).
Aligned with the Securitisation theory, the use of military language by the state and NGOs such
as a ‘war’ and ‘insurgents’ normalises these terms and helps to legitimise the involvement of
the military in the drive to save biodiversity (Duffy, 2014, 2016; Marijen and Verwijen, 2016).
The approach is not confined to South Africa, in Kenya rhino protection scouts in 2011 were
transformed into a new role named ‘Police Reservists’. Duffy (2014) suggests these changes
represent the growing reliance on military techniques in conservation efforts.
2.3.4 - Responses to Green Militarisation in literature
Largely, literature suggests that the process of militarising conservation will have irreversible
exclusionary effects on local communities and potentially intensify any ranger/poacher
conflicts (Daniel-Ryan, 2018). Advocates of CBNRM see the presence of the military as the
greatest threat to its success (Khagram, 2006). There is concern over the long term impacts a
reliance on private military companies may have, particularly regarding the values and ideas
that become entrenched in an environment following military presence (Lunstrum, 2015).
Indeed, green militarisation is seen to be tackling just one end of the poaching process rather
than states finding a way to effectively tackle the drivers of poaching (Rademeyer, 2012).
Further and more radical concerns lie in the dehumanising nature of the process and its links
to fortress conservation, colonial marginalisation and racist apartheid policies. Dialogue of a
19
‘war for biodiversity’ has been suggested to justify violent anti-poaching tactics which reignite
colonial definitions of poaching and hunting (Duffy, 2010: 97). Issues of race are seen within
discourse that depicts those protecting the wildlife as ‘white heroic military trainers’ and park
guards as ‘martyrs’ of conservation (Marijen, 2016: 276; Lunstrum, 2015). The number of
suspected poachers killed in KNP has risen dramatically. This is the result of what Lunstrum
(2015) describes as an ‘arms race’ in which poachers, soldiers and rangers are increasingly
acquiring more and more weaponry to stay ahead of each other. Military tactics to anti-
poaching claim to increase the number of poachers arrested, however Cardamone (2012)
highlights that capturing poachers will not remove the issue of poaching due to weak
implementation of laws and sentencing disparities across regions (SANParks, 2016). Critiques
from a broad range of backgrounds rely on the fact that, despite increased funding into
militarised tactics against poaching, the killing of both rhinos and elephants continues to
increase (Welz, 2013).
2.4 Conclusion of literature review Unpacking how the concepts of CBNRM, wildlife related illegalities, and green militarisation
are presented within literature lays the foundation for investigating how wildlife illegalities
have been responded to in practice. The prevalence of CBNRM over the past 20 years has
represented a shift in development and conservation theories towards human-centred and
grass-root approaches. The supposed benefits of integrating communities into wildlife
management have been well documented within literature, perceived by many to invoke
sustainable conservation practices (Roe and Nelson, 2009). Despite this, CBNRM in its
relatively short history has not yielded expected results on a global scale largely this is
attributed to an inability to bring theory into practice (Blaikie, 2003). Nevertheless, rising
demand for rhino horn and ivory has propelled the IWT into unprecedented levels, leading to
the intensification of militarised conservation practices in some regions and thus the potential
abandonment of CBNRM (Duffy, 2014). The process of Green Militarisation has been
suggested to be part of a wider attempt to securitise the environment. However, the disputed
nature of the concept and its relatively recent emergence means it’s characteristics and impacts
have not fully been investigated. By exploring why Green Militarisation has been invoked in
South Africa and its relationship with CBNRM, this research will enrich current studies on the
IWT and poaching and conservation practices in SSA. The diagram demonstrates the key
20
factors that have emerged from the literature and is used to guide data collection and analysis
in the following two chapters.
By visualising key thematic findings into a diagram, their connections were represented
through solid and perforated lines. The guiding research questions for the study could be
formulated, these are as follows:
Research Question: To what extent can community-based approaches address
wildlife related illegalities in Sub-Saharan Africa?
Sub-research Question 1: What do increasingly militarised responses to
poaching mean for community conservation?
Figure 3: Analytical Framework (Source: Author’s work)
Box 1: Research Questions
Critical concerns
21
Chapter 3: Namibia
3.1 CBNRM in Namibia – Communal Conservancy Program (CCP)
Despite being the second youngest country in Africa, Namibia’s innovative CCP model has
contributed significantly to the relative success of CBNRM goals in the country. A CCP is a
legally registered and communal area that has the rights to manage and utilise wildlife within
its boundaries. Conservancy members do not fully own the wildlife, yet retain usufruct rights
to acquire benefits from associated enterprises such as guided hunting, tourism and in-kind
benefits (Jones, 1998). CCPs are constitutionally based on three principles, as highlighted in
Box 2.
A variety of conditions within legislation are to be met for a communal area to be gazetted with
the Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET).These include but are not limited to: defined
boundaries, defined membership rules and a constitution, an assigned committee which is
representative of community members and a strategy for equitable revenue or benefit
distribution (NASCO, 2014). There are both consumptive and non-consumptive rights defined
by the CCP constitution; consumptive refer to the conditional ownership of game for trophy
hunting, local meat consumption by conservancy members, sale of meat commercially or live
captured game for sale. Non-commercial rights are the touristic opportunity rights and ability
to establish community-based tourism enterprises (CBTEs) or joint private sector ventures
A. The devolution of rights and responsibilities to the
lowest appropriate level
B. Proprietorship and tenure over the resources in
defined geographic areas
C. The creation of appropriate incentives through
empowerment, economic opportunities and the
reinstatement of traditional cultural and heritage
values
(NASCO, 2014: 12)
Box 2: Constitutional Basis of CCP’s Source: NASCO (2014: 12)
22
(NASCO, 2014). Figure 4 shows the proportions of registered CCP across Namibia in
comparison with state PAs and private concessions. PAs cover 37.89% of the total land in
Namibia and CCP’s cover 17.8 % of land (UNEP-WCMC, 2018; Jones et al, 2015).
Figure 4. Map of conservancies and protected areas in Namibia (Source: NASCO, 2016)
23
3.1.1 - Power and institutions
Chapter 2 highlighted that CBNRM application often suffers from an inability to practically
devolve power and decision making to the local level outside of policy. However findings from
existing studies show that in the case of the CCP approach, power is devolved appropriately
to conservancies (Ogbaharaya, 2006; Jones et al, 2013). The devolution of power is
demonstrated through the wildlife management authorities in Namibian CCP’s which are
comprised of elected committees that govern through a combination of customary law,
conservancy constitutions and locally voted policies and procedures (Stefanova, 2005). The
locally elected committees are comprised of a minimum of a chairperson, secretary and
treasurer who are elected at fixed intervals and required to report to an annual general
assembly (AGA) (NASCO, 2006). Decisions regarding revenue, meat distribution and
community business enterprises (CBE’s) are all made by the conservancy committee. Clear
decision making institutions have influenced wildlife populations positively and reduced the
rates of poaching. This will be further expanded in Section 2 of this chapter.
Table 1 outlines the actors involved within natural resource management in Namibia and their
respective roles.
Actor Roles and responsibilities
MET The MET provides legislation and policy regarding CCPs, monitors
compliance with such laws and provides some technical support with
administration if requested
International Donors Funding for technical support for conservancies or to buy assets or equity in
tourism businesses
NGOs Technical and capacity building support – if requested
Private Sector Business and marketing support for wildlife management i.e. tourism
ventures or involvement in Joint Ventures (JV)
Conservancies Receive rights over and manage wildlife and benefit distribution, manage
relationships with all other actors. Wildlife management is facilitated through
appointing conservancy game guards (see below). Conservancies are
responsible for applying for any hunting quotas and creating partnerships
with hunting companies and photographic tourism companies
The Nature Conservation Amendment Act 1996, grants a gazetted conservancy the same
rights as a commercial farmer within the Nature Conservation Ordinance (Gov of the Republic
Table 1: Actors and responsibilities within Namibian CBNRM (Source: Jones et al, 2015)
24
of Namibia, (GRN) 1996a). This is significant, by giving black Namibians the same rights as white
farm owners Apartheid policies started to become dismantled from the launch of CBNRM
policy implementation (Jones, 2010; Nelson and Agrawal, 2008). This legislation permits the
following; full ownership of any huntable game within a conservancy, the legal use of protected
and specially protected species through a permit system, and the trade of game within
conservancy land (GRN, 1996a). Trophy hunting of protected and specially protected game can
only take place on a conservancy if a permit is obtained. Poaching is illegal in Namibia; the state
defines it as the “illegal shooting, trapping or taking of game or fish from private or public property”
(FIC, 2017: 7). Federal laws include a maximum fine for the poaching of protected/specially
protected game of N$ 25 million, and the potential maximum imprisonment which can be
imposed alongside or instead of the fine is 25 years (Republic of Namibia, 2017). If an individual
is found guilty of subsequent convictions related to rhino or elephant, the fine increases to
N$50 million and the sentence to 40 years (Republic of Namibia, 2017). Entrenching specific
rights to animal utilisation in legislation enhances the legitimacy of CCP’s wildlife management
capacity (Jones et al, 2013).
The power and influence of community actors over one another through internal sanctioning
impacts natural resource governance. In addition to legal sanctions for poaching, internal
institutions such as the introduction of game guards or community rangers significantly
reduced poaching levels through local level monitoring of wildlife interactions with people. This
aspect of the CCP model aligns with Ostrom’s (1999) guidelines for local level sanctioning to
increase accountability and reduce illegalities. Game guards are employed directly by
conservancies and have a management system in which they report to local headmen who are
appointed by the committee (Ogbaharaya, 2006). If rules are not adhered to, legal sanctions
are enforced by the state or conservancy membership can be revoked according to individual
constitutions (ibid). The guards are responsible for monitoring wildlife wellbeing, conducting
annual game counts and managing human-wildlife conflict (HWC), particularly educating local
farmers on techniques for protecting crops from elephants (NASCO, 2013). Jones et al (2015)
found that the presence of locally employed game guards generated a significant amount of
wider community ownership over wildlife.
3.1.2 Conservancy contributions to community livelihoods
The key reason found for the success of the CCP model was the significant benefits
communities receive, consequently incentivising the protection of wildlife. In 2011 the direct
cash income within conservancies was N$36, 3777,109 (US$ 5.2 million) and an estimated
25
N$10,366,289 (USD 1.5 million) in non-cash benefits, predominately in the form of meat
(NASCO, 2013). In addition to the 665 direct employees of conservancies, there are a range of
social benefits obtained (NASCO, 2013). Jones et al (2015) found that soup kitchens were
provided for elderly community members and school improvements, infrastructure and water
supplies were often funded by conservancy revenue. HWC was addressed through off-setting
payments for crop loss through elephant damage, and significant training was provided for
community members by game guards relating to HWC (Jones et al, 2015).
The social benefits of conservancies have been beneficial for improving civil society, but not
necessarily reducing poverty (Jones et al, 2013). Yet the number of jobs that have been created
for conservancy members and the significant revenue accrued directly, provides income and
injects capital into the local economy (ibid). By 2016, tourism had created 2,304 jobs additional
to direct employment for local community members across Namibian conservancies, both full
and part time roles included lodge hosts, game drivers, cooks, cleaners and administration staff
(NASCO, 2016). The Nature Conservation Amendment Act 1996, states that once a CCP is
gazetted the committee will
“…acquire all rights to operate or lease tourism concessions within the conservancy, for the benefit
of the members of the conservancy"
(GRN, 1996a; MET 1995, 11).
The non-consumptive (recreational) utilisation of wildlife that is detailed within the Act allows
conservancies to have concessionary rights over any commercial tourism activities within the
CCP. This legal framework ensures that conservancies receive all income directly from any
tourism activities within the CCP. They do not have to share any of this with the state and the
committee decides how revenue is distributed with no state interference (Jones et al, 2015).
Furthermore, the MET ‘Policy on Promotion of Community Based Tourism’ grants
conservancies the right to independently build tourism lodges within their boundaries (MET,
1995). This legislation demonstrates the legitimate role conservancies play in national tourism
ventures. In practice, private tourism companies have become more interested in creating
joint-ventures (JV) with conservancies as the land is bigger in size and ‘unspoilt’ in comparison
to ‘developed and fenced freehold farmland’ (Jones et al, 2015: 25). These JV agreements allow
the private sector to build a tourism lodge on conservancy land in return for a percentage of
turnover paid directly to the conservancy. One of the most successful is the Torra Conservancy
and Wilderness Safari’s in the Kunene region. This is the highest earning conservancy in
26
Namibia with over N$2,000,000 (US$ 151,820) earned annually from JV tourism alone
(NASCO, 2012).
Reflective of critiques in CBNRM literature, research found that often socio-cultural
differences within conservancy borders are effecting power distribution within CCP
management. Within the Kunene region, conservancies incorporating numerous villages as
conservancies are required to be large enough for wildlife to roam (Schiffer, 2004). Research
found that committee elections more often than not resulted in a ‘power group’ consisting of
traditional authorities (TA’s) from the largest or more traditionally powerful villages within the
CCP boundaries (Schiffer, 2004: 13). Such power dimensions resulted in committees having an
overrepresentation of inhabitants of certain villages, and consequently decreasing the
democratic power of remaining conservancy members (Schiffer, 2004; NASCO, 2006). It was
found consistently across multiple studies that the size of conservancies geographically was an
issue for incentivising participation and defining communities within CCP boundaries (Schiffer,
2004; Bollig 2013; NASCO, 2016). Committees which are comprised of traditional and
authoritative village representatives have been found to not mobilise remote groups and let
logistical problems impact committee attendance and therefore decision making (Schiffer,
2004).
27
3.2 - Poaching and the IWT in Namibia
Wildlife populations across Namibia have risen dramatically since border wars of the 1970/80s
when poaching was at an all-time high (NASCO, 2013). In the Kunene region of Namibia
biodiversity is naturally most abundant, yet in the 1980s there were only 250 elephants and
65 rhinos left across the 115,260km area (NASCO, 2013: 51). Other large mammals were
reduced by 90% since the early 1970s due to a combination of illegal hunting and unmanaged
drought (NASCO, 2013: 51). The rise in wildlife populations was aided by the use of routine
game censuses conducted in all wildlife owning conservancies by the committee, and in all
national parks by the state (NASCO, 2016). The effective management of wildlife is
represented in the ‘attitudinal shifts’ that have transformed how communities value wildlife
(Ogbaharaya, 2006: 14). This success subsequently led to the MET translocating 8,388 animals
(15 different species) to 27 conservancies, including black rhinos to 7 conservancies between
1999 and 2000. The cost was covered by the MET and NGOs (NASCO, 2013; Jones et al,
2015). The rebuilding of wildlife bases contributed to empowering conservancies and
legitimising their conservation techniques, whilst ensuring they were able to realise the
benefits of sustainable wildlife management. Namibia remains the only country in the world
where black rhinos have been moved from PA’s to communal areas (NASCO, 2013). For clarity,
Table 2 demonstrates how wildlife and community rights over specific species in Namibia is
defined in legislation.
Legally defined category Wildlife Community rights
Specially protected game Elephant, Rhinoceros, Giraffe, Klipspringer, Impala, Hippopotamus, Black-faced Impala,
Zebra
n.b. all black rhino are under state ownership (FIC, 2017)
Only hunted through issue of a permit from MET in
line with sustainable offtake quotas
Protected game Species that still have biodiversity, cultural and financial value such as red hartebeest, sable, roan antelope, lion, cheetah, leopard,
waterbuck, crocodile
Only hunted through issue of a permit from MET in
line with sustainable offtake quotas (larger
number of quotas than specially protected for
some species) Huntable Game Bushpig, Buffalo, Oryx, Kudu, Warthog,
Springbok, Hartebeest and common game birds
Conditional rights to private farm owners and conservancies who may use for: shoot-for-sale,
shoot-for-own-use, biltong/meat, culling
(springbok only), game capture, trophy hunting
Table 2: Legal categorisation of wildlife in Namibia (Source: Adapted from Nature conservation ordinance of 1975)
28
3.2.1 Scale of poaching in Namibia
Extensive fixed route vehicle surveys from 1999-2009 found that black rhino and elephant
populations had doubled since the mass poaching crisis of the 1980s (NASCO, 2013). The
species had recovered to the point of stabilisation due to the ‘virtual cessation of poaching’,
which is attributed largely to the CCP model and notably the introduction of community game
guards (NASCO, 2013: 55; Jones, 2012). Namibia is home to the greatest number of black
rhinos in the world – approximately 1,850 out of 5000 left in the wild globally – and after South
Africa, Namibia holds the second largest number of rhinos in the world (FIC, 2017: 18). More
specifically in the Kunene region there are eight times more elephants than in 1982 and 10
times more plain animals (springbok, gemsbok, zebra) since 1980, which is a strong indicator of
healthy biodiversity (INDRC, 2016).
Until very recently, it was assumed that Namibia was immune to the blight of rhino poaching
as had been seen in South Africa. However since 2014 rhino poaching particularly has seen a
sharp rise (Shipanga, 2012). Research shows that in 2014, 24 rhinos were lost to poaching and
80 in 2015 (FIC, 2017). These figures reflect the significant rise in poaching when compared to
2012/13, Figure 5 demonstrates the instabilities in numbers of rhino and elephant carcasses
found in relation to poaching across Namibia between 2012 and 2015. The figures show that
elephant poaching has fluctuated significantly. In 2017 elephant poaching had decreased again
but rhino poaching is continuing to increase at faster rates.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
2012 2013 2014 2015
Elephants and rhino poaching in Namibia 2012-2015
Elephant carcasses found Rhino carcasses found
Figure 5: Elephants and Rhinos poached in Namibia 2012-2015 (data provided by FIC, 2017)
29
3.2.2 The Scale of IWT in Namibia and drivers
Poaching consistently transcends to the IWT and is therefore used as an official indicator for
the scale of IWT (FIC, 2017). Across the ‘Big 4 range states’ (South Africa, Kenya, Namibia and
Zimbabwe), South Africa, is the hotspot for rhino poaching. Table 3 shows Namibia’s
contribution to the IWT as one of the ‘Big 4 range states’ from 2013-2015. The data
demonstrates the increase in rhino horn entering the IWT from Namibia (Standley and Emslie,
2013: 2). Uncovering the drivers of poaching within Namibia has a number of challenges. In
particular the complexity of the IWT markets, actors and lack of usable data on account of the
blurred lines between legalities and illegalities across the wildlife trade sector (Lawson and
Vines, 2014; Price, 2017). Legal acts of hunting, trade and consumption co-exist within the
areas where illegal poaching is prevalent and such actions frequently become entwined with
illicit trade chains (FIC, 2017).
Duffy and St John (2013) conducted a rapid literature review and found that there is limited
evidence and understanding of the links between poverty and poaching. Findings
demonstrated that although there is some evidence that poverty encourages individuals to
poach, it does not necessarily ‘drive’ poaching and international market demand is a much more
significant driver of poaching in sub-Saharan Africa (Duffy and St John, 2013). Interviews from
the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) (2017) study found that in addition to rural poverty,
issues of ownership, land rights and historical conservation roots are significant drivers of
poaching in Namibia.
The demand from certain locations (predominantly Vietnam, China and Thailand) and the
supply access in source countries such as Namibia, contributes towards price fluctuations of
the product on the international market (FIC, 2017). Data obtained from the Eastern and
Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG( (2016) shows that the top three
countries where rhino horn and elephant ivory are seized are China, Vietnam and Hong Kong
respectively, though there is no way of identifying where the ivory originates. However, FIC
Country 2013 2014 2015 Total Kenya 59 35 11 105 South Africa 1,004 1,205 1,175 3,384 Zimbabwe 60 18 50 128 Namibia 10 25 91 116 Total 1,133 1,283 1,327 3,733
Table 3. Number of rhino’s poached in ‘Big 4 range states’ 2013-2015. Data from: WWF, Kenya Wildlife Service Report (2015) and Standley and Emslie (2013)
30
(2017) found that ivory and rhino horn is not traded in local Namibian markets and thus it is
reasonable to assume the animals poached within Namibia are contributing to the international
IWT. The Zambezi region has been the most targeted due to its location adjacent to the
international borders of Angola, Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe (FIC, 2017). Such porous
borders are geographically difficult to control and illicit products are being transported west to
Angola and then to sea ports which travel to Asia (FIC, 2017).
3.3 - Conclusion
Data from game counts and academic study has shown that the CCP approach to CBNRM has
been widely successful in reducing poaching across Namibia. Despite this, it was found that
until 2014 rhino levels were at a point of stability yet a stark rise in poaching incidents since
2015 has left the fate of the rhino’s future in Namibia uncertain (NASCO, 2016). There could
be reason to believe that the growing number of rhinos within the country combined with the
growing international markets that demand rhino horn, is contributing to rising poaching
incidents. Yet it must be acknowledged that in the case of Namibia, the likelihood of a poaching
crisis per se is decreased slightly by the continued benefits acquired through conserving
wildlife. Therefore the value of the horn on a dead rhino may remain to be less than the revenue
accrued from a live rhino’s touristic value. This could limit poaching returning to pre-
conservancy levels but is fully dependent on international demand and price fluctuations.
Despite the uncertain future of poaching in Namibia, the CCP model has demonstrated over
the last four decades that it has the capacity to effectively deal with poaching incentives and
has a demonstrated history of bringing declining species back to levels of stabilisation (Jones,
2012). Notably, the empowerment of conservancies has been achieved through realistic power
devolution thus allowing benefits to be felt by local actors and a sense of ownership to be
developed (Ogbaharaya, 2006). Tourism has played a significant role in job creation and
therefore the growth of local economies. This direct relationship between protecting wildlife
and obtaining financial/social benefits has contributed to entrenching the importance of
conservation within communities that were previously laden with HWC (Jones, 2010). The lack
of strong enforcement within Namibia in terms of poaching indicates that the CCP model
provides sufficient incentives for individuals not to engage in illegalities, yet this could leave
the approach vulnerable to any instabilities in tourism trends. Currently Namibia is
experiencing a tourism boom, with people travelling worldwide to experience safaris, hunting
and photographic holidays. Potential changes in this trend though could mean the benefits of
the CCP are reduced and the value of protecting wildlife decreased.
31
Chapter 4 – South Africa This chapter analyses the legislative environment that has effected how communities interact
with wildlife management in South Africa. An analysis of academic and government figures will
be used to unpack the scale and drivers of poaching and the IWT, and finally there will be an
examination of the current militarised response to ‘failed’ conservation in South Africa and its
respective relationship with people.
4.1 People and Parks
To understand the nuances of CBNRM progress within South Africa, it is necessary to unpack
the relationship between the immense national parks and the people who reside on their
peripheries. Particularly national park systems have been found to dominate the conservation
environment and complex legislation relating to land rights effects the ability for CBNRM to be
fully adopted (Algotson, 2006).
Discriminatory and racist colonial dogmas were continued in apartheid South Africa when black
nationals were forcibly relocated to assigned ‘African homelands’, to maintain the artifice of
the wilderness which would accommodate the growing demand of white tourists (Meer and
Schnurr, 2013: 485). The dominant conservation approach in the country has continuously
been to exclude people and restrain land use and legislation has historically reinforced this
ideal. By 1990 only 13% of land was reserved for black Africans and 70% for white commercial
farms (Roe et al, 2002). Yet, the first democratic elections in 1994 came with a promise to
redress past injustices and the African National Congress (ANC) in 1995 declared that “the land
shall be shared among those who work it” (quoted in Suttner and Cronin, 1996: 263).
Simultaneously theories of participatory development and CBNRM were influencing global
conservation policies, South Africa included. This was initially reflected in the Restitution of
Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 (from here on ‘the Act’) which created the Commission on
Restitution of Land Rights (CRLR) and the Land Claims Court (LCC) (Dept. of Land Affairs (DLA),
1997). The Act allows for communities and TA’s to claim back land they were dispossessed of
during the apartheid era. There was a five year period for claims to be made and then a further
ten years for the implementation and settlement of agreements (DLA 1997, 49). Despite this
deadline the CRLR’s task is still ongoing and has proven less than straightforward. Eligibility has
been contested as sufficient proof is required that dispossession took place through racially
discriminatory policies (Walker et al, 2010).
Tensions between contemporary priorities and historical claims were inflated by ongoing
conservation demands from actors such as SANParks and NGOs. These organisations opposed
32
ceding PA management to communal control (Hall, 2010). Research found that in light of this
tension, the most common outcome of the Act was to grant formal land tenure titles whilst
only allowing co-management of land under JV’s or with SANParks (Meer and Schnurr, 2013:
485). The friction between claimants and PA management let to a Cabinet Memorandum in
2001, which set out rules for claims within the borders of PA’s, Box 3 highlights some of these:
Although in 2001 this Memorandum was not legally binding 2009 saw the South African
government announce that in regard to the inside of KNP, all remaining land claims were legally
to be negated and other compensation or solutions were to be found due to the areas value as
a tourist attraction and conservation hub (Dressler et al, 2010). A further Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) was formed between the DLA and DEAT in 2007 in order to bridge the
divide between conservation and community land tenure issues (Mapoma, 2014). Despite the
MOA encouraging a collaborative approach, existing management authorities of PA’s still
retained control and co-management was understood to be the only viable option of
integrating communities into conservation (Mapoma, 2014).
4.1.1 - Livelihood Impacts
It was found that the exclusionary nature of tenure agreements has limited the ability for
CBNRM to contribute positively to livelihoods. Communities have restricted access to land
management and thus the incentive component of the CBNRM paradigm is weakened.
Particularly it was found that the link between community benefits and wildlife preservation is
significantly restricted by legislation that prohibits direct management of resources by
communities. Community participation in South African conservation is guided by the co-
management approach. This often dilutes the power communities have over enforcement or
sanctioning (Kidd, 2002). Legislation does not explicitly state any non-compliance mechanisms
for co-management and therefore communities become passive recipients of benefits, rather
Republic of South Africa Cabinet Memorandum for the Settlement of Restitutions Claims on Protected Areas and State Forests (2001)
- Limited residential settlement within PA’s - No development activity unless attuned to conservation usage - If no physical occupation is possible financial compensation should
replace this and derive from the economic benefits of conservation in order to align with the CBNRM paradigm
(Meer and Schnurr, 2013)
Box 3: RSA Cabinet Memorandum (2001) rules relating to land claims within PAs (Source: Meer and
Schnurr, 2013)
33
than exerting authority over wildlife management. Algotsson (2006) found that there was a
direct link between how income was generated within co-management approaches and the
success rate of CBNRM in terms of wildlife conservation. In instances where income-
generation was high through formal employment return, sustainable wildlife usage and
behavioural change was found (Algotsson, 2006). However when financial benefits were either
small or based on in-kind benefits, they were found to have limited influence over behaviours
and poaching did not decrease (Algotsson, 2006). SANParks ‘social ecology’ programmes are
listed in their publications as fulfilling CBNRM principles. However when compared to research
conducted by Anthony (2004) of 240 households adjacent to KNP, their projects do not align
with community interests (SANParks, 2000). Anthony (2007) found the consensus related to
benefits desired was to have access to land for subsistence hunting and traditional ceremonies.
Yet SANParks (2000) social ecology projects on the peripheries of KNP have been focussed on
either informal employment or training local communities in craft making to sell items to
tourists.
4.1.2 - Revitalising Fortress conservation?
The unrelenting IWT and undisputed poaching crisis that is occurring in South Africa,
particularly in the KNP, has been met with a surge of protectionism, there is much discussion
that fortress conservation is being re-ignited in order to save the rhino from extinction (Duffy,
2010; 2016). Notably the legal annulment of KNP land restitution claims that were replaced
with financial compensation is branded as a part of a CBNRM paradigm. This technique of
paying off local communities to not inhabit PAs has become aligned with market-based
approaches that create bureaucracies and hybrid institutions resembling the ideals of fortress
conservation (Dressler et al 2010). In practice, keeping people out of conservation zones is also
facilitated through land ownership policies. As part of the ANC constitution to make land
ownership more equal, if land redistribution is not claimed through the LCC, regional
agricultural authorities exist to assist those with little or no land to buy farmland for sale
(Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2010). However, when farms are located adjacent to national parks,
SANParks consistently outbid the Ministry of Agriculture (MA) and so the land is not
redistributed to poor people (Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2010). SANParks ‘social ecology’
projects are often exercised in these situations. In Namaqua National park local communities
who were out-bid on farmland were then employed in labour work to build the fences to
surround the new national park borders. This ‘empowerment’ project was described by
SANParks as
34
‘Realizing opportunities for, and equitable distribution of benefits to surrounding communities in line
with the SANParks resource use policy’ (SANParks, 2006).
Despite the ‘win-win’ discourse, sustainable benefits for the communities from conservation
are clearly limited.
4.2 – Poaching and the IWT
South Africa is home to the largest number of rhinos in the world, which therefore exposes its
vulnerability to poaching significantly and means wildlife crime has become one of the most
expensive security challenges for South Africa since 2010 (Aucoin and Donnenfeld, 2017). The
voracious demand for rhino horn in East Asia has resulted in poaching numbers tripling
between 2010 and 2015, and therefore organised crime is rising rapidly on the political and
security agendas (United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2016). Largely until
2000, South Africa had evaded the rhino poaching crisis that struck neighbouring countries,
predominately Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe’s rhino population was almost depleted in the northern
regions by 2000 and any surviving animals were kept in Intensive Protection Zones or de-
horned to reduce their value. Rising demand though in East Asian countries meant rhino
poaching in South Africa subsequently started to rise (Milliken and Shaw, 2012; 2014). In 2000,
7 rhinos were poached nationally but since 2010 rhino poaching has largely been concentrated
in KNP. Figure 6 highlights that the concentration of the nation’s poaching is in KNP which is
managed by SANParks (DEA, 2010). The provinces of KwaZulu-Natal and the North West have
recently been substantially targeted by rhino poachers,
333
668
1004
1215 11751054,
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Rhin
os p
oach
ed
Year
South African Rhino Poaching by Province 2010-2016
KNP Marakela National Park GautengLimpopo Mpumalanga North WestEastern Cape Free-State Kwa-Zulu NatalWestern Cape Northern Cape Other
Figure 6: Rhinos poached by province, South Africa (Source: Stop Rhino Poaching, 2017)
35
yet after 2015 provincial data was no longer released as concerns arose that it was assisting
targeted poaching (Charlton, 2017). Rhino are not free roaming animals in South Africa and
therefore any poaching that occurs is within private game reserves, farms or national parks
(DEA, 2010).
4.2.1 - Trafficking and Poachers
The identity of poachers and their role in illicit trafficking is a complex issue that poses
difficulties for research, particularly because of considerable regional disparity. In South Africa,
all species of rhino are listed as protected species in both national legislation (NEMBA, 2004)
and international conventions (CITES, 2016), therefore it is illegal to harm them in anyway.
Syndicate poaching, facilitated through organised crime is most acutely related to the IWT. In
particular Aucoin and Donnenfeld (2017: 10) found that rhino horn poaching and smuggling
was almost always carried out in ‘groups/associations/syndicates’. Interviews with South
African and Zimbabwean poachers along KNP conducted by Huebschle (2016) found that
buyers of the product were typically of Chinese or Vietnamese origin, most often located in
Chinatown in Johannesburg and it was thought the product was further trafficked from there.
Research regarding the identity of poachers in South Africa was mixed, alluding to the fact that
the dynamics of poaching actors could be evolving. This could be significant in understanding
the current poaching crisis. Charlton’s (2017: 126) research found that the actors involved in
syndicate poaching include ‘any individual motivated by money’, regardless of their
professional position or race. However Johan Jooste commented that poachers in KNP are
from adjacent local communities and driven by ‘money they never thought possible’ (Jooste,
2018). Similarly Aucoin and Deetlefs’ (2018) surveys found that poor job opportunities and low
income in South Africa was the key incentive for poaching. However, Charlton’s (2017)
interviews between 2014-2016 of households and conservation NGOs in the Limpopo
province surrounding KNP, found that 80% of the poachers arrested in these areas were of
36
Mozambique origin. The interview with Johan Jooste highlighted that in 2018, poachers are
now predominantly from South Africa but Mozambican’s are present:
Jooste’s comments insinuate that the presence of the park adjacent to disenfranchised
communities is significant in the origin of poachers. Local communities are also being
conscripted as ‘spotters’ – these individuals assist poachers in locating the animals and can
receive between $1,130-$4,522 USD for spotting a rhino (Charlton, 2017).
4.2.2 - IWT
Data available regarding the specific processes and the actors involved in the IWT in South
Africa is scattered. In turn, the degree of organisation can vary and data from SANParks and
primary interview research indicated that within KNP poachers largely enter in groups of three
and trade the rhino horn for cash within the borders of South Africa (SANParks, 2016; Jooste,
2018). Table 4 shows that South Africa has the highest number of rhino horn seizures globally,
followed by China and Vietnam (UNODC, 2016).
“Poachers are destitute, young black citizens who live adjacent to our parks, they are not
treated well and they are in their hundreds…. I can confirm that 3-4 years ago ¾ of
poaching [in KNP] was from Mozambique but its half of that now. There has been great
progress in Mozambique in terms of anti-poaching but still now Mozambique has a
significant amount of poachers in our country, but the numbers do now lean towards
South Africans”
37
South Africa is commonly cited as the key transit country in Africa due to good infrastructure,
sea ports and airports (Milliken and Shaw, 2012). Data supports this, it was found that 68% of
seizures globally have occurred at airports, and 86% of these where at OR Tambo International
in Johannesburg (Moneron et al, 2017: 9). Moneron et al (2017) found that transit countries
are favoured as a way to evade enforcement rather than directly transiting products from
source to consumer country.
Recent research from TRAFFIC produced findings that indicate the dynamics of the IWT and
poaching are evolving. Moneron et al (2017: 1) found that ‘entrenched criminal syndicates of
Chinese origin’ are more frequently being found manufacturing beads, bracelets and powder
out of rhino horn locally in order to smuggle wildlife products out of South Africa. Figure 7
shows the end products that were seized in Germiston in South Africa, and research from the
Country Number of seizures may by country
Number of seizures linked to country
South Africa 162 33 China 97 33 Vietnam 42 56 Mozambique 26 20 Hong Kong 19 23 Kenya 15 11 Qatar 2 18 Thailand 9 9 Unite States of America 10 1 Zimbabwe 8 1 Namibia 6 3 Malaysia 3 6 Cambodia 6 2 United Arab Emirates 1 7 Ethiopia 0 7 Nigeria 0 7 EU Countries 26 18 Others 24 31
Figure 7: Seized rhino horn beads and carvings in South Africa (Source: Moneron et al, 2017).
Table 4: Rhino horn seizures 2016 Source: Moneron et al (2017)
38
Wildlife Justice Commission (2016) found that these products matched those being sold in
Vietnamese markets.
Since 2009 there has been notable economic growth and thus expanded purchasing power in
China and Vietnam and this is often associated with the increased demand and poaching of
rhino in South Africa. A WildAid study found that in East Asia there has been a rise in diagnoses
of cancer, a disease which has traditionally been treated with traditional Chinese medicine
(Watts, 2017). This belief was propelled by a 2011 media story of a Vietnamese politician being
cured of cancer by rhino horn (Watts, 2017).
4.3 - Responses: Green Militarisation
A culmination of global media and political discourse igniting fear of rhino extinction and
declaring a war on poachers has been reiterated by the South African administration. Such that,
in 2010 the DEA announced at a crisis governmental meeting that rhino poaching threatens
‘the reputation, eco-tourism industry, and the public image of South Africa’. Subsequently the
Biodiversity Enforcement Directorate was created to sit within the DEA (DEA, 2010). Since the
creation of the Directorate and the deployment of the SANDF into KNP, government response
to anti-rhino poaching has been referred to as ‘Operation Rhino’ (Minister Buyelwa Sonjica,
2010). In 2011 under Operation Rhino, the Integrated Strategic Management of Rhinoceros
(INSMR) unit was implemented into KNP (DEA, 2014). The INSMR has intensified the
protection of rhino’s through the use of military strategy in training, deployment of the SANDF
and a sharp increase of ‘boots on the ground’ (Annecke and Masubele, 2016). SANParks as a
governmental organisation is the key stakeholder in facilitating Operation Rhino and appointed
Major Gen (Ret) Johan Jooste to direct the operations (SANParks, 2015). In a primary interview
Jooste noted that, ‘appointing someone like me was wise as I think strategy, formulate strategy &
implement strategy in terms of military operations’ (Jooste, 2018). Johan Jooste (2018) explained
that since his appointment he has implemented air and canine units and several new ‘modules’
to ranger training to ensure they are ‘ready for battle’. Jooste’s appointment represents how
conservation is being propelled into the security arena, and his language represents how the
practice of conservation is being transformed into an urgent security measure.
39
Figure 8 demonstrates the number of different actors deployed in KNP at any one time under
Operation Rhino. Current figures are significantly higher that the sub-400 rangers employed in
2013, which constituted of one ranger per 4,000 hectares (Lunstrum, 2014; Huebschle, 2016).
In addition Jooste (2018) explained that the police force are a major actor involved in anti-
poaching within the Kruger.
As elaborated in Chapter 2, the South African army has historical connections with KNP since
the border wars. Yet the demise of the apartheid era and the retreat of military dominated
discourse in the 1990s meant that from 1994 the South African Defence Force (SADF) was
removed from the KNP, The newly formed SANDF was a “military in search of a mission”
(Cilliers and Heinecken, quoted in Piombo 2013, 267). Lunstrum (2014) argues that Operation
Rhino has given the SANDF increased significance in a dual mission to conserve the KNP rhino
and protect the parks borders. In addition, the emerging ‘brand’ of rhino protection and
increased media attention around ‘bush wars’ has attracted an array of former-military
Figure 8: KNP anti-poaching force deployment. Source: Sam Ferreira (2015) Slide 5
40
personnel from the UK, Australia and the US who are employed by private and public game
ranches (Humphreys and Smith, 2014; Jooste, 2018).
41
4.3.1 - Effectiveness
Media discourse appears to present militarised conservation efforts as effective for curbing
poaching (Huebschle, 2016). Indeed, when analysed in terms of arrest rates, initial data
indicates that the ISMR has had a significant effect on the policing of poaching. The SANParks
2015/16 Annual report showed that 317 poachers were arrested in connection with poaching
in the KNP, in comparison to 258 in 2014 – additionally KNP rangers arrested 13% more
suspected poachers in 2015 than the previous year (SANParks, 2016). However, as suggested
by Cardamone (2012) weak sentencing and uncoordinated regional laws invalidate increased
arrest rates. Out of 359 poachers arrested in 2017 in KNP, only 15 of these cases made it to
court and from those cases only 22 perpetrators were sentenced for a total of 95 years
between them (Politics Web, 2017).
In 2017 rhino poaching decreased by 26 since 2016, the first reduction in over a decade (Save
the Rhino, 2017). Yet the banning of Vietnamese pseudo-hunters is reported to have reduced
the numbers of rhino poaching by 109 since 2011. Therefore 2017’s drop cannot validly be
credited to Operation Rhino alone (Huebschle, 2016). When the effectiveness of Operation
Rhino is looked at nationally, data from KwaZulu-Natal shows poaching has risen by 50%
between 2016 and 2017. This indicates that if the ISMR is having the desired affects in KNP,
it could be dispersing poachers elsewhere in the country and potentially regionally across SSA.
Jooste’s response to whether Operation Rhino has had a knock on effect is shown:
4.3.2 - Relationship with people
The intersection of the military into conservation environments has a direct effect on the
people within these spaces. Firstly, in terms of the poachers themselves, the ‘arms race’ is
apparent in respect to the number of poachers killed since 2010 (Lunstrum, 2016: 816). Data
on this is limited however and Huebschle (2016) discovered through interviews with a KNP
ranger in 2010 that four poachers were killed. Yet in 2014 this number was at 21, Table 5
“Yes no doubt about it. We call it the putty effect, you squeeze one place it
pops out the other. That’s why I personally have been tasked to help
provinces and private parks where we can, to customise our approach
because every park is different… I’ve been involved in a landmark project
with KZN, so you will see the figures drastically improve next year.”
Jooste (2018)
42
shows the data supplied to Huebschle in 2014. However in 2015 the Mozambican president
announced that 476 nationals had been killed in KNP by APU’s between 2010 and 2015 (AIM,
2015). Johan Jooste did not comment on poachers killed.
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
NEUTRALISED 67 82 73 133 174
KILLED IN
ACTION
4 21 17 47 45
Moreover, the socio-economic and cultural ‘collateral damage’ of military interventions
remains under-researched (Huebschle, 2016: 26). The historical and fractious relationship that
the military has in South Africa is seen to be reignited through the presence of the SANDF in
KNP. Annecke and Masubele (2016) found that a lack of trust for the military has exacerbated
marginalisation and removes the opportunity for cooperative and inclusive wildlife
management. When asked whether Operation Rhino reflects historical relationships between
the military and KNP, Jooste answered;
Interviews conducted within KNP peripheral villages found that the SANDF patrol of borders
has left communities feeling as though ‘wild animals are valued higher than black people by
conservation and government circles’ (Huebschle, 2016: 26). This reflects Neumann’s (2004:
820) suggestion that historically the military has been used as an ‘apparatus’ that transforms
marginalised people into ‘the enemy of conservation’.
It must however be acknowledged that militarised approaches are not presented by
governments as a replacement for community participation but an emergency measure
alongside it (Huebschle, 2016). Despite evidence that it restricts the ability for communities to
embrace CBNRM projects fully (Annecke and Masubele, 2016). During the interview Jooste
(2018) repeatedly stated ‘we need to improve community ownership and demand management’.
However he also urged that the current poaching crisis needs to be dealt with immediately and
because the ‘game’ of poaching has changed, the approach to conservation also needed to
become more militarised. When questioned on the role CBNRM can have in anti-poaching,
‘Yesteryear there was military involvement with the borders in Mozambique and KNP, it is
similar to today as SANDF patrols the border with Moz, but in those days the conflict in the
region was the focus, now it is the conflict in the bush’
Table 5: Poachers killed in KNP 2010-2014 Source: Huebschle (2016)
43
Jooste (2018) replied ‘But while the other approaches [CBNRM] take place we need to make sure
they [poachers] don’t plunder our resource, the resource is for heritage but also for the economy’.
44
Chapter 5 Conclusion
The 20th century saw PA’s dominate conservation alongside their exclusionary characteristics,
whereas in the 1980s CBNRM and decentralised approaches spread rapidly across southern
African nations (Hutton et al, 2011). However, since the occurrence of a contemporary
poaching crisis in South Africa over the past decade advocates for protectionist conservation
have re-emerged and increasingly militarised environments are becoming favoured over
community based approaches (Duffy, 2010). This chapter will return to the studies research
questions, followed by a wider conclusion of what these findings mean for the conservation
environment and how research can be developed.
To what extent can community based conservation approaches address wildlife illegalities in
SSA?
Despite continued advocacy for embracing CBNRM, there is increasing criticism that state
control over land or resources is not fully relinquished to local communities and beneficiaries
are not accurately defined (Stone & Nyaupane, 2003). This research has found in the case of
Namibia that given the appropriate power, support and incentives, communities can effectively
manage wildlife. Historically, Namibia’s land tenure was as equally racialized and discriminatory
as South Africa. Yet since 1990 when Namibia became a sovereign nation, there has been
continuous attempt to reform discriminatory resource policies and grant Namibians
‘environmental entitlements’ (Leach et al, 1999: 225). Both grey literature and academic study
finds Namibia to have effectively transferred administrative rights of resources to local level
systems more than any other African country. Research found that this is because of clear and
legitimate policy that has evolved since independence (NASCO, 2003; Davis, 2008; Roe et al,
2009). Such that contemporary Namibian legislation allows conservancies to retain 100%
revenue from tourism within conservancy boundaries (NASCO, 2013). The focus on tourism
has injected capital into local economies through job creation and touristic spending (Jones,
2010). Aside from legal sanctions for poaching, community management of illegalities has
largely resided in the introduction of conservancy employed game guards. It was found that
game guard’s contribution to poaching reduction has been to educate community members on
HWC mitigation and monitor wildlife movement/populations (Ogbaharaya, 2006). Boosted
wildlife numbers and the ‘virtual cessation’ of poaching in Namibia by 2010 are largely
accountable to the behavioural change that has occurred within the CCP model (NASCO, 2013:
55).
45
Despite successes, research illuminated that holes in practice remain on the ground.
Increasingly there are reports of elite actors capturing benefits and inequitable power
distribution within conservancy management (Schiffer, 2004). Notably the role of TA’s was
often blurred with committee roles, resulting in more benefits being accrued by these families
than other members of the conservancies. Notwithstanding this, research has found that there
is no evidence that the recent surge of rhino poaching in Namibia is because of flaws in the
conservancy system, yet more evidence points towards the growing demand of rhino horn
from East Asia and contemporary poaching tactics. It is therefore fundamental that further
research is conducted to uncover the drivers behind the recent growth of poaching in Namibia.
There is considerable backing behind the idea that unless international governments take
action against international markets and trade rings, poaching will never cease in source
countries (FIC, 2017). Therefore it is possible that as rhino populations increase in Namibia
because of effective conservation, the incentive to poach them will then also rise (Duffy, 2012).
An understanding of the dynamics between poverty and markets as drivers should assess
whether conservancy benefits can withstand poaching fluctuations, or whether the first sign
of high demand has fractured their exemplary record.
In the case of South Africa, mounting criticism of the CBNRM paradigm has been found to ring
true in practice. In 1994, the intentions of the ANC appeared similar to those of Namibia at
independence; restructure land tenure so previously marginalised indigenous communities can
own and benefit from said land (Suttner and Cronin, 1996). However, segregation was so
deeply entrenched in South Africa’s landscape that implementation of land restitution was
complex. Accordingly this impacted community’s capability to effectively manage wildlife as
land ownership was confounding. To a degree, this difficulty was an extension of history.
Algotsson (2006) found that people centred approaches struggled to surmount memories of
exclusion and trust in methods was limited. Undoubtedly, Namibian conservancies also
experienced ongoing impacts of colonial and apartheid policies. However, legislation was
clearly aimed to address land tenure injustices from the onset of independence, which may
have significantly enhanced and encouraged community trust in the CCP programme in
Namibia.
Community based conservation has inadequately addressed illegalities in South Africa due to
the complex and contradictory legislative environment in which it sits. Land tenure and
restitution overarches any attempts at devolving wildlife management power to local
institutions. Any participatory policy that is endeavoured in South Africa has to continuously
jump through the hoops of Land restitution laws, which are ever-changing and convoluted
46
(Algotsson, 2006). The legal instruments and implementation plans for CBNRM that do exist in
South Africa are based around co-management. This approach to CBNRM focuses on benefit
sharing and seeming ownership of land, meaning that resource management and exploitation
is not clearly addressed (Algotsson, 2006). Findings indicate there are no clear guidelines for
community based monitoring and sanctioning of wildlife exploitation in South Africa. In
Namibia, if an animal is poached within a conservancy, the community will bear the cost
directly. Therefore game guards monitor interactions and headmen sanction according to
conservancy constitution rules. In South Africa, the lack of community power in management
could be a contributory factor in the reversion to fences, fines and enforcement.
What are the impacts of increasingly militarised approaches to poaching on communities and
their abilities to manage wildlife?
This research has highlighted that within South Africa, despite some degree of intention to
integrate communities into resource management, the resilience and somewhat dependence
on national parks means the country has more aspects of fortress conservation than any other
approach. The KNP is one of the most historic cases of fortress conservation worldwide. Since
the end of the apartheid era there has been attempt to ‘break through this fortress’, but more
recently the engagement of the military in the park is further marginalising people from
participating in conservation (Bucher, 2015: 2; Annecke and Masubele, 2016). It has been
demonstrated that relationships between the military and the environment are complex and
longstanding. However Lunstrum (2014: 819) suggests that the emergence of green
militarisation is where ‘the tightest fit between the two emerges’. It could be suggested that
the contemporary ‘Operation Rhino’ which incorporates the SANDF mirrors the SADF’s
‘Kruger Park Commando’ from 1973, which was highly criticised for valuing animals over
marginalised black communities (Masse et al, 2017). Opposition to the process of Green
Militarisation is often themed around the little evidence available to support the effect on
conservation outcomes, and subsequently the low value this brings in comparison to the
alienating effects it has on communities (Duffy, 2015). This research found that despite
increased arrests of poachers in KNP attributed to the increased ‘boots on the ground’,
convictions remain low and therefore the objective of militarised enforcement to decrease the
incentive to poach is largely ineffective. Moreover, data shows that since Operation Rhino has
been in effect in KNP, poaching in KwaZulu-Natal has increased. This could also explain the
rise of poaching in Namibia, although there is not enough current evidence to substantiate this.
Whilst this research has explored the impacts of Green Militarisation in KNP, there are similar
techniques being used globally and therefore the medium and long term impacts of military
47
involvement need to be further researched before the method is branded as a silver bullet
(Huebschle, 2016).
This research has further illuminated the complex people-park relationship that exists when
the military is present in conservation. However it has also highlighted that there is a need to
investigate further whether the process of poaching and wildlife crime is becoming securitised
on national and global levels by a variety of actors and discourses. The power dynamics
between state actors securitising poaching and the pragmatic impacts on communities is
important to address. Duffy (2014: 821) states that images of ‘the rape of the earth, the war on
poachers and Malthusian visions of scarcity’ are used to invoke drastic measures within
conservation that are unsupportive in combatting the IWT effectively. Further research should
explore the effects of framing poaching as a security threat on the wider development of
source nations, and the acute impacts on communities who are branded as poachers.
This dissertation has outlined that given the opportunity, communities and wildlife can co-exist
in a mutually beneficial way and CBNRM can address wildlife illegalities. However, a multitude
of historical, economic and political conditions related to ownership are integral to its
application. A comparison of Namibia and South Africa has highlighted that community
conservation is not a single concept with set practices and policies. It is an idea that must be
built upon in relation to the surrounding socio-political, cultural and economic environment
(Adams and Hulme, 2001b). Despite the acceptance of holistic approaches such as CBNRM,
this dissertation has found that Western conservation narratives dominate and view of an
ongoing tension between wild animals and communities. The dominant narrative has
constructed a ‘Robin Hood-type social bandit’ in which wildlife illegalities are embedded within
village communities and sanctioned through economic explanations (Huebschle, 2016: 295).
The case of South Africa is commonly cited as ‘reverting’ back to Fortress conservation.
However analysis of legislation demonstrates that the importance of borders and fences have
never been fully relinquished to community participation. Therefore methods are not
necessarily reverting but continuing in more overt ways than in the past two decades. The
inability of conservation in South Africa to transform may be in part responsible for the current
poaching crisis that threatens it’s most valuable resources.
48
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