can earthquakes trigger serious industrial accidents in italy ...of the seismic safety paradigm,...

Bollettino di Geofisica Teorica ed Applicata Vol. 55, n. 1, pp. 227-237; March 2014

DOI 10.4430/bgta0116

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Can earthquakes trigger serious industrial accidents in Italy? Some considerations following the experiences of 2009 L’Aquila (Italy) and 2012 Emilia (Italy) earthquakes

S. Grimaz

SPRINT-Lab, Dipartimento di Chimica Fisica Ambiente, Università di Udine, Italy

(Received: March 27, 2013; accepted: July 8, 2013)

ABSTRACT Theearthquake in JapanonMarch11,2011,provoking theaccidentat thenuclearplantofFukushima,highlighted,unequivocally,asstrongseismiceventscanprovokemajor accidents. On the other hand the damage observed in recent earthquakes inItaly(L’Aquila,2009andEmilia,2012)pointedoutthehighseismicvulnerabilityofindustrialplants.Thispaperprovidesananalysisonthepossibilitythatearthquakescantriggerseriousindustrialaccidents(Na-Techrisk),referringinparticulartotheItalianterritory,wheremanySevesoestablishmentsarelocated.Theresultsshowahighriskandsuggest thaturgentpreventativeactionsareneeded.For thispurpose,achangeoftheseismicsafetyparadigm,movingfromtheclassicalsectorialandreductionistapproachtotheholisticandinterdisciplinaryone,isrequired.

Key words: L’Aquilaearthquake,centralItaly,Na-Techrisk.

© 2014 – OGS

1. Introduction

TheaccidentatthenuclearplantofFukushimaaftertheMarch11,2011powerfulearthquakein Japan has clearly shown that the impact of earthquakes on industrial plants and life-linesmay triggerevents thatcouldproducerelevanthazardousscenariosorcritical inoperabilityofsafetyfacilities(GrimazandSlejko,2014).Animportantquestionarisesfromthatexperience:can an earthquake provoke serious accidents also in Italy?To answer this question, a criticalreadingoftheimpactof2009L’Aquila(Italy)and2012Emilia(Italy)earthquakesonindustrialfacilities and life-lines, as they appeared to the rescue services immediately after the event,are here presented together with some considerations in terms of lessons learnt, also usefulforpreventative riskmitigationpurposes.Thishasbeenpossiblebecause fewdaysafterboththoseearthquakes,aresearchteamoftheUniversityofUdine,jointlytoengineersoftheItalianNational Fire Department (�orpo Nazionale dei �igili del Fuoco: �N��F), investigated and(�orpo Nazionale dei�igili del Fuoco: �N��F), investigated and, investigated andanalysed the damage occurred to industrial facilities and life-lines in order to identify majorandrecursivecriticismsandderiveuseful“lessonslearnt”forsafetyimprovement(GrimazandMaiolo,2010)andforthedefinitionofshorttermcountermeasures,necessaryformanagingtheemergencyoperationsinsafeconditions(Grimaz,2011).

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Boll. Geof. Teor. Appl., 55, 227-237 Grimaz

2. The earthquake of L’Aquila, 2009

OnApril6,2009, at3:32a.m. (local time), a6.3Mw earthquakeoccurred incentral Italy,withepicentre located7kmNWof the townofL’Aquila,withdepthofapproximately8kmon a normal fault on theApennine mountains. Even if the 6.3 Mw 2009 L’Aquila earthquakeisclassifiableasmoderate,L’Aquilaanditssurroundings, locatedin thenear-fieldareaof theearthquake,wereaffectedbyalevelofgroundmotioncapableofprovokingsignificantdamagetoindustrialfacilitiesandlife-linespresentinthatarea.PGAhigherthan0.6gwasrecordedinnearfield[foranaccurateanalysisofthedestructivepotentialofl’Aquila2009earthquakesee:Masiet al.(2011)].

2.1. Damage to industrial facilities and lifelines in the epicentral areaAfter the earthquake, three industrial zones (Bazzano-Paganica, Pile and Sassa), located

in the surrounding area of L’Aquila, were inspected and specific and recursive damage wasobserved(GrimazandMaiolo,2011).

In these areas there are high-tech, pharmaceutical, construction, mechanical andmanufacturing industries.The most diffuse typology of building is represented by precastconcretestructuresusingprecastpanels,reinforcedframeswithconcreteblockwallsandsteelorlightmetalframeswithprecastpanelwalls.

The damage observed was mainly concentrated in non-structural elements (e.g., partitionsand ceiling tiles) and contents.The criticisms were related to the connection between thesecondaryelementsand the structure.The inadequateanchoragebetween thewallpanels andthe roof and floor framingmembers in theprecast-concretebuildings resulted in the collapseof the walls. Some structural damage to beams and columns was also observed. In this casethe criticisms concerned the weakness of the joints and, in particular, the unseating effects(considerable movements of the beam and column corbel support) were observed. Otherrecursivelycriticismsregardedthefirststepof“soft-story”behaviourthatcouldleadtobuildingcollapsesincaseofastrongerearthquake.

Furthermore,theequipmentoftheindustrialplantsmovedand/orcollapsed,causingdamageand major business interruptions, because it was not anchored or adequately braced to avoidrelativemovementsduringtheearthquake.

AparticularcaseofdamagewasobservedinachemicalfacilitylocatedintheindustrialareaofBazzano-Paganica, 7kmsouth far fromL’Aquila town,where three tall steel silos storingpolypropylene beads suffered severe damage. The silos collided with the adjacent precastwarehouse,partiallycrushingtheconcretewallandleavingtheimprintoftheimpact.Thesilosalsocrumpledattheirbases(Fig.1).

Thedamageobservedonlife-lineshighlights theprimarycriticismsonthegasdistribution(Espositoet al., 2011).A lot of gaspipelinesweredamagedor brokenbecause thebuildingswere heavily damaged. Many R� buildings suffered high deformation caused by theplasticizationofthebeam-pillarconnections,andsomeofthem,witha“soft-story”,collapsedcompletely. Since the majority of flats, houses and apartments were served by autonomousboilers,a lotofgaspipelineswereinstalledoutsidethebuildings,ontheperimeterwalls,andmanyofthemwerebrokenordamaged.Thiscausedsignificantreleasesofgas,butfortunately,nofiresstarted.

Can earthquakes trigger serious industrial accidents in Italy? Boll. Geof. Teor. Appl., 55, 227-237

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Natural gas and electricity supplies were cut-off in the areas of severe damage, mainly indowntownofL’Aquila,andseveralusersweredisconnected.

Utilitynetworksforwater,electricityandphoneserviceswereallbrieflyinterruptedbecauseofthedamagecausedbytheearthquake.Thedamagewaslocalizedand,afterminorrepairsandreconfigurations,allserviceswerefullyfunctionalwithinaday.Apipe-breakinthemainwatersupplyoftheareawasthemostimportantdamagetothewatersystem.Ahighpressurewaterpipelinebrokeat thecrossingof thePaganicafault,due toaco-seismicmovementwithin themainevent.Therewerealsosomepipebreaksinthedistributionsystem,andalotofthemhadtoberepairedinordertoprovidewatertoemergencysheltersandtemporaryaccommodation.

Phone serviceswere interrupted for a short timebecauseof power failure.Problemsweresolvedbyputtingemergencygeneratorsintoservice.

Thedamage to transport infrastructurewasminimal.Theonly collapsed structurewas thebridge over theAterno River, along a secondary road to Fossa (AQ). Immediately after theearthquakebothhighwaysA24andA25, connecting theTyrrhenianandAdriaticcoasts,wereclosedforaninspectionoftheviaducts,butreopenedafewdayslater.

Anumberofregionalandprovincialroadswerepartiallyclosed,mainlybecauseoflandandrockslidesandsettlementsinducedbytheearthquake.Theseinterruptionscausedsometransitdifficultiesfortheemergencyrescueservices.

Fig.1-L’Aquilaearthquake:damageto,andcausedby,silosat�IBA�facilityintheBazzanoindustrialarea,7kmsouthfarfromL’Aquilatown.

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2.2. Lessons learnt from 2009 L’Aquila earthquakeThe post-earthquake inspections showed as L’Aquila earthquake, despite the moderate

magnitude, caused extensive damage to industrial facilities and life-lines. The industrialbuildings were non-ductile concrete and new precast constructions that suffered damage onstructuralandnon-structuralelementsandonequipment.Thistypologyofindustrialbuildings,widelydiffusedinItaly,hasshownsignificantseismicvulnerabilitiesbothinthestructureandtheequipment.ThehighlevelofvulnerabilityofthistypologyofbuildingshasbeenafterwardsunderlinedalsobyTonioloand�olombo(2012).

From thedamageobserved inL’Aquila, it canbe said that earthquakesof around6.3Mw,willpossibly,orarelikelytoresultinseriousindustrialaccidents,shoulddangeroussubstancesbestoredinpre-castbuildings.

Furthermore, incomparisonwith thepast,when theuseofgaswas lessdiffuse,nowadaystheprobabilityofgasreleasesandthepossibilityofsubsequentfiresareincreased.Thissuggeststheneedofintroducingspecificfireprecautionmeasures.

�onsideringthatasimilarsituationcouldoccuralsoinotherareasofthecountryincaseofanearthquake,theItalianNationalFireDepartmentsetupaspecificworkinggroupwiththeaimofdefiningtechnicalguidelinesforreducingseismicvulnerability,inparticular,ofgasfacilitiesandfirepreventionandprotectionsystems(�N��F,2012).

3. Observations and confirmations after the 2012 Emilia earthquake

OnMay20,2012at04:03(localtime)anearthquakeofMw 5.86struckthePianuraPadanaEmiliana(northernItaly).TheepicentrewaslocalizedbetweenthetownsofMirandola,FinaleEmilia,PoggioRuscoandBondenowithahypocentredepthof6km.OnMay29at9:00(localtime),asecondmainshockofMw5.66occurred,withepicentremovedwestwardsfromthefirstmainshock(closertoMirandola)andproducedverticalandhorizontalPGAupto0.7gand0.3grespectively,intheepicentralarea.

The area, highly industrialized, was heavily damaged.A lot of roofs of precast buildingscollapsedcausingdeathsand thecomplete interruptionof theactivities (Fig.2).Thescenarioconfirmed the high vulnerability of the precast industrial buildings, as evidenced after theL’Aquilaearthquake.Infact,themostdiffusestructuraltypologiesare:

a) precast system, in simple or multi-storey buildings, in which structural elements weremadeofprecastreinforcedconcrete;

b)mix-materialsbuildings,madeofpre-stressedconcretepillars,locatedinthecentralpartofthebuilding,andmasonrywallsalongtheperimeter.

Thepresenceofheavyequipmentorphotovoltaicfacilitiesinstalledontheroofaggravatedthevulnerabilityofthebuildings.ThedamagescenariowasextremelymoreextendedandseverethaninL’Aquila.Alotoflife-lineswentandremainedoutofservice.AdetaileddescriptionofindustrialbuildingdamagecanbefindinMarzoet al.(2012)andSavoia et al.(2012).

Definitely, all the considerations made after the L’Aquila earthquake were systematicallyconfirmed and accentuated by the impact analyses of the Emilia earthquake in 2012, whichshowed, inparticular, thehighvulnerabilityoffacilitiesandequipmentandtheriskrelatedtothe releaseofdangeroussubstances, likegasorchemicals,causedby rupturesofpipelinesor


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storage tanks. Despite the fact that a lot of facilities and pipelines broke due to the collapseof industrial buildings in which they were installed, fortunately, no dangerous events wererecorded. This was probably because the earthquake occurred at night when almost nohazardousactivitiestakeplace.

It is worth to observe that few weeks after the second main shock, the Italian National�ommissionofMajorRisks, inastatementreleasedbytheItalianPrimeMinister’sOfficeonthesituationinEmilia,said:“Intheeventofaresumptionofseismicactivityintheareaalreadyaffectedbytheearthquakesequenceinprogress,theprobabilityofasegmentactivationbetweenFinaleEmiliaandFerrara,witheventscomparabletothemajoreventsrecordedinthesequence,is significant”. In thatarea there is thepetrochemicalplantofFerrara; therefore, thepotentialimpact on a Seveso plant was one of the major concerns for the emergency management.Fortunately, the event did not occur, but this fact evidenced that the seismic vulnerability offacilitiesandofSevesoestablishmentsaswell,arefundamentalelementstotakeintoaccountinordertodefineadequatecountermeasures.

4. Seismic events and Seveso establishments in Italy

�onsideringtheexperiencesandthelessonslearntfromthelastrecenttwomainearthquakesinItaly(L’AquilaandEmilia),aquestionarises:whatwouldithappenifindustrialorchemicalplantswithahighriskofmajoraccidentwerelocatedintheepicentralareaofanearthquake?This question should generate concern because most of Italian territory is seismic and thistypologyoffacilitiespresentsalotofvulnerabilities.Infact,it is well known in literature thattiswellknowninliteraturethatindustrial equipment and systems can suffer structural damage when hit by earthquakes andcanprovokeseriousaccidentsasfire,explosionsanddispersionoftoxicsubstances(M�IDAS,M�IDAS,2001;Krausmannet al.,2011).

Fig.2-Emiliaearthquake:heavydamagetoindustrialbuildingsintheepicentralarea.Generalcollapseofroofofprecastsystemstructuresdestroyedtheinternalfacilities.

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Fig.3-SevesoestablishmentsinItaly.OntheupperpanelthelocationofSevesoestablishments(bluedots)ontheseismichazardmap(GruppodiLavoroMPS,2004)showingvaluesofPGAhaving10%probabilityofexceedencein50years(TR=475years).Tablesshowthenumberofestablishmentsineachregion,thepercentageofestablishmentstypologyatnationallevelandthedistributionofestablishmentsinthedifferentseismiczones[dataelaboratedfromM.S.(2010)andM.A.T.M.A.(2012)].


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InItaly therearemore than1100Sevesoestablishments(i.e.,establishments where certainestablishmentswherecertainquantities of dangerous substances are present, as defined in http://glossary.eea.europe.eu as). defined in http://glossary.eea.europe.eu as).http://glossary.eea.europe.eu as)..About 1/3 of them are located in areas with moderate or high seismic hazard. Fig. 3 showsthedistributionof establishments on the Italian territory, indicates thepercentageof differenttypologies of establishments and reports the number and percentage of establishments in thefourseismiczones.

Themostdiffuseactivitiesarechemicalandpetrochemicalplants,storageofliquefiedgasesandmineraloilstorages.Agreat number of Seveso establishments are located in areas in whichgreatnumberof Seveso establishments are located in areas in whichSevesoestablishmentsarelocatedinareasinwhichthe estimated level of acceleration on rock (ag) exceeds0.15 g with probability of exceedingequalto10%in50years.

Inordertoestimatetheexpecteddamageofequipmentcomponentsfollowinganearthquake,severalapproachesarepossible.AcorrelationlinkingtheconditionalprobabilityofthespecificLevelofDamage(LD)toPGAof theearthquakeisrequired.Intheconventionalapproachofprobabilisticanalysisofdamagecausedbyseismicevents,fragilitycurvesareusedtoassesstheresistanceofastructuretoagivenPGA(O’Rourkeet al.,2000;Talaslidiset al.,2004).�owevertheprobitfunctions(Finney,1971)havebeenmorewidelyusedinordertoderivevulnerabilitymodelsforindustrialequipment(Salzano et al.,2003,2009;Fabbrocino et al.,2005;�ampedelet al., 2008) but in some cases also for residential buildings (Grimaz, 2009). Probit analyseswerecarriedoutonthebasisofinformationofseismicdamageobservedondifferentitemsandcollectedindatabases(M�IDAS,2001;Di�eccaandGrimaz,2009).Advantage and drawbacksAdvantageanddrawbacksoffittingempiricaldatabyfragilitycurvesandprobitfunctionsarepresentedin Lallemant andLallemantandKiremidjian(2013).

Morespecifically, theprobitvariableY representsadose-responserelationshipandgivesaspecificquantal responseas a functionof the intensityof thevariableV (thedose) throughalinearcorrelationwiththelogarithmofV:

Y=k1+k2·lnV. (1)

For thecaseof seismicaction, thedose is consideredas the seismicPGA (g)whereas theeffect is consideredasLD, either as the structuraldamageor,more appropriately, the lossofcontainmentorthe“outofservice”ofindustrialequipmenthitbyanearthquake.ThevariableYcanbedirectlycomparedwiththeactualfailureprobabilityp,orthepercentagePoftargetthatsuffersthespecificLD,bymeansofthefollowingequations,respectively(��PS,2000;�ilchezet al.,2001):

V21

Y–5–––p=––––� (e ) dV (�ilchezet al.,2001) (2)�2π– ∞

2

Y –5|Y –5|P=50[1+––––––er f(––––––)] (��PS,2000). (3)

|Y – 5| �2

For a quantitative estimation of the potential of observing severe accidents triggered byearthquakesinItaly, it is interesting to compare probit equations of damage between industrial,it is interesting to compare probit equations of damage between industrialitisinterestingtocompareprobitequationsofdamagebetweenindustrial

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Fig.4 -On the top:graphsofcomparisonamongprobitequations forvarious industrialequipmentandresidentialmasonry buildings for two thresholds of damage. On the bottom: the table with the coefficients of each probit equation.


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equipmentandresidentialhousesproposedintheworksabovementioned(Fig.4).The graphs in Fig. 4, in particular, evidence that the probability that an earthquake willFig. 4, in particular, evidence that the probability that an earthquake will

triggeraseriousaccidentonequipmentinSevesoestablishmentisnotnegligible.A comparisonAcomparisonofvalueofk1ek2ofFig.4fordifferentitemsgivesdirectandusefulinformationonthegravityoftheaccidentalevent.

In particular, it is worth noting that the probability that an earthquake will trigger majordangeroussubstancereleasesfromanchoredandunanchoredatmosphericsteel tanksishigherthan theprobability that itwill cause significant structuraldamageonoldmasonrybuildings.For instance, if PGA is equal to 0.15 g, the probability of observing significant releases ofdangerous substances from full tanks will be higher than 50% if unanchored and 15% ifanchored,while,forthesamevalueofPGA,theprobabilityofobservingseriousdamageinoldandrecentmasonrybuildingswillbe5%and1%respectively.

Theseobservationspermittoappreciatethe importance of the 15heimportanceofthe15th“whereas”ofthe2012/18/EUDirective(SevesoIII):“Inordertodemonstratethatallthatisnecessaryhasbeendonetopreventmajoraccidents,and toprepareemergencyplansandresponsemeasures, theoperatorshould, in the case of establishments where dangerous substances are present in significantquantities,providethecompetentauthoritywithinformationintheformofasafetyreport.Thatsafetyreportshouldcontaindetailsoftheestablishment,thedangeroussubstancespresent,theinstallationorstoragefacilities,possiblemajoraccidentscenariosandriskanalysis,preventionand intervention measures and the management systems available, in order to prevent andreduce the risk of major accidents and to enable the necessary steps to be taken to limit theconsequences thereof.The risk of a major accident could be increased by the probability ofnatural disasters associated with the location of the establishment.This should be consideredduringthepreparationofmajor-accidentscenarios.”

Nevertheless,itisworthnotingthatItalianlaws,stillnowadays,donotincludeanyspecificrule about the necessity of assessing, for those plants, the risk of major accidents caused byseismicevents.

5. Considerations in term of prevention and conclusions

It is hoped that industrial seismic damage, observed after the L’Aquila and Emiliaearthquakes, suggests a better integration of seismic aspects in the laws and codes forindustrialplantsdesignandreinforcement,inordertoassessandreducepossibleNaTechrisks(technologicalaccidentsinducedbynaturalevents)forsuchfacilities.Furthermore,inordertoavoidseriousaccidentslikefiresorexplosions,theattentiontoNaTechrisksmustbeextendedfromSevesoestablishmentstootherindustrialandresidentialfacilitiesand,inparticular,togasstoragetanks,pipelinesandutilities.

In any case, it is necessary to highlight the low seismic resistance of the precast-concretebuildings, and the criticisms related to non-structural elements and equipment.The physicaldamage related to these vulnerabilities can cause releases of dangerous substances and theactivationofaccidents.Morestringentseismicdesignisneededforthesestructuresalsoinorderto avoiddamageonequipmentor facilities.Other elementof concern is the reliabilityof thecoolingsystemsof reactors inchemical industries,particularlywhen theearthquakeprovokes

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theinterruptionofthemainpipelinesofwaterfurniture.Some indications in terms of possible provision could be defined: greater attention must

be paid in designing effective connection between primary and secondary elements in theprecast concrete buildings and in controlling the relative deformation of the various parts ofthebuildingstructures.Specificattentionmustbeaddressed topipelines incorrespondencetofaultcrossingpointsandtotheredundancyofsafetysystems.Itisalsonecessarytoimplementmoreprecautionsontheanchorageofequipmentandtoavoiddestructiveinteractionswithothercomponents. Furthermore, automatic valves triggered by accelerometer should be installedonthegaspipelinesoutside thebuildings.Thiswill reducedrastically theriskoffirebecausean immediate blockage of the gas supply is automatically activated in the case of strongearthquake.

Finally, taking into account the observations on damage provoked by the L’Aquila andEmilia earthquakes, it is possible to answer the question stated in the title of the paper:Yes,unfortunately, earthquakes could trigger serious accidents also in Italy, not only in Sevesoestablishments!

Therefore,possiblybefore thenext severe earthquake,greater attentionmustbe addressedto NaTech problems, both in major risk assessment processes and seismic codes.Within therisk assessment and management framework, higher attention must also be addressed to theresilienceofaffectedsystemsand,inparticular,totheroleoflife-linesnetworksinsupportingthe emergency management and in facilitating the response and the recovery phases afteran earthquake.This requires to take into account the interdependence between natural andtechnological hazards in the policies of risk reduction, considering seismic safety as aninterdisciplinaryproblemthathastobeassessedandmanagedusingaholisticapproachratherthanthereductionistandsectorialone,nowadays,generallyused.

Acknowledgements. The author of this paper, in both the emergencies of L’Aquila, 2009 and Emilia,2012, worked jointly with the Italian National Fire Department (CNVVF) as scientific coordinator of the specialist unit responsible for damage assessment and short term countermeasures definition. This permitted to observe the damage since the first phase after the main shocks and to recognise and evaluate safety problemsinducedbytheearthquakeinindustrialfacilities.SincerethanksgotothecolleaguesalloftheCNVVF and the University of Udine for the effective and profitable work done together. Special thanks to thereviewersfortheirusefulsuggestionsthathavehelpedtoimprovethispaper.

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Corresponding author: Stefano Grimaz Dipartimento di Chimica Fisica e Ambiente, Università degli Studi Via Cotonificio 108, 33100 Udine, Italy Phone: +39 0432 558731; fax: +39 0432 558700; e-mail: [email protected]

can earthquakes trigger serious industrial accidents in italy ...of the seismic safety paradigm,...

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