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Canada Nuclear Program Instrumentation and Control 2015 Sunil Tikku

›TWG-NPPIC Meeting at IAEA, 27th May 2015 - Copyright -

Presentation Outline

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•Nuclear in Canada

•I&C – Key Priorities

•Recommendations for IAEA

- Copyright- © [2015] SNC-Lavalin Inc. and its member companies. All rights reserved. Unauthorized use or reproduction is prohibited.

Nuclear in Canada

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Source: Canadian Nuclear Factbook 2013


Nuclear Power in Canada

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• Bruce – 6272 Mwe (8 units)

• Darlington – 3512 Mwe (4 units)

• Pickering – 3094 Mwe (6 units)

• Point Lepreau – 635 MWe (1 unit)

Source: Canadian Nuclear Factbook 2013


CANDU® Markets - Existing and Emerging

- Copyright-

© [2015] SNC-Lavalin Inc. and its member companies. All rights reserved. Unauthorized use or reproduction is prohibited.

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4 units 4 units

2 units

1 unit, undergoing

life extension

1 unit

2 CANDU units

16 PHWR units in

operation and 4 under

construction

CANDU new build opportunities in existing markets

in Argentina, China and Romania and new markets

such as Poland and the UK.

18 units

Nuclear Power in Canada – Key Players

•National Regulator – Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC)

•Power Utilities - Ontario Power Generation, Bruce Power, New Brunswick Power

•Organization of Candu Industries - Association of 170 Leading Nuclear Suppliers

•Candu Energy (member of SNC Lavalin group):

• New Build Projects

• Life Extensions

• Services

•Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (formerly AECL):

• Research and development

• Isotopes

• Waste management / Decommissioning

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- Copyright- © [2015] SNC-Lavalin Inc. and its member companies. All rights reserved. Unauthorized use or reproduction

is prohibited.

SNC-Lavalin: Advancing CANDU®

Candu Energy Inc., a Member of the SNC-Lavalin Group, was established in 2011 to acquire the commercial reactor business of Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd.

Exclusive rights to CANDU technology

The largest EPC company in Canada with projects in 100 countries and offices in more than 40 countries

- Copyright-


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›New Build

›Cernavoda 3&4, Romania

›IV-CN, Argentina

›AFCR, China

›EC6 CANMOX, UK

O&M Services

›O&M services with CANDU

utilities worldwide

›Safety and operational products

and services to global nuclear

industry

›Life Extension

›Embalse, Argentina

›Darlington NPP, Canada

›Bruce NPP, Canada

CANDU-6® Power Reactor

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Fuel bundle

Calandria tube

Pressure tube

CANDU Fuel Channel Assembly

Features:

• Heavy water coolant and moderator

• On-power refueling

• Mid size - modular design (740 MWe)

• Natural Uranium as fuel

• Superior performance - average

lifetime Capacity Factor (CF): 88%

worldwide

• Fuel cycle flexibility

Advanced Fuel CANDU® Reactor (AFCR™)

- Copyright-


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AF

CR

TM

Thorium Mine

Uranium Mine

Thorium

Low Enriched Uranium

(LEU)

Spent fuel from 4 LWRs can be reused to fuel 1 AFCR

Recovered Uranium (RU):

• 90,000 ton manufactured to date (4,000 ton/yr production)

• Average 235U content is ~0.95%

Thorium:

• Abundant “fertile” material

• Globally well distributed and more available than NU

• Superior material properties

EC6® CANMOX™

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The UK has 140 tonnes of plutonium, which can power 5,000,000 homes for 30

years in 4 MOX-ready EC6® reactors, while reducing the plutonium stockpile to

100% proliferation resistant material

New Build I&C Design Enhancements

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•Compliance with latest Canadian regulatory requirements and

applicables codes and standards

•Standards based development framework

•Programmatic considerations such as Human Factors,

Cyber-Security

• Improvements to enhance plant safety margins

•Changes to address Fukushima review

•Changes to address obsolescence

• Improvements to address operational experience feedback

• Improvements for higher plant performance, reduced capital

costs and more economic life-cycle operation


is prohibited.

EC6 Overall I&C Architecture

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›Safety Systems

› Two fully capable, independent, diverse trip systems

› Separate from Control Systems

› Cooling and Containment independent from trip

›Safety Monitoring System

› SPDS functions

›Distributed Control System

› Essential Control Subsystem

› Plant Control Subsystem

›Plant Display System

›MCR and SCR panels

› Safety panels

› Control panels

Multiple PDS

Workstations

&

Soft Panel Devices

Single PDS

Workstation

HW Panel Devices

&

SMS Displays

(G2 & Limited G1)

Main Control RoomSecondary Control Room

Safety Equipment (Sensors/Actuators) Process Equipment (Sensors/Actuators)

HW Panel Devices

&

SMS Displays

(G1 & G2)

PDS

Gateways

LEGEND

PDS LAN

Signal Wiring Class 1

SMS LAN

Electrical Isolation Devices

PCSSECSSSafety Systems

SMS Gateways

Multiple

PartitionsG1

G2

G1

G1

G2

G2

Class 2

Class 3


is prohibited.

- Copyright- © [2015] SNC-Lavalin Inc. and its member companies. All rights reserved. Unauthorized use or reproduction is

prohibited.

13

EC6 - Control Centre

Safety panel

changes safety system

testing Production panel /

MOC improvements

Safety System Computers

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Present CANDU 6 Design

• Process trips for SDS1 and SDS2 implemented in computer

systems from different suppliers and different software design

methods and languages

• Emergency Core Cooling, Containment and SDS Neutronic trips

are hardwired

EC6 Design

• Neutronics computerized

• FPGA being considered (for one trip system) for improved

diversity and speed

• Computerized Emergency Core Cooling

• Computerized Safety System Testing


is prohibited.

Enhancements for Severe Accidents

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• SBO and Extended SBO Coverage strengthened to meet

Fukushima review and new regulations

• Dedicated diesel generator / batteries and power distribution

system to handle severe accident recovery and heat removal

• Monitoring to deal with SA to be available in both MCR and

SCA

• All related instrumentation evaluated / enhanced to cover the

measurement ranges expected for SA

• Instrumentation assessed for layout and power source

considerations for post SA effectiveness

• Instrumentation designed and assessed for survivability under

SA conditions

• Reliability of plant data to Emergency Support Centres


is prohibited.

- Copyright- © [2015] SNC-Lavalin Inc. and its member companies. All rights reserved. Unauthorized use or reproduction is prohibited. 16

Role of Control Centre Mock Up Facility

• Fully functional C-6 virtual control room

with plant simulator

• Full scale interactive panels

• DCC Emulator

• APIs developed for interface with

display and control system

• Individual system usability testing /

reviews demonstrate design correctness

from an HF standpoint

• Lab for integration and proofs of concept

for various technologies

• Confirms ‘faithful’ reproduction of control

programs

Development of Engineering Simulator C6SIM

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• To provide accurate prediction of dynamic behaviour of the CANDU® 6 reactor

• To provide functional validation and optimization for control algorithms

• To permit the analysis of the performance of specific components such as • steam generator (SG) and pressurizer, • effect of refueling on reactivity devices

• To provide analysis and diagnosis of problems reported by CANDU® stations in a timely manner with high confidence


is prohibited.

C6SIM User Interface

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is prohibited.

Dealing with Obsolescence

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• Sourcing Strategies

• “Like for Like” components

• Components based on new technology with the same

functionality as existing components

• Components based on new technology with new

functionality

• Software based components qualified according to the

applicable software standard

• Additional or different failure modes and their effects on the

system need to be considered


is prohibited.

Developing New Solutions


is prohibited.

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• In some cases we have found that for obsolete

components and new applications it makes more sense to

implement a solution using newer technologies than those

of the existing plant

• Two approaches have been used

• Use a qualified digital platform to emulate the

functionality of the existing system

• Develop a new digital device to implement design

improvements

Use of New Technologies


is prohibited.

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• Requires consideration of any embedded software or

application software within the device/system

• Use of a qualified platform simplifies the task

• Categorization of the functions performed by the device

and development in accordance with the category defined

• Development in accordance with Candu procedures based on

applicable national and international standards and practices

• Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) treated largely

as a software based system

New Solutions - Determining What Product to Use for this Application


is prohibited.

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Solution

• Developed an annunciation system based on a

supplier’s FPGA based Functional Safety Based

Controller (FSC) platform

• Same functionality of the existing system but

implemented in FPGA based logic

• Software qualification of the annunciator was performed

by Candu

›ACCIS is an in house SCADA system :

› High Safety Pedigree – Qualified for Class 2 and Class 3

› QNX based, POSIX Compliant

› Supervisory Control, Monitoring and Annunciation

› Data Acquisition Interfaces

› Historical Data Management

› Computer-Based Procedures

› Used also in PWRs (New Builds and Retrofits) for safety applications

23 - Copyright- © [2015] SNC-Lavalin Inc. and its member companies. All rights reserved. Unauthorized use or reproduction

is prohibited.

Recommendations for future IAEA work

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• Harmonization of international standards for • Qualification of important to safety I&C equipment • Coordinated emergency response • FPGA technologies – emphasis on development and V&V • Reliability testing (Statistical) for safety systems

• Hazards Analysis for Safety Systems

• VDU based design for annunciators

• Role of secondary control area


is prohibited.

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