canadians in crisis: the nature and source of support for leadership in a national emergency
TRANSCRIPT
Canadians in Crisis: the Nature and Source of Support for Leadership in a National Emergency*
J I L L A R M S T R 0 N G / University of Toronto
Cet article analyse un cas ou la position thkorique de Parsons concernant e l'in- flation de confiance D dans les autoritks politiques est opkrant dans un groupe B l'occasion d'une crise nationale. Un analyse de contenu de 1047 lettres ?i
l'iditeur dkmontre que leurs auteurs arriverent aux m h e s conclusions mais B partir de significations subjecteurs les plus diverses et une grande varikt6 de prises de positions idkalogiques. Db lors, le consensus dans les systhmes de valeur devenait alkatoire : on chercha B le susciter par le biais de deux strategies de leadership. Dune part on cherche B revaloriser l'attachement aux valeurs les plus fondamentales; d'autre part on veut cr6er la crainte par un dknigrement de l'ennemi. Une analyse plus pousske kvonce les conskquences possibles pour le systhme de la rkpugnance chez les membres B mener une analyse critique des politiques de leurs dirigeants.
This paper explores a case where Parsons' inflation of trust in political authori- ties was operating among system members during a national crisis. A content analysis of 1047 letters to the editor shows that writers reached the same con- clusion but through widely different subjective meanings and ideological posi- tions. Hence, value consensus was seen as problematic, and its source was sought in an exploration of two leadership strategies: inculcation of attachment to core values, and mobilization of fear through vilification of the enemy. Further anal- ysis suggests the consequences for the system of a reluctance among members to scrutinize the policies of political leaders.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT O F T H E OCTOBER E V E N T S
In the weeks following the Quebec crisis in October 1970, Canadians expressed overwhelming support for the prime minister and his government's stand. A November poll revealed that 89 per cent of citizens approved the invocation of the War Measures Act ( WMA) and 68 per cent supported the prime minister's actions and policy during the crisis. In this paper we will attempt to explore the nature and source of consensus among the English- speaking majority on the crisis and its aftermath, through a study of letters to the editors of the major Canadian newspapers.
While the dependent variable is social integration of the dominant group, the events must also be seen in the context of a historical division between
* I am indebted to Professors Bernd Baldus, Kenneth N. Walker, and David Kirk for many of the ideas in this paper, to Professor Raymond Breton for his comments, and to the Kirk Workshop which funded the research. 299
Rev. canad. SOC. & Anth./Canad. Rev. SOC. & Anth. 9(4) 1972
this group and the French Canadian minority in a bicultural system. Differen- tial access to political power at the federal level, the country’s socioeconomic resources, and symbolic recognition have historically divided those persons on either side of the Maple Leaf Curtain.
Inter-group conflict stems from the loyalties attached to vastly daerent national origins. With indirect rule after 1760 an effort was made to assure the social, economic, and political superiority of the colonial power. The new colony was to seek status only within the system of the mother country (Ossenberg, 197 1 : 1 13 ) . Through a coalition of English-speaking business- men, French-speaking landowners and rural clergy, Lower Canada was prevented from keeping pace with the English sector. During the early 19th century, “the political authority of a Protestant society became the defender of the values and institutions of the Catholic church, while the religious authorities of French Canada upheld, in the eyes of their flocks, British institutions” (A. Dubuc, quoted in Rioux, 1971 :45).
Following 1867, Canada as a nation-state came to be strongly identified with British Canadians, for British influence was heavily felt in Loyalist migrations to Ontario and New Brunswick, and a steady immigration of Britons to the West. Central government policy suggested that “unhyphen- ated Canadianism enjoyed a central rather than a marginal status in tradi- tional Canadian nationalism” (Guindon quoted in Leach, 196854). In the late 1840s, with work under way on a partnership between the French and English towards the BNA Act, a Toronto newspaper claimed that “ ... the seat of government ... [is in] control of French oligarchists and their Helots ... [this is] a war of the races” (Wade, 1968:277).
In 1837-38, during an economic depression, Les Putriotes, led by Papineau, rebelled against the Governor of Lower Canada and London. Contenders in the struggle were the agrarian majority and the oligarchic minority of officials and small businessmen. Lord Durham’s proclamation of 1838 sought “to raise the defective institutions of Lower Canada to the level of British civilization and freedom, to remove all impediments to the course of British enterprise in this province.” French Canadians saw the move as cultural extinction, since the Durham Report called for their ab- sorption into a wholly British North America (Wade, 1968: 190, 196, 203).
During the 1840s and 185Os, the Red River region became an important site of contention between the two Canadas. Ontario migrations were mili- tantly Protestant and aggressively English. The Riel uprising of 1869 was a clash between groups with different levels of social organization and ad- vancement, and on the Red River traditional rivalries of French and English on the St Lawrence were revived (Wade, 1960:321). The conflict, for the French Canadians and Mttis, centred on the recognition of their territorial rights by Canada in the face of massive immigration from Ontario. The execution of an Orangeman in the uprising was used by the expansionist Canada First movement in Ontario to arouse violent agitation, exploiting ethnic and religious hatred (Wade, 1968:402). Riel was executed in 1885, 300
to become a racial symbol, a French martyr killed at the hands of fanatical Orangists (Cook, 1969:25). When Quebec reacted with a move to oust the Macdonald government, Ontario mobilized its troops. The Toronto Mail stated that it “preferred that the dream of a united Canada should be shat- tered forever, than that unity be purchased at the price of inequality” (Wade, 1968:419).
The conscription issue in the two world wars also centred on differences in felt obligations of citizenship. For the English-speaking, the French anti- conscription position was seditious and traitorous. For the French Canadian, involvement in World War I meant fighting for an English Canada, with few benefits for themselves. The teaching of French in Ontario schools, for example, had only recently been denied them. French Canadians became increasingly disillusioned after 1910 with the movement that drew Canada into the wars of the Empire, and the wars were seen as retarding the march towards Canadian independence (Cook, 1969:218). In 1917, the English responded by deploying troops from Ontario to enlist French Canadians from Quebec.
It was with the leadership of Duplessis, however, that Quebec came to be seen by English Canadians as a province to be reckoned with. Duplessis’ efforts to secure representation of French Canadians in the civil service, and the safeguarding of their culture and religion were met with suspicion by an English Canada, who saw these and his other authoritarian measures, as a threat to North American democracy and Anglo-Saxon tradition (Wade, 1960: 10).
In recent times, a new French Canadian working class, no longer on the land, and a new middle class, began seeking space for occupational and organizational expansion. Their different goals and needs contributed to the restive character of intra-group relations and competing ideologies in the French Canadian community (Guindon quoted in Leach, 1968:51). The period was also marked by a split between the French Canadian intelligentsia and the clergy, so that it can no longer be said that the community possesses a homogeneous religious faith (Rioux and Martin, 1964:197). The gains which French Canadians have made are often misinterpreted by both groups; English speaking people who feel threatened exaggerate the advances of French Canadians, while separatists write off the gains as tokenism or a sell-out (Breton, 1972).
A more strident separatism has emerged in recent times and it has been opposed by English Canadians. The combined weariness, hope, and anger of English Canada found expression in the election of Prime Minister Trudeau. Having voted him in, English Canada hoped that Quebec would come to her senses and roll over and go back to sleep (Neville, 1971 : 18). The nature of the October events was not entirely unprecedented in the Canadian context, and the action taken by government was widely believed to be essential for the security of public confidence and the safety of the country. In the absence of stress, legitimacy of authority is not put to the 301
test, but in crisis, the measure of support for cardinal values is empirically tested, their meaning is amplified, and their content is reinforced or rejected (Easton, 1965: 198).
T H E FUNCTIONALIST FRAMEWORK
Trust in Political Leaders Parsonian functionalism sees trust in political leaders as essential to the stability of the complex social system, in which lack of face-to-face interaction among members precludes close checks and balances in the distribution of duties and rewards. Role allocation is made on the basis of competence, and members accept their limited roles because they see themselves as ill- equipped to assume leadership responsibilities. The model, however, provides for flexibility in that office-holding is temporary and leadership activities are limited by the scrutiny of system members, Vigilance and veto rights are “built into” the democratic system in that members can withdraw their support if the leadership is unacceptable to them.
For Parsons, a self-corrective process operates in the inflation and defla- tion of trust. If members do not view the existing arrangements as acceptable, deflation of trust will occur (Parsons, 1966). Authority is never absolute and the leader is also subject to the group’s norms and expectations. Further, perceived self-interest is not sufficient to generate feelings of legitimacy; but rather the common interest must supplement or reinforce individual wants and demands (Easton, 1965:311). Allegiance to a political com- munity does not depend on blanket approval of intellectual or political values (McClosky, 1964:378) but there must be a popular acceptance of the over-all legitimacy of the authorities and the regime. The public response in the Quebec crisis was generally that of unquestioning acceptance and a failure to challenge government policy.
Shared Values and Definitions A major source of the disposition to comply with leadership rests in the political socialization of system members. In early socialization a need to believe in the arrangements of distributing authority and the feeling that it is a moral obligation to care for one’s country is developed. Socialization, it has been said, is the mobilization of bias (Mann, 1970:437). Intrinsic to this conception is a belief that the object of loyalty is a finished product that cannot be improved and that must not be exposed to critical examina- tion. In Shakespeare’s Henry V , when told that the King’s war is just, William retorts: “That’s more than we know.” His comrade counters: “Ay, and more than we should seek after” (Schaar, 1957:32-33).
Core values are given a variety of interpretations by system members and leaders must defer accordingly in articulating them, at least so that it appears that no “reasonable” person would disagree with them (Easton, 1965: 196-197). Moreover, the leadership is constrained to provide defini- tions broad enough to elicit common standards for evaluating its policy with
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respect to political events. If the proffered definition does not command universal consensus, the articulation must effect a belief that “absolute” values are not being violated.
This is especially relevant in an emergency when leaders must both inter- pret and define the common interest. The official definition of the situation must provide the means for individual actors to identify themselves with one another on the basis of this shared perspective. Ordinary members weigh the statements of opinion leaders and heed those they see as trustworthy.
The variety of personal interpretations of the October crisis and sub- sequent events in the letters to the editor suggests that the needs of people can better account for wholesale support than the needs of the system. Ideological extremes and shades of opinion reflect the fact that writers re- sponded in the context of their personal biographies. Indeed, Mann argues that response to political events is not mediated by common values, for one’s relations with society are mostly indirect (Mann, 1970:435).
In announcing the invocation of the War Measures Act, the prime minister attempted to achieve a broad base of support by focusing on Canadians’ attachment to a set of shared values: “ ... [This is a] moment of grave crisis when violent and fanatical men are attempting to destroy the unity and the freedom of Canada ... Canada remains one of the most wholesome and humane lands on this earth. If we stand firm, this current situation will soon pass ... The result of their acts will be a stronger society in a unified country.” The full text of this address was printed on a scroll and distributed for sale across Canada, so that large numbers of people could share its message. Following the murder of Quebec Labour Minister Pierre Laporte, he said: “There are few occasions when the entire population of a country shares a single emotion and senses a deep unity in face of events ... In this moment of shock and grief I know that all Canadians are deeply conscious of the benefits that flow from a tolerant, compassionate and free society.”
The events themselves and government response to them served to im- munize leadership from severe opposition. The kidnapping of Laporte and his murder elicited widespread horror and outrage. At his funeral, mourners heard Laporte described as an “equal of Woodrow Wilson and John F. Kennedy.” His widow had asked that the funeral be private, but her needs were secondary to those of the state. The ceremony symbolized him as a dedicated representative of the government’s policies vis-A-vis French Canada: “His record of struggle and accomplishment sounds out like a trumpet in comparison with the whines of self-pity and the screams of hatred that have poured forth from the FLQ [Laporte’s children] will know that the name Pierre Laporte will be repeated by school children for generations as a symbol of steadfast opposition to division, disunity and hatred in Canada.”
Mobilization of Fear An additional strategy for a government attempting to gain support is to convince system members that an enemy poses a severe threat warranting stringent measures. For people to be stimulated by hope or driven by fear
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the objects of these emotions must be vivid and immediate. By magnifying the enemy, one depicts an evil which is easy to hate. Naming a villain ascribes to him a status which places him beyond the pale of civilized society, and defines him as deserving of harsh and severe sanctions (Klapp, 1956 :
In his address to the nation in October, the prime minister appeared to depict Canada as a previously peaceful state, defiled overnight. He told 2000 delegates at the National Liberal Party convention that the FLQ are “throwbacks,” “obsolete dark vestiges of prehistoric animals,” and “tailings of history” (Time, Nov. 10, 1970:7). The reduction of a complex pheno- menon to a readily identifiable and threatening entity served to facilitate its handling for a confused parliament and public. Canadians were given a legitimate target against which to seek retribution, and were thus to obtain “a stronger society in a unified country” - a climate of opinion calculated to elicit strong and uncritical pro-government attitudes1 (Time, Nov. 30, 1970:7).
As parliament debated the government position in the days following the Laporte kidnapping the extent of the threat was expanded beyond the evidence at hand. On October 14, Justice Minister John Turner reported that “ ... there are many clear indications that ... the central government of this country will fall within the purview of their endeavours” (Hummd, Oct. 16, 1970:213). On the day before Laporte’s murder, the Hon. Jean Marchand told MPS: “Quebec and the federal state are truly in danger ... The most pessimistic say that the FLQ has some 3000 members. [They] have inatrated every strategic place in ... Quebec, ... and they are in a position to cause [both] governments ... irreparable harm, with the support of outside organizations ... [The FLQ] has [enough] dynamite to blow up the core of downtown Montreal” (Hunsard, October 16, 1970:224). The prime minis- ter warned that their next target may be “some child ... or innocent members
Like the appeal to common values, the definition of the extent of the threat was vague enough to escape close scrutiny at the time of the crisis. At the same time, the villain labels were sufficiently vivid to evoke an emotional response and demands for strong measures. This relieved leadership and public of the responsibility of analysing the threat substantively. “In times of moral crisis, vilification movements tend to arise spontaneously in an urge to find and punish culprits. The need for culprits may be so great as to provoke outright scapegoating, creating a widespread feeling of moral alarm ... Vituperation, suspicions, and investigations are directed as much to giving public satisfaction as to solving the problem” (Klapp, 1954: 61).
339-340).
of your family.”
1 President Truman established the Loyalty Commission in 1947 at a turn in his foreign policy where he felt a need to rely on the devil theory of Communism. He had decided in that year that he would have to take over Great Britain’s place as shield against Communism in Greece. In a search for ways to justify such a task he was advised that he would have to “scare hell out of the country.” Murray Kernp- ton, “Truman and the Beast,” New York Review of Books, March 11, 1971: 8. 304
The strategy was very effective. The prime minister was quick to assure parliament and the country that his goals and strategy were shared by most Canadians. Many citizens accepted the upper limits of the description of the enemy, and the prime minister was given full leeway to rid the country of its disturbing elements.
Clearly it was the public which was responding to the situation in ac- cordance with the treatment of it by the government. In the four days follow- ing the kidnapping of British diplomat James Cross, the Prime Minister did not react strongly. Nor did the public; only 1.2 per cent of the letters were written in this period. It was after the invocation of the WMA on October 16 and Laporte’s murder several hours later that public response was greatest; 81.3 per cent of letters were written after this date.
Role of the Media The media provide a crucial influence on the climate in which members of the public come to form opinions on an issue, since they are the primary sources of information and interpreters of events. The abundant support for the government and the hunt for ideological defectors was undoubtedly af- fected by editorial treatment of events in Quebec.
Response from the non-elite in the form of public opinion polls and letters to the editor serves as a barometer for those making policy decisions. The Quebec crisis evoked a massive response from newspaper readers; many who had never written before felt constrained to record their views.
D A T A COLLECTION
Analysis of the content of 1043 letters to the editor, both published and discarded, will show how these persons described their national goals and interpreted the events which threatened these goals. Four large daily news- papers with circulations ranging from 13 1,000 to 400,000 constituted 95.4 per cent of the sample; the remaining letters were from dailies with circula- tions from 19,000 to 54,000.2 Because our focus is on the position of the dominant English speaking majority, French language newspapers were not included in the sample.
There have been many studies of the characteristics of people who write letters to the editor and the nature of their opinions (Gray and Brown, 1970; Vacin, 1965; Waldrop, 1948; Krieghbaum, 1956; Forsythe, 1950). (Many of these have included only letters which were published and thus have been screened by editorial gatekeepers.) Letter writers have been found to be disproportionately old, male, rich and well educated. Writers from smaller communities are disproportionately long-term residents and from higher occupational levels, while those from large cities are drawn from all occupa- tional categories. Letter writers are more politically aware than the popula- 2 98.2 per cent of letters were written by individuals, of which 7.2 per cent were anony-
mous, and 1.8 per cent by interest groups. 61 persons wrote more than one letter, and multiple communications were coded as one. Accordingly, 914 letters remain in the analysis. 305
tion at large and usually more partisan. For many, the letters column seems to serve as a catharsis, with motivations divided between ego interest and community interest. No consistent ideologies have been found among letter writers, although writers tend to be more conservative than the general population, and more prone to write against something than for it.
It is generally agreed that while the letters reflect what the public is thinking, they normally offer no accurate index of division of opinion. They may reflect public views quite accurately on highly salient issues, like the war in Vietnam in the United States, or the Quebec issue in Canada.
The letters were classified into 39 themes for and against the government’s stand, 76.5 per cent and 23.5 per cent respectively, as shown in Table I.
TABLE I
CATEGORIES OF LETTER CONTENT (FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION)
Incidence of Strongest sentiment in sentiment of totalsample (per cent) individual (per cent)
PROGOVERNMENT STAND: 76.5 per cent (2367) Objectives of writer: social cohesion 1. Unity, patriotism: bring us together
2. Clear collective conscience: shame
3. Fight for freedom and democracy
4. Security: law and order
5. French-Canadians divide Canada
Target of letter: threats to cohesion 6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FLQ revolutionaries, criminals
FLQ punks, cowards, bastards
FLQ depraved, sinister, satanic
Youth, studentssto blame
International conspiracy, Reds
Mafia, organized Crime
Radicals, protesters
All French-Canadians to blame
Poor leadership in past
Government critics : bleeding hearts
Methods advocated to achieve cohesion and deal with threats 16. Trust leadership: stand fast
17. Call out troops, martial law 306
TABLE I (cont.) Incidence of Strongest sentiment in sentiment of totalsample (per cent) individual (per cent)
18. Restore capital punishment 9.0% 2.0%
19. Use firing squads 5.9% 2.2% (63) (14)
~~
(41 ) 7.7%
(54) 20. Tighten immigration and censorship
21. Revenge: eye for an eye 6 ..4% ~~
22. Restrict French-Canadians (45 j
4.7% (33)
23. Deal with social problems in Quebec 6 ..O% (42)
4.0% (28)
24. Restore religious morality, prayer
Total pro-government letters*
ANTI-GOVERNMENT STAND: 23.5% (613) Objectives of writer: social cohesion 25. Crisis will bring us together
26. Protect freedom, democracy
27. Bring French and English together
28. Government eroding freedoms
Target of letter: threats to cohesion 29. Social, economic problems in Quebec
30. Loss of civil liberties through WMA
31. Overreaction of prime minister
32. Authoritarian dictatorship
Methods advocated to achieve cohesion and deal with threats 33. Repeal/revoke WMA
34. Give in to FLQ demands
35. Give in now, to save hostages,
36. Justify WMA: give us the facts
37. Obligated to save hostages:
38. Improve police forces
39. Agree with FLQ strategy
but destroy them later
sanctity of life
(2367)
5.6% (1 2)
20.5% (44)
13.5%
31.2% (67)
(29)
33 .O%
48.0% (103)
42.8%
36.3% (78)
(71)
(92)
12.1% (26)
10.7%
2.3% (5)
11.7%
(23)
(25) 11 -7%
(25) 3.3%
16.3% (35)
20.5% (44)
14.9% (32)
14.9% (32)
100.0% Total anti-government letters* (613) (215) * To analyse percentages of sentiments with each of the pro-government and anti-govern-
ment categories, Ns were calculated separately. Column 1 does not total 100 per cent because each sentiment could be expressed a number of times.
t Rounding error 307
The themes were categorized under three general headings: the writers, objectives for Canada, perceived threats to these objectives, and methods advocated to achieve goals and deal with the threats. The frequency of each theme appearing is shown in the first column, and the strongest sentiment of each writer shown in the second.
Further, to examine the possible Xuence of a psychological predisposi- tion to authoritarianism, a questionnaire composed of 35 F-scale and related items was mailed or administered to 200 of the letter writers three to four months after their original communications.
PROPOSITIONS E X A M I N E D
By examining the themes in the light of structural and attitudinal factors, it is hoped to determine what fed the writers’ support for, and unquestioning trust in the leadership. Specifically we will explore the following four propositions: (a ) Letter writers’ response to the FLQ and the government’s policy will be influenced by the reactions of the national leadership. The fear and hostility engendered by events and by the leader’s vilification of the FLQ will give rise to a high proportion of extremist sentiments in the letters. (b) The lack of insightful and substantive analysis of the threat by the government will be reflected in the letters, and writers who see the threat in monistic terms will be more likely to support the government’s position. A high degree of authoritarianism and cognitive closure will be found among pro-government writers. ( c ) As successfully socialized members of a democratic system, writers will see trust in a national leader in crisis as natural and appropriate. Consequently, incidence of trust in the leadership will be independent of such personality characteristics as authoritarianism. (d) Reaction to national emergency will be not mediated by group f i a t i o n s and structural linkages, but by individual responses to events and the leader’s interpretations of them. Membership in the two major ethnic groups, however, is an important exception.
O B J E C T I V E S O F W R I T E R S : SOCIAL COHESION
The goals described centred on security in the face of threat and a strong sense of patriotism. The writers defined Canadians as an entity and called for the acceptance of ideologies expressing unity and affirming common membership. When the nation is in trouble, the “common good” must take priority over component interests: “I proudly display my certificate of citizenship ... I am a very proud Canadian. I love this country and the events ... have strengthened my loyalty to our heritage ...” A drive to clear the Canadian conscience as a prerequisite to claiming the country’s rightful place as “number one” moved writers to expressions of shame:
We are a prosperous and fortunate nation and so should be able to set an example for those countries less developed ... 308
A barbaric and futile assassination has brought disorder to our country and I feel we have been degraded. This land of ours has up to this point been considered a stable, cautious-minded nation ... Now we have been lowered to the same shameful level as our Yankee neighbour. ... with great pride in our tolerance and understanding of all things democratic, it happened here. And ... we are all to blame. If Laporte’s death can reverse the sad and sickening descent into barbarism, he will not have died in vain. While some writers saw Laporte as a martyr for Canadian unity, others attempted to familiarize him, locating him in their circle of intimates:
... I am ashamed because my fellow Canadian Pierre Laporte was murdered in my country ... Canada has been shot in the back and I can feel the pain. [Mr Laporte] was not only a public servant ... he was the next door neighbour that had a lovely family, a father, a husband.
A high collective morale and optimistic bravery in the face of adversity, were constant themes:
m e ] will find great comfort if some good comes of this terrible and ugly crime, such as a new birth of unity in the hearts of Canadians ... Like World War II, adversity brings out the best in people, and will unite Canada. We are horrified to think this sort of anarchy has reached Canada and hope ICanadians] will unite ... and make OUT nation stronger and closer together ... Because [Laportel has become a part of our history, we should all be reminded by his name that after his life was snatched away, Canadians unified to bring about a better Canada.
An urge toward a surface uniformity of belief and feeling seemed to express the hope that Canadians would replace social disorder with certainty and stability, To this end, the writer usually stated a position not on his own behalf, but as a representative of a larger constituency, ranging from a modest “all my neighbours agree with me” to alignment with “all Canadians.” This can be seen as an attempt to evoke expanded identifications and elicit mass support in an effort to justify his stand (Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950: 105). A “typical” sentiment can stimulate sentiments of a mutual political identification among the people.
A sense of solidarity is also achieved when people draw together to fight an enemy. A readiness to act in concert serves to affirm common values. Fear can be a source of social cohesion, and the Prime Minister of Ontario got much applause for his statement that: “It’s war, total war. By jove, this has got to be a law-abiding country, where you can bring up your family without fear ... We have overlooked the fact that the large group has rights as well ... The majority rules.” Hostility was expressed against French-Cana- dims in general and for some, blame was seen to rest with the entire minority group. Blumer (1958:222) holds that ethnic prejudice is a protective device, functioning to preserve the integrity and the position of the dominant group.
Let’s drop the two-language labels on all items sold in English-speaking areas. These sops to the French Canadians have not appeased them one iota. [we need] martial law and enforcement to bring this province to its knees once and for all. 309
The more I read ... about ... the kidnappings, the more ashamed I feel that 1 ever taught French to junior high school students. The [murder and kidnapping] need not have happened had Ottawa not adopted an attitude of permissive revolutionary nationalism for the “nation” of Quebec.
It is paradoxical that the kind of issue that stimulates widespread political participation is also the kind likely to create wide cleavages in society (Mil- brath, 1965: 147). Many writers saw Canada’s cultural groups as a strength to be preserved: “Some people have realized there are two founding cultures in Canada ... and this is one of the few things which separates us culturally from the United States.’’ It was also evident that the concepts of freedom and unity do not bear the same content for all persons. For many supporters of Senator Joseph McCarthy, his appeal was not that of a man suppressing free speech, but of a man exercising it, in what appeared to be bold and fearless ways (Trow, 1958:273).g
Critics of the government’s stand wrote about a different sort of unity:
Surely we must show signs of unity ... but could Canadians not have shown an equal amount of unity by an en masse disapproval of the War Measures] Act? I hope that Canadians at home and abroad will express to the government their concern for due process ... The WMA must be repellant to all those consistent in their love of freedom and their belief in democracy. When our collective national temperature returns to normal, other Canadians will realize the true patriotism of (New Democratic Party leader Tommy) Douglas and those of similar conviction. Freedoms that were established in British common law only through hundreds of years of struggle have been abrogated in Canada in one hasty, ill-advised, pre- dawn proclamation. Is the democratic process only workable when the sun is shining?
T A R G E T O F L E T T E R : P E R C E I V E D T H R E A T S TO S O C I A L COHESION
Labelling is an attempt to understand problematical behaviour by reducing it to simple concepts, and is accompanied by little rational or reflective thought. Its function is to provide a vivid image of a public enemy against whom to take action. The label of “villain” serves to express group judg- ments, and facilitate consensus by classifying the offender invidiously and calling forth the appropriate modes of response to him. His role and history are not fully explored in this assignment of status, and a hard line is drawn between the pure and the damned (Klapp, 1954:57-61). In calling to salience his special characteristics and hence defining his social category, the task of meting out punishment is vastly simplified.
The categorizations writers made tended to separate the threat into three groups: a highly visible band of terrorists; insidious and suspicious isolates or cowards; or contemptuous fools. In the first group were descriptions of a wilful and destructive enemy incapable of living in a human society, an
3 Haggart and Golden (1971 : 110) report that shortly after the WMA was invoked, a group of students received permission to use the school’s mimeograph machine to turn out a pro-government petition. When a smaller group asked if they could pro- duce a petition in opposition, they were refused and told, “Your freedom of speech is being preserved by your right not to sign the petition.” 310
alien who defied labelling in human terms. Using such labels as “satanic,” “depraved,” “fanatic,” “fiendish,” “demented,” “savage and inhuman,” “sub-human horror,” and “phrenetic, blood-crazed human animals,” these writers saw their crimes as bizarre and demonic acts beyond the range of human understanding. “The kidnapping . .. perpetrated by vengeful, satanic traitors is too wicked to comprehend.”
Other writers were frightened by the low visibility of the threat and des- cribed the FLQ as a germ likely to spread, “a germinating evil,” “cancer” and a “festering sore.” “The virus from these rabid animals has got to be contained and eliminated.” Some people employed images of somewhat more complicated species, but still among the lower forms of life: “slimy rats,” “vermin,” and “terrorist snakes.” For this group, the less visible villain category called for powers of detection and alertness in addition to strong forms of punishment:
When man has a cancer, it is necessary to treat the growth with radium, harming some innocent tissue in the process. [Canadians must] demonstrate support to rid our country of this scum that would destroy us. Human garbage must be expunged from our society. These organized murderers cannot be exterminated because the death penalty has been abolished.
For the third group, the FLQ were objects of scorn and derision. As “gut- tersnipes,” “cowards,” or “punks,” they had not the courage to display themselves openly. As “Foolish Little Queers,” “Fanatical Loony Quacks,” and “goons” they served as legitimate objects of ridicule. In all cases, scape- goating was operating in imputing villain concepts in toto to real persons (Klapp, 1956:340).
Many writers expanded the sphere of influence of the FLQ, and extended the boundaries of danger to include other social groups, both in the country and beyond its borders. Lane holds that people in the grip of aggressive feelings about a frustrating group tend to generalize hostility toward others, giving much wider scope to the original impulse ( 1969: 163). In so doing, these writers stated a case for vigilante vengeance and extension of the powers of the WMA to root out and deal with organized criminals, students, youth, hippies, reds, and political protesters. They seemed to feel that the security of their own group depended on curbing the behaviour of other groups.
Invoke all statutes ... in order to stamp out this foreign rot and trash. ... there are some very undesirables filtering into Canada who are becoming a burden financially as well as disrupting law and order. Our land is being flooded with Mafia and Caribbean troublemakers. Quebec has allowed an influx of European agitators. Nothing has been done to arrest this trend. We are living in a world of violence and intrigue fomented by ... Soviet Russia and Red China. Quebec has probably been chosen by a world terrorist organization ... Our universitites can no longer be sanctuaries for radical professors who have contaminated the minds of so many students as well as the public at large. Danger signals were clear ... the CBC has been infiltrated with radicals and separatists. 311
“WEAK- KN E ED, B L E E DI N G HEARTS”
Another target group for writers approving the government’s position were the p p l e who opposed it. Almost to a man, the opponents were called “bleeding hearts,” echoing the words of the prime minister in a television interview on October 13: “I think society must take every means at its disposal to prevent the emergence of a parallel power ... It’s only weak-kneed bleeding hearts who aren’t prepared to take these methods ... All I can say is, go on and bleed. It’s more important to keep law and order in society than to be worried about weak-kneed people who don’t like the looks of an army.”
The writers who condemned the critics of the WMA saw civil liberties as remote, and their erosion was not considered a hindrance to their immediate concerns. They also sought to minimize and belittle the opposition as “a few naive politicians” or “some radical professors.”
How many of us have missed any of our rights since [the WMA]? I venture to say none. Some people would have us sit back and become as decadent and weak- willed as the Roman Empire in its final days. All this bellyaching about civil rights is only a hindrance to the authorities ...
There was a clear attempt to equate political criticism with disloyalty. Opponents were condemned as being soft on terrorism or even as being sup- porters of the PLQ. The writers who chose to depend on the official definition of the situation saw opposition as an assault upon the leadership and by inference, as a rejection of cherished values:
What measures would these (student demonstrators) have the government take? Sit idly by and watch the PLQ go their merry way? People who scream the loudest about freedom of speech, infringement of civil rights and strapping in the schools ... do not wish to comply with discipline.
A constant theme in these letters was a preference for a hierarchical scale, with contempt for “spineless” inferiors and submissiveness towards those in authority:
[They are] boobs, windbags, and second raters not fit to tie the laces of Trudeau’s skiboots. It’s to the great credit of Canadians that they’ve decided their lives and liberty are safer with Pierre Trudeau than with the degenerates of the FLQ and the bleeding heart liblabs ... who haven’t a clue to what’s rising up to smash them. I sincerely hope the bleeding hearts will not succeed in weakening [the Prime Minister’s] courageous attitudes. Canada has Caouette, Canadian first class; Said RCal, “This NDP, she bray like big jackass.” I find Ron Haggart’s latest exercise in bleeding-heartsmanship more nauseous than usual.
METHODS TO ACHIEVE COHESION
Political stability is related to the feeling on the part of the members that the authorities have the moral right to rule, and that their directives carry a moral imperative (Easton, 1965:292). Unquestioning trust in the leadership plays a vital role in translating might into right. 312
We have placed on the shoulders of our leaders the great responsibilities which we as individuals felt we could not carry. Mr Trudeau, I am passing the buck on to you. We are just ordinary citizens but we must let Mr Trudeau know that he has our sincere thanks and gratitude for the courageous act he has taken to save Canada from anarchy. I am an ordinary person. I do not represent anybody. Those who speak on my behalf [are] ... in Ottawa.
For many, the prime minister had attained a hero status in the crisis. To him these writers ascribed a host of superlative qualities (Klapp, 1954:60). For others Trudeau’s reaction reflected just the stand they would have taken in his place.
... if ever there is a man who can hold this nation together, it is Trudeau. Pierre Trudeau was elected because he alone could or would have the stamina and integrity to take just the stand he has taken. ... there was nobility in his manner and fire in his eye when he addressed the people on TV ... I trust his judgment. [Trudeau] revealed ... the inspiring Churchillian leadership we have a right to expect from the man we have invested with the supreme power in our country.
Many writers identified very warmly with him. A telegram to the Prime Minister read: “You must know we feel you have your arms around this country.” Other spoke of “sharing Trudeau’s anguish.”
The role of fear clearly reinforced support for the WMA. Drastic events often bring the terror of chaos to consciousness and such events must be followed at once with a solemn reaffirmation of the worth of political institu- tions (Berger and Luckmann, 1967:103-104). We have seen that there were widely varying and undocumented estimates of the extent of the danger, and the extremist writers were willing to accept, and amplify, the upper limits of the description of FLQ activities. They fell into an “either-or” fallacy and held that without the WMA, Canada would be utterly destroyed. For them the dilemma was one of stark alternatives: to oppress or be oppressed:
[Without the WMA] we would be in the midst of a bloodbath. It took just a handful of radical Nazis under Hitler to enslave Germany ...
plicitly for harsher measures.
Order a wholesale search ... bring in the whole army, search every house, cottage, and farm. ... put hanging on the books. Notify the FLQ that for every kidnapping or murder ... there will be ten of them shot immediately or hanged. Give the FLQ two hours’ public notice to release the hostages ... after that time, one of the 23 bandits in captivity would be shot every ten minutes. Why don’t you muzzle the press. They are broadcasting to the FLQ every move the forces of law and order are making, thus sabotaging their efforts. It is time for ... the death penalty for the selling of hard drugs, kidnapping, and the use of explosives that endanger the life of every citizen. We need a law that makes it compulsory for every Canadian ... to be finger- printed and to have a passport ... to increase the efficiency of our police. Police [should be] issued open season permits on every known and active sym- pathizer with subversive causes ...
Indeed, 28.5 per cent of the pro-government writers wrote calling ex-
313
For many anti-government writers, the “docile acceptance” of the WMA
and the “authoritarian leadership” of the prime minister were seen as omi- nous and provocative. Letters of opponents criticised the “hate-filled rheto- ric” of the prime minister and his attempts to “canonize” Laporte:
History provides us with too many instances of demagogues who began their rise to absolute power only “in the best interests of the people.” I’d rather have a bleeding heart than have no heart at all. To put it cynically ... nothing helps a leader like a good war.
A threat to civil liberties and traditional freedoms was articulated by many writers :
In the government’s firm stand, it must not violate those very rights it is striving to protect. ... I am appalled and frightened by the implications of [the WMA] and by the unthinking response of so many ... Canadians who surrender so easily the rights that thousands have died defending. The United States has dealt with many more serious civil disturbances without suspending the constitutional rights of its citizenry. There is no way of telling what is going on in the heads of every police officer and soldier who carry ... a blank check to do as they please. Have we created martyrs out of what was originally a small group of anarchists ... by persecuting and oppressing a large number of legitimate dissenters?
The intransigence of the prime minister displayed in the media, and his “overreaction” to the crisis was seen as broaching on hysteria:
Canada has lost its innocence ... By this outrageous overreaction Canada has abnegated a world responsibility. It is chilling to realize, looking at the pinched and angry face of our Prime Minister, that the words he is saying are not inspired by the intelligence and judgment which we all rely on ... Trudeau’s action ... was the action of an inexperienced, arrogant, immature, and panic-stricken politician. When you try to frighten people into doing what you want, you generally succeed only in frightening them into doing something nobody wants.
Many of the writers saw the safety of the hostages as a primary obligation of government, and for them sanctity of life was more important than social control :
We cannot in all conscience throw Mr Cross to the wolves. We cannot put the state before the lives of two men, innocent men, who are pawns in this power game. The hostage was alive for over a week while the government dickered with his life. The men who made that decision are the ones who killed Laporte. It takes no courage to allow a man to be murdered ... and not lift a hand to save him. You signed Laporte’s death warrant. Some were willing to capitulate to FLQ demands to eliminate them from the country, once and for all: “What matters is that these people not be allowed loose in Canada to do us harm. I plead with the government that a deal be proposed to the Cubans.”
A large group saw the chief priority as achieving a measure of social, economic, and political equality in Quebec. They attributed the crisis to a history of disadvantage and a host of social ills, and maintained that the FLQ was a symptom, rather than a cause, of disorder: 314
I feel that the government should concentrate on eliminating the poverty that spawned the FLQ in the first place. The WMA is only a device which deals with symptoms and outward manifesta- tions of more subtle and serious economic and social problems. Others held poor police work to blame for harsh legislative measures: “We get weeks of seeming bewilderment, frantic head-scratching and total in- effectiveness from the [RCMP] at a time when they were called upon to combat an emergency . . .” I N T O L E R A N C E O F A M B I G U I T Y
However singlemindedly many writers sought to stifle dissent and close down the marketplace of ideas, a simple, direct, “appropriate” solution is in fact fed by doubt and ambiguity (Lane, 1969:163). Simon (1965:173-174) argues that the tendency to treat cleavage and ambivalence as illegitimate is motivated by a quest for subjective certainty. The basic problem in human action is a gap between the multi-dimensional reality to which people have to react and the necessity that such reaction be unidimensional lest we go in all directions at once. “The actor bridges the gap by fitting in the stimuli with his existing pattern of beliefs, thus rendering them credible or illegiti- mate (1965: 175).”
Relativity of judgment and mutually exclusive values did not appear to fit in with many writers’ views of the world. Yet persons who crave certainty are likely to see the world around them as less orderly than it may be in fact. Inflexibility can yield a low tolerance of ambiguity and premature cognitive closure, restricting the range of alternatives relevant to the handling of a problem (McClosky and Schaar, 1968 : 28-29).
Each of the letters was thus further classified as to its complexity, accord- ing to whether it tended towards oversimplified dichotomization, trite rheto- ric, and unqualified either-or appraisals or solutions (“no dilemma” condi- tion: 55 per cent); or towards a careful exploration and tolerance of the relativity of events and consequent actions, well-developed arguments on a complex situation (“dilemma” condition: 45.0 per cent) .4
Table II supports the expectation that pro-government writers, like the government itself, would describe the threat in monistic terms: only 66 per cent of “dilemma” writers supported the government position, as compared with 85 per cent of “no dilemma” writers doing so. The effect of complexity of letter on specific sentiments is examined within “pro-government” and “anti-government” groups. Those who described the FLQ as “criminals” or “revolutionaries” rather than in extremist terms tended to write more thoughtful letters. 60 per cent of “dilemma” writers in the “pro-governmentyy group described the FLQ in these terms, as compared with only 39 per cent of “no dilemma” writers. The other three sentiments in Table II appeared only in “anti-government” letters, of which 139 acknowledged a dilemma and 76 did not, Of the writers who regarded the obligation to save the hostages as the most important concern, 7 per cent had acknowledged a
4 I am grateful to Professor H. David Kirk, who suggested this variable. 315
TABLE n PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION
Stand taken Dilemma No dilemma
Pro-governmen t 66 % (411)
Sentiment expressed Dilemma
85% (503)
No Dilemma
Percentage mentioning FLQ as “criminals.” “revolutionaries” Percentage mentioning danger to civil liberties Percentage mentioning overreaction Percentage mentioning sanctity of life
39% (427)* 36% (76) 29% (76) 21% (76)
* Pro-government letters
dilemma situation while 21 per cent had not. This suggests that the former writers were moved by a humanistic impulse to save l i e which overrode other considerations.
AUTHORITARIANISM AND SUPPORT FOR GOVERNMENT
It was expected that a positive relationship would be found between author- itarianism and approval of the government stand. Selection of the letter writers who received questionnaires was not randomized since the original sample was not randomly drawn. To facilitate interviewing, 200 Toronto names were arbitrarily chosen from the 847 for whom addresses were avail- able, and a questionnaire was mailed or administered to them three or four months after the October crisis. They fell into no particular category, but 80 per cent were pro-government. Because the original sample was not randomly drawn, no effort was made to randomize selection of the 200 letter writers to whom the questionnaire was mailed or administered, and to facilitate interviewing, they were all from large cities. There was a tendency to bifurcation on many of the questions. The F-scale cannot handle author- itarianism of the left, and does not reveal the many efforts of anti-govern- ment writers to discredit or vilify the prime minister (T.W. Adorno et al,
The first 32 questions, whose answers ranged from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” on a 5-point scale, covered four types of authoritarian- ism: submission, aggression, powerlessness, and anti-intraception. The last three questions concerned freedom of the press. To attempt to counteract the acquiescence response bias common to the F-scale, these questions were reversed; strong disagreement reflecting high authoritarianism.
Table III suggests that of writers supporting the government position, a greater proportion scored high on authoritarianism than those who criticized
255-257).
316 policy.
TA
BL
E I
11
STA
ND
TA
KEN
BY
WR
ITER
BY
LEV
EL O
F A
UTH
OR
ITA
RIA
NIS
M (p
erce
ntag
e dis
trib
utio
n)
Leoe
l of a
utho
rita
rian
ism
Aut
hori
tari
an-s
ubm
issi
on
Aut
hori
tar i
an-a
ggre
ssio
n Po
wer
less
ness
A
nti-i
ntra
cept
ion
Stan
d ta
ken
by w
riter
Lo
w
Med
ium
H
igh
Low
M
ediu
m
Hig
h Lo
w
Med
ium
H
igh
Low
M
ediu
m
Hig
h
Pro-
gove
rnm
en t
57%
95
%
95%
51
%
89%
93
%
75%
84
%
82%
58
%
87%
97
%
N =
(5
4)
(60)
(22)
(3
7)
(54)
(4
5)
(57)
(4
5)
(34)
(4
8)
(46)
(4
2)
EX
PRE
SSIO
N O
F “T
RU
ST L
EAD
ERSH
IP”
BY
LEV
EL O
F A
UT
HO
RIT
AR
IAN
ISM
(per
cent
age
dist
ribu
tion)
Leve
l of
auth
orita
rian
ism
Aut
hori
tari
an-s
ubm
issi
on
A ut
hori
tari
an-a
ggre
ssio
n Po
wer
less
ness
A
nti-i
ntra
cept
ion
Exp
ress
ion
of
“tru
st le
ader
ship
” Lo
w
Med
ium
H
igh
Low
M
ediu
m
Hig
h Lo
w
Med
ium
H
igh
Low
M
ediu
m
Hig
h
The results suggest that when letter writers were confronted with dramatic political events, there was trust in the leader as a political responsibility, Putting one’s faith in the leadership is not an active, conscious role, for political socialization endows it with a reflexive quality in the normal climate.
When we examine authoritarianism in the light of expressions of trust in the leadership, we find that this sentiment is accompanied by a decrease in authoritarianism on the powerlessness dimension, but it tends to increase on aggressive and anti-intraceptive authoritarianism. The incidence of moderate authoritarian submission suggests that when letter writers were confronted with dramatic political events, they saw trust in the leader as a political responsibility. Putting one’s faith in the leadership is not an active, con- scious role, for political socialization endows it with a reflexive quality in the normal climate.
Tolerance of a free press we would expect to indicate a lack of compliance with the leadership, and a willingness to entertain dissenting views. Neither of these predictions, however, is borne out, as Table IV shows. The reason for this may lie in the fact that the press served, in the main, to support the government’s position. In instances where editorial stands were not con- gruent with the writer’s own views, selective perception was likely operating as he sifted out the pro-government arguments which echoed his own, and dismissed the anti-government editorials which did not contribute to “sub- jective certainty.” Therefore, the ideological acceptance of free speech in the questionnaire need not be incompatible with the respondent’s opinions in the letters.
STRUCTURE A N D I D E O L O G Y IN CRISIS
Location in the social structure and role- or class-speciflc values have been said to contribute more to social cohesion than general core values (Mann, 1970:425). Further, consensus is said to be strengthened by such factors as urban residence, high educational attainment and high socioeconomic status, which increase the level of political articulation (McClosky, 1964: 362). In addition to structural factors, the interdependencies and linkages afforded by group membership in a pluralist system are considered to be in- strumental in mediating the opinions of constituent members.
Accordingly, we computed the proportions favouring the government’s stand and exhibiting trust in the government’s leadership by occupation, birthplace, and size of community lived in. The results are reported in Tables v and VI, where it is clear that no large or consistent differences on any of these variables appeared.
This suggests that the writers’ personal interpretations and handling of the events served to cancel out social influences in opinion formation.
Verba and his colleagues found that there was little relationship between the standard structural variables and policy preferences on the Vietnam war (1967:324). The war was not seen to involve domestic status politics, 318
TABL
E IV
--
SENT
IMEN
TS
EXPR
ESSE
D B
Y L
EV
EL
OF
TO
LE
RE
AN
CE
FO
R F
RE
ED
OM
OF
TH
E PRESS (p
erce
ntag
e dis
trib
utio
n)
-
-~
Leve
l OJ
tole
ranc
e for
free
dom
of t
he p
ress
St
and
take
n by
wri
ter
Low
M
ediu
m
Hig
h ~
__
~
-
Pro-
gove
rnm
ent
67%
80
%
90%
Ant
i-gov
ernm
ent
33
20
10
N=
(3
3)
(55)
(4
8)
Leve
l of
tole
ranc
e for
free
dom
of’
the p
ress
100%
10
0%
100%
.
__
-
Exp
ress
ion of
Exp
ress
ion
of
“tru
st le
ader
ship
” Lo
w M
ediu
m
Hig
h “b
leed
ing
hear
ts”
Low
Med
iuni
H
igh
Pres
ent
45%
58
%
56%
Pr
esen
t 18
%
16%
29
%
N=
(3
3)
(55)
(4
8)
(33)
(5
5)
(48)
w
h, 0
TA
BL
E V
STA
ND
TA
KE
N I
N L
ETTE
R B
Y O
CC
UPA
TIO
N O
F W
RIT
ER
(per
cent
age d
istr
ibut
ion)
Occ
upat
ion
Prof
essi
onal
Sa
les-
U
nem
ploy
ed
-man
ager
ial
cler
ical
Sk
illed
U
nski
lled
Stud
ent
Hou
sew
ife
-ret
ired
Pro-
gove
rnm
ent
71%
91
%
81%
77
%
76%
84
%
88%
N=
(2
29)
(76)
(7
2)
(34)
(1
14)
(73)
(6
5)
Cra
mer
’s V
= 0
.173
STA
ND
TA
KE
N I
N L
ETTE
R B
Y B
TR
TH
PLA
CE
OF
WR
ITE
R (p
erce
ntag
e dis
trib
utio
n)
Can
adia
n bo
rn
Eng
lish-
Fr
ench
- W
este
rn
Eas
tern
sp
eaki
ng
spea
king
E
urop
ean
Eur
opea
n O
ther
Pro-
gove
rnm
ent
78%
73
%
75%
73
%
75%
N
=
(599
) (3
3)
(79)
(5
6)
(147
) C
ram
er’s
V =
0.0
39
STA
ND
TA
KE
N B
Y W
RIT
ER
AC
CO
RD
ING
TO
SIZ
E O
F C
OM
MU
NIT
Y O
F R
ESI
DE
NC
E* (
perc
enta
ge di
stri
butio
n)
Pouu
latio
n si
ze
2500
25
01-
10,0
01-
25,0
01-
100,
001-
30
0,00
1-
1,ooO
,OO
1 or
less
10
,Ooo
25
,000
10
0,00
0 30
0,00
0 1,0
00,O
OO
an
dove
r ~
~ ~~
Pro-
gove
rnm
en t
82%
92
%
78%
69
%
82%
72
%
73%
N
=
(51)
(6
5)
(40)
(54)
(4
5)
(58)
(5
34)
Cra
mer
’s V =
0.1
35
* Po
pula
tion
as r
epor
ted
in th
e 19
61 C
ensu
s.
TA
BL
E V
I
PER
CE
NT
AG
E O
F “T
RU
ST L
EAD
ERSH
IP”
EXPR
ESSE
D B
Y O
CC
UPA
TIO
N,
BIR
TH
PLA
CE
, A
ND
PO
PU
LA
TIO
N SIZE
(per
cent
age
dist
ribu
tion)
Occ
upat
ion
Perc
enta
ge m
entio
ning
Pr
ofes
sion
al-
Sale
s-
Skill
ed
Uns
kille
d U
nem
ploy
ed-
“tru
st le
ader
ship
” m
anag
eria
l cl
eric
al
wor
ker
wor
ker
Hou
sew
ife
Stud
ent
retir
ed
~~
Birt
hpla
ce
Eng
lish-
spea
king
F
renc
h-sp
eaki
ng
Wes
tern
E
aste
rn
Can
adia
n C
anad
ian
Eur
opea
n E
urop
ean
Oth
er
50%
51%
49%
45%
41%
(599)
(33)
(79)
(56)
(147)
Popu
latio
n si
ze
2500
or
2501-
10,001-
25,001-
100,001-
300,001-
1,000,001
less
10,000
25,000
100,000
300,000
l,OOO,OOO
and
over
45%
(51)
77%
53%
(65)
(40)
39%
56%
48%
46%
(54)
(45)
(58)
(534)
322
and while the preference of writers had internal structure, they were not related to the broad social groupings around which political and social atti- tudes often cluster. On “smaller” issues, people pick up cues from their various groups but in major events, neither the informed nor uninformed receive such “segmental” cues (Verba et al, 1967:331, 333). Turner (quoted in Mann, 1970:427) found that affective responses are strongly motivated by such cognitive and personality factors as hostility and anxiety, and the relationship holds either independently of, or in combination with, social influences.
Four factors emerge which may give some indication of where to look for sources of political support in a national emergency, and the form it will take.
( a ) The leader’s strategy in crisis and the majority response influenced each other, and in cases where government efforts to inculcate attachment to core values and to mobilize fear were largely unsuccessful, the response was mainly characterized by monism and extremism. Both the quality and timing of sentiments in the letters strongly echoed those of the prime minister and his government.
( b ) While writers were almost evenly divided between those who saw a dilemma situation and those whose response revealed little complex analysis of events, more “no dilemma” letters were found among pro-government writers. People concerned about the effects of government overreaction and social control mechanisms tended to write more thoughtful letters.
( c ) Although authoritarianism scores tended to be fairly low among people who expressed “trust in the leadership,” this was the strongest senti- ment in 25 per cent of the pro-government letters, and appeared more than any other theme in the total sample. This suggests that successful socialiia- tion to comply with leadership directives issued in crisis serves to cancel out the role of authoritarian tendencies as components of wholesale support; events themselves tended to generate their own response.
( d ) The lack of influence of such variables as occupation, birth place, and population size on writers’ opinions indicates that the subjective mean- ings applied to a major issue have greater predictive power than structural factors.
CONCLUSIONS
Some tentative general statements can be made about system maintenance in crisis, in the light of the Canadian government and public response in October 1970. Even with widespread support, government resorted to coercive measures which retroactively defined formerly legal activities as crimes. Because the WMA increased the number of negatively sanctioned behaviours, the system required costly methods of surveillance and control to implement these measures.
Government and public response in the October crisis conferred legiti- macy on laws never before used in peacetime.
Clearly, if system members decide for themselves that the government is right, then the political authorities need not coerce them. Voluntary com- pliance, then, can be seen as beneficial for the system. The consistent find- ings that trust in the leadership appeared to be almost automatic suggest that Canadians eliminated themselves as social actors when faced with events of crucial significance.
For this reason, this paper has tried to explore some of the ideologies that supported the letter writers who saw criticism and questioning of govern- ment policy as both inappropriate and damaging in crisis. When attitudes and opinions lie dormant in apathy or quiescent in stability, they serve as crude predictors of consensus in a time of social disorder: consequently, it was attempted to seek their source and nature when anchored in a critical empirical context. To attempt an estimation of the degree of system integra- tion when the sun is shining yields little knowledge of what will happen when its members are faced with a national emergency.
REFERENCES
Adorno, T.W. et a1 1950 The Authoritarian Personality. New York. Norton. Berger, P., and T. Luckmann 1967 The Social Construction of Reality. New York: Anchor Books. Blumer, H. 1958 “Race prejudice as a sence of group position.” Pp. 217-227 in J. Masuoka
and P. Valien (eds.), Race Relations: Problems and Theory. Bonenfant, J.C. and J.C. Falardeau 1969 “Cultural and political implications of French-Canadian nationalism.”
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