can’t one put new wine into old bottles? comparing … · intergovernmental organizations...

CAN’T ONE PUT NEW WINE INTO OLD BOTTLES?

Comparing 23 Global Intergovernmental Organizations (GIGOs)

on the Grounds of Robert Dahl’s Political Theory1

Dr. DawissonBelém Lopes

Professor of International Politics at UFMG – Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Brazil

Visiting Researcher at GIGA – German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Germany (July-August 2013)

Abstract:In a world partially ruled by states, and still devoid of democratic global governance, how to

make political relations among states more pluralistic in their nature? In this paper, we assume Global

Intergovernmental Organizations (henceforth, GIGOs) to function as 'enablers' of inter-state liberal

politics by way of their multilateral institutional frameworks. To make the point, we recall this classic

concept of 'polyarchy' coined in the early 1950s by Robert Dahl. According to Dahl, polyarchy should be

understood as an aspect of democratic phenomena rather than as 'democracy itself.' That is to say,

polyarchy is a bi-dimensional theoretical construct applicable to measure the levels of liberalization in

political societies. It follows that the more actors take part in politics, and the more institutions allow

political opposition, the opener a society (of states) will possibly be. In so being, we want to assess and

rate the level of ‘polyarchization’ of 23 GIGOs which cover varied issue-areas and seize eligibility criteria

(e.g., to gather more than 100 member-states from at least 3 different continents). As for methodology,

a scorecard has been specially developed to help achieving our research objectives in full.

INTRODUCTION

From the late 1970s on, worldviews supported by the premise of ‘systemic anarchy’

have become commonplace in academic reflections on international politics (Bull

1977; Waltz 1979; Keohane 1984; Wendt 1996). The premise of systemic (or structural)

anarchy implies the recognition that in an environment where sovereign states

embody supreme authority over the limits of their respective territories, there can be

no world government. It is a logical corollary to the modern principle of equality

among nations. So if there is not an instance of power above or beyond states, there

would prevail(structural) anarchy. Thus it is up to each state to produce its own

jurisdiction and the legitimate use of force within its borders.

This modern international system (also called 'Westphalian') is extensively based on

the notion of territorial sovereignty and the horizontal relationship among states (as

opposed to the ‘vertical’ relation seen at the domestic level, between the ruler and the

1 This working paper is a by-product of the ‘Contested World Orders’ project, which has been conducted under the

auspices of the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) since 2013 until now. I am thankful to GIGA for

partly financing this research enterprise. I also take the opportunity to express my gratitude to João Paulo Oliveira,

Clara Silberschneider, Nikolas Passos, and Patricia Springer for their valuable research assistance over the years.

ruled). Martin Wight (1966) even claimed once that what one identified as

‘international politics’ should actually be termed ‘diplomatics’, since there was no

public space in the world dedicated to sovereign nations, but only interactions, on a

more or less regular basis, between their diplomatic corps (or armed forces, when

diplomacy failed). Kenneth Waltz (1979) postulated that the modern international

system was not the result of deliberate policy choices, but rather a delicate balance

reached among states by launching themselves in efforts for national survival and

constraining each other into some compromise. Hence the origins of the dynamic

realists have named the ‘balance of power’ (Paul etalii 2004).

This mechanistic and sovereigntist perspective was nuanced over the years, along with

profound reconfigurations in the field of international studies. Although there has not

been acknowledged so far any actor to overpower the modern nation-state, we can

already identify some loci of authority that compete with the ‘territorial sovereignty’

paradigm, injecting new political contents and interfering with the course of

international relations. Authors have been using the term ‘governance without

government’ (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992, Young 1999) to describe the fluidity of

political authority in the contemporary world. As for government, they usually refer to

the activities supported by formal authorities, i.e. the police power that ensures the

implementation of duly established policies. For governance it is meant those activities

underpinned by shared goals that may or may not derive from legal responsibilities

and not necessarily rely on police power that be put into practice. According to James

Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (1992), governance is broader a concept than

government, as the former is not limited to the latter.

Noting the fragmentation and multiplicity of relations of political authority in

contemporary politics, Rodney Hall and Thomas Biersteker (2002) developed the

concept of ‘private authority’. If it is correct that the term ‘political authority’ was

linkedthrough the course of modernity to the management of public affairs, the

authors realized that, more recently, some private entities have come to project

authority and influence a growing number of international issues. Actors from the

private sector are not important only for the international economy anymore, they

have also become of critical relevance in matters concerning multiple areas of systemic

governance. These agents have been involved in the establishment of social norms,

provision of welfare, safeguarding of contracts, peace keeping, bioethics, among

others. Not coincidentally, Hall and Biersteker (2002) pointed out the emergence of

private authority as an unequivocal sign of global governance. Even though private

authority almost never exceeds the authority of the national state, [for the authors] it

is increasingly important for the understanding of political dynamics in international

relations – which today contemplate actors as diverse as the states, market players,

international organizations, transnational movements, mafias, churches etc. .

The complexity of this framework of‘global governance without a world government’is

aggravated by the debate promoted on political legitimacy in international relations.

The question that comes up in discussions goesas follows: Ifthere are elements of

‘governance without government’ on a global scale, where does it derive its legitimate

authority from? Assumingthe diagnosis that democracy consists of the preferred

political regime and source of procedural legitimacy in domestic constituencies, there

are still serious pitfalls, within the ambit of the modern system of states, to operating

with the democratic formula.

STATE OF THE ART

In thiscurrent stage of international relations, the emergence of global issues which

potentially affect the entire planet has come to demand new public policies that

traditional territorial states mightfind difficult to carry out. These are issues that

require international and cross-border approaches, since its causes and effects are no

longer restricted to one or another state, region or group of states. In sum, the

contemporary problématique canbe enunciated this way: global issues constitute a

reality that few international actors have the wherewithal to tackle in isolation. Claims

for a global governance that is compatible with (some degree of) democracy have thus

spread out.

Nonetheless, suchclaims fora more democratic global governance – that is, one that

provides more open and plural decision-making processes regarding major global

issues with repercussions on planetary scale – often clash with allegations that, in

practical terms, the operationalization of this goal is confined to technocratic elites of

intergovernmental organizations, with little or no connection with an electorate or

genuinely global audiences (Keohane, Macedo and Moravcsik 2009; Marks 2001).

Rather, it is skeptically argued that international organizations entrusted with the tasks

of global governance consist, in most cases, of ‘bureaucratic bargaining systems’

among rulers, because they are opaque and fundamentally anti-democratic (Dahl

1999; Dahrendorf 1999).

It is admitted, however, that this tension between the democratization of international

relations and the performance of international multilateral institutions be perceived

from other angles. Magdalena Bexell, Jonas Tallberg, and Anders Uhlin (2010) despite

grudgingly recognizing the unfulfilled promises of multilateralism and the major

obstacles faced in the implementation of democratic global governance, postulate the

existence of an intense contemporary transnational activity, which, in some cases,

reaches the interior of intergovernmental organizations (see the cases of the European

Union, the International Labour Organization, and the United Nations ), bringing along

democratizing potentials (e.g., the formal inclusion of non-state actors in consultation

and decision-making processes).

Robert Keohane, Stephen Macedo, and Andrew Moravcsik(2009) contend, from a

different point of view, that formal international institutions such as the World Trade

Organization and the European Union, contribute to the promotion of a conception of

‘constitutional democracy’ in international relations, if safeguarding individuals and

minorities against the interests of ruling coalitions and powerful factions. Moreover,

they hypothesize that the promotion of multilateral cooperation unleashes the

propagation of information and arguments – and, by an indirect pathway, the

generation of (some) accountability – as often happens with the cases that are brought

up to the UN Security Council and the International Court of Justice.

So, to think of the complex relationships among democracy, global governance and the

modern system of states requires, in our opinion, a previous attempt to catalogue and

classify the approaches, lest we compare excessively disparate objects. There are in

the literatureat least two ways of approaching the democratization of global

governance, which I will call, for didactic purposes and clarity of argument, (a)

traditional and (b) contemporary.

Traditional approaches to the phenomenon of ‘democratization of global governance’

focus on the aspect of the pluralization of state actors with proven ability to

participate in formal multilateral arrangements, to elaborate and vocalize their

preferences (in equality of conditions with other players) and to make decisions

regarding the various agendas of international relations. They are derived from a

diagnosis that states (actors granted with territoriality and sovereignty) matter and,

more than that, still are necessary pieces to solve the global public administration

puzzle (Cf.Hurrell 2008 for an extended account of what he calls ‘Pluralism’ in IR).

Along this line, Guy Hermet (2002) understands that, although subject to the trends of

globalization in myriad of new issues, the territorial state remains the only actor able

to put a halt, at least provisionally, to the clashes that paralyze the global, regional,

and national political agendas. It is, so to speak, an unavoidable reference in the ‘space

management’ (p. 44). Therefore, any measure to establish democratic governance in

the international system will depend on the effective capacity of sovereign states to

collegially formulate and inscribe international regimes into the proceedings of public

international law.

Darren Hawkins et al. (2006) have employed ‘principal-agent’ theories (derived from

representative democracy) to explain some of the decision processes occurring in

multilateral international organizations. Within this analytical framework, ‘delegation’

takes place when ‘an amount of political authority is conceded to an agent by a

principal, empowering the former in the name of the latter’ (Hawkins et al., 2006, p.

7). According to the authors , delegation within international organizations (IO) works

on very similar lines to that of domestic politics , but with the difference that instead of

individuals, are the states that assign powers (always limited by a term) to the IO.

Thus, international organizations are designed, of course, as the agents that can

implement policy decisions of states and pursue their strategic goals.

The traditional approach to the democratization of global governance will evidently

demand from its adopters an emphasis on the concept of ‘system of states’. It

resembles, in terms of method, the representative/constitutional conception of

democracy, as long as citizens will just be able to influence international affairs

through the national elections they join. As summed up by Susan Marks (2001), it is as

if democracy could only be materialized through the ‘nation-state container’ (p. 50).

Furthermore, there is greater attention to the formalities of international political

participation, which will be led (and monopolized) by sovereign states (Bexell, Tallberg,

and Uhlin 2010).

If states are hubs of political loyalties par excellence, how is it possible to imagine a

legitimate locus of power that is above and beyond sovereign states? For Robert

Howse (2001), the mental operation is relatively simple: He proposes an analogy

between the formal attribution of authority that the states promote in relation to

international organizations, on the one hand, and the (actual or presumed) allocation

of authority of individuals in relation to the representatives of states, on the other.

Interstate multilateralism works as the device by which relations within the system of

states are legitimated, in the shadow of liberal contractualist formulas in modern

political theory.

However, it shall be clear that the argument of multilateralism as an extension of

domestic democracy will invariably prove fallacious because a considerable portion of

the members of global international organizations will always be made up of non-

democratic states. Additionally, as has already been convincingly demonstrated by

Miles Kahler (1992), the larger the number of members of a formal multilateral

arrangement, the greater the tendency of ‘minilateral’ practices to take place (i.e., the

formation of small ‘clubs’ of actors, with similar or compatible interests among

themselves within the framework of international institutions).

In a nearly opposite direction to that of traditionalists, contemporary approaches take

into account the incorporation of non-state actors – such as local governments, NGOs,

advocacy networks, social movements, political parties, transnational corporations,

philanthropic agencies, etc. – into global decision-making practices formerly

dominated by states (Alger 2010; Bexell, Tallberg, and Uhlin 2010;Keohane, Macedo,

and Moravcsik 2009; Prakesh and Gugerty 2010; Tallberget alii 2013). It is, therefore, a

matter of acknowledging the transnational characteristics acquired by democracy in

the midst of a broad and all-encompassing process of globalization of social and

human relations (Marks 2001; Held 2004; Zweifel 2006).

Contemporary interpretations of the democratization of global governance take as a

model the institutional formulas that allow a more direct exercise of democracy by the

‘global citizens’ (those directly involved in political processes), mixing ingredients of

representation, participation and deliberation (Bexell , Tallberg, and Uhlin 2010). The

alleged advantage of the method is its inclusiveness, since the participation of

transnational actors (beyond and below the state) expands and improves the access to

public power of significant strata of the world's population – which would most likely

remain ostracized by the usual representative channels (Marks 2001).

Note that the argument does not go without controversy. As Margaret Keck (2004)

pointed out, the activism of transnational civil society in international organizations

may represent positions not people, ideas not voters. Thus, the inclusion promoted

can collaterally generate problems of selectivity and biases in the representation of the

demos.

In view of the theoretical difficulties and moral problems brought to the fore, authors

such as David Held, Peter Singer, and Jürgen Habermas have tried to imagine

possibilities of inclusion and reconciliation between the traditional democratic method

of decision-making (which assumes the representation and/or participation of each

and every citizen) and the desirable effectiveness of the foreign policies of states. As a

first step, Held (2004) proposed a bold reform in the current model of global

governance that was established throughout the 1990s. ‘The possibility of a global

social-democratic polity is connected to an expanded framework of states and

agencies bound by the principles of the rule of law, democracy, and human rights’, he

states (p. 108). In rejecting the proposal of a gradual evolution within the already

established set of institutions, Held suggested the creation of a comprehensive and

interconnected network of public fora, overlapping cities, states, regions, and finally

the transnational order. In local domains, the participatory processes of the demos

would take place in direct fashion, and in more remote domains, there would be

mediation through representative mechanisms. In this context, the formation of a

global assembly, encompassing all states and agencies, can be envisaged. The focus of

this assembly would be the examination of the most salient issues among global

concerns (issues regarding health and disease, food supply and distribution, financial

instability, foreign debts, climate change, disarmament, nuclear, chemical and

bacteriological weapons, etc.).

Contrary to this view of global democracy (which he labels as ‘Kantian’), Kazancigil

(2002) is of opinion that ‘it takes that all states and nations share similar worldviews,

principles, and political systems, a condition that probably will never be met on a

planetary scale’ (p. 61). The author argues the unfeasibility of a model based on the

concept of ‘global constituency’, because it is a ‘distant perspective, almost utopian’

(Kazancigil , 2002, p. 62). He admits as a most optimistic hypothesis the existence of

regional democratic governance in the world today (namely, in parts of the European

Union), reaching a very limited number of state and non-state actors.

Singer (2004) states that if the group before whom one must justify their behavior is a

tribe or nation, their morality tends to be tribal or national. If, however, the

communication revolution has created a global audience, one might feel the need to

justify their behavior to the whole world. Such a change, for the author, creates the

material basis for a new ethics that reaches all of the planet’s inhabitants. It is

therefore possible to derive that individuals suitably adapted to the new global

dimension of political decisions will be able to think of social integration beyond the

neighborhood, city or country. Contemporaneously, the virtue of thinking the ‘political’

beyond the territorial boundaries of the state seems a requirement.

Regarding the possibilities of applying democratic formulas to international relations,

Habermas (1998) argues that a political community must – if it regards itself as

democratic – be able to distinguish between those who are their members and those

who are not. The self-referential concept of ‘collective self-determination’ points out

the logical space occupied by citizens brought together as members of a particular

political community (as opposed to other political communities gathered under other

states). This particular political community establishes itself as democratic as it proves

capable of elaborating its own standards for the interactions it will promote with other

political communities around the world. The solidarity forged by the population within

a state is rooted in a particular collective identity, supported by historical references

and moral persons. That is what shapes the nation and sets its potential for self-

administration.

A similar argument is put forward by Howse (2001), for whom the applicability of the

term demos in reference to issues related to the modern system of states remains

questionable. The author elucidates his objection as follows: ‘as there is not a

transnational demos, then transnational civil society will continue deriving its

legitimacy from the ability to represent interests, values and those stakeholders which

have some domestic salience’ (Howse 2001, 362).

The two perspectives –traditional and contemporary– are greatly relevant for the

studies on democratization of international politics, either for their potential or their

limits. It is not our intention to propose a reflection on the theme of democratization

of global governance that necessarily evokes the ‘armor of the nation-state’ concept

(Marks, 2001), nor to accept the idea of ‘global governance against the state’ (Hermet,

2001). After all, it is not a matter of pursuing the finely outlined extremes of this

debate, but rather of advancing a useful proposal for the understanding of, say, the

constitutive problem of international politics.

RESEARCH PROBLEM AND RESEARCH DESIGN

Given the ‘systemic anarchy’ – and the absence of a global democratic system or a

universal Leviathan – there surely are theoretical as well as empirical barriers to

‘democratizing’ international politics. Within this paper, our starting question was:

Considered the non-existence of a polity on planetary scale, is there a conceivable way

to speak of democratic political interactions in a system of territorial sovereign states?

First, it is important to recall that different approaches to the subject of

democratizationhave led to different formulas of operationalizing ‘democracy’ at the

academic realm of International Relations (IR). Susan Marks (2001), for instance, has

set forth a tripartite division of the projects for the democratization of global

governance, and grouped them into (a) world government, (b) pan-national

democracy, and (c) cosmopolitan democracy projects. While the first category refers,

quite literally, to the possibility of building a global democratic state, and the second

one to the pool of existing democratic regimes in the world, the third combines

elements from (a) and (b), associating the growing democratization at the domestic

level to the emergence of transnational and supranational institutions with the

capacity to democratize contemporary international politics. RaffaeleMarchetti (2012),

in a different fashion, has dismembered contemporary approaches into transnational

and cosmopolitan, identifying at least three normative models for the purpose of

applying the democratic formula to international politics (see Figure 1). In order to

grasp the degree of ‘transnational democracy’ of different formal international

institutions, Thomas Zweifel (2006) was a pioneer in measuring seven indicators,

namely appointment, political participation, transparency, reason-giving, overrule,

monitoring, and independence. The results proved disheartening for the democrats

around the world: from the eleven entities under evaluation, only two of them (the

European Union and the International Criminal Court) accomplished positive levels of

transnational democracy. All others were considered deficient in Zweifel’s

classification (see Figure 2).

FIGURE 1: Democratic formulasapplied to international politics.

Approach Model Democratic

Scope

Democratic

Principle

Institutional Design

Traditional

Intergovernment

al

NationalDemoi

SymmetricalAssociati

on

InterstateMultilaterali

sm

Contempora

ry (1)

Transnational

TransnationalDem

oi

Inclusion of

representative social

positions

Hybrid Networks (with

state and non-state

actors)

Contempora

ry (2)

Cosmopolitan

Global Demos

Universal inclusion

World Federation

Source: Adapted from Marchetti (2012, p. 12).

FIGURE 2: ‘Transnational democracy’ in eleven international institutions.

Global Multi-

Purpose IOs

Global Issue-Bound

IOs

Regionally-GroundedIOs

Dimension UN ICC WB IMF WTO EU OAU AU NAFTA NATO ASEAN

Appointment -1 0 0 -1 0 +1 -1 -1 0 0 -1

Participation -1 +1 0 0 -1 +1 -1 0 0 -1 0

Transparency 0 0 0 0 -1 0 -1 0 0 0 0

Reason-giving 0 +1 +1 -1 0 +1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1

Overrule -1 0 -1 -1 +1 +1 0 0 0 0 -1

Monitoring -1 0 0 0 -1 +1 -1 0 0 0 0

Independence -1 +1 -1 0 0 -1 -1 0 -1 0 -1

TOTAL SCORE -5 +3 -1 -3 -2 +4 -6 -2 -2 -2 -4

Ranking 10th 2nd 3rd 8th 4th 1st 11th 7th 4th 4th 9th

Source: Adapted from Zweifel (2006, p. 177).

According to Zweifel (id.), the direct confrontation between the United Nations (UN)

and the World Trade Organization (WTO) was favorable to the second. Taken from the

perspective of its Security Council, the UN was successful in criteria such as

transparency and capacity to offer public arguments (reason-giving). Given the

universe of cases, it has only outperformed the now defunct Organization of African

Unity. On the other hand, the WTO – notwithstanding the difficulties concerning the

monitoring of its members, its lack of transparency, and poor inclusion of actors in

decision-making processes – got good grades in categories such as ‘appointment’ (the

director-general of the institution is appointed by consensual decision among member

states), ‘reason-giving’ and ‘independence’, and its capacity to prevail over its

members (so-called ‘overrule’) deserved special merit. It achieved the fourth place on

the proposed ranking. If paired, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World

Bank achieveddistinct classifications. By those criteria employed, the World Bank

appears to be slightly more used to democratizing processes than the Fund – judgment

based on the ability to share with their policies’ stakeholders the underlying reasons of

their decisions. Overall, the IMF and World Bank are neutral or deficient in relation to

most of the indicators. Both received the grade <-1> for the ‘overrule criterion’, which

leads to the inference that when member states have consolidated their positions, the

twomultilateral banks can do little to resist them (see Figure 2).

The absence of a mechanism toweighing Zweifel’s operational criteria for transnational

democracy is noteworthy. There is no hierarchy among indicators for the calculation of

the index, as they simply assume, in a somewhat vague and impressionistic manner,

values ranging from ‘-1’ (absence of democracy), to ‘+1’ (presence of democracy). In

this scale, ‘0’ (zero) represents a dysfunctional democracy. Nonetheless, the

unilinearityof indicators may distort the conclusions achieved, as there are certain

elements that turn out to be more decisive than othersfor the functioning of

democracy. For example, it might be claimed in defense of the United Nations, that in

privileging the Security Council in this measurement exercise, the author jettisoned all

political potentialsfrom its General Assembly, making use of the proverbial technique

to ‘throw the baby out with the bathwater’.

More important than the index itself and the ranking elaborated by Thomas Zweifelare

in fact those reflections they provoke on the subject. Beginning with the institutional

conception of democracy the author evokes for his analysis. Arguably it is not precisely

a transnational ontology what Zweifel delivers, since the author brings together many

institutes fromdomestic democracy as parameters. It seems inappropriate to expect

that international courts and organizations be able to reproduce, in the same way as

contemporary states do, conventional democratic experiences, given the absence of a

global polity ordemos. Although the greatest problem, in our view, lies not in the

‘methodological statism’ of the study, but in hardly comparable objects, so diverse as a

court of justice, two multilateral banks, two global international organizations, and six

regional international organizations (with rather discrepant levels of

institutionalization and ambitions; see the cases of the EU and NAFTA). This broad

comparative enterprise, albeit laudable, cannot fully achieve its heuristic objectives.

All else taken into account, in this paperwe opted for adapting the conceptual tools of

conventional democratic theory in order to reach our goals. By applying the concept of

‘polyarchy’ to the study of international politics, we somehow subvert the original

plan, inasmuch as this concept was conceived by social scientist Robert Dahl in the

early 1950s to approach institutional environments from domestic politics.

As far asDahl’s political pluralism is concerned, the polyarchization of a society – i.e.,

the increase in levels of political participation and public contestation –should be seen

as just ‘one aspect of democratization’ (Dahl 2005,17). The conceptual parsimony

found in this author’s construct is consistent with his epistemological choice to treat

democracy as a Weberian ideal-typewhich is unattainable in factual situations, both

domestically and internationally speaking.Therefore, as one state develops into a

political system that allows opposition, rivalry or competition between the

government and its adversaries [henceforth, liberalization or contestation or

opposition], itsperceived level of polyarchygrows higher; likewise, whenever one

country expands the number of individuals and groups with access to institutional

mechanisms of participation in political life [henceforth, inclusiveness or participation],

then the dosing of polyarchymight have increased.It must be pointed out, moreover,

that a comprehensive system of public contestation and pluralism should not be

mistaken for the full democratization of a society (see Figure 3).In Dahl’s terms,

Polyarchies (...) can be thought of as regimes relatively (but incompletely)

democratized, or, in other words, polyarchies are institutional schemes that

have been substantially popularized and liberalized, that is, they are highly

inclusive and extensively open to public contestation (Dahl, 2005, p. 31).

FIGURE 3: Liberalization, inclusiveness, and democratization.

Source: Dahl (2005, p. 30).

However intellectually powerful it can be, we are not speaking of a hard-to-grasp

abstraction. Quite the opposite, this is an elegant, academically sound, and

straightforward concept. There is more: following Michael Coppedge (2012), variables

relating to inclusiveness and/or public contestation have been present in no less than

75% of all academic attempts to measure the level of democratization in the world for

the last 50 years. Facts basically refer to academia in the US, Canada and Europe. So,

considerable part of the well-known indices of democracy or democratization that

have been crafted in the world over the last 50 years make use of such categories, of

indicators that relate, one way or the other, to inclusiveness and contestation (see

Figure 4).2

2Michael Coppedge maintains a public database on ‘Data Used in Publications on Democratization’, which is

available at http://www3.nd.edu/~mcoppedg/crd/datacrd.htm (on 25 June 2014).

FIGURE 4:Indicators of ‘country democratization’ derived from conceptual categories by Robert Dahl.

Source: Coppedge(2012, p. 28).

Thus one can reasonably tell that in at least 75% of all cases that have been studied by

Coppedge (id.), indicators derive from Dahliandemocratic conceptions. Although the

labels of operational indicators may vary from piece to piece, they nearly always refer

to one of the two dimensions put forth by Dahl: whether inclusiveness or contestation.

(Very often might refer to both of them.) This omnipresence accounts for the strength

of Robert Dahl’s analytical categories and theoretical model. The same model many

political scientists not long ago had deemed to being old-fashioned, thenuseless. Yet

this attempt of rescuing Dahl’s categories from oblivion displays an extra feature,

which comes for the better for academics and scholars alike: it enables fruitful

dialogues between mainstream political scientists and IR experts.

Concede almost every person who has devoted herself to the study of democracy and

democratization in domesticsocietiescan be said to be a ‘Dahlian’, be that from the

normative or methodological viewpoint. Even so, the most disquieting question

remains unresolved: even if one believes the concept of polyarchyto be of any use for

the study of contemporary politics, would it still be reasonable to speak of

globalpolyarchies? How about having this concept for the study of IR and

intergovernmental organizations? Here we contend that the notion of polyarchy well

fits the discipline of IR and its phenomenology. After all, given the alleged difficulty for

a democratic regime to take place in international affairs, one should be afraid of

adopting thick conceptions of democracy for the study of international politics. In

embracing a thinner and simpler operational definition, one would probably better

account for the kind of democratic experience states and non-state actors will

actuallyenjoy in IR.

In so being, an intergovernmental organization (IGO) that gathers more than 100

member states and is representative of an encompassing relevant international

regime, and yet allows for opposition to its ruling coalition, could possibly be thought

of as a global polyarchy. Dahl (2005) employs his three-tiered classification to cover

the main empirical possibilities for domestic societies: polyarchies, competitive

oligarchies, and inclusive hegemonies. There is also a hidden fourth possibility: when

there is neither participation nor contestation in a political society, it shouldqualifyas a

closed hegemony. The ideal situation happens when the country – or in our case the

IGO – reaches position number 3 (see Figure 3).

Our proposal to assess the ‘polyarchizationof IGOs’ will adopt different metrics and

methodologicalpathways. Considering the practical challenge involved in this research,

we have just elaborated a scorecard to rate the IGO in regard to each dimension of

polyarchy (see Figure 5 for coding). To summarize it, say 75% of this model is

intergovernmental, while 25% goes transnational. In terms of participation and

contestation, approximately 42% of the final score an IGO can get comes from its

perceived ability to include states in decision-making processes, whereas 33%

comesfrom the ability to allow for contestation and 25%from the capacity to make

non-state actors take part in deliberations and decision-making procedures. As for

eligibility criteria, two rules were assumed for an IGO to be considered ‘global’ in

scope: (a) a 3-digit membership; and (b) having member states from at least 3 different

continents.

For the feasibility of this research project, one shall conceive international

organizations as universal and multilateral arenas to host some of the world’s

encompassing regimes, as open to public contestation and participation as it is

reasonable to expect from IGOs in international affairs. We take 23 cases as

representative of the political experience of states in contemporary international

world order.3

3 There they are: FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization); IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency); IBRD

(International Bank for Reconstruction and Development); ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization); ILO

(International Labor Organization); IMF (International Monetary Fund); IMO (International Maritime Organization);

IOM (International Organization for Migrations); IPU (Inter-Parliamentary Union); ISA (International Seabed

Authority); ITSO (International Telecommunication Satellite Organization); ITU (International Telecommunications

Union); OPCW (Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons); UN (United Nations); UNESCO (United

Nations Education, Science and Culture Organization); UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development

Organization); UNWTO (United Nations World Tourism Organization); UPU (Universal Postal Union); WCO (World

Customs Organization); WHO (World Health Organization); WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization); WMO

(World Meteorological Organization); WTO (World Trade Organization).

FIGURE 5:‘Global Polyarchy’ Scorecard (coding).

INCLUSIVENESS SCORE

State inclusiveness

1.1 How do countries accede to the IGO? Compliance with list of charges 0

Political acceptation by member states 1

Unidirectional expression of interest by candidate 2

1.2 How many member states are there? Less than 100 states 0

Between 101 and 150 states 1

More than 150 states 2

1.3 Can each member state participate in every IGO

organ?

Restricted participation in some organs 0

Every member is eligible, but only a few can participate in

some organs

1

Every member has access to every organ 2

1.4 How do countries participate in decision-making

procedures?

Turn (e.g.: there are observers which cannot voice out

their preferences)

0

Turn and voice (e.g.: there are members which can make

speeches, but do not vote)

1

Turn, voice, and vote (e.g.: All members participate,

discuss and vote for proposals)

2

1.5 What is the voting pattern? If there is any a member with formal veto power 0

Voting is asymmetric/weighted 1

Strict voting parity 2

Non-state inclusiveness

1.6 Can non-state actors be accredited

by the IGO?

No 0

Yes 1

1.7 If YES, how can non-state actors obtain formal

recognition?

Compliance with list of charges for acceptance 0

Acceptance of request, or invitation by states 1

Unidirectional expression of interest by non-state actor 2

1.8 How many non-state actors have been accredited

so far?

Less than 1,000 0

More than 1,000 1

1.9 How do non-state actors exert influence on

decision-making procedures?

Turn 0

Turn and Voice 1

Turn, Voice, Vote 2

CONTESTATION SCORE

2.1 Besides the secretariat and the general assembly,

does any other organ make part of the IGO

functional structure?

No 0

Yes 1

2.2 If YES, is there a balanced relationship between

the organs?

No 0

Yes 1

2.3 What is the rule for resolution approval in its

principal organ?

Consensus 0

Qualified Majority 1

Simple Majority 2

2.4 Are there reported cases of contestation to the

IGO institutional formula and/or constitution?

No 0

Yes 1

2.5 Which instruments can a member state make use

of to express its disagreement and/or oppose to

the ruling coalition?

No instrument whatsoever 0

Opposition by voting 1

Opposition via institutional instances 2

Source: Global Polyarchy Database (2014).

In the current stage of IR, the emergence of global issues that potentially affect the

entire planet, has required new types of public management, as traditional territorial

states face unbearable situations in performing their historical tasks. Such existential

menace has come to require an international cross-border approach, since its causes

and effects are no longer circumscribed to either one given state or group of states.

Global issues represent a new reality that few agents are able to cope with. In this

sense, the 23 IGOs we have studied here, thanks to their universal vocation and

representativeness in a nearly planetary scale, are perhaps those formal institutions

which have most advanced tools in public administration to exert influence over fields

as diverse and wide as telecommunications, human rights, environment, trade,

intellectual property, finance etc. From that aspect comes substantial part of the

political authority acquired by Global Intergovernmental Organizations (GIGOs) after

the Cold War – in times of economic and political globalization.

In light of the aforementioned, we state the main hypothesis of thispaper: there might

be a process of ‘polyarchization’ of international politics on the march, which

arguablymanifests in multilateral international organizations. This process is leading to

the inclusion of more and new actors (state and non-state ones) in decision-making

procedures that take place within international bureaucracies as well as greater

openness to public contestation with regard to international regimes. Nevertheless,

this polyarchizationobey different logics andpaces, what stems from the various

coalitions and power correlations that are established inside the many fields of

institutionalized governance in modern international system. As a general objective,

we intend to assess – and measure –whereeach different intergovernmental

organizationstands in so-called‘polyarchization process’ of contemporary international

politics.It is also ourgoal to analyze the potential and limits imposed by institutional

designs and thematic scopesfor the purpose of ‘democratizing’ contemporary

international relations, and to identify key coalitions and emergent power correlations,

in order to spot important trends and compare international regimes on the odds of

having opener and more pluralist management of collective-action problems over

specific issue-areas.

METHODOLOGICAL NOTE

On the index building

2.6 Is the secretary-general elected by the members

or simply appointed by the ruling coalition? 0-1]

Appointment 0

Voting 1

Global Intergovernmental Organizations (GIGOs) have been primarily classified

accordingto their institutional design,that is, by consulting their constitutive treaties,

official documents and all available literature on the subject, and secondarily by

interviewing their bureaucrats, national diplomats and experts on the issue-area. In

carrying out this research effort, a questionnaire has been filled for each GIGO under

analysis, so that references and justifications can be found for the grades received on

every item from the scorecard. Most of the justifications are formal and objective, as

they refer to official texts or articles from the GIGO founding treaty, while others have

required extensive interpretive work from the research team members.4

FINDINGS

By applying our analytical model to evaluateand find the polyarchizationlevel of 23

GIGOs in contemporary world politics, some interesting data have come to the

surface.It firstly drew our attention that organizations primarily related to education

and culture (UNESCO) and global public health (WHO) have scored higher in ‘Global

Polyarchy’ index than all others (see Figures 6 and 10). If both education and public

health are two of the most pressing agendas for domestic policymakers, they do not

enjoy the same status in IR. At least, that would be the intuitive hypothesis to explain

why UNESCO and WHO allow for broad participation and open contestation, despite all

setbacks that might befall member countries as powerful as the United States (for

instance, the polemic Palestinian membership in UNESCO). On the other hand,

multilateral banks (IMF and IBRD) and international security organizations (IAEA and

OPCW) have predictably got some of the lowest scores. However, in approaching the 4

individual cases, they will look different from each other: while the IMF would qualify

as something in between a ‘closed hegemony’ and a ‘competitive oligarchy’; IBRD,

OPCW, and especially IAEAwell fit the ‘inclusive hegemony’ category (much

participation and little contestation).

That is so because – following its institutional design – the IMF strikes in this

comparison as a NGO-avert organization, whose decision-making capacity lies in the

hands of economic greater powers. Another possible explanation for their lower

grades is the almost impervious technicality of debates relating to international

finance and weapons of mass destruction, what could have been decisive for those

organizations to reach the bottom of our ranking. Not to mention the Dahlian

argument that global elites could have tacitly judged that incurring repression costs

would be more expensive a strategy than making concessions to the lesser powers and

non-state actors in education and health issues (Dahl 2005, Acemoglu and Robinson

2006). This same reasoning would not apply to economic and security agendas though.

4 For an assessment of each individual criterion concerning the 23 GIGOs under analysis, see Figure 11.

All in all, the results achieved seem to be fairly consistent with ‘high-versus-low-

politics’ cleavages in IR – and reinforce its usefulness as a country behavior predictor

until today (see Figure 6).

FIGURE 6:GIGOs – Global polyarchies, competitive oligarchies, or inclusive hegemonies?


FIGURE 7: Comparativelevel of contestation in GIGOs.


When it comes to contestation, the five better

WHO and UNESCO – could

oriented’ international regime

institutional design may follow suit the political cleavages and power correlations to be

found inside the organizations. Again,

the greater permissiveness of contesting behaviors within the ambit of technique

bound GIGOs, what sharply contrasts with t

(IAEA, OPCW and IBRD) (see Figure 7)

FIGURE 8: Comparative level of inclusiveness in GIGOs


hen it comes to contestation, the five better-ranked GIGOs – UPU,

could be promptly associated with ‘low-politics’

’ international regimes. There probably lies another clue on how GIGOs’


nside the organizations. Again, one can easily infer, by examining available data,

the greater permissiveness of contesting behaviors within the ambit of technique

bound GIGOs, what sharply contrasts with the situation at the ‘bottom

(see Figure 7).

Comparative level of inclusiveness in GIGOs.

UPU, ITU, UNWTO,

’ or ‘technically-

s. There probably lies another clue on how GIGOs’


fer, by examining available data,

the greater permissiveness of contesting behaviors within the ambit of technique-

he situation at the ‘bottom-three’ GIGOs


FIGURE 9: Comparative level of ‘NGO


Amongst the most inclusive GIGOs, there will be those that combine state and non

state participation in more balanced ways. Unsurprisingly, UNESCO and WHO have

again reached good grades, whereas the IMF completely fails in including non

representatives in deliberative and decision

IAEA climbs many positions in this inclusiveness ranking and moves up to 3

terms of NGO-friendly GIGOs, t

this bank underwentsince the

then suffered and expanding the participatio

making procedures (Paloni and Zanardi 2006)

respectively ranked 2nd

and 3

and encompassing institutional designs, inasmuch as they allow state and non

actors to regularly interact

topics (Belém Lopes 2012; Kott and Droux 2013)


Comparative level of ‘NGO-friendliness’ in GIGOs.


Amongst the most inclusive GIGOs, there will be those that combine state and non


again reached good grades, whereas the IMF completely fails in including non

es in deliberative and decision-making procedures. Curiously enough,

IAEA climbs many positions in this inclusiveness ranking and moves up to 3

friendly GIGOs, the IBRD scored higher, possibly because of the reforms

since the late1980s, with a view at absorbing the harsh

expanding the participation of the global civil society in

(Paloni and Zanardi 2006). The UN and the ILO, which have

and 3rd

in this comparison, owe much of it to their sophisticated

and encompassing institutional designs, inasmuch as they allow state and non

actors to regularly interact with each other and deliberate on myriad of

s 2012; Kott and Droux 2013). The IMF, quite to the contrary, does

Amongst the most inclusive GIGOs, there will be those that combine state and non-


again reached good grades, whereas the IMF completely fails in including non-state

. Curiously enough,

IAEA climbs many positions in this inclusiveness ranking and moves up to 3rd

place. In

ossibly because of the reforms

harsh criticism it

n of the global civil society indecision-

The UN and the ILO, which have

comparison, owe much of it to their sophisticated

and encompassing institutional designs, inasmuch as they allow state and non-state

and deliberate on myriad of international

the contrary, does

not seem to welcome at all

Figures 8 and 9).

FIGURE 10:‘Global Polyarchy’ Index(


A few pending questions

inclusiveness and contestation

happen? A possible explanation for the alleged

complementary relationship

for instance, about the pressure

negotiation environments

globalization that took place in Seattle or Genoa

were not non-state actors

diluted as they happened to

behavior was (at least part

argument has not gone through

especially if one looks to the

IMF by means of NGO inclusion indeliberative practices

A second question to grapple with should be:

processes take place ‘under the same roof’

comparison, while the UN General Assemblyand the Economic and Social Council

get some of the best grades, the UN Security Council drags the

down, given its exclusive club structure and voting mechanisms

qualifies as a middle-ranking

Council, which dentsitspolyarchization

UNs’ as one and the same? (Jolly, Emmerij and Weiss 2009

point that has arisen during research work: Is it

at all the participation of non-state actors in its procedures

‘Global Polyarchy’ Index(as of April 2014).

Database (2014).

s remain. In some cases, an inverse correlation between

inclusiveness and contestation wasargued to exist. If that is actually so

happen? A possible explanation for the alleged trade-off would lie in th

complementary relationship the two dimensions of polyarchy concept

stance, about the pressure non-state actors made for recognition in formal

negotiation environments some 15 years ago, as in the famous protests against

globalization that took place in Seattle or Genoa. That pressure would

state actors accredited to participate in sessions, but

happened to join eventual negotiations. In those situation

behavior was (at least partially) replaced by a new participatory stance

argument has not gone throughsystematic testing yet, it should deserve

the World Bank example – and how it differentiate

IMF by means of NGO inclusion indeliberative practices (Belém Lopes 2013)

question to grapple with should be: What to do when cont

processes take place ‘under the same roof’? Take the caseof the UN.

comparison, while the UN General Assemblyand the Economic and Social Council

some of the best grades, the UN Security Council drags the GIGO classification

, given its exclusive club structure and voting mechanisms. In the end, the UN

ranking organization mostly because of the shadow of its

polyarchization potentials. Still, is it fair to treat the ‘various

UNs’ as one and the same? (Jolly, Emmerij and Weiss 2009) Another methodological

point that has arisen during research work: Is it scientifically soundto combine ‘hard’

state actors in its procedures (see

an inverse correlation between

ly so, why does it

off would lie in the

maintain. Think,

for recognition in formal

some 15 years ago, as in the famous protests against

would grow stronger

, but was otherwise

situations, opposition

ially) replaced by a new participatory stance. Although this

should deserve some credit,

and how it differentiates from the

(Belém Lopes 2013).

What to do when contradictory

the UN. In sheer

comparison, while the UN General Assemblyand the Economic and Social Councilwould

IGO classification

. In the end, the UN

shadow of its Security

entials. Still, is it fair to treat the ‘various

) Another methodological

soundto combine ‘hard’

(formal-institutional) and ‘soft’ (extra-institutional) indicators in the making of an

index? As we invested in the understanding of the institutional hardware of GIGOs, we

have run the risk of leaving most of the political essentials behind, as processes that

take place inside the GIGO do not strictly correspond to institutional settings (Reinalda

and Verbeek 2004). This is why we felt the need to make the ‘hard’ and the ‘soft’

dialogue, however problematic it can prove from an epistemological viewpoint. (For an

erudite account of the WHO contemporary politics and a case for the integration of

hard and soft variables, see Hein and Moon 2013.) Finally, we came across this classic

‘small-n’ research problem, given the limited number of GIGOs in the world today.

According to experts, there are now some 300 active IGOs, but only 10%-15% would

account for GIGOs (Karns and Mingst 2004). 30-40 is definitely not a comfortable

number of single cases to cope with – neither for inferential statistics, nor for in-depth

case studies (George and Bennett 2005;Coppedge 2012). Such difficulties we have

listeddo suggest the need for more investments in this broad research agenda for

better analytical gains in the future.

FINAL REMARKS

Ongoing debate on democratization of international politics is a must, not being

afforded to any Politics and IR academic to bypass. Susan Marks (2001) succinctly

stated the reasons for this phenomenon – on the one side, the commitment to

democracy has never been so disseminated throughout the world, on the other, never

before has the awareness of its empirical limitations been so acute.

In view of the literature, we insist on the need to assess the democratization of

international politics from a variety of, both traditional and contemporary, analytical

prisms. This will allow the understanding of how sovereign states and other important

non-state actors formulate and reformulate the institutional paths to a more plural

and open – and, in a very peculiar sense, more democratic – management of global

governance, under conditions of structural anarchy. The political dynamics of the

contemporary world facilitates the enlargement of membership in intergovernmental

organizations and, by extension, helps such institutions to globally project the values

and rules that emerge from a process of normative construction whose cornerstones

are the organizations themselves. Not to mention, of course, the hundreds – if not

thousands – of non-governmental organizations, subnational governments,

companies, individuals etc. that, since the early 1990s, have been gaining recognition

and authorization to work within the arrangements of global governance, both on ad

hoc basis and on regular advocacy networks.

FIGURE 11: An overview of GIGOs.


Moreover, with regard to intergovernmental organizations and international regimes,

what in fact is at stake is less the ability to replicate the democratic formula (such as

we know it) to tackle the problematic issues of the international agenda, and more the

authority that such institutions are increasingly vested in to play the functions of global

administration (even if not by democratic means). Therefore intergovernmental

organizations and international regimes are bothpolitical actors and meta-political

spaces (that is, microcosms) of this 21st

-century asymmetrical global governance.

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