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CapacityBuilding in AfricaCapacityBuilding in Africa

THE WORLD BANK

THE WORLD BANK W O R L D B A N K O P E R A T I O N S E V A L U A T I O N D E P A R T M E N T

ISBN 0-8213-6241-0

An OED Evaluation ofWorld Bank Support

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ENHANCING DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS THROUGH EXCELLENCE AND INDEPENDENCE IN EVALUATION

The Operations Evaluation Department (OED) is an independent unit within the World Bank; it reports directly to theBank’s Board of Executive Directors. OED assesses what works, and what does not; how a borrower plans to run andmaintain a project; and the lasting contribution of the Bank to a country’s overall development. The goals of evaluationare to learn from experience, to provide an objective basis for assessing the results of the Bank’s work, and to provideaccountability in the achievement of its objectives. It also improves Bank work by identifying and disseminating the les-sons learned from experience and by framing recommendations drawn from evaluation findings.

OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEPARTMENT

Study Series2003 Annual Review of Development Effectiveness: The Effectiveness of Bank Support for Policy ReformAgricultural Extension: The Kenya ExperienceAssisting Russia’s Transition: An Unprecedented ChallengeBangladesh: Progress Through PartnershipBridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyThe CGIAR: An Independent Meta-Evaluation of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural ResearchDebt Relief for the Poorest: An OED Review of the HIPC InitiativeDeveloping Towns and Cities: Lessons from Brazil and the PhilippinesThe Drive to Partnership: Aid Coordination and the World BankFinancial Sector Reform: A Review of World Bank AssistanceFinancing the Global Benefits of Forests: The Bank’s GEF Portfolio and the 1991 Forest Strategy and Its ImplementationFiscal Management in Adjustment LendingIDA’s Partnership for Poverty ReductionImproving the Lives of the Poor Through Investment in CitiesIndia: The Dairy RevolutionInformation Infrastructure: The World Bank Group’s ExperienceInvesting in Health: Development Effectiveness in the Health, Nutrition, and Population SectorJordan: Supporting Stable Development in a Challenging RegionLesotho: Development in a Challenging EnvironmentMainstreaming Gender in World Bank Lending: An UpdateThe Next Ascent: An Evaluation of the Aga Khan Rural Support Program, PakistanNongovernmental Organizations in World Bank–Supported Projects: A ReviewPoland Country Assistance Review: Partnership in a Transition EconomyPoverty Reduction in the 1990s: An Evaluation of Strategy and PerformancePower for Development: A Review of the World Bank Group’s Experience with Private Participation in the Electricity SectorPromoting Environmental Sustainability in DevelopmentReforming Agriculture: The World Bank Goes to MarketSharing Knowledge: Innovations and Remaining ChallengesSocial Funds: Assessing EffectivenessUganda: Policy, Participation, PeopleThe World Bank’s Experience with Post-Conflict ReconstructionThe World Bank’s Forest Strategy: Striking the Right BalanceZambia Country Assistance Review: Turning an Economy Around

Evaluation Country Case SeriesBosnia and Herzegovina: Post-Conflict ReconstructionBrazil: Forests in the Balance: Challenges of Conservation with DevelopmentCameroon: Forest Sector Development in a Difficult Political EconomyChina: From Afforestation to Poverty Alleviation and Natural Forest ManagementCosta Rica: Forest Strategy and the Evolution of Land UseEl Salvador: Post-Conflict ReconstructionIndia: Alleviating Poverty through Forest DevelopmentIndonesia: The Challenges of World Bank Involvement in ForestsUganda: Post-Conflict Reconstruction

ProceedingsGlobal Public Policies and Programs: Implications for Financing and EvaluationLessons of Fiscal AdjustmentLesson from Urban TransportEvaluating the Gender Impact of World Bank AssistanceEvaluation and Development: The Institutional Dimension (Transaction Publishers)Evaluation and Poverty ReductionMonitoring & Evaluation Capacity Development in AfricaPublic Sector Performance—The Critical Role of Evaluation

Multilingual EditionsAllègement de la dette pour les plus pauvres : Examen OED de l’initiative PPTEAppréciation de l’efficacité du développement :L’évaluation à la Banque mondiale et à la Société financière internationaleDeterminar la eficacia de las actividades de desarrollo :La evaluación en el Banco Mundial y la Corporación Financiera InternacionalCôte d’Ivoire : Revue de l’aide de la Banque mondiale au paysFilipinas: Crisis y oportunidadesReconstruir a Economia de Moçambique

http://www.worldbank.org/oed

OED PUBLICATIONS

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CapacityBuilding in Africa

W O R L D B A N K O P E R A T I O N S E V A L U A T I O N D E P A R T M E N T


2005The World Bank

Washington, D.C.

An OED Evaluation of

World Bank Support

© 2005 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank

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i i i

v Acknowledgments

vii Foreword

xi Acronyms and Abbreviations

xiii Summary of Findings and Recommendations

1 1 Introduction

5 2 Assessing Support for Capacity Building in the Public Sector5 Capacity building not a well-defined practice7 Key features of capacity building8 Bank capacity building support to Africa9 Evaluation approach

13 3 Relevance: Making Capacity Building a Goal13 Aligning support with country priorities and needs 16 Designing interventions to meet needs and demands for change 18 Monitoring, evaluating, and using the lessons of experience

19 4 Efficacy: Adapting Interventions to Country and Sector Conditions19 The overall record 21 Achieving capacity building objectives in diverse country

and sector conditions31 The quality of the inputs33 Toward more coherent capacity building

35 5 Providing Capacity Building Support through Corporate and Regional Mechanisms35 The World Bank Institute39 The African Capacity Building Foundation 41 The Institutional Development Fund 42 The overall value added

43 6 Findings and Recommendations43 Main findings45 Recommendations

Contents

47 Annexes47 A: A Selection of Prior Bank Assessments of Its Capacity Building

Support 51 B: Methodology Note 55 C: Country Case Study Missions 57 D: Lists of Projects, CASs, and ESW Reviewed 63 E: Africa Staff Survey67 F: Capacity Building in the Bank’s Africa Regional Strategies 69 G: Activities of the African Capacity Building Foundation71 H: Management Action Record

73 Endnotes

79 Bibliography

Boxes6 2.1: Different Donor Definitions of Capacity Building7 2.2: Early Calls for a New Capacity Building Perspective14 3.1: New Multisector Projects Integrate Essential Capacity Building

Elements into Project Design24 4.1: Four Capacity Building Achievements in the Roads Sector26 4.2: Building Capacity to Facilitate Decentralization: The Case of

Burkina Faso’s Health and Nutrition Project27 4.3: Human Resource Management in Health: The Need for a

Comprehensive Approach in Ghana28 4.4: A Well-Sequenced Approach to Capacity Building in the Education

Sector in Ghana30 4.5: Five Ways to Improve Capacity Building in Public Financial

Management31 4.6: Project Implementation Units Shortchange Development of

Sustainable Capacity32 4.7: A Promising New Approach to Training: Decentralization

in Uganda38 5.1: Building Professional Networks to Meet Knowledge Needs

in Africa

Figures10 2.1: Capacity Building Results Chain and Evaluation Scope20 4.1: Public Sector and Technical Assistance Projects in Africa Are Less

Successful than Bankwide Average23 4.2: Challenges to Improving Government Performance Vary

across Sectors36 5.1: Thematic Distribution of FY04 WBI Offerings in Africa37 5.2: WBI’s FY05 Budget Expenditures (including trust funds)

Tables2 1.1: A Weak Socioeconomic Foundation for Building Public

Sector Capacity3 1.2: Africa’s Public Sector Performance Lags Other Regions21 4.1: Economic and Public Sector Performance:

The Six Case Study Countries

C A PAC I T Y B U I L D I N G I N A F R I C A : A N O E D E VA L U AT I O N O F WO R L D B A N K S U P P O R T

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v

Acknowledgments

This report was prepared by a teamled by Catherine Gwin. Other teammembers were Arne Disch, Mai Le,

Floribert Ngaruko, Daniel Ritchie, and FransRonsholt. Support for the country case studieswas provided by Addis Anteneh, KhwimaNthara, Jovito Nunes, Abena Oduro, and Wak-ili Tairou. Additional input was provided byEliezer Orbach as well as Deepa Chakrapani,Mariola Chrostowska, and Angela Lisulo. Back-ground papers were prepared by Nils Boesen,who also served as an adviser to the evaluation,Peter Kimuyu, and Kenneth Prewitt. The teamreceived overall assistance from Parveen Moses.The report was edited by Caroline McEuen.

The report benefited from external expert ad-vice received at (and following) an entry work-shop from Deborah Brautigam, Merilee Grindle,Calestous Juma, Joyce Moock, Harris Mule, andJulie Robison. Harris Mule also served as an ex-ternal peer reviewer.

The Operations Evaluation Department(OED) acknowledges the support for the eval-uation provided by the Agency for Developmentand Cooperation of Switzerland; the Ministryof Foreign Affairs, Norway; and the Ministryof Foreign Affairs, Denmark.

The evaluation was conducted under theguidance of Victoria Elliott, Manager, OEDCorporate Evaluation and Methods Unit.

Director-General, Operations Evaluation: Gregory K. IngramDirector, Operations Evaluation: Ajay Chhibber

Manager, Corporate Evaluation and Methods: Victoria ElliottTask Manager: Catherine Gwin

v i i

Foreword

African countries must improve theperformance of their public sectors ifthey are to achieve their goals of

reducing poverty, accelerating economicgrowth, and providing better services to theircitizens. Achievement of such improvedperformance will require countries to comple-ment reforms with sustained capacitybuilding.

The World Bank supports a wide range ofcapacity building interventions through itscountry lending and nonlending programs anddedicated corporate and Regional entities.Between 1995 and 2004, the Bank providedsome $9 billion in lending and close to $900million in grants and administrative budget tosupport capacity building in Africa. The bulkof this support has been directed toward thepublic sector.

This evaluation assesses the relevance andeffectiveness of Bank support for public sectorcapacity building in Africa over the past 10years. It draws on studies of Benin, Ethiopia,Ghana, Malawi, Mali, and Mozambique;aggregate assessments of country strategiesand operations across the Bank’s AfricaRegion; and reviews of three corporate andRegional programs dedicated to capacitybuilding—the World Bank Institute, the

Institutional Development Fund, and theBank-supported African Capacity BuildingFoundation.

Main findingsRecent changes in approach have made Banksupport more relevantThe Bank’s traditional efforts in buildingpublic sector capacity focused primarily oncreating or reorganizing government units andbuilding individual skills. Conscious of thelimited impact of its support in the face ofcountries’ still-weak public sector capacity,the Bank has progressively changed itsapproach over the past 10 years:

• It has broadened its support to include thestrengthening of public institutions andthe fostering of demand for public serviceimprovements.

• It has added new diagnostic tools to assesscountries’ capacities to manage their public fi-nancial resources and has increased the rangeof lending instruments for delivering its ca-pacity building support to increase countryownership of these activities.

• It has also expanded corporate and Regionalprograms directly supportive of capacitybuilding.

These changes are relevant because theyrecognize that capacity building is a long-termprocess requiring a systemic approach,demand for improved public sector perform-ance, and supply of well-structured organiza-tions and skilled personnel.

In the Bank’s Africa Region, all recentcountry strategies identify public sectorcapacity building as a core objective, and theyrely increasingly on sectorwide programs andbudget support through Poverty ReductionCredits, whose broad strategic frameworksrequire identification of long-term capacityneeds. All the strategies include at least oneoperation with major capacity building aims,and a few include multisector projects thataddress capacity building issues within andacross ministries and levels of government.These new efforts may help authorities betterprioritize capacity building activities andguide support from donors.

But even with these recent improvements,the Bank's support for capacity building inAfrica remains less effective than it could be.This evaluation finds four areas that need tobe strengthened to obtain better results.

Most capacity support remains fragmented Because most capacity building support isdesigned and managed operation byoperation, it is difficult to capture cross-sectoral issues and opportunities and tolearn lessons across operations. Some of thenew multisector projects in countries withstrong public sector reform programsaddress, in an integrated way, the institu-tional, organizational, and human resourcechanges needed to improve public sectorperformance. But most projects embedcapacity building activities in other programcomponents and do not specify the capacitybuilding objectives. Many such capacitybuilding activities are not founded onadequate needs assessments and do notinclude appropriate sequencing of measuresaimed at institutional or organizationalchange and individual skill building.

Sector-specific capacity building approachesneed strengtheningThe challenges of capacity building varyacross sectors as well as across countries. Thisis because governments generally are inclinedto improve services demanded by powerfulinterests (for example, trunk roads) morereadily than those sought by weaker or morediffuse interests (such as primary education).In addition, the tractability of capacitybuilding problems depends on sectoral charac-teristics like labor intensity and the decentral-ization of service provision. While the Bank ismoving to better customize its capacitybuilding approaches to country conditions, ithas devoted inadequate effort to derivinglessons along sectoral dimensions and foster-ing country-led capacity building planningwithin sectorwide programs.

Tools and instruments could be more effectivelyand fully utilizedThe Bank’s traditional tools—technicalassistance and training—have often provedineffective in helping to build sustained publicsector capacity. The Bank is not fully utilizingall its available instruments to improve publicsector performance. Economic and sectorwork does not contribute to public sectorcapacity building as much as it is expected to,or could. Programmatic lending has so farbeen used more effectively to enhance strate-gic planning than to build sustainable capacityto manage sectors and deliver services. TheWorld Bank Institute has not yet completed itstransformation from individual training tocapacity building.

Quality assurance is inadequateFinally, the Bank does not apply the samerigorous business practices to its capacitywork that it applies in other areas. Eventhough capacity building is a stated corporateand Regional priority, most activities lackstandard quality assurance processes at thedesign stage, and they are not routinelytracked, monitored, and evaluated.

v i i i


RecommendationsThese findings underscore the importance ofapproaching capacity building in Africa as acore objective and ensuring that Bank capacitybuilding support is country-owned, results-oriented, and evidence-based. The evaluationrecommends that:

• The Bank, at the corporate level, shouldstrengthen its knowledge base and amplifyits framework for public sector capacity build-ing to better help countries (a) prioritize ca-pacity building activities and guide donorsupport; (b) link institutional, organizational,and human capacity developments; and (c)transform traditional capacity building toolsto improve results. It should also ensure thatguidelines and processes are in place for self-and independent evaluation of Bank capacitybuilding interventions.

• Sector and thematic leadership should de-velop sector-specific guidance on diagnosingpublic sector capacity needs and ways of mon-itoring and evaluating interventions.

• Regional senior management should ensurethat Country Assistance Strategies are used ef-fectively to help countries identify andstrengthen the capacities they need to plan, im-plement, and measure the results of theirpoverty reduction strategies. They should alsoensure that all operations that aim to buildpublic sector capacity are based on adequateassessments of capacity needs and have waysto monitor and evaluate results.

• The Bank should reassess what role trainingshould play in its capacity building support,how it should be provided, and what shouldbe the respective roles of a central training unitand Regional programs in any future supportfor this activity.

F O R E WO R D

i x

Gregory K. Ingram Director-General, Operations Evaluation

x i

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACBF African Capacity Building FoundationAFR Africa Region (World Bank)CAS Country Assistance StrategyCFAA Country Financial Accountability Assessment DFID Department for International Development (U.K.)DGF Development Grant Facility ESW Economic and sector workGDLN Global Development Learning NetworkGDP Gross domestic productICR Implementation Completion ReportICRG International Country Risk GuideIDA International Development AssociationIDF Institutional Development FundIDI Institutional development impactIT Information technologyOED Operations Evaluation Department (World Bank)OPCS Operations Policy and Country Services (World Bank)PACT Partnership for Capacity Building in AfricaPER Public Expenditure ReviewPFM Public financial managementPIU Program Implementation UnitPRSC Poverty Reduction Support CreditPRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy ProcessSWAp Sectorwide approach TA Technical assistanceTAL Technical Assistance LoanUNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeWBI World Bank InstituteWDR World Development ReportWHO World Health Organization

x i i i

Summary of Findingsand Recommendations

African countries must improve theperformance of their public sectors ifthey are to achieve their stated goals

of reducing poverty, accelerating economicgrowth, and providing better services to theircitizens. The continued weakness of the publicsector in most countries in the Region reflectsdeeply rooted conditions that are the legacy ofsuch influences as colonialism, politicalconflict, and the underdevelopment of theprivate and nongovernmental sectors. Long-term, systemic approaches are required tobuild public sector capacity under theseconditions.

The Bank supports a wide range of capacitybuilding interventions through both itscountry lending and nonlending programs anddedicated corporate and Regional entities.Between 1995 and 2004, it provided some $9billion in lending and close to $900 million ingrants and administrative budget to supportcapacity building in Africa. The bulk of thissupport has been directed toward the publicsector.

This independent OED evaluation assessesthe relevance and effectiveness of Banksupport for building public sector capacity inSub-Saharan Africa over the past 10 years(1995–2004). It draws on in-depth case studiesof Benin, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, and

Mozambique, which focused particularly onefforts in the roads, health, education, andpublic financial management sectors. Theevaluation also assesses country strategies andindividual operations across the Region, aswell as the work of the World Bank Institute(WBI), the Bank’s Institutional DevelopmentFund (IDF), and the Bank-supported AfricanCapacity Building Foundation (ACBF).

Overall approachThe international development community,including the World Bank, has traditionallytreated public sector capacity building as acollateral objective—that is, as a by-productor instrumental measure to advance near-termproject outcomes—rather than as a core goalin its own right, along with intended develop-ments on the ground. As a result, capacitybuilding has not developed as a well-definedarea of development practice with anestablished body of knowledge about whatworks in meeting different needs under differ-ent country and sector conditions.

Conscious of the limited impact of itssupport in the face of Africa’s still-weak publicsector capacity, the Bank has, since the mid-1990s, been modifying the design of itssupport programs. In line with its 2000 publicsector reform strategy, it has broadened the

scope of its capacitybuilding interventions toinclude strengthening ofpublic institutions. In theBank’s Africa Region,emphasis has been on publicfinancial management andaccountability and thedecentralization of services.The Bank has also addednew diagnostic tools toassess countries’ capacitiesto manage their publicfinancial resources andincreased its range of

lending instruments. These changes arerelevant because they recognize that capacitybuilding is a long-term process that requires asystemic approach and attention to bothdemand and supply for improved publicservices. But the new directions are not yetfully operationalized. The Bank has not yetestablished a knowledge base and guidance forcapacity building work comparable to that inplace for its other main work. Its diagnoses ofcapacity needs and design of capacity buildinginterventions are often partial in theircoverage of capacity constraints and obstaclesto change. The ability to implement capacitybuilding activities is often overestimated.And, even though capacity building is a statedcorporate and Regional priority, most activi-ties lack quality assurance processes at thedesign stage, and they are not routinelytracked, monitored, and evaluated.

Capacity building in country programsRecent country strategies for Africa do a betterjob of addressing capacity needs than did the

strategies of the mid-1990s.All recent Bank CountryAssistance Strategies (CASs)identify capacity building as acore objective. And they areshifting toward sectorwideprograms and budget supportthrough Poverty ReductionSupport Credits (PRSCs),

which set a broad strategy framework foridentifying long-term capacity building needs.Some CASs also include multisector projectsthat address capacity building issues within andacross ministries and levels of government.These are promising new directions: they aimto customize Bank support to country commit-ment to change, and they may help authoritiesprioritize capacity building activities and thesupport needed from donors.

The Bank could use these new processesmore effectively to help countries plancapacity building efforts linked to theiroverarching policy frameworks. Most supportfor capacity building in country programsremains fragmented—it is designed andmanaged project by project. This approachmakes it difficult to capture cross-sectoralissues and opportunities and to have the broadview needed to learn lessons acrossoperations. The Bank is also missing opportu-nities to fully utilize all of its instruments tosupport capacity building. The PovertyReduction Strategy process has the potentialto help authorities better prioritize capacitybuilding activities, but appears to have beenused in this way in only a few countries.Economic and sector work does notcontribute to public sector capacity buildingas much as it is expected to, or could.Programmatic lending offers the potential tomove toward more coherent capacitybuilding, but in most cases it has yet to fostercountry-led design of capacity building priori-ties and programs. The work of WBI has onlyrecently begun to be integrated into countryprograms, and the synergy between Bank andACBF country capacity building efforts islimited.

Capacity building in individualoperationsMany projects have capacity building activi-ties embedded in their major operationalcomponents, but the objectives of these activi-ties tend to be ill defined, and their achieve-ments poorly tracked and reported. In projectswhere capacity building is itself a main

x i v


These changes arerelevant because they

recognize thatcapacity building is a

long-term processthat requires a

systemic approachand attention to both

demand and supplyfor improved public

services.

Recent countrystrategies for Africa

do a better job ofaddressing capacity

needs than did thestrategies of the

mid-1990s.

component, objectives are better specified, butshortcomings in the underlying diagnosis ofcapacity needs and the constraints to change,and in the sequencing of measures aimed atinstitutional or organizational change andindividual skill building, often hamperachievement of those objectives.

In contrast, the relatively small number ofoperations that address capacity building asthe primary project objective, such as the newgeneration of multisector capacity buildingprojects, entail detailed capacity needs assess-ments and processes for establishing capacitybuilding outcome indicators for monitoringprogress and measuring results.

The sectoral dimension of buildingcapacityIn Africa, the Bank’s success in enhancing theperformance of the public sector varies acrosssectors as well as across countries, as evidencedby the four sectors covered in this evaluation.Support for capacity building in the roadssector has been more effective than support tothe other three sectors reviewed. This is becausethe roads sector is characterized by clear goals,stakeholders with a direct interest in change, aknown technique transferable across countries,and readily measurable results. These factorshave fostered the emergence of a coherentcapacity building strategy that has helpedgenerate institutional, organizational, andhuman resource achievements.

The experience in the roads sector is noteasily replicable. The health and educationsectors face greater challenges because theyare labor intensive and decentralized, relyingon thousands of dispersed frontline serviceproviders. Public pressure for change is morediffuse, and it is more difficult to measure andmanage for results.

The health sector in Africa is furtherhandicapped by the continuous outflow oftrained staff—a problem that the Bank andother donors have addressed primarily byfinancing training. But training is only part ofthe solution to building human capacity,because low salaries and poor working

conditions also contributeto high outflow. What isneeded is a comprehen-sive approach to humanresource management.

While there have beensuccesses, Bank supportfor capacity building hasencountered considerabledifficulty in the area of public financialmanagement. The countries do not fully“own” the change agenda, and understandingof how best to adapt international practices tocountry contexts is still evolving. The greatestsuccesses involved issues that are technical orreforms that enjoy broad political support,such as tax administration. Less has beenachieved in areas—such as performancebudgeting—that involve unfamiliar, complextechniques transplanted from outside thecountry and that depend on consultants forimplementation. Despite these importantdifferences among sectors, the Bank hasdevoted inadequate effort to deriving capacitybuilding lessons along sectoral dimensionsand promoting country-led capacity buildingplanning within sector programs.

Tools for supporting capacity building The Bank has not developed a body ofknowledge on what tools should be applied indifferent country and sector circumstances.Where technical assistance (TA) has been usedto fill the gaps in skills needed to manageBank-funded projects, it hashad little impact on strength-ening client capacity. TA hasbeen effective when used fora discrete and well-definedtechnical task and in thecontext of a clear TAstrategy that includes aphase-out plan. A majorityof the projects reviewedsupport training of individ-ual staff, and projects havealmost always achieved thetarget numbers to be trained.

S U M M A RY O F F I N D I N G S A N D R E C O M M E N DAT I O N S

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The Bank’s success inenhancing theperformance of thepublic sector variesacross sectors as wellas across countries.

The Bank has devotedinadequate effort toderiving capacitybuilding lessonsalong sectoraldimensions andpromoting country-led capacity buildingplanning withinsector programs.

But public agency staff is often trained forspecific tasks before they are positioned to usethe training or before measures are taken tohelp retain them. Regional operations andWBI and ACBF programs have focused on thesupply of individual skills in the public sectorwithout ensuring that the skill-building isappropriately synchronized with organiza-tional and institutional changes needed toimprove public sector performance.

Corporate and RegionalmechanismsThe Bank’s support of threededicated capacity buildingprograms in Africa ismanaged separately from itscountry assistance programs.Each of the three corporateand Regional programsprovides a distinct mode ofcapacity building supportand has the potential tocomplement, and evenstimulate, innovation in theBank’s scaling up of itscapacity building interven-tions, but their activitieshave been only moderatelyeffective.

The World Bank Instituteprovides training, knowledge, and advisoryservices to officials and leaders in the publicsector. The Africa Region currently accountsfor almost one-third of its some 1,000program offerings. Recognizing the modesteffectiveness of its past individual learningprograms, in 2002 WBI announced that it wasshifting from training individuals to a newcapacity building strategy. To support thatshift, it has recently introduced country-levelcapacity needs assessments and capacitydevelopment strategies, but is has not yetmade clear how its learning programs willtake account of the interrelationships amongindividual skills and organizational and

institutional development. Nor has itdeveloped a set of pedagogic tools for deliver-ing learning programs fitted to its reformu-lated capacity building role.1

The African Capacity Building Foundation isan independent institution in Harare thatprovides grants to national and regionalinstitutions and programs to help strengtheneconomic policy analysis and developmentmanagement. It was established in 1991 by theWorld Bank, the African Development Bank,and the United Nations DevelopmentProgramme (UNDP). The World Bankremains its largest source of funds; it hasprovided $186 million to programs andprojects. The ACBF has two distinctivecharacteristics that give it the potential tosupport capacity building: it can provide itsfunding over a long period and it supports adiverse range of activities, not limited toindividual TA and training. But it has yet tofind an effective way to link the ad hocprograms it funds to each country’s priorityneeds for enhanced policy and developmentmanagement. It also lacks the well-definedcapacity building outcome measures neededto monitor its accomplishments.

The Institutional Development Fund (IDF) isa World Bank program that provides grants togovernments to fund small-scale and pilotcapacity building activities for up to threeyears. The grants average some $300,000 andthe approval processes are streamlined.Recent reforms increase the relevance of theIDF’s country-executed and flexible capacitybuilding support, notably by allowing forserial IDF grants for activities that warrantfollow-up support but have no other source offunding. It will be important that a plannedself-evaluation of the impact of these reformsassess the country ownership of the activitiessupported and the sustainability of theirresults.

These three corporate and Regionalprograms, like Bank country programs, lack

x v i


Regional operationsand WBI and ACBF

programs havefocused on the supplyof individual skills in

the public sectorwithout ensuring that

the skill-building isappropriately

synchronized withorganizational and

institutional changesneeded to improve

public sectorperformance.

the knowledge base and results frameworkthey need to identify the impact of their activi-ties and allocate their limited resourcesefficiently.

Recommendations This evaluation’s findings underscore theimportance of approaching capacity buildingin Africa as a core objective and ensuring thatcapacity building support is country-owned,results-oriented, and evidence-based. Thechallenges to improving public sectorperformance in Africa—posed by political andinstitutional characteristics, weak incentivesand working conditions, and emigration ofhighly skilled professionals—necessitate thepriority focus and processes that encouragelong-term, systemic efforts. The evaluationrecommends that:

Operational framework: The Bank, at thecorporate level, should strengthen itsknowledge base and amplify its framework forpublic sector capacity building to better helpcountries (a) prioritize capacity buildingactivities and guide donor support; (b) linkinstitutional, organizational, and humancapacity developments; and (c) transformtraditional capacity building tools to improve

results. And it should ensure that guidelinesand processes are in place for self- andindependent evaluation of Bank interventions.

Sector-specific guidance: Sector and thematicleadership should develop sector-specificguidance on diagnosing public sector capacityneeds, enhancing incentives for performanceimprovements, and monitoring and evaluatinginterventions.

Country programs: Regional senior manage-ment should ensure that CASs are usedeffectively to help countries identify andstrengthen the capacities they need to plan,implement, and measure the results of theirpoverty reduction strategies, and coordinatedonor support. They should also ensure thatall operations that aim to build public sectorcapacity are based on adequate assessments ofcapacity needs and have ways to monitor andevaluate capacity building progress.

Training: The Bank should reassess what roletraining should play in its capacity buildingsupport, how training should be provided, andwhat should be the respective roles of a centraltraining unit and Regional programs in anyfuture support in this area.

S U M M A RY O F F I N D I N G S A N D R E C O M M E N DAT I O N S

x v i i

1

11Introduction

Public sector performance must be strengthened if African countries areto achieve their stated goals of reducing poverty, accelerating eco-nomic growth, and providing better services to their citizens. This need

for enhanced public sector capacity is widely recognized in Africa, the in-ternational development community, and the World Bank.

Three developments have brought publicsector capacity building to the forefront ofinternational assistance to Africa in the pastdecade. Most African countries haveestablished a reasonable degree of macroeco-nomic stability and moved toward ademocratic form of government (World Bank2000b). These transformations, often referredto as “first-generation reforms,” have intensi-fied internal demand for better governanceand improved public service. At the sametime, changes in the practice of developmentassistance aimed at improving aid effective-ness through greater country ownership ofdevelopment strategies and programs havehighlighted capacity building needs.

The World Bank provides substantialsupport for building and improving publicperformance in Africa through its lending andnonlending services and such corporate andRegional programs as those of the World BankInstitute (WBI), the Institutional DevelopmentFund (IDF), and the African Capacity BuildingFoundation (ACBF). The Bank’s Africa Regionhas proposed to “scale up support for capacitybuilding” as a core element of its assistancestrategy for the next several years. But thestrategy acknowledges that “more strategic

thinking and innovation” are needed to makeexpanded support effective (World Bank2004n, p. 7).

This independent OED evaluation isdesigned to contribute to the Region’s effortsby assessing the relevance and effectiveness ofBank support for public sector capacitybuilding in Sub-Saharan Africa1 over the past10 years (1995–2004) and by drawing lessonsfor future support within the context of theAfrica Region’s (AFR) strategy. The evalua-tion focuses on support to Africa because ofthe attention being given to the issue incurrent Bank and development partnershipdialogues on the continent,and on the public sectorbecause that is where thebulk of the Bank’s capacitybuilding support is directed.2

The evaluation is not areview of Bank assistance forpublic sector reform; rather,it is an assessment of howthe Bank has helped govern-ments to strengthen theirabilities to reform and carryout public sector functionson a sustainable basis.

The Bank’s AfricaRegion has proposed to “scale up supportfor capacity building.”But “more strategicthinking andinnovation” areneeded to makeexpanded supporteffective.

The starting point for this evaluation is thecontinued weak state of the public sector inmost countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, whichis largely the product of four deeply rootedand interrelated conditions. First, the basicsocioeconomic conditions in Africa, thoughimproving in some ways, constitute a weakfoundation for expanded public sector capaci-ties. The overall level of poverty both createsenormous need for effective public sectorperformance and limits the human and

financial resources available tothe public sector. Table 1.1illustrates some of the keysocioeconomic constraints thatlimit Africa’s public sectorperformance and shows thathalf of the indicators are lowerin Africa than in other Regions.

Second, specific political andinstitutional characteristics inAfrican countries inhibit

effective public sector performance. The statehas yet to integrate formal rules with informalnorms in ways that ensure good governance.The recent history of conflict and politicaltransition in many states has generatedcomplex configurations of winners and losersthat make consensus building in favor ofpublic sector reform and capacity buildingespecially challenging. And the relativelyunderdeveloped state of the private sector andcivil organizations of all kinds limitsindependent analysis and pressure for change(Herbst 2000; van de Walle and others 2003;World Bank 2004b).

Third, influenced by these underlyingcharacteristics, public sectors in Africa exhibitlow bureaucratic quality, large public servicewage bills, weak mechanisms of accountabil-ity, and high levels of corruption. Three out ofthese six indicators are lower in Africa than inthe other Regions, and the aid dependencyindicator is much higher (table 1.2).

2


Region

East Asia Latin America Middle East and Europe and and the and South

Socioeconomic indicator Africa the Pacific Central Asia Caribbean North Africa Asia

Education (%, 1990-most recent)

Gross tertiary school enrollment 3 9 38 19 17 7

Adult literacy 57 96 96 84 60 51

Health

Life expectancy (years) 46 69 69 71 69 63

HIV/AIDS prevalence in adults (%) 8 0.1 0.4 0.7 0.1 0.6

Connectivity (per 1,000 people, 2002)

Number of personal computers 12 26 73 67 38 7

Number of fixed and mobile telephone lines 52 273 438 359 180 45

Poverty and growth (%)

Population <$1/day (2001, PPP) 46 15 4 10 2 31

Growth in GDP per capita (1990–03) 0.2 6.0 0.1 1.1 1.1 3.5Note: PPP = purchasing power parity.

Source: Data for the above table are from World Development Indicators. Years are based on most recent data.

A W e a k S o c i o e c o n o m i c F o u n d a t i o n f o rB u i l d i n g P u b l i c S e c t o r C a p a c i t y

T a b l e 1 . 1

How well theWorld Bankmatches its

capacity buildingsupport to these

challenges is a keyquestion of this

evaluation.

I N T R O D U C T I O N

3

A f r i c a ’ s P u b l i c S e c t o r P e r f o r m a n c e L a g sO t h e r R e g i o n s

T a b l e 1 . 2

Region

East Asia Latin America Middle East and Europe and and the and South

Indicator of public sector performance Africa the Pacific Central Asia Caribbean North Africa Asia

Government wages and salaries (% GDP) 29 26 12 22 33 11

Civilian central government employment 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.3

(% population)

CPIA score on public sector management 2.9 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.2 3.4

and governance

Corruption 1.9 1.6 2.2 2.2 2.0 2.1

Bureaucratic quality 1.1 2.0 2.1 2.0 1.7 2.3

Democratic accountability 2.9 2.9 4.2 4.3 2.7 3.9

Aid dependency (% GDP) 5 0.6 1.0 0.3 0.9 1.0Source and Data Notes: Govt. wages and salaries: Data for Africa are from Africa Regional Database, World Bank. Data for other Regions were retrieved from the World Development

Report, World Bank. Civilian central government employment: Average is for 1996–2000, World Bank, World Development Report. CPIA (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment):

Scores range from 1 (lowest) to 6 (highest), World Bank. Corruption: Scores range from 1 (most corrupt) to 6 (least corrupt). International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), 2004. Bureaucratic

quality: Scores range from 1(lowest) to 4 (highest). Average calculated for 1999–2004, ICRG. Democratic accountability: Scores range from most corrupt to least corrupt. Average calcu-

lated for 1999–2004, ICRG. Aid dependency: Average is for the 1994–2002 period.

Last, globalization is widening gaps withinAfrica and between Africa and other Regions.While globalization offers opportunities tohelp African countries enhance their nationalcapacities—through easier access to globalknowledge—it also undermines their effortsby contributing to widening domestic incomegaps, pulling highly trained talent out ofAfrica, and accentuating Africa’s lack ofcompetitiveness in international research anddevelopment and investment. About 70,000highly qualified professionals and expertsleave the continent annually (ACBF 2004).While this migration brings in remittances,which help reduce poverty, it depresses publicsector performance in such crucial areas as

health, science and technology, and economicmanagement.

The capacity building challenges posed bythese conditions require long-term, systemicapproaches. How well the World Bankmatches its capacity building support to thesechallenges is a key question of this evaluation,which is the first independent review of theBank’s capacity building support. Many self-and independent evaluations have previouslylooked at aspects of the Bank’s capacitybuilding support—notably its technicalassistance and various approaches to institu-tional development—but none has examinedthe Bank’s efforts comprehensively.3

5

Assessing Support forCapacity Building in thePublic Sector

This evaluation has identified key features of successful capacitybuilding efforts from evolving thinking and practice to serve as bench-marks for the assessment of the Bank’s support. The evaluation has

also estimated the amount of Bank support for capacity building in Africaover the period of the review (1995–2004), and carried out aggregate-levelreviews of country strategies and operations as well as in-depth countrystudies, as described below.

Capacity building not a well-definedpractice

Although enhanced capacity is central toAfrica’s development, the internationaldevelopment community, including the WorldBank, has traditionally treated public sectorcapacity building as a collateral objective,rather than as a goal in its own right. The scopeof capacity building support has moved intandem with changes in other priority areas ofdevelopment assistance—first, in infrastruc-ture, and moving over time to agriculture,social services, and governance—rather thanbeing determined by identification of the mostpressing capacity shortfalls and their underly-ing causes. And the process of capacity

building has evolved in step with changes inthe overall practice of providing developmentassistance, rather than being based on theaccumulated knowledge of what works well inmeeting different kinds ofcapacity needs under diverseconditions. In short, capacitybuilding has not developed asa well-defined area of develop-ment practice.

In many areas of develop-ment assistance, such as fiscaldiscipline for macroeconomicstability and banking supervi-sion, a body of accepted ideasdirects international efforts.

22

The internationaldevelopmentcommunity hastraditionally treatedpublic sector capacitybuilding as acollateral objective,rather than as a goalin its own right.

But capacity building lacks a fully articulatedframework for assessing capacity needs,designing and sequencing appropriate interven-tions, and determining results. The rise toprominence in the 1990s of institutionaleconomics and new perspectives on publicmanagement enhanced understanding of therequirements for effective public sectorperformance. In the World Bank, this newthinking was reflected in the 1997 WorldDevelopment Report [WDR], The State in a

Changing World (WorldBank 1997e), which wasan important step inenvisioning the role andeffectiveness of the state indevelopment. Noting thatthere can be no singleapproach to state reformworldwide, it provided aframework for guidingpublic sector reformefforts. The framework

was based on a two-pronged strategy thatinvolved focusing on core public activities asthe way to rationalize the role of the state tomatch its capacities, and strengthening publicinstitutions in order to increase incentives forimproved public performance and bolsterrestraints against arbitrary and corrupt

behavior. The Bank’s subsequent public sectorstrategy, “Reforming Public Institutions andStrengthening Governance” (World Bank2000c), and related Regional strategiesfollowed up on the main themes of the WDRby proposing a broadening of Bank support toinclude strengthening public institutions andstimulating demand for performance improve-ments through enhanced mechanisms ofaccountability. But these general directivesfocused heavily on institutional change; theydid not propose how to link that process withrelated processes of organizational andbehavioral change.1 New ways of building thecapacity to realize a more effective state wouldhave to come from experimentation andlearning, without the benefit of accumulatedknowledge or explicit guidance on how toselect and combine approaches and instru-ments appropriate to country and sectorconditions, or how to determine if support wasworking as intended.2

As noted above, the reasons for weakpublic sector performance are deeply rooted.Whatever pragmatic steps can be taken underthe rubric of capacity building can be only asmall part of the solution. Yet there is littleempirical evidence to clarify what part of theproblem international capacity buildingsupport can best help to solve; in what order

6


CIDA (Canada): “Activities, approaches, strategies, and method-ologies which help organizations, groups and individuals to im-prove their performance, generate development benefits, andachieve their objectives over time.”

European Commission: “To develop and strengthen structures,institutions and procedures that help to ensure: transparent andaccountable governance in all public institutions; improve ca-pacity to analyze, plan, formulate and implement policies” in eco-nomic, social, environmental, research, science and technologyfields; and in critical areas such as international negotiation.

GTZ (Germany): Process of strengthening the abilities of “indi-viduals, organizations and societies to make effective use of re-sources, in order to achieve their own goals on a sustainablebasis.”

United Nations Development Programme: Capacity is the“process by which individuals, organizations, and societies de-velop abilities to perform functions, solve problems, and setand achieve goals premised on ownership, choice, and self-es-teem.” Capacity building is the “sustainable creation, reten-tion, and utilization of capacity in order to reduce poverty,enhance self-reliance, and improve people’s lives.”

D i f f e r e n t D o n o r D e f i n i t i o n s o f C a p a c i t y B u i l d i n g

B o x 2 . 1

Source: Whyte 2004.

Capacity buildinglacks a fully articulated

framework forassessing capacity

needs, designing andsequencing appropriate

interventions, anddetermining results.

capacity needs should be addressed; what canbe expected of different kinds of interventionsand why; and how knowledge of suchprocesses as organizational change, learning,and incentives should shape capacity buildingefforts. There is not even a shared definitionof what constitutes capacity building support.Some development agencies use a narrowdefinition focused on strengthening organiza-tions and skills, while others use a muchbroader definition that encompasses levels ofcapacity from the individual to the whole ofsociety (see box 2.1). The World Bank has nocorporate-wide definition, and no operationalpolicy to guide its capacity building work.3

Key features of capacity buildingIn the absence of an established definition,

this evaluation bases its assessment of Banksupport on the following key features ofsuccessful capacity building, suggested byevolving thinking and practice in this areaover the past decade.4

First, enhanced capacity should be treatedas a goal in its own right, not merely as ameans for achieving other developmentobjectives. This was the principal insightbehind the introduction of the term “capacitybuilding” at the start of the 1990s—it wasproposed as an improvement on the prevailingpractice of technical assistance, which servedmore to fill capacity gaps than to buildsustained country capacity (see box 2.2). Thecapacity building approach emphasized that aroot cause of poverty, illiteracy, and ill-healthwas lack of capacity: in government, to designand implement proper development strategies,and, in society, to hold government account-able for its actions. Only if political andeconomic institutions functioned properlywould development achievements be scalableand sustainable. Therefore, developmentsuccess lay not merely in outcomes on theground, but in outcomes on the ground thatwere the result of effective public and privateinstitutions.

Second, support for public sector capacitybuilding needs to address three dimensions ofpublic sector capacity:

• Human capacity: individuals with skills toanalyze development needs; design and im-plement strategies, policies, and programs;deliver services; and monitor results.

• Organizational capacity: groups of individu-als bound by a common purpose, with clearobjectives and the internal structures,processes, systems, staffing, and other re-sources to achieve them.

• Institutional capacity: the formal “rules ofthe game” and informal norms—for example,in collecting taxes, reporting on the use of pub-lic resources, or regulating private business—that provide the framework of goals andincentives within which organizations andpeople operate.

The traditional focus on creating or reorgan-izing government units and building individualskills cannot—by itself—foster improvedpublic sector performance. The institutionalcontext in which organiza-tions and individuals operateis critical to ensuring thenecessary incentives andrewards for improved publicsector performance. Andbecause human capacity,organizational processes, andinstitutional frameworks areclosely interrelated and do

A S S E S S I N G S U P P O R T F O R C A PAC I T Y B U I L D I N G I N T H E P U B L I C S E C TO R

7

• In a 1993 speech, former World Bank Vice President for Africa, Ed-ward Jaycox, captured these concerns, stating that “donors and Africangovernments together have in effect undermined capacity in Africa; theyare undermining it faster than they are building it” (Jaycox 1993). • A report issued by the United Nations Development Programme(UNDP) that same year further noted that “almost everybody ac-knowledges the ineffectiveness of technical cooperation in what is orshould be its major objective: achievement of greater self-reliance inrecipient countries by building institutions and strengthening localcapacities in national economic management” (Berg 1993, p. 244).

E a r l y C a l l s f o r AN e w C a p a c i t yB u i l d i n g P e r s p e c t i v e

B o x 2 . 2

Support for publicsector capacitybuilding needs toaddress the human,organizational, andinstitutionaldimensions.

not change quickly, capacity building effortsmust necessarily be long-term and systemic.

Third, demand as well as supply factorsshape capacity constraints and capacitybuilding opportunities and outcomes. Publicsectors are often weak, not just because oftheir lack of capacity, but also because theirweakness benefits powerful interests that seekto avoid taxation, regulation, or other

reforms. External assistancecan help on both the supplyand demand sides of theprocess by providing inputsto enhance the functioningof the public sector and bystrengthening structures ofdemand and accountability.But it cannot directlyinfluence the cultural normsand political economyunderpinning the demandfor public sector perform-ance. Therefore, capacity

building efforts will succeed only where theytake adequate account of the prevailing localpolitics and institutions, and are countryowned rather than donor driven.5

General knowledge of foreign adminis-trative practices needs to be combinedwith a deep understanding of the localconstraints, opportunities, habits,norms, and conditions. This means thatadministrative and institutionalsolutions need to be developed not justwith input or buy-in from localofficials, running local institutions, butby them . . . What this implies inpractice is that outsiders wanting tobuild administrative capacity . . .should not set precise conditions forhow resources are to be used but ratherenforce strict accountability standardsfor certain kinds of results . . . Underthis concept, the demand must existalready on the part of candidate recipi-ents (Fukuyama 2004, p. 88).

The Bank’s capacity building support to Africa

Bank support for the process of capacitybuilding in African countries is substantial.Although the Bank does not have a compre-hensive capacity building strategy, it uses thefull spectrum of its financial and knowledgeservices to support capacity building invirtually all countries and development areasin which it is active. The bulk of this supportto Africa is provided within the framework ofcountry assistance programs. The main focusof this evaluation is thus on the treatment ofcapacity building in Country AssistanceStrategies (CASs), lending operations, andnonlending activities.

Country programsIt is not possible to identify the total

amount of lending directed to capacitybuilding because the Bank does not have astandard way of accounting for capacitybuilding activities in its lending operations. Amethodology developed and used in thisevaluation estimates that over one-quarter oftotal investment credits is directed to capacitybuilding activities, ranging from some 10percent in transport, to 30 percent in healthand education, to 80 percent in public sectorprojects. Also, close to half of the conditionsunderpinning adjustment loans relate directlyto strengthening institutional, organizational,and human resource capacities. (See Annex Bfor a description of the methodology used inmaking these estimates.) Policy dialogue andrelated knowledge sharing activities also playa significant role in the Bank’s support forpublic sector capacity building, although theamount of that support is not quantifiable.The total amount of economic and sectorwork (ESW), which is often described in CASsas a key part of their capacity buildingprograms, would add an additional $1.1billion of capacity building support over thereview period.6 However, not all ESW isintended to build client capacity, and sincethere is no established procedure for distin-guishing ESW activities that are expressly

8


Capacity buildingefforts will succeed

only where they takeadequate account ofthe prevailing local

politics andinstitutions, and are

country owned ratherthan donor driven.

directed to capacity building, no crediblecalculation can be made of the scale of thiscomponent of the Bank’s capacity buildingsupport.

Corporate and Regional mechanismsThis evaluation examines three mechanisms

that provide additional support that is directlyfocused on capacity building in Africa.

• WBI provides training and knowledge serv-ices on a global, regional, and country level.Its annual budget is around $75 million, in-cluding trust funds. Since 2000, WBI has com-mitted approximately $92 million to Africa.Nine of WBI’s 33 newly identified “prioritycountries” are in Africa.

• IDF, which makes small grants to country-ex-ecuted capacity building projects, often in-volving studies, seminars, or trainingprograms, has provided $60 million to Africanprojects since its start-up in 1992.

• ACBF, an independent, regionally based in-stitution, has received some $158 millionfrom the World Bank since its establishmentin 1991—41 percent of its total commitmentsof $389 million—for its grant-making andrelated support to country and regional pol-icy analysis, training, and other programs.

Tools and techniquesThe Bank finances technical assistance,

training, studies, and equipment as its maintools for supporting capacity building. Techni-cal assistance (TA) is provided both withininvestment loans and in the form of stand-alone Technical Assistance Loans (TALs). Inthe past, TA often took the form of long-termassignment of international experts withingovernment agencies of client countries. Theexperts were to perform ongoing roles in theabsence of local capacity and, in principle,train local staff to take over the tasks. Butevidence of the failure of this approach tobuild local capacity has led the Bank tosupport more use of short-term TA and, asemphasized in its TA guidelines, to make useof local expertise where possible.

In addition to the trainingprovided directly by WBI,the Bank supports training inmost of its operations inAfrica. The bulk of thistraining now takes place in-country in the form of in-service seminars, workshops,and short-term courses forlarge numbers of middle-level civil servants anddegree programs for higher-level personnel. Inaddition, overseas training in the form of bothdegree and short-term programs is funded forsmall numbers of higher-level personnel.7

Capacity building support within projects isalso given through studies and equipment toupgrade the functioning of individual organi-zations. And since 1999, 14 distance learningcenters have been funded by the Bank in Africaas a means of expanding the reach of trainingand knowledge sharing among both policy-makers and middle-level civil servants.

Evaluation approachTo assess the relevance and effectiveness of

such Bank support in Africa, this evaluationexamines how well the Bank has aligned itscapacity building interventions with thedevelopment priorities and related institu-tional, organizational, and individual capacityconstraints in client countries. It alsoexamines the extent to which its capacitybuilding support has helped improve publicsector performance. Figure 2.1 depicts astylized results chain for public sector capacitybuilding and provides the basis for describingthe scope of this assessment. The results chainlinks capacity buildinginputs (such as studies,TA, training, equipment,and financial resources forthe support of changeprocesses) and outputs(such as new or enhancedinstitutional frameworks,organizational structuresand processes, and individ-ual skills and perform-


9

The Bank financestechnical assistance,training, studies, andequipment as its maintools for supportingcapacity building.

The results chain linkscapacity buildinginputs and outputs toimmediate publicsector outputs andlonger-term outcomesand developmentresults.

ance) to immediate public sector outputs andlonger-term outcomes and developmentresults.

Since it is not possible to directly attributedevelopment impacts to capacity buildingefforts, the evaluation looks to intermediateoutcomes and improved public sectorperformance to assess the effect of efforts toenhance capacity. It also seeks to identify thereasons for success and failure in the chainfrom inputs to intended outcomes, takingaccount of both demand- and supply-sidefactors. The absence of baseline data and theextremely limited evidence from monitoringand evaluation limit the inferences that can bedrawn from the activities reviewed.

The evaluation combines aggregate-levelreview of CASs and project data with in-depthreview of six country case studies.8 The reviewcovers the years 1995 to 2004, with emphasison the latter half of this period. The mainevaluation components are:

(1) A review of the literature on capacity build-ing and related topics (such as technical as-

sistance and institutional development),including studies undertaken within andoutside the Bank.

(2) Examination of the treatment of capacitybuilding in Africa Country AssistanceStrategies. This includes review of all AfricaCASs approved in FY03 and FY04 to as-sess the importance assigned to public ca-pacity building and the coherence of thesupport proposed.

(3) In-depth review of the Bank’s support in sixcountries, with particular attention to foursectors and themes. Case studies involvingmission visits were done in Benin, Ethiopia,Ghana, Malawi, Mali, and Mozambique.9

These countries were selected to provide across-Regional perspective and to includeevidence from countries with varying un-derlying conditions and national approachesto public sector reform and capacity build-ing. To allow for depth in the examinationof the capacity building experience in thesecountries, the evaluation concentrates onBank support in building capacity in the ed-ucation, health, and roads sectors and in thecrosscutting area of public expenditure

1 0


C a p a c i t y B u i l d i n g R e s u l t s C h a i n a n d E v a l u a t i o n S c o p e

F i g u r e 2 . 1

Inputs/Processes Outputs Outcomes:Intermediate

Outcomes:Longer Term

Impact

Povertyreduction andsustainabledevelopment

Evaluation Scope

• Assessment ofcountry capacityneeds and priorities

• External support(e.g., TA, training,equipment,information)

Improvements inperformance andaccountability of keyfunctions:• Long-term strategic

planning and policyformulation

• Mobilization andmanagement offunds

• Service delivery• Legal and regulatory

enforcement

Quantitative orqualitative changes inpublic sectordeliverables:• Better quality and

higher coverage ofpublic services

• Stable andsustainablemacroeconomic andfiscal balances

• Etc.

• Increased demandfor effective publicsector performance

• New or enhancedinstitutionalframeworks;organizationalstructures andprocesses; individualskills/competencies

management. These are areas of activeBank involvement in all six countries andinvolve distinct capacity building needsand challenges. These country studies askedhow effective Bank support has been andwhat accounts for variation across countriesor across sectors. Included as part of thecountry studies are:

• In-depth review of all projects in thefour focal sectors of the country casestudies. This case study project set in-cluded a total of 69 investment and ad-justment operations, most of which wereapproved during FY95–04, although afew started earlier and continued wellinto the review period.

• In-depth review of the 13 most recentpieces of fiduciary ESW (prepared in2001–03) and relevant sector-specificanalytical work in the four focal sectorsof the country case studies.10

(4) Examination at the aggregate level ofinvestment and adjustment projects. Thisentailed in-depth review of 31 TALsapproved during FY93–04 and a randomsample of 55 Africawide projects(excluding TALs) approved in FY95–04,

to assess whether and how they achievedcapacity building objectives. In addition,project outcome and institutionaldevelopment impact ratings for all 75TALs and 54 public sector governanceprojects in Africa were compared withBankwide ratings over the periodFY95–04.

(5) Examination of existing evidence fromself-assessments and/or external evalua-tions and interviews in the case studycountries of the capacity buildingsupport provided by WBI, the IDF, andthe ACBF. These reviews examine howeffective the programs have been inhelping countries build capacity and howthe support provided by these programsrelates to and reinforces capacitybuilding aims in Bank country assistanceprograms.

(6) Examination of staff views on the Bank’scapacity building efforts. Two focusgroups and a survey of headquarters andcountry office staff working on Africawere conducted to learn what staffthought has worked well, and what lesswell, in their capacity building workwith clients.11


1 1

1 3

Relevance: MakingCapacity Building a Goal

Over the past 10 years, public sector reform and capacity building havebecome a central theme of the Bank’s dialogue with African coun-tries. Capacity building support has become increasingly well aligned

with country needs and priorities as both the Bank and its clients have builtthe issue of improved government performance more explicitly into coun-try and sector strategies, and as the Bank has introduced new approachesto providing its support. But even with these improvements, the Bank coulddo more to make capacity building a core objective of its relations with Africa.

Aligning support with country prioritiesand needs

Capacity building figures prominently instatements of Bank corporate priorities(World Bank 1997d; 2000d; 2001a; 2001c;2003f). Virtually all of the Bank’s mainreports on Africa over the past 10 years haveemphasized public sector capacity as a bindingconstraint to development in the Region. Asuccession of strategies at the Regional levelhas highlighted key weaknesses in publicsector capacity and the need for wide-rangingcapacity developments (see Annex F).Recognizing the limited impact of its supportin the face of countries’ still-weak publicsector capacities, the Bank has progressivelybroadened the scope of its support forcapacity building and placed it in the contextof its public sector strategy. In the AfricaRegion, this evolution has resulted in particu-

lar emphasis on public expenditure manage-ment and accountability, decentralization ofpublic services, and governance.1 The Bankhas also added new diagnostic tools for assess-ing countries’ capacities for managing theirpublic financial resources and increased itsrange of lending instruments for delivering itscapacity building support.

These changes in capacity building inter-ventions have taken place in a context ofevolving development assistance practices(encompassed, for example,in the Poverty ReductionStrategy Process) that aimto make development sup-port country-led, built onpartnerships, and results-based. These practices couldfacilitate a shift from sup-ply- to demand-driven

33

The Bank hasbroadened itssupport for capacitybuilding and placedit in the context of itspublic sector strategy.

1 4


capacity building support and from narrowtechnical fixes to broader systemic changes.To realize this shift, countries have to take thelead in developing capacity building effortsand donors have to harmonize their supportaround the countries’ priorities. The changealso requires attention to four importantimplementation issues: how to encourageinternal country-led processes that set priori-ties for capacity building measures and donorsupport; how to connect measures aimed atneeded institutional, organizational, andhuman resource developments; how tostrengthen incentives (including pay, working

conditions, and professionalmotivation) for improvedperformance; and how totransform traditional tools,such as technical assistanceand training, to support thebroadened capacity buildingagenda.

In the Africa Region,country assistance strategiesare gradually adopting amore integrated approachto addressing capacity

building needs. The most recent cohort of 15Africa CASs2 do a better job of addressing

capacity building needs than a comparatorgroup of 10 CASs from the mid-1990s.3 Bothgroups proposed analytic work to identifycapacity constraints in detail and proposedstrengthening demand for improved perform-ance (for example, through enhancedaccountability mechanisms). But while only 6of the 10 earlier CASs included operationsfocused largely on specific capacity con-straints, all 15 of the more recent CASsinclude sector and cross-sector operationswith major capacity building aims. And whilethe earlier cohort contained only a single free-standing capacity operation, eight of the morerecent cohort include multisector capacitybuilding projects, ranging in size from $10million in Cameroon to $100 million inEthiopia, that aim primarily at strengtheningfinancial management and civil service reformacross the public sector (see box 3.1). Therecent CAS cohort shows a shift away fromproject support toward sectorwide programs,particularly in health and education, andtoward budget support through PovertyReduction Support Credits (PRSCs), whichset a broad strategy framework in whichcapacity constraints can be addressed. Inter-national Development Association (IDA)credits with cross-sectoral capacity building

Four new multisector capacity building projects in Africa addressboth inter- and intra-ministerial capacity building issues in anintegrated way. The $41.2 million Tanzania Public Service Re-form credit, the $100 million Ethiopia Public Sector CapacityBuilding program, the $20 million Rwanda Multisector Capac-ity Building project, and the $26 million Mozambique PublicSector Reform project have four key elements in common:• A capacity needs assessment conducted by the min-

istries/departments with stakeholder participation• A strategic process that aligns the objectives and improve-

ments being sought in individual ministries/departments to

the government’s overall development goals and public ex-penditure policies

• A human capacity development program (training, equip-ment, and resources) within the context of a larger institu-tional civil service reform effort to ensure that the skillsacquired will be retained and applied

• Development of monitoring and evaluation systems to pro-vide: (a) inter-program tracking and coordination so that theoutcomes of the capacity building program and other com-plementary reform efforts remain coherent, and (b) ministe-rial tracking and reporting on capacity development efforts.

N e w M u l t i s e c t o r P r o j e c t s I n t e g r a t eE s s e n t i a l C a p a c i t y B u i l d i n g E l e m e n t s i n t o P r o j e c t D e s i g n

B o x 3 . 1

Source: World Bank 2003d, 2004m, 2004o.

Countries have totake the lead in

developing capacitybuilding efforts and

donors have toharmonize their

support around thecountries’ priorities.

R E L E VA N C E : M A K I N G C A PAC I T Y B U I L D I N G A G OA L

1 5

as a central theme increased from under $150million in 1999 to some $450 million in 2004.These new directions are intended to cus-tomize Bank support for country commitmentto change, and may enable authorities to pri-oritize capacity building activities and thesupport needed from donors.

The Bank could use these new processesmore effectively to help countries plan andimplement capacity building efforts. In themajority of country programs, support forcapacity building remains fragmented—designed and managed operation byoperation. Few country programs make aconnection between capacity buildingmeasures in sector-specific operations andoperations supporting crosscutting issues ofpublic expenditure management or civilservice reform, or specify how the differentsets of measures are to be sequenced. Thismakes it difficult to capture cross-sectoralissues and opportunities, and to learn lessonsacross operations. The 2003 CAS for Benin,for example, states that “among the mostimportant contributions the Bank can make toBenin’s capacity enhancement agenda is tohelp the government reinvigorate the long-stalled civil service management reforms so asto build the enabling environment anddemand for results required for sustainableimprovements in capacity.” But the programdirects most of the Bank’s capacity buildingsupport through a PRSC and specific sectorinterventions, without specifying how theBank’s support will help Benin to developneeded sector and cross-sector capacitybuilding measures and systems for monitoringprogress. Moreover, country programsgenerally do not address—systematically, andin an integrated way—the issue of countries’ability to build capacity—for example, bystrengthening internal training institutions asa crosscutting issue, rather than by providingsupport for training on a piecemeal, project-by-project basis.

The Bank is also missing opportunities tofully utilize lending and nonlending instru-ments to support capacity building. One

important gap concerns thePoverty Reduction StrategyProcess (PRSP), which isnow central to the manage-ment of the Bank’s relationswith its African clients.Weak public sector capacityis widely acknowledged tobe the key impediment to the attainment ofpoverty reduction goals. The PRSP thus hasthe potential to help authorities better priori-tize capacity building activities and guidesupport from donors, but it does not appearto have been used in this way in mostcountries studied in a recent OED review. Norhas the Bank done much to help countries usetheir PRSP to inform capacity priorities andfoster the harmonization of donor capacitysupport around countries’ poverty reductiongoals (OED 2004c).

ESW is another process with underutilizedpotential to build capacity. Operationalguidelines identify the building of client analyt-ical capacity as one of five goals, and specifythat clients should make major analyticalcontributions and learn to produce outputsindependently (World Bank 2004r). Yet themajority of fiduciary and other ESW projects inthe six case study countries involved clientsmainly in organizational tasks and data collec-tion, and only to a limited extent in the analysisof data, the writing of reports,and the dissemination offindings. The Ethiopian authori-ties criticized this limited clientparticipation. They noted that10 years of experience withBank-supported Public Expendi-ture Reviews (PERs) hadcontributed little to capacity inthe Ministry of Finance or anyother institution to carry outsuch reviews on their own.Government counterparts sawthemselves as data providers,not as analysts. This view ofESW is echoed in the Africa Region staff survey,in which 74 respondents cited the use of formal

In the majority ofcountry programs,support for capacitybuilding remainsfragmented.

The PRSP has thepotential to helpauthorities betterprioritize capacitybuilding activitiesand guide supportfrom donors, but itdoes not appear tohave been used inthis way.

1 6


ESW as a tool of capacitybuilding, but only halfthought it to be effective. Arevision of Country FinancialAccountability Assessment(CFAA) guidelines in FY03,which explicitly expands thescope of these assessments toinclude a capacity objectiveand development actionplan, presents an opportunityto overcome these shortcom-

ings. The actual intensity of government partic-ipation and the specificity and prioritization ofcapacity building measures in the plans areimportant in realizing this opportunity.

Finally, the Bank’s country programs couldmake more effective use of the capacitybuilding efforts of the distinct corporate andRegional capacity building programs. OED’s2002 evaluation of the Bank’s knowledgesharing programs found that knowledgesharing activities were not well integrated intocountry programs and projects (OED 2003a).Similarly, the linkage between countryprograms and either WBI learning activities orACBF-supported policy analysis and economicmanagement training programs is limited. Forexample, only one of 15 recent CASs describeshow WBI activities will be integrated into the

country program, whileanother 6 CASs make generalreference to WBI activities tosupport individual countryoperations. WBI is workingto strengthen this linkage, asdiscussed in more detail inChapter 5.

In sum, recent changes inapproach have made countryprograms more relevant toclient capacity needs, but theimpact of those changes isattenuated by fragmentedinterventions and inadequatesynergy among instruments.What about the relevance ofindividual operations? That

depends heavily on the quality of the underly-ing diagnosis of capacity needs andconstraints to change, as well as the design ofcapacity building measures that take accountof those conditions.

Designing interventions to meet needsand demands for changeTo be relevant, Bank operations need to addressclearly defined problems. This evaluationreviewed three sets of operations to determinehow well individual interventions diagnosedcapacity constraints and designed measures toovercome them. While the review encounteredgood practice examples in all sets—the sampleincluded 55 Africawide projects, 31 TALs, andthe 69 country case study projects—it alsofound inadequacies in the underlying diagnosesof the need and demand for capacity buildingthat undermined the operational design.Examples from the in-depth review of thecountry case study projects illustrate threeprevalent shortcomings.

Diagnosis of the political economy context. Onlyabout half of the assessed country studyprojects4 reviewed in the country casesadequately addressed the political and institu-tional environment for capacity building. Forexample, a Mozambique health sector projectto improve sector management and adminis-trative capacity sufficiently identified andaddressed key political and institutionalfeatures through a collaborative diagnosticexercise carried out by the Ministry of Health,the Bank, and the World Health Organization(WHO). Conversely, although better manage-ment of the budget process was a priority ofcore officials in the Ministries of Finance inBenin and Ghana, the design of publicfinancial management projects overlooked theresistance of officials in line ministries withresponsibility for implementation. As a result,plans were altered and much delayed.

Systemic treatment of capacity constraints. About athird of the projects reviewed for the casestudies adequately diagnosed the three

Only about half ofthe assessed country

study projectsadequately addressed

the political andinstitutional

environment forcapacity building.

Road sector projectswere particularly

successful, becausethey included

comprehensive humanresource development

plans to accompanychanges in the sector’s

institutionalframework andorganizationalstructures and

processes.

dimensions of institutional, organizational,and human resource constraints and designedinterventions that recognized the interrela-tionships among them. Road sector projectswere particularly successful because theyincluded comprehensive human resourcedevelopment plans to accompany changes inthe sector’s institutional framework andorganizational structures and processes. Incontrast, despite the aim of strengthening thedelivery of health and education services,projects in these two sectors have done lesswell in integrating institutional, organiza-tional, and human resource developmentplans. For example, in Mali’s health sectorprojects, diagnosis and design focused onorganizational capacity weaknesses, eventhough the main capacity constraints wereinadequate incentive structures. As aconsequence, Mali has seen a steady increasein the number of well-equipped rural healthcenters, but has failed to attract and retainqualified staff, which has hampered theachievement of improved health care.

This finding is also supported by the in-depth review of 31 TALs (FY95–04). Whilethe project appraisals provided analysis andbackground of economic, financial, environ-mental, institutional, sectoral, and politicalissues, there was no explicit analysis ofcapacity needs, especially human capacityneeds. The review of the 55 Africawideprojects also found that about 80 percent ofthe project appraisal documents do notprovide any information on the sequencing ofthe capacity building components.

Assessment of capacity to build capacity. Only halfthe projects reviewed in the country casesshowed evidence of an assessment of theexisting capacity to implement capacitybuilding interventions. In the other half, theabsence of such an assessment was the causeof serious delay or failure in implementing theplanned capacity building measures. Forexample, a project focused on capacitybuilding for decentralized service delivery inEthiopia did not include an upfront, compre-

hensive capacity needs assessment at variouslevels of government. It also did not incorpo-rate the lessons of two small earlier effortsthat encountered difficulties because theyoverestimated, and therefore did not address,weaknesses in existing implementationcapacity. As a result, thecapacity building projectstarted much more slowlythan anticipated and failedto pilot approaches thatwere meant to be used in amuch larger follow-upoperation. Outside thecountry cases, the review ofthe 55 Africawide projectsfound that almost half didnot address the capacityconstraints that would limitthe achievement of overallproject objectives. Anotherthird (18 projects) mentioned capacityweakness in broad terms, such as “weakimplementation capacity throughout theadministration.” Only nine projects (17percent) identified specific implementationcapacity constraints facing the project.5

Fiduciary ESW is not effectively used toprovide the needed comprehensive diagnosesof and remedies for the capacity gaps. Thirteenrecent pieces of fiduciary ESW for the casestudy countries did not adequately assess ordiagnose key capacity constraints and thelinkages among them.6 Constraints aredescribed in general terms without discussionof the factors leading to them, and thus thework does not provide clear indications of thecapacity building measures that are needed.For example, one CFAA found that thecapacity of the government to manage publicexpenditure is constrained by an inability toforecast and project revenues. The proposedcapacity building activity is “to improverevenue forecasting,” which is expected to beachieved in a year, although no analysis ismade of factors that constrain this capacityand how they should be overcome. Otherassessments and their action plans focus on

R E L E VA N C E : M A K I N G C A PAC I T Y B U I L D I N G A G OA L

1 7

The review of the 55Africawide projectsfound that almosthalf did not addressthe capacityconstraints thatwould limit theachievement ofoverall projectobjectives.

types of agencies and practices needed, but donot address how to develop the professions offinancial managers, procurement specialists,or other experts required to staff thoseagencies. In addition, diagnoses giveinadequate attention to core capacity—theminimum level of capacity that must exist to

implement proposed perform-ance improvements. Forexample, all action planspropose training, but there islittle assessment of existingtraining institutions and theircapacity to deliver thattraining. Lacking a diagnosisof core capacity, many planshave been unrealistic in bothtime frame and scope. Newlyrevised CFAA guidelines thatexpand the scope of theseassessments to include acapacity building objective anddevelopment action planpresent an opportunity to

overcome these weaknesses, particularly if theyfoster intensified government participationand adequate specificity and prioritization ofcapacity building activities as part of the actionplans.

Monitoring, evaluating, and using thelessons of experience

Finally, the relevance of Bank capacitybuilding efforts is undermined by insufficientmonitoring and evaluation of the Bank’sinterventions and the failure of operations todraw lessons from experience. This is particu-larly a problem with capacity building activi-ties that are embedded in operations andtherefore not tracked, monitored, and

evaluated as core objectives. The review of the55 Africawide projects conducted for thisstudy indicates that only 23 percent (12projects) included performance indicators forcapacity building components and only 26percent (14 projects) considered past lessonsin the design of the capacity buildingcomponents. The reporting on achievement ofcapacity building components is also weak:Implementation Completion Reports (ICRs)for 27 percent of the reviewed projects, largelyadjustment loans, had no clear indication ofthe achievement of the capacity buildingobjective. As noted in the case studies, there isalso little tracking and reporting on theachievements of capacity building inputs. Thisis generally the case for TA, and the informa-tion on the reporting of training achievementis based on outputs (for example, number ofprograms delivered or participants trained),not learning outcomes or performanceimprovements. The result is lack of adequateknowledge for staff on good practices, asreflected in the staff survey conducted for thisevaluation. Forty-three percent of the Africastaff survey respondents recommendedimprovements in Bank knowledge on capacitybuilding through peer-to-peer exchanges, bestpractice notes, and formal and informaltraining.

These shortcomings in the diagnosis,design, and evaluation of capacity buildinginterventions have impeded the effectivehandling of two key capacity buildingimplementation issues—scope and sequencingof programs. These issues are discussed inChapter 4 as part of the review of the achieve-ment of capacity building objectives in thefour sectors explored in this evaluation’s casestudy countries.

1 8


Forty-three percentof the Africa staff

survey respondentsrecommended

improvements inBank knowledge on

capacity buildingthrough peer-to-peer

exchanges, bestpractice notes, and

formal and informaltraining.

1 9

Efficacy: AdaptingInterventions to Countryand Sector Conditions

The findings of this evaluation show that building durable capacity inAfrica is possible. But overall, the record in achieving this is poor, andthe effectiveness of Bank capacity building support has not been

strong. While country conditions—notably commitment and capacity forchange—are important determinants of the pace of change in public sectorimprovements, Bank effectiveness in supporting public sector capacity build-ing has varied markedly sector by sector in ways that are consistent acrosscountries.

The shift from project to programmaticlending—in support of sectorwide and cross-sector reform programs—has helped to setcapacity building efforts within a country-led,long-term strategic vision and policyframework conducive to a long-termapproach to specific capacity buildingmeasures. But programmatic support hasinvolved only limited, country-driven capacitybuilding planning and implementation. This isevident in both sectorwide programs and inrecent programmatic support of countrypoverty reduction strategies.

The overall recordThis evaluation looked at several sets ofprojects (see Chapter 2, “EvaluationApproach”) to get an overall picture of the

effectiveness of Bank support to capacitybuilding in Africa. Because capacity buildingactivities are embedded in most projects andnot separately monitored and reported—except in a very general way in the projectrating of institutionaldevelopment impact—theevaluation used a combina-tion of approaches to derivefindings.

Public sector governanceprojects and TALs arewholly or substantiallyfocused on helping to buildcapacity. As shown in figure4.1, both the outcomes andthe institutional develop-ment impact (IDI) of these

44

The shift from projectto programmaticlending has helped to set capacitybuilding effortswithin a country-led,long-term strategicvision and policyframework.

projects have been about 10 percentage pointslower for projects in Africa than for compara-ble projects Bankwide. Despite their focus on

institutional change, only 35percent of all 54 Africawidepublic sector governanceprojects that closed duringFY95–04 had an institu-tional development impactrating of substantial orabove, compared with aBankwide average of 47percent.1 TALs, of whichAfrica has been the largestrecipient since the inceptionof this instrument in the

1960s, have performed similarly. In the past 10years, institutional development impact ratingshave been low in both Africa and Bankwide;outcome was satisfactory for only 61 percentof all TALs in Africa, compared with 75percent satisfactory Bankwide2 (see figure 4.1).

To assess the effectiveness of capacitybuilding measures in projects where capacitybuilding was not the major project focus, weexamined a sample of 55 Africawide adjust-ment and investment projects (excludingTALs) randomly selected from a total of 280completed projects in Africa approved inFY95–04. Since overall project outcomeratings do not measure the embedded capacitybuilding dimensions, an in-depth documentreview was undertaken. Some of the 55projects had capacity building activities withinproject components, but the capacity buildingobjectives tended to be ill defined, and theirachievements poorly tracked and reported.Only a dozen provided capacity buildingindicators at appraisal. Furthermore, some 40percent showed satisfactory or higher achieve-ment of their capacity building objectives, 34percent were modest or lower, while as manyas 26 percent provided no clear indication ofthe accomplishment level. Although the

2 0


P u b l i c S e c t o r a n d T e c h n i c a l A s s i s t a n c eP r o j e c t s i n A f r i c a A r e L e s s S u c c e s s f u lt h a n B a n k w i d e A v e r a g e ( p e r c e n ts u b s t a n t i a l a n d p e r c e n t s a t i s f a c t o r y ,F Y 9 5 – 0 4 )

F i g u r e 4 . 1

Percent

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

IDI (% sub) Outcome (% sat) IDI (% sub) Outcome (% sat)

Public sector governance projects Technical assistance loans

AfricaBankwide

Source: World Bank data as of December 1, 2004.

Although the projectappraisal documents

enumerated manyrisks to capacity

building goals, theproject designs eitherdid not address these

risks or addressedthem inadequately.

project appraisal documents enumeratedmany risks to capacity building goals—suchas weak country commitment and social-political instability—the project designs eitherdid not address these risks or addressed theminadequately. Finally, less than one-quarter ofthe projects incorporated lessons on capacitybuilding from past projects in their design,and at completion, lessons about capacitybuilding were few or stated in only highlygeneral terms.

These three sets of findings on capacitybuilding are validated by the low institutionaldevelopment impact rating of all Africaprojects, a significantly lower rating than forprojects Bankwide. Only 33 percent of Africaprojects that exited during FY95–04,compared with 42 percent of Bankwideprojects, achieved a rating of substantial orabove. While this rating has shown a risingtrend since 1996, it remains at only 40 percentfor Africa projects exiting in 2004, still signif-icantly below the Bankwide average for thatsame year.3

The difference between Africa andBankwide ratings suggests the importance ofdesigning operations to fit underlyingcountry conditions. This requirement forsuccess is illustrated by the findings in thisevaluation’s six country case studies—although demonstrated in complex ways thatreflect the interplay of national and sectoralpolitics and institutions.

Achieving capacity building objectives indiverse country and sector conditionsThe effectiveness of the Bank’s capacitybuilding activities has varied both acrosscountries and, within countries, acrosssectors. The pace of public sector reform inAfrican countries reflects the strength ofcountries’ public sector institutions and thedegree of political competition in their politi-cal processes—the latter influences howstrongly interests within and outside govern-ment are able to press for—or obstruct—change. The six countries reviewed in thisevaluation fall along a spectrum within a

middle range on these twomeasures. They also differin economic and publicsector performance (seetable 4.1). Each countrytherefore presents a distinctcombination of strengthsand weaknesses that haveshaped the opportunitiesand constraints for thecapacity building efforts reviewed in thisevaluation.

As in other African countries, the Bank’smost recent CAS for each of these six casestudy countries gives increased emphasis toimproving public sector performance. Basedon the scope and implementation experienceof the Bank’s capacity building support, thecountries can be grouped into three clusters.

In Ethiopia and Mozambique, strongcountry leadership on public capacity buildingin recent years has been matched by substan-tial and innovative Bank support. In these twocountries, while internal political competitionis more limited than in the other fourcountries, action on public sector reform andcapacity building has been spurred by post-conflict renewal and the political imperativesof decentralization. Bank support over the pastseveral years has become closely aligned withthe countries’ strategies.

In Ethiopia, the challenge of weak capacityhas moved to the forefront of the developmentagendas of both the government and the Bank.The government has created aMinistry of Capacity Buildingand has made capacity building acentral focus in its povertyreduction strategy (OED 2004c).Still, problems remain inimplementing capacity buildingefforts in key sectors and inmaking progress on issues ofpublic financial management.The Bank’s 2003 CAS supportsthe government’s programsthrough six operations directedat capacity building.

E F F I C AC Y: A DA P T I N G I N T E R V E N T I O N S TO C O U N T RY A N D S E C TO R C O N D I T I O N S

2 1

The difference betweenAfrica and Bankwideratings suggests theimportance ofdesigning operationsto fit underlyingcountry conditions.

To be effective,capacity buildingefforts will need tobe more explicitlymanaged as a coreobjective by thegovernment andthe Bank.

In Mozambique, recent sectorwide strate-gies in roads, health, and public financialmanagement have paid increasing attention tocapacity constraints and coordination of donorsupport. But Mozambique is only beginning tobring the needed coherence to its public sectorcapacity building efforts through recentimplementation of its public sector reformprogram that targets both cross-sectoral andsectoral capacity constraints. The Bank’s moveto multisector capacity building programs(described in box 3.1) is a distinguishingfeature of its support to the public sectorprograms in both countries. Limited corecapacity is, however, a cause of slowimplementation, and the Bank needs to betterhelp countries appropriately design and paceefforts to cope with this constraint.

In Benin, Ghana, and Mali, country leader-ship on public sector reform has been weak. InBenin and Ghana, both government actionsand Bank support have been intermittent,while in Mali, government and Bank effortshave been consistently modest. All threecountries have moved to democratic forms of

government, registered reasonable economicgrowth, and improved social indicators. Butpublic sector reform and capacity buildingefforts have stalled or moved only slowly insuch key areas as public financial managementand civil service reform.

In Ghana, two comprehensive Bankprojects (in public financial management andpublic sector reform) failed, due to a mismatchbetween country ownership of the programsand their ambitiousness. A sectorwideprogram in health, by contrast, has been moresuccessful.4 The Bank is now working, largelyunder the rubric of the PRSC, to encouragethe government to rejuvenate a public sectorreform and capacity building effort.

In Benin, the Bank has provided substantialcapacity building support, relying heavily onprogrammatic lending, but implementationhas been poor. Both the government and theBank acknowledge the limited impact of theBank’s capacity building support. To beeffective, capacity building efforts, which arenow a focus of the country’s PRSC, will needto be more explicitly managed as a core

2 2


Measure Benin Ethiopia Ghana Malawi Mali Mozambique

Economic performancea

GDP per capita growth rate (%) 2.8 0.8 2.8 -0.8 3.8 5.3

Population below national poverty line (%) 33 44 40 65 64 69

Public sector performanceb

Political stability 63 26 48 56 48 61

Government effectiveness 38 32 50 36 33 42

Control of corruption 38 43 42 32 44 30

CPIA, economic managementc (quintile) Medium Medium Medium Medium Highest Medium

High

CPIA, public sector management (quintile) Medium Medium Highest Highest Medium Medium

High Higha. Economic performance data: GDP per capita growth rate is averaged for 2000–03. Population below national poverty line is the most recent estimate available between 1995 and 2003).

World Development Indicators. This includes two years of draught in Ethiopia.

b. Public sector performance: Higher scores correspond to better outcomes. Scores were rescaled based on data from World Bank Institute, Worldwide Governance Research Indicators

Dataset (1996–2002).

c. CPIA ratings: World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (2003).

E c o n o m i c a n d P u b l i c S e c t o r P e r f o r m a n c e :T h e S i x C a s e S t u d y C o u n t r i e s

T a b l e 4 . 1

objective by the government and the Bank, butthe supportive enabling environment is not yetapparent.

Similarly, in Mali, the Bank has financed anumber of operations, but public sectorreform and capacity building have progressedslowly, reflecting the government’s unambi-tious aims. The Bank has linked its 2003 CAStriggers to progress in key areas, but it isunclear how the Bank intends to help thecountry prioritize and develop its capacitybuilding activities.

In Malawi, shifting political forces in thecountry have stalled structural adjustment andpublic sector reform. An ambitious Bankpublic sector program in the 1990s failed toachieve its objectives because the Bank overes-timated the strength of the government’scommitment to change. The Bank now focusesits main capacity building effort on strength-ening public financial management. Whilesignificant progress has been made instrengthening the capacity of auditing andaccounting units and local training institu-tions, the project has stalled and is beingrestructured. In the health sector, the Bankhad more modest objectives with a singleproject designed to test the feasibility ofcommunity-based population and familyplanning services. During project planning,lack of human resource capacity wasrecognized as a key constraint. Effectivetraining and an organizational developmentcomponent designed to cover health servicefacilities from the community level up to thenational level were incorporated. In this case,capacity building was narrow in scope, and itwas notably successful.

Bank support for capacity building in thesesix countries has worked well where it hasbeen designed to fit underlying conditions.The record is not simply one of more successin the countries with the stronger economicand public sector management indicators,however. Rather, Bank programs have beeneffective under two conditions. The firstsuccess factor is to match the scope of individ-ual interventions to countries’ capacities and

commitments to change. Two examples notedabove of the comprehensive and largelyunsuccessful projects inGhana and the narrow andapparently effective effortin the health sector inMalawi are stark illustra-tions of this point.

Second, success has beendependent on how well thedesign of programs hasfactored in sectoral charac-teristics and the particularchallenges they pose tostrengthening governmentperformance. Figure 4.2differentiates sectoral activities along twodimensions. Specificity measures how readilyoutput performance can be monitored and,therefore, improvement measures identifiedand tracked. Transaction intensity describeshow complex/conflictual the decision processis to get from inputs to outputs, including thenumber and strength of relevant interestgroups and steps5 (identified in the figure arethe sectors reviewed as part of this evalua-tion’s country studies, discussed below).

The higher the transaction intensity and thelower the specificity, the more difficult it is toassess and prioritize capacity needs and designand sequence capacity building measures. It isalso more difficult to track the effectiveness ofthose measures, since this will requiremonitoring and feedback mechanisms thatcapture the views of large numbers of benefi-ciaries (or beneficiary groups). In contrast,low transaction/high specificity activities arelikely to facilitate not only the design andmonitoring of capacity building measures, butalso the structuring ofincentives in support ofchange. The effectiveness ofBank efforts to improvepublic sector performancereflects, in large part, thesesectoral differences. Indeed,the record of the Bank’scapacity building support in


2 3

Bank support forcapacity building hasworked well where itfit underlying countryconditions andfactored in specificsectoral challenges tostronger governmentperformance.

Support for capacitybuilding in the roadssector has been moreeffective than supportto the other threesectors reviewed.

all six countries shows similar variation,sector by sector, as described in the followingsections.

A proven approach in the roads sectorSupport for capacity building in the roadssector has been more effective, in all respects,than support to the other three sectorsreviewed. It is the only sector in which theoverall effectiveness was found to be satisfac-tory in all six case study countries. In Malawi,the weakest of the six countries, it was the

only sector with substantial and sustainablecapacity improvements. This result is largelyattributable to strong stakeholder pressure,the applicability of a proven approach, soliddiagnosis of capacity constraints, and effectiveuse of both TA and training.

The Bank has long provided substantialsupport in the roads sector. In all countries,the main focus was on the trunk road system,a priority agreed to by the government and thedonors, including the World Bank. Thistargeted focus set priorities for resourceallocations and enabled important infrastruc-ture to be built and maintained usingrelatively sophisticated technical solutions,while requiring a limited number of staff.These staff (not just managers and engineers,but also lower-grade staff) received higher payin some countries and enhanced workingenvironments and professional developmentopportunities in all countries. The Bank’ssupport has contributed to strengthenedcapacity in the roads sector in all countries, assummarized in box 4.1.

These efforts to improve sector perform-ance involved the standard instruments:formal education, on-the-job training,international and local TA, studies, and

2 4


• Development of a private sector construction industry, includingsupport for the training of contractors

• Greater stability and transparency of funding for the sector• Strengthening of key sector organizations, including the relevant

ministry, highway authority, and related departments, to plan, exe-cute, monitor, and account for national roads programs

• Development of technical skills in modern road design, construction,and repair.

F o u r C a p a c i t y B u i l d i n g A c h i e v e m e n t s i n t h e R o a d s S e c t o r

B o x 4 . 1

C h a l l e n g e s t o I m p r o v i n g G o v e r n m e n tP e r f o r m a n c e V a r y a c r o s s S e c t o r s

F i g u r e 4 . 2

HighPublic financial management

(Accounting)

Public financial management(Performance budgeting)

Primary educationLow

Low High

Roads

Spec

ifici

ty(o

utpu

t mea

sura

bilit

y)

Basic health

equipment. TA and training were successful inthis area because they were applied within anapproach that integrated institutional, organi-zational, and human capacity development.For example, TA in Malawi was targeted fortwo specific purposes: to prepare studies forparticular policy decisions and new legislationand to assist in the establishment of two newentities (the National Roads Administrationand the National Construction IndustryCouncil). In Ethiopia, staff skills wereupgraded through a package of overseasgraduate education and on-the-job trainingthat appears to have improved performance ina wide range of units in the Ethiopia RoadsAuthority. While many trainees left during theearly and mid-1990s, the situation changedmarkedly in the late 1990s because ofimproved work conditions, pay, and careerprospects and increasing opportunities in thecountry in the private sector as the govern-ment moved to privatize construction.

Clear goals, strong interests, a knowntechnique transferable across countries, andreadily measurable results have characterizedwork in the road sector. These factors facili-tated the design of a coherent capacitybuilding strategy and made it possible tocreate “enclaves” of effectiveness, even inenvironments of inefficiency, although thereare risks to sustainability of the enclavedgains. The experience is not easily replicable,as review of the other three sectors shows.

The challenge of human resource managementin health and educationBank support for capacity building in both thehealth and education sectors has been lesssuccessful than in roads. These two sectorsface greater challenges in human resourcedevelopment because they have large bureau-cracies, numerous frontline service providers,more diffuse and weaker pressures for change,and greater difficulty in measuring, managing,and monitoring for results.

Health. Countries have made improvementsin health outcomes—notably in child and

maternal health and in lifeexpectancy (except as thisprogress has been reversed bythe impact of HIV/AIDS)—since instituting reforms in the1980s and 1990s. But thegains have been modest andthe countries still facechallenges of uneven access,low-quality services, andinefficient use of resources.Efforts to improve theperformance of health caresystems have typically focusedon three sets of issues: (1)institutional strengthening toenhance central governmentpolicy, planning, and resourcemanagement; decentralize service delivery;and increase the voice of intended beneficiar-ies; (2) organizational strengthening of healthministries and other management structures;and (3) training for sector staff at all levels ofthe health system.

Overall, Bank support has not done well inproviding support for institutional and organi-zational development in this sector.6 Thegreatest achievement at the institutional levelhas been the introduction of health sectordevelopment programs and the improved policyand planning processes around them in all fiveof the six case study countries with substantialBank support in the sector (the one exception isMalawi, where lending has been limited to onesmall project for the period under review).Some progress has been madein all five countries in decentral-izing health service delivery aspart of these sector programs,although more has beenachieved in Ghana, Benin, andMali, where this process hasbeen under way for a substan-tial period of time, than inEthiopia, where a recent, rapiddecentralization push aimed at“learning by doing” has encountered low initialmanagement capacity at all levels. (A promising


2 5

In roads, clear goals,strong interests, aknown techniquetransferable acrosscountries, andreadily measurableresults facilitated thedesign of a coherentcapacity buildingstrategy and made itpossible to create“enclaves” ofeffectiveness.

In both the healthand the educationsectors, effectivenessis undermined bylarge, unresolvedhuman resourceconstraints.

approach to decentralized capacity building inanother case, Burkina Faso, is described in box4.2).

When it comes to organizational strengthen-ing, Bank support has been modest in all thecase study countries. In Benin, Ghana, andMali, the Bank’s support has helped restructurethe ministries of health. And it has helpedGhana to create the Ghana Health Service as anautonomous agency for managing the sector,although mandates and division of responsibil-ities between the Ghana Ministry of Health and

the service remain unclear afterseveral years because of a lack ofleadership and resistance tochange within affected parts ofthe government. In Benin andMali, the Bank has also financedefforts to build capacity outsidecentral government structuresby subcontracting key functionsto autonomous agencies.7 Inaddition, in all five countries,

support has been provided for strengtheninghealth information systems. But in eachcountry, this organizational strengthening hasbeen piecemeal. Moreover, its effectiveness isundermined by large, unresolved humanresource constraints.

A distinguishing feature of human resourcedevelopment in Africa’s health sector is the

continuous outflow of trained public healthmanagers and medical staff (World Bank2004p). The Bank has addressed this problem,primarily by financing training and strength-ening training institutions in the five casestudy countries. To enhance its effectiveness,training is increasingly being decentralized toreduce costs, increase retention, and make thetraining more relevant to the work people do.But this evaluation was able to find evidenceonly on the training outputs (for example,numbers of personnel trained and coursecurriculum modified), not on impact.

But training can be only part of the humancapacity building solution, because lowsalaries, poor working conditions, andalternative employment options underminethe retention of trained staff. One case studycountry, Mozambique, has implemented abroad health manpower developmentprogram, including a comprehensive approachto training and deliberate steps to retain staff.Still, the scarcity of skilled health workersremains an acute problem in Mozambique, aswell as in the other countries. A recent studyin Ghana proposes a range of actions toimprove human resource management in thesector, as summarized in box 4.3.8

In principle, the sectorwide programs infive of the case study countries provide aframework for identifying systemic capacity

2 6


The redesigned Burkina Faso Health and Nutrition Project(P000287) illustrates a potentially promising approach toward ca-pacity building at decentralized levels of government. The proj-ect financed work programs of provincial health directorates.With some variations among districts, the project succeeded in:• Developing a participatory planning and budgeting process

that involved communities and other stakeholders in set-ting priorities and providing oversight

• Providing direct central government funding to local dis-tricts, along with adequate autonomy and flexibility in the useof resources

• Enhancing accountability at decentralized levels throughthe use of management agreements, whose terms (on fundsallocation, payment modalities, obligations of recipients, fi-nancial management and auditing, and termination) weremade transparent.

B u i l d i n g C a p a c i t y t o F a c i l i t a t eD e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n : T h e C a s e o f B u r k i n aF a s o ’ s H e a l t h a n d N u t r i t i o n P r o j e c t

B o x 4 . 2

Source: Internal Bank and OED documentation.

A distinguishingfeature in Africa’shealth sector is the

continuous outflowof trained publichealth managers

and medical staff.

constraints. In practice, however, the majorshortcoming in human resource managementand modest institutional and organizationalstrengthening suggests that sectorwideapproaches (SWAps) have been more useful inenhancing capacities to set policy and strate-gic direction than in building capacities tomanage the sector and achieve improvedservice delivery results.

Education. Capacity building support ineducation has been less effective than inhealth, and more varied among the six casestudy countries. The differences reflect thelarger size of the education sector, greaterdifficulty in setting clear education goals andmonitoring progress, and techniques that areless easily transferable across cultures. Whilethe Bank has funded a few projects in tertiaryand vocational educational (for example, inGhana, Mali, and Mozambique), the bulk ofits support in all six countries has beendirected to primary education, which iscovered in this review.

Countries have improved in the past decadein increasing allocations to the sector and inboosting primary school enrollment rates. Yetthey still face major structural issues, notablyunequal access to primary education; unevenand inefficient allocation of resources;shortages of qualified teachers in a context ofrapidly increasing numbers of students;

management and implementation gaps,especially at district levels; and lack ofincentives for improved staff performance.

In all six countries, the need to improveprimary education outcomes and strengthensector management has been a recurring themein the Bank CASs and projects over the 10-yearreview period, indicating the difficulty ofmaking progress. The Bank has supported avariety of efforts to build capacity at the institu-tional level, with varying degrees of success. Forexample, in Mozambique, where education hasbeen a strong priority of the government, signif-icant progress has been achieved in developingpolicies and strategies for different parts of theeducation system and inintroducing new fundingarrangements at the primarylevel. But in Ethiopia,despite strong commitmentto a sector developmentprogram, the governmenthas not yet fully identifiedthe institutional capacityconstraints and developmentneeds to underpin itsdecentralization drive. InMali, decentralization hasnot progressed as intended,and the regional develop-ment plans envisaged arestill in preparation. In


2 7

“More effective human resource management should involvegoing beyond the narrow issues of salary and training to con-sider broader incentives and systems for encouraging and man-aging good performance.” A set of complementary actions thattake a broad labor market perspective are recommended, in-cluding: • Increasing the supply of health professionals, with attention

to the interplay of outflow from the country and retention

• New measures to attract and retain trained health workers• Managed exchange and return of migrants• Development and integration of new, mid-level cadres into

the health workforce (less likely to be hired abroad), bychanging educational systems and curricula and developingefficient HR management and administration, among othermeasures.

H u m a n R e s o u r c e M a n a g e m e n t i n H e a l t h :T h e N e e d f o r a C o m p r e h e n s i v e A p p r o a c h i n G h a n a

B o x 4 . 3

Source: Nyonator, Dovlo, and Sagoe (n.d.).

In both educationand health, theBank’s efforts havefocused on differentstructures across the six countries, but the efforts havebeen piecemeal, andthe resultingorganizationalstrengthening hasbeen modest.

Ghana, much as in the health sector, clearmandates have not been established as plannedbetween the Education Ministry and EducationService, which has impeded progress towardother capacity building objectives in the sector.The Ghana authorities recently launched aneducation sector strategy that proposes asequenced approach to this long-standingproblem (OED 2004d) (see box 4.4).

At the organizational level, the Bank’sefforts have focused on different structuresacross the six countries, but in all cases, theyhave been piecemeal, and the resulting organi-zational strengthening has been modest. For

example, in Ethiopia, theBank’s attempts tostrengthen the Ministry ofEducation’s research andpolicy development andstatistical capacity werenot fully achieved. InBenin, the Bank succeededin enhancing financialmanagement capacity inseveral departments withinthe Ministry of Education,but other departments inthe ministry, especiallyhuman resource manage-ment, remain weak.

Further, in Malawi andMozambique, the organi-

zational development agenda was short-changed because of the Bank’s use of ProgramImplementation Units (PIUs). In both Malawiand Mozambique, while Bank support builtPIU capacity, particularly in financial man-agement and procurement, improvementswere not built into the permanent governmentstructures. Mozambique’s education sectorprogram is now seeking to strengthen organi-zational capacity in the Ministry of Educationin the units for research, financial manage-ment, and monitoring and evaluation.

The sector’s major challenge in humancapacity development has been handled bysubstantial support for training. But, as in theother sectors, hard evidence is lacking on theutilization of the skills of the large numberstrained. Detailed study suggests seriousweaknesses, such as turnover of trainedteachers, low teacher morale, and inadequatein-service training (OED 2004b). Also,evidence from interviews suggests that theimpact of the training for ministry staff hasbeen low, especially in areas of sector planningand personnel management, because trainingwas out of sync with staff redeploymentrelated to decentralization, and civil serviceand pay reform have progressed slowly.

Limited country ownership of capacity buildingapproaches in public financial managementWhile there have been successes, Bank support

2 8


The government of Ghana and its donors have agreed on a newsectorwide program in education. Included in the program is adetailed plan for building institutional, organizational, and humancapacity in the sector, which will be addressed in three phases: • Analysis of organizations’ mandates, roles, functions, and di-

visions of labor

• Assessment of existing capacity and capacity gaps, and de-velopment of capacity building action plans for key compo-nents of the sector

• The translation of those plans into individual organization’scapacity building programs, involving activities such as re-deployment of staff, training, systems development, and theprovision of physical resources.

A W e l l - S e q u e n c e d A p p r o a c h t o C a p a c i t yB u i l d i n g i n t h e E d u c a t i o n S e c t o r i n G h a n a

B o x 4 . 4

Source: World Bank 2004g.

There have beensuccesses in public

financialmanagement, but

difficulties have beencreated by limited

country ownership ofthe change agenda

and the lack of a time-tested approach for

adapting internationalpractices to the local

context.

for capacity building has encountered consid-erable difficulty in the area of public financialmanagement (PFM). This is largely because oflimited country ownership of the changeagenda and the absence of a time-testedapproach for adapting international practicesto the local context. The Bank emphasizedcapacity building as the core objective of itspublic financial management work in FY03,and its agenda is still evolving.

Strengthening public financial manage-ment, which is key to improving a country’sability to use its development resourcesefficiently and effectively, has been a center-piece of national economic reform agendasthroughout Africa. Institutions, systems, andprocesses that deal with the aspects of publicfinancial management have tended to beweak, nontransparent, and often incapable ofdeveloping adequate budgets, monitoringpublic expenditures, using funds and invest-ment efficiently, and providing reliable data.In all six countries reviewed, the Bank hasplayed a major role in designing and support-ing capacity building efforts. It has supportedextensive diagnostic work and has played asignificant financing role, along with otherdonors. The scope of the Bank’s capacitybuilding support in this area has ranged fromcomprehensive (in Ghana) to incremental (inMalawi). Efforts have typically addressedreform of tax administration, improvedbudget processes, introduction of medium-term expenditure frameworks and integratedfinancial management systems, procurementreform, and strengthening of accounting andauditing systems.

At an institutional level, the greatest successhas been in technical areas or areas thatreceive political support, such as tax adminis-tration (which promises increased governmentrevenue, at least in the short term), and in theestablishment of new institutions with techni-cal mandates. Improvements in basic budget-ing, accounting, and reporting systems havealso made steady progress—for example, inMozambique and Ethiopia. But capacitybuilding efforts have progressed slowly in

other areas of deeply rooted institutionalconstraints related to governance issues,where governments have not implementedagreed improvements. For example, in Beninnew procurement procedures have beenapproved but not implemented. In Malawi,support has not led to theestablishment of an effectiveinternal audit system. Andin Mali, progress has beenmade in improving budgetformulation processes, butnot in strengthening parlia-mentary budget controls.

The Bank’s capacitybuilding support has alsobeen less successful in areasof institutional strengthen-ing that involve leading-edge approaches brought infrom outside and heavilydependent on consultants (referred to byMalawi officials as areas of “donor ideol-ogy”). Efforts to help countries strengthentheir capacities to design and use medium-term expenditure frameworks and perform-ance budgeting have been stymied by a lack ofclient awareness of the potential benefits(World Bank 2002a). The introduction ofintegrated financial information managementsystems, requiring advanced technology man-aged by highly skilled and costly staff, hasbeen more cumbersome and time consumingthan foreseen (World Bank 2002b). For exam-ple, the Ghana public financial managementproject, which involved eight componentsdesigned to be implemented simultaneously,encountered significant difficulties in theintroduction of the computerized system forbudget and expenditure management, whichin turn derailed other components. As onesenior manager of the information technologyeffort reported, “we have spent $30 millionand eight years and still can’t produce basicbudget reports,” and this has considerablyslowed other dimensions of the public finan-cial management capacity building agenda.Even in Malawi—where a more staged


2 9

Introduction ofintegrated financialmanagement systems,requiring advancedtechnology managedby highly skilled andcostly staff, had beenmore cumbersomeand time consumingthan foreseen.

approach was adopted after failure to imple-ment ambitious reforms—committed seniorofficials have faced difficulty in building the

necessary support for changewithin and across ministries,and the technologies usedhave been too complex for thecountry’s capacity and needs.

The effectiveness of organi-zational and human resourcedevelopment efforts has alsobeen limited. Bank operationshave helped specific parts ofministries of finance and othergovernment structures andoversight mechanisms. Butthese are usually discreteinterventions, and the Bank isoften not the major donor atthis level.

The Bank and other donorshave funded training programsto build skills in economic man-

agement and targeted areas of public financialmanagement. Where the training has been de-mand driven and closely linked to ongoing in-stitutional or organizational changes, it hasproved effective. For example, in Malawi a Bank

project provides funding that the government al-locates on a competitive basis to autonomoustraining institutes that respond to governmentdemands for specific training.9 The effective-ness of training programs more generally appearsto be hampered by lack of well-developed train-ing strategies, poor sequencing of training withorganizational and institutional developmentsthat would utilize the skills acquired, and lowretention of staff trained in such areas as eco-nomics, accounting, auditing, and informationtechnology, who increasingly face attractive op-portunities in the private sector and with inter-national development agencies. Moreover, inthe view of some government officials, the in-troduction of complex public financial man-agement programs has created capacity gapsthat are being inadequately addressed by poorlydesigned training and limited transfer of knowl-edge and skills from consultants.

The experience in the six case studycountries suggests the need for five improve-ments in efforts to build capacity in publicfinancial management, summarized in box4.5.10

Recognizing the need for improvements, theBank has initiated a broadening of the publicfinancial management agenda from a strictlyfiduciary perspective to include public sectorcapacity building. A key feature of that changehas been the introduction of public financialmanagement performance indicators thatserve to identify country capacity needs andprioritize donor capacity support. Notably, theHighly Indebted Poor Country Initiativeexpenditure-tracking exercise provides amechanism to benchmark a country’s budgetprocess and reporting system, develop plans tostrengthen those systems, and reviewprogress.11 Building on this exercise, amultidonor Public Expenditure and FinancialAccountability (PEFA) Initiative is finalizingan expanded performance managementframework that aims to expand the monitor-ing of country public financial managementperformance and promote donor harmoniza-tion of public financial management capacitybuilding support.12

3 0


• Deepen the diagnosis of underlying political and institutional so-lutions

• Reduce reliance on ambitious technical solutions• Better identify and address core capacity needs upfront, including

the change management capacity of units responsible for imple-menting improvements

• Address financial management capacity constraints in phases, byfocusing initially on a few high-priority functions and well-definedobjectives

• Establish outcome indicators and process for monitoring and eval-uating capacity building activities.

F i v e W a y s t o I m p r o v eC a p a c i t y B u i l d i n g i nP u b l i c F i n a n c i a lM a n a g e m e n t

B o x 4 . 5

To improve capacity building in

public financialmanagement, five

measures aresuggested, including

deepening thediagnosis of

underlying politicaland institutional

solutions andreducing reliance onambitious technical

solutions.

The quality of the inputsIn all sectors, the quality of capacity buildinginputs—notably technical assistance andtraining—has had a significant bearing on theeffectiveness of Bank support. While TA andtraining were both used in the great majorityof case study projects, they were found to beof only limited effectiveness—a result consis-tent with many past assessments.13 The limita-tions stem less from inherent weaknesses inthe tools themselves than from their use in theabsence of explicit capacity building plans andassociated TA or training strategies.

Technical assistance has been used for twodistinct purposes: (a) to fill gaps in technicalskills needed for managing Bank-fundedprojects and (b) to transfer knowledgesupportive of projects’ capacity buildingobjectives. “Substitute” or gap-filling TA hashad little impact on strengthening clientcapacity and was criticized by governmentauthorities for failing to build enduringcapacity in the six case study countries. Anotable exception was Mozambique, wheretechnical assistance was used well to fill in foruniversity teaching staff while they were sentoverseas for training.

The use of TA in support of capacitydevelopment objectives has produced mixedresults. The country studies show that TA hasbeen effective under two conditions: first,when it has been used for a discrete and well-

defined technical task and the client agencyhas sufficient core capacity to both overseeand benefit from the contribution and, second,when it has been used in the context of a clearTA strategy with a plan for phasing out theassistance without loss of policy or programmomentum. Of the four sectors reviewed, it isin the roads sector that these conditions havegenerally prevailed and TA has worked best.The record is more mixed in the other threesectors, where the objectives and the exitstrategies have often been less than clear fromthe outset.

Borrowers across the six case study countriescriticized the heavy use of PIUs, as explained inbox 4.6. The shift from projects to sectorwideapproaches can facilitate a move from PIUs togovernment management of TA, buta smooth transition requires anearly focus on capacity building aspart of a PIU exit strategy. Forexample, in Mozambique, the recenttransition to government manage-ment of a new education sectorprogram has taken off slowly. It hascreated what one ministry officialhas described as “islands” inside theregular structures—confined toisolated units rather than being wellintegrated throughout the ministry.This reflects lack of earlier attentionto capacity building as part of the arrangementsfor project implementation.


3 1

Stakeholders in all six case study countries heavily criticizedthe Bank’s use of PIUs, typically staffed by technical advisersand established outside the regular government structures.They consider that PIUs have promoted rapid and efficientproject implementation at the expense of long-term capacitybuilding. These project management arrangements, whichrely on highly paid consultants and top-up salaries, “have un-dermined mainline public sector capacity development anddemoralized low-paid civil servants” (OED 2003b, pp. 32–33).

The Bank, recently acknowledging the deficiencies of PIUs,has drafted a guidance note that indicates that the use of gov-ernment or other existing structures “should be the defaultposition for project implementation, and only where this isclose to impossible would it be desirable to create separatestructures.” The guideline is a positive step in accordinggreater priority to building sustainable capacity, although itdoes not address how TA used for long-term capacity buildingcan be more effective (World Bank 2004h).

P r o j e c t I m p l e m e n t a t i o n U n i t s S h o r t c h a n g eD e v e l o p m e n t o f S u s t a i n a b l e C a p a c i t y

B o x 4 . 6

The shift tosectorwideapproaches canfacilitate a move from PIUsto governmentmanagement oftechnicalassistance.

Training is funded in most of the case countryprojects reviewed to upgrade specific skills ofpersonnel in government ministries and otheragencies, in project implementation units, andamong service providers such as nurses andteachers. In all sectors, there is evidence ofsuccess in creating training capacity anddelivering training, but less evidence ofincreased ability to design and managetraining programs at a sector level.

Projects have almost always achieved theirtarget numbers of individualsto be trained. But on the crit-ical question of whether newskills were acquired andtranslated into improvedorganizational performance,the record seems weak. Sinceno tracer studies were foundfor any of the projects, thisfinding is based on in-countryinterviews and observationsin Bank project completionreports. This evidence indi-

cates that each of the three main trainingmodalities funded—long-term (degree or cer-tificate) training abroad; long-term trainingin-country; and short-term, in-service train-ing—has worked well only some of the time.Africa Region staff also view Bank supportfor training as moderately effective overall,with more respondents skeptical about theeffectiveness of long-term (two-thirds) than ofshort-term training (one-half).

Training interventions have generally beenfunded without an organizational trainingneeds assessment or a comprehensive trainingplan. Staff is being trained for specific tasksbefore they are in positions to use the training,or before measures have been taken to helpretain them. In addition, donors play a largerole in financing training, but have done littleto coordinate their support. In the case ofMalawi it is estimated that 95 percent of civilservants trained are donor funded. Becausemuch of this funding has been tied to individ-ual projects, the government is impeded fromdeveloping and implementing long-term,

3 2


Decentralized Service Delivery: A Makerere University TrainingPilot Project, approved in 2002, is a Learning and InnovationCredit that aims to help develop an effective, replicable, and sus-tainable strategy to build capacity of those responsible for serv-ice delivery and management at the local government level.Past attempts at such training by the government and donorcommunity, including the Bank, had resulted in a “multiplicityof short-term training programs that were narrow in coverage,supply driven, uncoordinated, ad hoc, and have relied heavilyon external technical assistance.”

This project presents a unique approach to training. It representsa first attempt to foster a strategic long-term relationship betweenan in-country capacity “supplier” and the local “demand” for ca-pacity building. It attempts to utilize Makerere University (andother tertiary institutions) in Uganda to meet the critical re-

quirements in public capacity to support Uganda’s large-scaledecentralization program, which has put considerable pres-sure on local government capacities and has resulted in a sub-stantive demand for increasing human skills and competenciesin diverse fields. In collaboration with the government, the uni-versity (which traditionally provided academic training and re-search) is expected to carry out a detailed training needsassessment at the district and urban levels and develop and de-liver appropriate courses to meet the local demand.

By early 2004 indicators of progress for many activities hadbeen met or exceeded ahead of schedule. A detailed project Mid-Term Review in mid-2004 provided the foundation for shifting frommonitoring output (activity) indicators to indicators of outcomes,results, and lessons.

A P r o m i s i n g N e w A p p r o a c h t o T r a i n i n g :D e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n i n U g a n d a

B o x 4 . 7

Source: World Bank 2002a.

Staff is beingtrained for specific

tasks before they arein positions to use

the training, orbefore measures

have been taken tohelp retain them.

sector-based or cross-sector training strate-gies. Moreover, the focus on training forspecific public sector tasks will always face thepotential problem of leakage of staff out ofthe public service unless skill building isapproached from a broad human resourcedevelopment perspective, linked to a country’slabor market conditions.

The more successful efforts tend to bethose that are well integrated within acoherent capacity building effort (as in thecase of roads) and are demand driven.Interesting and positive examples of Banksupport for training include partnershipprograms involving the government, theBank, and others to build institutionalizedtraining programs on a country, sub-Regional, or Regional basis, focused onspecific development aims (see box 4.7).

Toward more coherent capacity buildingBetter-quality inputs are necessary but notsufficient for effective capacity buildingsupport. Experiences in all four of the sectorsreviewed point to four key steps to ensure theinternal coherence of capacity buildinginterventions. The first step is a capacity needsassessment conducted with stakeholder partic-ipation. The second is a management structurethat aligns the public sector improvementsbeing sought with country development goals,sets outcome objectives, and coordinatesefforts across program components andrelated public sector reforms. The third step isan implementation process that arrangesmeasures to strengthen relevant institutional,organizational, and human resource capaci-ties in the right sequence. Finally, monitoringand evaluation is needed to monitor progressand suggest necessary course corrections.

The use of sector development programs,combined with donors’ willingness to usethem as a funding framework, provides morepotential than do individual projects toapproach public sector capacity building in acoherent way. The health sector programs inthe six case study countries and the educationprograms in five of the six are based on sector

strategies that provide a framework for theidentification of systemic capacity constraints,prioritization of capacity building responses,and coordination of government and donormonitoring of programprogress. But so far theseprograms have focused moreon achieving immediatesector reforms than onstrengthening implementa-tion capacity to producedesired sector outcomes on asustainable basis.14 If theseprograms are going to adequately supportimproved sector management, they will needto introduce more well-defined capacitybuilding objectives and measures for achiev-ing them.

Beyond the need for internal coherence, theoverall scope of capacity building support, likesupport for other development objectives,needs to match country demand for change ina given sector. This is a clear finding from theexperiences with capacity building in the foursectors reviewed. The variation in improvingpublic performance across the sectors showsthe importance of building ownership withinthe broad task environment (which mayencompass several depart-ments and ministries, levelsof government, and non-governmental actors). And astill broader political coali-tion is needed to fuel the bigissues, such as civil servicepay reform, that must under-pin sector-specific perform-ance improvements. For theBank, these case study findings underscore theinstitution’s need to do a better job of helpingcountries take the lead in diagnosing con-straints, designing coherent responses, andapplying capacity building tools effectively.They also suggest that the Bank needs to dobetter in identifying the drivers of change in itsareas of support and in matching its interven-tions to their commitment and capacity forenhancing public sector performance.


3 3

The first step is a capacity needsassessmentconducted withstakeholderparticipation.

The overall scope of capacity buildingneeds to matchcountry demand for change in a given sector.

3 5

Providing CapacityBuilding Support throughCorporate and RegionalMechanisms

While the Bank addresses capacity building mainly as a collateralobjective in country programs, it provides small, additionalamounts of support to Africa through corporate and Regional

mechanisms—resourced and managed separately, outside country pro-grams—that have capacity building as their core objective. Three mainmechanisms are the training programs and knowledge services of WBI; thenational and Regional grant financing of the partnership-funded ACBF;and the small-scale, upstream grants to clients provided by the Bank’s IDF.

Their direct capacity building orientationgives each mechanism the potential toreinforce and even stimulate innovation forscaling up interventions in country programs.But evidence shows that their activities havebeen only moderately effective in achievingtheir immediate objectives. To date there hasbeen little synergy between these programsand the Africa Region’s country lending andanalytical work. Each of the three mechanismshas recently embarked on transforming itsprogram to enhance its effectiveness, but allthree face major challenges in moving in newdirections.

The World Bank Institute The World Bank Institute provides training

and knowledge and advisory services topolicymakers, technical experts, business, andcivil society leaders.1 The Africa Regioncurrently accounts for 22 percent of its clientparticipants (see figure 5.1) and almost one-third of its some 1,000 program offerings(World Bank 2004q, Appendix 3, p. 72).WBI’s learning programs use a mix ofpedagogical strategies. Lectures and presenta-tions—delivered both through face-to-faceand distance learning technologies (forexample, online courses and seminars)—

65

dominate the use of course time.2 Onlinetraining, which has greatly increased thenumber of participants in WBI’s learningprograms in the past few years, has beenaccompanied by IDA credits for the establish-ment of 14 distance learning centers in Africancountries (9 of which are currently in fulloperation).

WBI’s internal evaluations show that itstraining activities produce only modestlearning gains.3 An impact evaluation of clientprograms in FY00–01, based on participantsurvey responses of a sample of six thematictraining activities in that year, found that

“measures of the effectiveness and impact ofWBI learning activities are lower than institu-tional benchmarks.”4 The findings of a secondreport in FY02, based on pre/post testing ofparticipants, leads to a similar conclusion:WBI has had only modest success, and recentyear-to-year outcomes are not showingimprovement (World Bank 2003a).5 Theevaluations also show that WBI’s pedagogicalstrategies could make a difference in theeffectiveness of the training. Although lecturesand presentations take up 42 percent of coursetime, WBI analysis shows that this emphasisdoes not correlate with measures of effective-

3 6


T h e m a t i c D i s t r i b u t i o n o f F Y 0 4 W B I O f f e r i n g s i n A f r i c a

F i g u r e 5 . 1

0

2

4

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8

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12

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16

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Percent share of all Africa programs

Source: World Bank Institute. Chart excludes programs representing less than 2 percent of total offerings.

ness. The strategy found most effective in itsrecent evaluations—developing action plans—takes up less than 10 percent of course time.6

Surveyed participants want more focus ontheir country-specific problems, courses oflonger duration that go the extra step tooffering solutions, and more follow-up toenhance the utilization of the knowledgegained. In Africa, where the undersupply oftrained professionals remains an issue, suchimprovements could be of major benefit.

Recognizing the modest effectiveness of itslearning programs, WBI announced in 2002that it was shifting from training individualsto a new capacity building strategy. WBI’sstrategy states that it will provide services forlong-term institution building through a newcountry focus, aligning more closely with theBank’s operational work and with countries’priorities. It identifies 33 “priority countries”;9 are in Africa. It also introduces two maincountry-specific instruments to help carry outits new strategy: capacity development needsassessments and country capacity develop-

ment strategies. These tools,which are being piloted in anumber of focus countries, areintended to provide input toWorld Bank CASs and bettermatch the supply of WBIactivities to country demand.7

The FY05 budget forimplementing this newprogram includes $7.1 million,or 10 percent of total budgetresources, for capacityenhancement support services such as workingwith countries to develop country-specificprograms, providing technical assistance toBank and borrower country teams, anddeveloping the knowledge base for Banksupport of country capacity building efforts(see figure 5.2).

Although WBI’s FY04 Annual Report(World Bank 2004q) states that the transitionfrom individual training to long-term institu-tional capacity building is largely completed,four issues remain to be addressed (World

P R OV I D I N G C A PAC I T Y B U I L D I N G S U P P O R T T H R O U G H C O R P O R AT E A N D R E G I O N A L M E C H A N I S M S

3 7

Participants wantmore focus on theircountry-specificproblems, courses oflonger duration thatgo the extra step tooffering solutions,and more follow-up.

W B I ’ s F Y 0 5 B u d g e t E x p e n d i t u r e s ( i n c l u d i n g t r u s t f u n d s )

F i g u r e 5 . 2

Learning programs and products ($40.8m)54%

Crosscutting products and other services ($19.7m)26%

Capacity enhancement support services ($7.1m)9%

Country learning centers ($4.1m)5%

Global programs ($3.8m)5%

Source: Internal Bank document.

Bank 2004q, p. 6). First, WBI has not yetmade clear what service improvements itintends to provide the nonpriority Africancountries.

Second, WBI’s learning activities are notfully aligned with the capacity building goal.

Most do not yet connect theirskill building aims with organi-zational and institutionalchanges needed to foster theeffective use of new skills.While WBI has developedlearning programs in a widerange of subject areas, itcannot, and probably shouldnot, aim to be expert in allareas where capacity develop-ments are needed. It should be

more selective in its subject area focus.Moreover, WBI has not developed a set ofproven pedagogic approaches matched to itsreformulated capacity building role—eventhough the need for this change is documentedin its own assessments of the modest success ofits current, main learning modalities (asdiscussed above).8 WBI staff consider the use ofdistance learning a key change that comple-ments and facilitates a number of emerginglearning approaches—such as multisitetraining, reduced lecturing and increasedcountry-to-country knowledge sharing, andteam-based learning.9 But a recent evaluationcommissioned by WBI found no “instances

where programs delivered via the GlobalDevelopment Learning Network (GDLN)resulted in capacity enhancement at thenational level” (World Bank 2004f, p. xvi). Thereport notes that the nature of knowledgetransfer and sharing through distance learninghas strong potential to strengthen institutions.But outcomes related to capacity can only beachieved if current learning programapproaches are changed to provide a continu-ous process of capacity enhancement focusedon targeted country capacity constraints. To theextent that the Bank chooses to continue toprovide training services, it needs to developgreater understanding than WBI’s experiencehas yet provided of effective pedagogic strate-gies that, as one staffer put it, are gearedtoward “adult elites who are WBI’s primaryaudience.”10 For example, WBI’s country focuscannot exploit approaches based on multicoun-try networking (see box 5.1).

Third, capacity building support in Africaneeds to match effective country demand. WBIrecognizes this need and the necessity ofintegrating capacity building services of acentral unit into Bank country programs. Yetwhile operational staff in the Africa Regionwelcome WBI’s intention to work more closelywith them because WBI offers particular skillsand a network of international contacts, theyexpress skepticism about WBI’s capacity, as acentral unit, to play a major role in developingBank capacity building efforts at the country

3 8


The Bank needs todevelop greater

understanding ofeffective pedagogic

strategies gearedtoward “adult elites

who are WBI’s primary audience.”

An examination of African-based networks to strengthen re-search capacity offers a generalization that holds for capacitybuilding more generally. The networks were brought intobeing because of the failures or limitations of other researchsettings. This point is important. In many other parts of theworld, professional networks draw from a strong researchand training core located in functioning institutions, primarily

universities. But in Africa, it is the weakness of the core thatmotivates the establishment of networks. These compensa-tory networks, of which the Bank-supported African Eco-nomic Research Consortium is a successful example, havecharacteristics of particular importance, including processesof mutual adjustment between the networks and the profes-sional sectors in which they operate.

B u i l d i n g P r o f e s s i o n a l N e t w o r k s t o M e e tK n o w l e d g e N e e d s i n A f r i c a

B o x 5 . 1

Source: Prewitt 1998.

level. The implication is that WBI has yet todefine clearly the added value it proposes tobring to the Bank’s capacity building efforts atthis level.

Finally, WBI has launched its new strategywithout having put in place a system tomeasure progress and results. Its currentmethodology for evaluating its learningprograms based on individual knowledgegains11 does not capture the kind of transfor-mation implied in capacity building. WBI isnow piloting its work with country programswith a view to learning and distilling lessons,and it is developing ways to track its newnontraining outputs (such as support tocountry teams in devising needs assessmentsand support to capacity development institu-tions at the country level). These efforts stillleave a need for benchmarks and progressindicators by which to assess the capacitybuilding effectiveness of WBI’s work. WBIneeds to know if its new strategy is working tochange staff incentives and rewards toadvance its capacity building work.12

These indications suggest the need for acandid assessment of what a central capacitybuilding unit in the Bank can and cannot do.Such an assessment would depend on anunderstanding with Regional staff on the roleof the unit in strengthening Bank support forcapacity building in client countries and thetools and techniques to use to achieveintended capacity building outcomes.

The African Capacity BuildingFoundationThe ACBF is an independent institution basedin Harare, Zimbabwe, that provides grants tonational and regional institutions andprograms to help strengthen economic policyanalysis and development management withinAfrican countries. In a period of just over 10years, it has become a key provider of long-term support to programs involved in develop-ing human and organizational capacity inareas of development policy analysis andmanagement—“a remarkable achievement fora young, small organization.”13

The foundation was established in 1991through the collaborative efforts of the WorldBank, the African Development Bank, and theUnited Nations Development Programme(UNDP). Funding for the foundation’s activi-ties is currently provided on a multiyear basisby these three institutions, the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF), 10 developed-countrydonor agencies, and 22 African govern-ments.14 Since its inception, the ACBF hasapproved 113 operations in 37 Africancountries for a total commitment of US$197million (through December 2003), of whichsome two-thirds has supported nationalprojects and one-third, regional projects.

Initially, the ACBF provided grants toeconomic policy units and training programsto improve the work of central ministries,agencies, and their core economic manage-ment and planning functions. In 2000, a newinitiative, the Partnership for CapacityBuilding in Africa (PACT), was launched bythe Bank in cooperation with African govern-ments. The aim was to support a wider rangeof activities, including interactions of policy-makers with civil society and private sectororganizations. PACT was incorporated intothe ACBF. And, within 18 months of takingon board the new PACT agenda, ACBFdoubled its active project portfolio (see AnnexG for a description of its activities).

The World Bank has played a major role inthe ACBF and PACT. Its senior managementwas centrally involved in the design andlaunch of both initiatives and continues totake the lead in mobilizing donor contribu-tions. Bank resources provide the largest shareof the foundation’s funding, amounting to atotal of some $158 million over 1991–2004,or some 40 percent of $389 million in commit-ments. The Bank’s Regional Vice President forAfrica serves on the foundation’s Board ofGovernors, which has policymaking andoversight responsibility; Regional staff sit onthe Executive Board, which approves thefoundation’s budget, annual business plans,and all ACBF/PACT–funded projects.Moreover, the Bank administers the ACB


3 9

Fund and ACBF-PACT Trust Funds throughwhich contributors pool their support.15

The ACBF has two distinct characteristicsthat give it the potential to support capacitybuilding: it can provide funding over a longperiod, and it supports a diverse range ofactivities not limited to individual training andTA interventions. Grantees welcome thecritical funding role that the ACBF plays incontributing to their recurrent and overhead

costs, unlike many otherfunders who provide onlyproject financing. They alsowelcome the networking andvisibility around the issue ofcapacity building that thefoundation, as an African-staffed and African-based

organization, has helped to foster across thecontinent.16 But the ACBF faces fourchallenges in fully realizing its potential.

First, the impact of ACBF-funded programsand institutions is uneven, suggesting the needfor the foundation to be more selective in theuse of its scarce funds. The impact of recipientprograms and institutions on capacitybuilding—as assessed by two independentreviews—has been stronger with semi-autonomous policy units and national andregional graduate-level training than withgovernmental policy units and in-servicetraining programs.17

• Policy analysis units. Through its core insti-tutional support, the ACBF has played a cat-alytic role in creating a network of some 40new or strengthened national and regionalpolicy analysis units. The units, which havebeen mandated and contracted to provide re-search, advisory services, and training togovernment ministries and other public agen-cies have demonstrated considerable impacton policy. Independent units, in contrast,have produced high-quality policy research,but have had less direct policy impact becauseof difficulties in obtaining data from gov-ernment agencies, weak dissemination prac-tices, or lack of government receptivity to

independent research. Because both the semi-autonomous and independent units have fo-cused on producing quality research, theyhave relied heavily on established (some-times international) expertise instead of em-phasizing the development of domestichuman resource capacity.

• National and Regional graduate-level train-ing. Two Regional graduate-level trainingprograms supported by the ACBF (alongwith other funders) are performing well ac-cording to an independent in-depth review.Their main objective has been to improve theteaching and research capacities of the de-partments of economics in universitiesthroughout francophone and anglophoneAfrica, and thereby build capacity for policyanalysis and macroeconomic management.Although neither project has developed adatabase to demonstrate the extent of im-provements in university staff, interviews in-dicate that the African Economic ResearchConsortium has strengthened departments ofeconomics and built individual competen-cies that participants have been able to putto use. Programme de Troisieme Cycle In-terUniversitaire started later, so it is too earlyto tell its effects, although progress is said tobe satisfactory. The ACBF has also providedsupport to strengthen local university train-ing in economic policy management.

• National and Regional in-service (short-term)training courses. Unlike the graduate-levelprograms, the four national and Regional in-service training programs reviewed had onlylimited impact on their beneficiaries—a find-ing similar to the evidence on WBI training—and because of heavy reliance on externalresource persons to deliver the bulk of theircourses, they have not contributed signifi-cantly to the human resource capacity of therecipient institution.

Second, the ACBF has yet to find aneffective way to ensure a strong link between acountry’s need for enhanced policy anddevelopment management and the ad hoccapacity building programs it funds. It has

4 0


The ACBF has twodistinct characteristics

that give it thepotential to support

capacity building.

recently decided to shift its grant-making froma project to a country program approach tomeet that challenge, but how to make thattransformation remains an unresolved issue(World Bank 2003f). Third, like WBI, theACBF lacks well-defined capacity buildingoutcome measures against which to monitorthe progress of individual grantees and theoverall performance of its capacity buildingefforts. Finally, the resources committed by itsfunding partners are too small in relation tothe ACBF’s expanded mandate and programambitions. The Bank assumed at the start ofthe ACBF that in 10 years, the foundationwould be able to raise an endowment andbecome self-sufficient within a decade (Jaycox1993). But donors have never expressed awillingness to commit funds to anendowment, and there is no evidence that eventhe most successful of ACBF grantees are ontheir way to becoming self-sufficient. Indeed,it would be unrealistic to expect self-sufficiency in light of the experience of publicpolicy research and training programselsewhere.18 Indeed, since the incorporation ofPACT, the ACBF has become more dependenton the World Bank than at the outset.19

The Institutional Development FundThe IDF is a World Bank grant-makingmechanism established in 1992 to providequick, action-oriented funding to govern-ments for small-scale capacity building activi-ties, closely related to the Bank’s countryassistance strategy, policy dialogue, anddiagnostic work. IDF grants are to be used tostrengthen institutions when specific Bank-financed projects and other donor resourcesare not available. They are not meant tosubstitute for lending or to finance routineactivities such as budget preparation. Theycan be used to build capacity to performroutine activities or to enable clients todevelop a new idea sufficiently to seek grantsfrom other sources. Grants, which can coveractivities for up to three years, can range insize from $50,000 to $500,000 (and haveaveraged around $300,000), and their

preparation and approval procedures arerelatively streamlined.

The IDF granted $25 million annuallyduring the 1990s, with a decline to some $20million yearly from 1999 to the present.20

From the outset, Africa has been the largestbeneficiary, receiving some30 percent of total alloca-tions since FY93, and asmuch as 35 percent over thepast four years. The largestpercentage of grants to Africain FY04 supported activitiesin financial management (39 percent),monitoring and evaluation (27 percent), andlegal and judicial reform (19 percent).

A strategic review of the IDF carried out in2001 found weaknesses in its grant approvaland oversight processes. The review recom-mended sharpening the focus of IDF grantsand strengthening its governance and man-agement arrangements.

In FY02–03, the IDF evaluated 110 projectsin five areas (or just over a third of allprojects). This review found that of the 89 thatwere rated, only half of the projects hadsatisfactory of higher outcome ratings.21

Several crosscutting issues emerged:

• Projects tended to be supply driven and to lacka clear capacity building strategy. They neededto be based on more adequate assessments, in-volving country participants.

• A large majority of projects included trainingprograms, but training was consistently theweakest component in most projects. On-the-job training was less effective than formaltraining components.

• Projects tended to be overly ambitious and in-volve too many objectives. A step-by-step ap-proach would have been more effective.

• In most cases, follow-up operations would beneeded to sustain the initial IDF-funded ca-pacity building effort, but these were notprovided.

In accordance with the findings of the tworeviews, the IDF has introduced three main


4 1

Like WBI, the ACBFlacks well-definedcapacity buildingoutcome measures.

sets of reforms. It has focused the bulk of itsgrant making on issues of public financialmanagement and accountability, monitoringand evaluation, legal and judicial reform,HIV/AIDS, and low-income countries under

stress. It has revised itsgovernance structure, devolv-ing grant-making decisions tothe Regions and strengthen-ing Regional monitoring ofthe IDF portfolio; and it hasintroduced the possibility ofserial IDF grants for activitiesthat warrant follow-upsupport but have no othersource of funding. Whilethese changes have thepotential to increase IDF’s

relevance as a distinct mode of country-executed and flexible capacity buildingsupport, it will be important that a plannedself-evaluation of the impact of these reformsassess the country ownership of the activitiessupported and the sustainability of theirresults.

The overall value added Each of these three mechanisms was designedto provide a distinct means of capacity buildingsupport not readily available in a cost-effectiveway through Bank country programs—WBI asa provider of global knowledge to enhanceindividual skills; ACBF as a mobilizer andsource of long-term, core funding for countryand Regional policy analysis and managementtraining institutions; and IDF as a flexiblesource of catalytic funding to help jump startcountry-based capacity building initiatives.These are all relevant ways to help buildcountry capacity. But like Bank countryprograms, all three mechanisms lack theknowledge base and results framework theyneed to identify the impact of their activitiesand allocate their limited resources efficiently.Moreover, although WBI and ACBF devoteconsiderable amounts of their resources totraining, neither has demonstrated fullyeffective approaches to the use of trainingactivities as part of efforts to improve publicsector performance. Nor is there a perspectivein the Africa Region on how to get the most useout of the Bank’s investment in these distinctmodes of capacity building support.

4 2


All three mechanismslack the knowledge

base and resultsframework they needto identify the impactof their activities andallocate their limitedresources efficiently.

4 3

Findings andRecommendations

Main findings

The Bank, between 1995 and 2004, provided some $9 billion in lend-ing and close to $900 million in grants and administrative budgetto support capacity building in Africa. Conscious of the limited im-

pact of this support in the face of Africa’s still-weak public sector capac-ity, it has made changes in the design of its support programs.

• The Bank has broadened the scope of its sup-port to deal with demand as well as supplyconstraints to improved public sector per-formance, and cross-sectoral issues such aspublic financial management and decentral-ization of public services.

• It has added new diagnostic tools for assess-ing countries’ capacities for managing theirpublic financial resources and increased itsrange of lending instruments for delivering itscapacity building support with the aim ofstrengthening country ownership of capacitybuilding activities.

• It has also expanded its complementary cor-porate and Regional mechanisms directly sup-portive of capacity building: WBI, ACBF, andthe IDF.

These changes are relevant because theyrecognize that capacity building is a long-termprocess that requires a systemic approach and

attention to demand for improved publicservices as well as the supply of well-structuredorganizations and skilled personnel.

But even with these improvements, theBank's support for capacity building remainsless effective than it could be. This evaluationfinds six areas in need of further strengtheningto obtain better results.

1. Operational framework. The Bank has notestablished a body of knowledge to guide itscapacity building work the way it has forother important issues. As a result, itsdiagnoses of capacity needs and obstacles tochange tend to be partial in their coverage ofcapacity constraints and key interrelationshipsamong them. Both Regional operations andWBI programs have focused on supply ofindividual skills for the public sector withoutensuring that the design and sequencing ofskill building is meshed with needed organiza-

66

tional and institutional developments. Thecapacity to implement capacity buildingactivities is often overestimated, and provenapproaches to building human resourcecapacity on a sustainable basis are underde-veloped. The Bank also has not developedindicators to define capacity buildingoutcomes and measure progress in publicsector performance.

2. Core objective. All recent country strategiesidentify public sector capacity building as acore objective. They are also shifting to sectorand multisector programs and budget support,which set broad frameworks for identifyinglong-term capacity needs. These are promis-ing approaches that may help authoritiesprioritize capacity building activities and thesupport needed from donors. The Bank coulduse these new processes more effectively forhelping countries plan and implement capacitybuilding efforts. Most support for capacitybuilding remains fragmented—designed andmanaged operation by operation. This makesit difficult to capture cross-sectoral issues andopportunities and to learn lessons acrossoperations. Moreover, many projects thataddress capacity building as a collateral ratherthan core objective have ill-defined capacitybuilding objectives that are poorly tracked;and shortcomings in the underlying diagnosisof capacity needs and constraints to changeoften undermine the design of interventionsand the achievement of objectives.

3. Sectoral characteristics. In Africa, the Bank’srecord of success in enhancing the perform-ance of the public sector varies across sectorsas well as across countries. This is becausegovernments, generally, are inclined toimprove services demanded by powerfulinterests (e.g., trunk roads) more readily thanthose sought by weaker or more diffuseinterests (e.g., primary education). Inaddition, the tractability of capacity buildingproblems depends on sectoral characteristics,such as labor intensity and decentralization.The Bank has devoted inadequate effort toderiving lessons along sectoral dimensions.

4. Tools and techniques. The traditional capacitybuilding tools of TA and training have oftenproved ineffective in helping to improvesustained public sector performance, in largepart because they are not applied within abroad human resource managementframework linked to necessary organizationaland institutional developments. Moreover, theBank has not developed a body of knowledgeon what tools should be applied and how indifferent country and sector circumstances.Even though WBI has conducted a great dealof training, its experience has not provided theBank with an understanding of how toeffectively support training as a part ofbuilding professional competencies in thepublic sector.

5. Use of Bank instruments. The Bank is not fullyutilizing all its instruments to improve publicsector performance. The poverty reductionstrategy process has the potential to helpauthorities better prioritize capacity buildingactivities and guide support from donors, butit does not appear to have been used in thisway in most countries. Economic and sectorwork does not contribute to public sectorcapacity building as much as it is expected to,or could. The use of programmatic lending—sectorwide or budgetary—offers the potentialto move toward less fragmented and morecoherent capacity building support by theBank and other donors. But programmaticapproaches have so far contributed more tostrengthening capacities for policy and strate-gic planning than for sector management andprogram implementation. Also, synergybetween country programs and the activitiesof WBI and the ACBF is limited.

6. Quality assurance. Finally, the Bank does notapply the same rigorous business practices toits capacity work that it applies in other areas.Even though capacity building is a statedcorporate and Regional priority, there are nostandard quality assurance processes for theunderlying diagnosis and design of measures,and capacity building interventions are notroutinely tracked, monitored, and evaluated.

4 4


Recommendations This evaluation’s findings underscore theimportance of approaching capacity buildingin Africa as a core objective and ensuring thatcapacity building support is country-owned,results-oriented, and evidence-based. Theevaluation recommends that:

• Operational framework: The Bank, at the cor-porate level, should strengthen its knowl-edge base and amplify its framework forpublic sector capacity building to better helpcountries (a) prioritize capacity building ac-tivities and guide donor support, (b) link in-stitutional, organizational, and humancapacity development, and (c) transform tra-ditional capacity building tools to improve re-sults. And it should ensure that guidelines andprocesses are in place for self- and inde-pendent evaluation of Bank capacity build-ing interventions.

• Sector-specific guidance: Sector and thematicleadership should develop sector-specific guid-

ance on diagnosing public sector capacityneeds, enhancing incentives for performanceimprovements, and monitoring and evaluat-ing interventions.

• Country programs: Regional senior manage-ment should ensure that CASs are used ef-fectively to help countries identify andstrengthen the capacities they need to plan,implement, and measure the results of theirpoverty reduction strategies. They shouldalso ensure that all operations that aim tobuild public sector capacity are based on ad-equate assessments of capacity needs andhave ways to monitor and evaluate capacitybuilding results.

• Training: The Bank should reassess what roletraining should play in its capacity buildingsupport, how training support should be pro-vided, and what should be the respective rolesof a central training unit and Regional pro-grams in any future support for this activity.

F I N D I N G S A N D R E C O M M E N DAT I O N S

4 5

4 7

ANNEX A: A SELECTION OF PRIOR BANK ASSESSMENTS OF ITS

CAPACITY BUILDING SUPPORT

Report Year Key findingsFree-Standing Technical 1990 • The main goal of freestanding TA is to enhance the capacities ofAssistance for Institutional borrower institutions and government agencies to perform their workDevelopment in Sub- on a sustainable basis. The record of the Bank is poor: only 3 out of theSaharan Africa. OED. 19 Bank projects reviewed were rated as having satisfactory outcomes.

• Reasons for poor performance include: inadequate attention to country context, inconsistent performance of expatriate consultants, and weaknesses in project design and supervision (especially training projects) that include failure to account for limited borrower capacity, unclear objectives, lack of performance indicators, and poor choice of instruments.

• TA for institutional development should be de-linked from fast-disbursing adjustment lending and considered as a freestanding project.

• There is a need for candid assessment and consideration of the level of borrower commitment in TA design.

“Managing Technical 1991 • The Bank should strengthen the conceptualization and preparation ofAssistance in the 1990s” TA projects and programs by, among other things, providing clients with

grant funding.• TA needs to be subject to the same rigor—high quality technical inputs

and professional management—that is accorded to investment lending and ESW.

• The Bank should partner with other development agencies (UNDP) tosystematically coordinate TA activities.

“The Bank’s Use of 1991 • The Bank labors under several handicaps when considered as aTechnical Assistance for “supplier of TA,” including absence of explicit and systematic attentionInstitutional Development” to borrower commitment in Bank work, inadequate knowledge of

country context, poor institutional memory because of high staff rotation, cost ineffectiveness of Bank TA vis-à-vis grants from bilateral donors, and overcentralization of policies and procedures in the Bank.

• Use of TA should be limited to cases where government commitment is demonstrable.

• Alternative instruments are needed for institutional development, not an excessive reliance on TA.

4 8


“Technical Assistance in 1994 • The use of TA as a means to develop institutional capacity has had veryAfrica: How It Works and limited success in Africa. Instead of transferring expertise, thisDoesn't Work” approach has created dependency on foreign experts that has not

diminished over the years.• TA does not substitute for institutional reform.• The Bank should reduce the reliance on TA by linking projects to

absorptive capacity and having an exit strategy to phase out TA. “Partnership for Capacity 1996 • Bank limitations in capacity building are structural and fundamental—Building in Africa: Strategy the Bank has to recognize and emphasize the centrality of capacity and Program of Action” building in its work and not treat it as a by-product of its activities.

• Capacity issues are not well integrated into the Bank’s policies, lending, or analytical work: o The project cycle does not support capacity building: it emphasizes

project appraisal rather than implementation, and thus the borrower’s implementation capacities are taken for granted.

o The Bank has missed opportunities to use policy-based adjustment lending and ESW to build client capacity.

Capacity Building in the 1999 • The difficulty in defining capacity building goals in monitorable termsAgricultural Sector in (absence of explicit performance criteria) has led to capacity building Africa. OED. components receiving little attention in Bank projects.

• Sustainable capacity building may not be possible without reform in civil service incentive structures.

• The Bank should de-link short-term policy reform and related conditionality in SALs from long-term institution building interventions.

• Long-term overseas training, generally for advanced degrees, did not have the intended impact, because the trainees frequently left their intended employers, either by seeking more lucrative opportunities outside government, moving into more attractive opportunities in government, or being reassigned to other posts. Such training should be coordinated with personnel and incentive policies.

• Large numbers of TA personnel in projects reflect initiatives from the Bank during project design, against the stated reluctance of recipients. The hosts were willing to receive TA as a means to gain access to other project components such as equipment and training.

Civil Service Reform: 1999 • Bank-supported civil service reforms were largely ineffective inA Review of World Bank achieving sustainable results in capacity building or institutional Assistance. OED reform.

• Capacity building interventions failed, as they were based on a narrow understanding of civil service incentives—that is, equating it to wage incentives alone. Some Bank practices, such as the use of PIUs and expatriate consultants, had a detrimental impact on the morale and incentives for civil service performance and local capacity building efforts.

• Capacity building interventions should be better linked to job descriptions and performance indicators.

“Reforming Public 2000 • Capacity building should be at center stage of Bank operations.Institutions and • There is a mixed but improving record of project performance in severalStrengthening Governance” types of public sector management interventions (such as expenditure

management, tax reform, civil service reform, legal reforms, and the like. Less effective efforts can be attributed to four factors:

Report Year Key findings

o Lack of adequate consideration of “demand” for capacity building, such as the drivers that create pressure to change, incentive structures in government, and level of borrower commitment.

o Inadequate attention to customization to the local context—the tendency to generate and apply a single “best practice,” irrespective of country context.

o Shortage of staff skills in specialized areas, including capacity building, given the limited emphasis on institution-building goals.

o Inadequate instruments for long-term capacity building efforts.“Technical Assistance in 2002 • Capacity building does not play a universally central role in the CAS,the PREM Portfolio: and staff do not have incentives to devote adequate time and effort toStocktaking and Lessons TA operations.Learned” • While quality at entry and overall performance of TA has improved

steadily over the 1990s, the Bank should better consider factors of demand—incentives of clients—in TA design.

• TA continues to be the Banks’ “stepchild.” Business processes for TA need improvement—public sector reforms need to be better applied to TA operations, ICR guidelines for TA need to be improved, and more reliable indicators are needed for monitoring and evaluation of TA operations.

Economic Reforms and 2004 • Capacity constraints are binding: they dictate the speed and the Growth Experiences: direction of public sector reforms.Lessons from the 1990s • “Big bang” approaches have failed because they overstrained limited(Chapter 10). implementation capacity. What is needed is “strategic

incrementalism”—highly focused and pragmatic interventions that are better grounded in the political realities and consistent with the capacity constraints of the country concerned.

Building State Capacity 2004 • The record of experience supports a paradigm shift in the approachin Africa toward state capacity building: from narrow, organizational, and public

management approaches to a broader perspective that includes not just institutional rules of the game, but also political dynamics that drive institutional change. Three features of the new approach are:o Analytical orientation: Shift from specialized knowledge of public

administration functions and supply of human resources to analyzing the country-specific institutions and political dynamics and identifying potential entry points for enhancing demand for capacity and public performance.

o Areas of focus: Broaden focus from capacity building in bureaucracies to include building capacities of accountability mechanisms that generate the demand for public sector capacity.

o Design of interventions: Shift from comprehensive, politically challenging capacity building interventions to modest, pragmatic initiatives with demonstrable results.

• Change processes are cumulative; even a modest initiative can provide a foundation and/or increase demand for improvements in other areas. The process—the orchestration of the capacity building strategy—is important to the development of sustained capacity.

A N N E X A

4 9

Report Year Key findings

5 1

ANNEX B: METHODOLOGY NOTE

This note describes the methodology followedfor the major evaluation components (exclud-ing the staff survey instrument presented inAnnex E).

Literature review. An external consultant wascommissioned to review studies from insideand outside the Bank. The review, whichcovered assessments of capacity building,institutional development, and the instru-ments of technical assistance, training, andother modes of support, explored findings onwhat has worked and what has not worked,the reasons for success or failure, and thecriteria used in making the assessments.

Country Assistance Strategies. All 15 Africa CASsapproved in FY03 (Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea,Malawi, Niger, Rwanda, and Senegal) andFY04 (Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Ghana,Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, andZambia) were reviewed to determine theimportance assigned to public sector capacitybuilding, the coherence of the approach tocapacity building within and across CASpriority sectors, and the specificity of perform-ance indicators. These findings werecompared with a 1997 review of nine CASs(Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mauritius,Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe) preparedby the Africa Region.

Country case studies. To enable assessment ofthe relevance and effectiveness of the Bank’scapacity building support at a country level

and obtain client views of the effectiveness ofthe support they received, six case studies—ofBenin, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, andMozambique—were carried out. Theyinvolved mission visits and focused particu-larly on capacity building efforts in the sectorsof education, health, and roads, and the cross-cutting area of public financial management.Annex C provides details on the dates of thecountry missions and individuals interviewedin government, the private sector, civil society,and donor agencies; Annex D lists the countryCASs, projects, and ESW reviewed. A team ofindependent consultants, one from inside andone from outside the country, conducted eachcase study.

The teams addressed a common set ofevaluative questions in reviewing countryassistance strategies and lending operations:

• Relevance: How well have the country’s ca-pacity needs/constraints been identified and as-sessed, and capacity building priorities set?How clearly do Bank country assistance strate-gies specify capacity building objectives? Hasthe Bank had coherent and realistic strategiesfor achieving its country capacity buildingobjectives, and have its strategies been tech-nically and politically sound? To what extenthave the capacity building operations fundedby the Bank been well designed—individuallyand in the aggregate?

• Efficacy: To what extent have the capacitybuilding objectives of the CASs and the Bank-supported operations been achieved, or arethey likely to be achieved? To what extent are

the capacity gains likely to be sustained? Howeffective have TA activities been in helpingcountries build capacity? How effective havetraining activities been in helping countriesbuild capacity? What factors have influencedthe extent of achievement of the capacitybuilding output and outcome objectives ofBank-supported lending and nonlending op-erations? Are there examples of significantor outstanding capacity gains, and if yes, whatelements of good practice do they reflect?

• Bank and borrower performance: How haveBank operational policies, procedures, andpractices reinforced or undermined capacitybuilding efforts? How has country commit-ment to and leadership of capacity buildingoperations influenced the achievement of ca-pacity building aims?

A consultant undertook a separate in-depthreview of 13 recent pieces of fiduciary ESWfor the six countries to assess the quality ofthe analysis and diagnosis of capacityconstraints. The main evaluative questionswere: the extent to which the assessments werebased on a clear conceptual framework forcapacity, the extent to which they addressedkey linkages among capacity constraints, andthe relevance and level of specificity ofcapacity building measures identified in theiraction plans. This review covered fourCountry Financial Accountability Assess-ments (Benin 2001, Ghana 2004, Malawi2003, and Mozambique 2001), four CountryProcurement Assessment Reports (Ghana2003, Malawi 2004, Mali 1998, andMozambique 2002), and five Public Expendi-ture Reviews (Ethiopia 2001, Malawi 2001,Mali 1995, and Mozambique 2001 and2003).

Technical assistance loans. Thirty-one Africa-wide technical assistance loans (listed in tableD.3) were reviewed to determine the qualityof their assessment of capacity needs,relevance of capacity building objectivesagainst assessed needs, and extent to whichthose objectives were achieved or are likely to

be achieved. An initial pilot assessment wasmade of all nine Africa TALs that wereapproved and exited in the period FY96–03.Based on the findings of this pilot review, 22additional TALs approved over the longerperiod of FY93–04 (13 closed and 10 active)in economic management and public sectorreform were reviewed to compare theirrelevance and effectiveness with the broaderrange of TALs and to determine what, if any,change in the design of these instruments hadoccurred since the mid-1990s. In addition, theproject outcome and institutional develop-ment impact ratings for all TALs and publicsector governance projects in Africa werecompared with Bankwide ratings over theperiod FY95–04.

Random sample of Africawide projects. Fifty-fiveAfricawide adjustment and investmentprojects, excluding TALs (listed in table D.4)were reviewed to determine the quality ofassessment of capacity needs, relevance ofobjectives, and efficacy. The sample ofprojects was drawn from the total of 280Africa projects approved and exited in1995–2004. Standard sampling tools wereused to (a) generate a sample size with amargin of error of 0.1 and a 90 percentconfidence interval, and (b) draw a randomsample. Project appraisal, supervision, andimplementation completion reports werereviewed and Bank staff interviewed as neededto clarify information available in thedocumentation.

Estimated amounts of project funds allocatedto capacity building activities. Projectdocuments do not provide a routinebreakdown of the costs of capacity buildingactivities supported as part of projectcomponents; therefore, two methods weredeveloped and used to make a trial estimate ofaggregate costs for investment and adjustmentloans. For investment loans, capacity buildingsupport was estimated by summing the costsof activities—such as TA, training, consultan-cies, studies, and equipment and materials—

5 2


designed to strengthen government functions(not including costs for direct frontline servicedelivery, such as the construction of schoolsand clinics). For adjustment operations, theestimate was based on calculating the numberof conditions or actions directed to achievingspecified capacity building objectives (such asstrengthening policy or budget formulation,administrative systems, or legislation, asdistinct from quantitative targets for revenuegeneration and expenditure) as a percentageof the total number of actions.

Corporate and regional mechanismsWorld Bank Institute. An external consultantreviewed WBI strategic documents, annualreports, learning program descriptions, anddescriptions and evaluations for 20 courses.The courses were selected from FY02 andFY03 offerings in five program areas(education, health, governance, public finance,and decentralization) that corresponded to thesectoral focus of the OED evaluation and thattook place either in one of the evaluation’s sixcase study countries or at another location inwhich nationals from the six countries partici-pated. The consultant also interviewed 25 WBIstaff, including all relevant top management,and a smaller number of Africa Region staffwith sector responsibilities in the areas ofhealth, education, and public sector manage-ment and governance. The review focused ontwo main questions: What has the World BankInstitute (and its predecessor, the EconomicDevelopment Institute) contributed to capacitybuilding over the period of the OED evalua-tion? Is the WBI positioned to make a contri-bution in the scale-up proposed by the Bank?

Africa Capacity Building Foundation. An externalconsultant reviewed ACBF/PACT strategicdocuments, annual reports, program descrip-tions, and existing ACBF evaluations. Theassessment of effectiveness was based largelyon a 2002 independent evaluation commis-sioned by the Bank and presented to theBank’s Board of Executive Directors and a2001 independent evaluation commissionedby the United Kingdom’s Department forInternational Development. The consultantinterviewed the ACBF’s senior management inHarare in July 2005 and conducted telephoneinterviews with three members of the ACBFExecutive Board. In addition, the case studymission teams interviewed the management ofselected ACBF-funded programs in four ofOED’s case study countries (Benin, Ethiopia,Ghana, and Malawi). These in-countryinterviews were based on a common interviewguideline that sought ACBF recipient views onthe relevance of the foundation’s support fortheir programs and the efficiency with whichthe support was provided. The OED evalua-tion task manager also conducted interviewsin Washington with staff responsible for Banksupport of the ACBF.

Institutional Development Fund. A desk reviewwas made of IDF documents and six perform-ance reviews prepared by the IDF over theperiod FY94–03. The review’s assessment ofthe relevance and effectiveness of the IDF wasmainly based on A 2002 Strategic Review byOPCS and supplemental review of 89 IDF-financed projects (or just over one-third of allprojects financed over the 10-year periodFY93–02).

A N N E X B

5 3

5 5

ANNEX C: COUNTRY CASE STUDY MISSIONS

Country missions were carried out in Benin,Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, andMozambique between March and July 2004.In each country, a team of one to threeconsultants conducted interviews with keyinformants (government officials, donoragencies, civil society representatives, andBank staff) using a common case studyguideline (described in Annex B). In all, themissions conducted interviews with 150government officials, 71 donor agencyrepresentatives, 27 Bank field staff, and 46other stakeholders.

BeninDaniel Ritchie (international consultant),Wakili Tairou (national consultant), and MaiLe (OED) interviewed 18 governmentofficials, 9 donor representatives, 3 countryBank staff, and 8 other stakeholders (May1–13, 2004).

EthiopiaFrans Ronsholt (international consultant) andAddis Anteneh (national consultant)interviewed 23 government officials, 8 donorrepresentatives, 7 country Bank staff, and 6other stakeholders (May 10–20, 2004).

GhanaDaniel Ritchie, Abena Oduro (nationalconsultant), and Catherine Gwin (OED)interviewed 27 government officials, 11 donorrepresentatives, 7 country Bank staff, and 3other stakeholders (March 22–April 2, 2004).

MalawiArne Disch (international consultant) andKhwima Nthara (national consultant)interviewed 43 government officials, 13 donorrepresentatives, 3 country Bank staff, and 10other stakeholders during two field visits(April 18–May 4, 2004).

MaliFloribert Ngaruko (international consultant)interviewed 11 government officials, 10 donorrepresentatives, 3 country Bank staff, and 12other stakeholders (June 26–July 10, 2004).

MozambiqueArne Disch and Jovito Nunes (nationalconsultant) interviewed 38 governmentofficials, 20 donor representatives, 4 countryBank staff, and 8 other stakeholders duringtwo field visits (April 18–May 4, 2004).

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ANNEX D: LISTS OF PROJECTS, CASs, AND ESW REVIEWED

Table D.1: Country Case Studies–Projects

HealthPopulation and Health(1995)

Family Health Project(1988)Health SectorDevelopment Program(1998)

Health Sector Support(1998)Health Sector ProgramSupport Project II (2003)

Population & FamilyPlanning Project (1999)

Health SectorDevelopment Program(1999)

Health Sector RecoveryProgram (1996)

RoadsTransport SectorInvestment Project (1997)

Roads RehabilitationProject (1992)Emergency RecoveryReconstruction Program(1992)Road Sector DevelopmentProject (1998)Economic RecoveryProgram (2001)Road Sector DevelopmentPhase (2003)

Urban Transport (1993)Highway SectorInvestment Program (1996)Road Sector DevelopmentProgram (2002)

Roads Maintenance and Rehabilitation (1999)

Mali Transport Sector(1994)

Second Roads and CoastalShipping Project (1994)Roads/BridgesManagement andMaintenance (2002)

CountryBenin

Ethiopia

Ghana

Malawi

Mali

Mozambique

Sector

EducationEducation Development Project (1994)

Seventh Education Project (1988)Education Sector Development Program(1998)

Tertiary Education (1993)Primary School Development (1993)Vocational Skills & Informational Sector Program (1995)Basic Education Sector Improvement(1996)National Functional Literacy Program(1999)Education Sector Project (2004)

Primary Education Project (1996)Secondary Education Project (1998)

Education SECAL (1995)Vocational Education and Training (1996)Improving Learning in Primary Schools(2000)Education Sector Expenditure Program(2001)

Human Development Project (1993)Education Sector Strategy Program (1999)Higher Education Project (2002)

PFM/PSMEconomic Management Project (1994)SAC III (1995)PERAC (2001)PRSC (2004)

Structural Adjustment Credit I (1993)Economic Rehabilitation AdjustmentCredit (2001)Economic Structural Adjustment Credit(2002)Capacity Building for DecentralizedService Delivery (2003)PRSC 1 (2004)Public Sector Capacity BuildingProgram (2004)

Public Financial Management TAProject (1997)Public Sector Management Program(1999)Economic Recovery Support OperationII (1999)Economic Recovery Support OperationIII (2002)PRSC I (2003)

Fiscal Restructuring andDeregulation (1996)Fiscal Restructuring and Deregulation II(1999)Fiscal Restructuring and Deregulation IITA (1998)Fiscal Restructuring and DeregulationIII (2001)Fiscal Restructuring and DeregulationIII TA (2001)Institutional Development II (1994)Financial Management, Transparency,and Acct (2003)

Economic Management (1996)SAC III (2002)

Financial Sector Capacity Building(1994)Second Economic Recovery Credit(1994)Third Economic Recovery Credit (1997)Economic Management ReformOperation (1999)Public Sector Reform (2003)Economic Management and PrivateSector Operation (2003)

Note: SAC = Structural Adjustment Credit; PERAC = Public Expenditure Reform Adjustment Credit; SECAL = Sector Adjustment Loan.

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Table D.2: Country Case Studies–CASs, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, and Analytical Reports

Country

Benin

Ethiopia

Ghana

Poverty ReductionStrategy Papers (PRSP)

Interim PRSP and Assessment (2000)PRSP Preparation Status Report andJoint Assessment Vol. 1 (2002)PRSP and Joint Staff Assessment Vol. 1(2003)

Interim PRSP (01/2000–03/2002) andJoint Assessment Vol. 1 (2001)PRSP and Joint Assessment Vol. 1(2003)First Annual PRSP Progress Report andJoint Assessment (2004)

Development Strategy for PovertyReduction Vol. 1 (2000)Interim PRSP and Assessment Vol. 1(2001)PRSP Preparation Status Report andJoint Assessment (2002)PRSP and Joint Assessment Vol. 1(2003)

Country AssistanceStrategy (CAS)

Rural Water Supply andSanitation Project (1994)Interim CAS (2001)2004 CAS

1995 CAS1998 CASCAS: Interim Support Strategy (2001)2003 CAS1995 CAS

1998 CAS2000 CAS2004 CAS

Analytical and other reports

Assessment of Selected Road Funds in Africa (2001)Le Systeme Educatif Beninois (2002)Le Secteur Medical Privé a Cotonou, Benin, en 1999 (2000)Towards a Public Sector Management Strategy for West/CentralAfrica (1997)Republique du Benin—Rapport Analytic sur la Passation des Marches(Country Assessment Procurement Report), (2000)Country Financial Accountability Assessment (2001)Civil Service Reform: Strengthening World Bank and IMFCollaboration, vol. 1 (2002)Toward a Poverty Alleviation Strategy for Benin, vol. 1 (1995)Sustainable Banking with the Poor (1997)Contribution pour une Strategie de Protection Sociale du Benin (2000)Agricultural Markets in Benin and Malawi (2002)

Transport Sector Memorandum (1997)Improving Transport to Reduce Poverty (2004)Higher Education Sector Work (2004)Paramedical Manpower Study (2003)Public Expenditure Policy for Transition (1994)Public Expenditure Review (1997)Country Procurement Assessment Report (1998)Review of Public Finances (1998)Country Economic Memorandum (2000)Public Expenditure Review (2000)Woreda Study (2002)Municipal Decentralization in Ethiopia: A Rapid Assessment (2002)Issues in State Transformation: Decentralization, Delivery, andDemocracy (Concept Note), (2003)Country Procurement Assessment Report (2002)Ethiopia Public Expenditure Review (2002)Ethiopia Country Financial Accountability Assessment (2003)Ethiopia Public Expenditure Review: Emerging Challenge (2004)Toward Poverty Alleviation and a Social Action Program (1993)Regionalization (2000)

The Problems Facing Labor-Based Road Programs (1996)Review of Transport Projects in Ghana (OED), (1999)Assessments of Road Funds (2000)Staff Loss and Retention at Selected African Universities (1994)Participation in Education (1995)Tertiary Education Policy (1999)Adult Literacy and Earnings in Ghana (2000)Public Health and Education Spending in Ghana (2001)Children's Health and Achievements in School (1994)Reproductive Health and Health Sector Reform (2000)HIV/AIDS and African Universities (2001)Financial Sector Review (1994)Country Economic Memorandum (1995)Budgetary Institutions and Expenditure Outcome (1996)Country Financial Accountability Assessment (2001)Draft Country Portfolio Performance Report (2002)Public Expenditure Tracking (2002)Salary Review of Public and Private Sectors in Ghana (2003)Country Procurement Assessment Report (2003)Country Financial Accountability Assessment (2004)Country Economic Memorandum (2004)Country Policies for Poverty Reduction (1993)Ghana 2000 and Beyond: Setting the Stage for Growth (1993)Poverty Past, Present, and Future (1995)

A N N E X D

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Table D.2: Country Case Studies–CASs, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, and Analytical Reports

Country

Malawi

Mali

Mozambique

Others

Poverty ReductionStrategy Papers (PRSP)

Interim PRSP and JointAssessment Vol. 1 (2001)Joint IDA-IMF PRSP (2003)PRSP and Joint StaffAssessment Vol. 1 (2003)

PRSP and Assessment Vol. 1Joint Assessment of theProgress of the PRSP Vol. 1(2002)PRSP and Joint IDA-IMFAssessment Vol. 1 (2003)

Interim PRSP and AssessmentVol. 1 (2000)PRSP Vol. 1 (2002)PRSP Annual Progress Reportand Joint Staff Assessment(2003)

Country AssistanceStrategy (CAS)

1996 CAS1999 CAS2003 CAS

1995 CAS1998 CAS2004 CAS

1996 CAS1998 CAS2000 CAS2004 CAS

2003 Gambia CAS2003 Guinea CAS2003 Niger CAS2003 Rwanda CAS2003 Senegal CAS2003 Cameroon CAS2004 Chad CAS2004 Madagascar, CAS2004 Zambia CAS

Analytical and other reports

Cost, Financing, and School Effectiveness of Education in Malawi (2004)The Changing Distribution of Public Education Expenditure in Malawi (2002)Malawi Health Expenditure Review (1999)Public Sector Management Review Vol. 1 & 2 (1993)Civil Service Pay and Employment Study (1994)Public Expenditures (2001)Country Financial Accountability Assessment (2003)Country Economic Memorandum (2003)Country Procurement Assessment Report (Draft) (2004)Human Resources and Poverty (1996)Accelerating Malawi's Growth (1997)Malawi: Preliminary Document on the Initiative for Heavily Indebted PoorCountries (HIPC) (Draft 2001)Strategic Country Gender Assessment (UNDP and World Bank, 2003)Malawi: Country Assessment and Action Plan for HIPCs, (Draft 2004)

Water Management in Roadwork Design in the Sahel (1997)Water Management in Roadwork Design in the Sahel, vol. 2 (2003)Transport Sector to Sustainable Economic Growth (2004)Case Studies in Financing Quality Basic Education (1993)Participation in Education (1995)Regional AIDS Strategy for the Sahel (1995)Socioeconomic Differences in Health, Nutrition, and Population in Mali (2000) School Health Situation Analyses (2002)Increasing Clients’ Power to Scale Up Health Services to the Poor (2003) Health, Nutrition, and Population Country Status Report (2004)Mali Health Sector Work (2004)Public Expenditure Review (1995)Country Procurement Assessment Report (1998)Country Financial Accountability Assessment (2003)Mali CPAR Update (2004)Country Policies for Poverty Reduction (1993)Review of Policies, Strategies, & Programs in Traditional Energy Sector(1993)Country Environmental Strategy Paper (1994)The Use of Spatial Analysis at the World Bank (1998)Local Solutions to Regional Problems (1998)Mali Sources of Growth with Equity (2004)Mali-Private Sector Strategy Note (2004)

Cost and Financing of Education (2003)Improving Health for the Poor in Mozambique, The Fight Continues (2002)HIV/AIDS, Human Capital, & Economic Growth Prospect for Mozambique (2003)Financial Sector Study (1993)Capacity Building Study (1993)Partnership for Capacity Building in Africa: Mozambique (Draft 1996)Public Expenditure Management Review (2001)Country Economic Memorandum (2001)Country Financial Accountability Assessment (2001)Country Procurement Assessment Report (2002)Public Expenditure Review (2003)Impediments to Industrial Sector Recovery (1995)Country Assistance Review (1997)Rebuilding the Mozambican Economy: Assessment of a Development Partnership(OED, 1998)

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Table D.3: Project Review—31 Technical Assistance Loans

FY Project ID Country Description

Public Sector TALs (FY93–04)

1993 P001187 Côte d’Ivoire Economic Management

1993 P001209 Côte d’Ivoire Human Resources Management

1993 P001810 Mozambique Public Sector and Legal ID

1993 P002167 Nigeria Economic Management

1993 P002427 Sierra Leone Public Sector Management

1993 P002788 Tanzania Parastatal and Private Sector Reform

1993 P002975 Uganda Economic and Financial Management

1994 P000116 Benin Economic Management

1994 P000437 Cape Verde Public Sector Reform and Capacity Building

1994 P001657 Malawi Institutional Development II

1995 P001367 Kenya ID and Civil Service Reform

1995 P002976 Uganda Institutional Capacity Building

1997 P045588 Ghana Public Financial Management

2000 P044679 Uganda Second Economic and Financial Management

2000 P065301 Nigeria Economic Management Capacity Building

2001 P073832 Malawi Third Fiscal Restruction and Deregulation

2001 P073904 São Tome Public Resource Management

2002 P066490 Kenya Public Sector Management

2003 P050938 Ethiopia Capacity Building and Decentralization Service Delivery

2003 P072205 Angola Economic Management

2003 P076901 South Africa Municipal Financial Management

2004 P074448 Madagascar Economic and Financial Management

2004 P078613 Sierra Leone Institutional Reform and Capacity Building

Other Closed TALs (FY96–03)

1996 P041553 Cameroon Privatization and Private Sector

1996 P000568 Congo Privatization and Capacity Building Project

1996 P000943 Ghana Non-Bank Financial Institution

1996 P001077 Guinea Mining Sector

1996 P001090 Guinea Higher Education

1997 P045588 Ghana Public Financial Management

1997 P001555 Madagascar Private Sector Development

1997 P044383 Senegal Urban Transport Reform and Capacity Building

1999 P063791 Mauritania Telecommunications and Postal

Note: ID = Institutional development.

A N N E X D

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Table D.4: Project Review—Random Sample of Africawide Projects

FY Project ID Country Description1995 P000112 Benin Environmental Management Program1996 P001334 Kenya SAC I1996 P003240 Zambia Economic Recovery and Investment1996 P039856 Cameroon SAC II1996 P001967 Niger Natural Resource Management1996 P040115 Côte d’Ivoire Railways Rehabilitation1996 P001746 Mali Vocation Education and Training Consolidation1996 P000061 Angola Social Action1996 P035669 Madagascar Social Fund 21996 P042305 Malawi Primary Education Project1996 P000957 Ghana Highway Sector Investment Program1996 P001331 Kenya Arid Lands1996 P001081 Guinea Agricultural Services1996 P001792 Mozambique Health Sector Recovery 1996 P034106 Mauritania Urban Infrastructure and Pilot Decentralization1996 P035620 Tanzania Financial Institutional Development1996 P035623 Chad Capacity Building1997 P035922 Mozambique ERC III1997 P001974 Niger Public Sector Adjustment1997 P044975 Chad SAC II1997 P046650 Mauritania Regional Power1997 P048389 Rwanda Emergency Reintegration and Recovery Credit1997 P003253 Zambia Environmental Support Program1997 P001738 Mali Irrigation Promotion1997 P001537 Madagascar Environment II1997 P044324 Zambia Enterprise Development1997 P044651 Eritrea Road Sector Engineering Project1997 P040019 Madagascar Capacity Building1998 P051357 Senegal Energy Sector Adjustment1998 P002972 Uganda Education Sector Adjustment Credit1998 P045644 Angola Post Conflict Social Reconstruction Project1998 P002891 Togo Natural Agricultural Service1998 P041280 Togo Public Enterprise Restructuring and Privatization1998 P044912 Côte d’Ivoire Urban Land Management1998 P056487 Madagascar Mining Project1999 P055186 Niger Public Financial Reform 1999 P001767 Mozambique Economic Management Recovery Operation1999 P044974 Chad SAC III1999 P064305 Madagascar Social Fund III1999 P050615 Ghana Public Sector Management Program1999 P002941 Uganda Institutional Capacity Building for Protected Areas1999 P037588 Côte d’Ivoire Agricultural Services II2000 P069820 Mauritania Fiscal Reform Support Operation Project2000 P035637 Sierra Leone Economic Rehabilitation and Recovery Credit2000 P060092 Central African Central African Republic—Fiscal Consolidation Credit

Republic2000 P066198 Mauritius Financial Sector Infrastructure Credit2001 P073329 Niger Oil Shock Supply—PFRAC2001 P069568 Niger Public Finance Recovery Credit2001 P055471 Senegal Trade Reform and Competitiveness2002 P052202 Chad SAC IV2002 P069569 Niger Public Expenditure ADJ Credit2002 P050619 Ghana ERSO III2002 P075070 Mauritius Public Expenditure Reform Loan Project2002 P074642 Sierra Leone Economic and Rehabilitation Recovery Credit II

Note: SAC = Structural Adjustment Credit; ERC = Expenditure Review Committee; PFRAC = Public Finance Recovery Credit; ADJ = adjustment; ERSO = Economic

Recovery Support Operation.

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ANNEX E: AFRICA STAFF SURVEY

OED conducted a survey of Africa Regionstaff to gain their views on the scope andeffectiveness of capacity building efforts onwhich they had worked. The survey was sentelectronically to 680 operational, non-managerial Africa staff based in the headquar-ters and in country offices. All network staffaffiliated with the Africa Region and WBI(except those in the financial complex andinternal support areas, such as humanresources and information technology) wereincluded.

Response rate Of the 680 staff surveyed, OED received 131responses, a 19 percent response rate. Ofthese, 46 respondents noted that they had notparticipated in any capacity buildingoperations in the Region and were thereforeexcluded from the rest of the survey. Eighty-five respondents who had worked on at leastone capacity building operation responded to

questions on the nature and effectiveness ofBank support for capacity building.

The survey instrument and responses

What is capacity building?In an open-ended question, staff memberswere asked to relate how they would describecapacity building to someone who was new tothe Bank and to their sector. The wide range inresponses reveals that there is no commondefinition among Bank staff on what consti-tutes or should constitute capacity building.

Frequency and use of various kinds of capacitybuilding activitiesUsing a four-point scale, staff were asked torank various capacity building activities on:(a) the frequency with which they have usedthe listed activity in their operations, and (b)the effectiveness of the activity.

Description of capacity building Responses (%) Number of responses

Three-level: organizational, institutional, human capacity 19 13

Human capacity and institutional incentives/enabling 19 13environment

Human capacity, technical assistance, and equipment 19 13

Vague or general terms (such as strengthening client 25 18capacity to meet development goals)

Equate capacity building with issues such as harmonization, knowledge sharing, and the like 8 6

Other (too varied to classify) 8 7

Total 70

Bank effectiveness in various features ofcapacity buildingStaff were asked to rate the Bank’s effective-ness on a number of features that arecommonly considered important for success-ful capacity building efforts. Only a little morethan a third of the respondents thought theBank was effective in identifying countryleaders and champions for capacity building.

Ratings on Bank support to staff on capacitybuildingStaff were asked to rate their level of satisfac-tion with support provided to them by theBank to undertake capacity building efforts inclient countries. In an open-ended follow-upquestion, staff were also asked to indicateimprovements they would like to see in Banksupport to staff.

6 4


Frequency Did not(often/ Effective Somewhat Not rate

Capacity building Responses sometimes, and very effective effective effectivenessactivities (number) %) effective (%) (%) (%) (%)

Formal analytical work 74 77 49 32 5 14

Informal AAA 69 77 62 23 6 9

Shot-term training 79 52 52 38 5 5

Long-term training 69 48 29 38 7 26

Study tours 74 70 58 23 5 14

Expert advice 79 92 59 27 5 9

IT equipment and support 74 76 54 32 3 11

Dialogue on project

preparation/supervision 79 95 73 15 3 9

Other 8 63 13 13 13

Total 85

Bank effectiveness on features Effective and very effective

Analyzing political and institutional context (%) 68

Developing an agreed sector strategy (%) 49

Assessing client capacity at project entry (%) 57

Identifying short-term or long-term capacity building outcome objectives (%) 49

Identifying country leaders and champions (%) 36

Cooperation w/other development partners (%) 51

Total responses (number) 81

Very satisfied/Instruments of Bank support to staff Responses (number) Did not receive (%) satisfied (%)

Policies and guidelines 80 16 33

Management support 84 7 50

Peer review 82 10 45

Knowledge 82 7 51

Formal training 81 25 33

Other 10 20 30

Note: AAA = analytical and advisory activities; IT = information technology.

Forty-three percent (of 55 respondents tothe question) recommended improvements toBank knowledge on capacity building (throughbrown-bag lunches, seminars, workshops,peer-to-peer exchanges, best practice notes,and formal and informal training). Thirty-onepercent also suggested improvements to theBank’s organizational structure—emphasis on

long-term results (such as capacity building) aswell as short term goals; revamping sectorstructures to deal with crosscutting issues; andgreater clarity in corporate policies andguidelines on capacity building. Twenty-fivepercent called for greater managerialsupport—in terms of time, resources, andencouragement to staff.

A N N E X E

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6 7

ANNEX F: CAPACITY BUILDING IN THE BANK’S AFRICA

REGIONAL STRATEGIES

Virtually all of the Bank’s Regional reports onAfrica over the past 10 years have emphasizedpublic sector capacity as a binding constraintto development in the Region. A succession ofstrategies at the Regional level has highlightedkey weaknesses in public sector capacity andthe need for institutional and human resourcecapacity development. The following is asummary of the approaches to capacitybuilding in the Regional documents.

Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crises toSustainable Development (1989)• Identified capacity building as a development

priority and defined as human development,restructuring public and private enterprises,and strengthening political leadership

• Called special attention to strengthening thepolicy analysis and economic managementcapabilities of governments

• Encouraged capacity building at all levels ofgovernment (central and local) and in publicenterprises, with emphasis at the local level (es-pecially rural areas) to support effective de-centralization and enhanced service delivery.

A Continent in Transition: Sub-SaharanAfrica in the Mid-1990s (1995), andToward a Public Sector ManagementStrategy for West Central Africa (1996)• Proposed a “strategic approach to capacity

building,” built on country ownership andcommitment, customized solutions to fit localconditions, enhanced selectivity, appropriatesequencing, and attention to enhancing skillmix

• Emphasized the need for improved stake-holder participation and donor coordination.

Partnership for Capacity Building inAfrica: Strategy and Program of Action(1996)• Encouraged creation of national capacity

building secretariats in client countries to mo-bilize local efforts and interact with donors,and a corresponding Regional focal point orsecretariat in the Bank to implement and mon-itor the Bank’s capacity building activities

• Sought changes to Bank policies and proce-dures in order to mainstream capacity build-ing into Bank operations

• Created a trust fund (PACT) for capacitybuilding in Africa to support and catalyzebroad international financing and an inter-national Consultative Group for CapacityBuilding in Africa to coordinate donor efforts.

Public Sector Management: Africa RegionSector Strategy Paper—2000 and AfricaRegion PSM Strategy Update—2002• Emphasized not only the supply of capacity

building services, but also measures to in-crease demand for improved public sectorperformance

• Called for strategic selectivity, based on coun-try conditions, within four broad areas ofemphasis: (a) reform of state structures (de-centralization, role of the state, privatization,regulatory environment); (b) strengtheningof public sector management (budget disci-pline, expenditure management, performancemonitoring); (c) building demand and ac-

countability; and (d) empowering communi-ties for service delivery.

Strategic Framework for IDA’s Assistanceto Africa—2003• Elaborated on three demand aspects: (a)

distinguishing between capacity of individ-uals, organizations, and systems; (b) usingmonetary and nonmonetary incentives toshape capacity utilization and retention atall three levels; and (c) building ownershipand commitment

• Advocated a differentiated strategy based oncountry conditions: a strong programmatic ap-

proach in countries with supportive conditions;a narrow set of interventions in countrieswith commitment but low bureaucratic ca-pacity; and an opportunistic approach with afocus on service delivery in low-income coun-tries under stress and those on the borderline

• Encouraged focus on improving country con-text by building consensus and/or coalitionsfor change

• Advocated use of diagnostic governance in-dicators and diagnosis of political economy inBank analytical and advisory activities.

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6 9

ANNEX G: ACTIVITIES OF THE AFRICAN CAPACITY BUILDING

FOUNDATION

Established in 1991, the ACBF is an independ-ent institution based in Harare, Zimbabwe,that provides grants to national and regionalinstitutions and programs for improvingpublic sector capacity and effectiveness in sixfocus areas, shown in figure G.1. The activi-ties of the ACBF can largely be grouped intothree areas: projects and programs,knowledge management and outreach, andother program support activities.1

1. Projects and Programs Direct pperations: The ACBF provides grantfunding to regional and national programsand projects in Africa. Since its inception, the

ACBF has approved 113 operations in 37African countries for a total commitment ofUS$197 million (as of year end 2003).2 Theactive portfolio consists of 80 projects (figureG.1) and the main area of emphasis iseconomic policy analysis and management.

National focal points: The ACBF also supportsinstitutional frameworks in client countries,commonly referred to as National FocalPoints (NFPs), to determine core capacityneeds of stakeholders and to enhanceownership of and commitment to capacitybuilding. These institutional frameworks,serve as small high-level bodies that facilitate

D i s t r i b u t i o n o f A C B F A c t i v e P o r t f o l i o b y C o r e C o m p e t e n c y

F i g u r e G . 1

Economic policy analysis and management (62%)

Financial management and accountability (4%)

Public administration and management (3%)

National statistics (4%)

National parliaments (4%)

Professionalization of voices (23%)

government, private sector, and civil societyparticipation, and are mandated to plan,coordinate, and monitor implementation ofcapacity-building activities. The ACBF has todate established 26 NFPs.

2. Knowledge Management, Outreach,and Partnership ActivitiesSince 2002, the ACBF has had an activeknowledge management, outreach, andpartnership program that includes the follow-ing activities:

1. Creation of Knowledge Networks and Knowl-edge Sharing Platforms: The ACBF haslaunched two types of networks—TechnicalAdvisory Panels and Networks (TAP-NETs),six of which have been launched,3 and theCountry-Level Knowledge Networks (CLK-NETs), the first of which is being set up inGhana. Both types of networks aim to en-courage communities of practice among de-velopment stakeholders in ACBF corecompetence areas to facilitate knowledge gen-eration, sharing and dissemination for goodgovernance, sustainable growth, and povertyreduction.

2. Generation of best practice studies and lessonsnotes.

3. Creation of the Senior Policymakers and De-velopment Managers Knowledge Sharing Pro-gram that documents senior policymakers’views on topics related to the foundation’s mis-sion.

4. Publications and occasional papers. 5. Dissemination events such as brown bag

lunches, conferences, seminars, and work-shops.

3. Program Support Activities As part of its program support activities, theACBF also plays a visible role in a number ofregional and international workshops,seminars, and conferences.4 These eventsprovide an opportunity for governmentauthorities and staff to exchange informationon issues relating to performance enhance-ment in African public services and theopportunity for ACBF to promote capacitybuilding in public administration and manage-ment in Africa.

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7 1

ANNEX H: MANAGEMENT ACTION RECORD

OED Recommendation

The Bank, at the corporate level, should

strengthen its knowledge base and amplify its

framework for public sector capacity building to

better help countries (a) prioritize capacity build-

ing activities and guide donor support; (b) link

institutional, organizational, and human capac-

ity developments; and (c) transform traditional

capacity building tools to improve results. And

it should ensure that guidelines and processes

are in place for self- and independent evalua-

tion of Bank capacity building interventions.

Sector and thematic leadership should develop

sector-specific guidance on diagnosing public

sector capacity needs, enhancing incentives for

performance improvements, and monitoring and

evaluating interventions.

Regional senior management should ensure

that CASs are used effectively to help coun-

tries identify and strengthen the capacities they

need to plan, implement, and measure the re-

sults of their poverty reduction strategies. They

should also ensure that all operations that aim

to build public sector capacity are based on ad-

equate assessments of capacity needs and have

ways to monitor and evaluate capacity building

results.

The Bank should reassess what role training

should play in its capacity building support, how

training support should be provided, and what

should be the respective roles of a central train-

ing unit and Regional programs in any future sup-

port for this activity.

Management Response

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ENDNOTES

Summary1. Management notes that WBI has

developed a number of new pedagogicalapproaches focused on developing capacity,leadership, and consensus at the organizationaland institutional levels. These approachesconstitute a majority of the work done byseveral major learning programs at WBI andare being progressively adopted by others.

Chapter 11. Although the focus of the evaluation is

on support to countries in Sub-SaharanAfrica, the term Africa will be used through-out this review.

2. The evaluation focuses mainly on Banksupport for public sector capacity building atthe national level. It does not cover support atthe community level or the Bank’s work inlow-income countries under stress—bothsubjects of forthcoming OED reviews. Nordoes it cover capacity building support fornon-state actors; Bank support for highereducation; or support provided at thecorporate level by such units as DevelopmentEconomics (DEC) and the Legal Department.The capacity building dimensions of globalprograms were previously covered in OED2002 and OED 2004a.

3. Brief summaries of a selection of priorassessments are presented in Annex A.

Chapter 21. Management notes that the Bank’s

framework and strategy for public sectorgovernance operations, which were developed

and applied during the period under review,also address processes of organizational andbehavioral change; therefore, managementbelieves that the OED review should haverecognized and applied this framework in itssubsequent assessment of relevance andefficacy of capacity building activities.

2. A recent Bank study draws togetherlessons of experience in several key areas, butfocuses mainly on institutional reforms andlittle on how to advance and sequence otherdimensions of human resource and organiza-tional capacity development and the instru-ments and activities to use for helpingcountries achieve coherent capacity buildingefforts (World Bank 2004b).

3. The closest the Bank comes to givingguidance is its OP/BP/GP 8.40 (World Bank2004r).

4. For a review of the literature, see Boesen(2004), prepared as a background paper forthis evaluation.

5. See, for example, Boesen and Therkild-sen 2004.

6. Bank budget and trust fund supportmake up $79 million and $30 million, respec-tively, of total economic and sector work cost.

7. This evaluation is not able to provide aprecise indication of the amount of Bankfunding for these different types of training,because these costs are not routinely separatedout in project documents. In the evaluation’scase study countries, in-country training wasfunded as part of almost all projects reviewedin depth, and overseas training was funded insome one-third of the projects.

8. See Annex B for a description of theevaluation methodology.

9. See Annex C for information on the sixcountry missions.

10. See Annex D for lists of all CASs,projects, and economic and sector workreviewed.

11. See Annex E for information on thestaff survey instrument.

Chapter 31. A recent OED evaluation reviewed the

Bank’s anticorruption work, which has beenone major aspect of its governance agenda: itssupport for anticorruption (World Bank2004c).

2. Fifteen CASs approved in FY03(Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Malawi, Niger,Rwanda, and Senegal) and FY04 (Benin,Cameroon, Chad, Ghana, Madagascar, Mali,Mozambique, and Zambia).

3. World Bank 1997a. This paper reviewsCASs for: Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana,Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mauritania,Mauritius, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.

4. While 69 projects in the 6 country casestudies have been reviewed, the assessment ofdiagnosis and design excluded 2 projects notadvanced enough to assess along thesedimensions, and 4 that lacked sufficientinformation.

5. On the adequacy of the assessment of theproject’s capacity needs, over 70 percent ofreviewed projects did not provide anyinformation. Seven percent indicated that theassessment was not adequate, 15 percent ofthe projects mentioned some adequacy, andonly 5 percent of the reviewed projects hadadequate assessment.

6. These assessments included four CountryFinancial Accountability Assessments, fourCountry Procurement Assessment Reports,and five Public Expenditure Reviews preparedin the period 2001–03 for the six case studycountries.

Chapter 41. On a Regional basis, Africa compares

favorably to South Asia and the Middle East

and North Africa; none of the 5 South Asiaprojects or the 10 Middle East and NorthAfrica public sector governance projects thatexited during 1993–2003 was rated by OEDto have substantial ID impact.

2. Of particular significance for capacitybuilding, the subset of economic policy andpublic sector governance TALs in Africaperform significantly worse in terms of bothinstitutional development impact (23 percentsubstantial) and outcome (39 percent satisfac-tory) than the Africa aggregate, although thissubset does not perform significantly worseon a Bankwide basis. See World Bank 1998;OED 1990.

3. OED ratings retrieved as of November2004.

4. This is the conclusion of the Governmentof Ghana’s review of the two projects and oftwo Bank Implementation CompletionReports—“Public Financial ManagementTechnical Assistance Project” (World Bank2004k) and “Public Sector ManagementReform Project” (World Bank 2004l).

5. This explanation is drawn from Israel(1987) and recent work by Fukuyama (2004)and Woolcock and Pritchett (2002).

6. This was the conclusion of OED’s report,Investing in Health: Development Effective-ness in the Health, Nutrition, and PopulationSector (OED 1999c). The report called forimproved institutional analysis and greaterrealism in setting institutional objectives.While the institutional development impact ofall health projects in Africa has risen from alow rating of 1.4 percent satisfactory in1995–99, it remains at only 41.4 percent forthe period 2000–04.

7. For example, in Benin the Bank hassupported the creation of an autonomous DrugProcurement Agency, which recruits staff on acompetitive basis and involves communityparticipation as a way to enhance transparency.This has led to a reduction in staff, less corrup-tion, and greater availability of drugs through-out the country at a lower cost than under theprevious government arrangement.

8. The same conclusion emerges from theBank study on the state of the health

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workforce in Africa (World Bank 2004p),which describes “a health workforce crisis” inAfrica and calls for internally competitivewages, nonfinancial incentives, improvedinvestments in training, as well as alternativeservice delivery mechanisms.

9. The Malawi Financial Management,Transparency and Accountability Project(FIMTAP) aimed to fund local training institu-tions to provide specific training needs identi-fied by the Ministry of Finance. Although theproject stalled and is now being restructured,the training component had been progressingsatisfactorily.

10. These lessons are also reflected in the“good practices in budget support, sectorapproaches and capacity development inpublic financial management” (OECD 2005).

11. Of the four African countries reviewedin 2001 and 2004, Ghana showed markedimprovements from a low base, and BurkinaFaso, Rwanda, and Zambia showed littlechange in the number of benchmarks met(World Bank 2003i).

12. The Bank is a founding member of thePublic Expenditure and Financial Account-ability (PEFA) Initiative and houses itssecretariat. PEFA’s performance measurementframework comprises 6 objectives that PFMshould address, and a set of 30 indicators thatassess performance against these objectives,along with criteria for ranking performance.

13. See Annex A and the literature reviewprepared for this evaluation.

14. This issue is highlighted in OED’sproject performance assessment of twoUganda education sector projects, one aninvestment project and one an adjustmentcredit, which concluded that “it has not yetbeen demonstrated in Uganda that capacity-and institution-building needs in the sector canbe sufficiently addressed through budgetsupport.” Rather, the assessment pointed to anessential interrelationship between the policydevelopment and sector planning capacityefforts of the adjustment credit and the systemsand implementation capacity developedthrough the investment loan (OED 2004e).

Chapter 51. This support includes a variety of

learning programs and training materials,online dialogues, diagnostic tools, and policyadvisory services on specific issues such asgovernance and corruption.

2. The World Bank Institute’s ImpactEvaluation of WBI Client Programs, FY00–01(World Bank 2002c) shows the followingbreakdown of average proportion of timeallocated to different pedagogical strategiesbased on a sample of FY00–01 WBI offerings:42 percent for lectures and presentations, 27percent for hands-on activities, 20 percent forexchanging knowledge, 9 percent for develop-ing action plans, and 2 percent for site visitsand study tours.

3. While there are serious limitations to thequality of the data on core WBI assessments(including low response rates and selectionbiases), the consistency of findings is convinc-ingly clear. This review of WBI draws onPrewitt 2004.

4. The average success of the courses inraising awareness of critical issues and how todeal with them is a modest 3.19 (on a 1–5scale, with 1 being low and 5 being high), andthe rating is an even lower 3.12 on whetherparticipants believed that they could use thelearning to advance policy reforms. (WorldBank 2002c, p. xi).

5. Management disagrees with this assess-ment and notes that the learning gainsmeasured by WBI are robust by educationalstandards, not modest, and learning gains atthis level could not be expected to grow overtime.

6. Management notes that this data comesfrom one study in FY01. More recent datashow improvements since that time.

7. World Bank Institute: Annual Report2004 (World Bank 2004q) cites major contri-butions to CASs for 7 of the 33 focuscountries: Bangladesh, Brazil, India, Kenya,Lao PRD, Mexico, and Nigeria (p. 7).

8. Management notes that WBI hasdeveloped a number of new pedagogicalapproaches focused on developing capacity,

E N D N OT E S

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leadership, and consensus at the organizationaland institutional levels. These approachesconstitute a majority of the work done byseveral major learning programs at WBI andare being progressively adopted by others.

9. WBI has not provided OED withaggregate data on how these new approacheshave been used and their accomplishments.

10. Prewitt 2004. While WBI estimates thatdistance learning will be used in 70 percent ofits activities in the future, it has yet to assesswhich modalities fit best with that deliverymechanism. Other aid agencies use a widerrange of learning programs that are not partof WBI’s current repertoire, such as develop-ment of in-country training institutes, regionalor subregional summer institutes, and profes-sional research and training networks.

11. Level I measures participants' satisfac-tion with and feedback about learning activi-ties. Level 2 focuses on measuringparticipants’ knowledge/skills at the start andthe end of the courses (World Bank Institute).

12. Evidence for this comes from a paperprepared by the WBI evaluation that reviewsthe literature on capacity building indicators.See World Bank 2004c.

13. See World Bank 2003f and the ACBFbackground paper for this evaluation (Kimuyuand Gwin 2004).

14. All of whom are members of theFoundation’s Governing Board.

15. Since the second request for fundingunder the Bank’s Development Grant Facility(DGF), ACBF/PACT has operated under thesame internal rules as other DGF-supportedprograms. This means that its proposal forgrant funds has to be sponsored by a unit ofthe Bank and reviewed for technical qualityand alignment with Bank objectives. Inkeeping with these procedures, two internalreviews of the ACBF/PACT were conducted in2002 and 2004 by a DGF-PACT review teamdrawn from central, Africa Region, and DGFstaff.

16. This view was clearly expressed by alarge majority of respondents in a survey ofgrantee organizations, as well as by the

members of the ACBF Board of Governors,who agreed or strongly agreed that ACBF hasenhanced the priority for capacity building inAfrica, particularly with respect to enhancingthe ability of public and private sectors tointeract effectively in the design of publicpolicies and has played a catalytic role increating a network of new policy analysisunits (World Bank 2003f, p. 50).

17. This is the finding of an externalevaluation of the capacity building effective-ness of the ACBF, commissioned by the U.K.Department for International Development(DFID) at the request of the foundation’sBoard of Governors and based on in-depthreview of eight projects supporting policyanalysis units and eight projects supportingtraining programs during 1999–2001(Goldsworthy and Bennel 2001, p. 16).

18. For example, the Brookings Institution,an independent, nonpartisan research organi-zation that seeks to improve the performanceand quality of U.S. public policies, is financedlargely by an endowment and through thesupport of philanthropic foundations,corporations, and individuals. Other sourcesof revenue are executive education andpublications. Similarly, the Overseas Develop-ment Institute, the leading British independentthink-tank on international development andhumanitarian issues, is registered as a charityand is supported by grants and donationsfrom research foundations, internationalorganizations, nongovernmental organiza-tions, and businesses.

19. The Bank’s share of total commitmentshas increased from 22 percent in 1991–99 to54 percent in 2000–04, the period sincePACT’s merger.

20. While at the corporate level IDF isfunded through the Bank’s DevelopmentGrant Facility, additional funds for specificactivities have also been provided from otherdonors. Proposals are vetted and approved atthe Regional level, based on Regional budgetallocations approved by an Operations Policyand Country Service–managed IDF SteeringCommittee.

7 6


21. This percentage of satisfactory projectsis slightly lower than that reported in thereview of focus area projects because the IDFcategorized projects according to ratings of“moderately satisfactory and above” and“unsatisfactory and below,” whereas OEDrecategorized the projects into groups of“satisfactory and above” and “moderatelysatisfactory and below”

Annex G1. From http://www.acbf-pact.org (ACBF

Web site) and the ACBF’s Annual Report for2003.

2. $107 million was disbursed by 31December 2003.

3. The TAP-NETs are in the foundation’s sixcore competence areas. These are: EconomicPolicy Analysis and Management (EPANET),Public Administration and Management(PAMNET), Financial Management and

Accountability (FIMANET), Professionaliza-tion of the Voices of the Private Sector and CivilSociety (VOICENET), Strengthening of PolicyAnalysis Capacity of National Parliaments andParliamentary Institutions (PARLIANET), andStrengthening and Monitoring of NationalStatistics (STATNET). Two other KnowledgeNetworks, the African Policy Institutes Forum(APIF) and Economic and Financial Policymak-ers’ Network (EFNET), are to be launched bythe end of 2004.

4. In 2003, for instance, the ACBForganized (a) a four-day Pan-African Consul-tative Workshop on Public Service andAdministration Capacity Building and (b) aregional workshop on Public Service Perfor-mance Measurement and Enhancement, incollaboration with the African RegionalCenter for Research and Training (CAFRAD)and Government of the Gambia.

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B I B L I O G R A P H Y

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Report No. WTP 225. Washington, DC.———. 1994b. “Technical Assistance in Africa:

How It Works and Doesn’t Work.” ReportNo. 13005. Washington, DC.

———. 1991a. “The Bank’s Use of TechnicalAssistance for Institutional Development.”Report No. WPS 578. Washington, DC.

———. 1991b. “Managing Technical Assis-tance in the 1990s.” Washington, DC.

———. 1989. Sub-Saharan Africa: From Cri-

sis to Sustainable Growth. Report No. 8209.Washington, DC.

———. 1981. Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Report No. 1030. Wash-ington, DC.

Whyte, Anne. 2004. “Human and InstitutionalCapacity Building: Landscape Analysis ofDonor Trends in International Develop-ment.” Report to the Rockefeller Foundation.New York.

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ENHANCING DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS THROUGH EXCELLENCE AND INDEPENDENCE IN EVALUATION

The Operations Evaluation Department (OED) is an independent unit within the World Bank; it reports directly to theBank’s Board of Executive Directors. OED assesses what works, and what does not; how a borrower plans to run andmaintain a project; and the lasting contribution of the Bank to a country’s overall development. The goals of evaluationare to learn from experience, to provide an objective basis for assessing the results of the Bank’s work, and to provideaccountability in the achievement of its objectives. It also improves Bank work by identifying and disseminating the les-sons learned from experience and by framing recommendations drawn from evaluation findings.

OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEPARTMENT

Study Series2003 Annual Review of Development Effectiveness: The Effectiveness of Bank Support for Policy ReformAgricultural Extension: The Kenya ExperienceAssisting Russia’s Transition: An Unprecedented ChallengeBangladesh: Progress Through PartnershipBridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyThe CGIAR: An Independent Meta-Evaluation of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural ResearchDebt Relief for the Poorest: An OED Review of the HIPC InitiativeDeveloping Towns and Cities: Lessons from Brazil and the PhilippinesThe Drive to Partnership: Aid Coordination and the World BankFinancial Sector Reform: A Review of World Bank AssistanceFinancing the Global Benefits of Forests: The Bank’s GEF Portfolio and the 1991 Forest Strategy and Its ImplementationFiscal Management in Adjustment LendingIDA’s Partnership for Poverty ReductionImproving the Lives of the Poor Through Investment in CitiesIndia: The Dairy RevolutionInformation Infrastructure: The World Bank Group’s ExperienceInvesting in Health: Development Effectiveness in the Health, Nutrition, and Population SectorJordan: Supporting Stable Development in a Challenging RegionLesotho: Development in a Challenging EnvironmentMainstreaming Gender in World Bank Lending: An UpdateThe Next Ascent: An Evaluation of the Aga Khan Rural Support Program, PakistanNongovernmental Organizations in World Bank–Supported Projects: A ReviewPoland Country Assistance Review: Partnership in a Transition EconomyPoverty Reduction in the 1990s: An Evaluation of Strategy and PerformancePower for Development: A Review of the World Bank Group’s Experience with Private Participation in the Electricity SectorPromoting Environmental Sustainability in DevelopmentReforming Agriculture: The World Bank Goes to MarketSharing Knowledge: Innovations and Remaining ChallengesSocial Funds: Assessing EffectivenessUganda: Policy, Participation, PeopleThe World Bank’s Experience with Post-Conflict ReconstructionThe World Bank’s Forest Strategy: Striking the Right BalanceZambia Country Assistance Review: Turning an Economy Around

Evaluation Country Case SeriesBosnia and Herzegovina: Post-Conflict ReconstructionBrazil: Forests in the Balance: Challenges of Conservation with DevelopmentCameroon: Forest Sector Development in a Difficult Political EconomyChina: From Afforestation to Poverty Alleviation and Natural Forest ManagementCosta Rica: Forest Strategy and the Evolution of Land UseEl Salvador: Post-Conflict ReconstructionIndia: Alleviating Poverty through Forest DevelopmentIndonesia: The Challenges of World Bank Involvement in ForestsUganda: Post-Conflict Reconstruction

ProceedingsGlobal Public Policies and Programs: Implications for Financing and EvaluationLessons of Fiscal AdjustmentLesson from Urban TransportEvaluating the Gender Impact of World Bank AssistanceEvaluation and Development: The Institutional Dimension (Transaction Publishers)Evaluation and Poverty ReductionMonitoring & Evaluation Capacity Development in AfricaPublic Sector Performance—The Critical Role of Evaluation

Multilingual EditionsAllègement de la dette pour les plus pauvres : Examen OED de l’initiative PPTEAppréciation de l’efficacité du développement :L’évaluation à la Banque mondiale et à la Société financière internationaleDeterminar la eficacia de las actividades de desarrollo :La evaluación en el Banco Mundial y la Corporación Financiera InternacionalCôte d’Ivoire : Revue de l’aide de la Banque mondiale au paysFilipinas: Crisis y oportunidadesReconstruir a Economia de Moçambique


OED PUBLICATIONS

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