capitol records file-sharing mil decision

8/14/2019 Capitol Records File-Sharing MIL Decision

1/27

1

UNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURTDISTRICTOFMINNESOTA

________________________________________________________________

CAPITOLRECORDS

INC.,

aDelawarecorporation;

SONYBMGMUSICENTERTAINMENT,

aDelawaregeneralpartnership;

ARISTARECORDSLLC,

aDelawarelimitedliabilitycompany;

INTERSCOPERECORDS,

aCaliforniageneralpartnership;

WARNERBROS.RECORDSINC.,

aDelaware

corporation;

and

UMGRECORDINGS,INC.,

aDelawarecorporation;

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUMOFLAW&ORDERCivilFileNo.061497(MJD/RLE)

JAMMIETHOMAS

RASSET,

Defendant.

________________________________________________________________

AndrewB.Mohraz,DavidA.Tonini,andTimothyM.Reynolds,HolmeRoberts

&Owen,LLP;FeliciaJ.Boyd,KaraL.B.Barrow,andMaryAndreleitaWalker,

Faegre&Benson,LLP;andMatthewJ.Oppenheim,OppenheimGroup,LLP;

counsel

for

Plaintiffs.

JoeSibleyandK.A.D.Camara,Camara&Sibley,LLP,andGarrettD.

Blanchfield,Jr.,ReinhardtWendorf&Blanchfield,counselforDefendant.

________________________________________________________________


2/27

2

ThismatterisbeforetheCourtonthepartiesmotionsinlimine. The

CourtheardoralargumentonthesemotionsonJune10,2009. Trialissetto

beginonJune15,2009.

I. DefendantsMotiontoSuppressEvidence[DocketNo.263]DefendantJammieThomasRassetarguesthattheCourtshouldexcludeall

evidencegatheredbyMediaSentrybecauseitoperatedinviolationofstateand

federallaws

and

because

Plaintiffs

attorneys

violated

ethical

rules

through

their

involvementwithMediaSentry. BecausetheCourtholdsthatMediaSentryhas

notviolatedanyoftheassertedstateorfederallaws,itdeniesDefendants

motion.

A. MediaSentrysActionsPeertopeernetworksallowInternetuserstoconnecttoeachotherand

transferfilesdirectlyfromusertouser. (JacobsonDecl.2,Pls.Ex.A.) When

filesaredistributedfromoneusertoanotheruserthroughapeertopeer

network,suchasKazaa,asetofidentifyinginformationtiesthefilesbacktothe

userwhodistributedthefiles. (Id.3.) Thisinformationincludesthe

distributorsIPaddress,thenameofthefile,thesizeofthefile,thecontenthash,


3/27

3

andtheportinformation. (Id.) Theuserrequestingthefilescommunicatesthe

requestthatthesharingcomputersendthefiles,andthesharingcomputerthen

sendsthose

requested

files.

(Id.

5;

Connelly

Decl.

2,

Pls.

Ex.

B.)

Kazaa

does

notallowoneusertogainaccessintoortomanipulatethecontentsofanother

userscomputer. (JacobsonDecl.5.) Itdoesallowausertoviewthecontents

ofthefilesthatotherusersplacedinthesharedfolder. (Id.)

TheKazaainterfacedisplaysinformationabouteachfilethatisavailable

inotheruserssharedfolders. MediaSentryrecordedtheimageforeachscreen

displayedbyKazaathatliststheavailablefiles. ItalsousedKazaatodownload

selectedfilestoitsownmachinetoconfirmthatthefileswerecopyrightedsound

recordings.

TheIP

address

is

transmitted

as

part

of

the

normal

process

of

connecting

onecomputertoanotherovertheInternet. (JacobsonDecl.6.) When

attemptingtoidentifyallegedinfringersonpeertopeernetworks,MediaSentry

usedthesameKazaanetworkprotocolsthateveryotheruserusedtosearchfor

and

download

files

on

the

network.

(Connelly

Decl.

2.)

Files

were

transferred

toMediaSentrybytheuploaderintheformofdatapackets,whichcontained

informationidentifyingthesourceIPaddress. (Id.) Throughpacketcapture


4/27

4

technology,MediaSentryrecordedtheinteractionbetweenitselfandthe

computerconnectedtothefilesharingnetworkanddistributingthematerialto

MediaSentry.

(Id.;1Trial

Tr.

185.)

MediaSentry

captured

every

packet

transferred,whichincludedtheIPaddressofthesourceofthepacket. (1TrialTr.

18788.)

B. TheMinnesotaPrivateDetectivesAct1. WhetherMediaSentryViolatedtheAct

DefendantallegesthatMediaSentrycollectedevidenceagainstherin

violationoftheMinnesotaPrivateDetectivesAct,Minn.Stat.326.32,etseq.

(MPDA). TheMPDAprovides:

Nopersonshallengageinthebusinessofprivatedetectiveor

protectiveagent,oradvertiseorindicateinanyverbalstatementor

inwritten

material

that

the

person

is

so

engaged

or

available

to

supplythoseservices,withouthavingfirstobtainedalicenseas

providedinsections326.32to326.339.

Minn.Stat.326.3381,subd.1. MediaSentrydoesnotholdaprivatedetective

licenseinMinnesota. (Def.Ex.A.)

Defendant

argues

that

MediaSentry

engaged

in

the

business

of

being

a

privatedetectiveundermultipleprovisionsofthestatute:

Personswhoforafee,reward,orotherconsideration,undertakeany


5/27

5

ofthefollowingactsforthepurposeofobtaininginformationfor

othersareconsideredtobeengagedinthebusinessofaprivate

detective:

***

(2)investigatingtheidentity,habits,conduct,movements,

whereabouts,transactions,reputation,orcharacterofanypersonor

organization;

(3)investigatingthecredibilityofwitnessesorotherpersons;

(4)investigatingthelocationorrecoveryoflostorstolenproperty;

[or]

***

(8)obtainingthroughinvestigationevidencetobeusedbeforeany

authorizedinvestigatingcommittee,boardofaward,boardof

arbitration,administrativebody,orofficerorinpreparationfortrial

ofcivilorcriminalcases;

Minn.Stat.

326.338,

subd.

1.

Defendant

asserts

that

MediaSentry

engaged

in

eachofthelistedactivitieswhenitinvestigatedtheidentityoftheuserofthe

computerfromwhichitdownloadedthesongsatissueinthislawsuitandwhen

itobtainedevidenceofthecopyrightedsongsonDefendantscomputer.

Defendant

also

claims

that

MediaSentry

violated

the

MPDA

when

it

held

itself

outtobeaprivatedetective;however,shehasofferednoadmissibleevidenceof

suchadvertisementinMinnesota.


6/27

6

DefendantnotesthattheallegedviolationsoftheMPDAarecrimesunder

Minnesotalaw. SeeMinn.Stat.326.339.

TheCourt

concludes

that

MediaSentry

is

not

subject

to

the

MPDA.

Based

onthelanguageoftheMPDA,theActdoesnotapplytopersonsorcompanies

operatingoutsideofthestateofMinnesota. SeeMinn.Stat.326.3381,subd.5

(providingproceduresforlicensingoutofstateapplicationsforthosewho

establishaMinnesotaoffice). Additionally,thereisageneralpresumptionthat

Minnesotastatutesdonotapplyextraterritorially. SeeInrePratt,18N.W.2d147,

153(Minn.1945),citedinHarringtonv.NorthwestAirlines,Inc.,No.A03192,

2003WL22016032,at*2n.1(Minn.Ct.App.Aug.26,2003)(unpublished)(noting

thatMinnesotacourtsemploythepresumptionagainstastatestatutehaving

extraterritorialapplication).

MediaSentrydoesnotoperatewithinMinnesota. (ConnellyDecl.3.) It

hasnoemployeesinMinnesotaanddoesnotconductanyactivitiesinMinnesota.

(Id.) Itpaysnotaxesinthestateandhasnoagentforserviceofprocesshere.

(Id.)

MediaSentry

conducted

no

activity

in

Minnesota

relating

to

this

case,

and

alloftheinformationitreceivedwassentbyDefendantfromhercomputerto

MediaSentryscomputerinastateotherthanMinnesota. (Id.) Merely


7/27

7

monitoringincominginternettrafficsentfromacomputerinanotherstateis

insufficienttoconstituteengaginginthebusinessofprivatedetectivewithinthe

stateof

Minnesota.

C. ThePenRegisterandTrapandTraceDevicesActDefendantassertsthatMediaSentryviolatedthePenRegisterActwhenit

recordedthepacketsthatincludedtheIPaddressofthesender. Itisacrime

under18U.S.C.3121toinstalloruseapenregisteroratrapandtracedevice,

withoutfirstobtainingacourtorder.

Underthestatuteboththetermpenregisterandthetermtrapandtrace

devicearedefinedasdevicesorprocesseswhichcapturecertaininformationbut

donotcapturethecontentsofanycommunication. 18U.S.C.3127(3),(4). See

alsoColumbia

Pictures,

Inc.

v.

Bunnell,

245

F.R.D.

443,

450

(C.D.

Cal.

2007)

([P]enregistersandtrapandtracedevices,bydefinition,donotrecordthe

contentsofanycommunication.)(citationomitted).

ThePenRegisterActhasnoapplicationherebecausetheIPaddress

recorded

by

MediaSentry

was

part

of

the

content

of

the

communication.

The

metadatathatistransmittedalongwitheveryfilesentthroughtheFastTrack

networkusedinthiscasealwaysincludestheIPaddress. (JacobsonDecl.6.)


8/27

8

Furthermore,thePenRegisterActcannotbeintendedtoprevent

individualswhoreceiveelectroniccommunicationsfromrecordingtheIP

informationsent

to

them.

If

it

did

apply

in

those

cases,

then

the

Internet

could

notfunctionbecausestandardcomputeroperationsrequirerecordingIP

addressessopartiescancommunicatewithoneanotherovertheInternet.

(JacobsonDecl.4.)

Additionally,thePenRegisterActdoesnotbarrecordingsofthecontents

ofcommunicationsthataremadewiththeconsentofoneofthepartiestothe

communication. See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Millet,No.05CR81,2005WL

3605269,at*1(N.D.Ill.Nov.3,2005)(Andrecordingsmadeofconversations

withtheconsentofoneofthepartiesarepermissibleunderfederallaw. Thepen

registersand

trap

and

trace

devices

may

well

assist

the

government

in

determiningtheexacttimeanddateoftelephonecallsandthetelephones

accessed,buttheydonotdisclosethecontentsoftheconversations,nordothey

makeillegaltheconsensualrecordings.). Inthiscase,theIPaddresseswere

communicated

as

part

of

the

packets

Defendants

computer

sent

to

MediaSentryscomputer. MediaSentry,asapartytothatcommunication,simply

recordedtheinformationtransmittedtoitfromThomasRassetscomputer.


9/27

9

D. TheElectronicCommunicationsPrivacyActof1986TheElectronicCommunicationsPrivacyActof1986prohibits

unauthorizedwiretapping:

Exceptasotherwisespecificallyprovidedinthischapteranyperson

who

(a)intentionallyintercepts,endeavorstointercept,orprocuresany

otherpersontointerceptorendeavortointercept,anywire,oral,or

electroniccommunication;

***

shallbepunishedasprovidedinsubsection(4)orshallbesubjectto

suitasprovidedinsubsection(5).

18U.S.C.2511(1).

DefendantclaimsthatMediaSentryviolated2511(1)byintercepting

electroniccommunications

in

the

form

of

the

packets

traveling

between

Thomas

RassetscomputerandMediaSentryscomputer. Defendantalsoclaimsthat

MediaSentryviolatedthestatutewhenitrecordedimagesoftheKazaainterface.

SheassertsthatthedisplayscreeninterfaceofKazaaconstitutedanelectronic

communication

from

the

sender

to

the

MediaSentry

operator,

communicating

informationaboutthefilesonthesenderscomputer.

Assuming,withoutdeciding,thatMediaSentrysactionsconstituted


10/27

10

interceptionofanelectroniccommunication,MediaSentryfallsunderthe

participantexceptiontotheWiretapAct. Section2511(2)(d)provides:

Itshall

not

be

unlawful

under

this

chapter

for

aperson

not

acting

undercoloroflawtointerceptawire,oral,orelectronic

communicationwheresuchpersonisapartytothecommunication

orwhereoneofthepartiestothecommunicationhasgivenprior

consenttosuchinterceptionunlesssuchcommunicationis

interceptedforthepurposeofcommittinganycriminalortortious

actinviolationoftheConstitutionorlawsoftheUnitedStatesorof

anyState.

18U.S.C.A.

2511(2)(d).

MediaSentrywasclearlyapartytotheelectroniccommunicationwith

Defendant. DefendantassertsthatthisexceptiondoesnotprotectMediaSentry

becauseMediaSentrywasinterceptingcommunicationsforthepurposeof

committingthecrimeunderMinnesotalawofengaginginthebusinessofa

privatedetectivewithoutalicense,committingthecrimeunderfederallawof

recordingIPaddressesinviolationofthePenRegisterAct,andcommittingthe

Minnesotatortofintrusionuponseclusion.

MediaSentrydidnotinterceptthecommunicationsforthepurposeof

committingacrimeortort. AstheCourthasalreadyheld,MediaSentrydidnot

commitacrimeundertheMPDAorunderthePenRegisterAct. Although


11/27

11

Defendanthasvaguelyalludedtoprivatedetectivelicensinglawsfromother

states,thereisnoevidenceorlegalargumentbeforetheCourtuponwhichthe

Courtcould

conclude

that

MediaSentry

was

subject

to

and

violated

another

statesprivatedetectivelawinthiscase. Evenif,incapturingtheinformation

sentfromDefendantscomputer,MediaSentryhadincidentallyviolatedaprivate

detectivelicensingstatutefromsomeotherstate,gatheringevidenceof

Defendantsallegedcopyrightinfringementcannotbesaidtohavebeen

accomplishedforthepurposeofcommittingatortorcrime. SeeMeredithv.

Gavin,446F.2d794,798(8thCir.1971)(discussinglegislativehistoryofexception

toonepartyconsentexceptiontotheWiretapAct,whichwasaimedat

monitoring...forinsidiouspurposessuchasblackmail,stealingbusiness

secretsand

holding

that

exception

applied

when

recorders

purpose

is

evil).

Thetortofintrusionuponseclusionoccurswhenoneintentionally

intrudes,physicallyorotherwise,uponthesolitudeorseclusionofanotherorhis

privateaffairsorconcerns...iftheintrusionwouldbehighlyoffensivetoa

reasonable

person.

Lake

v.

Wal

Mart

Stores,

Inc.,

582

N.W.2d

231,

233

(Minn.

1998)(footnoteomitted). ThomasRassetassertsthatMediaSentrysactions

wouldbehighlyoffensivetoareasonableperson. TheCourtdisagrees. Thereis


12/27

12

noexpectationofsolitudeorseclusionwhenapersonactivatesafilesharing

programandsendsafiletotherequestingcomputer. ByparticipatinginKazaa,

auser

expects

millions

of

other

users

to

view

and

copy

her

files,

each

time

receivingtheveryinformationthatThomasRassetsenttoMediaSentryand

MediaSentryrecorded.

E. EthicalViolationsDefendantassertsthattheCourtshouldsuppressevidencegainedby

MediaSentrybecauseitwasillegallyobtainedatthedirectionandunderthe

supervisionofPlaintiffslawyersinviolationoftheirethicalobligations. The

CourthasheldthatMediaSentrydidnotillegallyobtaintheevidenceinquestion.

MediaSentryactedforthelegitimatepurposeofdiscoveringinfringersand

protectingits

clients

copyrights.

Therefore,

there

was

no

ethical

violation

committedbyPlaintiffsattorneysinvolvementwithMediaSentrys

investigation.F. Conclusion

Because

Defendant

has

failed

to

show

that

MediaSentry

violated

any

law

ingatheringtheevidencetobeusedinthiscase,Defendantsmotiontosuppress

isdenied.


13/27

13

II. PlaintiffsMotioninLiminetoExcludetheTestimonyofDefendantsExpertDr.YongdaeKim[DocketNo.272]A. DaubertStandardTheadmissibilityofexperttestimonyisgovernedbyFederalRuleof

Evidence702. Theproponentofthetestimonyhastheburdentoshowbya

preponderanceoftheevidencethatthetestimonyisadmissibleunderRule702.

Lauzonv.SencoProds.,Inc.,270F.3d681,686(8thCir.2001). UndertheRule:

Ifscientific,

technical,

or

other

specialized

knowledge

will

assist

the

trieroffacttounderstandtheevidenceortodetermineafactin

issue,awitnessqualifiedasanexpertbyknowledge,skill,

experience,training,oreducation,maytestifytheretointheformof

anopinionorotherwise,if(1)thetestimonyisbaseduponsufficient

factsordata,(2)thetestimonyistheproductofreliableprinciples

andmethods,and(3)thewitnesshasappliedtheprinciplesand

methodsreliablytothefactsofthecase.

Fed.R.

Evid.

702.

UndertheframeworkdevelopedinDaubert,trialcourtsmustserveas

gatekeeperstoinsurethatprofferedexperttestimonyisbothrelevantand

reliable. Trialcourtsaregivenbroaddiscretioninfulfillingthisgatekeepingrole

.

.

.

.

Wagner

v.

Hesston

Corp.,

450

F.3d

756,

758

(8th

Cir.

2006)

(citations

omitted). Theproposedtestimonymustbeusefultothefactfinderindeciding

theultimatefactissue;theexpertwitnessmustbequalified;andtheproposed


14/27

14

evidencemustbereliable. Lauzon,270F.3dat686.

Whenconsideringthereliabilityandrelevanceofexperttestimony,the

Courtmay

examine

whether

the

theory

or

technique

is

subject

to

testing,

whetherithasbeentested,whetherithasbeensubjectedtopeerreviewand

publication,whetherthereisahighknownorpotentialrateoferrorassociated

withit,andwhetheritisgenerallyacceptedwithintherelevantcommunity.

Unreinv.Timesavers,Inc.,394F.3d1008,1011(8thCir.2005)(citationomitted).

TheCourtsinquiryisflexibleandfactspecific. Id.

Asageneralrule,thefactualbasisofanexpertopiniongoesto

thecredibilityofthetestimony,nottheadmissibility,anditisupto

theopposingpartytoexaminethefactualbasisfortheopinionin

crossexamination. Onlyiftheexpertsopinionissofundamentally

unsupportedthatitcanoffernoassistancetothejurymustsuch

testimonybeexcluded.

Bonnerv.ISPTechs.,Inc.,259F.3d924,92930(8thCir.2001)(citationomitted).

B. FactualBasisforKimsOpinionDefendantsexpertwitnessisDr.YongdaeKim,asAssociateProfessorin

theUniversityofMinnesotaDepartmentofComputerScience. Kimwillnotoffer

anopinionregardingwhetherThomasRassetinfringedPlaintiffscopyrightsor

whetherhercomputerwasusedtodistributetheircopyrightedsound


15/27

15

recordings. Instead,Kimwillofferpossibleexplanationsregardinghow

someoneotherthanThomasRassetcouldhavecommittedthefilesharingat

issuein

this

case.

Plaintiffs

argue

that,

although

Kim

lists

fourteen

possible

explanationsinhisreport,headmitsthatthereisnoevidencetosupportanyof

theexplanations.

DefendantretortsthatKimwillonlyofferrebuttaltestimonytoassistthe

juryinproperlyweighingtheevidenceregardingtheoriginoftheKazaa

softwareandtheallegedlyinfringingsongsonDefendantscomputer.

DefendantadmitsthatKimwillnotofferanopinionregardingtheprobable

causeofthepresenceofKazaaandthesongsonThomasRassetscomputer.

Instead,heismerelyofferinghistestimonyasarebuttaltothetestimonyof

Plaintiffsexpert

witness.

Kim

will

opine

on

the

reliability

and

weight

of

Plaintiffsexpertstestimony. Kimwillalsodiscusspossiblealternative

explanationsthatPlaintiffsexpertdidnotconsiderinarrivingathisconclusions.

Defendantassertsthattestimonyregardingpossibilities,eveniftheyarenot

probable,

is

legally

sufficient

if

the

proposed

expert

is

attempting

to

rebut

the

testimonyofanotherexpert. Defendantalsoarguesthatshedoesnotbearthe

burdenofproofonthequestionofcausation,soherexpertdoesnotneedto


16/27

16

testifyregardingprobablecausation,butcansimplyofferalternative

explanationstoattackPlaintiffstheoryofcausation.

Asadefense

rebuttal

witness,

Kim

does

not

have

to

testify

that

the

other

possibleexplanationsweretheprobablecausethatKazaaandthesound

recordingsatissueappearedtobeonDefendantscomputer. See,e.g.,Allenv.

BrownClinic,P.L.L.P.,531F.3d568,57475(8thCir.2008)(holdingthatdefense

expertcouldtestifyastootherpossible,butnotnecessarilyprobable,causesof

plaintiffsinjury,because,torequiremorewouldundulytieadefendants

handsinrebuttingaplaintiffscase,whereashere,plaintiffsexperttestifiesthat

noothercausecouldhavecausedplaintiffsinjury,andwouldimpermissibly

shifttheburdenofproofandrequireadefendanttodisproveaplaintiffstheory

byapreponderance

of

the

evidence)

(citation

omitted).

Because

Kim

is

offered

onlyasarebuttalexpert,andonlyopinesregardingpossibilitiesinhisreport,his

testimonymustbelimitedsuchthatremarksaremadeinrebuttalofPlaintiffs

expertandarenotdonetoestablishacause. Morrisonv.Stephenson,No.

2:06

CV

283,

2008

WL

618778,

at

*4

(S.D.

Ohio

Mar.

3,

2008).

Therefore,Kimcantestifyregardingthepossiblescenariosthatcanoccur

onapeertopeernetworkthatwouldresultintheincorrectuserbeingidentified


17/27

17

byMediaSentry. Kimcannotopineregardingcausationorwhathethinks

probablyoccurredinthiscase.

Plaintiffsnote

fourteen

particular

instances

of

Kims

testimony

that

they

allegeareunsupportedandobjectionable. BecauseKimstestimonyislimitedto

rebuttalandheisnotpermittedtotestifyastocausation,theCourtrejectsmost

ofPlaintiffsargumentsregardingadmissibility. Theallegedlackoffactualbasis

formanyofKimsopinionsgoestocredibilityandprovidesgroundforcross

examination. However,theCourtdoesholdthatKimcannottestifybasedpurely

onspeculationorwhen,beyondlackingevidencetosupporthistheory,the

recordonlycontainsevidencethatmakeshistheoryimpossible,and,thus,

unhelpfultothejury. SeeMarmov.TysonFreshMeats,Inc.,457F.3d748,757

(8thCir.

2006)

(Expert

testimony

is

inadmissible

if

it

is

speculative,

unsupported

bysufficientfacts,orcontrarytothefactsofthecase.)(citationomitted).

Therefore,giventheevidencethatthereisnowirelessrouterinvolvedin

thiscase,theCourtexcludesKimsopinionthatitispossiblethatsomeonecould

have

spoofed

or

hijacked

Defendants

Internet

account

through

an

unprotected

wirelessaccesspoint. Similarly,becauseKimexplicitlytestifiedthatthiscase

doesnotinvolveanyblackIPspace,oranytemporarilyunusedIPspace


18/27

18

(KimDep.11011),heisnotpermittedtoopineattrialthathijackingofblackIP

spaceortemporaryunusedIPisapossibleexplanationinthiscase.

In3.4

of

his

Report,

Kim

asserts

that

there

is

no

evidence

that

the

music

fileswereconsciouslyplacedintheshareddirectoryonThomasRassets

computerorwerewillfullyofferedfordistribution. Kimtestifiedthatheisnotan

expertinhumanbehaviorandthathisopinionisbasedonnothingbut

speculation. (KimDep.12728.) AlthoughtheCourtgrantsKimleewayto

testifyregardingpossibilities,speculativetestimonyisstillinadmissible. Because

Kimadmitsthathisopiniononthispointisspeculative,itisexcluded.

In4.4ofKimsreport,heopines,TheKaZaAreportedIPaddressisnot

evidencethatthemachinerunningKaZaAisnotbehindaNATdevice.

However,Kim

testified

that

he

has

no

knowledge

to

support

this

opinion.

(Kim

Dep.14143.) HeadmitsthathedidobtainafunctioningversionofKazaaand

couldhaverunittoobserveitsbehavior,butchosenotto. (KimDep.14445.)

KimadmittedlyhasnoknowledgetosupporthisopinionregardingKazaas

functioning

and

has

not,

in

fact,

observed

Kazaa

functioning

although

he

had

theopportunitytodoso. HisopinionregardingKazaasfunctioninginthis

instanceisexcludedasnotbasedonareliablescientificmethod.


19/27

19

AstoKimsotheropinions,theCourtconcludesthattheirallegedlackof

foundationorimproperfactualbasisgoestoweightnotadmissibility.

C. KimsExpertisePlaintiffsarguethat,whileKimisqualifiedincomputerscience,hehasno

experiencewiththeKazaaorKazaaLitefilesharingprogramsorwiththe

FastTrackfilesharingnetwork. HisonlyexperiencewithKazaawashisattempt

todownloadtheprogramandexaminetheinterfaceinconnectionwiththiscase.

Hedidnotattempttoruntheprogramorobserveitsbehavior. Plaintiffs

concludethat,therefore,KimisnotqualifiedtotestifyonKazaa,KazaaLite,or

FastTrack. PlaintiffsalsoarguethatKimisunqualifiedtoopineregardinghis

examinationofaforensiccopyofDefendantscomputerbecauseofhislackof

experiencein

computer

forensics.

DefendantrespondsthatKimhasconductedresearchandisanexpertin

peertopeersystemsandnetworksecurity. Kimseducationandbackgroundin

computersciencequalifyhimasanexpertingeneralcomputerscience.

Defendant

admits

that

Kim

has

little

experience

with

FastTrack,

Kazaa,

or

Kazaa

Lite,butarguesthatthisisauniversalproblembecausetherehavebeenfew

studiesdoneoftheseprogramsintheacademiccommunity,particularlybecause


20/27

20

Kazaaisproprietary. Defendantarguesthat,somehow,Plaintiffshavea

monopolyonKazaaexperts.

Kimis

qualified

in

the

general

areas

of

computer

science,

peer

to

peer

networks,andcomputersecurity. HeisnotspecificallyanexpertinKazaa,

KazaaLite,orFastTrack. Here,PlaintiffsdonotcontrolKazaa,FastTrack,or

KazaaLite. Infact,KimhadafunctioningcopyofKazaa,butchosenottotestit.

Thereisnoinstitutionalbarriertoacomputerscienceexpertbecomingexpertin

KazaawithoutworkingwithPlaintiffs.

Despitethisfact,theCourtholdsthatKimisqualifiedtotestifyinthiscase.

Heisanexpertinthegeneralfieldsofpeertopeernetworksandcomputer

security. AlthoughhehasnottestedKazaa,KazaaLite,orFastTrackfirsthand,

hehas

gained

knowledge

of

these

areas

through

his

review

of

other

academic

studies,informedbyhisgeneralexpertiseinpeertopeernetworks. Kims

failuretotestofKazaa,FastTrack,orKazaaLitegoestotheweightand

credibilityofhisopinionsandwillbegroundsforcrossexamination.

D. ApplicationofRule403PlaintiffsalsoclaimthatKimstestimonyshouldbeexcludedunder

FederalRuleofEvidence403.


21/27

21

1. Rule403StandardFederalRuleofEvidence403provides:

Althoughrelevant,

evidence

may

be

excluded

if

its

probative

value

issubstantiallyoutweighedbythedangerofunfairprejudice,

confusionoftheissues,ormisleadingthejury,orbyconsiderations

ofunduedelay,wasteoftime,orneedlesspresentationof

cumulativeevidence.

Because[e]xpertevidencecanbebothpowerfulandquitemisleading,a

trialcourtmusttakespecialcaretoweightheriskofunfairprejudiceagainstthe

probativevalueoftheevidenceunderFed.R.Evid.403. Nicholsv.Am.Natl

Ins.Co.,154F.3d875,884(8thCir.1998)(quotingDaubertv.MerrellDow

Pharm.,509U.S.579,595(1993)).

2. ApplicationtoKimsProposedTestimonyPlaintiffs

argue

that

Kims

testimony

has

almost

no

value

because

he

has

noexperienceortrainingwithKazaaortheFastTracknetworkandbecausehis

opinionsrelyonspeculativeassumptions. Theyconcludethattheprobative

valueofhistestimonyisoutweighedbythedangersofunfairprejudiceto

Plaintiffs,

of

confusing

the

issues,

and

of

misleading

the

jury.

TheCourthasrestrictedKimstestimonytoexcludeopinionsoncausation,

opinionsbasedonspeculation,andopinionsbasedonfactscompletely


22/27

22

contradictedbytherecord. Thebasisforhisremainingopinionscanbetested

throughcrossexamination. HavingweighedtheprobativevalueofKims

testimonyas

rebuttal

against

the

dangers

enumerated

in

Rule

403,

the

Court

concludesthatRule403doesnotjustifyadditionalexclusion.

III. DefendantsUnopposedMotioninLimine[DocketNo.276]AstheCourtorallyruledduringtheJune10hearing,thepartiesshallrefer

totheprevioustrialasapriorproceeding. Theresultsofthattrialshallnotbe

revealedtothejury.

IV. PlaintiffsMotioninLiminetoPrecludeDefendantfromRaisingorAssertingEvidenceofOtherLawsuits[DocketNo.279]PlaintiffsaskthattheCourtbarDefendantfromintroducingevidence

regardingothercopyrightlawsuitsinvolvingPlaintiffs. AstheCourtexplained

duringJune10hearing,itwillreserverulingonthismotionbecausethetypeof

evidencethatDefendantwillbepermittedtoofferwilldependupontheevidence

andargumentsofferedbyPlaintiffs. AllpartiesarewarnedtoabidebytheRules

ofEvidenceandCivilProcedureduringtrial.

V. PlaintiffsMotioninLiminetoPrecludeFairUseDefense[DocketNo.283]

PlaintiffsaskthatDefendantbebarredfromassertingthefairusedefense


23/27

23

becauseshefailedtoassertthisaffirmativedefenseuntiltwoweeksbeforetrial

andhaswaivedthedefense.

Fairuse

is

an

affirmative

defense.

Campbell

v.

Acuff

Rose

Music,

Inc.,

510

U.S.569,590(1994)(Sincefairuseisanaffirmativedefense,itsproponentwould

havedifficultycarryingtheburdenofdemonstratingfairusewithoutfavorable

evidenceaboutrelevantmarkets.)(footnotesomitted);Harper&RowPublrs,

Inc.v.NationEnters.,471U.S.539,561(1985)(Thedraftersresistedpressures

fromspecialinterestgroupstocreatepresumptivecategoriesoffairuse,but

structuredtheprovisionasanaffirmativedefenserequiringacasebycase

analysis.)(citationsomitted).

DefendantsrelianceuponSonyCorp.ofAmericav.UniversalCity

Studios,Inc.,

is

misplaced.

464

U.S.

417

(1984).

In

Sony,

the

Supreme

Court

did

notholdthatfairuseisnolongeranaffirmativedefenseinnoncommercial

cases. Moreover,bothCampbellandHarper&Rowweredecidedafterand

bothcitedtoSonyandbothexplicitlyprovidedthatfairuseisanaffirmative

defense.

The

Supreme

Court

has

explicitly

rejected

any

fair

use

presumption

basedoncommercialornoncommercialuse. SeeCampbell,510U.S.at584

(discussingSonyandholding:Thelanguageofthestatutemakesclearthatthe


24/27

24

commercialornonprofiteducationalpurposeofaworkisonlyoneelementof

thefirstfactorenquiryintoitspurposeandcharacter. ... Asweexplainedin

Harper&

Row,

Congress

resisted

attempts

to

narrow

the

ambit

of

this

traditional

enquirybyadoptingcategoriesofpresumptivelyfairuse,anditurgedcourtsto

preservethebreadthoftheirtraditionallyampleviewoftheuniverseofrelevant

evidence.)(citationsomitted).

Generally,failuretopleadanaffirmativedefenseresultsinawaiverof

thatdefense. FirstUnionNatlBankv.PictetOverseasTrustCorp.,Ltd.,477

F.3d616,622(8thCir.2007)(citationsomitted). However,[w]henanaffirmative

defenseisraisedinthetrialcourtinamannerthatdoesnotresultinunfair

surprise,...technicalfailuretocomplywithRule8(c)isnotfatal. Id.(citation

omitted).

Inthiscase,theCourtholdsthatDefendanthaswaivedtheaffirmative

defenseoffairuse. DefendantfailedtoraisethefairusedefenseinherAnswer,

atanytimebeforetheFirstTrial,duringtheFirstTrial,oratanytimeleadingup

to

this

retrial

until

only

two

weeks

before

retrial.

This

litigation

has

gone

on

for

years,yetPlaintiffshadnoinklingofthisdefenseuntiltheeveoftrial. Because

Plaintiffshadnonoticeofthisdefense,theyhavetakennodiscoveryregarding


25/27

25

Defendantsallegedfairusedefense. Therecordinthiscase,withwhichthis

Courtisintimatelyfamiliar,gavenohintthatafairusedefensewouldbe

forthcoming.

Itwould

be

highly

prejudicial

to

Plaintiffs

to

allow

Defendant

to

assertthisnewaffirmativedefenseontheeveofretrial,whentheyhaveno

opportunitytoconductdiscoveryonthisissueandlongagomissedthe

opportunitytofileadispositivemotionregardingthisaffirmativedefense. The

CourtholdsthatDefendanthaswaivedthefairusedefense. Plaintiffsmotionis

granted.

VI. PlaintiffsMotioninLiminetoPrecludeDefendantfromAssertinganInnocentInfringementDefenseatTrial[DocketNo.284]PlaintiffsasktheCourttoholdthatDefendantcannotseekareductionin

statutorydamagesunder17U.S.C.504,knownastheinnocentinfringement

defense. TheyclaimthatThomasRassethaswaivedthisdefensebynotasserting

ituntiltwoweeksbeforetrialand,inthealternative,thedefenseisbarred

becausePlaintiffsplacedpropercopyrightnoticesonpublishedcopiesoftheir

copyrightedworkstowhichThomasRassethadaccess.

AttheJune10hearing,DefendantinformedtheCourtthatshedoesnot

opposePlaintiffsmotion. Therefore,Plaintiffsmotionisgranted.


26/27

26

VII. DefendantsMotiontoDismissforLackofSubjectMatterJurisdiction[DocketNo.310]

AstheCourtorallyruledduringtheJune10hearing,DefendantsMotion

toDismissforLackofSubjectMatterJurisdictionisdeniedatthistimebecause

themotionispremature.

Accordingly,baseduponthefiles,records,andproceedingsherein,ITISHEREBYORDERED:

1. DefendantsMotiontoSuppressEvidence[DocketNo.263]is

DENIED.

2. PlaintiffsMotioninLiminetoExcludetheTestimonyofDefendants

ExpertDr.YongdaeKim[DocketNo.272]isGRANTEDINPARTandDENIEDINPARTassetforthinthisOrder.

3.

DefendantsUnopposed

Motion

in

Limine

[Docket

No.

276]

is

GRANTEDassetforthinthisOrder.

4. PlaintiffsMotioninLiminetoPrecludeDefendantfromRaisingor

AssertingEvidenceofOtherLawsuits[DocketNo.279]is

RESERVED.

5. PlaintiffsMotioninLiminetoPrecludeFairUseDefense[Docket

No.

283]

is

GRANTED.

6. PlaintiffsMotioninLiminetoPrecludeDefendantfromAsserting

anInnocentInfringementDefenseatTrial[DocketNo.284]is

GRANTED.


27/27

27

7. DefendantsMotiontoDismissforLackofSubjectMatter

Jurisdiction[DocketNo.310]isDENIEDWITHOUTPREJUDICEaspremature.

Dated: June11,2009 s/MichaelJ.Davis

MichaelJ.Davis

ChiefJudge

UnitedStatesDistrictCourt

capitol records file-sharing mil decision

Documents